Rodríguez

As a child in Newark, N.J., Narciso Rodriguez was often transported back to Cuba by the stories from his family and their friends. He walked the halls of El Encanto, a Havana department store and fashion mecca on the island — one that drew in celebrity clientele and featured haute-couture designs and fragrances from the far-flung fashion capitals of Paris and Milan.

“I don’t know that they could have afforded any of those things when they were in Cuba,” he tells De Los. “But they certainly filled my imagination with beautiful stories and laid the foundation for my work.”

It was the women in his life — the “amazing, powerful, loud, colorful dynamos,” as he describes them — who inspired him to pursue a career in fashion.

“Their stories, their lives, their power, their curves, it all influenced me,” he says. “They’re the reason I wanted to create things.”

Over the last three decades, the renowned designer has earned a reputation for sleek, flattering lines and effortless shapes, most famously seen on the career-launching dress he designed for his friend Carolyn Bessette-Kennedy to wear on her wedding day. The bias-cut silk slip has remained a source of inspiration for generations of brides since, and has been making waves again thanks to the FX series “Love Story: John F. Kennedy Jr. and Carolyn Bessette.”

Omari K. Chancellor as Gordon Henderson, from left, Sarah Pidgeon as Carolyn Bessette, Tonatiuh as Narciso Rodriguez in FX’s “Love Story: John F. Kennedy Jr. & Carolyn Bessette”

(Eric Liebowitz / FX)

“Love Story” will follow the couple’s wedding in the latest episode, out March 5. (Rodriguez is portrayed by Tonatiuh on the show.)

After designing Bessette-Kennedy’s dress, Rodriguez launched his own label and a fragrance line, and has continued to create designs that are woven into the fabric of American history — Michelle Obama wore his dress on election night in 2008.

De Los spoke with Rodriguez about his career, upbringing and memories of designing Bessette-Kennedy’s dress.

You’ve spoken about how inspired you were by the women in your life growing up. Are there any “fashion icons” from your family or neighborhood that you could point to from your childhood?

You know, I’m so lucky because I was raised in a very Cuban household in a very culturally rich community in Newark. I mean, it was Italian, Spanish, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Black. It was everything. But I always think back to when I was very, very young, there was a kind of matriarch here in the neighborhood. Her name was Concha and she was kind of this lightning rod. My dad’s sister was married to her son, so when my parents came to the U.S., she gave them a place to stay. She would teach all of the young women how to cook and gave everyone a place to stay until they got on their feet. She was larger than life, she was like “Auntie Mame.” She had these great ‘60s beehive wigs in amazing wig boxes, she made these beautiful Chanel suits for herself, and had all these gold bangles, great lipstick and stilettos. When she came into the room, she just radiated power, joy and style. I always think of her as being my first signpost on the road.

They were all beautiful, you know? My aunts and my mom were the most beautiful, glamorous women. None of them were wearing designer clothes, but they took great pride and great care in how they looked, and that really made an impression on me.

How did that impression translate into a concrete passion? How did you go about actually pursuing a career in fashion?

I loved architecture. I loved building things, so I was always drawing, sketching and sculpting. Then I would see my mom take a piece of fabric and the way she could take something flat and shapeless and turn it into a garment was fascinating. By the time I was 13, I was doing fashion illustration, and I got a job in a tailor shop. Later, I enrolled myself in Saturday courses at Parsons [School of Design], and I kind of had to hide it from my parents at first. I felt like I couldn’t be a fashion designer, you know, because of the whole “macho” idea, but I just kept going. I was lucky that I was someone who always knew what they wanted to do, and that Parsons recognized I had talent for it at a young age.

I was exposed to really great people there, too. Donna Karan was a critic, Calvin Klein was a critic, Oscar de la Renta too. I got to do projects with all of them, and then I was hired after school by Donna Karan while she was still at Anne Klein. It was an amazing experience, and then I got poached by Calvin Klein, which was a very different experience.

How so?

It was incredible, but just very different. Whereas Anne Klein was this melting pot of creativity, Calvin was much more image-driven and precision-driven. He brought in great talents to collaborate with, so on any given day, you’d be working with the most amazing photographers, stylists and art directors. It was a really great finishing school as a young person.

You arrived at Calvin Klein during a period of reinvention for the brand. This was in the era of Kate Moss, and the famous “Marky Mark” print ads. We see a version of it in “Love Story,” but what was it like to actually be there?

When I got there, I think around 1989, it hadn’t really started to change yet. And I thought, “Wow, I made a really big mistake. This is not my aesthetic, not my thing.” But it changed very quickly, and it was very exciting. [Calvin] worked very hard. He was very focused, and he appreciated that I could keep up. Like everybody, there was a rough initiation period, but afterward, he gave me the opportunity to work on some tailored pieces that sold really well at retail, so I was rewarded with more opportunities.

But it was the ‘90s, and it was New York, and it was brilliant. It felt like the whole city was reinventing itself, and Calvin was a leader in that. All the best photographers, the most brilliant artists were there. Jacky Marshall, Zack Carr, Carolyn — the talent was endless. I was really fortunate to experience it and build friendships that were lifelong.

I’m curious if you remember your first impressions of Carolyn. How did you two connect?

We were quite friendly immediately, and then we became the best of friends. We lived in the same building, so the rest was history. You know, she’s an incredible person, and she had great style. She was bigger than life.

Carolyn has been regarded as a fashion icon, and especially now, everyone is trying to re–create her look. There was something more subtle and interesting going on than just “minimalist” fashion, so how would you describe what made her style so special?

Carolyn was so authentic in so many ways, and I think that she was very pragmatic about her choices. She had a great eye. She knew what worked for her, and she knew how to present herself. She never wanted to be uncomfortable. She was very connected to herself. I think so many people have this relationship to fashion and what they think they should look like based on the ideas they see in a magazine or being sold to you by the industry, and Carolyn never fell into that trap.

