situation

Few people know the Middle East as well as Joseph Votel. From March 2016 to March 2019, the retired Army general served as the commander of U.S. Central Command, overseeing American military operations in the region. A big part of that job was planning for contingencies like what would become Operation Epic Fury, and especially how they would affect the massively strategic waterway that joins the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman — the tumultuous Strait of Hormuz. This waterway, in which about 20% of the world’s oil passes, is currently shutdown by Iran.

In the first part of our wide-ranging exclusive interview with Votel, we focus on what is happening in the Strait. The author transited the Strait with Votel, now a Distinguished Military Fellow at the Middle East Institute, in 2016 and got a first-hand look as Iranian ships shadowed the USS New Orleans.

Some of the questions and answers have been lightly edited for clarity.

Q: How surprised were you that the Iranians closed the Strait of Hormuz, attacked shipping and Arab nations?

A: I’m not particularly surprised. I expected that they would attack some of the Gulf partners, but I did not think they would go after civilian targets. I thought they would go after military installations, particularly our military installations in most countries, but going after things like hotels and civilian airports, things like that, I think was, was not expected. I was a little surprised that they would do that. I think we certainly expected them to respond to it and of course, trying to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, I think was very expected.

Q: Did you expect that?

A: Oh yeah.

Q: Why?

A: Because it’s their principal advantage. They control that terrain. They have the advantage over the Strait of Hormuz. They know it’s a critical choke point. They know it’s a pain point for many, and they knew it would cause the discussion that it’s causing right now.

Q: How much pain do you think the Arab allies can sustain during this fight?

A: Well, I think they’re actually proving pretty resilient right now and they’re doing a good job defending themselves. Some of [the missiles and drones] are getting through, but it hasn’t been catastrophic in terms of that. Obviously, some damage… That’s not good. But they’re doing a pretty good job of defending themselves. 

And I think as you have seen from some of the open source reporting today, some of the Arab countries are beginning to run out of patience here, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, of course, and we may see them lash back out. But they are also watching very carefully what the United States is doing, along with the Israelis, and they see that we are striking back very, very hard at the Iranians. So I think that that helps them to be a little bit more patient. We haven’t stepped away from this. We’re still very, very engaged, and I think that allows them to be a little bit more patient as we work through this.

Q: How feasible or not is a mission to escort ships in the Strait and de-mine it? What are the challenges and dangers of that?

A: Well, first of all, it’s very feasible. The United States Navy has a history of doing this kind of stuff, and they have, for the most part, all the resources that are required for this. 

I think the most important thing to appreciate before we really kind of get into the Strait of Hormuz here, is to appreciate what’s preparatory to doing all that. We really have to kind of finish this campaign that’s already been started. That is focused on reducing the Iranian capabilities to a very significant degree. And that’s what’s happening right now.

I think we need to appreciate that CENTCOM is executing a war plan here that’s going to take some weeks to destroy the military capability, and then they will be in a position – they’ll set the condition, so to speak – so they can actually go and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and then direct and escort tankers through there. 

For the most part, we have all the resources that we need for that. As I mentioned, it might be helpful to get some additional resources from our international partners. And I’m not sure that’s going to happen based on some of the politics around all that and how we engaged and not engaged them in the lead up to this. But the United States Navy and Marine Corps and other joint services are, I think, are fully prepared to do that.

Q: Have the engagements we’ve had with foreign nations been helpful or hurtful or the ability to draw in assistance for any escort effort?

A: Well, we’ve had a pretty adversarial discussion going on, particularly with our European allies for at least the last 12 to 14 months with them. We haven’t really sent a positive signal. And the whole thing about Greenland and getting everybody fired up over that, and pushing that kind of thing, I think really gave some pause to them. 

And of course, you know, there’s continuous rhetoric coming from across the administration towards this, and in the lead up to this, we apparently didn’t do any kind of consultation with any of our partners that we expected would be impacted by this, or whose resources we thought we would need.

Now, coming back after things have been joined and they haven’t been consulted, I think makes it really, really hard for us to get them involved. And I think it makes it hard for those international partners to sign on with this readily, very, very readily, without a lot of debate and understanding what they’re getting into. So we really didn’t set the conditions very well for if we thought we needed international support on this. 

And we usually do. I mean, that’s a normal thing that we do. We generally always try to fight as a coalition, because it gives us credibility. It gives us additional resources. And it kind of helps share the burden a little bit, and it makes everybody feel like they’re part of the solution to this. But in this case – with the exception of Israel – we pretty much chose to go it alone.

Q: We talked about the importance of keeping the Strait open while we were transiting it when you commanded CENTCOM. What’s your worst case scenario for the Strait now, given the current situation?

A: I think the worst case now would be if we’ve found positive evidence of the Strait being mined… That would really extend out the time [for opening the Strait]. We probably have to assume that there are mines in there right now. But a serious mining effort by Iran could really complicate and slow things down. 

