Sudan

Sudan’s prolonged war is creating risks that extend well beyond its borders. The growing role of Islamist armed groups, including the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, could further complicate the country’s political and security landscape while creating new challenges for China’s economic and strategic interests in the Red Sea, East Africa and the Horn of Africa.

The Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, an Islamist militia associated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement, has been one of the armed formations supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during the conflict. In September 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the brigade over its involvement in Sudan’s civil war and alleged connections to Iran. In March 2026, Washington designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, also known as the Sudanese Islamic Movement, as a terrorist organization and updated the brigade’s designation accordingly.

These measures have increased the international pressure on Sudanese Islamist networks and could complicate their future role within the country’s political and security institutions. For China, however, the issue is less about the ideological orientation of these groups than about the possibility that their growing influence could contribute to a broader fragmentation of Sudan’s security environment.

A security vacuum with regional consequences

The continuing conflict has already weakened Sudanese state institutions and created space for armed groups to expand their influence. The danger for Beijing is that prolonged fragmentation could transform Sudan into an environment in which local, regional and external actors compete through armed proxies.

Such a development would have consequences beyond Sudan itself. The country occupies a strategically important position on the Red Sea, while its internal conflict is increasingly interconnected with developments in neighboring states and wider regional security dynamics.

China has consistently called for a ceasefire, protection of civilians and a political settlement in Sudan. Following attacks on Port Sudan in May 2025, Beijing called for the protection of civilian facilities and civilians and urged all parties to work toward an early ceasefire and the restoration of peace and stability.

This approach reflects a broader Chinese preference for protecting its economic and diplomatic interests without becoming directly involved in Sudan’s internal conflict.

For Beijing, therefore, the emergence of increasingly autonomous armed formations represents a potential strategic problem. The greater the fragmentation of Sudan’s security institutions, the more difficult it becomes to protect infrastructure, commercial interests and Chinese nationals while maintaining a policy of non-interference.

Why the Red Sea matters to Beijing

Sudan’s Red Sea coastline gives the conflict a significance that extends far beyond the country itself.

The Red Sea is a critical maritime corridor linking Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Any deterioration in security along Sudan’s coast could add to the risks already affecting commercial navigation in the wider Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb area.

For China, the issue is particularly important because the country is heavily dependent on secure maritime trade routes. Instability along the Red Sea can increase shipping costs, disrupt supply chains and complicate the movement of Chinese goods between Asia, Europe and Africa.

The risks are therefore not limited to projects formally identified with the Belt and Road Initiative. They extend to China’s wider commercial, energy and logistical interests across the region.

Sudan’s instability could also affect Chinese companies operating in infrastructure, energy, mining and other sectors. The safety of Chinese workers and businesses becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee when state authority is fragmented and armed groups operate with greater autonomy.

The South Sudan connection

One of the most important dimensions of Sudan’s instability for China is its potential impact on South Sudan.

South Sudan’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports, while much of the country’s oil reaches international markets through infrastructure crossing Sudan. Any prolonged disruption to Sudanese territory, oil infrastructure or export facilities could therefore have consequences for South Sudan’s production and revenues.

This matters to China because Beijing has significant economic and diplomatic interests in South Sudan. China and South Sudan established a strategic partnership in 2024, and China remains one of South Sudan’s major trading partners, with crude oil constituting a major component of bilateral trade.

Consequently, instability in Sudan could create an indirect risk to China’s interests in South Sudan even without any direct Chinese involvement in the Sudanese conflict.

The relationship between the two countries also demonstrates why Beijing is unlikely to view Sudan solely through the lens of the Sudanese civil war. Developments in Sudan can affect neighboring states, energy flows, infrastructure networks and regional trade routes in which China has invested for decades.

China’s limited but expanding security footprint

China has sought to protect its interests in the region while avoiding direct military involvement in Sudan’s war.

Its military presence in Djibouti provides Beijing with an established logistical and security position around the western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. At the same time, China’s broader commercial presence in Djibouti has continued to expand, reinforcing the country’s importance as a regional trade and logistics hub.

This does not mean that China is preparing to intervene militarily in Sudan. Rather, the existence of a Chinese military and commercial presence in the wider region gives Beijing additional capabilities for protecting its nationals, supporting maritime security and responding to emergencies if regional instability intensifies.

China’s activities in South Sudan also demonstrate a gradual expansion from purely economic engagement toward broader cooperation in areas such as security and public-sector capacity. In June 2026, for example, China handed over a Chinese-aided digital forensic laboratory to South Sudanese authorities, describing improved public-security management as important to national stability.

Beijing is therefore building relationships and capabilities that can help it protect its interests without becoming a direct party to regional conflicts.

The Islamist factor

The future role of Sudanese Islamist organizations remains an important variable.

The international designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade could make it more difficult for these networks to operate openly through political or institutional channels. At the same time, pressure on an armed or ideological movement does not necessarily eliminate its influence. It can instead encourage the movement to adapt, fragment or seek alternative forms of political and social organization.

For China, this creates an additional layer of uncertainty.

Beijing has little incentive to become involved in Sudan’s ideological disputes. Its primary concern is whether political fragmentation and the proliferation of armed groups will threaten the stability required for trade, investment, energy flows and the safety of Chinese citizens.

The more Sudan’s conflict develops into a competition involving multiple armed and externally supported actors, the more difficult it becomes for China to maintain its preferred strategy of pragmatic engagement with all sides.

What China is likely to do

China’s response is likely to remain cautious and pragmatic.

Beijing is unlikely to seek a direct military role in Sudan unless its citizens, facilities or broader maritime interests face a severe and immediate threat. Instead, China is likely to continue supporting diplomatic efforts, calling for dialogue and a political settlement while maintaining relations with Sudanese institutions and neighboring countries.

China’s recent diplomatic position toward Sudan and South Sudan reinforces this approach. At the United Nations, Beijing has continued to emphasize political solutions and stability in the region, while maintaining engagement with both Sudan and South Sudan. In May 2026, China’s permanent representative to the UN warned that the continuing conflict in Sudan and instability in South Sudan were delaying the Abyei political process and called for greater attention to the security situation.

This suggests that Beijing sees the Sudanese conflict increasingly as part of a wider regional security problem rather than an isolated domestic crisis.

The central challenge for China is therefore not simply the rise of one Islamist militia. It is the possibility that Sudan’s institutional fragmentation will produce a durable security vacuum connecting the country’s internal conflict with instability in South Sudan, threats to Red Sea navigation and competition among regional and international powers.

If that happens, Sudan could become a much more serious strategic problem for Beijing.

China’s interests in the region depend on stability without requiring China itself to become responsible for providing it. The longer Sudan’s war continues, the harder that balance becomes to maintain.

The rulings allow the Trump administration to end Temporary Protected Status for nationals of the two countries.

Two federal judges have cleared the way for President Donald Trump’s administration to end temporary protections from deportation for people who have come to the United States from South Sudan and Myanmar.

Judges in Boston, Massachusetts and Chicago, Illinois on Friday rejected last-ditch efforts by immigrant-rights advocates to maintain the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for the two countries after the US Supreme Court in June allowed the administration to end similar protections for thousands of people from Haiti and Syria.

TPS shields people from deportation and grants work authorisation when their home countries are affected by armed conflict, natural disasters or other extraordinary conditions. The terminations would end protections for about 232 South Sudanese nationals and roughly 4,000 people from Myanmar, according to the Reuters news agency.

The Supreme Court decision had limited lower courts’ ability to block the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to end TPS for people from roughly a dozen countries, arguing the executive branch maintained broad authority to make decisions on the programme.

After the Supreme Court’s ruling, immigrant-rights lawyers made a new challenge, arguing that DHS lacked the authority to terminate TPS.

But US District Judge Patti Saris in Boston rejected the argument, saying it would not only call into question DHS authority to end TPS but also its longstanding authority to extend the protections.

Judge Matthew Kennelly in Chicago made a similar conclusion in the Myanmar case hours later.

Advocates have warned the rulings leave TPS recipients, who had been given an “administrative stay” amid the ongoing legal battle that allowed them to continue to work and live in the US, exposed to possible deportation to countries still gripped by conflict and instability.

DHS had moved in November 2025 to end TPS for South Sudan, which has held the designation since 2011 amid ongoing conflict, and Myanmar, in political turmoil since a 2021 military coup.

James Percival, General Counsel of DHS, said the new rulings leave only TPS terminations for Ethiopian and Somalian nationals, which are still blocked by courts.

“Every day these ‘administrative stays’ are in effect is a day the American people are denied what they voted for,” he wrote on X.

