Sudan

EXPLAINER

China and Sudan signed off on a waiver of $50m as Sudan’s military-led government seeks support amid Western sanctions.

China has waived loans worth $50m that it had given to Sudan, the two countries said over the weekend. The agreement comes three years into a war between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that has shrunk the country’s economy by roughly 40 percent, according to the United Nations.

The sum is small compared with what Sudan owes overall to external governments or agencies, an amount estimated at more than $56bn before the war. But the waiver lands at a moment when Khartoum has few other international lenders extending any financial support.

China’s relationship with Sudan predates the war by decades, built on oil and infrastructure interests that survived multiple changes of government in Khartoum. But the war has narrowed Sudan’s options elsewhere, as Western governments have largely held back or imposed sanctions.

Here’s why this deal is significant for Sudan and China:

What do we know about the deal?

The signed protocol in Port Sudan cancels four interest-free loans worth 344 million yuan, about $50m, with immediate effect, according to Sudan’s official news agency, SUNA.

Sudan’s Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim welcomed the move, reportedly saying that China has continued investing in the country throughout the war while Western governments, including the United States and European Union members, have largely held back. Gibril himself was added to the US Treasury sanctions list in September 2025 for his alleged “involvement in Sudan’s brutal civil war and … connections to Iran”.

China’s charge d’affaires in Sudan, Xu Jian, reportedly said at the signing ceremony that China was ready to help rebuild what was destroyed during the war in Sudan.

What’s in it for Sudan?

Sudan’s external debt of more than $56bn before the war is expected to have ballooned since.

The $50m debt relief amounts to not even 1 percent of the total external pre-war debt. In fact, Sudan was close to a far bigger debt write-off in 2021. It was on track with the IMF and the World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative to have more than $50bn of its debt forgiven within three years. The 2021 military coup in October derailed that debt relief plan, and the process was formally suspended a year later.

Still, China’s waiver arrives at a moment of acute need for the country. The war is now in its third year. More than 1.5 million people have been killed, according to the UN, and the war has displaced about 14 million people – about a quarter of the Sudanese population. The World Health Organization says less than 14 percent of health facilities are still functioning. Jobs have vanished in many parts of the country, and the rising cost of living has made it difficult for households to survive.

The Sudanese pound has collapsed since the start of the war. It went from roughly 600 to the dollar before the war to more than 5000 to the dollar by June 2026.

What’s in it for China?

In many ways, Beijing’s decision to waive the $50m loan is in keeping with a broader approach it has taken in recent years, one that has helped cement China as Africa’s largest trading partner for 17 consecutive years.

China has provided interest-free loan forgiveness as a diplomatic gesture to multiple countries, and these decisions are recurrent announcements at Beijing’s frequent leader-level summits with African nations. This is especially true for smaller loans. Research from the Johns Hopkins China Africa Research Initiative found that China forgave at least $3.4bn of these kinds of debts across the African continent between 2000 and 2019.

By contrast, larger loans are usually commercial loans through state banks that come with interest, and waiving those is harder.

At a time when the West is largely trying to isolate Sudan’s leadership, a small loan waiver gives China outsized influence in a country that sits at the intersection of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

What have China-Sudan ties been like historically?

Oil has long served as a catalyst for their relationship. From the mid-1990s on, China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) poured billions of dollars into Sudanese oil fields and the pipelines carrying that crude oil to Port Sudan. This was a time when many Western companies were pushed out due to sanctions.

The relationship changed when the southern part of the country voted in favour of independence in 2011. The world’s newest country, South Sudan, left the north and took most of the country’s oil fields with it.

Chinese investment largely dried up afterwards, but Sudan still has more than $5bn of outstanding debt to China. The war has aggravated Sudan’s economic challenges. The CNPC requested a formal exit from Sudan in December 2025.

Khartoum, Sudan – As drone attacks rain down on el-Obeid and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) tighten their months-long siege, the capital of North Kordofan has emerged as the latest flashpoint in Sudan’s grinding war of attrition.

