Sudan

Sudan was teetering on the edge of crisis long before open war erupted in April 2023. Decades of authoritarian rule under Omar al-Bashir resulted in a fragile economy, fragmented security forces, and entrenched paramilitary structures.

Following the coup that overthrew al-Bashir in 2019, a fragile civilian-military transitional arrangement failed to unite competing factions. Political instability, localised rebellions, and a simmering rivalry between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the successor to the Popular Defence Forces, government-backed militia known as the Janjaweed who committed war crimes in Darfur in the early 2000s – escalated into full-blown conflict.

By mid-2023, Sudan was effectively split into contested zones, with major urban centres, such as Khartoum and Omdurman, transformed into battlefields, and millions of civilians displaced internally or forced across borders as refugees.

Although geographically removed, the European Union played a consequential role in these developments. For nearly a decade, it pursued a strategy of “externalising” migration control, directing aid, training, and equipment to African states ostensibly to reduce irregular migration towards Europe.

In Sudan, this approach produced unintended and devastating consequences that the EU is yet to be held accountable for. Funding initially justified under “migration management” and “capacity building” intersected with opaque arms flows, Gulf intermediaries, and weak oversight. European money and materiel, intended to stabilise populations and impose border forces to buffer the migratory ambitions of Africans, may have indirectly reinforced the very actors now perpetrating war crimes in Sudan.

Between 2014 and 2018, the EU channelled more than 200 million euros ($232m at the current exchange rate) into Sudan via the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the Better Migration Management (BMM) initiative.

These programmes formally aimed to strengthen migration control, border security and anti-trafficking enforcement. In reality, they entrenched cooperation between the EU and Sudan’s security structures, including units that effectively merged into the RSF.

As early as 2017, the Enough Project, an advocacy group focused on conflict, corruption and human rights, published a report titled Border Control from Hell, warning that “the gravest concern about the EU’s new partnership with Sudan is that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the most abusive paramilitary groups in the country, stands to benefit from EU funding” and that “the equipment that enables identification and registration of migrants will also reinforce the surveillance capabilities of a Sudanese government that has violently suppressed Sudanese citizens for the past 28 years”.

Two years later, the EU had to suspend several migration-control activities in Sudan because there was a risk that resources could be “diverted for repressive aims”, according to an EU official document cited by German news outlet Deutsche Welle.

And yet, a factsheet titled What the EU really does in Sudan, published on the bloc’s website in 2018, claimed: “The EU does not provide any financial support to the Government of Sudan … The Rapid Support Forces of the Sudanese military do not benefit directly or indirectly from EU funding.”

All this raises an important question: If the EU knew of the risk of diversion, why did it still invest hundreds of millions into a context where control over the end use of training, equipment and funds was manifestly weak?

What is worse is that the EU’s role was not limited to supplying funds that could be misappropriated. It also provided weapons, albeit indirectly.

As the conflict deepened, investigators started uncovering foreign-manufactured weapons and ammunition circulating widely among the RSF and the SAF. Verified imagery, open-source analysis and serial number tracing have revealed European-manufactured systems on Sudan’s battlefields. In November 2024, Amnesty International released an investigation disclosing that Nimr Ajban armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were equipped with French-made Galix defensive systems. Amnesty’s analysts verified images and videos from multiple Sudanese locations and concluded that, if deployed in Darfur, their use would breach the longstanding United Nations arms embargo on the region.

In April, investigations by France24 and the Reuters news agency traced 81mm mortar shells found in an RSF convoy in North Darfur back to Bulgaria. The markings on this ammunition matched mortar bombs manufactured by a Bulgarian firm and exported legally to the United Arab Emirates in 2019. The Bulgarian government had not authorised the re-export of the shells from the UAE to Sudan.

In October, The Guardian reported that British military equipment, including small-arms target systems and engines for APCs, had been used by the RSF in Sudan, and they may have been supplied by the UAE.

Taken together, these findings illustrate a pattern: European-made arms and weapons systems, legally exported to third countries, have subsequently been diverted into Sudan’s conflict, despite embargoes and supposed safeguards.

Although the UAE denies it plays any role in the conflict, its position as an intermediary hub for re-exported weaponry has been repeatedly documented. Still, European suppliers, bound by end-user agreements and export-control frameworks, share responsibility for ensuring compliance.

Under the United Kingdom and EU regulations, governments must deny or revoke licences when there is a clear risk of diversion to conflict zones or human rights abusers. The use of European-made arms and weapons systems in Sudan, therefore, demands a rigorous reassessment of post-shipment monitoring and enforcement.

Despite this, European and British governments have continued to issue new export licences to potential violators, including the UAE. Recent reporting by Middle East Eye shows that the UK approved roughly $227m in military exports to the UAE between April and June this year, even after being informed that Emirati-supplied equipment had reached the RSF.

European countries are by far not an exception in failing to ensure that their weapons are not diverted to war zones under embargo.

My own country, South Africa, has also faced criticism over the lack of control over its arms shipments. In the mid-2010s, the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) faced international and domestic scrutiny after South African-manufactured weapons and ammunition were reportedly used by Saudi and Emirati forces in Yemen.

As a result, in 2019, the NCACC delayed or withheld export approvals, especially for “the most lethal” items, amid disputes over updated inspection clauses and human rights concerns. The South African authorities demanded that they be granted access to facilities in importer countries to ensure compliance with the end-user agreement – something the UAE and Saudi Arabia, along with several other countries, refused to provide. By 2022, previously withheld consignments were eventually cleared under renegotiated terms.

Today, evidence suggests that South African weapons may have been diverted to Sudan as well. Investigators and open-source analysts claim to have identified munitions consistent with South African manufacture in Sudan.

The South African case illustrates that even when there is political will to ensure compliance with the end-user agreements for arms sales, enforcement can be challenging. And yet, it is a necessary and crucial part of peacebuilding efforts.

If democratic governments wish to reclaim credibility, end-use monitoring must be enforceable, not a bureaucratic concession. The NCACC in Pretoria and export control authorities in Brussels, Sofia, Paris and London must publish transparent audits of past licences, investigate credible diversion cases, and suspend new approvals where risk remains unmitigated.

