Sudan

When Altayeb Alhadi was just six years old, his father died after a well collapsed in his village in White Nile state, south-central Sudan. Two months later, and his mother also died, leaving the five children in the family as orphans. As the eldest of the siblings, it was Altayeb’s responsibility to find work and help the family survive.

At 14, he travelled hundreds of kilometres from his home in Galli village to seek work in the north, where gold mines dot the landscape, so he could feed his siblings and keep them in school.

“We warned him about the dangers, but he was ambitious. Some relatives were already working in the area although they had found jobs in restaurants and other services rather than underground extraction,” Ayateb’s uncle Alhadi Hamid told Al Jazeera.

The boy initially worked in transport and other jobs, but when he heard lucrative stories from miners in the area, he began to search for gold in the surrounding mountains.

Altayeb died in an air strike attributed to the Egyptian military at a gold-mining site near Jabal Al-Aigdat in Sudan’s Red Sea region on October 10, which killed at least 72 miners, a few months after he began working at the site.

“It was less than 30 minutes since we separated, and he said he was going to the mine. We suddenly heard a loud sound of bombardment, and we ran. It was too chaotic with people running in all directions and many attacks taking place within a few minutes,” a fellow miner told Al Jazeera, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“We found Altayeb with his hand and leg [blown off] and a severe injury to his abdomen [which] was open. We tried to help him and took him to a safer place near a mountain. We were terrified. He died within hours. … We couldn’t believe how quickly things could happen.”

Altayeb worked alongside about 15 young men and children, using basic tools to extract gold from the rocks. The miners worked night and day, taking the material they gathered to nearby mills for processing.

Proceeds from any gold found were shared, but earnings depended on the amount of gold recovered and individual agreements. On productive days, the group could earn more than $100, the miner said.

“We used to dig for two to three weeks until we found a gram or less. If the gold percentage in the well wasn’t good, we would change locations. When we found a gram or less, we sold it and shared the profit, which was about $100,” Altayeb’s former colleague said.

For young people supporting relatives, even irregular earnings in these dangerous gold mines can seem preferable to unemployment.

Altayeb told his siblings 10 days before his death that he would soon return home, his sister Rogaia Alhadi told local media.

Friends told the family that Altayeb visited them at a restaurant near the mining site on the morning of the attack, his uncle said. They shared a cup of tea before heading towards the mine for the final time. Minutes later, the air strike hit the area.

Authorities in Egypt have accused Sudanese miners of crossing its border and reportedly linked some to gold smuggling, drugs and human trafficking. The Sudanese side did not respond to these allegations.

Since a civil war between Sudan’s military and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group broke out in 2023, the economy has tanked and forced thousands with no other source of income to find work in the artisanal gold mines of northern Sudan.

This can vary from independent prospecting to working in investor-owned pits for a share of the proceeds. Earnings depend on the amount of gold found, equipment and fuel costs, and profit percentages agreed with financiers.

Although some miners strike gold, they still face an array of dangers, ranging from collapsing shafts and unstable ground to air strikes. Limited medical care makes mining, particularly in remote areas, especially hazardous.

Living conditions are also extremely hard. Mohamed Awadalkarim, who was a miner in River Nile state for 10 years, said workers often shelter in makeshift huts made from burlap sacks and plastic sheeting. Their diet consists mainly of lentils and sorghum porridge.

But for families without reliable incomes, mining offers a possible source of immediate earnings. Miners may spend hours searching for gold and not find enough to cover their expenses. Others share proceeds with investors or equipment owners, leaving them with limited money left.

Artisanal and small-scale mining accounted for 53.71 tonnes, or about 83 per cent, of Sudan’s declared gold production in 2024, but this was just in areas under government control, according to research by the Chatham House think tank. About one million people were involved in artisanal mining across Sudan’s 18 states, generating $1bn annually for the country.

Artisanal mines, while generally viewed as being outside the main war-funding networks, have still been exposed to violence.

On June 16, several people were reportedly killed and injured in attacks on mining sites near the Egyptian border, according to local sources and miners.

The repeated air strikes near Sudan’s border with Egypt have raised concerns about civilian protection, territorial sovereignty and accountability.

Egyptian authorities have accused Sudanese prospectors of crossing the border to mine near a concession managed by an Egyptian company, but there is little independent evidence to back these claims.

Sudanese military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan reportedly ordered a fact-finding committee involving prosecutors, judicial representatives and security agencies to investigate the attack. Findings from an inquiry into a similar incident announced in June have not been made public.

Altayeb paid the highest price in this regional conflict and the hunt for gold, which provides huge profits for some and meagre incomes for many.

Altayeb’s siblings are now living with their extended family, including uncles, aunts and cousins. People who know them are trying to help his brothers and sisters and are carrying out community initiatives in Galli to keep his memory alive.

“We will raise the children and care for them as he would have wanted. He was young, caring and brave, and he will always be remembered,” Altayeb said.

MIAMI — More than 100,000 people from Ukraine and Sudan can stay in the United States without immediate risk of deportation, the Department of Homeland Security said, in what amounts to a temporary reprieve after their right to stay in the country was set to expire Monday.

Temporary Protected Status was set to end Oct. 19 for about 101,000 Ukrainians and 1,800 Sudanese. But DHS said an announcement “will be made at the appropriate time.” Until then, the department said in a written statement, Ukrainians and Sudanese in the U.S. covered by those temporary measures “retain protection.” The Department did not indicate how long they could stay or when a final announcement would be made on their status.

DHS did not respond to a question about whether they can keep their work permits, but TPS generally allows people to work while their protections remain in effect.

The decision Monday marks another incident where the Trump administration, which has previously sought to end these temporary protections from deportation and send people back to their home countries, has allowed people covered by the temporary status to stay in the country but without giving any guidance as to how long.

The context of the decisions to keep the protections

The Trump administration has already terminated TPS for more than 1 million people from 13 countries, including Venezuela, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Syria.

But in a change in practice roughly a month ago, the administration kept protections in place for nearly 200,000 Salvadorans whose TPS was set to expire Sept. 9. In that case they also said that they were going to make a decision at the appropriate time and that in the meantime, people from El Salvador could continue to work and live in the U.S.

Activists and a bipartisan group of lawmakers have been raising the alarm over the upcoming deadline for TPS to expire for Ukrainians, arguing that conditions remain unsafe for them to return home amid the war with Russia.

Ukraine was first designated for TPS in April 2022, following Russia’s full-scale invasion two months earlier. The Biden administration subsequently extended the designation, most recently in January 2025, when DHS authorized an additional 18 months of protection through October 2026.

The TPS program for Sudan was established in 1997, and since then, successive U.S. administrations have extended it due to the armed conflict and political instability that have plagued the African nation.

The decision Monday comes two weeks before the Nov. 3 midterm elections, when Trump’s hard line immigration policies will face a test at the ballot box.