Women displaced by Sudan’s war are speaking publicly about surviving rape by Rapid Support Forces fighters. UN investigators verified 546 incidents affecting at least 838 victims, warning the documented cases represent only the tip of the iceberg.

Egypt has moved from rhetorical backing of Sudan’s army to active enabler of its war effort, with a covert drone hub on Egyptian soil symbolising how Cairo has tied its regional strategy to the survival of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Since fighting erupted between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, Egypt has framed its stance as defence of Sudan’s “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” and of its “national institutions, particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces.” Officially, President Abdel Fattah al‑Sisi repeats pledges of “non‑interference,” presenting Egypt’s role as limited to mediation, humanitarian aid and hosting Sudanese refugees.

In practice, that line has steadily eroded. Years of joint drills, intelligence sharing and arms ties since 2019 created deep interoperability between the two militaries, well before the civil war began. Egyptian troops captured by the RSF at Merowe airbase in April 2023 were explained away as being on pre‑scheduled exercises, a narrative few regional observers accepted.

The New York Times investigation into East Oweinat in Egypt’s Western Desert crystallises this shift from backstage support to direct operational involvement. Satellite imagery, flight records and videos show a once‑civil agricultural airstrip expanded since 2018 with a second runway, new hangars and satellite links, and by 2025 hosting Turkish Akinci combat drones.

According to U.S. and European officials cited in that reporting, those drones have for at least six months flown strike missions into Sudan, hitting RSF targets up to hundreds of miles inside the country, including convoys on supply routes from Libya and Chad. The drones and their munitions match Turkish systems, but are based on Egyptian territory and shield Sudan’s military assets from RSF retaliation, blurring whether Cairo is merely hosting or also directing the campaign.

For Cairo, East Oweinat offers plausible deniability: operations are embedded in a desert reclamation project far from public scrutiny, yet close enough to Sudan’s border to project sustained air power. For Sudan’s army, it is a lifeline in a war where the RSF has excelled at capturing bases and shooting down drones; at least several Akinci units have reportedly been lost to RSF fire in recent months.

RSF statements and battlefield evidence further illuminate the depth of Egyptian support. In January 2026 the RSF published what it called “irrefutable” proof of Egypt’s direct role, citing captured Egyptian‑made ammunition, armoured vehicles and testimonies from detained SAF‑aligned commanders who described arms, training and medical support routed from Egypt.

Egypt’s wager on the SAF is rooted in hard security and regime‑survival logic. Egyptian strategists see Sudan’s collapse as an existential threat, evoking fears of refugee flows and arms smuggling on a porous southern frontier. Control of the Nile is still more fundamental: since the 2019 fall of Omar al‑Bashir, Cairo has tightened security and military coordination with Khartoum to present a united front against Ethiopia’s GERD and protect its historic water share.

There is also an ideological affinity. General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan is a career officer with long‑standing ties to Egyptian commanders, and his military rule mirrors Sisi’s own path from barracks to presidency. Backing the SAF fits a long‑standing Egyptian instinct to side with Sudan’s regular army “whoever is in charge of it,” and more broadly to prefer strong central militaries over unruly civilian transitions in the Arab world. The SAF’s reliance upon Muslim Brotherhood–aligned militias and ideologues, including the glorification of early militant figures such as Bara Bin Malik, against the backdrop of Washington’s formal designation of key Muslim Brotherhood chapters as terrorist organisations, should be unsettling to Cairo.

Yet by 2026, Egypt’s bet looks increasingly brittle. The war has killed tens of thousands, displaced more than 14 million and pushed parts of Sudan close to famine, while neither side has secured decisive control. Burhan’s legitimacy is deeply disputed: he led the 2021 coup that derailed a fragile civilian‑military transition, and many of the forces that drove the 2018–19 uprising see him as the continuation of military dominance, not a route to elections.

Cairo’s categorical rejection of “parallel entities” and alternative governments in exile is presented as a defence of Sudanese unity, but in effect delegitimises broad civilian coalitions trying to organise outside the SAF–RSF binary. By equating Sudan’s “national institutions” with the current military leadership, Egypt narrows the field of acceptable interlocutors to a junta whose territorial control and popular backing are both eroding.

At the same time, Egypt seeks recognition as a mediator, through formats like the Quad and by hosting conferences of Sudanese civil and political actors in Cairo. That posture sits uneasily with explicit promises not to be “lax or late in supporting the legitimate Sudanese government” under Burhan, and with mounting evidence of Egyptian‑based air operations in the conflict. The covert base in the desert, and the drones that rise from its runways toward Sudanese skies, have become emblematic of a policy that claims non‑interference while in practice helping to lock Sudan into a devastating, externalised war.

Charity warns that shrinking humanitarian support could threaten efforts to support communities trying to rebuild lives after 1,200 days of conflict.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has called for greater international support for Sudan, saying humanitarian needs are escalating while funding falls far short.

“Sudan is one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises, yet it is also one of its most overlooked” IFRC Special Envoy for Sudan, Derk Segaar, told reporters in Geneva after returning from the Sudan.

Sudan plunged into all-out war in April 2023 between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese military, leading to the deaths of at least 59,000 people, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, a conflict monitoring group.

Aid groups say the figure is an undercount and the true number could be many times higher.

Segaar said while some aid is trickling into Kordofan and Darfur regions, the whole of Sudan has been devastated by the war, including Khartoum, where millions lack reliable electricity, clean water and healthcare, as cholera, malnutrition and floods pose additional risks.

He said 35 million people require humanitarian assistance, more than 9 million are internally displaced, and fighting has driven 4.5 million people out of Sudan.

Fighting

Speaking before a gathering of soldiers, Sudanese Army Lieutenant-General Yasser al-Atta on Monday said the military is advancing on all fronts with the aim of eliminating the RSF before the end of the year.

The location of the gathering was not specified.

“We are implementing the theory of advancing in all directions, with all fronts moving simultaneously, as happened during the recapture of Khartoum state,” al-Atta said.

“Before the end of this year, there will not be a single Janjaweed fighter,” he said, using a term to refer to the RSF, “or a foreign fighter, and we are determined to achieve that”.

Al-Atta’s remarks came days after the army and allied forces carried out a rapid operation in which they seized Bara, Jabra al-Sheikh, Um Sayala and other positions along a key road connecting Omdurman with el-Obeid in North Kordofan.

Sudan’s three Kordofan states – North, West and South – have witnessed continued fighting between the army and the RSF since October 2025.

Diplomacy

Meanwhile, the United Nations is ramping up efforts to get the stalled political process on track.

The UN says representatives from five international organisations, including the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the European Union and the League of Arab States held talks with Sudanese political parties on Monday.

“Building on exploratory consultations held in Addis Ababa in June, the Quintet engaged Sudanese civilian political leaders in recent days. Discussions continued on proposals and perspectives for advancing the political process, including through the establishment of confidence-building measures,” said UN deputy spokesman Farhan Haq.

The UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto, is also talking with RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo to discuss reducing escalation.

Tens of thousands have been killed since April 2023 in the war between RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his former ally, army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

At least 35 people were killed, and several others wounded, when Sudanese army drones struck a traditional court in western Darfur, a rights group has said.

The Emergency Lawyers group, which has documented abuses by both sides of the three-year civil war in Sudan, said the strike on Sunday hit a court in the village of Garra al-Zawaya in North Darfur state at about 1pm local time (11:00 GMT).

It said civilians had “gathered to attend hearings on local cases and disputes” when the attack took place.

The village is under the control of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Tens of thousands of people have been killed since the war began in April 2023 between supporters of RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his former ally, Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

The court building, which serves as a traditional institution for resolving local and tribal feuds, was also damaged in the strike, Emergency Lawyers said.

“The court session was being held under a tree with the participation of local community leaders,” a witness from the area told the AFP news agency on condition of anonymity for safety reasons.

Among those killed were “four tribal leaders and two RSF commanders”, the witness added.

Garra al-Zawaya lies near the town of Kabkabiya, about 150km (93 miles) west of el-Fasher, the army’s last stronghold in Darfur, which the RSF captured after a bloody offensive in October last year.

United Nations investigators have said violence linked to the RSF siege and capture of el-Fasher bore “the hallmarks of genocide”.

Following its takeover of the city, the RSF – which emerged from the government-backed militia known as the Janjaweed, accused of atrocities in Darfur in the early 2000s – consolidated control over much of the region.

Since that campaign, both sides have increasingly relied on drone warfare. According to the UN, more than 1,000 civilians were killed in drone strikes during the first five months of this year.

The conflict has also displaced millions and created what the UN describes as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.