I have this conversation often with young designers, with people, with journalists. Today, everything that we see is inauthentic. Celebrities are paid to wear designer clothes. They’re styled by a stylist, and nothing is innate. That is the opposite of Carolyn. She was 100% real.

Narciso Rodriguez in 1997.

(Paolo Roversi)

We have to talk about her wedding dress. If you’re a bride, it’s impossible to look for inspiration without coming across her dress. What was it like to have a friend ask you to create something for such a special, important moment?

You know, until my children were born, Carolyn was the love of my life. We were very close, and she asked me, as you said, to make the dress that she would marry the love of her life in. It was very personal for me. It wasn’t a press event, it was a conversation between two people who were very close. I knew what looked good on her, she knew what looked good on her. I knew that she would never want to be bogged down with trains and lace. It wouldn’t be her.

What was the actual design process like?

It was an effortless collaboration. She came to fittings in Paris, we pulled the neckline down a bit lower, and the dress was born. I added the gloves, the veil and the shoe. It was just magical, and exactly the way it should be. It really made her the focus. You know, she was the one who pointed that out to me about my work. She always said, “You create a frame for a woman’s beauty and personality to shine through.” I’ve always thought that was a really beautiful thing that she gave me, because it’s true. I never want my work to be what you see first. I think the success of that dress is that you see her and her happiness and the purity of it all.

Everything about the wedding, including the dress, had to be kept a secret. Was it a challenge to make sure that no one knew what you were working on?

I was working in Paris, and I got approval from the owner of [Cerruti]. He was discreet about it. I worked with one pattern maker. I had a fit model who was lovely. Nobody knew who it was for. They always asked. But because I was working in Paris, they didn’t really connect me to her. I was also quite cautious when the dress was in work, I remember I had become quite friendly with Azzedine Alaïa. I asked, “Can I take this dress over to you and have you check it out to see what I’m doing?” I went over and he looked at the prototype, and said, “Why don’t you move this seam over the bum by a centimeter. I think it’ll be more flattering.” And I did, because he was the master, and he tortured me to know who it was for, but I never told him. Later, when it was all over the press, he would call and pretend he was a fancy lady looking for a wedding dress for her daughter. [Laughs] He tricked me a few times into believing some of his gags, but he was an amazing person.

It was just a magical time in all of our lives. And then I flew to America with the dress and went to the wedding, and it was that simple. You know, I’ve heard all these amazing stories about how the dress didn’t fit, and I had to sew her into it, and that she was hours late because of it, and none of this is true. But I love that people have made up all these stories.

Maybe the dress on her seems so effortless that people want to invent a way to complicate it.

[Laughs] I really have heard so many crazy stories, but when you look at the pictures, it certainly doesn’t look like it didn’t fit. That’s for sure.

As you mentioned, the dress was all over the press later. How did that moment impact your career?

Well, I went from Paris to my best friend’s wedding, and then I flew home to New York to do a pit stop at my apartment. When I arrived, there was a huge crowd outside the building with news trucks. I kind of walked through the crowd and into the building, and I said to the doorman, “What’s all that about?” And he looked at me, and he said, “They’re here to see you.”

Oh, wow.

It was a very big, kind of scary, unexpected change in my life. I remember going up to my apartment and trying to navigate that when Anna Wintour’s office called and said, “Anna would like for you to come to the Princess [Diana] benefit in Washington.” And I said I couldn’t go, I needed to be back in Paris, I didn’t even have a white shirt. And they said, “It’s Princess Di and Anna Wintour. You’re going. We’ll send you a shirt.” So I went, and I met Princess Diana, and it was really strange to be at such a big event and have so many eyes on me, because I didn’t expect that, and everyone was curious. I remember they were shady journalists trying to sit next to me and get information about where [John and Carolyn] went on their honeymoon. Life changed dramatically, but it brought great attention to the work that I was doing in Paris, and I was able to then go off and start my own business and do my own thing.

I’m sure you had an understanding through Carolyn about what it felt like to be hounded or followed by photographers and press, but did that firsthand experience in New York give you another layer of understanding for what she was going through?

It’s so funny because society today will do anything for that. But it was a very different time, and she was a very private person. I was a very private person. It’s very invasive, and I was kind of stuck in the middle, because while I needed to promote my work and my shows, and sort of be in the press, it wasn’t something that I was very comfortable with. I mean, I love doing the work more than I like the things attached to it. It can be debilitating, and it was difficult for me, but I adjusted, because I could hide behind my work, but as a private citizen, it was more difficult for her.

Narciso Rodriguez.

(Sølve Sundsbø)

You’ve been a part of fashion history on numerous occasions. Michelle Obama frequently wore your designs, but most famously, on election night in 2008, and then during her final appearance as first lady. How does it feel to have been a part of those moments?

It’s hard to put into words. You know, you spend so much time in it, and you have these amazing moments, like designing a dress that became legendary for brides, or getting to dress the first lady, and it wasn’t until COVID that I took a step back. I think about my mother and father coming here to give their son a chance to live out his dreams. And to have been able to sit with my friends on election night and watch her appear in my dress on such a historic moment — the first African American elected president of the United States — words fail. [Michelle Obama] is such an incredible human being who I admire so much, and to have been a part of that night, I feel so lucky.

I don’t talk about my work with my children, but the other day, when they were on the bus headed to school, they told one of their friends, “My dad went to the Obama White House.” They were proud of me. My parents’ dreams came true, and now I get to share that with my children. It’s very special.

It’s really powerful to hear you frame it that way — that these moments mean so much because of your experience being the child of immigrants. How does it feel to be in the midst of a revival right now?

It makes me want to create more. It means a lot to me that people remember these pieces, and that they’re still part of the conversation. But it also means a really great deal to me because I think it’s an important story to tell today. I think it’s important that young people hear that this kind of thing can happen to the children of immigrants, especially as I’m watching all of the horrible things happening to immigrants now.

