shadow

The presidents of Nigeria and the United States have announced the killing of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, described as the second-in-command of ISIL (ISIS).

Donald Trump first made the announcement in a social media post on Friday, without disclosing when or where the joint Nigerian-US military operation happened.

On Saturday, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu said in a statement that al-Minuki, also known as Abu-Mainok, was killed “along with several of his lieutenants” during a strike on his compound in the Lake Chad Basin.

The Nigerian army described it as “a meticulously planned and highly complex precision air-land operation” carried out on Saturday between midnight and 4am (23:00 to 03:00 GMT) in Metele, in Borno state in northeast Nigeria.

Borno has been the epicentre of a long-running campaign by the Boko Haram armed group and its splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which is linked to ISIL.

Who was al-Minuki?

Little is publicly known about al-Minuki, who had been under US sanctions since 2023.

Before pledging allegiance to ISIL in 2015, al-Minuki was a prominent Boko Haram leader, according to the Nigerian army.

An army statement described him as a “key” operational and strategic figure who provided guidance to ISIL entities outside Nigeria on media operations, economic warfare and weapons manufacturing.

“His death removes a critical node through which ISIS coordinated and directed operations across different regions of the world,” the army said.

It added that al-Minuki oversaw ISIL-linked operations across the Sahel and West Africa, including attacks against “ethnic and religious minority communities”. In 2018, he was linked to the kidnapping of more than 100 schoolgirls in Dapchi, in northeastern Nigeria’s Yobe state.

Emerging power

Al-Minuki is believed to have risen through the ranks of ISWAP following the disappearance of veteran commander Mamman Nur in 2018.

His reported ability to operate discreetly and avoid public attention helped him maintain influence over operations, while evading detection by regional and international security forces.

Cheta Nwanze, chief executive of the Lagos-based advisory group, SBM Intelligence, said al-Minuki had previously been declared killed in 2024 after a military operation in Kaduna state.

“That earlier announcement did not produce a lasting degradation of ISWAP’s capabilities,” he told Al Jazeera, warning that eliminating a single commander may have a limited impact.

Nwanze said the group will be able to recover as long as a growing “ransom economy” in Nigeria – which raised some $1.66m between July 2024 and June 2025, according to an SBM intelligence report – “remains intact”.

“The ultimate tool for control is the man on the ground with a gun, and the ultimate backing for that man is a functional social contract, which sadly Nigeria does not have,” he said. “Until the economic logic that feeds these groups is disrupted, the cycle will continue.”

Experts say leaders such as al-Minuki have been central to coordination between local fighters and ISIL’s broader network, but are not irreplaceable due to the group’s decentralised command structure.

“The killing of al-Minuki will disrupt ISWAP operationally in the short term,” Alex Vines, the Africa programme director at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Al Jazeera.

“ISWAP has proven resilient to leadership losses, suggesting this killing will not be strategically decisive on its own.”

‘Inclusive governance reforms’

ISWAP has recently intensified attacks along the Nigeria-Cameroon border, targeting military outposts and humanitarian convoys.

These operations are seen as part of a deliberate effort to consolidate territory and demonstrate the group’s continued relevance despite ongoing pressure, including after Trump accused Nigeria of not doing enough to protect Christians in the country’s north from attacks.

The Nigerian government has rejected the claim, insisting that Muslims are also being targeted by armed groups. In recent months, dozens of US troops have been deployed to Nigeria to help in the fight against armed groups by providing intelligence sharing and technical support.

Tinubu said Nigeria “appreciates” the partnership with the US “in advancing our shared security objectives,” adding that he looked forward “to more decisive strikes against all terrorist enclaves across the nation”.

Vines said al-Minuki’s killing was “a tactical win” for the Tinubu administration, but ISWAP remains a “serious security concern”.

As for the US, eliminating al-Minuki is likely to be framed as a victory against ISIL’s Africa network. It will also reinforce Nigeria’s importance “as a key security partner and a reminder that bilateral relations are much better than a year ago”, Vines told Al Jazeera.

Nwanze said the joint nature of the strike signalled a deepening of US‑Nigeria security cooperation, but the collaboration “will face limits”.

“Washington’s willingness to engage is likely contingent on narrow counter‑terrorism objectives, not on a wholesale commitment to rebuilding Nigeria’s fractured security architecture,” he added.

Mubarak Aliyu, a political and security risk analyst, called the elimination of al-Minuki “a remarkable operational success”. He stressed, however, that “broader, inclusive governance reforms remain fundamental to solving the long-term security challenges in the wider region”.

Reporting from Sacramento — Susan Kennedy, the former top aide to Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, has agreed to pay $32,500 in fines for shadow lobbying, or advocating for clients before a state agency without registering as a lobbyist, according to documents released Monday.