In parallel, the EU must ensure migration management funding cannot be coopted by armed actors.

Without such measures, Europe’s migration policy and South Africa’s defence trade risk complicity in a grim paradox: initiatives justified in the name of security that foster insecurity.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

From deadly floods in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, to antigovernment protests in the Philippines and demonstrations in Italy to show solidarity with Gaza, here is a look at the week in photos.

Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are pushing hard to take Kordofan. In the sights of the paramilitary force – accused of committing grave human rights abuses during Sudan’s war – are the cities and towns of the vast central region, such as Babnusa and el-Obeid.

The momentum is currently with the RSF, which defeated their Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) opponents in el-Fasher, in the western region of Darfur, last month, unleashing a tidal wave of violence where they killed at least 1,500 people and forced thousands more to flee.

SAF soldiers are still able to repel RSF fighters in West Kordofan’s Babnusa, a major transport junction connecting several parts of the country. But continuing to hold the city will be difficult for the SAF, and if it does fall, then the RSF will likely press forward towards North Kordofan’s el-Obeid, and a vital gateway towards the capital Khartoum.

The RSF were forced out of Khartoum in March, a time when the SAF seemed to be on the ascendancy in the more-than-two-year war.

But now the tables have turned, and having lost Darfur completely with the fall of el-Fasher, the SAF now risks losing Kordofan, too.

“The RSF has momentum, which they will carry on through with,” said Dallia Abdelmoniem, a Sudanese political analyst, who pointed out that an RSF ally, the SPLM-N, already controls the Nuba Mountains region of South Kordofan.

“Hemedti was never going to be satisfied with just controlling the Darfur region – he wants the whole country,” she said, using a nickname for Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the head of the RSF.

With the SAF overstretched and cut off from reliable arms procurement, Abdelmoniem believes that the balance of power is shifting. “The SAF is weakened unless they miraculously get their hands on weaponry equal, if not better, to what the RSF has.”

Ceasefire talks

It is notable that the RSF advances have taken place despite ongoing mediation efforts from the so-called “Quad” – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States – aimed at reaching an end to the fighting.

The head of the SAF, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, last Sunday rejected a ceasefire agreement proposed by the Quad, saying that the deal benefitted the RSF. He also criticised the UAE’s involvement in the Quad, accusing it of supporting the RSF, a claim Abu Dhabi has long denied.

For its part, the RSF announced on Monday an apparently unilateral three-month ceasefire. However, since the announcement, the RSF has continued to attack Babnusa.

The Quad mediation efforts, which have included a push from US President Donald Trump, may perplexingly be the reason for the recent escalation in fighting.

“The pressure for a ceasefire coming from the Quad, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, is pushing the SAF and the RSF to gain a territorial advantage as quickly as possible in case something shifts during the mediation,” said Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory. “Each side will always try to maximise its position before the talks.”

Khair points out that both sides had been amassing weapons over the summer rainy season, when conditions were more difficult for fighting. Now that conditions are dry, the weapons are being “put to use”, particularly as the RSF is emboldened following its victory in el-Fasher.

The strategic importance of Kordofan makes it an important prize, particularly if any ceasefire deal freezes the areas under the control of each side.

“[Kordofan’s] location makes it important to control due to its agricultural, livestock, and petroleum resources,” said Retired Lieutenant Colonel Omar Arbab. “The battle for Kordofan is not merely territorial – it is about controlling Sudan’s economic backbone.”

Arbab added that there is a military logic to the RSF’s push towards Babnusa, as it is the gateway linking their forces in Darfur to el-Obeid. “If the RSF controls it, they could pose a threat to el-Obeid – and certainly will attempt to besiege it.”

“They’ve been shelling it consistently for weeks. If they take it, then they will redeploy some of those troops toward el-Obeid,” said Khair. Should the city fall, she warned, the political shockwave will be enormous. “It’s a huge mercantile centre, a regional capital, and a major economic win. It also brings the RSF several steps closer to Khartoum.”

Potential partition

Beyond the battlefield, analysts warn that Kordofan’s escalation is intensifying the fault lines fragmenting Sudan’s political and ethnic map.

Khair pointed out that the fall of el-Fasher had cemented the territorial fragmentation of western Sudan, but added that there were also “dozens of armed groups”, either aligned to the SAF, the RSF, or independent, that each controlled their own fiefdoms.

For Khair, the real driver of Sudan’s disintegration is not territory but identity. “This war has become extremely ethnicised, by both the SAF and the RSF, so they can mobilise troops. Because of that, you now have a split of communities who believe their ethnic interests are served by the SAF, by the RSF, or by other groups.”

This ethnic competition, she said, is now steering the trajectory of the war more than military strategy. “There’s no singular Sudanese project right now – not intellectually, militarily, politically, or economically – and that is catalysing fragmentation.”

Abdelmoniem, however, warns that some within the SAF may be willing to accept fragmentation. “Undoubtedly, there are elements within the SAF who would be more than happy for further fragmentation of the country so they can continue to rule over the Arab Sudanese side,” she said. “Losing Darfur is not an issue, and they’re willing to forgo the alliance with the joint forces over it,” she added, referring to former rebel groups largely based in Darfur and allied to the SAF.

Many Sudanese in Darfur are non-Arab, and have been targeted in particular by RSF attacks.

But any approach that abandons Darfur, Abdelmoniem believes, is unsustainable. “Without the joint forces and other groups under their political-military umbrella, they cannot win. And how do you contend with public opinion when the Sudanese people will view the SAF as the entity that lost or broke up the country?”

Arbab takes a more cautious view. While he acknowledges the reality of de facto breakage, he believes formal partition is unlikely. “Division is not currently on the table,” Arbab said, “because the structure of alliances on both sides requires a political project encompassing all of Sudan. Social complexities and the diversity of actors make such an option extremely difficult.”

Humanitarian fallout

As the front lines expand, Korodofan now faces the prospect of a humanitarian disaster on the scale seen in Darfur. Abdelmoniem drew a direct parallel to the warnings issued before the fall of el-Fasher. “The atrocities committed will be on a different scale,” she cautioned. “We might not get the video uploads like before, but the crimes will be committed.”