I could never do what my parents did. When I think about it now, my parents were so much more successful than I could ever be, because they left behind their home for a cold climate, in a place where they couldn’t speak the language, and they really struggled for a long time before I was born. And now, the idea that we’re trying to take that opportunity away from people? It just blows my mind.

My parents faced so many hardships, their life wasn’t easy, but I can’t imagine if they had been put through what immigrants are put through today. I am the “American Dream,” right? I got the chance I got to do the work that I love and succeed because of them. I want that for everyone. I want that to be the world we live in.

Mérida, February 23, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly passed the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence on Thursday, January 19. 

The government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, immediately enacted the legislation and presented it as a step toward “peace and tolerance.”

The law establishes mechanisms that aim to promote political reconciliation through a blanket amnesty for crimes or offenses committed in the context of political violence between 1999 and 2026. The final document explicitly lists high-profile contexts, including the 2002 coup against then-President Hugo Chávez, the 2014 and 2017 opposition-led violent “guarimba” street protests, and the unrest following the July 2024 presidential elections.

“This law is guided by principles of freedom, justice, equality, […] the primacy of human rights, and political diversity,” article 3 reads.

Article 7 of the amnesty bill defines the ethical and constitutional scope of the pardon, expressly excluding those who have participated in serious human rights violations, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, in accordance with Article 29 of the Venezuelan Constitution.

The legislation also excludes those prosecuted for or convicted of homicide, corruption offenses while in public office, and drug trafficking with sentences exceeding nine years.

During a press conference at the National Assembly, the head of parliament Jorge Rodríguez stated that the new law represents “a step forward to avoid the mistakes of the past.” 

“I believe that this law recognizes the victims in its articles and represents a step toward avoiding the mistakes of the past,” he told reporters. “This sends a powerful message that we can live, work, and grow politically within the framework established by the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.”

During the Thursday session, opposition Deputy Henry Falcón from the Democratic Alliance affirmed that “amnesty is an opportunity that the state offers to forget. We cannot cling to past differences in the face of a higher interest: the country itself.”

After twenty days of consultations and debates and three two legislative debates, Jorge Rodríguez presented the final text that was unanimously endorsed by all 277 deputies. He also announced the creation of a Special Monitoring Commission, chaired by Jorge Arreaza (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV) and Nora Bracho (A New Era, UNT). This commission is responsible for ensuring the law’s implementation and addressing requests for release.

At a special ceremony held at Miraflores Palace on Thursday evening, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez formally received the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence following approval by the legislature and called for national reconciliation.

“This amnesty law opens an extraordinary door for Venezuela to come together again, to learn to live together democratically and peacefully, and to rid itself of hatred and intolerance,” she expressed. “ 

Regarding the exclusions contemplated, Rodríguez asked the Commission for the Judicial Revolution, chaired by Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, to review cases not covered by the amnesty and formulate recommendations to “heal wounds.”

The president of the legislature’s special commission, Jorge Arreaza, stated on a televised interview that the first 379 amnesty applications had been processed, primarily in Caracas.

“Both the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office have received 379 requests for amnesty,” he explained. “These individuals should be released in the coming hours. This process will continue in the coming days.”

Parliamentary leader Jorge Rodríguez said on Saturday that there are a further 1,500 cases being revised.

Meanwhile, Ernesto Villegas, minister of culture and coordinator of the Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence, reported on his Telegram channel a meeting with campesino, tenant, and labor organizations to discuss cases of activists facing legal proceedings due to social struggles over land, housing, and employment. These groups were not explicitly contemplated among the direct beneficiaries of the law.

The grassroots collectives denounced the criminalization of their social demands and provided concrete information that will be forwarded to the relevant authorities in coordination with the National Assembly’s special commission.

The meeting hosted by Villegas also saw relatives of individuals imprisoned for alleged corruption in the public sector criticize the penal system and advocate for their loved ones’ rights.

The Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence promised to promptly send the complaints to the relevant bodies and encourage corrective actions.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Caracas, February 19, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez met with US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) chief General Francis Donovan in Miraflores Palace on Wednesday.

According to the presidential press, the previously unannounced high-level talks also included Venezuela’s interior and defense ministers, Diosdado Cabello and Vladimir Padrino López, respectively.

“During the meeting, both countries agreed to work on a bilateral cooperation agenda to fight against drug trafficking in our region, as well as on terrorism and migration,” a statement released on social media read.

The Venezuelan government argued that the meeting showed that “diplomacy” is the mechanism to address “differences and issues of regional interest.”

Donovan is the latest US high-ranking official to visit Caracas and meet with Rodríguez since the January 3 US military attacks that killed over 100 people and saw special operations forces kidnap Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

The acting president held talks with CIA Director John Ratcliffe on January 15 and hosted Energy Secretary Chris Wright last week at the presidential palace. US Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu has been in the country since late January, and Rodríguez has recently reported regular “respectful and courteous” communication with Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

SOUTHCOM confirmed the visit in a press release, disclosing that Donovan was accompanied by Acting Assistant Secretary of War Joseph Humire and stating that the officials expressed the US’ “commitment to a free, safe and prosperous Venezuela.”

The US military command added that discussions focused on “shared security across the Western Hemisphere,” and the Trump administration’s stated “three-phase plan” for the Caribbean nation: “stabilization, economic recovery and reconciliation, and transition.” For her part, Dogu reported Donovan’s visit on social media, calling it a “historic day” to “advance in the objective of having Venezuela aligned with the United States.”

Donovan took over the SOUTHCOM leadership in February after the resignation of Admiral Alvin Holsey over reported disagreements with US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth on the legality of US lethal strikes against boats suspected of carrying drugs.

Since September, through “Operation Southern Spear,” SOUTHCOM has coordinated over 40 bombings of small vessels that have killed more than 130 civilians. The latest strikes, on February 16, targeted two boats in the Eastern Pacific and one in the Caribbean, killing 11 people in total. Neither Donovan nor Rodríguez mentioned the ongoing attacks in their public readouts following the meeting.