Despite mounting international alarm and renewed US diplomatic pressure aimed at securing a nationwide truce, Sudan’s warring generals remain deeply entrenched. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF appear locked in a pursuit of outright military victory, largely sustained by a continuous flow of foreign weapons.

Through the lens of the escalating crisis in el-Obeid, a grim reality is unfolding: Civilian suffering is increasingly weaponised amid polarised domestic narratives, while geopolitical manoeuvring repeatedly stalls any viable path to peace.

A strategic prize and international alarm

El-Obeid holds immense strategic value. Located 550km (340 miles) southwest of Khartoum, it acts as the primary gateway linking Khartoum to the vast Darfur region. The city is also a major military stronghold, hosting the SAF’s 5th Infantry Division, known as “Al-Hagana”, and has become a refuge for hundreds of thousands of displaced civilians fleeing violence elsewhere.

The looming threat of a full-scale ground invasion has triggered urgent global warnings. Recently, 38 international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), alongside the UN and countries including Qatar, sounded the alarm over the escalating use of drones and the potential for mass atrocities, warning that el-Obeid could face the same devastation recently seen in el-Fasher.

Yet these warnings have failed to alter the calculus on the ground.

Polarised narratives of a stalled peace

Recent United States diplomatic efforts, led by Massad Boulos, an adviser to US President Donald Trump, have pushed for a comprehensive ceasefire. However, the push for peace has collided with absolute domestic polarisation.

SAF commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has firmly rejected unconditional truces, stating that the army will operate with the precision of “digging with a needle” until the RSF is entirely dismantled.

This deadlock reflects a deeply fractured political landscape. Fathi Abu Ammar, a Sudanese academic, told Al Jazeera that the SAF is primarily responsible for the prolonged suffering by obstructing peace initiatives and refusing to establish safe corridors for civilians to leave el-Obeid.

He accused the army of using the city’s residents as “human shields” to garner international sympathy, while arguing that the RSF is fighting to address legitimate historical grievances.

Conversely, Sudanese journalist and political analyst Yousef Abdel Mannan vehemently rejected these claims.

Speaking to Al Jazeera from Sudan, Abdel Mannan accused the RSF of widespread atrocities, including a recent drone attack on a girls’ school in el-Obeid and the systematic killing of thousands of civilians in el-Fasher, including patients inside the Saudi Hospital.

Abdel Mannan dismissed the US-backed truce proposals as inadequate measures that merely “treat the wounds of the conflict while leaving the root cause intact”, arguing that only a comprehensive political settlement, not a temporary ceasefire, can resolve the crisis.

He maintained that civilians in el-Obeid are not being held hostage by the army, but rather prefer to remain in their homes rather than face displacement at the hands of paramilitaries.

Foreign arms and the geopolitical deadlock

Beneath the domestic blame game lies a critical factor sustaining the conflict: Foreign interference.

David Shinn, a former US diplomat and assistant secretary of state for African affairs, noted that despite years of US engagement and sanctions targeting both SAF and RSF leaders, neither side has shown a genuine interest in halting the violence.

“There is a desire from both sides to continue fighting until one side wins,” Shinn told Al Jazeera.

The escalating use of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) over el-Obeid underscores this external lifeline. “Neither the RSF nor the Sudanese army manufactures drones,” Shinn pointed out, meaning these advanced weapons must be imported.

He highlighted that the warring parties are actively backed by regional powers, pointing to the United Arab Emirates as a backer of the RSF, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia as supporters of the SAF, arguing that the conflict has transformed into a proxy war.

For the siege of el-Obeid to end and a genuine peace process to begin, the geopolitical spigot must be turned off.

Until the international community forces external actors to halt their military support, analysts warn that Sudan will remain hostage to a war its generals believe they can still win.

