Sudan

The United Nations is warning that rapidly escalating drone warfare in Sudan has killed more than 200 people in little over a week as schools, hospitals, and civilian infrastructure become targets.

Trump administration accuses the group of receiving support from the Iran and carrying out violence against civilians.

The United States has designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a “terrorist” group, as the administration of President Donald Trump widens its crackdown on the organisation.

The State Department accused the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood on Monday of receiving support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Washington labelled the group as a “specially designated global terrorist” (SDGT) and said that it will designate it as a “foreign terrorist organisation” (FTO) starting next week.

“The Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood uses unrestrained violence against civilians to undermine efforts to resolve the conflict in Sudan and advance its violent Islamist ideology,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in a statement.

The SDGT designation enables economic sanctions against the group, while the FTO label makes it illegal to provide material support to it.

The State Department accused Muslim Brotherhood fighters in Sudan – where the Sudanese military is fighting against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group – of conducting “mass executions of civilians”.

The RSF, which has been accused of major human rights violations, and its supporters often argue that they are fighting Muslim Brotherhood forces.

On Monday, the United Arab Emirates welcomed Washington’s move to blacklist the group in Sudan.

The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the “US measure reflects the sustained and systematic efforts undertaken by the administration of President Trump to halt excessive violence against civilians and the destabilizing activities carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan”.

In January, the Trump administration blacklisted Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Lebanon, Jordan and Sudan, a move the groups rejected.

Established in 1928 by Egyptian Muslim scholar Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood has offshoots and branches across the Middle East, including political parties and social organisations.

The group and its affiliates say they are committed to peaceful political participation.

In the US and other countries in the West, right-wing activists have for years tried to demonise Muslim immigrant communities and Israel’s critics with accusations of links to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Some of Trump’s hawkish allies in Congress have also for years been calling for the group to be blacklisted.

The international community has a structural problem in reading conflicts: it treats silence as neutrality, when in fact silence is a manufactured condition. When international monitors report the absence of civil protests or testimonies from conflict zones, they are not documenting consensus; they are documenting the success of propaganda operations. This article argues that conflicting parties are now actively exploiting the spiral of silence as a strategic weapon, and the international community’s failure to recognize this results in a structurally flawed diplomatic response even before analysis begins. This argument will be constructed in three layers: how the spiral is engineered, how Sudan proves it, and why the international interpretive framework must be updated immediately.

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1974), in her theory Spiral of Silence, describes how individuals suppress their minority opinions to avoid social isolation. This theory is built on the assumption of a free society, where silence is an organic social choice. In conflict zones, this assumption collapses completely. Silence is not chosen; it is engineered. Propaganda actors flood information channels with dominant narratives not to convince audiences that these narratives are true, but to signal which voices are safe and which are not. The result appears to be consensus. But it is not.

Social media has transformed this architecture of silence into something almost invisible. Platforms give users real-time visibility into how much public response a particular view receives. When opposing content is systematically silenced through algorithmic deprioritization and coordinated mass reporting campaigns, people conclude that speaking out is pointless, or worse, dangerous. Jowett and O’Donnell (2019) note that bandwagon propaganda does not require audiences to believe in the dominant narrative, only to believe that others already believe it. At that point, the spiral becomes self-sustaining: it no longer needs external enforcement because the target population has internalized it themselves.

The agenda-setting theory proposed by McCombs and Shaw (1972) adds another layer to this problem and makes it much more difficult to detect. The media and information channels do not merely reflect reality; they determine what is considered worthy of discussion from the outset. When warring parties dominate the information space, they not only shape international perceptions. They also determine which testimonies are considered safe for local residents to give and which silences are necessary for survival. This is not a side effect of conflict. It is a deliberate targeting of the information environment itself, and the international community has been consistently slow to recognize this as such.