SOUTHCOM has also participated in the seizure of oil tankers accused of violating US sanctions by transporting Venezuelan crude. After seizing seven ships in the Caribbean between December and January, US forces have boarded two tankers in the Indian Ocean this month.

In the months leading up to the January 3 operation, Maduro and other Venezuelan officials consistently denounced the US’ military buildup in the Caribbean Sea and the subsequent naval blockade against oil exports.

Venezuelan authorities likewise blasted Washington’s “narcoterrorism” accusations against Caracas, pointing to specialized reports, including from the DEA, that placed Venezuela as a marginal country for global narcotics flows. Venezuelan officials also recalled the history of US agencies’ involvement in drug trafficking.

However, in the weeks after the January 3 strikes, Washington and Caracas have fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement with a view toward reopening embassies. President Donald Trump has publicly recognized the acting government but the official change in policy has yet to be confirmed.

The acting Rodríguez administration also prioritized economic reforms to attract foreign investment, including a pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law. National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez said that the government is “adapting” legislation to attract US corporations and aiming for a “free market economy.”

An interesting debate about the past two months centers on the extent to which Delcy Rodríguez is finding her new seat comfortable. There are areas where she feels like a smooth operator (or a yes-woman for Rubio and Trump) and levers she can’t yet pull without finding resistance from her old comrades.

One can sense she isn’t too bothered driving Trump’s energy agenda. As Maduro’s economic vice president and oil minister, the last few years saw Delcy spend serious amounts of energy lobbying for sanctions relief, engaging with consecutive US governments, and maneuvering to bring in new players to the oil industry. Experts still cast doubt on her  ability to reinvigorate an economy and energy sector that still requires an institutional revamp much broader than a single piece of legislation. 

The issue is not the written rules themselves, but that the chefs in Washington DC are currently rebuilding the restaurant with the same cooks who, no matter how new the pots and pans, will sooner or later revert to the habits that made the kitchen a pigsty to begin with.

Sure, steps are being taken to move on the economic trajectory the US has imposed. In the first 50 days of the so-called “new political moment,” we have a new energy law, a US Treasury account holding Venezuela’s oil revenues, and dollar auctions for private banks at a free exchange rate. Last week, Trump’s Energy Secretary Chris Wright visited the country. In front of him, Chevron boasted of its crown jewels. The US followed up with further sanctions relief, albeit limited and subject to specific authorizations.

In the opposite end, the country still lacks clarity over political trajectory. The puzzle of democratization has hundreds of missing pieces. It’s not just a matter of whether elections will be held and results enforced, with the opposition choosing its candidate, with competitors sitting down to discuss the day after the vote, etc. Every question about freedoms and human rights has come attached to the ifs, buts and maybes of a regime that can’t even agree on the degree of control it gives up or whether politicians will be allowed to behave like politicians. The Guanipa incident suggests the answer is still no. So does the fact that Miguelangel Suárez, the Universidad Central student leader, was chased and spied on hours after last week’s Youth Day protest.

It’s still early, but in the sphere of political liberalization, the mantra from Jorge and Delcy Rodríguez seems to be: raise expectations and fall short.

Big headlines, slow progress

As noted by Camila González in our latest post, the Rodríguez siblings are trying to convey the idea that they’re true political reformers rather than the alleged traitors of the revolución that foreign newspapers obsessed with after January 3. Their messages are simple: we know how bad things are, though we can’t always admit it, we will empty the country’s prisons, we’d like to overhaul the courts.

Delcy’s speech at the Supreme Tribunal on January 30^th is a prime example. Not only did she order the creation of an amnesty statute covering chavismo’s lifespan and the shutdown of El Helicoide. She invoked a “great national consultation” for a new justice system (which likely points at behind-the-scenes discussion the ruling elite and the military are having) before naming some of the issues that make the system so dysfunctional: lacking access to justice, procedural delays, and corruption across the country’s tribunals and prosecutors’ offices. Jorge, more adept at improvising to manipulate different audiences, later said that guys like him need to both “forgive and ask for forgiveness” before describing political prisoners as necessary, “due to the realities, circumstances and the concrete situation of a society.” Three weeks after his remarks, 444 political prisoners have been released. Six hundred are still behind bars.

In theory, the amnesty law should also entail the release of the so-called historic, Chávez-era political prisoners.

These performances seem to align with the tendencies of the biggest external stakeholder in the process, Donald Trump, who has publicly praised Delcy Rodríguez and releases as a powerful humanitarian gesture. But in Venezuelan cliques, the implementation and discourses around these initiatives (brought about under a careful management to shield domestic stakeholders from further pressures) underscore the internal resistance and tensions playing inside chavismo.

The amnesty law, a key landmark of any political transition, would open the door to the return of political figures that includes many of chavismo’s longtime enemies, and perhaps more crucially, confrontation with the consequences of years of having imprisoned military officers subjected to the worst kind of punishments under the high command’s oversight. Foro Penal reports that 185 FANB personnel are still imprisoned. Venezuelan journalist Hernán Lugo Galicia affirms that most of them are National Guards and Army officers, and that only a handful have been released since the process began on January 8.

An amnesty in handcuffs

In theory, this policy should also entail the release of the so-called historic, Chávez-era political prisoners: public officials convicted in trials riddled with irregularities. This group includes Héctor Rovaín, Erasmo Bolívar, and Luis Molina—former officers of the now-defunct Caracas Metropolitan Police accused of shooting demonstrators and supplying weapons to coup participants during the massive anti-Chávez protest of April 11, 2002 (the narrative chavismo used to shield armed colectivos and party leaders from legal responsibility). It also includes Otoniel, Juan Bautista, and Rolando Guevara, three police agents convicted for the murder of Danilo Anderson, the prosecutor investigating the planning of the 2002 coup.

These cases are deeply symbolic for the regime: the conviction of the Metropolitan Police officers helped cast blame on a handful of supposedly putschist cops while insulating the Chávez government from responsibility for the violent deaths. The Guevara case, meanwhile, appears designed to silence the controversy and corruption that surfaced during investigations into the events of 2002.

