South Korea has announced it’s ending bear bile farming over animal cruelty concerns. The controversial industry was used for traditional medicine, but questions over its effectiveness knocked its popularity in recent years.
Published On 30 Dec 202530 Dec 2025
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Legislation reflects Democrats’ efforts to seek tighter oversight of Trump administration’s military action.
The United States Senate has passed a $901bn bill setting defence policy and spending for the 2026 fiscal year, combining priorities backed by President Donald Trump’s administration with provisions designed to preserve congressional oversight of US military power.
The National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) was approved in a 77-20 vote on Wednesday with senators adopting legislation passed by the House of Representatives last month. It now goes to Trump for his signature.
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Several provisions in the bill reflect efforts by Democratic lawmakers, supported by some Republicans, to constrain how quickly the Trump administration may scale back US military commitments in Europe.
The bill requires the Pentagon to maintain at least 76,000 US soldiers in Europe unless NATO allies are consulted and the administration determines that a reduction would be in the US national interest. The US typically stations 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers across the continent. A similar measure prevents reductions in US troop levels in South Korea below 28,500 soldiers.
Congress also reinforced its backing for Ukraine, authorising $800m under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative with $400m allocated for each of the next two years. A further $400m per year was approved to manufacture weapons for Ukraine, signalling continued congressional support for Kyiv and cementing Washington’s commitment to Europe’s defence.
The bill also reflects priorities aligned with the Trump administration’s national security strategy, which places the Asia Pacific at the centre of US foreign policy and describes the region as a key economic and geopolitical battleground.
In line with that approach, the NDAA provides $1bn for the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative, aimed at strengthening defence cooperation as the US seeks to counter China’s growing military influence.
The legislation authorises $600m in security assistance for Israel, including funding for joint missile defence programmes, such as the Iron Dome, a measure that has long drawn broad bipartisan support in Congress.
The NDAA increases reporting requirements on US military activity, an area in which Democrats in particular have sought greater oversight.
It directs the Department of Defense to provide Congress with additional information on strikes targeting suspected smuggling and trafficking operations in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, adding pressure on Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to provide lawmakers with video footage of US strikes on alleged drug-smuggling boats operating in international waters near Venezuela.
Lawmakers moved to strengthen oversight after a September strike killed two people who had survived an earlier attack on their boat.
Some Democratic lawmakers said they were not briefed in advance on elements of the campaign, prompting calls for clearer reporting requirements.
The legislation repeals the 2003 authorisation for the US invasion of Iraq and the 1991 authorisation for the Gulf War. Supporters from both parties said the repeals reduce the risk of future military action being undertaken without explicit congressional approval.
The bill also permanently lifts US sanctions on Syria imposed during the regime of President Bashar al-Assad after the Trump administration’s earlier decision to temporarily ease restrictions. Supporters argue the move will support Syria’s reconstruction after al-Assad’s removal from power a year ago.
Other provisions align more closely with priorities advanced by Trump and Republican lawmakers under the administration’s America First agenda.
The NDAA eliminates diversity, equity and inclusion offices and training programmes within the Department of Defense, including the role of chief diversity officer. The House Armed Services Committee claims the changes would save about $40m.
The bill also cuts $1.6bn from Pentagon programmes related to climate change. While the US military has previously identified climate-related risks as a factor affecting bases and operations, the Trump administration and Republican leaders have said defence spending should prioritise immediate military capabilities.
In June 1967, when the sun was rising over the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Israeli fighter squadrons skimming through the coastlines at low altitude struck Egyptian airbases with a devastating blow. Within barely a couple of hours, most of the Egyptian air forces were destroyed. Operation Focus was not a mere initiation of the Six-Day War, but it determined the final outcome of the war. When the ground offensives advanced across the Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, Israel had already established its critical military superiority, namely, air supremacy. The Six-Day War remains a typical case of how a short, incisive, and highly compressed conflict could overturn the premise of regional deterrence and restructure the long-term strategic reality.
Almost 60 years later, a very different state is studying similar lessons. Based on its nuclear and missile capabilities and deepened defense cooperation with the Russians, nuclear-armed North Korea is refining tools that could enable its own version of a swift and high-impact attack. North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24 series—quasi-ballistic missiles modeled upon the Russian Iskander-M—have irregular, low-altitude trajectories that are designed to complicate missile defense. Through their recent use by Russia against Ukraine, North Korea has gained invaluable live-fire battlefield data, accelerating improvements in precision, reliability, and mobility during flight. In addition, thanks to Russian assistance—advanced technology, training assistance, and potential space-oriented targeting support—North Korea is securing capabilities that were unattainable in the past.