Two technical mechanisms make all this work, and neither requires direct violence to be effective. First, bandwagon propaganda floods channels with coordinated content until dissent appears marginal and irrelevant. Second, fear appeals work without needing to be explicitly stated. In conflict environments, people have witnessed what happens to those who oppose the dominant narrative, so self-censorship becomes a rational choice, not a sign of weakness. The combination of the two is the most dangerous: the spiral no longer requires external enforcement because its targets are already silencing themselves. This is not the moral failure of individuals who choose to remain silent; it is a system designed to work exactly as intended.

The case of Sudan illustrates this most clearly. Both the SAF and the RSF launched coordinated information operations from the early days of the conflict. RSF channels spread a narrative of civilian protection, while the SAF network framed the war solely as a counter-terrorism operation. These two narratives, although contradictory, both served to narrow the space for independent civilian testimony. Civilians in Khartoum and Darfur faced an information environment that made disclosure a risk calculation rather than a right. The internet blackouts recorded at various periods of the conflict were not merely technical obstacles; they were a very clear signal of the price to be paid for speaking out.

Zeitzoff (2017) shows that users in environments close to conflict significantly alter their disclosure behavior under perceived surveillance, even without direct threats. In Sudan, the threat is anything but hypothetical. The diplomatic consequences are immediately apparent: the UN’s initial assessment of the Sudanese conflict has been repeatedly criticized by humanitarian organizations for underestimating civilian casualties and displacement figures. This is not a methodological failure. It is the intended result of a deliberate information architecture, a condition in which the most relevant data is already missing before the verification process even begins.

What makes this a diplomatic crisis, not merely an information crisis, is that the international response is built on what is reported. When open-source assessments treat civilian silence as a neutral baseline, they are not accessing the truth on the ground. They are accessing whatever has made it through the spiral. This pattern repeats itself in various conflicts because it consistently works in Syria, in Myanmar, and in Ethiopia. In each case, the international community finds itself working with records that have been curated by the parties most interested in concealing crimes.

The solution is not more monitoring infrastructure. What is needed is a different interpretative framework. Silence must be treated as a data point that requires explanation, not as a default condition that requires nothing. When there are no reports from conflict zones, it does not mean that nothing is happening; rather, it means that the conditions for speaking out have been destroyed first. Protected witness pathways, verification networks from the diaspora, and analysis of anomalies in information flows are all useful, but only after a fundamental recognition that the problem is not a lack of information, but rather that engineered silence is constantly misinterpreted as the absence of anything worth investigating.

The Spiral of Silence was originally a theory about how even free societies can slowly and unconsciously silence themselves. In the hands of modern propaganda architects, the theory has been repurposed as a method to ensure that the most credible witnesses to crimes never speak out and that their silence is interpreted by the international community as proof that there are no crimes to investigate. The arguments in this article, from the mechanisms of spiral engineering to the role of social media to the case of Sudan, all point to the same conclusion: as long as silence is interpreted as absence, the international community is not conducting independent analysis. They are confirming the narrative of those most interested in concealing the truth. The loudest voices are not the most honest; they are simply the ones allowed to speak.

Thousands of civilians have fled an opposition stronghold in eastern South Sudan after the army ordered evacuations to clear the way for a military offensive, the latest sign that the country’s fragile peace is unravelling, as fears of a return to all-out civil war haunt the world’s youngest nation.

The town of Akobo, near the Ethiopian border, was almost completely emptied by Sunday after the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces issued an ultimatum on Friday demanding that civilians, aid workers and United Nations peacekeepers leave ahead of a planned assault.

“The town is now almost empty,” said Nhial Lew, a local humanitarian official. “Women, children and the elderly have left and crossed into Ethiopia.” By Sunday evening, he could hear the conflict closing in. “We are hearing the sound of machine guns approaching,” he told the Associated Press news agency.

The army’s deadline was set to expire Monday afternoon.

The order extends a government counteroffensive, launched in January and dubbed Operation Enduring Peace, that has already displaced more than 280,000 people across Jonglei state since December, when opposition forces began seizing government positions.

The UN’s Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan warned of a possible “return to full-scale war” if the country’s leadership didn’t take the challenges it faces more seriously.