The TPS program has offered protections for decades but is controversial

The U.S. Congress created TPS in 1990 to prevent deportations to countries suffering from natural disasters or civil strife.

It allows people already in the country to remain and work, for renewable periods if the homeland security secretary determines conditions are unsafe for their return. But it doesn’t give them a pathway to permanent residency.

Supporters say that using this tool protects people from being returned to dangerous situations and that uprooting people covered by TPS after years of living in the U.S. is cruel. Critics, especially in the Trump administration, say successive administrations have extended these protections for years regardless of what has happened in the home countries.

Federal rules say TPS is automatically extended for six months if the secretary doesn’t make a determination at least 60 days before the designation expires.

Advocates are grateful for DHS decision, warn about the war

“We’re grateful for an extension, however temporary, for TPS holders from Ukraine and Sudan,” said Myal Greene, president and CEO of World Relief, an organization that has provided humanitarian assistance in both countries. “We encourage the administration and Congress to consider longer term relief for women, men and children trying to carve out stability while their countries of origin remain in upheaval.”

Krish O’Mara Vignarajah, president and CEO of Global Refuge, noted Ukraine and Sudan are not safe and meet the legal conditions for TPS to be extended.

“Russia’s war on Ukraine is nearing its fifth year, and Ukrainians are bracing for another winter under drone and missile strikes, driving civilian casualties and devastating critical infrastructure. Sudan remains locked in a brutal civil war marked by famine, widespread human rights abuses and the hallmarks of genocide,” Vignarajah said. “It is not safe for these families to go home.”

Salomon writes for the Associated Press. AP reporter Rebecca Santana contributed to this report from Washington.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has unveiled an updated national security doctrine and displayed a map of rival regional alignments, signalling a security approach that prioritises preemptive military action, the expansion of buffer zones, and the pursuit of new regional partnerships.

The document was developed with the assistance of Israel’s National Security Council and published by the Prime Minister’s Office on Sunday, just nine days before Israel’s parliamentary elections that could spell the end of Netanyahu’s time in office. It outlines a formal policy of preventing perceived threats through military action rather than containment – a policy that has already been seen in action over the past few years, as Israel pursues multiple wars and attacks on its neighbours.

Electoral survival strategy

The timing of the map’s release carries particular political significance, with Netanyahu fighting to retain power amid criticism of his conduct in power, the ongoing corruption trial he faces and his handling of the October 7, 2023, attacks, as well as the wars that followed.

As the October 27 election day draws closer, Netanyahu is attempting to bolster his credentials as Israel’s ‘Mr Security’, hoping to get the votes of Israelis who may not like some of his other policies or behaviour, but still view him as the most likely leader to defend the country.

Netanyahu, who did get the endorsement of US President Donald Trump on Sunday, said during the briefing that Israel could face the possibility of a far less supportive administration in Washington in two years, after the end of the Trump presidency.

“In two years, a president… who is extremely hostile to Israel could come to power [in the United States],” Netanyahu warned.

He therefore argued that Israel must “expand our network of alliances and develop capabilities that make us a valuable asset” to other countries as a way of protecting itself if US policy towards it changed.

The comments, according to analysts, suggest that Netanyahu is seeking to portray his leadership as essential to navigating both Israel’s regional military challenges and its diplomatic isolation, all while keeping a fearful electorate reassured.

Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, explained that the strategic presentation centred on competing regional blocs and buffer zones.

That framework “incubates and nurtures existential fears, which would lead Israeli voters to feel the need for a decisive leader”, Hage Ali noted.

In his assessment, Netanyahu stands to benefit from the Israeli public’s fear of regional threats by presenting himself as a familiar leader capable of managing them, making him “the devil you know”, as the analyst put it, to voters reluctant to embrace political change at a sensitive time.

Netanyahu’s political opponents have been quick to push back against that narrative.

Gadi Eisenkot, one of the prime minister’s main challengers in the upcoming election, said that the published doctrine was “two hollow pages, full of slogans that have nothing to do with a security concept”.

Another, former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, described the document as “superficial”.

Expanding security zones

The map displayed during Netanyahu’s briefing was originally published in May by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a German political foundation. It divides the Middle East and parts of Africa into competing blocs, highlighting the region’s complex network of alliances and rivalries.

Those networks include states, unrecognised entities and non-state actors.

The map identifies an Israel-United Arab Emirates alignment, described as the “Hexagon Alliance”, alongside a separate grouping of Egypt, Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – the latter three of which signed the Mecca mutual defence pact in August – labelled the “Sunni Diamond Alliance”. It also depicts Iran and its regional allies as a separate axis.

The map serves to illustrate the issues outlined in the published security doctrine, presenting a region where Israel faces multiple threats, the alliance that Israel is seeking to cultivate across the wider region, and the perceived need for “buffer zones” – the occupation of territory in other countries.

Israel’s existing illegal occupation of territory in Gaza and southern Lebanon illustrates the potential consequences of expanding the buffer zone approach.

Hage Ali warned that continuing to pursue an approach built around expanding military control could lead to “more conflict and more ethnic cleansing” under the guise of security buffers.

Embracing regional factions

A striking element of the map displayed by Netanyahu is its explicit designation of non-state actors as friendly entities.

The map highlights territories controlled by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Khalifa Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army within an alignment deemed cooperative to Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Israel views these actors as pragmatic partners or at least cooperative entities in a broader strategic grid, Hage Ali explained. However, the public association of these groups with Israel threatens to damage their domestic standing across the Arab world.

That reflects Netanyahu’s immediate priorities, where “what Israelis think matters more than the reputation of your allies and the viability of these alliances”, Hage Ali added.

The portrayal of the Middle East as a region divided into competing alliances also carries risks for Netanyahu’s broader diplomatic ambitions.

Earlier this year, Netanyahu proposed a “hexagon of alliances”, envisaging cooperation between Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and unnamed Arab, African and Asian partners, against what he described as “radical” regional alliances.

The proposed grouping has not been established as a formal alliance, and commentators in Israel and the international press have described the project as a branding exercise rather than a binding military pact, noting that countries like India prioritise non-alignment and pragmatic trade over ideologically rigid blocs.

For Tehran and its regional partners, the map also offers potent political leverage.

Hage Ali emphasised that the visual layout “will certainly help their propaganda machine”, providing Hezbollah and other Iranian allies with evidence to reinforce the narrative that Israel seeks to expand and dominate the region.

The Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) exchanged artillery and missile fire from their positions in Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri, while a UN official warned that famine is threatening the country.

Army forces bombed RSF sites in the Riyadh neighbourhood and Sports City, south of Khartoum.

From their positions east of Khartoum, the RSF launched artillery shelling, targeting army camps in the capital and the General Command.

This comes as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu, resumed its bombing of the city of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan State, after having ceased for weeks.