Egypt’s foreign ministry used carefully calibrated language on Monday to restate a familiar position: unwavering support for Sudan’s “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” and for its “national institutions, particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).” Framed as a rejection of “parallel entities” seeking to form an alternative government in exile, the statement is another sign that Cairo is tying its Sudan policy ever more tightly to General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan and the SAF as the country’s civil war grinds into yet another year.

Behind the diplomatic phrasing lies a blunt political choice. Since the outbreak of fighting between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, Egypt has emerged as one of the army’s main regional backers, both politically and—according to multiple reports—quietly in security terms. Egyptian officials insist they are defending Sudanese state institutions against militia fragmentation and external meddling, a message they repeat in multilateral forums and joint communiqués with Burhan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council.

From Cairo, the stakes in Sudan are seen as existential rather than abstract. Egyptian analysts routinely describe the stability of their southern neighbour as a vital national security concern, citing fears of refugee flows, arms smuggling and jihadist safe havens along the porous border. Control of the Nile is an even deeper driver: since the 2019 fall of Omar al‑Bashir, Egypt has intensified security and military coordination with Khartoum to counter Ethiopia’s upstream Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and preserve its historic water share.

There is also a clear regime‑security affinity, however misguided that affinity might be. Burhan, a career officer who trained in Cairo and maintains close ties with Egyptian generals, represents a familiar authoritarian model for President Abdel Fattah el‑Sisi, himself a former general who came to power after a coup in 2013. Supporting the SAF fits Egypt’s long‑standing pattern of siding with Sudan’s army “whoever is in charge of it,” and buttresses Cairo’s broader preference for strong central militaries over messy civilian transitions across the region.

Officially, Egypt insists it is not a party to Sudan’s war. Sisi has repeatedly pledged “non‑interference,” and Cairo frames its role as limited to mediation, humanitarian aid, and hosting millions of Sudanese fleeing the conflict. Egyptian troops captured by the RSF at Merowe airbase in April 2023 were described as participants in pre‑scheduled joint exercises, not combat operations, a spin that few international observers bought.

The line between deterrent presence and de facto involvement has become increasingly blurred. Analysts note years of intensifying joint drills, intelligence cooperation and arms ties between the two militaries since 2019. Think‑tanks and regional media have reported unconfirmed Egyptian airstrikes on RSF positions and possible targeting of gold‑mining camps in northern Sudan, amid allegations by RSF leaders that Cairo is providing drones and tactical support to the SAF—claims Egypt denies. The pattern points towards at the very least a protective security umbrella for Burhan’s forces, far beyond the strict neutrality Cairo proclaims.

Yet in Burhan Egypt is backing a very risky partner. By hinging its Sudan strategy almost entirely on the SAF and Burhan’s sovereignty council, Egypt is betting on a man and an institution that look increasingly incapable of reunifying the country. The war has left tens of thousands dead, displaced over 14 million people, and pushed parts of Sudan towards famine, with the army losing and regaining territory in a grinding stalemate against the RSF. Burhan’s own legitimacy is deeply contested: he led the 2021 coup that derailed a fragile civilian‑military power‑sharing agreement, and his government is widely seen by pro‑democracy groups as a continuation of military dominance rather than a path to elections.

Cairo’s categorical rejection of “parallel governments” sounds like a defence of state unity, but in practice it risks delegitimising genuine civilian coalitions seeking to organise outside the SAF‑RSF binary. By equating Sudan’s “national institutions” with the existing military leadership, Egypt narrows the political horizon and sidelines the broad civilian forces that led the 2018–2019 uprising—precisely the actors most likely to provide a sustainable, inclusive settlement. If the SAF continues to fragment on the battlefield or loses further territorial control, Cairo may find that its red lines have locked it into defending a shrinking power centre with dwindling popular backing.

There is also a long‑term reputational cost. Egypt positions itself as a mediator through formats such as the “Quad”, and hosts conferences of Sudanese civil and political actors in Cairo. But as long as its public diplomacy is tethered to explicit promises that it “will not be lax or late in supporting the legitimate Sudanese government” under Burhan, that positioning is scarcely credible. On the contrary, Egypt has decisively and actively allied itself to Sudan’s military junta.