Releasing the históricos (who go back to a time where Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez were not in politics) would be an admission that chavismo engaged in political persecution early on, tearing down the myth of one of its martyrs in Anderson and the Policías Metropolitanos as the sole rotten apples of 2002. Releasing FANB members, many in terrible shape because of mistreatment and prolonged isolation, would of course add another layer of pressure to a military high command embarrassed by the American incursion that killed dozens of subordinates and captured the commander-in-chief, not to mention the array of testimonies and revelations that a decision like that could start to induce. Interior Minister Cabello is well aware of that, and sounds resolute in his opposition to the release of those accused of plotting or rebelling in arms.

The amnesty bill is now stuck. Chavista lawmakers don’t yet agree on the contents of Article 7, which commands dissidents charged with relevant crimes, many of which went in hiding or fled the country, to turn themselves in in order to become amnesty beneficiaries.

Reality suggests that supposed moderates still fall short, unable to break from the dominant logic of  fear and control.

“They said they didn’t do anything. Not lobbying for sanctions, not cheering at the (US) intervention. The amnesty is about acknowledging mistakes,” Iris Varela recently said in a pro-chavista podcast. “If you want both an amnesty and to return to the country, then come over here, prove you were under persecution, and get the amnesty.”

Varela is one of the lawmakers in charge of the amnesty project, but she is known as a radical chavista for more than 20 years. After her intervention in the National Assembly last week, Jorge Rodriguez decided to adjourn the discussion arguing that the minority bloc led by Henrique Capriles had requested further amendments.

Therein lies another distinction in the official choreography surrounding the amnesty saga. Even if all chavista voices ultimately recycle the same talking points about sovereignty, malign NGOs, and chavismo as the guarantor of peace, their performances differ in tone and posture. While figures such as Diosdado Cabello and Iris Varela maintain an unyielding stance toward traditional opponents, more civilian-facing chavista actors are attempting to stage a process in which civil society groups ostensibly have a say in shaping the amnesty bill.

Representatives from leading human rights organizations such as Provea and Foro Penal attended a meeting with the parliamentary Domestic Policy Committee, shortly after Professors Guillermo Aveledo (Universidad Metropolitana) and Juan Carlos Apitz (Universidad Central de Venezuela) were allowed to criticize and question the extent to which reforms are actually in motion, while in the same room as Jorge Rodríguez and Nicolás Maduro Guerra.

These meetings may well be cosmetic, and are unlikely to determine the final legal outcome, but they appear designed to position certain chavista officials within a “moderate” camp: figures supposedly willing to build bridges with the opposition and entertain uncomfortable truths, even if their broader script remains unchanged.

Reality suggests that supposed moderates still fall short, unable to break from the dominant logic of  fear and control. After what appeared to be a staged embrace with relatives of political prisoners, the promise by Jorge Rodríguez to release all detainees held at the PNB jail in Boleíta, eastern Caracas, is yet to materialize. Meanwhile, Jorge Arreaza, who heads the Internal Policy Committee, recently offered little beyond justifying Guanipa’s re-arrest as relatives of victims and journalists pressed him for answers about the release process.

Scenes like these—Rodríguez, however calculated the gesture, appearing outside a political prison, and Arreaza being publicly challenged and scrutinized in the streets—would have been inconceivable just a year ago. They are a novelty in the politics of late-stage chavismo. But novelty is not reform. Such gestures are unlikely to persuade a skeptical public that a genuine shift is underway. Again, emphasis appears to rest more on optics than on tangible results.

Perfume and polish for the security sector

The Interior Ministry is still in Cabello’s hands, with top cops and allies running the main security agencies: Douglas Rico at CICPC, his cousin Alexis Rodriguez Cabello at SEBIN, and his old pal Gustavo González López now commanding both Delcy’s security ring and the fearsome DGCIM (his predecessor was fired after the US captured Maduro and Cilia Flores). Colonel Alexander Granko, who became the face of state violence in the 2020s, remains DGCIM’s special ops star, but has kept a low profile in recent weeks.

Having said that, recent moves suggest that Delcy Rodríguez retains an interest in the structure and functions of a security apparatus she does not fully control—and is willing to upgrade and trim it where possible. On February 9, the government officially dissolved the Strategic Center for Security and Protection of the Homeland (CESSPA), the intelligence body tasked with monitoring “foreign and domestic enemy activity” by centralizing data from all state security organs. Its shutdown came with the elimination of six social missions dating back to the Chávez and Maduro periods.

Senior politicians close to the opposition leader—Guanipa, Perkins Rocha, and Freddy Superlano—remain under house arrest. The amnesty law, scheduled for discussion tonight, would be entirely incompatible with that fact.

Earlier, flanked by senior chavista leaders and military generals, Rodríguez announced the creation of a new intelligence body: the National Office for Defense and Cybersecurity, conceived as a hub “where Venezuela’s scientists and technology experts should come together to defend our cyberspace.” She appointed Gabriela Jiménez to lead it, a biologist who previously served as Science and Technology Minister and was part of chavismo’s delegation during the Mexico negotiations. In August 2024, Jiménez had already alleged that the National Electoral Council (CNE) and dozens of Venezuelan institutions were the target of cyberattacks in the context of the July 28 presidential vote.

Delcy may have already taken a step toward the state goal of reforming the judicial system. This month, the National Assembly approved an amendment to the statute governing the CICPC, emphasizing clearer chains of command and defining officers’ roles in criminal investigations. In a country where the scientific police (whether the CICPC or its predecessor, the Policía Técnica Judicial) has long exercised outsized influence over the justice system, the reform does sound interesting. It doesn’t undo Chávez-era decrees that subordinate judges and prosecutors to intelligence bodies rather than positioning them as institutional checks. Whether this marks the beginning of deeper changes with chavismo in power also remains to be seen.