Abdemoniem said international inaction has emboldened all armed actors. “That sense of impunity prevails and will only increase the longer the international community is content with releasing statements and not doing much else.”

Arbab echoed that concern. Global attention, he said, was focused on el-Fasher because the violence there contained “elements of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. But Kordofan’s dynamics differ. In Babnusa, SAF and RSF forces come from the same overlapping tribal and ethnic communities, making the violence distinct from Darfur’s ethnic massacres. Yet the risks remain profound: reprisal killings, sieges, and mass displacement.

Khair warned that humanitarian access to Kordofan is already near impossible. “I don’t see SAF granting access, and I don’t see the RSF granting access into areas they control,” she said. Unlike Darfur, Kordofan lacks open borders where aid could be routed. “Access issues become even more heightened when you’re away from an international border.”

Sudan Doctors Network says military use of hospital is ‘a blatant violation of sanctity of medical institutions’.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have converted a large part of Al-Nuhud Hospital in West Kordofan in wartorn Sudan’s south into a military command centre and barracks since their takeover of the city more than five months ago, according to the Sudan Doctors Network.

The nongovernmental organisation said on Friday that the RSF, the government-aligned Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) bitter rival in the brutal three-year civil war, has been preventing the hospital from fulfilling its essential role in providing healthcare for the population.

“This military use of the health facility constitutes a blatant violation of the sanctity of medical institutions and undermines civilians’ right to access treatment,” the statement on Facebook said, adding that some of the medical personnel in the city have been accused of cooperating with the military before fleeing the city.

“As a result, the hospital is suffering from a severe shortage of healthcare workers, leaving the remaining medical services extremely limited and unable to meet patients’ needs,” it added.

Since April 2023, the SAF and the RSF have been locked in a war that regional and international mediation has failed to end.

The conflict has killed thousands of people and displaced millions of others, causing what the United Nations calls the world’s largest humanitarian disaster.

Fleeing the horrors of el-Fasher

Hundreds of Sudanese children have arrived in the town of Tawila in Sudan’s western Darfur region without their parents since the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized control of the city of el-Fasher last month, a humanitarian group says.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) said on Thursday that at least 400 unaccompanied children had arrived in Tawila but that the real number was likely much higher.

The RSF seized control of el-Fasher – the capital of Sudan’s North Darfur state – on October 26 after an 18-month siege that cut residents off from food, medicine and other critical supplies.

The paramilitary group has been accused of committing mass killings, kidnappings and widespread acts of sexual violence in its takeover of the city. The Sudanese army has also been accused of committing atrocities during the war.

Washington’s truce proposal

The United States has recently presented Sudan’s warring parties with a proposal for a ceasefire, but neither side has formally accepted it.

The RSF unilaterally declared a cessation of hostilities on Monday in line with US wishes.

But on Tuesday, the SAF said it had repelled an attack on a base in Babnusa in West Kordofan state, the newest front line in the war.

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan called on US President Donald Trump on Wednesday to bring peace to the country.

“The Sudanese people now look to Washington to take the next step: to build on the US president’s honesty and work with us – and those in the region who genuinely seek peace – to end this war,” Sudan’s de facto leader wrote in an op-ed published in The Wall Street Journal.

Attempts to broker peace between Burhan and his one-time deputy, RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, have repeatedly failed over the course of the war that has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced 12 million and created the world’s largest hunger and displacement crises.

Trump took a public interest in the war for the first time last week, promising he would end it after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman urged him to get involved.

Humanitarian group says at least 400 children reached Tawila without their parents after Rapid Support Forces’ advance.

Hundreds of Sudanese children have arrived in the town of Tawila in Sudan’s western Darfur region without their parents since the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized control of the city of el-Fasher last month, a humanitarian group says.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) said on Thursday that at least 400 unaccompanied children had arrived in Tawila but that the real number was likely much higher.

“Children are reaching Tawila exhausted and deeply distressed, often after days of walking through the desert,” the group said.

“Many arrive terrified of the armed groups they fled from or might have encountered on the road. Many became separated from their parents during the chaos of flight, while others’ parents are believed to have gone missing, been detained or killed.”

The RSF seized control of el-Fasher – the capital of Sudan’s North Darfur state – on October 26 after an 18-month siege that cut residents off from food, medicine and other critical supplies.

The paramilitary group, which has been battling the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for control of Sudan since April 2023, has been accused of committing mass killings, kidnappings and widespread acts of sexual violence in its takeover of the city.

The RSF has denied targeting civilians or blocking aid, saying such activities are due to rogue actors.

But United Nations human rights chief Volker Turk said in mid-November that the “atrocities” that have unfolded in el-Fasher “constitute the gravest of crimes”.

More than 100,000 people have fled el-Fasher since the RSF’s takeover last month, according to the latest figures from the UN, with many seeking refuge in nearby Chad.

Meanwhile, the NRC said on Thursday that it had registered at least 15,000 new arrivals in Tawila, about 60km (37 miles) from el-Fasher, since October 26. More than 200 children are being registered each day on average, it added.

Nidaa, a teacher with the humanitarian group’s education programme in Tawila, said children arrive showing “signs of acute trauma”.

“When we first started our classes, some of the children could not speak at all when they arrived. Others were waking up with nightmares,” she said. “They describe hiding for hours, travelling at night to avoid attacks, and becoming separated from family in the chaos.”

Fears of human trafficking

Humanitarian groups have said the already heavily populated displacement camps in Tawila are becoming overwhelmed with the influx of new arrivals from el-Fasher and its surrounding villages.

The Sudanese American Physicians Association estimated in early November that more than 650,000 internally displaced people from el-Fasher and other parts of Darfur had sought refuge in Tawila amid months of fighting in the region.

Nearly three-quarters of displaced residents – 74 percent – lived in informal sites without adequate infrastructure, the group said in a November 5 report, while less than 10 percent of displaced households had reliable access to water or latrines.

