Sudan

In a small house in Omdurman, Hassan Saber Jumaa, a senior administrator at the Zamzam displacement camp in Sudan, sat on a simple wooden chair. He scrolled through his phone, looking for any photograph he might have of Zamzam, which is near el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, and once sheltered hundreds of thousands.

He found nothing. Jumaa explained that his old phone was looted during last year’s attack by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces on the camp. Pointing to the bare walls around him, Jumaa said that all he has left are his memories of the camp, and the people who once called it home.

Zamzam, established in 2004, was home to generations of people displaced by western Sudan’s Darfur war, which began in 2003 and continued for nearly two decades. Alongside Abu Shouk camp and al-Salam camp, Zamzam formed part of one of Darfur’s largest concentrations of displaced people.

Jumaa recalled a bustling community, with its market open every day, and children walking to school.

Zamzam memories

Zamzam continued as a refuge for civilians until Sudan’s current war, which began in 2023. The RSF, fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces and its allies, captured the camp in April 2025, after months of attacks. Famine had been confirmed in the camp in August 2024.

Mukhtar Musa, a survivor of the assault, watched the community he knew descend into starvation and violence. He said restrictions on the movement of goods had exhausted food supplies, leaving some residents with little choice but to eat animal feed and peanut shells.

Umm Kulthum Ali Saleh described the months before the final attack as the hardest of her life. The RSF siege on Zamzam stopped goods from entering. She searched for food every morning, and recalled seeing women cooking grass and mixing mud with flour to bake bread.

Saleh believes the blockade was not merely a military measure, but a deliberate way to weaken the camp’s residents in advance of the final offensive, and Zamzam’s fall.

Brutal military offensive

On April 11, the RSF launched a three-day assault using cars, camels, and horses, burning straw homes and health facilities.

A United Nations Human Rights Office report documented at least 1,013 civilians killed, including 319 who were summarily executed in homes, markets, schools, clinics, and mosques. The report documented other abuses, including rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence, particularly targeting the Zaghawa community.

Musa was a witness to some of those mass killings, and said he saw RSF fighters kill civilians while chanting religious slogans. He described seeing bodies scattered around the main market and near schools, and said fighters continued pursuing civilians along roads leading out of the camp.

Saleh also recalled seeing bodies littering the roads, with only chickens, donkeys, and sheep wandering among the abandoned buildings.

The attack forced tens of thousands to flee Zamzam, with many remaining in the el-Fasher area, and others fleeing south to Tawila and Dar al-Salam.

The violence continued to engulf el-Fasher and its surrounding displacement camps over the following months.

With Zamzam under its control, the RSF launched an attack on el-Fasher in August 2025, and soon captured the Abu Shouk camp.

The UN Human Rights Office said at least 40 displaced people were killed inside Abu Shouk, while 19 others were injured. The International Organization for Migration reported that at least 500 residents fled the camp that day.

The RSF captured el-Fasher itself on October 26, 2025. More than 6,000 people are believed to have been killed in the attack, in el-Fasher as well as on escape routes out of the city. The UN found that RSF fighters targeted civilians, including members of non-Arab communities, and committed acts amounting to war crimes.

The RSF has previously denied targeting civilians in Zamzam and el-Fasher, while acknowledging that some fighters committed abuses.

The survivors of Zamzam, al-Shouk, and el-Fasher focus on bearing witness to the tragedy they faced.

Jumaa said the destruction of Zamzam marked not the end of the violence, but the beginning of another wave of displacement.

For him, the camp survives in the memories of those who once lived there – even as they are now displaced elsewhere.

Musa, meanwhile, said he cannot forget the first days of the siege, and the bodies he saw on the streets.

“Whoever survives must tell the story of what happened,” Musa said.

Attacks the latest to disrupt electricity supplies; army reports new defections from paramilitary RSF.

Drone strikes are reported to have hit three electricity substations in eastern and northern Sudan, the latest attacks in a concentrated campaign.

The attacks on Monday, which caused widespread power outages across parts of the country, brought the number of strikes reported to target Sudan’s electricity network to 18 over the past week.

Sudan’s military government has claimed that Ethiopia is aiding the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – which it has been fighting since April 2023 – in carrying out the attacks.

Facilities in New Halfa and Aroma in eastern Kassala state were hit early on Monday, while the al-Ghazali substation in Sudan’s Northern State was also targeted, according to local media.

Videos circulating on social media appeared to show fires at the facilities, with civil defence teams trying to extinguish the fires. Al Jazeera was not able to immediately verify the footage and reports.

On Sunday, Sudan’s government said it had filed complaints against Ethiopia with the United Nations Security Council and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, accusing Addis Ababa of involvement in the ongoing campaign of attacks on civilian infrastructure and power stations.

The Sudanese army also reported on Monday that a group of RSF members had defected by surrendering to its forces in Damazin, the capital of southeastern Blue Nile state.

The announcement follows a declaration, in video footage obtained exclusively by Al Jazeera, by senior RSF commander Siddiq Ander that he had defected.

In a statement, the army said that the development was the latest in increasing defections from the paramilitary group in Blue Nile state.

It added that the group’s commander had provided information concerning the management of military operations in Damazin, including “Ethiopian support” for the RSF.

One-way drone attacks have killed or wounded 484 civilians since February, Khartoum says.

Sudan has lodged a complaint against Ethiopia with both the United Nations Security Council and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council after a series of deadly drone attacks this year.

In a statement late on Sunday, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group of using Ethiopian territory to launch “brazen aggression” against “civilian sites and power stations” in Sudan, resulting in hundreds of casualties and disruptions to essential services.

The string of incidents “places Ethiopia before international law”, the ministry added.

Sudan’s military has repeatedly accused Ethiopia of aiding the RSF, which it has been fighting in a civil war since April 2023. Ethiopia, meanwhile, has accused the Sudanese military of backing rebels linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, a charge Khartoum denied.

The ministry’s statement came alongside a report from Sudan’s army-led Transitional Sovereignty Council that alleged 70 assaults from February 15 to October 27 involving 187 one-way attack drones.

The attacks killed or wounded 484 civilians and killed 176 Sudanese soldiers, the report said, with another 200 soldiers wounded.

“Since February 2026, armed drones have taken off from Ethiopian soil … to strike Sudanese cities and civilians,” the report said.

The report identified launch sites at Asosa Airport in western Ethiopia, the Kurmuk-Gizen border area and Bahir Dar airbase in northwestern Ethiopia’s Amhara region.

Last month saw 28 attacks carried out by 97 drones, the report said.