Information remains scarce and, now more than ever, the country’s future is being discussed behind closed doors, with few listening in—such as yesterday’s meeting between Southern Command chief Francis Donovan and Delcy Rodríguez, Cabello, and Vladimir Padrino López. Our latest Political Risk Report indicates that María Corina Machado’s return to Venezuela featured prominently in conversations between Secretary Wright and Delcy last week. That development would not only deepen tensions within chavismo, but also test the resilience of the supposed transition now being pursued.

Senior politicians close to the opposition leader—Guanipa, Perkins Rocha, and Freddy Superlano—remain under house arrest. The amnesty law, scheduled for discussion tonight, would be entirely incompatible with that fact. We will soon see how far the so-called moderate lawmakers are willing (or able) to push it.

Los Angeles city officials may be empowered to remove homeless encampments from hillside areas at severe risk of fire, even without the property owner’s permission, under a proposal that the City Council moved forward on Tuesday.

The proposal would allow the city to remove hazardous materials, including homeless encampments, from private property in hillside areas in “Very High Fire Severity Zones,” including in the Santa Monica and Verdugo Mountains.

By an 11-3 vote, the council directed the city attorney to draft changes to the municipal code, which the council will then vote on at a later date.

“Prevention [of fires] is the most cost-effective tool we have,” said Councilmember Monica Rodriguez, who sponsored the proposal. “When we are in imminent threat of wildfires, especially as it relates to or is exacerbated by these types of encampments, we have a duty to act.”

Rubbish fires, many related to homeless encampments, have skyrocketed over the last several years, according to Los Angeles Fire Department data. Rodriguez said there have been five wildfires in her northeast San Fernando Valley district since she took office in 2017, though none was caused by an encampment.

Between 2018 and 2024, about 33% of all fires in the city, and more than 40% of rubbish fires, involved homeless Angelenos, according to the LAFD.

Rodriguez said the city is often left flat-footed when encampments pop up on hillsides and property owners don’t help address the issue.

“If a private property owner is not responsive, it puts the rest of the hillside community under threat,” Rodriguez said in an interview.

Rodriguez’s motion said it’s often difficult for city departments, including police and fire, to get permission from property owners to enter.

“It can take weeks to determine property ownership and to obtain the necessary signoffs from property owners to access the property, causing unnecessary delays and increasing the risk for a serious fire and threats to public safety,” the motion reads.

Some council members argued that while they agreed with the intent of the proposal, some details needed to be addressed.

Councilmember Hugo Soto-Martínez — who voted against the proposal — said he was concerned that homeless people would end up getting shuffled around the city.

“What I don’t want to see is this being used as a tool to push homeless folks from one side of the street to the other side of the street,” he said before casting his vote.

Soto-Martínez said he wouldn’t vote for the proposal until the city developed a definition of what a fire hazard is.

Councilmember Ysabel Jurado also voted against the proposal, saying she wanted the council to do more research before changing the municipal code.

Councilmember Eunisses Hernandez was the third “no” vote.

Caracas, February 12, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez hosted US Energy Secretary Chris Wright at Miraflores Palace in Caracas on Wednesday.

Wright is the highest-ranked US official to be received at the presidential palace in over 25 years. The high-profile visit took place a little over a month after US forces bombed Caracas and kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores on January 3.

Rodríguez and Wright, who was accompanied by US Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu, held a private meeting before briefly addressing the press.

Venezuela’s acting leader centered her statements on a joint “energy agenda” between Caracas and Washington that could be “mutually beneficial.” The talks reportedly included discussions on oil, natural gas, electricity, and mineral projects.

“The main point in our agenda is the establishment of a long-term productive alliance, with an energy agenda that becomes the engine of our bilateral relations,” Rodríguez told reporters. “This energy agenda should be effective, complementary, and beneficial for both countries.

Defending the recent rapproachment, she pointed to Venezuela and the United States’ energy ties dating back 150 years. 

“Our relationship has had its ups and downs in political terms, but I am confident that through diplomacy we can overcome our differences,” Rodríguez added. She made no mention of Maduro in her public remarks. 

Rodríguez, who served under Maduro as vice president, assumed the presidency on an acting basis on January 5 as directed by the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber. Maduro and Flores have pleaded not guilty to charges including drug trafficking conspiracy.

Venezuelan authorities have fast-tracked a diplomatic reengagement with the Trump administration since the January 3 attacks. In a recent interview, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, brother of the acting president, emphasized the prospect of establishing a “win-win” relationship with Washington.

The parliamentary leader stated that Venezuela was “adapting” legislation to attract US investment. The Venezuelan legislature recently overhauled the country’s Hydrocarbon Law to grant increased incentives to foreign corporations. Under the reformed law, private corporations will enjoy reduced taxes and royalties, as well as expanded control over operations and sales and the prerogative to take disputes to external arbitration bodies.

For his part, Wright said that he brought “a message” from Trump, that the US president was committed to a “broader agenda to make the Americas great again.” The Energy Secretary praised a “wonderful and candid dialogue” with Venezuelan leaders and spoke of “tremendous opportunities” in the Caribbean nation’s energy sector.

Wright highlighted the Trump administration’s recent sanctions waivers allowing US companies to return to the Venezuelan oil sector and permitting exports of diluents, other inputs, and technology for oil operations to the South American country.

“We have been working to issue licenses to existing businesses, to new businesses that want to enter Venezuela, for Venezuelan companies to buy [US] products and raise oil production,” he continued. “We want to set the Venezuelan people, and the economy, free.”

On Thursday, Rodríguez and Wright visited Petroindependencia, a crude upgrader in the Orinoco Oil Belt. According to reports, Wright is also scheduled to visit Petropiar. Chevron is a minority stakeholder in both joint ventures. The US official will also hold meetings with business executives, and claimed he wants to “improve the management” of PDVSA.

Since January, the Trump administration has exerted control over Venezuelan oil exports. Commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura have lifted Venezuelan crude to resell to other customers, while depositing proceeds in US-run accounts in Qatar. Washington has thus far returned to Caracas US $500 million out of a reported $2 billion initial agreement.