“These conditions mean Tawila has effectively become a stand-alone crisis epicentre, not merely an overflow from el-Fasher,” the report said.

At the same time, a group of UN experts warned on Thursday that the deteriorating situation in the region has opened Sudanese women and girls up to a heightened risk of sexual exploitation and trafficking.

Displaced children are also increasingly vulnerable to being recruited to fight in the escalating conflict, the experts said.

“We are deeply concerned at the alarming reports of human trafficking since the takeover of el-Fasher and surrounding areas by the [RSF],” they said in a statement.

“Women and girls have been abducted in RSF-controlled areas, and women, unaccompanied and separated children are at elevated risk of sexual violence and sexual exploitation.”

Noting that families have been left without shelter, humanitarian aid, and access to basic services, including healthcare and education, the experts called for “urgent action to end the human rights violations driving this suffering”.

Search ongoing for fourth suspect as prosecutor’s office says the accused hold positions in critical defence companies operating inside Turkiye.

Three executives of defence companies have been arrested by Turkish authorities on suspicion of spying for foreign powers, prosecutors say.

“An operation was carried out on November 25, 2025, to apprehend four individuals identified in connection with the conspiracy,” the Istanbul public prosecutor’s office said in a statement on Tuesday.

“As a result of the operation, three individuals were apprehended, and an arrest warrant was issued for one individual due to being abroad.”

It said the suspects “hold executive positions within critical defence companies operating in our country”.

They are accused of trying to provide “biographical” information about employees to foreign countries.

According to the AFP news agency, the prosecutor’s office initially said the suspects worked for the intelligence services of the United Arab Emirates before deleting that statement and publishing a significantly revised version on X that did not mention the UAE.

Turkey’s defence exports swelled by 29 percent ($7.15bn) in 2024, according to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, driven notably by the success of its military drones.

Sudan’s army chief Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan blasted a new US-led ceasefire plan as “the worst one presented,” accusing mediators — including the United Arab Emirates — of bias. The RSF says it accepted the truce. Sudan’s 30-month war has killed tens of thousands and is the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.

United States President Donald Trump “looks at Saudi Arabia like a piggy bank or an ATM machine” and that’s why the recent Saudi-US summit focused on deals instead of strategic regional issues, such as Sudan, Palestine, Iran and Syria, argues political scientist Gregory Gause, professor emeritus of international affairs at Texas A&M University.

Gause tells host Steve Clemons that if Riyadh can seal a deal to house a joint AI data centre, “that’s the best guarantee of US security.”

He adds that China may be Saudi Arabia’s biggest customer but the US is Riyadh’s “preferred partner on security, AI, economics and defence cooperation”.

“We’ve already started working on that.” US President Donald Trump said his administration is searching for a possible resolution to the war in Sudan. He added that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had raised the conflict in a conversation with him.

Last week, 42 migrants were presumed to have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea after their dinghy set sail off the Libyan coast.

At least 29 of them were Sudanese refugees who fled the catastrophic civil war in their country between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the regular army known as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

Since erupting in April 2023, the Sudan war has caused the largest displacement crisis in the world.

Nearly 13 million people have been uprooted from their homes and more than four million have fled to neighbouring countries, such as Chad, Egypt and Libya.

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), more than 86,000 Sudanese nationals are registered as asylum seekers or refugees in Libya – a 60,000 uptick compared with before the war.

As more Sudanese attempt to reach Europe from Libya, this is everything you need to know about their plight.

How many Sudanese asylum seekers have reached Europe since the war started?

From April 2023 to January 2024, the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) registered nearly 10,000 asylum applications from Sudanese nationals across the European Union – nearly twice as high as the previous year.

While figures for 2025 have not yet been published, the growing number of Sudanese nationals arriving in Libya suggests that more people are aiming to reach Europe as their final destination.

“I hope to soon take the journey across the sea to Europe,” Hamid, a Sudanese refugee from Khartoum, told Al Jazeera from Libya, where he arrived earlier this year.

“Hopefully, God will make the journey safe,” he added with resignation.

How are Sudanese asylum seekers treated in Europe?

Only a minority of the 10,000 Sudanese asylum seekers have been granted protection so far, with the rest either rejected or waiting for a ruling.

In general, life has not been easy for many young Sudanese men after reaching Europe.

Some EU states are using anti-smuggling laws to criminalise young men for steering the small and overcrowded boats that smugglers put them in.

In Greece, more than 200 Sudanese minors and young men between the ages of 15 and 21 are facing smuggling charges.

Some have already been convicted and sentenced to decades or life in prison, pushing their lawyers to appeal.

Migration experts have long explained that vulnerable youth often agree to “steer” boats in exchange for a discounted price from smugglers, who often charge thousands of dollars from destitute asylum seekers looking for safety.

Does Europe share responsibility for the crisis in Sudan?

The RSF, which has committed countless atrocities throughout the war, emerged from the nomadic “Arab” government-linked Popular Defence Forces, known as the Janjaweed militias, that spearheaded a brutal campaign in the far western region of Darfur at the turn of the millennium.

Those militias were later accused of carrying out countless war crimes and crimes against humanity against mainly sedentary “non-Arab” communities.

Many legal scholars and human rights groups believe the atrocities may have amounted to genocide.

Yet in 2013, Sudan’s then-President Omar al-Bashir repackaged many of the Popular Defence Forces militias into the RSF.

The RSF, looking to acquire international legitimacy, quickly portrayed itself as a possible partner in the EU’s mission to “manage migration” in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.

In 2014, the EU announced that it was launching the “Khartoum Process”, an initiative that strengthened cooperation between the EU and East African nations to counter irregular migration.

About $200m was pumped into Sudan over the next five years for this purpose.

According to research carried out by Sudan expert Suliman Baldo in 2017, a portion of this money went to strengthening the judiciary and law enforcement and may have possibly been diverted towards the RSF.

The EU has long denied that it financed the RSF in any capacity.

When Sudan’s security forces – including the RSF – killed more than 120 pro-democracy protesters in the capital Khartoum on June 3, 2019, the EU suspended all migration cooperation.