It cited an October 9 attack on displaced families in Wad el-Mahi, located in Sudan’s Blue Nile region near the Ethiopian border, which it said killed 30 civilians – 26 women and four children – and wounded 100.

A spokesman for UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said on Saturday that he was “appalled” by the impact of drone strikes in Sudan, days after another strike on a market in RSF-controlled territory in Darfur killed more than 100 people.

The secretary-general “strongly condemns the escalating drone attacks in Sudan by the parties to the conflict and the catastrophic toll these attacks are inflicting on civilians”, the spokesman said, adding that the strikes constitute violations of international humanitarian law.

Port Sudan, Sudan – Awad Haroun, 45, a visual artist and theatre director, fled his home in Al-Halfaya, Khartoum North, after war destroyed a life he had worked hard to build in the capital.

He moved to Port Sudan with his wife and son, leaving behind his home, artistic workspace and the tools he needed to work, shortly after fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary in April 2023.

When he fled, he carried little: Two shirts, two pairs of trousers, two books and a few torn drawing papers, expecting to return soon. Instead, he has been forced to rebuild his life far from home.

He lost not only his home but also the tools and materials he relied on to work and make a living.

In Port Sudan, he looked to use his skills in sculpture, design and decoration for some money. He has since participated in theatrical performances at Wasel Festival, organised by Ahalina Cultural Group in partnership with UNESCO, and led traditional arts workshops with cultural groups.

Awad founded Ahalina cultural group in 2013 with a group of young people, using theatre, visual arts, music and puppetry to engage with young people and promote peace and social cohesion.

Drawing, storytelling, music and play have also given children opportunities to express themselves and connect with others.

“Losing my tools does not mean I have lost my skills, and losing my workspace does not mean I have lost my ability to create,” Awad told Al Jazeera.

Awad and other displaced artists found shelter at an old school in Port Sudan, where they helped clean and prepare the building for families forced from their homes.

“Now, concerns about the possibility of eviction have left us uncertain about where we will go next,” he said.

While art cannot replace a lost home or end the war, Awad believes it can preserve memories, bring communities together and offer children space to play and express themselves.

“From the ashes, we will rise” is the motto of Ahalina cultural group. This is more than a slogan for Awad; it is a reminder to keep creating, despite everything the war has taken from him.

The war has taken a heavy toll on Sudan’s cultural life, damaging heritage sites and disrupting the livelihoods of artists across the country.

In June 2026, UNESCO estimated that Sudan’s cultural sector faced a $30m funding gap. But behind this figure are deeply personal losses: Artists killed by the war or forced to leave behind studios, galleries, artworks and the tools they need to create.

In April 2024, UNESCO reported that the Artists and Writers Union in Port Sudan had provided shelter to more than 112 displaced artists and other cultural professionals.

The challenges remain significant, but cultural initiatives have continued. In April 2026, UNESCO said its initiatives in Port Sudan had benefitted more than 350 artists, women, girls and internally displaced cultural professionals, supporting efforts to sustain Sudan’s cultural life amid the conflict.

Asim Abdelaziz, 31, a musician and filmmaker, left El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, amid escalating fighting and repeated drone attacks. He arrived in Port Sudan in November 2023, hoping to find safety and work.

Separated from his family, who are scattered between Omdurman and El Obeid, Asim lives alone in a shelter for displaced artists. The war has uprooted his life and disrupted his career, but he continues to use music to preserve Sudan’s cultural heritage and bring communities together.

In Port Sudan, he has worked with the local Artists and Writers Union, UNESCO and community organisations.  He has also collaborated with the Ministry of Culture and Information and other artists on music programmes to address social issues, including hate speech and racism.

Asim said the war has spurred hate speech and deepened divisions between Sudan’s different communities. He believes art can counter these differences by promoting diversity, mutual acceptance and peaceful coexistence.

“I have seen firsthand how hate speech affects people’s lives,” Asim told Al Jazeera. “Through music, I try to remind Sudanese people that we are all brothers and sisters, and that war does not represent who we are.”

Mokhalaya, a project he founded to document and archive traditional music and rhythms from across the country a year ago, is one avenue for this.

“I hope to take the project to international festivals, introducing audiences abroad to [showcase] Sudan’s rich musical traditions and cultural diversity,” he said.

Preserving heritage is not just about safeguarding the past, but also about keeping Sudan’s cultural identity alive during a war that has displaced communities and disrupted lives, he said.

Abdelqader Hashem, secretary of the Red Sea State Writers and Artists Union, told Al Jazeera the union has supported artists and their families who fled fighting in other parts of Sudan since the war began on April 15, 2023.

“We worked to establish a shelter for displaced artists in a school in Port Sudan and sought support from local and international organisations to provide for their basic needs,” he said.

Beyond providing shelter, the union has helped displaced artists take part in the city’s cultural activities, contributing to community awareness programmes that address important societal issues such as the dangers of drug use, a growing concern in Sudan.

“We have also implemented projects in partnership with UNESCO to train children in displacement camps in handicrafts, including concrete crafts,” Hashem said.

“Most of the displaced artists have since returned to their homes in Khartoum following the Sudanese army’s recapture of the capital.”

EXCLUSIVE

Siddiq Ander has accused RSF leader Hemedti of running the paramilitary group like a family business and suppressing dissent.

Senior commander Siddiq Ander says he has defected from Sudan‘s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), according to exclusive video footage obtained by Al Jazeera.

The footage, published on Friday, shows Ander accusing relatives of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti”, of tightly controlling the group’s finances, weapons, troop movements and military promotions.

Ander’s exit follows a string of high-profile defections this year, with some commanders leaving alongside hundreds of fighters.

“It has become clear to us beyond any doubt that we were serving a purely family-based project controlled by Hemedti’s relatives in every aspect, money, weapons, fighters’ movements and the granting of ranks,” Ander said.

“Anyone who speaks out and tells the whole truth faces expulsion, imprisonment or a hidden death.”

Hemedti’s brother, Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, serves as the RSF deputy commander.

Senior commanders break ranks

A wave of defections has seen several senior RSF commanders leave the group this year, including Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Azraq al-Fanjari, who announced on October 8 that he was leaving, along with 300 officers and soldiers and 30 military vehicles.

Al-Fanjari also urged other fighters to abandon the RSF, expressing regret over the suffering caused by the war.

His announcement came after the September 25 defection of Al-Tayeb al-Wahidu, who joined the enemy Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with 50 fighters in Omdurman, across the Nile from the capital, Khartoum, according to The Sudan Tribune.

Al-Wahidu cited abuses within the RSF as his reason for leaving.

Earlier, in May, Brigadier Ali Rizqallah, known as Savannah, announced his departure.