Mine clearing is very deliberate. It’s very slow. It’s very frustrating. It’s that way if you’re doing it on land, and it’s that certainly if you’re doing it at sea. So to me, I think that kind of represents the most challenging thing that we would have to deal with. I mean, we can get [combat air patrols] Air CAPs up over this. We seem to be doing a good job going after missiles and drones and shore-based systems. We’ve destroyed a lot of the Iranian Navy and the IRGC Navy, and we can continue to ping on [Fast Attack Craft] FACs and [Fast Inshore Attack Craft ] FIACS – things like that that they might send in there. 

But the mines, I think, are a really, really hard issue. And when we think about one of these big tankers, so they are just really vulnerable, they’re thin-hulled, getting into this very narrow traffic scheme that’s there – two miles wide, right in the middle of the Strait and then hitting a mine and being disabled on the spot. Not only will we have a mine problem, we have a disabled ship problem and an ecological disaster, and a whole bunch of other things there. So in my view, I think the worst case situation kind of looks like a deliberate mining effort by the Iranians.

Q: Can the Gulf allies protect the Strait on their own? Some have expressed fear that the U.S. could end Epic Fury before the Strait is secured.

A: I don’t know. I don’t think so. They are a little dated in some of their capabilities. There hasn’t been a huge investment in the resources that would be necessary for keeping the Strait open in an armed conflict scenario. You need destroyers. You need a bunch of them. You need to be able to maintain several air CAPS up over it. You need to have extensive ISR. You need to have boarding parties. You need to have all the other stuff, like mine sweepers.

And I don’t know that they have that. They may have all the pieces and parts of it across some of the Gulf countries, although I doubt they have the number of frigates that would be needed. But then bringing that together, they don’t necessarily have a great history of coming together for these kinds of things and combining these capabilities under a unified command other than the United States. I think it would be a challenge for the Gulf partners to be able to do that.

In our next segment, Votel talks about the highly strategic Kharg Island and how recovering uranium in Iran would be a more massive effort than most people think, among other topics.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad says Qatar will ‘not hesitate’ to ensure its stability as US-Israeli war on Iran continues.

Qatar’s Interior Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad has said the situation in the Gulf country is “stable” amid Iranian drone and missile attacks launched across the Middle East in response to the US-Israeli war on Iran.

In an interview with Qatar Television on Friday, Sheikh Khalifa said the Qatari government had a plan in place to deal with the prospect of more Iranian attacks amid a regional war.

“The security situation in the country is stable, and we will not hesitate to take any measure that ensures the stability of our nation,” he said.

The interior minister said Qatar’s early warning system has been effective as authorities responded to reports of falling missile fragments at more than 600 sites across the country.

He added that Qatar has enough water to last for several months, as well as food reserves that will cover the nation’s needs for a year and a half.

Sheikh Khalifa’s remarks come as Qatar and other countries in the Gulf region have faced a barrage of Iranian attacks since the United States and Israel launched a war against Iran on February 28.

While Iran has said it is targeting US and Israeli military interests in the wider Middle East, the strikes have hit civilian infrastructure, including oil and gas facilities.

That has prompted a slowdown in regional energy production, which – coupled with Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key Gulf waterway – has raised concerns around the war’s effects on global economies.

Earlier this week, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution denouncing the Iranian attacks on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

Sheikha Alya Ahmed bin Saif Al Thani, Qatar’s ambassador to the UN, had condemned the firings as “a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter”.

The attacks, she told reporters in New York on Wednesday, “impacts deeply the foundation of understanding upon which bilateral relations between our countries have been built”.

The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, six frigates, three light warships, and approximately thirty fighter jets and support aircraft have entered the Middle East by order of Donald Trump who, by repeatedly touting the slogan “I have ended six/seven/eight wars,” has considered (and continues to consider) himself deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize. What objective do all these tensions that the U.S. administration has generated in the region actually pursue? The weakening of Iran, or the overthrow of the incumbent government? Whatever his and his administration’s aim may be, it appears that—within the cost–benefit calculations of his trader’s mindset—he has yet to arrive at a definitive conclusion as to what kind of blow, and at what scale, could deliver the desired outcome. His recent military posturing around Iran and his increasingly threatening rhetoric against the Islamic Republic have placed him in a no-win situation whose end few can predict.

Why a no-win situation for Trump?

First Strike Doubt: Trump and the constellation of officials currently in the White House—who, notably, are far from unified or aligned on how to approach Iran—have reached no certainty regarding the effectiveness of a first strike against Iran or the likelihood of achieving their desired results. It is evident to all that the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither Venezuela, nor Libya, nor Syria, nor Afghanistan, nor Iraq, nor anything akin to the historical cases in which the United States has intervened militarily in the name of democracy verbally and in pursuit of its own interests operationally. This very reality has, thus far, prevented Trump from issuing the order to “open fire” on Iran up to now.