This episode examines how mass violence in Darfur has been constructed over time and why many activists, governments and courts have labelled it genocide, even as that term remains politically contested. It traces how environmental stress, neglect of the peripheries and competition over land fed grievances between communities. It shows how Khartoum armed and mobilised militias, how racialised language framed “Arabs” and “Africans” as enemies and how aerial bombing, burning of villages and mass displacement became tools of policy. Through survivors’ testimony and legal analysis, the film follows the path from counterinsurgency to crimes against humanity and alleged genocide and asks what justice has – and has not – been delivered for Darfur.

Built in 1875 and modelled on the Chapelle Saint-Marc in Lyon, the church was originally intended to be the chapel for St Joseph University, which was opened by French Jesuits as part of France’s colonial-era “civilising mission”.

Its pale stone facade rises above a busy Beirut street. Today, it remains under Jesuit stewardship, with Father Michael Petro leading the parish.

“It’s an interesting space, because it is on the edge of Ashrafieh, a predominantly Christian, francophone area, which has plenty of wealthy Lebanese people living in it. But it also has their domestic workers. From the start of the first waves of migrants in the 70s, this place became known as a place for them,” he tells Al Jazeera.

Every Sunday, during peacetime, the gravel car park is transformed into a cricket ground. Indian and Pakistani migrant workers play softball cricket while families sit on the sidelines sharing home-cooked food, catching up with friends and enjoying one of their few days away from work.

Today, the atmosphere is very different.

Instead of the crack of a plastic bat and Bollywood music spilling across the church grounds, rows of mattresses line the floors, and laundry hangs from railings. Men slouch on plastic chairs littered around the church, scrolling through their phones. Women carry blankets and washed clothes in plastic tubs. Only the children seem able to break the subdued mood, darting between adults and filling the space with bursts of laughter.

“When the war escalated, we immediately had large groups of Sudanese and South Sudanese come here,” Father Michael says. “They showed up because they would ask community leaders what to do, and were told to come here, as it is the first place they trusted.

“On one hand, that’s very beautiful, because people thought they would be welcome here, and they were.”

However, the strain of being a first port of call for so many displaced migrants is beginning to show.

Supplies are low, and tensions occasionally flare among those sheltering at the church. Father Michael says the church reached its capacity of 250 people on just the second day of the war.

“We’ve turned away more than 100 people in the last few days,” he says. “It’s a disaster.”

Mohammad says daily life has become increasingly difficult, particularly since the arrival of their son.

“We do not have enough clothes, especially now that the baby is growing. Also, my wife’s nutrition is not great. Sometimes she gets constipated, and then the baby becomes ill. We need more protein and vegetables. The diet is a huge concern.”

Living in crowded conditions, surrounded by uncertainty, has taken a toll on people’s mental wellbeing, Rufaida says.

“Because of the atmosphere and mental health problems, small problems become big ones. I said good morning to someone, and they didn’t like it. There are no big fights, but there is an underlying tension.”

Both say they understand why tempers sometimes fray. Many of those sheltering at the church have fled war, lost homes and spent months or years living with uncertainty.

Small problems become big ones.

by RUFAIDA, DISPLACED SUDANESE MOTHER

Their gratitude is rooted partly in what happened when Rufaida sought maternity care.

At Karatina Hospital, they say they were repeatedly overlooked by doctors in favour of Lebanese patients. “We were there to get papers so she could give birth in that hospital, but we were ignored, and Lebanese people were allowed into consultations first,” Mohammad says.

After waiting for three hours, a worker from the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), who had accompanied them to the hospital, intervened and helped ensure they were seen.

Through support coordinated by JRS and partner organisations, the entire cost of Rufaida’s pregnancy was covered, including prenatal care, the cesarean delivery and Ahmad’s vaccinations.

“It gave me comfort and peace that I was able to deliver in a safe environment,” Rufaida says.

Their experience is increasingly common among Sudanese migrants in Lebanon, many of whom have found themselves uprooted more than once — first by war in Sudan and then by conflict in Lebanon.

Rufaida’s story is far from unique. According to figures published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in August 2025, there are 164,097 migrants living in Lebanon, of which 14,854 are Sudanese nationals.

That number represents only a small fraction of the 4.4 million Sudanese who have fled their country since the outbreak of civil war in April 2023.

Some, like Rufaida, arrived on tourist visas. Others found jobs as concierges or domestic workers, under Lebanon’s kafala sponsorship system, which ties a migrant worker’s legal residency to their employer.

Human Rights Watch has described the system as, at its worst, a form of modern slavery.

About 3,800 Sudanese have also found asylum in Lebanon as registered refugees with the UN Refugee Agency.

For refugees in Lebanon, a UNHCR registration card can mean far more than a piece of paper. It offers a measure of protection from detention or deportation, can unlock access to aid and education where services exist, and, for many, represents their best hope of one day being resettled in another country.

Among them is 30-year-old Roudaina Mustafa.

The order prevents thousands from El Salvador, Sudan and Ukraine from losing work authorisation while lawsuit proceeds.

A United States federal judge has temporarily blocked the administration of US President Donald Trump from revoking work permits for tens of thousands of asylum seekers and immigrants with Temporary Protected Status (TPS), preventing a policy that was set to take effect as early as Wednesday.

On Tuesday, US District Judge Nathaniel Gorton sided with immigrant rights groups and labour unions challenging a series of new US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policies that implement immigration restrictions passed by Congress last year.

In the five-page order, he wrote, “The consequences faced by plaintiffs are potentially severe.” The order will stay in place while he considers whether to issue a longer-term injunction, with a decision expected by August 5.

The lawsuit, filed earlier this month by a coalition of organisations represented by the legal group Democracy Forward, challenged a number of recent USCIS policy changes. Those include a new policy allowing the agency to reject pending asylum applications and revoke work permits if applicants don’t pay a newly created annual asylum fee, as well as its decision to scrap a decades-old rule requiring initial asylum work permit applications to be processed within 30 days. The lawsuit argued USCIS made the changes without public input, as required by law.

It also challenged the retroactive application of the new rules to people from El Salvador, Sudan and Ukraine, who are still protected by TPS, which allows people from countries affected by war, natural disasters or other major crises to live and work legally in the US until it is considered safe for them to return home.

“This decision protects thousands of asylum seekers and TPS holders from immediate and irreparable harm while this case moves forward,” said Democracy Forward president, Skye Perryman, in a statement. “Without this relief, families who have followed the law and relied on longstanding humanitarian protections faced the sudden loss of their employment authorisation and ability to support themselves through no fault of their own.”

The ruling means thousands of TPS holders from El Salvador, Sudan and Ukraine will be able to keep working while the legal challenge moves forward.

While the judge didn’t block the collection of the asylum fee on Tuesday, he did temporarily block the consequences of not paying it, including having an individual’s application rejected or work permit terminated.

The controversial provisions were introduced as part of Trump’s signature tax and spending law, the so-called One Big Beautiful Bill Act, passed by the Republican-controlled Congress in July 2025.

The Trump administration has made ending TPS protections a central part of its immigration agenda, moving to take the status away from people from more than a dozen countries. Last month, the US Supreme Court allowed the administration to end protections for thousands of Haitian and Syrian immigrants.

USCIS did not immediately respond to a request for comment from the Reuters news agency.

Khartoum, Sudan – A senior Sudanese minister says more than three years of a devastating war in the country have “profoundly reshaped” its demographic makeup.

Minister of Human Resources and Social Development Mutasim Ahmed Saleh told Al Jazeera Arabic that his ministry was working with several partners to strengthen population policies and link them to social protection programmes.

Sudan has been embroiled in a brutal civil war between its army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary since April 2023. The war is estimated to have killed about 200,000 people and displaced more than 11 million, creating what the United Nations calls the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.

The war has also affected Sudan’s demographics.

Before the war, the North African country’s population was expected to exceed 64 million by 2035, according to official data. In 2020, the population stood at about 44.4 million, with forecasts of a growth rate of about 2.39 percent – one of the highest rates globally.

The war has not only displaced millions of people internally in South Darfur, North Darfur and Central Darfur states, it has also forced tens of thousands of others to seek asylum in neighbouring countries, including Egypt, South Sudan and Chad.

Saleh said the most significant demographic changes caused by the war included a general increase in poverty levels, a large segment of citizens losing their income, the deterioration of basic services in a number of areas, and a decline in the labour market and human capital.

To mark World Population Day on July 11, the minister said his government would work for the people – “the focus and ultimate aim of the state’s attention” – and strengthen social protection programmes.

Saleh said his ministry, through the National Population Council and with other state partners, would strengthen Sudan’s population policies and link them to social protection, the voluntary return of refugees, the reintegration of displaced people, and human resource development to contribute to rebuilding the country’s human capital as the “cornerstone of national recovery and sustainable development”.