Yet another senior commander, Major General al-Nour Ahmed Adam, known as al-Qubba, joined the SAF in April and was publicly welcomed by Sudanese leader and military chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Al-Qubba’s departure followed disagreements over military appointments within the RSF leadership, the Tribune reported.

Sudan’s war erupted in April 2023 after a power struggle between the army and the RSF, including disagreements over plans to integrate the paramilitary group into the regular military.

The conflict has since displaced about 13 million people and pushed parts of the country into famine.

The latest defections come as both sides increasingly use drones in attacks that have caused mounting civilian casualties.

On October 26, strikes hit a market and residential area in Nyala, an RSF-controlled city in South Darfur.

Emergency Lawyers, a Sudanese rights group, reported more than 100 deaths, although other medical organisations recorded lower figures.

The United Nations says drone strikes have become the leading cause of civilian deaths in Sudan’s war.

Khartoum, Sudan – Rasha Abdelaziz Musa works every day for seven hours selling tea. But by the time she finishes for the day at 10pm, she’s still unsure if she has enough to feed her four children.

Musa, 39, is doing her best, but her earnings are increasingly no longer enough to cover soaring food prices in the Sudanese capital.

Her husband, a member of the Sudanese military, has spent more than eight months on the front lines of the country’s war, in which the military has been fighting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces since 2023. Musa has not heard from him for months, and he has sent no money.

In his absence, Musa has been left to provide for their children, who attend kindergarten, primary and secondary school.

Musa told Al Jazeera that feeding her family costs about 40,000 Sudanese pounds per day ($4 at the parallel-market exchange rate) before accounting for rent, household essentials and other expenses.

Some of the family staples are ful medames, a dish of stewed fava beans, or lentils. When lentils are too expensive, Musa serves taamiya, or falafel, sandwiches.

Prices regularly change, and Musa often ends the day in debt to the traders she gets her food from.

Large families struggle

Musa is not alone in struggling to cover her family’s daily expenses.

Ahmed Youssef, 61, supports a family of 12 through his work in a butcher’s shop and as an occasional intermediary in livestock sales. He can earn 90,000 to 140,000 pounds ($9 to $14) when a deal succeeds, but that income is irregular.

He told Al Jazeera that his household spends more than 100,000 Sudanese pounds ($10) daily and his income is no longer enough to support the family.

“One income is no longer enough to cover the family’s needs, and sometimes my older children have to work to help meet expenses,” Youssef told Al Jazeera.

Ali Fadil supports a family of 10. Without a permanent job, he goes to the market each morning to look for work. Some days, the 57-year-old earns enough to buy food, but on other days, he finds no work at all. And yet his daily expenses still reach about 70,000 pounds ($7), with rising prices adding to the financial pressure he faces.

“Sometimes I skip meals so I can pay for school fees or medical costs,” he said. “I also borrow money to meet other obligations.”

Food prices rise as Sudanese pound weakens

A survey of four local markets in the Khartoum State area by Al Jazeera last week found that prices for several essential foods had risen sharply within days, making it increasingly difficult for families to plan their spending.

A kilogramme (2.2.lb) of sugar cost about 10,000 pounds ($1), up from 9,000 pounds ($0.90) two days earlier. A litre (1 quart) of cooking oil rose to 25,000 pounds ($2.50) from 20,000 pounds ($2) while a loaf of bread costs 500 pounds ($0.05), compared with 300 pounds ($0.03) a week earlier.

Lentils cost about 10,000 pounds ($1) per kilogramme, up from 8,000 pounds ($0.80), and rice was priced at 13,000 pounds ($1.30) per kilogramme, up from 10,000 pounds ($1). Powdered milk reached 70,000 pounds ($7) per kilogramme, up from 60,000 ($6) two days earlier.

The Sudanese pound has also continued to weaken. According to exchange rates monitored by Al Jazeera, $1 was trading at 10,050 Sudanese pounds on the parallel market on Friday, compared with 9,500 the previous day.

Food inflation adds to pressure on households

Official figures offer further evidence of the rising cost of living, particularly in Khartoum and other urban areas.

According to Sudan’s Central Bureau of Statistics, prices across the country were 28 percent higher in September than a year earlier, up from 26 percent in August. Prices rose by 7.5 percent in September alone, more than double the increase recorded the previous month.

Food prices have risen even faster. Across Sudan, food and beverages cost nearly 37 percent more in September than a year earlier, up from an annual increase of about 21 percent in August. In September alone, food prices jumped by more than 17 percent.

The situation was particularly severe in Khartoum State, where prices were nearly 60 percent higher than a year earlier. Prices rose by more than 15 percent in September alone, following an increase of nearly 9 percent in August.

That sharp increase comes as the capital region struggles to recover from widespread destruction caused by the war. Although displaced residents have begun returning and businesses are gradually reopening since the military recaptured the state from the RSF last year, damaged infrastructure and rising transport costs continue to constrain the availability of goods.

The return of residents has also increased demand for essential supplies, further driving up prices. In September, fuel shortages hit the capital as consumption rose faster than supplies could be replenished.

Urban areas have generally been hit harder than rural communities. Food prices in towns and cities were 55 percent higher than a year earlier, up from about 40 percent in August. Overall, prices in urban areas rose by 40 percent over the past year, compared with about 21 percent in rural areas.

The war is the main driver of these increases, disrupting livelihoods and supply chains. According to the World Bank, Sudan’s economy shrank by an estimated 29 percent in 2023 and a further 14 percent in 2024 as the war devastated businesses, disrupted agricultural production and eliminated jobs.

The conflict has also forced millions of people from their homes with nearly 8.9 million people still internally displaced as of April, according to the International Organization for Migration.

War destroys livelihoods

Journalist and economic affairs specialist Khalid Teks said Sudan’s economic deterioration began long before the war. Falling oil production after South Sudan’s secession in 2011 worsened conditions as did the depreciation of the pound, cash shortages, international isolation, political conflict and corruption in the years preceding the removal of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019.

Teks said political instability during the power transition undermined Sudan’s economic performance, and deep reforms were not implemented before war broke out in 2023. The conflict devastated infrastructure and productive sectors, depleted savings and disrupted economic activity. The climate has also been a factor. Strong agricultural production in 2024 was followed by concern over limited rainfall this year and possible food shortages after the harvest begins in November.

Teks told Al Jazeera that families increasingly deplete their savings and sell their possessions to cover everyday expenses.

He also pointed to disruptions to remittance channels, which many Sudanese households rely on for financial support.

Teks called for easier humanitarian access, an end to the war, direct support for vulnerable households and low-interest loans for small businesses and craft enterprises.

