strategy

WASHINGTON — The Democratic National Committee will spend millions of dollars to cement control of voter registration efforts that have traditionally been entrusted to nonprofit advocacy groups and individual political campaigns, a shift that party leaders hope will increase their chances in this year’s midterm elections.

The initiative, being announced on Tuesday, will begin in Arizona and Nevada with at least $2 million for training organizers. It’s the first step in what could become the DNC’s largest-ever push to sign up new voters, with a particular focus on young people, voters of color and people without college educations. All of those demographics drifted away from Democrats in the last presidential race, which returned Republican Donald Trump to the White House.

“It’s a crisis. And for our party to actually win elections, we have to actually create more Democrats,” DNC Chair Ken Martin said in an interview with the Associated Press.

Martin added that “we need all hands on deck, not just the outside groups,” as the party tries to win back control of Congress and break Republicans’ unified control in Washington.

Democrats have spent decades relying on advocacy organizations and civic groups to register voters, but those efforts are generally required by law to be nonpartisan. Party leaders want a more explicitly partisan approach like the one used by Republicans, who have relied less on outside groups to register and mobilize their voter base.

Martin said allied nonprofits are “really important partners” that have “done amazing work to actually get people engaging in their democracy.”

“But in this moment right now, given the significant disadvantage that we have and the advantage the Republicans have, we actually have to do more,” he said.

The DNC initiative aims to reach non-college-educated young voters by recruiting organizers from a wide array of backgrounds, like gig economy workers and young parents, who have often been overlooked in the party’s grassroots efforts. Democrats hope that organizers’ own perspectives and experiences will help party strategists learn how to connect with Americans in blue-collar roles who are disaffected with politics, whom the party fears it has lost touch with in recent elections.

“I think it’s incredible that Democrats are actually investing in reaching Democratic voters who have been left behind,” said Santiago Mayer, founder of Voters for Tomorrow, a progressive political youth group that is collaborating with the DNC. “We got killed on persuasion in 2024, and I think this is a really important step, fixing it and ensuring that we do not have a repeat of that in 2026.”

The program will kick off with dozens of videos from lawmakers, activists and party leaders across the country. Democrats hope to boost enthusiasm for the program through interstate party competitions throughout the year.

If successful, the investments will provide a foundation that Democrats can rely upon beyond the fall midterm elections.

“This is a critical piece of the infrastructure that we’re building to actually not only win the moment in ’26 but to win the future,” Martin said. “For us to put ourselves in a position to win in ’28 and ’30 and ’32, we actually have to keep doing this work and do it consistently.”

Brown writes for the Associated Press.

Jan. 5 (Asia Today) — By 2026, understanding international relations and shaping national core-interest strategies should start from a geoeconomic perspective. Geoeconomics links geopolitics and economics. It describes the use of economic tools as weapons to achieve political and security goals and the study of how those tools work.

The term is not widely used, but the idea has been around for decades. In 1990, strategist Edward Luttwak argued in an essay, “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: The Logic of Conflict, the Grammar of Commerce,” that competition among nations was shifting from geopolitical rivalry to geoeconomic rivalry. In other words, economic instruments were becoming as consequential as military ones.

Traditional geopolitics explains international relations mainly through territory and military power. The reality today looks different. Tariffs, supply chains, exchange rates, finance and standards have become powerful tools aimed at rivals.

The start of President Donald Trump’s second term and the intensifying U.S.-China confrontation highlight what the author calls the arrival of the geoeconomic era. The erosion of free trade and de facto globalization, the “America First” approach and broad tariffs, and the cycle of retaliation and sanctions between Washington and Beijing are presented as signals of that shift.

In the past, globalization prioritized efficiency. That made strategies such as “security with America, economy with China” workable for South Korea. The author argues that economic interdependence itself is now a weapon. Globalization is no longer a stable order. Trump’s tariff policy, the author writes, should be understood not only as an economic move to improve the trade balance but as part of a broader security strategy intended to shrink rival industries, rebuild supply chains inside the United States and push China out of key nodes of the global supply chain.

China’s countermeasures, the author adds, reflect similar logic. The U.S.-China confrontation has expanded beyond military tensions into economic conflict. The author says the superpower rivalry will place increasing pressure on allies and neighboring states to choose sides, as each power blends hard and soft approaches. The author describes an emerging world of overlapping sanctions that could reshape international order.