He said that investing in people was “the real investment in Sudan’s future”.

“The more we succeed in restoring population stability and empowering citizens economically and socially, the closer we come to building a more stable, just and prosperous homeland,” Saleh said.

Population imbalance

Experts say Sudan is distinct in its demographic structure – it has a large youth population, with about 70 percent of the population under the age of 30, according to data from the last census conducted in 2008.

They say that its large youth population gives Sudan a demographic dividend that could drive economic development. But Saleh’s ministry said young people have faced challenges such as limited access to education, scarce job opportunities and widespread poverty, even before the conflict turned them into one of the worst-affected groups.

Khalid Saad, director of the Sudanese Center for Development Communication, told Al Jazeera that Sudan’s population crisis did not begin with the war.

Despite the country’s vast territory and abundant natural resources, it has suffered for decades from a clear imbalance in population distribution, he said.

“The war came to deepen this imbalance, redraw the demographic map through displacement and asylum, empty some areas of their populations, burden other cities with numbers beyond their capacity to absorb, while large numbers of people have returned to areas retaken by government forces,” he said.

Saad said the likely return of people does not mean the end of the demographic crisis, because returnees often go back to areas that have lost a large part of their economic infrastructure.

“The challenge therefore remains in rebuilding an environment that ensures their stability and prevents renewed displacement,” he said.

The war, Saad added, raises questions that still require precise answers: the actual scale of human losses; how the war has affected mortality rates; how it has changed patterns of marriage and childbearing; the impact of displacement and migration on birth rates and age structure; and how the emigration of skilled professionals will affect the size of the workforce in coming years.

Answers to these questions form the basis for any economic or social planning in the post-war phase, he said.

Data released by the National Population Council also points to a demographic imbalance.

Sudan’s urban population rose to about 17.9 million in 2020, with Khartoum alone accounting for about 42 percent of the country’s urban population, indicating a pattern of internal migration driven by uneven development.

The International Organization for Migration said that about 4.1 million people have returned to their areas of origin across Sudan. The vast majority — more than 80 percent — returned from within Sudan to nine states, led by Khartoum, Gezira and Sennar.

According to the organisation, the number of internally displaced people has fallen by 23 percent compared with the highest level recorded in January 2025, when the number of people displaced within Sudan stood at nearly 12 million.

Sudan has entered its fourth year of conflict amid a complex political and military landscape, with little hope of a resolution. Infrastructure has collapsed, and essential services remain disrupted.

Meanwhile, local and international warnings are mounting over a worsening humanitarian crisis, driven by shortages of food and medicines, and the difficulty of delivering aid to affected or besieged areas.

Renewed conflict and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have slowed fertiliser shipments, worsening hunger in Sudan.

Sudan risks facing a deepening hunger crisis due to ongoing conflict, aid ⁠funding cuts, and rising agricultural costs driven by the global disruption caused by the Iran war, a senior World Food Programme (WFP) official has said.

“It’s a massive crisis, both in terms of numbers, but also due to the gravity,” Carl Skau, the WFP’s acting executive director, told Reuters on Tuesday.

Skau said that more than 100,000 people were still facing famine-like conditions, placing them in the highest level of the United Nations-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). “With these kinds of numbers in IPC 5 starvation, it is extremely, extremely serious,” he said.

Sudan remains the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with around five million people facing emergency or catastrophic levels of hunger, even after an intensive ‌aid response helped reduce the number of people in famine-like conditions, Skau said.

Nearly 19.5 million people across Sudan face high levels of acute food insecurity, according to the ⁠IPC. Skau said that recent fighting around el-Obeid in North Kordofan had raised fears the ⁠city could suffer a fate similar to el-Fasher in Darfur, where conflict and siege conditions trapped civilians and hindered aid deliveries, and where the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) carried out mass killings and gang rapes after they took control of the city in the course of their three-year conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

In recent days, however, violence has eased somewhat around el-Obeid, raising hopes that aid deliveries can be expanded from 100,000 to 250,000 in the area.

The WFP is ⁠also increasingly concerned about renewed fighting over the past week in Darfur, which has forced the closure of the Tine border crossing, a route from Chad ⁠into Darfur. This renewal of conflict threatens to reverse gains made after famine took hold in parts of the country, it said.

Throughout the country, the WFP has reduced the number of people ⁠it assists from five million a year ago to about 3.5 million, and reduced rations in many areas, including in Tawila in Darfur, as it faces a $646m funding gap after cuts from major donors, including the United States, European countries and Britain.

“We’re not heading in the ‌right direction here,” Skau said. “If anything, we are falling backwards.”

Skau also warned that soaring diesel prices and fertiliser shortages linked to conflict in the Gulf and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz could further undermine ‌Sudan’s food security during the current planting season.

Sudan relies heavily on fertiliser imports from Gulf countries, while much of its agriculture depends on irrigation pumps, which may be too expensive for farmers to run.

The ⁠war between SAF and the RSF, now entering its fourth year, has displaced millions and devastated much of the country. Aid agencies have repeatedly warned of worsening food insecurity and limited humanitarian access.

Birao, Central African Republic – When Islam Ibrahim fled Sudan after her father was killed during the siege of el-Fasher, she thought she had escaped the worst of the war.

The 20-year-old pharmacy student fled with her mother and six sisters to the neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR), leaving behind her pharmacy studies.

Now in Korsi refugee camp, she spends her days helping newly arrived Sudanese women and girls. Drawing on the medical knowledge she gained before war interrupted her studies, she volunteers to support refugees arriving exhausted after dangerous journeys from Darfur.

But even in exile, Islam says she cannot escape the pressures that followed her from home.

Her uncles have travelled to the refugee camp urging the family to return to Sudan, so her mother can settle her late father’s estate. Islam fears that returning would not only place them back in an active conflict zone but also expose her and her sisters to pressure to marry relatives against their wishes.

“I only want to go back to Sudan if it’s to continue my education,” Islam told Al Jazeera. “I don’t want to go back to Darfur to divide my father’s inheritance.”

Islam’s story is echoed across Korsi refugee camp, where an entire generation of Sudanese students is trying to salvage futures interrupted by war.

More than 30 Sudanese university students interviewed over several days described lives put on hold by a conflict that has uprooted families, shattered ambitions and left many wondering whether they will ever return home. Most are in their 20s and come from Amdafock, a border town in Darfur that became both a refuge and later a departure point as families fled escalating violence.

Many believed their displacement would be temporary. They imagined returning home to complete their degrees once the fighting stopped.

Instead, that hope has grown increasingly distant.

Their experiences reflect a wider educational divide created by Sudan’s war. Millions of school pupils and university students in Darfur and other areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have now gone more than three years without regular schooling or access to nationally recognised examinations. In contrast, despite repeated disruptions caused by the conflict, many students in areas held by the Sudanese army have gradually returned to classrooms and sat their exams, widening disparities in educational opportunities between young people on opposite sides of the war.

Lost years

Amdafock was recently seized by fighters from the Seleka rebel coalition operating across the border in the CAR, further diminishing any realistic prospect of return for many of the families originally from the town.

With support from UNHCR, dozens of Sudanese refugees have secured places at the University of Bangui, offering a fragile path back into education after years of disruption.

But returning to university has proved far from simple.

Having completed their schooling in Arabic, they must now study in French, learning an entirely new language while trying to keep pace with university demands. Many say the additional years required, coupled with financial hardship and the psychological toll of displacement, make it feel as though they are losing time they can never recover.

“We have already lost so many years,” several students told Al Jazeera.

Among them is Gamar el-Shaikh, a sociology student at the University of Bangui.

“We left Birao refugee camp, promising our loved ones that we would return with university certificates,” Gamar told Al Jazeera. “But with the educational environment we are in, and all the difficulties we face, it feels almost impossible to keep that promise.”

Another student, Baderelddian Issa, said his family fled after his father, an imam in Amdafock, was persecuted by the RSF for criticising them during sermons at the mosque.

Baderelddian told Al Jazeera that his father’s position made the family a target, forcing them to flee Sudan for the CAR, where he is now trying to continue his studies, while watching the possibility of return slip further away.

Painful choices

For some students, displacement has demanded even more painful choices.

Intisar el-Sadig lost her husband during the war before fleeing to the CAR with her young child. After UNHCR secured her a place at the University of Bangui, she made the difficult decision to leave her three-year-old son in Korsi refugee camp with her mother so she could continue her studies in the capital.

She travels back whenever she can, but says every separation is painful.

“I am studying because I don’t want this war to take everything from us,” Intisar told Al Jazeera. “If I stop now, then we will have lost not only our home and my husband, but also our future.”