SPLM bombed the city with artillery and Katyusha rockets from the east and north.

In South Darfur state, about 80 people were killed over the last three days in the tribal conflict between the Beni Halba and Salamat tribes near the city of Buram. The conflict between the two tribes has broken out several times and led to the death and injury of dozens.

A UN official has warned that the ongoing conflict could mean more than six million people face the threat of famine.

The deputy head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHOA) in Sudan said that the general situation in the country is catastrophic.

READ: Sudan medics warn that cholera and dengue fever are spreading

Sudanese medical sources reported that 18 people died and 265 were infected with cholera in the state of Gedaref, bordering Ethiopia, while medics warned of an outbreak of cholera and dengue fever across the country with the start of seasonal rains and the effects of the war on the health system there.

The Sudanese Medical Association reported that 3,398 cases of dengue fever were recorded in the states of Gedaref, Red Sea, North Kordofan and Khartoum from mid-April to mid-September.

The war has forced more than 4.2 million people to flee their homes and about 1.2 million to cross into neighbouring countries.

Hasanat al-Rashid, 48, has lived with diabetes for 15 years, and the three-and-a-half-year civil war between Sudan’s military and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group has worsened her situation. Finding the treatment she needs has become a daily struggle.

When the war broke out in April 2023, she was forced to flee south from her home in Haj Yousif in Khartoum North to Umm Daw Ban in Khartoum State.

During her displacement, she went for days without medication and was forced to eat foods unsuitable for her condition, such as asida, a traditional Sudanese porridge.

She underwent operations on her foot twice when she developed complications of diabetes, including a severe infection.

She moved between hospitals in Gezira State south of Khartoum, seeking treatment in Rufaa, Wad Madani and Al-Hasahisa. When fighting spread to these areas in December 2023, she fled again, arriving in Port Sudan, a city on the Red Sea that was less affected by the war.

Her condition has worsened to the point that she now has to use insulin every day and with this comes added costs, something that forces diabetes sufferers in Sudan to choose between medicine and other essentials, such as food.

“The doses vary depending on whether my blood sugar is high or low,” she told Al Jazeera.

The war has pushed income levels in Sudan back to those last seen in the 1990s, according to the United Nations Development Programme. This means Hasanat and other diabetes sufferers are struggling to afford the medicine they need to treat the condition.

Hasanat’s doctor recommended she use an insulin pen, a device used to inject insulin under the skin. She would need one or two of the devices a month, but the cost at 70,000 Sudanese pounds ($8) is more than she can afford up front, so she opts for a vial of insulin.

This is cheaper at 17,000 Sudanese pounds ($1.80), but there is the additional cost of buying ice every day to keep the insulin cool. She spends 180,000 pounds ($20) a month on ice to preserve the medicine. But she is able to spread these costs out through the month, making the vials her only viable option even if the overall costs are higher than an insulin pen.

“It may last a month or less, but the challenge is that I don’t have a refrigerator, so I struggle to store the insulin properly,” she said.

She also needs painkillers and vitamins on a regular basis to manage complications caused by the diabetes.

The rising cost of treatment

Fatima Adam, 75, is among the patients at Port Sudan Hospital struggling to afford the medicines she needs to manage her hypertension and a thyroid condition.

She was admitted to the hospital with complications caused by high blood pressure, which has started to impact her heart. Too unwell to speak to Al Jazeera herself, her daughter, Aisha, described how the rising cost of treatment has affected her whole family.

Before the war, Fatima received medicine through the National Health Insurance Fund. She paid a quarter of the cost while the fund covered the rest. But when the war started and the economy collapsed, the medicines she needed were no longer covered by the scheme.

“My mother takes six different medicines because hypertension has affected her heart in addition to her thyroid medication. The war has made things harder because the prices of these medicines have gone up,” Aisha told Al Jazeera.

The responsibility for paying for Fatima’s treatment and supporting her and her daughter falls on her son, who works as a casual worker. With no fixed income, he goes to the market every day in search of work but sometimes returns home empty without any luck.

“Sometimes, when my brother finds work, we buy enough medicine to last a month. Other times, we have to buy smaller quantities and take the medicines intermittently,” Aisha said.

She bought a month’s supply of her mother’s medication a few days ago for 160,000 Sudanese pounds ($17.80), a substantial expense for a family whose income depends on day labour but essential to treating Fatima’s condition.

War damage

The war has caused an estimated $500m in losses to medicine stocks, infrastructure and transport fleets, dealing a major blow to Sudan’s pharmaceutical supply system, the National Medical Supplies Fund told Al Jazeera.

The National Medicines and Poisons Board estimated that only eight of the 30 pharmaceutical factories in Khartoum that shut down during the conflict have resumed operations despite the security situation in the capital recently improving.

This has increased Sudan’s reliance on imported medicines, but the subsequent depreciation of the Sudanese pound has driven up the costs of pharmaceutical procurement and production.

Hossam al-Naeem, who works as a pharmacist in Port Sudan, said customers with diabetes and hypertension require regular painkillers and vitamins to help their overall condition.

“I feel deeply saddened when I see the expressions on some patients’ faces as they ask about the prices of medicines and discover how much they have increased because of the depreciation of the Sudanese pound,” Hossam told Al Jazeera.

The currency’s collapse has created added challenges for pharmacists. Before the war, a dollar traded for roughly 600 Sudanese pounds. Now black-market currency traders are quoting rates of 9,300 pounds to the dollar, meaning higher costs for most goods in Sudan.

Sometimes Hossam incurs losses himself when he finds that the prices of drugs have risen sharply, and keeping essential medicines stocked is becoming difficult.

“I used to sell a strip of cold and flu tablets for 6,000 Sudanese pounds [70 cents]. But when I went to buy new stock, I found that the supplier’s price was also 6,000 pounds per strip. That means I made no profit, not even enough to cover the pharmacy’s operating costs,” he said.

The struggle to afford heart medication

Huda Mahmoud, 58, lives in el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state in south-central Sudan, where drone attacks and other violence remain a problem while the military is making advances towards the city.

Huda has lived with heart problems for more than 12 years and described the impacts of the war as being physical, financial and emotional.

“I take five different medicines. There was a time when they weren’t available, and I suffered a lot. Sometimes, I had to ask people in Wad Madani, Sennar or Port Sudan to send them to me,” she told Al Jazeera. “The medicines were extremely expensive, costing me 300,000 Sudanese pounds [$33.30] a month.”

Taking medication has become a carefully managed routine with each pill tied to a specific time of day.

“I’ve become tied to my pills: this one before eating, that one afterwards. If I forget one, my heart starts beating very fast,” she added.

In March, Huda was forced to travel from el-Obeid to Omdurman. Following her strict treatment regimen has become increasingly difficult during repeated periods of upheaval.

She has now returned home to el-Obeid, where her regular medicine is priced at 151,000 Sudanese pounds ($16.80) a month, something she can barely afford.