The author argues such pressure is already visible in currency and tariff measures and in battles over standards tied to technological leadership in telecommunications, semiconductors and artificial intelligence. The author also cites energy security, the restructuring of battery and electric-vehicle supply chains and debates over the burden of security costs. Without a geostrategic plan, the author warns, South Korea could face a compound crisis spanning industrial diplomacy and security.

The column cites U.S. State Department criticism of South Korea’s proposed revision of the Information and Communications Network Act, a measure described as aimed at rooting out false and manipulated information. The author says the U.S. raised “serious concerns,” arguing it could harm the business of U.S.-based online platforms and impede freedom of expression. The author writes that the episode shows how Washington may intervene in other countries’ domestic law when it sees national interests at stake, including through potential trade disputes.

The author links that criticism to what is described as controversy involving Coupang, which is listed in the United States. While the author says Coupang deserves criticism over a personal data leak, the column argues that influential politicians in Washington have spoken up on the company’s behalf, while responses in South Korea have largely focused on calls for hearings and political pressure.

The author also points to a U.S. airstrike on Venezuela and the operation to arrest President Nicolás Maduro as an illustration of how economic interests and security strategy can converge. The author argues that while the stated rationale included counternarcotics, remarks cited in the column about “taking back the oil” reveal a geopolitical calculation tied to energy and supply chains.

The column concludes that no national interest can be protected without a tough geoeconomic strategy and that patriotism rooted in anger or emotion cannot substitute for strategy. The author argues that domestic-focused politics risks being pushed aside in a geoeconomic order and urges South Korea to rethink its national survival strategy rather than remain a passive object of great-power competition.

Editor’s note: The views expressed in this column are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of this publication.

Kim Myung-ho is a visiting professor at Konkuk University’s Graduate School of Journalism and Public Relations.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Courtenay confirmed the news on his LinkedIn page,, external saying: “I’d like to say a huge thanks to everyone I worked with at Red Bull. I made so many great friends there and I hope I’ll still see many of you in the paddock. It was an incredible two and a bit decades.

“But now I’m looking forward to settling into my new role and team, and hopefully making plenty more new friends, as I do my very best to help McLaren continue its recent success in the coming years.”

Courtenay reports to McLaren racing director Randy Singh in his new role.

Red Bull are expected to promote principal strategy engineer Hannah Schmitz, who has worked closely with Courtenay for the past 15 years, to lead their strategy team.

The new F1 season starts with the Australian Grand Prix in Melbourne on 6-8 March.

Before that, there are three pre-season tests for teams to prepare new cars following major changes to both the chassis and engine rules for 2026 – in a private session at the Circuit de Barcelona-Catalunya on 26-30 January, followed by two in Bahrain, on 11-13 and 18-20 February.

Jan. 1 (Asia Today) — Major South Korean game companies posted sharply different results in 2025, with performance largely tied to whether they shipped new titles built on established intellectual property or introduced new franchises, industry officials said.

Nexon is projected to report 2025 revenue of 4.5594 trillion won ($3.16 billion) and operating profit of 1.4112 trillion won ($979 million), up 13.7% and 26.4% from a year earlier, according to industry estimates.

The gains were attributed to the impact of recent releases including Mabinogi Mobile, Maple Raising and The First Berserker: Khazan. Mabinogi Mobile won the top prize at the 2025 Korea Game Awards held at BEXCO in Busan.

Krafton is also expected to top 1 trillion won ($693 million) in operating profit. The company’s 2025 revenue is estimated at 3.09 trillion won ($2.14 billion) with operating profit of 1.301 trillion won ($902 million), up about 14% and 10% on the year.

Krafton’s results were driven by its flagship PUBG: Battlegrounds franchise, with Battlegrounds Mobile India cited as a key growth engine in the Indian market.

Netmarble is projected to post 2025 revenue of 2.79 trillion won ($1.93 billion) and operating profit of 360 billion won ($250 million), up 4.7% and 68% from a year earlier. The company’s new titles based on in-house IP, including Vampyr and Seven Knights Re:Birth Global, were credited with supporting profitability, along with a higher share of self-developed games in its lineup.

NCSoft, which recorded its first loss since its initial public offering last year, is expected to return to profit. The company’s 2025 revenue is estimated at 1.45 trillion won ($1.01 billion) with operating profit of 15 billion won ($10.4 million), with strong early performance of the MMORPG Aion 2 cited as a key factor.