Ahmed knows how quickly those hopes can collapse.

Before the war, he was studying law and dreamed of becoming a judge. His father, a Sudanese army officer, was killed during the fighting in el-Fasher. The family fled to Nyala, believing they had reached safety, but Ahmed says fighters from the RSF attacked them there. During the assault, his mother was beaten so severely that her arm was broken.

The family eventually reached the CAR.

Now living in exile, Ahmed’s studies have been put on hold, and his ambitions have narrowed to survival.

Enduring hope

Across Korsi, that sense of loss is shared in different ways.

Students who once imagined futures as pharmacists, judges, engineers, teachers and academics now spend their days navigating life in exile, learning a new language and trying to rebuild their education in an unfamiliar system while worrying about relatives still trapped in Sudan.

For young women like Islam, displacement has also brought renewed pressure over inheritance and marriage. For others, the loss is measured in years of interrupted education that may never be recovered.

Islam continues volunteering in the camp, while Gamar, Baderelddian and Intisar persist with their studies despite extraordinary obstacles. Ahmed still clings to his dream of becoming a judge.

For these young Sudanese, education has become both refuge and resistance, a fragile attempt to rebuild meaning in lives shattered by war.

“We are the lost generation of Sudan,” Ahmed told Al Jazeera through tears. “We lost everything in this war.”

A UN Fact-Finding Mission found that the paramilitary’s systematic campaign of violence in Darfur amounted to genocide.

Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) committed genocide in the western city of el-Fasher, carrying out mass killings, gang rapes and deliberate starvation as part of an intentional policy, a United Nations investigation has found.

The UN Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan released its findings on Wednesday, concluding that the RSF’s systematic campaign of violence against civilians during and after its siege of the capital of North Darfur state amounted to genocide, building on a February report that had already identified hallmarks of the crime.

The mission’s chairman warned that the findings have urgent lessons for el-Obeid, another major city now ringed by RSF forces, where the UN human rights chief has warned a “catastrophe” is unfolding.

In Wednesday’s report, survivors in el-Fasher described being raped in rooms where bodies of recently killed ‌civilians, including their own family members, were still lying on the ground.

The report found that the RSF and its allies committed the war crime of starvation by imposing a prolonged siege on the city, impeding relief supplies and shelling food production systems.

The RSF has denied such abuses in more than three years of war with the Sudanese military, saying the accounts have been manufactured by its enemies and making counteraccusations against them.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk warned last week that ⁠a “catastrophe” was unfolding around el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state in south-central Sudan, and his office had documented patterns of summary executions, abductions, torture and sexual violence in the surrounding region.

For much of Sudan’s civil war, international attention has centred on Khartoum and the Darfur region.

In recent weeks, however, attention has increasingly shifted to el-Obeid as fighting has intensified across the Kordofan region in central Sudan.

Members of the UN Human Rights Council on Monday condemned the violence and set up an urgent inquiry ⁠into reported abuses there.

The United Kingdom and other states have warned of a risk of large-scale atrocities as the RSF have massed forces around el-Obeid, now home to ⁠about half a million people, including more than 83,000 internally ⁠displaced people.

The fact-finding mission had already concluded in its February report that mass killings of non-Arab communities when the RSF captured el-Fasher bore hallmarks of genocide.

Its new report said it found additional evidence that the widespread and systematic ‌pattern of conduct of the RSF, including large-scale killings, mass rapes and deliberate starvation, was part of an intended policy.

“The patterns we documented in el-Fasher – including encirclement, attacks on civilian infrastructure, restrictions on ‌humanitarian ‌access and widespread abuses against civilians – serve as a stark warning,” said Mohamed Chande Othman, the mission’s chairman.

“The international community must heed these lessons and act to prevent further catastrophe,” he added.

More than 11,000 people, including over 5,500 children, have fled escalating fighting around Sudan’s strategic city of el-Obeid over the past two weeks, according to Save the Children, as the United Nations warns that up to 500,000 civilians could be at risk if the violence intensifies. The city has become the latest focal point in a war that has already triggered the world’s largest displacement crisis.

For much of Sudan’s three-year civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), international attention has centred on Khartoum and the Darfur region. In recent weeks, however, attention has increasingly shifted to el-Obeid as fighting has intensified across Kordofan, prompting warnings from UN officials and humanitarian organisations that another acute humanitarian emergency could be unfolding.

Francesco Lanino, deputy country director for Save the Children in Sudan, said the consequences of displacement extend far beyond the loss of housing.

“For children, displacement is far more than the loss of a home,” he said. “It often means losing access to school, healthcare, clean water and the support networks that help them feel safe and protected. Many have already been displaced multiple times, and without urgent action to protect civilians, ensure humanitarian assistance can reach those in need and prevent further violence, thousands of children could be forced to flee while facing increasing risks to their safety, health and wellbeing.”

Why is el-Obeid so important?

El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, lies about 360km (224 miles) southwest of Khartoum at the intersection of roads linking central Sudan with Darfur and the country’s southern states.

That location has made it one of Sudan’s most important commercial centres and a key logistical hub for both military operations and humanitarian aid.

The city has remained under the control of the SAF, making it one of the army’s most important positions in western Sudan. Military analysts say control of el-Obeid helps shape movement along key supply routes connecting central Sudan with Kordofan and Darfur, helping explain why both the SAF and the RSF consider it strategically important.

Why has the fighting intensified now?

The battle for el-Obeid reflects a broader shift in Sudan’s war.

After the SAF regained territory in and around Khartoum earlier this year, fighting increasingly concentrated in western Sudan, particularly across the Kordofan and Darfur regions.

The RSF has expanded military pressure around el-Obeid while the army has reinforced its positions inside the city. UN officials have warned that the growing military build-up raises the risk of a wider assault, although neither side has announced plans for a full-scale offensive.

The conflict has also evolved. Drone warfare has become an increasingly prominent feature of the conflict, targeting military positions as well as infrastructure civilians rely on, including fuel depots, electricity networks and water facilities.

What are civilians experiencing?

Civilians in el-Obeid are facing mounting hardship as the fighting intensifies and essential services come under increasing strain.

Aid agencies and the United Nations say repeated attacks have disrupted electricity and water supplies, contributed to fuel shortages and driven up the prices of food and other essential goods. Damage to water infrastructure, combined with restricted humanitarian access, has also heightened concerns about waterborne diseases, including cholera.

Many of those now fleeing el-Obeid had already been displaced by fighting elsewhere in Sudan, meaning they are being uprooted for a second or even third time. Save the Children says more than half of the people displaced in the latest wave are children, underscoring the disproportionate impact the conflict is having on young people and their families.

Why are the UN and aid agencies so concerned?

The immediate concern extends beyond the fighting itself to the possibility that el-Obeid could become the next city to experience prolonged urban warfare, with civilians trapped between rival forces.

According to the United Nations, up to 500,000 civilians in and around el-Obeid could be at risk if violence escalates. The figure includes longtime residents as well as people who had already sought refuge in the city after fleeing fighting elsewhere in Sudan.

Humanitarian organisations warn that continued hostilities could further restrict the delivery of humanitarian assistance into North Kordofan at a time when many communities already face shortages of food, medicine, fuel and clean water.

The UN has also raised alarm over the growing use of drone strikes, warning that repeated attacks on civilian infrastructure are deepening the humanitarian crisis and making it harder for people to access essential services.

Why are officials comparing el-Obeid and el-Fasher?

Officials increasingly fear el-Obeid could follow the trajectory of el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, where months of fighting left civilians trapped, humanitarian access severely restricted and basic services devastated.

The comparison does not mean el-Obeid has reached the same stage. Rather, UN officials say it highlights the risk that the city could follow a similar trajectory if fighting intensifies and civilians cannot safely leave or receive humanitarian assistance.

El-Fasher has become one of the starkest examples of the human cost of Sudan’s war. Since fighting escalated there in 2024, repeated clashes, shelling and attacks on displacement camps have forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee, while hospitals, markets and other civilian infrastructure have been damaged or destroyed. Aid agencies have repeatedly warned that restrictions on humanitarian access have deepened hunger and disease, leaving many residents with little access to food, clean water or healthcare.

UN officials fear a similar pattern could unfold in el-Obeid if military pressure continues to build. The city has become a refuge for people displaced from other parts of Sudan, meaning a major offensive could trap large numbers of civilians while further disrupting aid operations across Kordofan. Preventing another prolonged urban battle, they say, is critical to avoiding an even wider humanitarian crisis.

What could happen next?

The next phase of the conflict will depend on whether the current military pressure around el-Obeid develops into a sustained ground offensive or whether diplomatic efforts succeed in reducing hostilities and improving humanitarian access.