On the other side, there is no sign of the flexibility or concession sought by the United States in the behavior or rhetoric of Iranian officials—a fact acknowledged by American officials themselves. This indicates that pressure, intimidation, and threats have thus far yielded no results. The reason is clear: the Islamic Republic views any potential confrontation as an existential war and is unwilling to grant any concessions. Trump, however—who seeks to manufacture achievements out of even the smallest events and whose penchant for exaggeration is among his defining traits—perceives such circumstances as detrimental to his personal prestige and standing.

Iran’s Resilience: The experience of the Israeli attack and the hybrid war launched against Iran in June 2025, with direct assistance from the United States and indirect support from so many others, demonstrated that the instability they sought within the governing structure of the Islamic Republic and even the internal social fragmentation and rifts that had been cultivated for years through various media tools did not materialize. Despite the blows inflicted on Iran, none of the long-term strategic objectives of the United States and Israel were achieved. Likewise, the unrest and riots of January 8 and 9, despite the violence and damage they caused to the public and the state, were ultimately brought under control and culminated in a multi-million-person rally on January 12 condemning the unrest and supporting the central government of the Islamic Republic.

High costs and Persian Gulf Worries: Operationalizing a military threat would impose heavy costs on the United States and its allies. The Islamic Republic has explicitly declared that any military action against its territory, at any scale, would be regarded as all-out war, and that, consequently, the entire region—as well as U.S. interests wherever they may be—would fall within range of Iran’s retaliatory strikes. This serious warning has also prompted Persian Gulf states to mobilize their capacities to dissuade Trump from attacking Iran. The strikes on U.S. bases at Ayn al-Asad and Al-Udeid entrenched the perception that the Islamic Republic does not shy away from responding to foreign aggression, even if large segments of the world regard the attacking state as a “superpower.”

Global Energy Risks: The ignition of war in the Persian Gulf would amount to a grave threat to global energy supply routes. Roughly 30 percent of the world’s crude oil and 20 percent of liquefied natural gas are supplied by Persian Gulf countries, and 20–25 percent of global crude oil transits the Strait of Hormuz. Any aggressive action by the United States would jeopardize the security of one-fifth of the world’s fuel and profoundly affect the global economy.

Although the U.S. National Security Strategy does not place the Middle East among America’s top strategic priorities, the same document states that: “We (the United States) want to prevent an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass while avoiding the forever wars”, which shows Persian Gulf oil is still of high importance for Washington.

Tilting Power Balance: In addition, heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf would endanger China’s economic interests, and any large-scale military confrontation would likely lead to a more pronounced military-security presence by Russia and China in the Gulf—tilting the balance in favor of America’s rivals.

And finally?

The embers beneath the region’s ashes today could be ignited by the slightest breeze, engulfing a vast area. Israel, while likely the first target of Iran’s retaliatory response in the event of a U.S. attack, is nevertheless eager to initiate confrontation based on the calculation that a war waged with the full might of the United States could ultimately erode the very existence of the Islamic Republic or weaken it to the point of capitulation. In this context, it is not far-fetched to suggest that the disclosure of new documents and details concerning Trump’s links to the notorious Epstein case and his mysterious island may have been driven by the Mossad, as such revelations could compel the U.S. president to undertake an irrational action to divert attention elsewhere.

Today, Trump is acting more than ever in contradiction to his own professed principles—from trampling on his signature MAGA slogan and morphing it into MIGA (Make Israel Great Again), to undermining his administration’s efforts to reduce unnecessary international expenditures; from his paradoxical pride in having ended “eight wars” to the strategy of off-shore balancing the Middle East. Should a war of this magnitude and consequence erupt, no country involved—whether through direct action or geographic proximity—would be spared its consequences. Regarding these circumstances, it appears that the only desirable scenario for Trump, the region, and the world at large is the opening of a genuine dialogue, free from the shadow of threats, intimidation, and American bullying.

Sean McVay’s refashioned Rams coaching staff is taking shape.

Nate Scheelhaase will be promoted to offensive coordinator and Dave Ragone will serve as co-offensive coordinator and quarterbacks coach, a person with knowledge of the situation said, Friday. The person requested anonymity because the moves have not been announced.

Scheelhaase, 35, replaces Mike LaFleur, who was hired as head coach by the Arizona Cardinals.

McVay will remain the Rams’ play-caller.

Scheelhaase joined the Rams staff as an offensive assistant in 2024. He served as passing game coordinator last season and was interviewed by several teams for head coach positions.

Ragone, 48, has been the Rams quarterbacks coach since 2024. He was the Atlanta Falcons’ offensive coordinator before joining the Rams’ staff.