Her greatest fear is running out of medicine or being unable to afford her next supply, which would put her at risk of a blood clot.

“I’m afraid of becoming incapacitated. I used to be responsible for the whole household, but now I need help. I feel like I’ve become a burden on my family,” she said.

More than three years into the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan is desperately in need of a political settlement. The fighting has caused immense suffering, and a military solution alone cannot rebuild the state or reunify its fractured society. Under such circumstances, any effort aimed at encouraging Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue deserves serious consideration rather than outright rejection.

In August, a self-appointed committee of 19 Sudanese public figures, chaired by Ahfad University President Qasim Badri, launched an initiative to prepare the ground for national dialogue inside Sudan. Its members had earlier met SAF chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and called for legal restrictions on opposition politicians to be lifted. The authorities subsequently issued a decree to drop certain politically motivated charges against Sudanese abroad returning for dialogue and grant participants temporary legal protections. These are limited but important confidence-building measures.

The initiative has nevertheless faced strong opposition. The civilian coalition Sumoud, led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and Ta’sis, an alliance that includes the RSF, have opposed the proposed internal dialogue. They question its independence and warn that holding talks in army-controlled areas could legitimise al-Burhan’s authority and entrench the country’s divisions. These concerns are legitimate and deserve serious attention. But the committee says it is not seeking to negotiate Sudan’s future or determine the agenda of a national dialogue. Its role is to help create the conditions for Sudanese political actors to engage one another directly. The question is whether it can fulfil that role without allowing one side of the conflict to dominate the process. Dismissing the initiative before it has had an opportunity to demonstrate its value would be premature.

The country’s political actors and civil society organisations remain deeply divided, previous mediation efforts have faltered, and the war continues to make comprehensive political engagement increasingly difficult. The committee’s initiative is an attempt to break the deadlock. Efforts to prepare for political dialogue should not be postponed until the fighting stops. Securing a ceasefire and ensuring humanitarian access are urgent priorities, but preparations for political dialogue can proceed alongside efforts to achieve them.

The committee’s members were not elected, and they do not represent every political constituency. Yet the committee’s legitimacy cannot be judged solely by how it was created. It must also be judged by whether it can help bring a broader range of political actors into a national dialogue.

Good intentions alone cannot resolve concerns about credibility. Political dialogue can succeed only if participants believe the process is fair and independent. The legitimacy required to facilitate a political opening is not necessarily the same as that required to negotiate a national settlement. But even a preparatory initiative must earn the trust of those it seeks to bring together.

The committee’s meeting with al-Burhan was a practical necessity. As army chief and head of the Sovereignty Council, he was in a position to respond to the committee’s demands for legal protections. Engaging with al-Burhan does not in itself amount to an endorsement of his authority. But if the initiative becomes too closely associated with the army, other political actors may view it as an extension of al-Burhan’s political agenda rather than an independent facilitator. The committee must therefore demonstrate that its engagement extends beyond the military authorities and that it is prepared to work with political forces that oppose them.

The initiative was launched in Khartoum, which is under army control. This raises a genuine concern about whether a process beginning in territory controlled by one side of the war can attract the confidence of political forces across the country. A national dialogue cannot be confined to one geographical or political constituency. Entire regions have experienced different realities of war, governance, displacement and insecurity. The committee must find ways to reach those living outside army-controlled areas, including Sudanese displaced by the fighting, and ensure they can participate freely and without intimidation.

Sumoud and Ta’sis’s decision to reject the initiative does not automatically invalidate the process. Their concerns deserve consideration, but outright rejection at this early stage risks closing off an opportunity for political engagement. At the same time, their absence matters. Sudan’s crisis is too deep and complex to be addressed by any single political current. The committee cannot expect every stakeholder to endorse its initiative immediately, but it must create conditions that persuade reluctant actors to participate. If it fails to do so, the initiative itself will have failed.

The African Union Commission and the Arab League have also welcomed the initiative, providing an important measure of regional support. Their endorsement lends weight to the effort to revive Sudanese-led political dialogue, although external backing cannot substitute for the confidence of Sudan’s own political forces.

The committee’s initiative should therefore be judged without excessive optimism or automatic suspicion. The legal measures announced following its engagement with al-Burhan are an encouraging first step, but the real test lies ahead. Does it help remove legal and political obstacles facing opposition actors in practice, not just on paper? Can it win the confidence of those who have rejected it? Can it ensure that Sudanese across the country’s political and geographical divides have an opportunity to participate freely?

What is clear, however, is that Sudan’s crisis will ultimately require Sudanese actors with profoundly different visions of the country’s future to sit together and engage one another politically. No committee can do that on their behalf. No external actor can do it for them. At best, a preparatory initiative can help create the conditions under which such engagement becomes possible. The concerns raised by its critics should not be dismissed, but neither should they be grounds for rejecting the initiative before it has had an opportunity to address them. Those who have rejected it should remain open to reconsidering their position if the committee demonstrates that it can build an independent and inclusive process. If it succeeds, it will have rendered an important national service.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – As renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa, public backing by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of Ethiopia’s federal government and Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy are drawing scrutiny.

Both Gulf powers have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, but their roles differ. The UAE has publicly backed Ethiopia’s government while Saudi Arabia has previously helped broker an Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and was reported to have offered to mediate between the two countries in 2025.

The renewed fighting threatens to unravel the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended a war between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan forces. As tensions with Eritrea add to the risks of a wider confrontation, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh offer a window into the interests of external powers in the crisis.

The UAE: Clear alignment, unproven leverage

On September 25, the UAE condemned attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray and the escalation in the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara.

Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE minister of state, expressed solidarity with Ethiopia’s government and people, reaffirmed support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement.

The statement made Abu Dhabi’s public position clear: It backs Ethiopia’s federal government while calling for de-escalation and dialogue. It did not establish whether the UAE was providing military assistance or had secured commitments from the parties to end the fighting.

The UAE also has commercial interests across the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) operates Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 connects the port with Jebel Ali in the UAE, providing an additional corridor for cargo serving inland destinations, such as Ethiopia. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade.

These commercial links help explain Abu Dhabi’s interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa. However, they do not establish that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de-escalate or change Ethiopia’s military calculations.

The extent to which Abu Dhabi can use its relationship with the federal government to encourage a political response to the conflict remains unclear.

Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic experience, uncertain engagement

Saudi Arabia has yet to publicly announce its position on the latest fighting in Tigray.

The kingdom has not publicly commented on the renewed war, according to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, although it undertook diplomatic efforts earlier this year to reduce tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF.

Saudi Arabia has previously sought to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that sources said Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two countries amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security.

A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank said previous Saudi mediation efforts had failed, partly because negotiations did not address Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.

The kingdom’s broader regional alignment also matters. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as backing Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

This is an assessment of regional alignment, however, not evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly providing military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting.

Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in Red Sea security, a vital corridor for international shipping and its own oil exports. Whether Riyadh will take a more public diplomatic role as tensions escalate remains unclear.

Egypt’s rivalry with Ethiopia adds to regional tensions

Egypt’s role in the crisis is shaped by its longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its growing ties with Eritrea.

Cairo has also stressed that responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with countries bordering the waterway, a position shared by Asmara. The issue has added to regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks reliable access to the sea.

In September, Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

His remarks, reported by Al Jazeera on September 28, did not provide evidence substantiating the accusation. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, subsequently reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference, rejecting suggestions that it had departed from those principles.

He did not directly address the specific allegation of Egyptian support for the TPLF.

Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea has nevertheless become an important part of the regional picture. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026.

According to Egypt’s presidency, the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security.

The two leaders also stressed the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting highlighted closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but did not establish that either country was involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.

For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

Its relations with Eritrea and its disagreements with Addis Ababa form part of the wider regional context, but they are not evidence of direct Egyptian involvement in the renewed conflict. Whether these regional relationships will affect the course of the fighting remains uncertain.

From Tigray to a wider regional crisis

The risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable access to the sea is a national priority while Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups. Eritrea denies the allegations and has called on the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The allegations remain contested, but deteriorating relations have raised the stakes of renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.

A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, complicate humanitarian access and disrupt regional trade and security. It would also test whether external partners could encourage restraint without appearing to endorse either side’s military objectives.

The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could provide a channel for diplomatic engagement while Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy offers a possible opening for renewed talks. However, the available public evidence does not establish that either country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

Influence must be measured by outcomes

The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be cast as pursuing opposing strategies simply because one has publicly backed Ethiopia’s federal government while the other’s current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not show that either has decisive influence over the fighting.

Their contribution should be assessed by whether they can help secure concrete steps towards de-escalation, renewed political dialogue and a reduction in tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic achievements may create opportunities for engagement, but they are not substitutes for progress on the ground.

The Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, yet renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of sustaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A durable settlement will depend primarily on the parties themselves. External partners could contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations.

For now, the UAE’s public alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic record offer different potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can turn those relationships into a meaningful contribution towards de-escalation remains unresolved.

Government security forces regain control of Rumbek town after outsiders attempted to take control of the area.

Intercommunal clashes have killed 71 people in South Sudan’s town of Rumbek, in Lakes State, the caretaker government said in a statement.

“According to initial security reports, approximately 71 people were reportedly killed,” including four soldiers, the South Sudanese interim Ministry of Information said in a statement on Friday. The exact number of fatalities has yet to be verified.

According to AFP, witnesses said a group of people from outside Rumbek tried to take control of the town and briefly succeeded. The attackers withdrew when police and military reinforcements arrived. Two witnesses said the fighting moved outside the city limits.

The government statement said, “Rumbek town is currently under the control of Government security forces, and efforts are ongoing to restore normalcy”.

The caretaker government strongly condemned the violence and urged all communities to “exercise maximum restraint and refrain from acts of retaliation that could further escalate tensions”.

Interim government

On September 22, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir dissolved the transitional government, three months before the country’s first election since its independence in 2011. Kiir appointed a caretaker administration as the country prepares for its first-ever national elections.

His decree ended a power-sharing arrangement set up under a 2018 peace deal that halted a five-year civil war in which about 400,000 people were killed.

Intercommunal conflict has continued across South Sudan, resulting in multiple deadly clashes.

On September 17, 26 people were killed, and 82 were injured during days of fighting in a disputed region on the border between South Sudan and Sudan.

In early March, intercommunal violence left at least 169 people dead after dozens of armed men attacked a town.

At least 10 civilians were killed in West Kordofan and 5,500 displaced in Blue Nile as clashes widened on Tuesday.

Sudan’s military chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has promised to seize “every inch” of territory under the control of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), rejecting negotiations to end three and a half years of war.

Al-Burhan made the comments on Tuesday while addressing a gathering in Village 5, located in the northern Sudanese locality of Merowe, according to the Sudan News Agency.

He said the “military option” would continue until the RSF was removed from Sudan.

The Sudanese army and the RSF have been fighting since April 2023 after leaders of the groups fell out over plans to integrate the paramilitary force into Sudan’s army. The conflict has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced around 13 million, according to UN and international estimates.

Al-Burhan’s pledge to continue fighting came as 10 civilians were killed and several others were wounded in an attack by the RSF in Sudan’s West Kordofan state, according to a local charity group.

In a statement, the Dar Hamar Emergency Committee accused the RSF of multiple violations against civilians in Abu Ajal village in the southeastern countryside of En Nahud.

The RSF has been massing in West Kordofan as Sudan’s army advances towards the cities of En Nahud and Al Khuway after gains in neighbouring North Kordofan.

In Sudan’s Blue Nile state, more than 5,500 people were displaced from villages over three days amid deteriorating security, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said on Tuesday.

Meanwhile, an envoy of US President Donald Trump said Sudanese parties must take the lead in talks to end the war.

In a post on X on Monday, Massad Boulos, the US senior adviser for Arab and African affairs, said peace could be achieved “through an inclusive Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led national dialogue, transition toward a civilian-led government”.

The US State Department said last month that neither the Sudanese Armed Forces, the RSF, nor their respective leaders “represent legitimate, constitutional governance for Sudan”.

Eritrea has cut off diplomatic relations with neighbouring Ethiopia, escalating a long-simmering conflict between the two states rooted in territorial disputes and mutual accusations of interference.

The move comes as fighting flares in northern Ethiopia between Ethiopian federal troops and an opposition alliance that Addis Ababa accuses Eritrea of backing.

The clashes are the most severe in Ethiopia since its 2020-2022 civil war that killed hundreds of thousands of people.

But this time, the ripple effects could go further, potentially fuelling broader unrest in a region already plagued by numerous interrelated conflicts, analysts warn.

Here’s what we know about the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the latest fighting in northern Ethiopia and what it could mean for the region at large:

Why did Eritrea break off ties with Ethiopia?

Eritrea announced it was severing ties with Ethiopia on Thursday, after Addis Ababa announced it would close its embassy in Asmara and expel 10 Eritrean diplomats.

In a statement, Eritrea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Ethiopia’s actions had left it with “no option but to reciprocate in kind and sever all diplomatic ties with Ethiopia”.

The Eritrean ministry accused Ethiopia of pursuing a years-long “agenda of incessant hostility”, including by infringing on its coastal areas and arming fighters opposed to Ethiopia’s government.

Ethiopia has likewise accused Eritrea of backing armed groups opposed to its government. Both sides have rejected the other’s accusations.