“Preventing further mass atrocity crimes, institutional collapse, and the destruction of South Sudan’s fragile transition requires urgent coordinated national, regional and international re-engagement,” the report said.

Akobo, which had been considered a relatively safe haven and sheltered more than 82,000 displaced people, is one of the last remaining strongholds of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition, or SPLM-IO, the armed movement loyal to South Sudan’s detained former vice president, Riek Machar.

Two UN flights evacuated most humanitarian staff on Sunday, though the International Committee of the Red Cross had not yet pulled its personnel from a surgical unit it runs at the local hospital, where wounded patients were still being treated.

“We are worried for our patients,” said Dual Diew, the county health director. “We tried to make a plan to take them to a safer location, but we don’t have enough fuel.”

The offensive comes amid a wider breakdown of the 2018 peace agreement that ended a civil war between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and those backing Machar, a conflict that killed an estimated 400,000 people and forced millions from their homes.

Machar has been under house arrest in the capital, Juba, since March 2025, facing charges of treason and murder that his supporters say are politically motivated.

His detention coincided with a sharp rise in armed opposition activity, and a UN inquiry has since found that South Sudan’s leaders have been “systematically dismantling” the accord.

Conflicts have taken place across the country among groups associated with the two factions, said Jan Pospisil, a South Sudan researcher who spoke to Al Jazeera.

Dozens killed in the north

On Sunday, at least 169 people were killed, among them 90 civilians, including women and children, when armed men stormed a village in Abiemnom county in the country’s north.

The local administrator blamed the attack on elements of the White Army, a militia historically allied to Machar, alongside SPLM-IO-affiliated forces. The group denied any involvement. More than 1,000 people sought shelter at a UN base in the area.

“Such violence places civilians at grave risk and must stop immediately,” said Anita Kiki Gbeho of the UN mission in South Sudan.

Aid organisations operating in the conflict zone have also been targeted, with Doctors Without Borders, known by its French initials, MSF, saying on Monday that 26 of its staff remain unaccounted for, a month after a government air strike destroyed its hospital in the town of Lankien and a separate facility in Pieri was looted.

Staff who had been reached described “destruction, violence and extreme hardships”. It was the 10th attack on an MSF facility in 12 months.

“Medical workers must never be targets,” said Yashovardhan, the charity’s head of mission in South Sudan, who uses only one name.

Pospisil said the crisis had exposed the fragility of Kiir’s hold on power.

“The state is literally falling apart,” Pospisil said, referring to the convergence of conflict in the country and the elderly state of the president, whose condition has raised questions.

Pospisil added that the outcome of Machar’s ongoing trial would likely shape what comes next.

Days after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed forging a network of allied nations, including in the Middle East and Africa, to stand against what he called “radical” adversaries, the country’s president is on an official visit to key ally, Ethiopia.

It is not yet known which Arab and African countries will form part of Netanyahu’s hypothetical “hexagon of alliances”, which he said on Sunday will include Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and others to stand against their enemies in the Middle East. Chief among those enemies is presumably Iran and its network of resistance groups from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis of Yemen.

Analysts doubt Israel could secure enough influence over nation-states to form a formal security pact.

However, the country is deepening its ongoing charm offensive in Africa, which it began during the genocide in Gaza, as its reputation suffered a decline on the continent, with the African Union (AU) releasing multiple statements condemning Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians.

In a rare visit, Israeli President Isaac Herzog arrived in Ethiopia on Tuesday. The last presidential trip to the East African country took place in 2018.

“The relationship between our peoples is woven deep into the pages of history and human tradition,” Herzog said in a statement upon his arrival. “At the heart of the story of both our nations lies a clear common thread – the ability to join hands, unite resources of spirit and substance, to innovate, develop, and grow for the benefit of all.”

Herzog, on Wednesday, met with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who said the two leaders talked about “ways to improve collaboration in areas of mutual interest,” without revealing further details.