The state Fair Political Practices Commission’s enforcement staff says Kennedy failed to register though she attempted to influence the California Public Utilities Commission from 2012 through 2014 on behalf of her clients, Lyft Inc. and San Gabriel Valley Water Co. Kennedy was paid $201,000 for the lobbying work.

Kennedy served on the California Public Utilities Commission from 2003 to 2006. She was chief of staff to Schwarzenegger from 2007 to 2011 before she became a consultant.

She signed an agreement with the FPPC enforcement staff admitting to the violations of the state Political Reform Act.

“In this case, the violations were serious since the public and other interested parties were not informed of Kennedy’s lobbying activity,” the agreement says. “While Kennedy maintains she did not intend to qualify as a lobbyist, given her experience and sophistication, she should have been aware at the time that her activity qualified as lobbying.”

The agreement and fines are expected to be approved by the Fair Political Practices Commission on Feb. 15.

The panel has been investigating shadow lobbying for years at the state Capitol and has fined others who have tried to secretly influence state government.

The state defines a lobbyist as someone who receives $2,000 or more in a calendar month to communicate directly, or through an agent, with state officials for the purpose of influencing legislative or administrative action. Such people must register as lobbyists with the state and periodically report who is paying them, how much and for what purpose.

Kennedy failed to register and disclose her payments, resulting in eight violations of the Political Reform Act. In 2012, Lyft Inc. gave Kennedy a $15,000-a-month contract to help “strategic management” of Lyft’s public policy interests, the report said.

Lyft and other ride-hailing firms including Uber were under the scrutiny of the PUC for operating without its approval at the time, and Lyft agreed to pay a fine of $20,000 for operating without the agency’s authority.

After being retained by Lyft, Kennedy contacted CPUC President Michael Peevey, Executive Director Paul Clanon and other staff to convince them that the state should work with the ride-hailing firms, not shut them down.

At Kennedy’s prodding, the California Public Utilities Commission decided to adopt rules on the new industry regarding liability insurance, driver licensing and background checks, driver training programs and vehicle inspections.

James C. Harrison, an attorney for Kennedy, said she “moved immediately once the discrepancy was identified to provide the necessary information requested by the FPPC. Integrity and character are hallmark principles in how Kennedy conducts herself in business, which is why she is acting swiftly and looks forward to its resolution.”

Updates from Sacramento »

patrick.mcgreevy@latimes.com

Twitter: @mcgreevy99

UPDATES:

3:15 p.m.: This article was updated to provide total amount of fines and a comment from Kennedy’s attorney, James C. Harrison.

This article was originally posted at 2:20 p.m.

On March 11, the Thai cargo ship Mayuree Naree was struck by two projectiles while crossing the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important waterways located between Iran and Oman. A fire broke out in the engine room, and while 20 sailors were rescued, three remained trapped inside the stricken vessel. Their remains were found weeks later when a specialised rescue team boarded the vessel, which had run aground on the shores of Iran’s Qeshm island.

At about the same time, a “shadow fleet” of tankers continued to navigate the very same waters safely. Operating with fake flags, disabled signals and unspecified destinations, this covert armada survived because it operates outside the traditional rules of maritime trade.

Iran threatened to block “enemy” ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz – a crucial chokepoint for a fifth of the world’s oil – in the wake of the United States-Israeli war launched on February 28. Soon, navigation through the strait was disrupted amid fears of attacks.

Following a temporary ceasefire on April 8, the United States imposed a full naval blockade on Iranian ports on April 13. Theoretically, traffic through the strait should have come to a complete halt.

However, tracking data reveals a remarkably different reality.

An exclusive Al Jazeera open-source investigation tracked 202 voyages made by 185 vessels through the strait between March 1 and April 15, navigating both under fire and across blockade lines.

The numbers behind the shadows

To understand how the strait operated under extreme pressure, Al Jazeera’s Digital Investigative Unit monitored the waterway daily, cross-referencing vessel International Maritime Organization (IMO) numbers with international sanction lists from the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United Nations. An IMO number is a unique seven-digit figure assigned to commercial ships.

Of the tracked voyages, 77 (38.5 percent) were directly or indirectly linked to Iran. Notably, 61 of the ships transiting the strait were explicitly listed on international sanctions lists.

The investigation divided the conflict into three distinct phases to map the fleet’s behaviour:

• Phase 1: Open War (March 1 – April 6): 126 ships crossed the strait, peaking at 30 vessels on March 1. Among these, 46 were linked to Iran.
• Phase 2: The Truce (April 7 – 13): 49 ships crossed during this fragile pause. More than 40 percent of these vessels were tied to Iran, including the US-sanctioned, Iranian-flagged Roshak, which successfully exited the Gulf.
• Phase 3: The US Blockade (April 13 – 15): Despite the explicit naval blockade, 25 ships crossed the strait.