At the time, Sudan expert Alex de Waal said the EU’s reaction was “basically an admission of guilt” that the RSF had benefitted politically and financially from the Khartoum Process.

When we talk about conflict in a country, we usually think of war, crisis, violence, and so on. Of course, these conflicts are crucial phenomena and need to be discussed. The civil war in Sudan is no exception. Sudan has been a country experiencing a humanitarian crisis since the military clashes in 2023. There are strong allegations of foreign interference through illicit funding, which has exacerbated this crisis. This issue is important to address because it shows that transnational societies are not always glorified as positive entities and that globalization can be an instrument contributing to the suffering of the Sudanese people.

The crisis in Sudan was sparked by a power struggle between the government military, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo. Initially, the two military groups were allied to overthrow the regime of President Omar Al-Bashir, but disagreements arose over how to integrate their respective forces. Suspicion arose on both sides, leading to fierce fighting on April 15, 2023. The capital, Khartoum, suffered extensive damage, and the fighting spread, displacing more than 3 million people across the country and abroad. (Prayuda, Syafrana, Sundari, Shiddiqy, & Riau, 2024) 

Given the complexity of the Sudanese conflict, the author views the Sudanese conflict as a concrete illustration of how transnational society and globalization can give rise to new contradictions: promising interconnectedness and collaboration across borders, while simultaneously giving rise to networks that exacerbate humanitarian crises. The author analyzes the Sudanese conflict based on the concepts of transnational networks and shadow globalization. This paper focuses not only on domestic phenomena but also involves various non-state actors. Thus, the author is guided by three arguments, namely: first, how the transnational network strengthens the conflict so that the conflict has been organized to the global level; second, how globalization becomes a tool for illegal flows, thus triggering ongoing violence; and third, how the presence of transnational networks and shadow globalization makes the Sudanese conflict not only related to domestic affairs but also a global responsibility due to complex interdependence.

The Sudanese conflict has involved transnational actors who play a role as suppliers of weapons and illegal funding for the warring factions. A report from Amnesty (2024) asserts that “the conflict in Sudan is being fueled by a constant flow of weapons into the country,” originating from China, the UAE, and Turkey. Anti-material rifles, jammer drones, and mortars made in China; armored personnel carriers (APTs) from the UAE; hundreds of thousands of blank firearms from Turkey; and variants of civilian light weapons from Russia have provided external support for both parties in the conflict. All this data clearly shows that national borders are no barrier to the export of violence. Brokers, military contractors, and sponsoring states continue to supply weapons, ultimately providing them with ammunition for war. In other words, the Sudanese conflict could transform into a global war, with transnational communities acting as intermediaries in supplying weapons and interests across borders.

The role of transnational networks is the reason why the Sudanese conflict is difficult to stop. When supply A is blocked, another supply emerges. In the concept of transnational networks, “Transnational networks are webs of interactions that connect actors across national borders for the exchange of resources, information, or influence” (Keck & Sikkink, 1999), so these cross-border non-state actors are independent and not controlled by national governments. Reporting from France 24, according to Sudanese officials themselves, there are sources of mining industry and Swissaid research; almost all of Sudan’s gold flows to the UAE through official trade routes, smuggling, and direct Emirati ownership. This certainly provides funding for the warring armies to purchase new weapons.

Amidst the rapid flow of globalization, we cannot ignore shadow globalization. This concept describes how aspects of the illicit economy are transforming from the domestic sphere into transnational networks operating under official auspices, thus giving rise to mutually beneficial relationships between markets and criminal groups. According to Peter Lock (2005), when countries reduce regulations and begin to open their economies as part of neoliberal globalization, this actually allows criminal agents and groups to move freely in the global sphere, for example, through money laundering or illicit trade. There is a strong suspicion of the misuse of legal economic activities, ultimately leading to illegal objectives that violate international law. Thus, shadow globalization is the dark side of globalization because it operates in accordance with legitimate global flows.

Sudan possesses abundant natural resources, including oil, gas, and gold reserves, but these resources are diverted through illegal cross-border channels. A report from Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) indicates that the country lost approximately US$5.7 billion between 2012 and 2018 due to illicit activities, particularly in the gold and oil resources sectors. (Integrity, 2024).  There are strong indications that funds intended for the benefit of the Sudanese people are instead being diverted to fund armed groups. More broadly, a 2020 UNCTAD report also stated that Africa loses approximately US$50 billion annually to illicit financial flows. This aligns with other reports that define illicit financial flows as funds whose origin, transfer, or use are illegal (In, 2020). Comprehensively, globalization can be an instrument of the shadow economy to support the ongoing violence in Sudan.

The situation in Sudan demonstrates that global structures are interdependent. Connectedness through technology, economics, politics, and security forces has erased national borders. Consequently, the decisions of actors, both formal and informal, influence other countries. Transnational networks and shadow globalization have transcended national borders through financial flows, arms trade, and gold, which have entered global markets and indirectly implicated external actors. Consequently, dependencies created by globalization impact economic stability, security, and humanitarianism.

Global responsibility is questionable, as the assumption that the conflict in Sudan is solely domestic is a misleading narrative. Every actor involved behind the scenes must recognize their moral responsibility for the profits derived from this conflict, for example, through the trade in gold, oil, and arms. According to a report by Chatham House (2023), the Sudanese conflict has a strong transnational dimension due to the involvement of Gulf states and global markets in the war economy. Furthermore, UNCTAD (2020) has confirmed that illicit financial flows in Africa have resulted in the loss of billions of dollars that could have been used for development and stability. Therefore, if globalization is understood as a global realm connecting all actors, the authors strongly argue that stability must be seen as a shared responsibility.

The three arguments above demonstrate that the Sudanese conflict can no longer be viewed as a domestic issue. The role of transnational networks and shadow globalization clearly illustrates how globalization fosters openness to cross-border cooperation but also opens up illicit flows of funds, weapons, and resources that exacerbate conflict. Furthermore, the concept of complex interdependence explains how the actions of one actor impact others. Therefore, the Sudanese conflict is a moral and political responsibility of the international community. Globalization has bound countries in interdependent relationships, so achieving stability must be seen as a shared project of the entire global community. With this awareness, the world is expected to view conflicts like Sudan as a real test of global solidarity and humanity.