The diplomatic breakdown follows months of worsening relations, driven largely by disputes over landlocked Ethiopia’s push for access to the Red Sea and allegations that Eritrea is backing the rebel Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which leads the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, a rebel alliance fighting for control of parts of northern Ethiopia.

Have Ethiopia’s ties with Egypt and Sudan been hit, too?

Yes. Ethiopia accuses Egypt and Sudan of joining Eritrea in backing Tigrayan rebel forces, worsening already strained ties with both countries.

Ethiopia has long been at odds with Egypt over the status of Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project, which Cairo views as a risk to its water security and share of the Nile.

Ethiopia and Egypt have also expelled diplomats. Cairo ordered an Ethiopian diplomat to leave the country on Thursday, after Addis Ababa earlier kicked out an Egyptian diplomat, Egyptian state-linked media reported.

Egyptian state-linked broadcaster Al-Qahera News quoted an Egyptian official as calling Ethiopia’s move to expel the Egyptian diplomat as “regrettable and unjustified” and saying that Cairo responded in line with “the principle of reciprocity”.

The latest conflict also has implications for Sudan, whose military-backed government accuses Ethiopia of backing rebel forces it is fighting in its own civil conflict. Ethiopia rejects those allegations.

“The conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan have become more interconnected, with the Ethiopian government and Sudanese Armed Forces accusing each other of harbouring and equipping respective opposition forces from inside their own borders,” Ahmed Soliman, senior research fellow at the Chatham House think tank’s Africa programme, told Al Jazeera.  “Egypt has also been drawn into the escalation with its long-running enmity with Ethiopia over the Nile.”

What is happening in northern Ethiopia?

Tigrayan-led rebel forces have engaged in clashes with Ethiopian government-backed forces in the country’s north since last week. Fighting is concentrated in three regions: Tigray, Amhara and Afar.

Al Jazeera’s bureau chief in Ethiopia, Mohammed Taha Tawakel, reported that forces loyal to the federal government have made significant gains in the Tigray region, taking control of several towns and closing in on the regional capital, Mekelle.

Further east in Afar, a pro-government armed group claimed on Thursday to have recaptured the town of Erebti, which rebel forces had taken control of earlier in the week. The pro-government group thanked the Ethiopian military for its “magnificent air support” and said it would pursue further advances.

Despite the pro-government advances, Tawakel reported that rebel forces still maintain what he described as a “strong rear link with Eritrea” along the countries’ border.

He also reported growing fears that fighting could move into major urban centres of Tigray, such as Adwa, Axum, Shire and Mekelle. Some people have already begun fleeing to Amhara and Afar, he added.

Outside northern Ethiopia, the conflict appeared to spill into the capital, Addis Ababa, for the first time early on Thursday, as an explosion was reported at the Ministry of Defence.

AFP quoted a diplomatic source as saying small drones were the most probable cause of the blast.

While Ethiopia’s army has a much larger arsenal of drones, rebel forces have previously used them to target airbases and airports in various parts of the country, reported conflict monitor ACLED.

What are the roots of the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute?

Ties between the neighbours have been historically fragile. In 1962, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea. An armed independence struggle, led by Eritrea’s current President Isaias Afwerki, secured independence in 1993. The countries fought another border war from 1998 to 2000.

When Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, he moved to end the tensions and normalise diplomatic relations with Eritrea. During Ethiopia’s last civil war in 2020-2022, Eritrea even backed Ethiopia’s government against the TPLF.

But Abiy’s ambitions to seek direct sea access for landlocked Ethiopia have contributed to recent tensions, say analysts. Abiy has repeated that Ethiopia has a right to sea access, words that officials in Asmara take as a declaration of territorial conflict with Eritrea.

Could the current conflict spread in the region?

Many analysts fear it could.

Laura Hammond, professor in development studies at SOAS University of London, told Al Jazeera this scenario is already under way.

“The risks that conflict will spread to other countries, or that neighbours in the region will be brought into the present conflict are already playing out in terms of Eritrea’s support for the TPLF and the Alliance for Survival,” said Hammond.

“There is a strong possibility that Eritrea will become more involved in the conflict on the ground inside Tigray if it continues much longer,” she continued. “There is also a risk that the conflict could inflame relations with and inside Sudan.”

Martin Plaut, an analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa, also said there was a “real danger” of the conflict spreading.

“The situation is extremely tense and it would only require a spark to ignite a conflagration that could engulf [Ethiopia and Eritrea], as well as neighbouring Sudan,” he told Al Jazeera.

Fighting in Sudan’s Kordofan region has intensified since late 2025, turning it into one of the main battlegrounds in the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), now in its fourth year.

The vast region, which comprises North, West and South Kordofan states, lies where the two sides’ areas of control meet, between the army-held central region and the RSF-controlled Darfur in the West. In recent months, the SAF has pushed the RSF out of much of North Kordofan.

The battle is increasingly being fought from the air. Drone strikes on towns in North Kordofan are growing more frequent and deadly, and civilian infrastructure has been hit across the region.

Since the war began in April 2023, one in five recorded attacks in Sudan has taken place in Kordofan.

Al Jazeera maps where the fighting is concentrated in Kordofan and across Sudan, and the displacement that has followed.

Who controls what on the ground?

Sudan is broadly divided between the two sides. The SAF controls the capital, Khartoum, and most of the north, east and centre, while the RSF controls the west, including almost all of Darfur and parts of Kordofan. Smaller armed groups, including the RSF-allied Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), hold pockets of territory in the south.

The army has the upper hand in the north, the RSF in the west, and South Kordofan remains contested.

Where have most attacks occurred?

According to an Al Jazeera analysis of data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), an independent conflict monitor, there were 14,648 recorded attacks between the start of the war on April 15, 2023, and September 19, 2026.

The four most affected states include:

• Khartoum: The capital region has seen the most, with 5,719 attacks, or 39 percent of the total, almost three times as many as North Darfur, the second-highest
• North Darfur has witnessed 1,999 attacks (13.7 percent)
• Gezira state has seen 1,435 attacks (9.8 percent)
• Kordofan emerged as a major centre for fighting. North, South and West Kordofan together recorded 2,876 attacks, or about 19.7 percent of all recorded attacks, putting the region behind only Khartoum when considered collectively.

Who has carried out the most attacks?

The SAF is associated with the largest share of recorded attacks between April 15, 2023 and September 19, 2026, accounting for just over half (52 percent), compared with just over a third (34.7 percent) for the RSF and 13.3 percent for other actors.

The balance of attacks has shifted over time. The SAF was associated with more recorded attacks than the RSF in the first year and a half of the war, before the RSF overtook it in number of attacks from late 2024 to mid-2025.

Since August 2025, the two sides’ monthly attack counts have been closer, with the SAF generally recording slightly more, even as the overall number of attacks has fallen sharply.

Where have attacks in Kordofan occurred?