For the Sudanese Armed Forces, holding el-Obeid is important to maintaining its position in North Kordofan and preserving access to western Sudan. For the Rapid Support Forces, increasing pressure on the city could strengthen its military position in the region, although the outcome of any future offensive remains uncertain.

If fighting escalates, aid organisations warn that more families are likely to flee while shortages of food, clean water, fuel and medical supplies deepen. A wider battle could also further disrupt humanitarian operations across Kordofan, a region that serves as an important corridor for assistance to communities affected by the war.

More broadly, the battle for el-Obeid reflects the changing geography of Sudan’s war. As front lines shift away from Khartoum, Kordofan is emerging as one of the conflict’s most consequential theatres, carrying profound implications not only for the military balance but also for hundreds of thousands of civilians caught in the fighting.

As the latest wave of displacement illustrates, the humanitarian consequences are already unfolding. Whether el-Obeid becomes another prolonged urban battleground, or whether sustained international efforts help avert a wider assault, may determine not only the next phase of Sudan’s war but also the fate of hundreds of thousands of civilians caught in its path.

“The signs from el-Obeid are clear and unmistakable: another human rights catastrophe is unfolding in Sudan,” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk warned late last week. “This is not a drill. It is a red alert that needs to land on the desks of heads of state and government around the world.”

Sudan has been engulfed in a devastating civil war since April 2023, when fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The conflict has displaced millions of people, triggered one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and led to widespread allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Al Obeid, one of Sudan’s largest and most strategically important cities, has become the latest flashpoint as the RSF intensifies military operations around the city. The situation has raised fears of a repeat of the violence witnessed in Al Fashir in North Darfur, where fierce fighting, civilian casualties and widespread reports of abuses drew international condemnation.

Against this backdrop, the United Nations Human Rights Council has moved to increase international scrutiny by launching an urgent inquiry into alleged violations committed during the escalating violence.

The United Nations Human Rights Council on Monday adopted a resolution condemning escalating violence by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces in Al Obeid and authorising an urgent investigation into alleged human rights abuses committed during the fighting.

The motion, introduced by the United Kingdom with support from 14 other countries, was adopted by consensus, although China distanced itself from the decision over concerns about country specific investigations conducted without the consent of the government concerned.

The inquiry will seek to document alleged violations as international concern grows over the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in the city.

Diplomats warned that the situation in Al Obeid could mirror previous atrocities reported elsewhere in Sudan.

Britain’s Human Rights Ambassador Eleanor Sanders urged the council to prevent a repeat of the violence seen in Al Fashir, warning that similar patterns of attacks against civilians must not be allowed to recur.

South Africa also backed the resolution, describing the situation as a critical warning and expressing concern that the RSF was employing tactics similar to those previously documented during operations in Darfur.

The mounting international concern reflects fears that the conflict around Al Obeid could rapidly escalate into another large scale humanitarian disaster.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recently warned that a catastrophe is unfolding around Al Obeid.

According to the Human Rights Office, investigators have documented reports of summary executions, kidnappings, torture and widespread sexual violence in areas surrounding the city.

The findings add to a growing body of evidence gathered by United Nations agencies and international human rights organisations documenting alleged abuses committed during Sudan’s civil war.

The Rapid Support Forces have consistently rejected previous allegations, arguing that the accusations are politically motivated and making similar allegations against rival forces.

The newly approved investigation is intended to independently gather evidence, establish facts and improve accountability for alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

Although the Human Rights Council does not possess judicial authority, its investigations often provide evidence used by international courts, sanctions bodies and future accountability mechanisms.

The inquiry may also increase diplomatic pressure on parties to the conflict while drawing greater international attention to the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Sudan.

While the resolution was adopted without a formal vote, China stated that it did not support investigations targeting individual countries without their approval.

Beijing has consistently argued that international human rights mechanisms should respect national sovereignty and avoid what it considers politically selective investigations.

Despite China’s position, the resolution received sufficient backing from council members to proceed.

The investigation signals growing international concern that Sudan’s conflict is entering another dangerous phase marked by escalating violence against civilians.

Independent documentation of alleged abuses could strengthen future efforts to pursue accountability while increasing international pressure for humanitarian access and renewed peace negotiations.

The inquiry also demonstrates the Human Rights Council’s willingness to respond quickly when there are warnings of possible mass atrocities.

United Nations Human Rights Council

Launching an urgent investigation into alleged abuses and monitoring developments in Al Obeid.

Rapid Support Forces

Facing renewed international scrutiny over allegations of serious human rights violations, which the group denies.

Sudanese Armed Forces

Continuing military operations against the RSF while remaining a central party to the conflict.

Civilians in Al Obeid

Confronting increasing risks from escalating fighting, displacement and humanitarian hardship.

Seeking greater accountability, humanitarian access and diplomatic efforts to reduce violence.

China

Maintaining its opposition to country specific human rights investigations conducted without state consent.

The Human Rights Council will begin organising the urgent inquiry, with investigators expected to collect evidence, interview witnesses and monitor developments around Al Obeid.

Meanwhile, international attention will remain focused on whether fighting intensifies around the city and whether diplomatic efforts can prevent another humanitarian catastrophe similar to those witnessed elsewhere in Sudan.

The Human Rights Council’s decision reflects growing concern that events in Al Obeid are following a pattern already witnessed elsewhere in Sudan’s civil war. The repeated references by diplomats to Al Fashir suggest the international community fears another episode of mass civilian suffering before meaningful intervention becomes possible.

The inquiry itself will not stop the fighting, nor does the Human Rights Council possess enforcement powers. Its primary significance lies in documenting evidence that may later support international legal action, targeted sanctions or future accountability mechanisms. Such investigations also serve as an important warning to armed groups that alleged violations are being monitored by the international community.

The decision also highlights the persistent divisions within the United Nations over country specific investigations. China’s decision to distance itself from the resolution reflects a broader debate between protecting state sovereignty and responding rapidly to alleged mass atrocities. Similar disagreements have shaped international responses to conflicts in Myanmar, Syria and other crisis zones.

For Sudan, however, the immediate challenge remains humanitarian rather than diplomatic. Continued fighting around Al Obeid threatens to worsen displacement, restrict humanitarian access and expose more civilians to violence. If the conflict follows the trajectory seen in other parts of the country, the consequences could further deepen what is already one of the world’s largest humanitarian emergencies.

Ultimately, the inquiry represents an effort to ensure that alleged abuses are documented while there is still an opportunity to deter further violations. Whether it contributes to greater accountability or influences the conduct of the conflict will depend largely on developments on the ground and the willingness of the international community to translate its findings into concrete action.

With information from Reuters.

After years of closure due to war, hospitals in the Sudanese capital are welcoming mothers again, despite lingering economic and logistical hurdles.

In the Sudanese city of Omdurman, the maternity hospital, known locally as Al-Dayat or ‘Midwives” in English, has resumed operations after a long closure caused by the war. Mothers are once again arriving at maternity wards, navigating difficult economic and logistical conditions to give birth safely.

Al-Toma Jabara, a mother from East Nile, gave birth to her daughter, Doaa, at the hospital two days ago. She told Al Jazeera that she was unable to conceive during the war years. Fighting between the Sudanese armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) separated Jabara from her husband for two years.

She has lived under constant bombardment and clashes in her home, making a normal family life seem impossible. She described Doaa’s arrival as a “new beginning” for her family after years of fear and deprivation.

At Bahri Hospital, Fatima Abdel Rahman, a mother from Al Jazirah state, recounted her exhausting and expensive journey to the capital Khartoum. Her family had to spend a large portion of their income on transportation and temporary accommodation near the facility to monitor her condition post-delivery.

Abdel Rahman noted that medication shortages forced her to buy basic drugs from outside pharmacies at inflated prices, adding to her financial burden. However, she stressed that the functioning maternity ward provided her with a vital sense of safety, sparing her the fear of dying due to lack of medical care – a constant dread she lived with during the war.

Rebuilding the shattered health sector

During the conflict, the closure of specialised maternity hospitals forced many women to undergo unsafe home births or travel long distances, drastically increasing risks for both mothers and infants. An anonymous official from the Khartoum State Ministry of Health confirmed that maternal and infant complications and mortality rates surged during the war due to closures.

The official told Al Jazeera that complication rates are now gradually decreasing as services resume. The health ministry has repaired and reopened 15 maternity wards across the capital, including Al-Dayat and the Saudi Hospital. The capital’s hospitals are now recording a significant increase in births, reaching about 7,000 new deliveries per month.

Emad Abdullah, director of the Omdurman Maternity Hospital, noted that it initially received only one or two cases a day upon reopening. Today, that number has climbed to approximately 60 births per day, as services expand to meet growing demand.