Therefore, any findings regarding foreign funding and the involvement of global actors in the Sudanese conflict require further reporting. This article is not intended to marginalize any particular party but rather to open up space for reflection on the fact that amidst globalization, the boundaries between local and global interests are increasingly blurred. This relevance reminds us that the Sudanese conflict is not merely a spectacle but rather a mirror for shared humanitarian responsibility.

RSF is burning and burying bodies near a university, mosque, camp for the displaced people, and hospital in el-Fasher, Yale University researchers say.

The government-aligned Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have recaptured two territories in the North Kordofan state from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as the paramilitary group continues burning and burying bodies in Darfur’s el-Fasher to hide evidence of mass killings.

Footage circulating online this week showed army soldiers holding assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades celebrating their takeovers of Kazqil and Um Dam Haj Ahmed in North Kordofan, the state where intense fighting is expected to rage over the coming weeks.

Kazqil, which had fallen to the RSF in late October, is located south of el-Obeid, the strategic capital city of the state in central Sudan, which the paramilitary group is trying to capture from the army.

أبطال القوات المسلحة من داخل ” كازقيل” بولاية شمال كردفان#السودان #السودان_ينتصر pic.twitter.com/wVflEodHK5

— Sudan News 🇸🇩 (@Sudan_tweet) November 15, 2025

The fighting between the two rival generals leading the army and the paramilitary group, which started in April 2023, has increasingly turned east over the past weeks as the RSF solidifies control over the western parts of the war-torn country, now in its third year of a brutal civil war.

The fighting, fuelled by arms supplies from the region, has created what the United Nations has called the largest displacement crisis in the world. More than 12 million people have been forced from their homes, and tens of thousands have been killed and injured. The UN has also confirmed starvation in parts of the country.

The RSF said last week it accepted a ceasefire proposal put forward by the United States and other mediators, with the announcement coming after an international outcry over atrocities committed by the paramilitary group in el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state in western Sudan.

But the army has refused to agree to a ceasefire under the current battle lines, and both sides have continued to amass troops and equipment in the central parts of the country to engage in more battles.

The RSF launched an offensive against the Kordofan region at the same time as it took el-Fasher late last month, seizing the town of Bara in North Kordofan state as a crucial link between Darfur and central Sudan. The army had recaptured the town just two months earlier.

Satellite images reveal mass graves

More than two and a half weeks after fully capturing el-Fasher from the army, the RSF has continued to dispose of bodies in large numbers.

An analysis of satellite imagery released by Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) on Friday exposed four new locations where paramilitary fighters are disposing of bodies in and around el-Fasher.

Activities consistent with body disposal are visible at the University of Alfashir, a structure on the edge of Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced people, a neighbourhood near al-Hikma Mosque, and at Saudi Hospital, where RSF forces massacred hundreds.

The HRL could not conclude how many people the RSF had killed or how quickly, but it said the observations are alarming, given the fact that the whereabouts of many civilian residents remain unknown.

🚨ATROCITY ALERT🚨@HRL_YaleSPH has identified four new locations where the RSF is disposing of bodies in and around El Fasher. #KeepEyesonSudan

🛰️@Vantortechhttps://t.co/y5gaMRlBm2 pic.twitter.com/OsCVb1ihTf

— Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) at YSPH (@HRL_YaleSPH) November 14, 2025

Nathaniel Raymond, the lead researcher of that report, said an estimated 150,000 civilians are unaccounted for, and daily monitoring of city streets shows no activity in markets or water points, but only RSF patrols and many bodies.

“We can see them charred. So the question is, where are the people and where are the bodies coming from?” he told Al Jazeera.

Raymond said the evidence also includes numerous videos released by the RSF fighters themselves, who are “the most prodigious producers of evidence about their own crimes”.

The UN Security Council says further extensions would hinge on real progress between Sudan and South Sudan.

The United Nations Security Council has voted to renew a UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the peacekeeping mission in the oil-rich disputed region between Sudan and South Sudan, for another year.

A 12-0 vote late on Friday, which saw Russia, China and Pakistan abstain, extended the mission until November 2026, but warned that progress on ending bloody fighting in the region would be crucial to any potential future extensions.

The United States submitted the draft resolution that renewed the mandate, which was due to expire on November 15, and said it “negotiated this draft in good faith, asking only for reasonable and common-sense benchmarks for this mission”.

Friday’s resolution stated that further renewal would be based on “demonstrable progress” by Sudan and South Sudan, including the creation of a joint police force for Abyei and the complete demilitarisation of the region, as agreed upon by the two sides in 2011 when South Sudan gained independence.

The 4,000 police and soldiers of UNISFA are tasked with protecting civilians in the region plagued by frequent armed clashes.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres is now tasked with presenting a report by August 2026 on whether Sudan and South Sudan have made any tangible progress, which would also enable the Security Council to assess the consequences of reducing the peacekeeping force.

“These benchmarks will help describe the mission’s impact and provide a critical tool to hold host governments accountable for measurable progress,” said US representative Dorothy Shea.

UNISFA is a small but politically sensitive mission, operating in a region where clashes have displaced thousands and humanitarian access has often been constrained by a lack of security and dangerous road conditions.

Unrest in the disputed area with South Sudan also continues at a time when Sudan is devastated by a civil war that erupted in April 2023, when two generals started fighting over control of the country.

Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have been committing atrocities in Darfur and other regions, have also been active in Abyei.

UN rights chief urges countries to ‘stand up against atrocities’ committed by paramilitary RSF in takeover of the city.

The United Nations’s top human rights body has ordered a probe into abuses in Sudan’s el-Fasher, where mass killings have been reported since the city fell to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) last month.

During a special session in Geneva on Friday, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution ordering the UN’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan to urgently investigate violations in el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state.

The resolution also called on the investigative team to “identify, where possible” suspected perpetrators in an effort to ensure they are “held accountable”.