Al Jazeera journalist Al-Tahir al-Mardi has been reunited with his family in Khartoum after three years of separation and forced displacement caused by Sudan’s war.

Emergency Lawyers said dozens were also wounded in the strike that came less than 24 hours after similar drone attacks.

A drone strike on a market in central Sudan has killed at least 11 people and injured dozens more, according to a local rights group, as escalating aerial attacks further increase the death toll of one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

The attack on Saturday targeted the main market in Abu Zaeima, a paramilitary-controlled town in North Kordofan state, according to Emergency Lawyers, which has documented abuses since fighting erupted in April 2023 between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The group said the casualty figures could rise, but did not specify who carried out the attack. Neither side has claimed responsibility.

Emergency Lawyers said the strike came less than 24 hours after similar drone attacks struck nearby villages and a civilian vehicle.

Condemning the attack, it said the repeated targeting of civilians, villages and public transport reflected a blatant disregard for human life and the basic principles of international humanitarian law.

The group added that the continued loss of civilian life should not be treated as routine and called for an end to such attacks, as well as accountability for those responsible.

Two witnesses told the AFP news agency that another drone hit a fuel station later on Saturday in el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, which the RSF has partially encircled for months.

A medical source at a hospital there said four wounded civilians had been brought to the facility.

Drone warfare

Nearly 70 people were killed in two separate drone strikes in the West and North Kordofan states over the past week, according to Emergency Lawyers and a local leader.

Drone warfare has become increasingly more common in Sudan’s conflict.

The United Nations said in May that at least 880 civilians were killed in drone strikes nationwide between January and April.

Fighting has intensified in Kordofan and Blue Nile State near the Ethiopian border since the RSF captured el-Fasher last October, the military’s last major stronghold in western Darfur.

Since then, more than 300,000 people have fled front-line areas, including el-Fasher and parts of Kordofan and Blue Nile, according to the UN.

Kordofan, rich in oil and arable land, is strategically significant, linking RSF strongholds in the neighbouring Darfur region to the country’s army-controlled east. The region remains largely contested between the army and the RSF.

Now entering its fourth year, the war has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced nearly 13 million others, creating what the UN describes as the world’s largest displacement and hunger crises.

Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces have had a long history of violations, going back to when they were known as the ‘Janjaweed’. Over the past few years, they have been trying to change their image and become influential political actors in Sudan, but will that work? Al Jazeera’s Hala Saadani looks back at the RSF’s history and where they may go from here.

On a modest bed inside his war-battered home in the Khartoum North neighbourhood of the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, Murtada Mohieddin, a diabetic patient in his early 50s, carefully counts his remaining doses of insulin. His search for medicine has transformed into a harrowing battle – not just to find the treatment he needs to survive his diabetes, but to ensure the medicine is not expired or ruined.

“Sometimes the insulin is spoiled,” Mohieddin tells Al Jazeera, inspecting his limited supply. “You wouldn’t know if it is ruined or expired. You can check the expiration date, but it could still be damaged from poor storage.”

More than three years of civil war have crippled Sudan’s healthcare infrastructure: hospitals, health centres and pharmaceutical factories have been shut and vital medical supply chains and storage across the country have been disrupted.

The war, which erupted as a power struggle between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has killed more than 50,000 people and displaced 14 million – nearly a quarter of the country’s population.

The devastating conflict has paralysed domestic pharmaceutical production and collapsed vital supply chains across the country.

According to a World Health Organization (WHO) news release dated April 14, 2026, Sudan represents the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with 21 million people lacking basic healthcare services out of 34 million needing aid.

In the void left by the closure of pharmaceutical companies, smuggling networks have flourished, flooding the market with unregulated drugs locally known as “Boko” medicines.

These include critical intravenous malaria medications smuggled across borders. Because they completely bypass strict temperature controls and quality checks during transit, these drugs are frequently spoiled, rendering them either totally ineffective or lethally toxic to patients.