“The government needs to provide direct support through dedicated funds and the Zakat Chamber, facilitate humanitarian organisations and offer affordable loans for small businesses and vocational activities,” Teks said. “This could help reopen markets and workshops and expand microfinance.

When Altayeb Alhadi was just six years old, his father died after a well collapsed in his village in White Nile state, south-central Sudan. Two months later, and his mother also died, leaving the five children in the family as orphans. As the eldest of the siblings, it was Altayeb’s responsibility to find work and help the family survive.

At 14, he travelled hundreds of kilometres from his home in Galli village to seek work in the north, where gold mines dot the landscape, so he could feed his siblings and keep them in school.

“We warned him about the dangers, but he was ambitious. Some relatives were already working in the area although they had found jobs in restaurants and other services rather than underground extraction,” Ayateb’s uncle Alhadi Hamid told Al Jazeera.

The boy initially worked in transport and other jobs, but when he heard lucrative stories from miners in the area, he began to search for gold in the surrounding mountains.

Altayeb died in an air strike attributed to the Egyptian military at a gold-mining site near Jabal Al-Aigdat in Sudan’s Red Sea region on October 10, which killed at least 72 miners, a few months after he began working at the site.

“It was less than 30 minutes since we separated, and he said he was going to the mine. We suddenly heard a loud sound of bombardment, and we ran. It was too chaotic with people running in all directions and many attacks taking place within a few minutes,” a fellow miner told Al Jazeera, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“We found Altayeb with his hand and leg [blown off] and a severe injury to his abdomen [which] was open. We tried to help him and took him to a safer place near a mountain. We were terrified. He died within hours. … We couldn’t believe how quickly things could happen.”

Altayeb worked alongside about 15 young men and children, using basic tools to extract gold from the rocks. The miners worked night and day, taking the material they gathered to nearby mills for processing.

Proceeds from any gold found were shared, but earnings depended on the amount of gold recovered and individual agreements. On productive days, the group could earn more than $100, the miner said.

“We used to dig for two to three weeks until we found a gram or less. If the gold percentage in the well wasn’t good, we would change locations. When we found a gram or less, we sold it and shared the profit, which was about $100,” Altayeb’s former colleague said.

For young people supporting relatives, even irregular earnings in these dangerous gold mines can seem preferable to unemployment.

Altayeb told his siblings 10 days before his death that he would soon return home, his sister Rogaia Alhadi told local media.

Friends told the family that Altayeb visited them at a restaurant near the mining site on the morning of the attack, his uncle said. They shared a cup of tea before heading towards the mine for the final time. Minutes later, the air strike hit the area.

Authorities in Egypt have accused Sudanese miners of crossing its border and reportedly linked some to gold smuggling, drugs and human trafficking. The Sudanese side did not respond to these allegations.

Since a civil war between Sudan’s military and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group broke out in 2023, the economy has tanked and forced thousands with no other source of income to find work in the artisanal gold mines of northern Sudan.

This can vary from independent prospecting to working in investor-owned pits for a share of the proceeds. Earnings depend on the amount of gold found, equipment and fuel costs, and profit percentages agreed with financiers.

Although some miners strike gold, they still face an array of dangers, ranging from collapsing shafts and unstable ground to air strikes. Limited medical care makes mining, particularly in remote areas, especially hazardous.

Living conditions are also extremely hard. Mohamed Awadalkarim, who was a miner in River Nile state for 10 years, said workers often shelter in makeshift huts made from burlap sacks and plastic sheeting. Their diet consists mainly of lentils and sorghum porridge.

But for families without reliable incomes, mining offers a possible source of immediate earnings. Miners may spend hours searching for gold and not find enough to cover their expenses. Others share proceeds with investors or equipment owners, leaving them with limited money left.

Artisanal and small-scale mining accounted for 53.71 tonnes, or about 83 per cent, of Sudan’s declared gold production in 2024, but this was just in areas under government control, according to research by the Chatham House think tank. About one million people were involved in artisanal mining across Sudan’s 18 states, generating $1bn annually for the country.

Artisanal mines, while generally viewed as being outside the main war-funding networks, have still been exposed to violence.

On June 16, several people were reportedly killed and injured in attacks on mining sites near the Egyptian border, according to local sources and miners.

The repeated air strikes near Sudan’s border with Egypt have raised concerns about civilian protection, territorial sovereignty and accountability.

Egyptian authorities have accused Sudanese prospectors of crossing the border to mine near a concession managed by an Egyptian company, but there is little independent evidence to back these claims.

Sudanese military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan reportedly ordered a fact-finding committee involving prosecutors, judicial representatives and security agencies to investigate the attack. Findings from an inquiry into a similar incident announced in June have not been made public.

Altayeb paid the highest price in this regional conflict and the hunt for gold, which provides huge profits for some and meagre incomes for many.

Altayeb’s siblings are now living with their extended family, including uncles, aunts and cousins. People who know them are trying to help his brothers and sisters and are carrying out community initiatives in Galli to keep his memory alive.

“We will raise the children and care for them as he would have wanted. He was young, caring and brave, and he will always be remembered,” Altayeb said.

MIAMI — More than 100,000 people from Ukraine and Sudan can stay in the United States without immediate risk of deportation, the Department of Homeland Security said, in what amounts to a temporary reprieve after their right to stay in the country was set to expire Monday.

Temporary Protected Status was set to end Oct. 19 for about 101,000 Ukrainians and 1,800 Sudanese. But DHS said an announcement “will be made at the appropriate time.” Until then, the department said in a written statement, Ukrainians and Sudanese in the U.S. covered by those temporary measures “retain protection.” The Department did not indicate how long they could stay or when a final announcement would be made on their status.

DHS did not respond to a question about whether they can keep their work permits, but TPS generally allows people to work while their protections remain in effect.

The decision Monday marks another incident where the Trump administration, which has previously sought to end these temporary protections from deportation and send people back to their home countries, has allowed people covered by the temporary status to stay in the country but without giving any guidance as to how long.

The context of the decisions to keep the protections

The Trump administration has already terminated TPS for more than 1 million people from 13 countries, including Venezuela, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Syria.

But in a change in practice roughly a month ago, the administration kept protections in place for nearly 200,000 Salvadorans whose TPS was set to expire Sept. 9. In that case they also said that they were going to make a decision at the appropriate time and that in the meantime, people from El Salvador could continue to work and live in the U.S.

Activists and a bipartisan group of lawmakers have been raising the alarm over the upcoming deadline for TPS to expire for Ukrainians, arguing that conditions remain unsafe for them to return home amid the war with Russia.