The strategic risk lies not in whether Pyongyang could literally replicate Operation Focus. Instead, the genuine risk lies in Kim Jong-un drawing wrongful lessons from the Six-Day War and the Russia-Ukraine War: that surprise, speed, and concentrated firepower could overwhelm the opponent before activating an effective response. If Pyongyang is convinced that a blitzkrieg is achievable or judges that nuclear blackmail could suppress the US and Japan’s intervention for a certain timeframe, the incentives for war could increase.
Ways That North Korea Could Attempt a Six-Day War-Style Blitzkrieg
Such perception—that momentum has changed—endangers the nowadays Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are expanding both in terms of magnitude and precision. Meanwhile, North Korea’s SRBM and MLRS systems could strike almost all major airbases and C2 nodes located within South Korea. North Korean SOF, who have long trained themselves with penetration operations via tunnels, submarines, and UAV drops, are carefully analyzing Russian tactics used in the Russia-Ukraine War, ranging from loitering munition to precision targeting of critical infrastructures. Pyongyang may imagine that by combining missile salvos, swarm drones, electronic jamming, SOF penetration, and nuclear escalation, it could paralyze South Korea’s initial response in the first few hours of the war and create a meaningful fissure in alliance coherence.
Here the Six-Day War offers a second powerful lesson. The opening phase of the war has greater importance than other phases. In 1967, Israel’s preemptive strike wiped out Arab air forces on the ground, granting unlimited air dominance to the IDF. Although North Korea could not attain air superiority, it could attempt something functionally similar—denying the US, Japan, and South Korea’s ability to conduct operations normally in the initial hours of the war. This could include simultaneous missile saturation on air defense batteries, fuel depots, hardened aircraft shelters, runways, and long-range sensors. Meanwhile, missiles with irregular trajectories might avoid radar detection and try to penetrate interception layers comprised of PAC-3, L-SAM, THAAD, and Aegis destroyers. Swarm drones could overwhelm short-range air defense or neutralize petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) depots and movable C2 vehicles. Cyber operations and GPS jamming would complement such a kinetic assault, creating friction and delays in the alliance response cycle.
Eventually, Pyongyang could conduct its own version of Operation Focus ‘in reverse,’ not to secure air dominance but to prevent opponents from achieving air supremacy. This is to enable North Korea to conduct SOF penetration, a limited armored push in and around the DMZ, and nuclear blackmailing to prevent reinforcement. Such an operation would be based on the similar logic—the ideal mixture of shock, speed, and confusion—that Israel showcased in Sinai and the Golan Heights.
Deterring Blitzkrieg: Lessons for the US, Japan, and South Korea
By using the Six-Day War as a reference, the US, Japan, and South Korea could figure out ways to deter North Korea’s aforementioned provocations. Israel’s victory in 1967 was not achieved solely by air supremacy but also through resilience in its mobilization system and the adaptability of its reserve forces. Once securing air dominance, the IDF swiftly mobilized its reserve forces, stabilized major frontlines, and executed critical maneuvers before Arab countries coordinated with one another. Meanwhile, North Korea might use an intensive SOF operation in the initial phase of the war to wreak havoc on South Korea—recreating the chaos that Israel’s opponents had to experience in 1967—by attacking leadership, transportation centers, and communication nodes.
The solution is clear. If South Korea could prevent internal paralysis in the first 24 to 48 hours of the war, North Korea’s ambitious surprise attack would be largely unsuccessful. Therefore, Seoul should treat protection against SOF, city defense, and civil-military resilience at a level equivalent to ‘air superiority.’ This means diffusion of C2, reinforcement of police and reserve forces, hardening communication, and ensuring that local governments could fully function even under missile strikes and SOF infiltration. Irrespective of the high intensity of an opening barrage, state function should be able to survive, maintain consistency, and prepare for countermeasures.
The political aftermath of the 1967 war is also an important lesson. Israel’s swift victory engendered long-term strategic burdens: the occupation problem, regional backlash, and disputes on legitimacy. It well demonstrates that a short and decisive war could create unpredictable, long-term spillover effects. Applying it to the Korean Peninsula, the US and its allies should have a clear picture regarding North Korea’s failed surprise attack or a regime change. Issues like securing WMD, China’s intervention, refugee flow, humanitarian stabilization, and restructuring North Korea’s political order cannot be managed in an impromptu manner.
The strategic task for Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul is to deny Pyongyang any illusion of a short war. Deterrence should be based on the confidence that North Korea cannot achieve within 6 hours what Israel achieved in 6 days. To make that happen, integration of missile defense systems, real-time intelligence sharing, enhancing the survivability of air bases, diffusion of key assets, and rapid counter-strike capabilities are necessary. Moreover, the US and its allies should establish a political foundation that could withstand a war of attrition—a type of conflict that North Korea cannot tolerate.