A double threat

Inside local pharmacies in Omdurman, located on the outskirts of Khartoum, the crisis is not just limited to scarcity. Patients now face the double threat of exorbitant costs and life-threatening quality issues, as these illicit medicines are often severely spoiled due to a lack of proper storage and refrigeration.

Mutawakil Hamza, a pharmacist based in Omdurman, said the reliance on unregulated channels is putting lives at immediate risk.

“Most malaria medicines are now brought in through smuggling,” Hamza said. “These are ultimately injections for intravenous use, and this is highly dangerous to a patient’s health.”

Because intravenous treatments bypass the body’s natural defences and require absolute sterility, administering improperly stored or degraded smuggled injections can rapidly cause severe bloodstream infections, systemic shock, or death.

The war has effectively dismantled local manufacturing, reversing years of medical self-reliance. Yasser Ahmed Youssef, a pharmaceutical industry expert whose factory is located in Khartoum, noted the stark contrast to the pre-war era, when local factories managed to produce “very large quantities of life-saving medicines, including drugs for blood pressure, diabetes, colds, and paediatric care”.

Now, the majority of those production lines are silent, leaving the population dependent on a shattered healthcare system. According to the October 2025 Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS) report cited in a WHO Public Health Situation Analysis from January 6, 2026, 40 percent of health facilities nationwide are entirely nonoperational.

The situation is even more drastic regionally, with 87 percent of facilities shut down in Khartoum and 85 percent closed in North Kordofan, whose control is contested between the rival sides.

In active conflict zones such as Gezira, Khartoum, Darfur and the Kordofan regions, the shortages are particularly dire.

A United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) emergency report from August 2025 highlighted that the only functioning maternity hospital in the besieged city of el-Fasher faces critical medicine shortages and risks imminent closure.

El-Fasher, the last SAF stronghold in the western region of Darfur, was taken over by the RSF in late October 2025, trapping approximately 700,000 civilians – mostly women and children. People have been cut off entirely from food and medicine and subjected to attacks.

Collapsed warehouses and supply lines

In the government-funded public sector, the National Medical Supplies Fund maintains that it is working to secure essential medicines despite the fighting, claiming to have achieved 75 percent availability for cancer medications and fully secured supplies for kidney patients.

However, officials admit the overarching infrastructure is in ruins, with the local health ecosystem almost destroyed.

“We have been massively affected by the ongoing war inside Sudan,” said Abubakar Salouha, a department director at the fund. “The medical supplies have been severely impacted; there has been a collapse at the level of the main warehouses at the headquarters.”

International aid deliveries from neighbouring countries also face enormous logistical hurdles.

The WHO’s January 6 situation analysis detailed that cross-border transit times for medical commodities can take up to 90 days to reach remote regions like Darfur from the Cameroonian city of Douala via Chad. Compounding these suffocating delays, armed groups have repeatedly targeted medical infrastructure, looting pharmacies and stripping remaining hospitals of their vital medical supplies.

Recent attacks highlight this systematic destruction by rival sides. On March 20, 2026, a drone attack on Al-Daein Teaching Hospital in East Darfur state killed at least 64 people, including medical personnel, and injured 89 others. Sudanese rights group the Emergency Lawyers reported that the army was behind the attack.

On April 2, another drone attack struck Al-Jabalain Hospital in White Nile state, killing 10 staff members, including the hospital’s director while he was performing surgery. That same day, the Family Hospital in el-Daein was looted, and patients and health workers were assaulted and expelled. Similarly, a hospital in Kurmuk, Blue Nile state, was looted on March 25, its equipment destroyed, and patients forced out. The RSF was blamed for these attacks.

“Sudan is confronting one of the gravest humanitarian and public health emergencies in the world today. The ongoing conflict has pushed the health system to the edge of complete collapse,” warned WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus on April 4.

“These incidents are stark reminders of the urgent need for renewed international solidarity and decisive political and humanitarian action. Sudan cannot endure this crisis alone.”