After the fall of el-Fasher, the last major Darfur city held by the army and its allies, in October 2025, attention shifted to Kordofan. The region sits between RSF-held Darfur and the army-held centre, north and east, forming a corridor between the two sides’ heartlands.

Kordofan’s three states recorded 2,717 attacks: North Kordofan had 1,205 (44 percent), South Kordofan 789 and West Kordofan 723. Adding Abyei, a disputed oil-rich area on the Sudan-South Sudan border that was historically part of Kordofan, brings the total to 2,878.

The concentration of attacks differs from state to state. In North Kordofan, Sheikan locality alone accounted for 497 attacks, or 41 percent of the state’s total. Sheikan is home to the state capital, el-Obeid, a commercial and administrative hub linking central Sudan with the west. Taking the city would open a route east towards Khartoum for the RSF.

On September 9, a drone strike on a college in el-Obeid tore the roof off the building and killed a security guard, the college’s dean, Abdel Aziz al-Sheikh, told Reuters.

“As you can see, the entire faculty is destroyed and we feel that our dreams are destroyed, ⁠our future is destroyed,” Omnia Aboul Gassim, a student who had sat her exams at the el-Obeid college just one day before the attack, told Reuters.

In South Kordofan, Dilling locality was the main hotspot, with 242 attacks (31 percent), followed by Kadugli with 107 (14 percent) and Al Quoz with 94 (12 percent).

Attacks in West Kordofan were spread more evenly across localities. Babnusa recorded the most, with 142, followed by En Nuhud (119), Al Khiwai (112) and Abu Zabad (111).

ACLED has recorded at least 12,314 reported fatalities in Kordofan since April 2023.

The SAF was associated with 1,323 attacks (46 percent) across all three states in Kordofan, compared with 920 (32 percent) for the RSF and 633 (22 percent) for other actors.

How many people are displaced?

About 8.6 million people remain internally displaced across Sudan, according to the latest United Nations figures, down from a peak of 11.6 million in January 2025 as millions returned home to areas retaken by the army. New displacement continues in Kordofan, Darfur and Blue Nile.

Darfur hosts the largest concentrations of internally displaced people (IDPs), particularly South and North Darfur.

Returns have steadily increased since 2025, reaching about 5.1 million by August 2026. Khartoum has seen a major return of displaced people, with about 2.7 million returnees.

Despite the decline, millions remain displaced more than three years into the war. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) says the number of people newly displaced in Kordofan since fighting escalated in October 2025 has risen 65 percent in four months, from more than 132,000 in February to at least 219,000 by late June.

The agency has warned that el-Obeid, which shelters about 500,000 people, including more than 83,000 displaced, faces a looming threat of a full-scale invasion.

“The warning signs are impossible to ignore,” said IOM Director General Amy Pope earlier this month. “Across Sudan, families are fleeing violence, losing access to water, electricity and healthcare, and now facing the added burden of destructive floods.”

As renewed fighting spreads across northern Ethiopia, the government has accused Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of backing armed opposition groups, raising fears that the conflict could draw in regional powers.

Over the weekend, Ethiopian army chief Birhanu Jula attributed his country’s unrest to those he called Ethiopia’s “historical and contemporary adversaries”.

Birhanu accused Eritrea of being the go-between linking these external powers – including Sudan and Egypt, which he explicitly named – with armed groups inside Ethiopia.

Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt have all rejected the accusations. Speaking to Al Jazeera, Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nader Zaki said that Egypt’s foreign policy was founded on “full respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of states, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries”.

Zaki added that Egypt “is fully committed to the rules of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and rejects any practices that would undermine regional security and stability”.

Major-General Samir Farag, the former head of the Egyptian Armed Forces’ Morale Affairs Department, also told Al Jazeera that the accusations against Egypt were false. “It has not been Egypt’s policy to interfere in the internal affairs of any state in the region,” he said.

Sudan’s military also dismissed the accusations as “baseless” and levelled its own charge of destabilising behaviour at Ethiopia, accusing it of supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces since 2023. Ethiopia has denied those allegations.

Troubled relations

Ethiopia’s relations with the countries it has accused have already been strained by other disputes that predate the latest fighting.

Relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa have remained tense as a longstanding dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) remains unresolved. Competition between the two has increasingly extended to regional security, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Sudan’s relations with Ethiopia are similarly troubled. Since the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war, Khartoum has accused Addis Ababa of providing training, supplies and the use of Ethiopian territory to the RSF.

Eritrea had fought alongside Ethiopia against rebel groups in the latter’s Tigray region during a war between 2020 and 2022, but relations between the two neighbours have since soured, with Eritrea alarmed by Ethiopia’s attempts to gain access to the Red Sea.

Against that background, some analysts and Ethiopian opposition figures say that Addis Ababa is pointing the finger at foreign conspiracies in a bid to rally support behind its national army.

Mohamed Selim, deputy chair of the Egyptian parliament’s African Affairs Committee, told Al Jazeera that he believes the accusations were an attempt to shift attention from Ethiopia’s domestic problems by creating an external enemy and seeking to unify the internal front.

Amani al-Tawil, director of the Africa Programme at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, similarly described the accusations as “an understandable attempt to escape from internal crises”.

She questioned why Egypt would choose this moment to intervene militarily in Ethiopia, given the two have been in dispute over GERD since 2011.

Al-Tawil said the breadth of the new opposition alliance in Ethiopia – seven groups representing disparate ethnic groups and regions announced the coalition last week – presented a challenge to Addis Ababa.

Spillover concerns

The renewed fighting in Ethiopia has spread across Tigray and into neighbouring Amhara and Afar.

Mohammed Hussein, the chairman of the Prosperity Party Afar Region Branch Office – the ruling party in Ethiopia’s Afar region – told Al Jazeera that the three regions together have a population of more than 38 million, according to his estimate, and include areas near the borders with Djibouti and Eritrea, raising fears of a regional war.

Ammar Arki, a writer focusing on Horn of Africa affairs, told Al Jazeera that Ethiopia had, at various stages, blamed Sudan, Egypt and Eritrea for contributing to instability inside Ethiopia.

He said the latest accusations could be interpreted as an attempt to redirect some domestic attention towards an external threat and build support around the federal government.

But Arki warned that the longer Addis Ababa continued to explain its internal crisis in terms of an “external conspiracy”, particularly if neighbouring states responded in the same way, the greater the risk that Ethiopia’s conflict could move beyond Ethiopia’s borders and become regional.

The Houston Texans’ linebacker wore eye black with the names of slain sisters Lana, 12, and Bana, eight.

American football player Azeez Al-Shaair has once again honoured Palestinian children killed by Israeli forces in Gaza, despite previous fines and the threat of being removed from games, this time wearing the names of sisters Lana and Bana Ahmad on his eye black during his latest National Football League (NFL) game.