Breaking the blockade

When the US blockade took effect, the shadow fleet adapted immediately.

The Iranian cargo ship “13448” successfully broke the blockade. Because it is a smaller vessel operating in coastal waters, it lacks an official IMO number, allowing it to evade traditional sanction-monitoring tools. The vessel departed Iran’s Al Hamriya port and reached Karachi, Pakistan.

Similarly, the Panama-flagged Manali broke the blockade, crossing on April 14 and penetrating the cordon again on April 17 en route to Mumbai, India.

The investigation uncovered widespread manipulation of Automatic Identification System (AIS) trackers. Vessels such as the US-sanctioned Flora, Genoa and Skywave deliberately disabled or jammed their signals to hide their identities and destinations.

Fake flags and shell companies

To obscure ultimate ownership, the shadow fleet heavily relies on a complex web of “false flags” and shell companies. The investigation identified 16 ships operating under fake flags, including registries from landlocked nations like Botswana and San Marino, as well as others from Madagascar, Guinea, Haiti and Comoros.

The operational network managing these ships spans the globe. Operating firms were primarily based in Iran (15.7 percent), China (13 percent), Greece (more than 11 percent) and the United Arab Emirates (9.7 percent). Notably, the operators of nearly 19 percent of the observed vessels remain unknown.

The toll of a parallel system

Despite the intense military pressure, energy carriers dominated the traffic, with 68 ships (36.2 percent) transporting crude oil, petroleum products and gas. Ten of these tankers were directly linked to Iran. Non-oil trade also persisted, with 57 bulk and general cargo ships crossing during the open war phase, 41 of which were tied to Tehran.

Before the war, at least 100 ships crossed the Strait of Hormuz daily. Today, a staggering 20,000 sailors are trapped on 2,000 ships across the Gulf – a crisis the International Maritime Organization described as unprecedented since World War II.

A shadow Iranian fleet, meanwhile, has been navigating seamlessly as part of a parallel maritime system born from 47 years of US sanctions on Tehran. Washington slapped sanctions on Tehran following the 1979 Islamic revolution that toppled the pro-Washington ruler Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The two countries have had no diplomatic ties since 1980.

April 29 (UPI) — The United States has sanctioned 35 entities and individuals accused of overseeing a shadow-banking network that moved tens of billions of dollars for Iran, as the Trump administration flexes Washington’s financial might amid a stalemate in peace negotiations with Tehran.

The sanctions announced Tuesday come as U.S.-Iran peace negotiations came to a halt last week after Tehran said it would not participate in talks until the United States lifted its blockade of sea-based trade to the Middle Eastern nation.

Those blacklisted by the Treasury include several private companies known as rahbars, which manage thousands of overseas companies used by Iranian banks cut off from the international financial system to execute payments for Iranian trade.

According to the Treasury, these rahbar companies coordinate with Iranian exchange houses and front companies to conduct international trade on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, the National Iranian Oil Company and other sanctioned entities.

“By dismantling these financial channels, we advance the administration’s policy in the conflict with Iran and underscore our commitment to imposing maximum pressure on Iran,” State Department spokesman Thomas Pigott said in a statement.

The punitive action was part of what the Treasury calls Operation Economic Fury, a branded escalation of President Donald Trump‘s broader maximum-pressure campaign against Iran.

Coinciding with the sanctions on Tuesday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued an alert to financial institutions over the risks they face for doing business with so-called teapot oil refineries in China, primarily in Shandong Province, that import and refine Iranian crude oil.

According to the alert, China is the largest purchaser of Iranian oil, and the Treasury has designated multiple small China-based refineries since March of last year.

“The United States will further disrupt illicit funding streams that finance Iran’s malign activities,” Pigott said.

“We will not relent in our efforts to deny Iran and its proxies the resources they use to threaten U.S. interests and regional stability.”

Trump first employed the maximum-pressure campaign strategy to coerce Iran into negotiations over its nuclear program in 2018 after unilaterally withdrawing the United States from a landmark multinational accord that sought to prevent Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

Iran then breached its commitments under the deal, enriching uranium up to 60%, far exceeding the accord’s 3.67% but below weapons-grade levels.

Trump restored the maximum-pressure campaign after returning to office in 2025, and the United States bombed three major Iranian nuclear facilities that June.

The United States and Israel have since escalated their pressure campaign, attacking Iran in strikes that triggered a war now halted by a fragile cease-fire to permit peace talks.

Iran has imposed restrictions on energy trade through the Strait of Hormuz, prompting the United States to impose a blockade of Iran’s ports in response to what it describes as Tehran holding a major share of the world’s energy supplies hostage.