Sudan has recalled its ambassador to Addis Ababa, accusing Ethiopia of being behind attacks on Khartoum’s airport. International Crisis Group’s Alan Boswell says the escalation risks making the countries’ internal challenges worse.

The security landscape along the border between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan is deteriorating amid a series of alarming attacks attributed to armed men believed to be South Sudanese soldiers. The Kakwa chiefdom, particularly the Roumou tribal group and the village of Agoroba in Aru territory, Ituri province, has been severely affected by these incursions. 

Local sources said the suspected South Sudanese soldiers looted cattle and money, and abducted Congolese civilians.

“These armed men coming from South Sudan have looted from the population, taking away cows, goats, money, and even abducting young men, whom they continue to hold in the bushes. This situation does not date today. It has been several months since these armed men have been crossing the border to attack our villages,” a local chief told HumAngle.

Dieudonne Tabani, a national parliamentarian,  has raised concerns about the worsening security situation along the border between the DRC and South Sudan in the Aru territory of Ituri province. He condemned how the repeated incursions in several localities of Kakwa chiefdom are characterised by the looting of belongings as well as the abduction of civilians.

“The number of our soldiers along the border with South Sudan is very minimal. When these armed men enter, they are not faced by a rigorous response. We call on the provincial authorities, under the state of siege, to urgently reinforce the military presence in the zone,” a local in the Ituri province told HumAngle. “The central government must also get involved in diplomatic overtures with a view to clearly demarcating the boundary, most times given as a reason for the incursions into our territory.”

Amid this troubling situation, Ituri provincial authorities have called on the population to remain calm, assuring that the authorities in Kinshasa have already been briefed and that measures will eventually be taken to secure the zone.

In January, DRC and South Sudan completed a major prisoner exchange following a diplomatic meeting. The border town of the Aru territory in the DRC serves as a haven for numerous South Sudanese refugees escaping the civil conflict in their homeland.

The attack, the second in a week, follows months of relative calm in the city after government forces regained control last year.

A drone strike carried out by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has killed five civilians in Khartoum, according to an NGO.

The attack, which Emergency Lawyers, an independent legal group supporting victims of human rights violations in Sudan, reported on Saturday, is the second to take place in the capital within a week. It follows months of relative calm in the city after government forces regained control last year.

The NGO said it holds the RSF fully responsible for the strike, accusing the group of breaching international humanitarian law.

Emergency Lawyers said the incident forms part of an ongoing pattern of attacks on civilians. Nearly 700 civilians were killed in drone strikes in the first three months of this year, according to UN figures.

‘Completely free’

On Tuesday, a drone struck a hospital in the Jebel Awliya area, around 40 kilometres (25 miles) south of central Khartoum, a security source and eyewitnesses told the AFP news agency. It was the first such attack in the area in months.

The Sudanese army, which now enjoys a solid grip in the north and east, launched a rapid counteroffensive last year that pushed the paramilitary forces out of the capital.

Following intense fighting around the capital last year, Sudan’s military government declared the Khartoum region “completely free” of RSF.

Since then, the RSF has largely concentrated on expanding its control in its stronghold in the western Darfur region and pushing into neighbouring areas, capturing valuable oil-producing assets.

Violence has also spread to southeastern Blue Nile state near the border with Ethiopia, raising fears of a more prolonged and fragmented conflict.

The RSF carried out a series of drone strikes on Khartoum last year, largely targeting military sites, power stations and water infrastructure.

In recent months, however, the capital has seen relative calm. More than 1.8 million displaced residents have returned, and the airport has resumed domestic flights. That said, much of the city remains without electricity or basic services.

The conflict between the Sudanese government and the RSF – a former ally – began in April 2023. Since then, around 14 million people have been displaced and two-thirds of the population are in urgent need of humanitarian support, according to the United Nations.

Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher told the UN Security Council that South Sudan is at risk of slipping into ‘full-scale famine and collapse’ as fighting intensifies and the UN peacekeeping mission is cut back.