But beneath the surface, observers say the visit also represents a battle for influence over Addis Ababa, which has received similar high-level delegations from Turkiye and Saudi Arabia in recent days.

Shared ties and shared anger

Ethiopia and Israel are bound by several links, from shared histories of their people to shared scrutiny over recent political moves in the Horn of Africa that have angered several of the region’s influential nations.

Both countries maintain friendly ties largely due to the Beta Israel community, or Ethiopian Jews, who hail from northern Tigray and Amhara. Historically, Ethiopian Jews suffered religious persecution, and after Israel’s formation, it sought their emigration under its Law of Return policy. Between the late 1970s and mid-1990s, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews were covertly transported to Israel – during a time when several African countries, including Ethiopia, had cut off ties with Israel over the 1973 Yom Kippur War and its invasion of Egypt. On the cusp of a civil war in Ethiopia in 1991, Mossad, Israel’s spy agency, launched a daring operation that airlifted 14,000 Ethiopians over the course of just two days.

About 160,000 Ethiopian Jews now live in Israel. Many within the community have struggled to integrate and have complained of discrimination and racism. In 2019, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews flooded the streets in protest across Israeli cities after a 19-year-old of Ethiopian origin was shot dead by the police.

Ethiopia-Israel state relations have, meanwhile, remained steady. In 2016, when Netanyahu visited the country in his first prime ministerial visit – Addis Ababa became one of the first African countries to voice support for Israel’s long-sought observer status at the AU. Fierce opposition from South Africa, Algeria and other countries supporting Palestine delayed the process until 2021. Later, in 2023, the AU confirmed it had withdrawn the status.

Mashav, Israel’s aid agency, has, in the past decade, provided aid to Ethiopia in the form of agriculture and water cooperation projects, although Addis Ababa receives much more significant funding from wealthier partners like China. When Israel sponsored several African journalists on media trips to the country last year, Ethiopia was among the countries it invited journalists from.

More recently, both countries are bound by their support for Somaliland, which Somalia claims as part of its territory and which Israel sees as critical to its own national security, Hargeisa-based analyst Moustafa Ahmad told Al Jazeera.

In December, Israel recognised Somaliland’s statehood, becoming the first country to do so. Months before, there were unconfirmed talks about plans to move displaced Palestinians to Somaliland or to South Sudan, another key Israeli ally in the region. Analysts speculate that countries like South Sudan and the United Arab Emirates, another close friend of Israel, may also recognise Somaliland.

Israel’s focus on the Horn of Africa intensified after a late 2024 report from a United Nations expert panel, which found that the Somalia-based armed group, al-Shabab, was actively collaborating with Yemen’s Houthis. Where the Houthis were providing weapons and drone training, al-Shabab was, in return, granting access to a smuggling corridor stretching along the Somali coast and connecting to the Gulf of Aden, where Iranian weapons could be smuggled into Yemen.

The move to recognise Somaliland was therefore meant to disrupt that cooperation by stationing an Israeli naval base in the region, analysts note.

“It’s part of their calculations even if they haven’t said it publicly,” Ahmad said.

Several countries, as well as the AU, have pushed back on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, calling it a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. In Somaliland, however, many have celebrated the move.

Addis Ababa under pressure

While neither Israel nor Ethiopia has provided details of topics on the agenda during Herzog’s visit, Somaliland is likely at the top of the list.

Addis Ababa had in 2024 enraged its neighbours after it signed a controversial port deal with Hargeisa that would allow it access to the sea, reportedly in exchange for a future recognition of Somaliland. Although massive and rapidly industrialising, Ethiopia is landlocked, having lost its sea access after Eritrea seceded in 1993. Prime Minister Abiy has often said sea access is critical for his country.

The fall-out between Ethiopia and Somalia was so severe that analysts sounded the alarm over possible armed conflict between the two neighbours until Turkiye, a key development partner for Mogadishu, stepped in to smooth things over by pressuring Addis Ababa to coordinate with Mogadishu instead.