The move comes weeks after the RSF, which has been battling the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for control of Sudan since April 2023, took full control of el-Fasher on October 26 after an 18-month siege on the city.

Nearly 100,000 people have fled el-Fasher since the RSF’s takeover, with displaced Sudanese civilians saying they faced indiscriminate attacks and sexual violence, among other abuses. Many said they saw dead bodies lining the streets.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk told the council on Friday that the “atrocities that are unfolding in el-Fasher were foreseen and preventable” and “constitute the gravest of crimes”.

He said the UN had warned that the fall of el-Fasher “would result in a bloodbath”.

“So none of us should be surprised by reports that since the RSF took control of el-Fasher, there have been mass killings of civilians, ethnically targeted executions, sexual violence including gang rape, abductions for ransom, widespread arbitrary detentions, attacks on health facilities, medical staff and humanitarian workers, and other appalling atrocities,” Turk said.

“The international community has a clear duty to act. There has been too much pretence and performance and too little action. It must stand up against these atrocities, a display of naked cruelty used to subjugate and control an entire population.”

Violence spreading

The RSF has denied targeting civilians or blocking aid, saying such activities are due to rogue actors.

But the UN, human rights groups and other observers have said evidence suggests that mass killings were committed by the paramilitary group.

Sudanese medics have also warned that the RSF appears to be trying to bury the bodies of those killed in el-Fasher in an effort to conceal what happened.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of people are believed to remain trapped in the city, prompting the head of the UN’s migration agency this week to urgently call for a ceasefire and a humanitarian corridor to provide aid to those civilians.

During Friday’s Human Rights Council session, Mona Rishmawi, a member of the UN’s independent fact-finding mission on Sudan, described examples of rape, killing and torture and said a comprehensive investigation is required to establish the full picture.

She said RSF forces had turned el-Fasher University, where thousands of civilians had been sheltering, “into a killing ground”.

Meanwhile, Turk warned that violence is “surging” to the neighbouring Kordofan region, where bombardments, blockades and forced displacement have been reported. “Kordofan must not suffer the same fate as Darfur,” he said.

The council, which is made up of 47 UN member countries, does not have the power to force countries or others to comply, but can shine a spotlight on rights violations and help document them for possible use in places like the International Criminal Court (ICC).

In early November, the ICC said it was “taking immediate steps regarding the alleged crimes in el-Fasher to preserve and collect relevant evidence for its use in future prosecutions” as part of an ongoing investigation into abuses committed in Darfur since April 2023.

The head of the UN migration agency says more than 10 million people have been forced to flee their homes in Sudan because of the war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The agency says humanitarian operations in North Darfur are on the brink of collapse.

IOM chief calls for ceasefire to allow aid groups to reach Sudanese civilians trapped in war-torn Darfur region.

The head of the United Nations’ migration agency has called for a ceasefire and a humanitarian corridor to help tens of thousands of civilians trapped in el-Fasher, the city in Sudan’s Darfur region that fell to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) last month.

Amy Pope, director-general of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), told Al Jazeera on Wednesday that “the primary concern is getting access” to residents who have been largely cut off from humanitarian aid and services in el-Fasher.

“When humanitarian actors are themselves at risk – when they’re killed, when they’re shot, when they’re detained – we can’t get the people what they need to survive,” Pope said.

“The primary issue is ensuring that there is a ceasefire, a humanitarian corridor, so that aid groups can bring in that aid to the civilians who are very much caught in the middle.”

Human rights groups have accused the RSF, which has been battling the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for control of Sudan since April 2023, of committing widescale massacres in its capture of el-Fasher on October 26.

While thousands of residents remain stuck in el-Fasher, the capital of Sudan’s North Darfur state, nearly 90,000 others have fled since the RSF’s takeover, according to the latest IOM figures.

On Wednesday, Pope said displaced families have described dangerous journeys out of el-Fasher.

“They spoke about seeing dead bodies as they walked. They spoke about having to create makeshift trenches to avoid being shot at, or being harmed by the drones. They spoke of unspeakable, unbearable, sexual trauma [and] sexual abuse,” she said.

“The stories are really harrowing, and they’re happening now even as we speak.”

Her comments come a day after the IOM warned that humanitarian aid efforts in Sudan were “on the brink of collapse” due to continued insecurity and a lack of funding.

“Warehouses are nearly empty, aid convoys face significant insecurity, and access restrictions continue to prevent the delivery of sufficient aid,” the agency said in a statement, noting that violence is also spreading to other parts of the country.

Nearly 39,000 people have fled intense fighting in North Kordofan state, east of el-Fasher, between October 26 and November 9, the IOM said.

Meanwhile, Anna Mutavati, the regional director for East and Southern Africa at UN Women, told reporters this week that women and girls who fled el-Fasher now face serious threats of sexual violence in displacement camps around the city.

“What the women tell us is that … every step that they’ve taken – to fetch water, to collect firewood, or to stand in a food line – is carrying a high risk of sexual violence,” Mutavati said during a news conference in Geneva on Tuesday.

“There is mounting evidence that rape is being deliberately and systematically used as a weapon of war,” she added.

“Women’s bodies … have just become a crime scene in Sudan.”

In a remote and silent region, thousands of innocent lives have been lost for the sake of a country’s interests. The silence of Sudan has become a global tragedy, with more than 60,000 people killed and more than 11 million displaced. Yet the world seems silent and mute, as if they are ‘invisible.’

Is empathy for a life that is not recognized by digital algorithms so low?

This question seems to haunt me every time I open social media. I see many people around me who do not even know what is happening in Sudan. Their social media timelines never show any news or posts about it, as if nothing is happening. In fact, thousands of lives are lost there every day. This shows that digital empathy is highly controlled by algorithms on social media, which determine what should be visible and what should be left to sink into silence.

During a class discussion a few days ago, I realized that to attract empathy from the digital community, conflicts and global issues are influenced by hashtags used by prominent figures on social media. When they raise the issue of Gaza, the whole world will talk about it, so that issues that are invisible to them, such as Sudan, will never be seen by algorithms and will have an impact on the digital empathy of the community.