The Houston Texans linebacker took the field against the Indianapolis Colts on Sunday wearing the names of Lana, 12, and her sister Bana, eight, who were killed along with their family in an Israeli air attack earlier this month.

Hours before the game, Al-Shaair posted about the sisters on his Instagram account and followed it with a photo of the black tape bearing their names that he would later wear during the game. The image also showed part of Al-Shaair’s black shoes with flags of Palestine and Sudan stitched on them.

Al-Shaair, a Black American Muslim player, has repeatedly spoken about the plight of Palestinians. On September 13, he wore the name of Hind Rajab, the five-year-old girl who was killed in Gaza after Israeli soldiers opened fire on her family’s stranded car on January 29, 2024.

The NFL fined him $11,491 for breaching the league’s code of conduct on players’ clothing and equipment during a match against the Buffalo Bills.

However, basketball player Kyrie Irving stepped in and offered to pay the fine for Al-Shaair, who later confirmed that he had been in touch with the nine-time NBA All-Star.

Al-Shaair brushed off talk of the fine while speaking to reporters last week. “It’s bigger to me; what’s a life worth? Is a life worth $11,000? No, I think it’s priceless,” he said.

In his subsequent game against the Cincinnati Bengals, Al-Shaair then wore an eye black — a sticker or paint frequently used by NFL players to reduce glare — with the name of Wafa Akila, an eight-year-old who was killed along with her father in an Israeli attack in western Gaza as they were making their way home.

He was also fined in January, during the NFL’s last season, for displaying the message “Stop The Genocide” on his nose tape. While it did not specifically refer to a particular conflict, it was widely understood to be about Gaza and Sudan.

Following his NFL outing in which he wore the name of Rajab, Al-Shaair was informed he would have to remove the eye black or he would not be permitted to continue playing in the game, according to reports in US media.

US Democratic politician Isaiah Martin condemned the NFL’s reported reaction to Al-Shaair wearing eye black with the names of slain Palestinian children.

“This harms no one by letting him do this,” Martin said in a post on X. “I think it’s absurd they were fining him, but those were the ‘rules’ and he agreed to pay the fine. Removal from the game is INSANE. This shouldn’t stand!”

The Israeli genocide in Gaza has severely limited education for the Strip’s 660,000 children, with 90 percent of schools left damaged or destroyed.

Israel has killed at least 21,500 children since October 7, 2023, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza.

Army chief accuses Eritrea of funding and supporting armed groups to weaken Ethiopia.

Ethiopia’s federal military has said it is handling rising tensions in the country’s north with restraint, as fears grow that Ethiopia could be heading towards another civil war.

In his first comments on the recent military developments, Army Chief of Staff Field Marshal Berhanu Jula said the army was responding to what he called provocations from the Tigray front with “wisdom and restraint”.

He accused Eritrea of funding and supporting armed groups to weaken Ethiopia, describing the “Tsimdo” alliance as an extension of a longstanding pattern of hostile alliances, which he said cannot confront the state without outside backing.

Eritrea, wary that landlocked Ethiopia may be seeking to invade it to gain access to the Red Sea, denied the accusations.

The fighting has spread from Tigray into neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions after seven armed groups announced an alliance, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, committed to removing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government.

In Afar, the latest battles have taken place around Abala, where the military has been trying to prevent rebels from seizing control.

Separately, in North Wollo, a zone of Amhara bordering Tigray, the army said on Thursday it had killed 272 Tigrayan fighters and wounded 260 in a counter-offensive, reporting heavy losses for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

The TPLF’s Tigray Army said the federal government had launched a “full-scale offensive” involving infantry, mechanised units and drones.

Abdisalam Balema, a TPLF central committee member, told Al Jazeera the situation had become a “full war”.

Fighting has also continued around Sama, Soqota and Raya Alamata, with government forces reportedly closing in on the town of Alamata.

The army command said it prefers a strategy of “strategic calm” over a large-scale military confrontation, arguing the Tigray front’s popular support is dwindling and its leadership divided.

Internet access was reportedly cut across northern Ethiopia on Friday, a day after the UN said it was alarmed by reports of drones being used against civilians there.

The renewed fighting has put the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which ended a brutal two-year civil war in Tigray, under severe strain. It comes weeks after Washington lifted sanctions on Ethiopia and Eritrea tied to atrocities from the last war, saying the “national emergency … has expired”.

It marks the most serious challenge yet to that agreement, raising fears of a wider regional conflict that could draw in armed groups from across Ethiopia.

Addressing the UN General Assembly, Ethiopia’s president sought to portray the country as a force for regional stability, accusing unnamed external actors of meddling in Ethiopia’s affairs while highlighting Addis Ababa’s role in supporting peace efforts in neighbouring Sudan.

Alemayehu Weldemariam, a professor of law at Indiana University, told Al Jazeera that the federal government bears much of the blame for the collapse of the Pretoria Agreement.

“This war has been in the making for a while now. Much of the provisions in the cessation of hostilities [in the 2022 agreement] were primarily sabotaged by the federal government itself,” he said, citing fuel, service and cash restrictions imposed on Tigray, and the government’s failure to set up the interim administration the deal had promised.

“What was supposed to be an interim arrangement turned out to be permanent,” with Tigray excluded from national elections since, he added.

Egyptian FA has decided to rest Salah to protect him from playing on artificial turf, which has a higher risk of injuries.

Mohamed Salah will not travel with ⁠Egypt’s ⁠squad to South Sudan for their second Africa Cup of Nations qualifier because the ⁠match will be played on artificial turf, the Egyptian Football Association said ⁠on Saturday.

Record seven-time AFCON champions Egypt were held to a goalless draw by Angola at Cairo International Stadium on Friday in their opening qualifier.

Two-time African Footballer of the Year, Salah, who ‌joined Turkiye’s Trabzonspor from Liverpool last month, started against Angola but did not complete the match after coach Hossam Hassan substituted him midway through the second half.

“The Egypt national team’s technical staff, led by Hossam Hassan, has ⁠decided to rest Mohamed Salah ⁠for the match against South Sudan scheduled for September 29 because of the playing surface,” the EFA said on social ⁠media.

“It was agreed between the national team’s technical staff and ⁠Mohamed Salah before the Angola ⁠match that he would not play against South Sudan, and the technical staff preferred this approach in order to ‌protect the player,” the EFA added.

Salah has scored 68 goals for Egypt and is just one short of matching coach and ex-player Hassan’s all-time record of 69 for The Pharaohs.

Tuesday’s match between South Sudan and Egypt will be played ‌at ‌Juba Stadium, which has an artificial turf pitch. Such surfaces pose a higher risk of injuries than those with natural grass.

Egypt are in Group B of the AFCON 2027 qualifiers, alongside Angola, South Sudan and Malawi. The 2027 AFCON will be co-hosted by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, featuring 24 teams.

Though Egypt are the most successful African side, they haven’t won the championship since 2010.