It is likely, analysts say, that Israel is now hoping to push Ethiopia further towards recognising Somaliland, which boasts a 850km (528-mile) coastline. In Hargeisa, many are disappointed after more countries failed to follow Israel’s steps, Ahmad said.

Addis Ababa, though, might not appreciate further pressure at the moment as it faces increasing regional isolation on several fronts.

One key reason is the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt and Sudan say is blocking the water supply they need for irrigation.

A source of national pride for Ethiopians, the dam was funded almost entirely through citizens’ donations and government funds. Israeli engineers participated in the project, and Israel reportedly sold weapons to Ethiopia to protect the dam amid tensions with its neighbours, although the Israeli government denies this.

At the same time, Addis Ababa is also facing tensions with Eritrea, which has moved closer to Somalia and Egypt. Both countries have historically feuded, and recently, tensions have again risen over the 2020 Tigray War and Abiy’s repeated statements about his country needing access to the sea.

“Addis Ababa is cautious of making a decision that will cement its regional isolation at this time [because] it is clearly hedging among various actors seeking to influence the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region,” Ahmad said.

Pressure is also mounting on Addis Ababa from countries eager to keep the status quo.

On Sunday, Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Ethiopia and said in his speech: “I would like to emphasise that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland does not benefit Somaliland or the Horn of Africa.”

His statement drew a backlash from Hargeisa, which called it “unacceptable interference” aimed at wrecking relations between Somaliland and its partners.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, which is embroiled in an ongoing rift with the United Arab Emirates over how to deal with the conflict in Yemen, also intervened in the fray in February. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Waleed Elkhereiji was in Addis Ababa this week to discuss “regional peace”, just two weeks after Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud arrived in the city for talks with Abiy.

So far, it is unclear if Riyadh has recorded any success in influencing Addis Ababa.

How Israel will fare in that regard is also still unclear.

Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs says Mohamed Dagalo’s meeting with President Yoweri Museveni focused on ending war.

Sudan has condemned Uganda for hosting the head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, as an “insult” to humanity and the Sudanese people.

In a statement on Sunday, Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced the reception of Dagalo, also known as “Hemedti”, in the “strongest terms” and his meeting on Friday with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.

“This unprecedented step insults humanity before it insults the Sudanese people, and at the same time, it disregards the lives of innocent people killed due to the behaviour of Hemedti and his terrorist militia,” the Foreign Ministry wrote.

Rights groups and international organisations have accused the RSF of war crimes and targeting civilians in Sudan.

Khartoum said hosting Dagalo “disregards” human values.

It “completely disregards the laws governing relations between member states of regional and international organisations that prohibit providing any support for rebel forces against a legitimate, internationally recognised government”, the Foreign Ministry added.

In 2023, Sudan was plunged into a civil war between the Sudanese army, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF.

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at least 11.7 million people have been displaced by the conflict and an estimated 150,000 people have been killed.

Last week, the United States imposed sanctions on three RSF commanders over their alleged roles in the 18-month siege and capture of el‑Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State in western Sudan.

In a statement, the US Department of the Treasury accused the RSF of perpetrating “a horrific campaign of ethnic killings, torture, starvation, and sexual violence” during the siege and capture of el-Fasher, which fell to the RSF in October.

Separately, a UN mission found that the RSF campaign in el-Fasher was a “planned and organised operation that bears the defining characteristics of genocide”.

‘Poisonous’ identity politics

Uganda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its own statement on Dagalo’s visit and said his meeting with Museveni focused on “ending the ongoing conflict in Sudan and restoring regional stability”.

Museveni reiterated in his remarks to Hemedti that peace in Sudan could only be achieved through dialogue and warned against what he described as identity politics.

“When I last came to Sudan, I met [former] President [Omar al-] Bashir and advised against the politics of identity instead of the politics of interest,” Museveni said.

“Identity politics is poisonous. It does not yield good results. What is important are shared interests that unite people,” he said while calling for both parties to prioritise “peace over military confrontation”.