The recent licenses likewise mandate that payments be made to accounts designated by the US Treasury and block transactions with companies from China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Russia. US forces have maintained a naval blockade and seized several tankers for allegedly transporting Venezuelan crude. PDVSA also remains under financial sanctions.

Former President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) had a confrontational relationship with Washington, repeatedly denouncing US interventions abroad, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. He likewise promoted several regional integration projects.

Maduro severed diplomatic ties with the US in 2019 after the first Trump administration formally recognized the Juan Guaidó-led self-proclaimed “interim government” as the country’s legitimate authority.

Despite the rapid rapprochement, the White House has yet to recognize the acting government of Delcy Rodríguez. The formal recognition could pave the way for a restructuring of Venezuela’s sizable foreign debt.

In a previous article, we suggested that the opposition activate street mobilization to secure a safe seat at the negotiating table of the transition—where, for now, only Delcy Rodríguez and Trump seem to have a voice. The goal is not to derail the transition, but to make it impossible to move forward without guarantees that it will culminate in a genuinely democratic regime.

To avoid draining popular energy through a call for street demonstrations around a goal that may seem implausible, the opposition should focus on rebuilding trust within the broader social base through periodic, predictable, and sustained mobilizations. Once a week, for example, on a fixed day. Such a strategy would also serve to test how willing chavismo is to repress, using less combative slogans and instead pushing for modest concessions that the Rodríguez regime might already be prepared to grant.

A possible example of this type of demand was the call for the release of political prisoners loudly voiced by student movement activists, human rights groups and associations of relatives. Mobilizations have become recurrent over the past couple of weeks. The anticipated repression has not arrived, and scenes such as UCV student representatives directly confronting Delcy Rodríguez seem to signal a renewal of Venezuelan society’s defiant spirit. The unexpected announcement of an Amnesty Law and the closure of El Helicoide as a political prison are beginning to feel like hard-won gains for a sector of the country long accustomed to the sterility of its struggle.

These gains, however, have limits. The re-incarceration of Juan Pablo Guanipa as a disciplinary gesture toward the opposition’s leadership continues to reveal the regime’s sensitivities—but also its internal fractures (clashes between moderate and hardline factions) and openings for further struggle.

With the Hate Law still in force, NGOs outlawed, uncertainty over the final wording of the Amnesty Law, the persistence of state-terror structures and other detention centers, one cannot be certain that the current process of political liberalization will not suffer setbacks should the whims of the Executive shift. Even so, these remain victories that inspire other sectors. A group of workers demanding an update to the minimum wage managed to protest outside the Supreme Tribunal of Justice without facing repression.

The opposition must embrace a strategy less rooted in open confrontation and more in applying political aikido to the regime.

There is, however, a glaring absence: political parties and María Corina Machado, who, being abroad, has not managed to forge a genuine connection with these mobilizations. Without party-based political organization behind these demands, there is a risk of missing the opportunity to build a true movement capable of pressuring the government toward re-democratization.

What is lacking is the activation of leadership and a national organization capable of proposing a political program in which these demands can be recognized as interconnected. One where the strength of multiple social sectors affected by state neglect can reinforce one another.

For the opposition, the risk is not only being left behind when the ‘transition train’ departs, but also that the Rodríguez-led economic reforms—encouraged by US oil interests—could generate a new consumption and welfare boom that eventually dampens political protest. If the most skeptical sectors begin to believe that economic liberalization without political liberalization is an acceptable arrangement after decades of social decline, the space for democratic struggle could narrow significantly.

So how can this missing piece in the national political moment be recovered?

In search of political parties

For now, Machado’s return to Venezuela is unlikely without security guarantees. Nor do we believe her physical return is strictly necessary to produce an organized democratic movement. What matters is restoring grassroots organizational structures which, as the example of the Comanditos showed, are possible in our country. Especially when the cost of repression appears to be rising.

In this context, the opposition must embrace a strategy less rooted in open confrontation and more in applying political aikido to the regime. Aikido, as a martial art, centers on using your opponent’s force against them. Politically speaking, the opposition does not need to impose an alternative transition agenda on chavismo at this moment. Instead, it should take the agenda that Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez are proposing and deepen it. Where it sees a small crack open, it should place its foot in the gap until the door opens wide enough to pass through. And chavismo is already offering such an opportunity with the reorganization of the party system.

Jorge Rodríguez, as president of the National Assembly, announced that the PSUV would seek to reform the Electoral Code. A few days later, the National Electoral Council (CNE) announced the temporary suspension of the party registration and revalidation period. One hypothesis is that, in response to US demands for some degree of political liberalization, chavismo may facilitate the normalization of parties previously intervened by the judiciary and lift disqualifications barring political leaders from running for office.

Whether or not this proves true, opposition parties must seize this window of opportunity to reactivate their militant structures by convening neighborhood assemblies, open town halls, and even engaging in dialogue with communal councils to bring the legislative agenda proposed by chavismo itself into public debate.

By targeting the National Assembly as the focal point of mobilization, the opposition would not only pressure the regime but also force the hand of those lawmakers who call themselves opposition.

This requires political pedagogy from the opposition: demonstrating that this is not simply capitulation, but rather an acknowledgment that the transition to democracy is a gradual process that demands strategy, shrewdness, maturity—and, crucially, organization and active civic commitment as new pockets of freedom are won and the struggle progressively deepened. Such mobilization should aim to re-oxygenate party cadres and lend legitimacy to the proposals that might emerge during parliamentary debates over reform.

Naturally, tensions arise. The opposition deemed legitimate in the eyes of the public earned that status precisely by completely refusing to compete in the 2025 legislative elections, and therefore holds no seats in the Assembly. Conversely, opposition lawmakers that chavismo tolerates lack credibility among the broader opposition base. Yet this doesn’t need to be an obstacle for democratic forces, which can continue to pressure the Legislative branch from the outside. For instance, Machado’s leadership could call mobilizations on the days of parliamentary debate—not to oppose the discussions outright, but to demand that the people’s demands be heard in the reforms to come.