Kakao Games, however, is projected to swing to an operating loss amid delays in new releases. The company’s 2025 revenue is estimated at 470 billion won ($326 million) with an operating loss of 39 billion won ($27.0 million).

An industry official said game makers are leaning more heavily on proven franchises while trying to develop new IP, and that 2026 results will likely depend on whether companies can sustain release momentum.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Jan. 1 (Asia Today) — Kim Tae-woo, director of nuclear security research at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs, said the security outlook on the Korean Peninsula remains grave as North Korea continues missile activity and China advances new weapons systems.

In a column, Kim pointed to North Korea’s missile launches late last year and its unveiling of what he described as a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine under construction. He also cited reports of a Chinese hypersonic glide vehicle test.

Kim said the White House in December released a four-chapter National Security Strategy that he described as notably different in tone and language from past versions. He said it explicitly embraces “America First” and frames policy around U.S. national interests.

Kim said the strategy argues that post-World War II U.S. leaders wrongly believed taking on global burdens served U.S. interests. He said it criticizes free trade for weakening U.S. industry and portrays alliances in transactional terms, arguing some allies shifted security costs to Washington or drew it into conflicts not tied to core U.S. interests.

Kim wrote that the strategy’s stated goals include U.S. survival and security, neutralizing external threats and unfair trade, maintaining the strongest military and nuclear arsenal, developing next-generation missile defense, sustaining a dynamic economy, protecting industrial and energy capacity and preserving leadership in science, technology and soft power.

He said the document defines core U.S. interests as maintaining dominance in the Western Hemisphere, protecting freedom of navigation and supply lines in the Indo-Pacific, restoring what it calls Western civilization’s identity and self-reliance in Europe, preventing hostile forces from dominating Middle Eastern energy and preserving U.S. leadership in cutting-edge science.

Kim said the strategy lists U.S. political institutions, economic innovation, financial leadership, technological and military strength, alliance ties, geographic advantages and natural resources as key tools. He said it also lays out guiding principles including a focus on core security interests, “peace through strength,” a preference for non-intervention and demands for greater allied defense spending.

On regional policy, Kim said the strategy describes the Western Hemisphere as a zone where the United States will seek to maintain dominance, prevent external threats and block illegal immigration, drug trafficking and human trafficking, while expanding partnerships and, if needed, redeploying forces to address urgent threats.

For Asia, Kim said the strategy emphasizes economic security and military deterrence while criticizing past assumptions that integrating China into the global economy would lead it to accept a rules-based order. He said it targets China’s state-led industrial practices, intellectual property theft and efforts to restrict access to resources such as rare earths. He added that it also says the United States will not accept persistent trade deficits with allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada and European partners.

On deterrence, Kim said the document maintains existing U.S. declaratory policy on Taiwan and calls deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait a U.S. interest, arguing this requires conventional military superiority and greater allied cost-sharing and roles. He said it also warns that rival control of the South China Sea would pose a serious threat to U.S. interests and calls for cooperation from Asian nations from India to Japan to keep sea lanes open.

Kim said the Europe section urges European countries to reclaim identity and self-reliance and criticizes what it calls weakening economic weight and lax immigration policies. He said it presses Europe to pursue strategic stability with Russia, treat NATO less as an ever-expanding alliance and open markets to U.S. goods while offering fair treatment to U.S. companies.

Kim said the Middle East and Africa sections are comparatively brief, focusing on burden-sharing and limiting long-term intervention. He said the document argues the Middle East’s strategic value has declined due to increased U.S. oil production, while emphasizing preventing hostile control of energy and maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, countering terrorism, supporting Israel and expanding the Abraham Accords. On Africa, Kim said it calls for selective engagement tied to resource security.

Kim argued the strategy no longer reflects the image of the United States as an “Uncle Sam” defender of liberal democracy and human rights. He said it does not emphasize strengthened combined defense and extended deterrence, and he wrote that it does not mention North Korea’s nuclear program or the North Korean threat. He said South Korea appears only a few times, largely in contexts that call for greater allied defense burdens and fair trade.

Kim said South Korea has limited options, even if concerns grow about the reliability of U.S. commitments after what he described as a blunt statement that the era of America carrying the world order is over. He wrote that South Korea should treat a “changing America” as the new normal, keep the alliance as the cornerstone of its security and approach talks on tariffs, investment and alliance modernization as critical.

The views expressed in this column are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication.

– Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.