For his part, Dagalo thanked Museveni and said he shares the Ugandan president’s “principles and your commitment to peace”, according to a statement released by the Ugandan government.

“He noted that Sudan continues to face serious humanitarian and institutional challenges as a result of the conflict and stressed the need for a peaceful resolution,” the statement added.

Sudan’s civil war is shifting into a drone-driven phase, erasing the lines between battlefield and civilian life. As Ramadan begins under famine conditions, how do the people of Sudan mark the holy month in the midst of war?

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Episode credits:

This episode was produced by Sarí el-Khalili and Melanie Marich with Maya Hamadeh, Tuleen Barakat and our guest host, Tamara Khandaker. It was edited by Ney Alvarez. 

Our sound designer is Alex Roldan. Our video editors are Hisham Abu Salah and Mohannad al-Melhemm. Alexandra Locke is The Take’s executive producer. Ney Alvarez is Al Jazeera’s head of audio. 

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A UN fact-finding body says mass killings by Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in El Fasher carry the hallmarks of genocide, with thousands reported killed. Al Jazeera’s Hiba Morgan breaks down the findings, which accuse the RSF of rape, torture, and extortion.

Drone-fired missiles have hit a market in central Sudan’s Kordofan region, killing at least 28 people and wounding dozens of others, a rights group says.

Emergency Lawyers, a group tracking violence against civilians, said in a statement on Monday that drones bombed the al-Safiya market in the town of Sodari in North Kordofan state.

The bombing on Sunday occurred when the market was packed with people, “exacerbating the humanitarian tragedy”, it said, adding that the number of casualties is likely to rise.

“The attack occurred when the market was bustling with civilians, including women, children and the elderly,” the group said.

“The repeated use of drones to target populated areas shows a grave disregard for civilian lives and signals an escalation that threatens what remains of daily life in the province. Therefore, we demand an immediate halt to drone attacks by both sides of the conflict,” the statement said.

The area is currently the fiercest front line in the three-year-old war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Sodari, a remote town where desert trade routes cross, is 230km (132 miles) northwest of el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, which the RSF has been trying to encircle for months.

The Kordofan region has seen a surge in deadly drone attacks as both sides fight over the country’s vital east-west axis, which links the western RSF-held Darfur region, through el-Obeid, to the army-controlled capital, Khartoum, and the rest of Sudan.

After consolidating its hold on Darfur last year, the RSF has pushed east through the oil- and gold-rich Kordofan in an attempt to seize Sudan’s central corridor.

Emergency Lawyers said on X that the drones targeting the market on Sunday belonged to the army.

Two military officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity as they were not authorised to brief the media, told The Associated Press news agency that the army does not target civilian infrastructure and denied the attack.

A week ago, a drone close to the city of Rahad in North Kordofan hit a vehicle carrying displaced families, killing at least 24 people, including eight children. A day before the attack, a World Food Programme aid convoy was also hit by drones.

Violence ‘shocking in scale and brutality’

Fighting between the RSF and the Sudanese military erupted into a full-blown war across the country in April 2023. So far, at least 40,000 people have been killed and 12 million displaced, according to the World Health Organization.

Aid groups say the true death toll could be many times higher, as the fighting in vast and remote areas impedes access.

The United Nations human rights chief recently said that the Kordofan region remains “volatile and a focus of hostilities” as the warring parties vie for control of strategic areas.

Both sides have been accused of atrocities.

The UN Human Rights Office issued a report on Friday saying that more than 6,000 people were killed over three days when the RSF unleashed “a wave of intense violence… shocking in its scale and brutality” in Darfur in late October.

The RSF’s offensive to capture the city of el-Fasher, which used to be a military stronghold, in late October included widespread atrocities that amounted to war crimes and possible crimes against humanity, according to the UN.

The war has created the world’s largest hunger and displacement crisis. It has also effectively split the country in two, with the army holding the centre, north and east, while the RSF controls the west and, with its allies, parts of the south.