The hospital has several vital departments, including a caesarean section, an intensive care unit and a neonatal department equipped with about 140 incubators, making it the largest in Sudan.

Rising costs and logistical nightmares

Maternity costs vary significantly depending on the facility. At government hospitals, a natural birth typically costs about 130,000 Sudanese pounds ($216), while C-sections cost around 400,000 pounds ($666). In private hospitals, the cost of a natural birth shoots up to approximately 500,000 pounds ($813) and C-sections range between 600-800,000 pounds ($999-1,322), depending on the service level.

Despite the reopening of wards in Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri, large challenges remain with patients from distant regions such as Al Jazirah and Kordofan facing exhausting journeys and exorbitant transport costs.

In the hospitals, there is a shortage of basic medicines and emergency rooms often operate beyond their capacity. In addition, the wartime exodus of doctors and nurses has left a critical gap in qualified staff, while essential medical equipment needs regular maintenance to keep up with demand.

Amira Othman Abdel Majeed, an infection control officer at Bahri Hospital, described the war as the most challenging period for the health sector, marred by severe shortages of supplies, electricity and water. That has imposed psychological pressure on medical staff who feared losing mothers and children during treatment.

However, she said the “liberation of Khartoum” and the resumption of maternity services have dramatically changed the landscape. Staff emerged stronger and more resilient, with the ongoing medical care serving as a prime symbol of the capital’s recovering health sector.

Dr. Mukesh Kapila, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, warns the current crisis in El Obeid, Sudan could be even worse than what unfolded in El Fasher in 2024-2025. However, he says sustained international attention and Al Jazeera’s continued coverage could help deter the RSF.

Sudan has been engulfed in a devastating civil war since April 2023, when fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. The conflict has evolved into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, displacing millions, collapsing healthcare and public services, and triggering repeated warnings of famine and ethnic violence.

The latest concern centres on Al-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan. The city is strategically important because it links central Sudan with the western Darfur region and serves as a major logistical and commercial hub. Control of Al-Obeid would provide whichever side captures it with a crucial military corridor for moving troops and supplies across Sudan.

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, civilians in the city have endured siege-like conditions for around 18 months, with dwindling food, water and medical supplies, while drone strikes and shelling have intensified.

Why it matters

The warning from UN High Commissioner Volker Türk suggests international concern that Al-Obeid could become another major atrocity site similar to previous battles in Darfur.

Several factors make the situation particularly alarming:

• Strategic military battle: Both the SAF and RSF view Al-Obeid as critical to controlling supply routes between central and western Sudan.
• Civilian catastrophe: Thousands of civilians remain trapped as fighting intensifies, with limited humanitarian access and worsening shortages of clean water, food and healthcare.
• Risk of mass atrocities: Britain requested the emergency UN debate amid fears that an RSF offensive could result in large-scale civilian killings similar to previous episodes documented elsewhere in Sudan.
• Humanitarian spillover: Further escalation would increase refugee flows into neighbouring countries already struggling to absorb displaced Sudanese populations.

Key stakeholders

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)

• Controls parts of central and eastern Sudan.
• Seeks to prevent RSF advances into North Kordofan and maintain control over key transport routes.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

• Attempting to expand territorial control after major campaigns elsewhere.
• Surrounding Al-Obeid could strengthen its position in western and central Sudan.

United Nations

• The OHCHR is documenting civilian casualties and warning of possible mass atrocities.
• UN agencies are pushing for humanitarian access before conditions deteriorate further.

United Kingdom

• Requested the urgent debate at the United Nations Human Rights Council, highlighting growing Western concern over another possible humanitarian disaster.

Humanitarian organisations

• Aid agencies face increasing difficulties reaching civilians due to insecurity and siege conditions.

Regional countries

• Neighbours including Chad, South Sudan and Egypt remain vulnerable to additional refugee inflows and regional instability.

Future outlook

The immediate outlook depends on whether the RSF launches a full-scale assault on Al-Obeid or negotiations produce humanitarian access.

Possible scenarios include:

• Escalation: A major offensive could trigger another urban battle marked by heavy civilian casualties, infrastructure destruction and further displacement.
• Prolonged siege: Even without a direct assault, continued encirclement could deepen shortages of water, food and medicine, increasing disease and starvation risks.
• International pressure: The UN and Western governments may increase diplomatic pressure for humanitarian corridors, though previous efforts have had limited success.
• Limited accountability: Despite mounting documentation of alleged abuses by both sides, meaningful international enforcement remains difficult given the fragmented nature of the conflict.

Volker Türk’s warning reflects growing concern that Sudan’s conflict is entering another dangerous phase rather than improving. Al-Obeid represents more than a humanitarian hotspot—it is a strategic military objective whose capture could reshape the balance of power between the SAF and RSF.

The battle also illustrates a recurring pattern throughout the war: military gains are increasingly achieved through sieges, attacks on civilian infrastructure and restrictions on humanitarian access. These tactics magnify civilian suffering even before major ground offensives begin.

For the international community, the warning underscores a familiar challenge. The UN can document abuses and raise alarms, but translating those warnings into protection for civilians has repeatedly proven difficult. Without stronger diplomatic leverage or sustained international engagement, there is a significant risk that Al-Obeid could become the latest symbol of Sudan’s worsening humanitarian crisis rather than the point at which the conflict’s trajectory changes.

With information from Reuters.

EXPLAINER

China and Sudan signed off on a waiver of $50m as Sudan’s military-led government seeks support amid Western sanctions.

China has waived loans worth $50m that it had given to Sudan, the two countries said over the weekend. The agreement comes three years into a war between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that has shrunk the country’s economy by roughly 40 percent, according to the United Nations.

The sum is small compared with what Sudan owes overall to external governments or agencies, an amount estimated at more than $56bn before the war. But the waiver lands at a moment when Khartoum has few other international lenders extending any financial support.

China’s relationship with Sudan predates the war by decades, built on oil and infrastructure interests that survived multiple changes of government in Khartoum. But the war has narrowed Sudan’s options elsewhere, as Western governments have largely held back or imposed sanctions.

Here’s why this deal is significant for Sudan and China:

What do we know about the deal?

The signed protocol in Port Sudan cancels four interest-free loans worth 344 million yuan, about $50m, with immediate effect, according to Sudan’s official news agency, SUNA.

Sudan’s Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim welcomed the move, reportedly saying that China has continued investing in the country throughout the war while Western governments, including the United States and European Union members, have largely held back. Gibril himself was added to the US Treasury sanctions list in September 2025 for his alleged “involvement in Sudan’s brutal civil war and … connections to Iran”.

China’s charge d’affaires in Sudan, Xu Jian, reportedly said at the signing ceremony that China was ready to help rebuild what was destroyed during the war in Sudan.

What’s in it for Sudan?

Sudan’s external debt of more than $56bn before the war is expected to have ballooned since.

The $50m debt relief amounts to not even 1 percent of the total external pre-war debt. In fact, Sudan was close to a far bigger debt write-off in 2021. It was on track with the IMF and the World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative to have more than $50bn of its debt forgiven within three years. The 2021 military coup in October derailed that debt relief plan, and the process was formally suspended a year later.

Still, China’s waiver arrives at a moment of acute need for the country. The war is now in its third year. More than 1.5 million people have been killed, according to the UN, and the war has displaced about 14 million people – about a quarter of the Sudanese population. The World Health Organization says less than 14 percent of health facilities are still functioning. Jobs have vanished in many parts of the country, and the rising cost of living has made it difficult for households to survive.

The Sudanese pound has collapsed since the start of the war. It went from roughly 600 to the dollar before the war to more than 5000 to the dollar by June 2026.

What’s in it for China?

In many ways, Beijing’s decision to waive the $50m loan is in keeping with a broader approach it has taken in recent years, one that has helped cement China as Africa’s largest trading partner for 17 consecutive years.

China has provided interest-free loan forgiveness as a diplomatic gesture to multiple countries, and these decisions are recurrent announcements at Beijing’s frequent leader-level summits with African nations. This is especially true for smaller loans. Research from the Johns Hopkins China Africa Research Initiative found that China forgave at least $3.4bn of these kinds of debts across the African continent between 2000 and 2019.

By contrast, larger loans are usually commercial loans through state banks that come with interest, and waiving those is harder.

At a time when the West is largely trying to isolate Sudan’s leadership, a small loan waiver gives China outsized influence in a country that sits at the intersection of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

What have China-Sudan ties been like historically?

Oil has long served as a catalyst for their relationship. From the mid-1990s on, China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) poured billions of dollars into Sudanese oil fields and the pipelines carrying that crude oil to Port Sudan. This was a time when many Western companies were pushed out due to sanctions.