Ukraine was first designated for TPS in April 2022, following Russia’s full-scale invasion two months earlier. The Biden administration subsequently extended the designation, most recently in January 2025, when DHS authorized an additional 18 months of protection through October 2026.

The TPS program for Sudan was established in 1997, and since then, successive U.S. administrations have extended it due to the armed conflict and political instability that have plagued the African nation.

The decision Monday comes two weeks before the Nov. 3 midterm elections, when Trump’s hard line immigration policies will face a test at the ballot box.

The TPS program has offered protections for decades but is controversial

The U.S. Congress created TPS in 1990 to prevent deportations to countries suffering from natural disasters or civil strife.

It allows people already in the country to remain and work, for renewable periods if the homeland security secretary determines conditions are unsafe for their return. But it doesn’t give them a pathway to permanent residency.

Supporters say that using this tool protects people from being returned to dangerous situations and that uprooting people covered by TPS after years of living in the U.S. is cruel. Critics, especially in the Trump administration, say successive administrations have extended these protections for years regardless of what has happened in the home countries.

Federal rules say TPS is automatically extended for six months if the secretary doesn’t make a determination at least 60 days before the designation expires.

Advocates are grateful for DHS decision, warn about the war

“We’re grateful for an extension, however temporary, for TPS holders from Ukraine and Sudan,” said Myal Greene, president and CEO of World Relief, an organization that has provided humanitarian assistance in both countries. “We encourage the administration and Congress to consider longer term relief for women, men and children trying to carve out stability while their countries of origin remain in upheaval.”

Krish O’Mara Vignarajah, president and CEO of Global Refuge, noted Ukraine and Sudan are not safe and meet the legal conditions for TPS to be extended.

“Russia’s war on Ukraine is nearing its fifth year, and Ukrainians are bracing for another winter under drone and missile strikes, driving civilian casualties and devastating critical infrastructure. Sudan remains locked in a brutal civil war marked by famine, widespread human rights abuses and the hallmarks of genocide,” Vignarajah said. “It is not safe for these families to go home.”

Salomon writes for the Associated Press. AP reporter Rebecca Santana contributed to this report from Washington.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has unveiled an updated national security doctrine and displayed a map of rival regional alignments, signalling a security approach that prioritises preemptive military action, the expansion of buffer zones, and the pursuit of new regional partnerships.

The document was developed with the assistance of Israel’s National Security Council and published by the Prime Minister’s Office on Sunday, just nine days before Israel’s parliamentary elections that could spell the end of Netanyahu’s time in office. It outlines a formal policy of preventing perceived threats through military action rather than containment – a policy that has already been seen in action over the past few years, as Israel pursues multiple wars and attacks on its neighbours.

Electoral survival strategy

The timing of the map’s release carries particular political significance, with Netanyahu fighting to retain power amid criticism of his conduct in power, the ongoing corruption trial he faces and his handling of the October 7, 2023, attacks, as well as the wars that followed.

As the October 27 election day draws closer, Netanyahu is attempting to bolster his credentials as Israel’s ‘Mr Security’, hoping to get the votes of Israelis who may not like some of his other policies or behaviour, but still view him as the most likely leader to defend the country.

Netanyahu, who did get the endorsement of US President Donald Trump on Sunday, said during the briefing that Israel could face the possibility of a far less supportive administration in Washington in two years, after the end of the Trump presidency.

“In two years, a president… who is extremely hostile to Israel could come to power [in the United States],” Netanyahu warned.

He therefore argued that Israel must “expand our network of alliances and develop capabilities that make us a valuable asset” to other countries as a way of protecting itself if US policy towards it changed.

The comments, according to analysts, suggest that Netanyahu is seeking to portray his leadership as essential to navigating both Israel’s regional military challenges and its diplomatic isolation, all while keeping a fearful electorate reassured.

Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, explained that the strategic presentation centred on competing regional blocs and buffer zones.

That framework “incubates and nurtures existential fears, which would lead Israeli voters to feel the need for a decisive leader”, Hage Ali noted.

In his assessment, Netanyahu stands to benefit from the Israeli public’s fear of regional threats by presenting himself as a familiar leader capable of managing them, making him “the devil you know”, as the analyst put it, to voters reluctant to embrace political change at a sensitive time.

Netanyahu’s political opponents have been quick to push back against that narrative.

Gadi Eisenkot, one of the prime minister’s main challengers in the upcoming election, said that the published doctrine was “two hollow pages, full of slogans that have nothing to do with a security concept”.

Another, former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, described the document as “superficial”.

Expanding security zones

The map displayed during Netanyahu’s briefing was originally published in May by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a German political foundation. It divides the Middle East and parts of Africa into competing blocs, highlighting the region’s complex network of alliances and rivalries.

Those networks include states, unrecognised entities and non-state actors.

The map identifies an Israel-United Arab Emirates alignment, described as the “Hexagon Alliance”, alongside a separate grouping of Egypt, Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – the latter three of which signed the Mecca mutual defence pact in August – labelled the “Sunni Diamond Alliance”. It also depicts Iran and its regional allies as a separate axis.

The map serves to illustrate the issues outlined in the published security doctrine, presenting a region where Israel faces multiple threats, the alliance that Israel is seeking to cultivate across the wider region, and the perceived need for “buffer zones” – the occupation of territory in other countries.

Israel’s existing illegal occupation of territory in Gaza and southern Lebanon illustrates the potential consequences of expanding the buffer zone approach.

Hage Ali warned that continuing to pursue an approach built around expanding military control could lead to “more conflict and more ethnic cleansing” under the guise of security buffers.

Embracing regional factions

A striking element of the map displayed by Netanyahu is its explicit designation of non-state actors as friendly entities.

The map highlights territories controlled by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Khalifa Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army within an alignment deemed cooperative to Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Israel views these actors as pragmatic partners or at least cooperative entities in a broader strategic grid, Hage Ali explained. However, the public association of these groups with Israel threatens to damage their domestic standing across the Arab world.

That reflects Netanyahu’s immediate priorities, where “what Israelis think matters more than the reputation of your allies and the viability of these alliances”, Hage Ali added.

The portrayal of the Middle East as a region divided into competing alliances also carries risks for Netanyahu’s broader diplomatic ambitions.

Earlier this year, Netanyahu proposed a “hexagon of alliances”, envisaging cooperation between Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and unnamed Arab, African and Asian partners, against what he described as “radical” regional alliances.

The proposed grouping has not been established as a formal alliance, and commentators in Israel and the international press have described the project as a branding exercise rather than a binding military pact, noting that countries like India prioritise non-alignment and pragmatic trade over ideologically rigid blocs.