In her study, Zeynep Tufekci (2017) states that social media algorithms create filter bubbles, where users are exposed to information that confirms their views, while alternative views are ignored. This further shows that digital empathy is highly controlled by algorithms on social media. Thus, when information does not align with the algorithms and their behavior on social media, it is ignored. In other words, the digital world creates inequality in the space of empathy, where certain issues, such as Sudan, which are not included in social media algorithms, will remain buried and forgotten because they do not meet the logic of virality.

This phenomenon not only reveals the weakness of digital empathy but also how it shapes the hierarchy of humanity in the digital space. Safiya Umoja Noble (2018), in The Algorithm of Oppression, argues that social media algorithms are not neutral but refer to the interests within them. Social media search engines prioritize certain issues and promote websites that lead to a set of biased algorithms, ignoring issues that should be of global concern. As a result, a hierarchy of global empathy towards certain issues is formed, whereby issues that do not align with economic or political interests, such as Sudan, will never gain traction in the global arena.

The impact of this algorithmic bias is very real. The conflict in Sudan is an extreme example of the existence of a ‘Digital Empathy Hierarchy’ where only issues that receive a lot of response are considered important, while issues that do not receive much response and global attention are easily ignored. Hashtags such as #AllEyesOnRafah managed to capture the world’s attention, while hashtags such as #Sudan and #Sudanese only received brief attention and then disappeared into silence. In fact, the suffering in Sudan is no less tragic than what is being widely discussed, but the public seems to turn a blind eye, creating injustice in the digital space and allowing empathy to be controlled by invisible algorithms.

The agenda-setting theory states that the media can shape public opinion by determining which issues receive the most attention. It has been widely studied and applied to various forms of media, which easily gain global attention and are considered important by the international community. However, when issues in Sudan are not reported, people consider them unimportant, and the media agenda for Sudan is low, resulting in a low public agenda for Sudanese issues.

Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1993) states that moral distance causes people to lack a sense of responsibility to care about the suffering of others who are geographically and symbolically distant from them. This moral distance creates digital inequality because algorithms are increasingly widening, making it easy to dismiss information that does not attract mass attention. This imbalance in empathy and morality reflects the worsening humanitarian reality in Sudan. According to the OCHA report (2025), Sudan is facing the worst crisis in its history, with 30.4 million people, more than half of Sudan’s population, in dire need of humanitarian aid. Of that number, 16 million are children who are Sudan’s future generation. However, despite the large number of victims, Sudan remains invisible and neglected by a world that seems to prefer to remain silent.

Data from DataReportal (2025) shows that Sudan had 3.68 million social media users in January 2025, equivalent to 7.2 percent of the total population. Digital access in Sudan is indeed open and increasing, but the volume of discussion about Sudan is very small and even inaudible. This further proves that there is a paradox in the digital world, where the more connected humans are, the more disconnected they become from real empathy. This humanitarian crisis requires a response and support from the global media, but as long as everything is determined by algorithmic biases that are considered uninteresting to gain global attention and international support, then hundreds of lives lost and the suffering of the Sudanese people will be lost in silence and invisibility.

If issues that are considered important are only viewed in terms of their magnitude and depend on digital hierarchy algorithms, then humanity’s morals are declining. International organizations controlled by countries with political interests are increasingly eager to create narratives that seem to say that an issue is considered unimportant because it does not benefit them. This pattern slows down the response of international organizations in addressing issues due to digital inequality that creates a hierarchy that will continue to exist, leaving those who are suffering further behind and forgotten.

Many Sudanese people are waiting for hope and support from the global community, but they seem indifferent and uncaring towards the suffering experienced by Sudan. Even in classroom learning, issues that are not widely discussed on social media are often not discussed, and this is very much at odds with the sense of humanity that should be fundamental to international relations students.

As an international relations student, I understand that in this world, everything is determined by interests, power, and algorithms that appear in digital media. Conflicts that are ‘uninteresting’ in the digital space become irrelevant to those with political interests. However, we have a responsibility to eliminate this inequality and moral decline. If social media cannot create algorithms to raise these issues, then we must be the ones to take the lead in continuing to voice these issues in public until the world realizes that there are important issues that must be raised.

Because in truth, Sudan is not invisible, but we are the ones who choose not to see it.

Nov. 11 (UPI) — Women fleeing El Fasher in western Sudan are subjected to rape, starvation and deadly bombing, the United Nations reported on Tuesday.

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces recently captured El Fasher after a 500-day siege and are using rape as a “weapon of war,” according to the United Nations.

“Women speaking to us from El Fasher, the heart of Sudan’s latest catastrophe, tell us that they’ve endured starvation, displacement, rape and bombardment,” said Anna Mutavati, U.N. Women regional director for East and Southern Africa.

“Pregnant women have given birth in the streets as the last remaining maternity hospitals were looted and destroyed,” she added.

“What the women tell us in that on their horrific journey, every step that they’ve taken to fetch water, to collect firewood or to stand in a food line has carried a high risk of sexual violence,” Mutavati said.

“There is mounting evidence that rape is being deliberately and systematically used as a weapon of war.”

The situation is getting worse as fighting spreads throughout El Fasher, forcing thousands of women and girls to flee the city or risk being killed, raped or otherwise brutalized by RSF forces, the United Nations reported.

El Fasher is the capital of North Darfur and was the area’s last stronghold for the Sudanese Armed Forces amid the civil war in Sudan. An estimated 89,000 people have fled El Fasher and often seek refuge in Tawila, which is about 45 miles away, as well as Korma and Malit.

Humanitarian resources are scarce in those locales, though, according to the United Nations.

Satellite images also show evidence of widespread summary executions and other likely war crimes committed by the RSF, the Australian Broadcasting Company reported.

“All of my patients, my staff and everyone else in the hospital were killed,” a medical professional identified as “Abdullah” told the ABC. “They shot them all.”

Abdullah was part of the Saudi Hospital staff in El Fasher, where the World Health Organization said more than 460 patients and their companions were killed by RSF members.

At least six healthcare workers also were taken by the RSF, according to the WHO.