On the one hand, there is clearly no guarantee that all demands will be incorporated or that reforms proposed by the opposition-outside-the-Assembly will translate into effective legislation. But the return in militant energy and organizational capital for political parties may outweigh the legislative outcome itself, since that strengthened organization becomes the new foundation for future mobilizations.

On the other hand, by targeting the National Assembly as the focal point of mobilization, the opposition would not only pressure chavismo but also force the hand of those lawmakers who call themselves opposition yet face credibility issues. Politics is, after all, a game. The moral maximalism with which the legitimacy of opposition leaders is often judged can become an obstacle to recognizing that the Capriles Radonskis of the 2025 Assembly do not need to be wholehearted opposition figures.

One effect of January 3 was that Capriles himself—a detractor of Machado—praised her leadership position, likely driven by political calculation. Yet it is precisely these political interests that democratic forces can exploit. These positioning lines are openings the opposition can deepen, twisting not only the government’s arm but also that of these lawmakers, pressuring them to answer to the organized groups outside the Assembly. Establishing channels of communication with such lawmakers would not contaminate the democratic struggle if approached from a standpoint of strategic pragmatism.

So long as the means employed do not undermine the ultimate objective—the consolidation of a democracy grounded in memory, truth, and justice—the opposition would do well to weigh its alternatives with less moral timidity and greater political maturity.

Caracas, February 6, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez held meetings with oil executives from Repsol (Spain) and Maurel & Prom (France) on Wednesday as part of ongoing efforts to secure energy investments amid US pressure and unilateral sanctions.

“We discussed the models established in the reformed Hydrocarbon Law to strengthen production and build solid alliances toward economic growth,” Rodríguez wrote on social media.

State oil company PDVSA, represented at the meetings by its president, Héctor Obregón, touted the prospects of establishing “strategic alliances” and “win-win cooperation” with the foreign multinational corporations. 

The Rodríguez administration recently pushed a sweeping reform of Venezuela’s Hydrocarbon Law. Corporations are set to have increased control over crude extraction and exports, while the Venezuelan executive can discretionally reduce taxes and royalties and lease out oil projects in exchange for a cut of production.

Venezuelan leaders have defended the pro-business reform as a step forward to attract investment for a key industry that has been hard hit by US coercive measures, including financial sanctions and an export embargo, since 2017, as part of efforts to strangle the Venezuelan economy and bring about regime change.

Former President Hugo Chávez had overhauled oil legislation in 2001 to reestablish the state’s primacy over the sector with mandatory majority stakes in joint ventures, increased fiscal contributions, and a leading PDVSA operational role. Increased revenues financed the Bolivarian government’s aggressive social programs of the 2000s, which dramatically reduced poverty and expanded access to healthcare, housing, and education for the popular classes. 

Repsol and Maurel & Prom currently hold stakes in several oil and natural gas joint ventures in the South American country. The two firms, as well as Italy’s Eni, have operated in a stop-start fashion in recent years as a result of US sanctions. 

The European companies have consistently lobbied for increased control and benefits in their projects in the molds now established in the reformed energy legislation.

Since launching military attacks and kidnapping Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, the Trump administration has vowed to take control of the Venezuelan oil sector and impose favorable conditions for US corporations. Senior US officials have praised Caracas’ oil reform.

According to reports, the White House has dictated that proceeds from Venezuelan crude sales be deposited in US-run accounts in Qatar, with an initial agreement comprising 30-50 million barrels of oil that had built up in Venezuelan storage as a result of a US naval blockade since December.

On Tuesday, the US Treasury Department issued a license allowing Venezuelan imports of US diluents required to upgrade extra-heavy crude into exportable blends. On January 27, Washington issued a sanctions waiver allowing US companies to purchase and market Venezuelan crude. The exemption requires payments to be made to US-controlled accounts and bars dealings with firms from Russia, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea.

The US Treasury is additionally preparing a license to allow US companies to extract Venezuelan oil, according to Bloomberg.

The White House has urged US corporations to invest in the Venezuelan oil sector and promised favorable conditions. However, executives have expressed reservations over significant new investments. According to Reuters, US refiners have likewise not been able to absorb the sudden surge of Venezuelan heavy crude supplies, while Canadian WCS crude remains a competitive alternative. 

Vitol and Trafigura, two commodities traders picked by the White House to lift Venezuelan oil, have offered cargoes to European and Asian customers as well. India’s Reliance Industries is reportedly set to purchase 2 million barrels. In recent years, the refining giant has looked to Venezuela as a potential crude supplier but seen imports repeatedly curtailed by US threats of secondary sanctions.

US authorities have reportedly delivered US $500 million from an initial sale to Venezuelan private banks, which are offering the foreign currency in auctions that are said to prioritize private sector food and healthcare importers. Nevertheless, Venezuelan and US officials have not disclosed details about the remaining funds in a deal estimated at $1.2-2 billion.

Besides controlling crude sales, the Trump administration has also sought to impose conditions on the Venezuelan government’s spending of oil revenues. On Tuesday, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told House Representatives that the flow of oil funds will be subject to outside audits. 

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had told a Senate committee last week that US authorities would scrutinize Caracas’ public expenditure and claimed that Venezuelan leaders needed to submit a “budget request” in order to access the country’s oil proceeds.

Washington’s attempted takeover of the Venezuelan oil industry also has an expressed goal of reducing the presence of Russian and Chinese companies. On Thursday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told media that the country’s enterprises are being “openly forced out” of the Caribbean nation at the behest of the US.

In mid-January, the US’ naval blockade drove away Chinese-flagged tankers on their way to Venezuela. With crude shipments partly used to offset longterm oil-for-loan agreements, Beijing has reportedly sought assurances of the repayment of debts estimated at $10-20 billion. For their part, independent Chinese refiners have moved to replace Venezuelan supplies with Iranian heavy crude.