For Tehran and its regional partners, the map also offers potent political leverage.

Hage Ali emphasised that the visual layout “will certainly help their propaganda machine”, providing Hezbollah and other Iranian allies with evidence to reinforce the narrative that Israel seeks to expand and dominate the region.

The Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) exchanged artillery and missile fire from their positions in Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri, while a UN official warned that famine is threatening the country.

Army forces bombed RSF sites in the Riyadh neighbourhood and Sports City, south of Khartoum.

From their positions east of Khartoum, the RSF launched artillery shelling, targeting army camps in the capital and the General Command.

This comes as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu, resumed its bombing of the city of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan State, after having ceased for weeks.

SPLM bombed the city with artillery and Katyusha rockets from the east and north.

In South Darfur state, about 80 people were killed over the last three days in the tribal conflict between the Beni Halba and Salamat tribes near the city of Buram. The conflict between the two tribes has broken out several times and led to the death and injury of dozens.

A UN official has warned that the ongoing conflict could mean more than six million people face the threat of famine.

The deputy head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHOA) in Sudan said that the general situation in the country is catastrophic.

READ: Sudan medics warn that cholera and dengue fever are spreading

Sudanese medical sources reported that 18 people died and 265 were infected with cholera in the state of Gedaref, bordering Ethiopia, while medics warned of an outbreak of cholera and dengue fever across the country with the start of seasonal rains and the effects of the war on the health system there.

The Sudanese Medical Association reported that 3,398 cases of dengue fever were recorded in the states of Gedaref, Red Sea, North Kordofan and Khartoum from mid-April to mid-September.

The war has forced more than 4.2 million people to flee their homes and about 1.2 million to cross into neighbouring countries.

Hasanat al-Rashid, 48, has lived with diabetes for 15 years, and the three-and-a-half-year civil war between Sudan’s military and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group has worsened her situation. Finding the treatment she needs has become a daily struggle.

When the war broke out in April 2023, she was forced to flee south from her home in Haj Yousif in Khartoum North to Umm Daw Ban in Khartoum State.

During her displacement, she went for days without medication and was forced to eat foods unsuitable for her condition, such as asida, a traditional Sudanese porridge.

She underwent operations on her foot twice when she developed complications of diabetes, including a severe infection.

She moved between hospitals in Gezira State south of Khartoum, seeking treatment in Rufaa, Wad Madani and Al-Hasahisa. When fighting spread to these areas in December 2023, she fled again, arriving in Port Sudan, a city on the Red Sea that was less affected by the war.

Her condition has worsened to the point that she now has to use insulin every day and with this comes added costs, something that forces diabetes sufferers in Sudan to choose between medicine and other essentials, such as food.

“The doses vary depending on whether my blood sugar is high or low,” she told Al Jazeera.

The war has pushed income levels in Sudan back to those last seen in the 1990s, according to the United Nations Development Programme. This means Hasanat and other diabetes sufferers are struggling to afford the medicine they need to treat the condition.

Hasanat’s doctor recommended she use an insulin pen, a device used to inject insulin under the skin. She would need one or two of the devices a month, but the cost at 70,000 Sudanese pounds ($8) is more than she can afford up front, so she opts for a vial of insulin.

This is cheaper at 17,000 Sudanese pounds ($1.80), but there is the additional cost of buying ice every day to keep the insulin cool. She spends 180,000 pounds ($20) a month on ice to preserve the medicine. But she is able to spread these costs out through the month, making the vials her only viable option even if the overall costs are higher than an insulin pen.

“It may last a month or less, but the challenge is that I don’t have a refrigerator, so I struggle to store the insulin properly,” she said.

She also needs painkillers and vitamins on a regular basis to manage complications caused by the diabetes.

The rising cost of treatment

Fatima Adam, 75, is among the patients at Port Sudan Hospital struggling to afford the medicines she needs to manage her hypertension and a thyroid condition.

She was admitted to the hospital with complications caused by high blood pressure, which has started to impact her heart. Too unwell to speak to Al Jazeera herself, her daughter, Aisha, described how the rising cost of treatment has affected her whole family.

Before the war, Fatima received medicine through the National Health Insurance Fund. She paid a quarter of the cost while the fund covered the rest. But when the war started and the economy collapsed, the medicines she needed were no longer covered by the scheme.

“My mother takes six different medicines because hypertension has affected her heart in addition to her thyroid medication. The war has made things harder because the prices of these medicines have gone up,” Aisha told Al Jazeera.

The responsibility for paying for Fatima’s treatment and supporting her and her daughter falls on her son, who works as a casual worker. With no fixed income, he goes to the market every day in search of work but sometimes returns home empty without any luck.

“Sometimes, when my brother finds work, we buy enough medicine to last a month. Other times, we have to buy smaller quantities and take the medicines intermittently,” Aisha said.

She bought a month’s supply of her mother’s medication a few days ago for 160,000 Sudanese pounds ($17.80), a substantial expense for a family whose income depends on day labour but essential to treating Fatima’s condition.

War damage

The war has caused an estimated $500m in losses to medicine stocks, infrastructure and transport fleets, dealing a major blow to Sudan’s pharmaceutical supply system, the National Medical Supplies Fund told Al Jazeera.

The National Medicines and Poisons Board estimated that only eight of the 30 pharmaceutical factories in Khartoum that shut down during the conflict have resumed operations despite the security situation in the capital recently improving.

This has increased Sudan’s reliance on imported medicines, but the subsequent depreciation of the Sudanese pound has driven up the costs of pharmaceutical procurement and production.

Hossam al-Naeem, who works as a pharmacist in Port Sudan, said customers with diabetes and hypertension require regular painkillers and vitamins to help their overall condition.

“I feel deeply saddened when I see the expressions on some patients’ faces as they ask about the prices of medicines and discover how much they have increased because of the depreciation of the Sudanese pound,” Hossam told Al Jazeera.

The currency’s collapse has created added challenges for pharmacists. Before the war, a dollar traded for roughly 600 Sudanese pounds. Now black-market currency traders are quoting rates of 9,300 pounds to the dollar, meaning higher costs for most goods in Sudan.

Sometimes Hossam incurs losses himself when he finds that the prices of drugs have risen sharply, and keeping essential medicines stocked is becoming difficult.

“I used to sell a strip of cold and flu tablets for 6,000 Sudanese pounds [70 cents]. But when I went to buy new stock, I found that the supplier’s price was also 6,000 pounds per strip. That means I made no profit, not even enough to cover the pharmacy’s operating costs,” he said.