The relationship changed when the southern part of the country voted in favour of independence in 2011. The world’s newest country, South Sudan, left the north and took most of the country’s oil fields with it.

Chinese investment largely dried up afterwards, but Sudan still has more than $5bn of outstanding debt to China. The war has aggravated Sudan’s economic challenges. The CNPC requested a formal exit from Sudan in December 2025.

Khartoum, Sudan – As drone attacks rain down on el-Obeid and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) tighten their months-long siege, the capital of North Kordofan has emerged as the latest flashpoint in Sudan’s grinding war of attrition.

Despite mounting international alarm and renewed US diplomatic pressure aimed at securing a nationwide truce, Sudan’s warring generals remain deeply entrenched. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF appear locked in a pursuit of outright military victory, largely sustained by a continuous flow of foreign weapons.

Through the lens of the escalating crisis in el-Obeid, a grim reality is unfolding: Civilian suffering is increasingly weaponised amid polarised domestic narratives, while geopolitical manoeuvring repeatedly stalls any viable path to peace.

A strategic prize and international alarm

El-Obeid holds immense strategic value. Located 550km (340 miles) southwest of Khartoum, it acts as the primary gateway linking Khartoum to the vast Darfur region. The city is also a major military stronghold, hosting the SAF’s 5th Infantry Division, known as “Al-Hagana”, and has become a refuge for hundreds of thousands of displaced civilians fleeing violence elsewhere.

The looming threat of a full-scale ground invasion has triggered urgent global warnings. Recently, 38 international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), alongside the UN and countries including Qatar, sounded the alarm over the escalating use of drones and the potential for mass atrocities, warning that el-Obeid could face the same devastation recently seen in el-Fasher.

Yet these warnings have failed to alter the calculus on the ground.

Polarised narratives of a stalled peace

Recent United States diplomatic efforts, led by Massad Boulos, an adviser to US President Donald Trump, have pushed for a comprehensive ceasefire. However, the push for peace has collided with absolute domestic polarisation.

SAF commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has firmly rejected unconditional truces, stating that the army will operate with the precision of “digging with a needle” until the RSF is entirely dismantled.

This deadlock reflects a deeply fractured political landscape. Fathi Abu Ammar, a Sudanese academic, told Al Jazeera that the SAF is primarily responsible for the prolonged suffering by obstructing peace initiatives and refusing to establish safe corridors for civilians to leave el-Obeid.

He accused the army of using the city’s residents as “human shields” to garner international sympathy, while arguing that the RSF is fighting to address legitimate historical grievances.

Conversely, Sudanese journalist and political analyst Yousef Abdel Mannan vehemently rejected these claims.

Speaking to Al Jazeera from Sudan, Abdel Mannan accused the RSF of widespread atrocities, including a recent drone attack on a girls’ school in el-Obeid and the systematic killing of thousands of civilians in el-Fasher, including patients inside the Saudi Hospital.

Abdel Mannan dismissed the US-backed truce proposals as inadequate measures that merely “treat the wounds of the conflict while leaving the root cause intact”, arguing that only a comprehensive political settlement, not a temporary ceasefire, can resolve the crisis.

He maintained that civilians in el-Obeid are not being held hostage by the army, but rather prefer to remain in their homes rather than face displacement at the hands of paramilitaries.

Foreign arms and the geopolitical deadlock

Beneath the domestic blame game lies a critical factor sustaining the conflict: Foreign interference.

David Shinn, a former US diplomat and assistant secretary of state for African affairs, noted that despite years of US engagement and sanctions targeting both SAF and RSF leaders, neither side has shown a genuine interest in halting the violence.

“There is a desire from both sides to continue fighting until one side wins,” Shinn told Al Jazeera.

The escalating use of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) over el-Obeid underscores this external lifeline. “Neither the RSF nor the Sudanese army manufactures drones,” Shinn pointed out, meaning these advanced weapons must be imported.

He highlighted that the warring parties are actively backed by regional powers, pointing to the United Arab Emirates as a backer of the RSF, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia as supporters of the SAF, arguing that the conflict has transformed into a proxy war.

For the siege of el-Obeid to end and a genuine peace process to begin, the geopolitical spigot must be turned off.

Until the international community forces external actors to halt their military support, analysts warn that Sudan will remain hostage to a war its generals believe they can still win.

Egypt’s foreign ministry used carefully calibrated language on Monday to restate a familiar position: unwavering support for Sudan’s “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” and for its “national institutions, particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).” Framed as a rejection of “parallel entities” seeking to form an alternative government in exile, the statement is another sign that Cairo is tying its Sudan policy ever more tightly to General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan and the SAF as the country’s civil war grinds into yet another year.

Behind the diplomatic phrasing lies a blunt political choice. Since the outbreak of fighting between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, Egypt has emerged as one of the army’s main regional backers, both politically and—according to multiple reports—quietly in security terms. Egyptian officials insist they are defending Sudanese state institutions against militia fragmentation and external meddling, a message they repeat in multilateral forums and joint communiqués with Burhan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council.

From Cairo, the stakes in Sudan are seen as existential rather than abstract. Egyptian analysts routinely describe the stability of their southern neighbour as a vital national security concern, citing fears of refugee flows, arms smuggling and jihadist safe havens along the porous border. Control of the Nile is an even deeper driver: since the 2019 fall of Omar al‑Bashir, Egypt has intensified security and military coordination with Khartoum to counter Ethiopia’s upstream Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and preserve its historic water share.

There is also a clear regime‑security affinity, however misguided that affinity might be. Burhan, a career officer who trained in Cairo and maintains close ties with Egyptian generals, represents a familiar authoritarian model for President Abdel Fattah el‑Sisi, himself a former general who came to power after a coup in 2013. Supporting the SAF fits Egypt’s long‑standing pattern of siding with Sudan’s army “whoever is in charge of it,” and buttresses Cairo’s broader preference for strong central militaries over messy civilian transitions across the region.

Officially, Egypt insists it is not a party to Sudan’s war. Sisi has repeatedly pledged “non‑interference,” and Cairo frames its role as limited to mediation, humanitarian aid, and hosting millions of Sudanese fleeing the conflict. Egyptian troops captured by the RSF at Merowe airbase in April 2023 were described as participants in pre‑scheduled joint exercises, not combat operations, a spin that few international observers bought.

The line between deterrent presence and de facto involvement has become increasingly blurred. Analysts note years of intensifying joint drills, intelligence cooperation and arms ties between the two militaries since 2019. Think‑tanks and regional media have reported unconfirmed Egyptian airstrikes on RSF positions and possible targeting of gold‑mining camps in northern Sudan, amid allegations by RSF leaders that Cairo is providing drones and tactical support to the SAF—claims Egypt denies. The pattern points towards at the very least a protective security umbrella for Burhan’s forces, far beyond the strict neutrality Cairo proclaims.

Yet in Burhan Egypt is backing a very risky partner. By hinging its Sudan strategy almost entirely on the SAF and Burhan’s sovereignty council, Egypt is betting on a man and an institution that look increasingly incapable of reunifying the country. The war has left tens of thousands dead, displaced over 14 million people, and pushed parts of Sudan towards famine, with the army losing and regaining territory in a grinding stalemate against the RSF. Burhan’s own legitimacy is deeply contested: he led the 2021 coup that derailed a fragile civilian‑military power‑sharing agreement, and his government is widely seen by pro‑democracy groups as a continuation of military dominance rather than a path to elections.

Cairo’s categorical rejection of “parallel governments” sounds like a defence of state unity, but in practice it risks delegitimising genuine civilian coalitions seeking to organise outside the SAF‑RSF binary. By equating Sudan’s “national institutions” with the existing military leadership, Egypt narrows the political horizon and sidelines the broad civilian forces that led the 2018–2019 uprising—precisely the actors most likely to provide a sustainable, inclusive settlement. If the SAF continues to fragment on the battlefield or loses further territorial control, Cairo may find that its red lines have locked it into defending a shrinking power centre with dwindling popular backing.

There is also a long‑term reputational cost. Egypt positions itself as a mediator through formats such as the “Quad”, and hosts conferences of Sudanese civil and political actors in Cairo. But as long as its public diplomacy is tethered to explicit promises that it “will not be lax or late in supporting the legitimate Sudanese government” under Burhan, that positioning is scarcely credible. On the contrary, Egypt has decisively and actively allied itself to Sudan’s military junta.

Al Jazeera journalist Al-Tahir al-Mardi has been reunited with his family in Khartoum after three years of separation and forced displacement caused by Sudan’s war.