The struggle to afford heart medication

Huda Mahmoud, 58, lives in el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state in south-central Sudan, where drone attacks and other violence remain a problem while the military is making advances towards the city.

Huda has lived with heart problems for more than 12 years and described the impacts of the war as being physical, financial and emotional.

“I take five different medicines. There was a time when they weren’t available, and I suffered a lot. Sometimes, I had to ask people in Wad Madani, Sennar or Port Sudan to send them to me,” she told Al Jazeera. “The medicines were extremely expensive, costing me 300,000 Sudanese pounds [$33.30] a month.”

Taking medication has become a carefully managed routine with each pill tied to a specific time of day.

“I’ve become tied to my pills: this one before eating, that one afterwards. If I forget one, my heart starts beating very fast,” she added.

In March, Huda was forced to travel from el-Obeid to Omdurman. Following her strict treatment regimen has become increasingly difficult during repeated periods of upheaval.

She has now returned home to el-Obeid, where her regular medicine is priced at 151,000 Sudanese pounds ($16.80) a month, something she can barely afford.

Her greatest fear is running out of medicine or being unable to afford her next supply, which would put her at risk of a blood clot.

“I’m afraid of becoming incapacitated. I used to be responsible for the whole household, but now I need help. I feel like I’ve become a burden on my family,” she said.

More than three years into the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan is desperately in need of a political settlement. The fighting has caused immense suffering, and a military solution alone cannot rebuild the state or reunify its fractured society. Under such circumstances, any effort aimed at encouraging Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue deserves serious consideration rather than outright rejection.

In August, a self-appointed committee of 19 Sudanese public figures, chaired by Ahfad University President Qasim Badri, launched an initiative to prepare the ground for national dialogue inside Sudan. Its members had earlier met SAF chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and called for legal restrictions on opposition politicians to be lifted. The authorities subsequently issued a decree to drop certain politically motivated charges against Sudanese abroad returning for dialogue and grant participants temporary legal protections. These are limited but important confidence-building measures.

The initiative has nevertheless faced strong opposition. The civilian coalition Sumoud, led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and Ta’sis, an alliance that includes the RSF, have opposed the proposed internal dialogue. They question its independence and warn that holding talks in army-controlled areas could legitimise al-Burhan’s authority and entrench the country’s divisions. These concerns are legitimate and deserve serious attention. But the committee says it is not seeking to negotiate Sudan’s future or determine the agenda of a national dialogue. Its role is to help create the conditions for Sudanese political actors to engage one another directly. The question is whether it can fulfil that role without allowing one side of the conflict to dominate the process. Dismissing the initiative before it has had an opportunity to demonstrate its value would be premature.

The country’s political actors and civil society organisations remain deeply divided, previous mediation efforts have faltered, and the war continues to make comprehensive political engagement increasingly difficult. The committee’s initiative is an attempt to break the deadlock. Efforts to prepare for political dialogue should not be postponed until the fighting stops. Securing a ceasefire and ensuring humanitarian access are urgent priorities, but preparations for political dialogue can proceed alongside efforts to achieve them.

The committee’s members were not elected, and they do not represent every political constituency. Yet the committee’s legitimacy cannot be judged solely by how it was created. It must also be judged by whether it can help bring a broader range of political actors into a national dialogue.

Good intentions alone cannot resolve concerns about credibility. Political dialogue can succeed only if participants believe the process is fair and independent. The legitimacy required to facilitate a political opening is not necessarily the same as that required to negotiate a national settlement. But even a preparatory initiative must earn the trust of those it seeks to bring together.

The committee’s meeting with al-Burhan was a practical necessity. As army chief and head of the Sovereignty Council, he was in a position to respond to the committee’s demands for legal protections. Engaging with al-Burhan does not in itself amount to an endorsement of his authority. But if the initiative becomes too closely associated with the army, other political actors may view it as an extension of al-Burhan’s political agenda rather than an independent facilitator. The committee must therefore demonstrate that its engagement extends beyond the military authorities and that it is prepared to work with political forces that oppose them.

The initiative was launched in Khartoum, which is under army control. This raises a genuine concern about whether a process beginning in territory controlled by one side of the war can attract the confidence of political forces across the country. A national dialogue cannot be confined to one geographical or political constituency. Entire regions have experienced different realities of war, governance, displacement and insecurity. The committee must find ways to reach those living outside army-controlled areas, including Sudanese displaced by the fighting, and ensure they can participate freely and without intimidation.

Sumoud and Ta’sis’s decision to reject the initiative does not automatically invalidate the process. Their concerns deserve consideration, but outright rejection at this early stage risks closing off an opportunity for political engagement. At the same time, their absence matters. Sudan’s crisis is too deep and complex to be addressed by any single political current. The committee cannot expect every stakeholder to endorse its initiative immediately, but it must create conditions that persuade reluctant actors to participate. If it fails to do so, the initiative itself will have failed.

The African Union Commission and the Arab League have also welcomed the initiative, providing an important measure of regional support. Their endorsement lends weight to the effort to revive Sudanese-led political dialogue, although external backing cannot substitute for the confidence of Sudan’s own political forces.

The committee’s initiative should therefore be judged without excessive optimism or automatic suspicion. The legal measures announced following its engagement with al-Burhan are an encouraging first step, but the real test lies ahead. Does it help remove legal and political obstacles facing opposition actors in practice, not just on paper? Can it win the confidence of those who have rejected it? Can it ensure that Sudanese across the country’s political and geographical divides have an opportunity to participate freely?

What is clear, however, is that Sudan’s crisis will ultimately require Sudanese actors with profoundly different visions of the country’s future to sit together and engage one another politically. No committee can do that on their behalf. No external actor can do it for them. At best, a preparatory initiative can help create the conditions under which such engagement becomes possible. The concerns raised by its critics should not be dismissed, but neither should they be grounds for rejecting the initiative before it has had an opportunity to address them. Those who have rejected it should remain open to reconsidering their position if the committee demonstrates that it can build an independent and inclusive process. If it succeeds, it will have rendered an important national service.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – As renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa, public backing by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of Ethiopia’s federal government and Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy are drawing scrutiny.

Both Gulf powers have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, but their roles differ. The UAE has publicly backed Ethiopia’s government while Saudi Arabia has previously helped broker an Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and was reported to have offered to mediate between the two countries in 2025.

The renewed fighting threatens to unravel the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended a war between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan forces. As tensions with Eritrea add to the risks of a wider confrontation, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh offer a window into the interests of external powers in the crisis.

The UAE: Clear alignment, unproven leverage

On September 25, the UAE condemned attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray and the escalation in the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara.

Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE minister of state, expressed solidarity with Ethiopia’s government and people, reaffirmed support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement.

The statement made Abu Dhabi’s public position clear: It backs Ethiopia’s federal government while calling for de-escalation and dialogue. It did not establish whether the UAE was providing military assistance or had secured commitments from the parties to end the fighting.

The UAE also has commercial interests across the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) operates Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 connects the port with Jebel Ali in the UAE, providing an additional corridor for cargo serving inland destinations, such as Ethiopia. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade.

These commercial links help explain Abu Dhabi’s interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa. However, they do not establish that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de-escalate or change Ethiopia’s military calculations.

The extent to which Abu Dhabi can use its relationship with the federal government to encourage a political response to the conflict remains unclear.

Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic experience, uncertain engagement

Saudi Arabia has yet to publicly announce its position on the latest fighting in Tigray.

The kingdom has not publicly commented on the renewed war, according to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, although it undertook diplomatic efforts earlier this year to reduce tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF.

Saudi Arabia has previously sought to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that sources said Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two countries amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security.

A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank said previous Saudi mediation efforts had failed, partly because negotiations did not address Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.

The kingdom’s broader regional alignment also matters. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as backing Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

This is an assessment of regional alignment, however, not evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly providing military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting.

Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in Red Sea security, a vital corridor for international shipping and its own oil exports. Whether Riyadh will take a more public diplomatic role as tensions escalate remains unclear.

Egypt’s rivalry with Ethiopia adds to regional tensions

Egypt’s role in the crisis is shaped by its longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its growing ties with Eritrea.

Cairo has also stressed that responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with countries bordering the waterway, a position shared by Asmara. The issue has added to regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks reliable access to the sea.

In September, Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

His remarks, reported by Al Jazeera on September 28, did not provide evidence substantiating the accusation. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, subsequently reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference, rejecting suggestions that it had departed from those principles.

He did not directly address the specific allegation of Egyptian support for the TPLF.

Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea has nevertheless become an important part of the regional picture. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026.

According to Egypt’s presidency, the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security.

The two leaders also stressed the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting highlighted closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but did not establish that either country was involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.

For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

Its relations with Eritrea and its disagreements with Addis Ababa form part of the wider regional context, but they are not evidence of direct Egyptian involvement in the renewed conflict. Whether these regional relationships will affect the course of the fighting remains uncertain.

From Tigray to a wider regional crisis

The risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable access to the sea is a national priority while Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups. Eritrea denies the allegations and has called on the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The allegations remain contested, but deteriorating relations have raised the stakes of renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.

A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, complicate humanitarian access and disrupt regional trade and security. It would also test whether external partners could encourage restraint without appearing to endorse either side’s military objectives.

The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could provide a channel for diplomatic engagement while Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy offers a possible opening for renewed talks. However, the available public evidence does not establish that either country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

Influence must be measured by outcomes

The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be cast as pursuing opposing strategies simply because one has publicly backed Ethiopia’s federal government while the other’s current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not show that either has decisive influence over the fighting.

Their contribution should be assessed by whether they can help secure concrete steps towards de-escalation, renewed political dialogue and a reduction in tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic achievements may create opportunities for engagement, but they are not substitutes for progress on the ground.

The Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, yet renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of sustaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A durable settlement will depend primarily on the parties themselves. External partners could contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations.

For now, the UAE’s public alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic record offer different potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can turn those relationships into a meaningful contribution towards de-escalation remains unresolved.

Government security forces regain control of Rumbek town after outsiders attempted to take control of the area.

Intercommunal clashes have killed 71 people in South Sudan’s town of Rumbek, in Lakes State, the caretaker government said in a statement.

“According to initial security reports, approximately 71 people were reportedly killed,” including four soldiers, the South Sudanese interim Ministry of Information said in a statement on Friday. The exact number of fatalities has yet to be verified.

According to AFP, witnesses said a group of people from outside Rumbek tried to take control of the town and briefly succeeded. The attackers withdrew when police and military reinforcements arrived. Two witnesses said the fighting moved outside the city limits.

The government statement said, “Rumbek town is currently under the control of Government security forces, and efforts are ongoing to restore normalcy”.

The caretaker government strongly condemned the violence and urged all communities to “exercise maximum restraint and refrain from acts of retaliation that could further escalate tensions”.

Interim government

On September 22, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir dissolved the transitional government, three months before the country’s first election since its independence in 2011. Kiir appointed a caretaker administration as the country prepares for its first-ever national elections.

His decree ended a power-sharing arrangement set up under a 2018 peace deal that halted a five-year civil war in which about 400,000 people were killed.

Intercommunal conflict has continued across South Sudan, resulting in multiple deadly clashes.

On September 17, 26 people were killed, and 82 were injured during days of fighting in a disputed region on the border between South Sudan and Sudan.

In early March, intercommunal violence left at least 169 people dead after dozens of armed men attacked a town.

At least 10 civilians were killed in West Kordofan and 5,500 displaced in Blue Nile as clashes widened on Tuesday.

Sudan’s military chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has promised to seize “every inch” of territory under the control of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), rejecting negotiations to end three and a half years of war.

Al-Burhan made the comments on Tuesday while addressing a gathering in Village 5, located in the northern Sudanese locality of Merowe, according to the Sudan News Agency.

He said the “military option” would continue until the RSF was removed from Sudan.

The Sudanese army and the RSF have been fighting since April 2023 after leaders of the groups fell out over plans to integrate the paramilitary force into Sudan’s army. The conflict has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced around 13 million, according to UN and international estimates.

Al-Burhan’s pledge to continue fighting came as 10 civilians were killed and several others were wounded in an attack by the RSF in Sudan’s West Kordofan state, according to a local charity group.

In a statement, the Dar Hamar Emergency Committee accused the RSF of multiple violations against civilians in Abu Ajal village in the southeastern countryside of En Nahud.

The RSF has been massing in West Kordofan as Sudan’s army advances towards the cities of En Nahud and Al Khuway after gains in neighbouring North Kordofan.

In Sudan’s Blue Nile state, more than 5,500 people were displaced from villages over three days amid deteriorating security, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said on Tuesday.

Meanwhile, an envoy of US President Donald Trump said Sudanese parties must take the lead in talks to end the war.

In a post on X on Monday, Massad Boulos, the US senior adviser for Arab and African affairs, said peace could be achieved “through an inclusive Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led national dialogue, transition toward a civilian-led government”.

The US State Department said last month that neither the Sudanese Armed Forces, the RSF, nor their respective leaders “represent legitimate, constitutional governance for Sudan”.