regime change

Six days after the commencement of Operation Epic Fury, President Trump took to Truth Social to announce, in the context of the ongoing joint American-Israeli military campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran: “There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” In the same post, the president seemed to equate such “unconditional surrender” with “the selection of a GREAT & ACCEPTABLE Leader” to lead Iran, which would enable the country to come back from the “brink of destruction” and emerge “stronger than ever.”

Just three days after announcing “unconditional surrender” as his goal, Trump, speaking on March 9 in Doral, Fla., proclaimed that the end of the war will happen “very soon.” One might be forgiven for experiencing some whiplash — especially because earlier that same day, Trump told Fox News he was “not happy” with Iran’s naming of a new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. In fact, around the same time he was demanding “unconditional surrender” the prior week, Trump had already called Khamenei the younger “unacceptable.”

What exactly is going on here?

Trump is a conservative nationalist, which means his general approach to foreign policy and his specific foreign policy “excursions” are guided by his view of how best to secure the American national interest. Accordingly, since Operation Epic Fury started, Pentagon press briefings featuring Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine have repeatedly emphasized empirical metrics for measuring success, such as Iranian naval vessels sunk, Iranian air force planes shot down, Iranian ballistic missile silos and launch sites destroyed and so forth.

Trump hasn’t said it explicitly, but the Trump administration’s goal — and thereby, definition of victory — in Operation Epic Fury seems clear enough: the neutralization of Iran as an active, ongoing threat to the United States and our interests. If nothing else, at least, that is how victory in the current campaign should be defined.

That does still raise at least one pressing question, though, especially in the context of exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s call to the Iranian people to prepare for “the decisive stage of our final struggle”: Where does that most controversial of foreign policy goals, “regime change,” fit into the puzzle?

At this point, it is undeniable that wholesale regime change is the most desirable outcome for the conflict in Iran. The pursuit of regime change as a goal unto itself is often now disparaged, coming in the aftermath of the failed neoconservative boondoggles earlier this century. But it ought to be axiomatic that there are some foreign regimes that behave in a manner that redounds to the American national interest, and there are some foreign regimes that behave in a manner that is contrary to the American national interest. It is natural and logical that we would wish for the latter types of regime to be heavily reformed or outright replaced — especially with the local populace leading the way.

Perhaps even more to the point: One does not take out a 37-year-ruling despot like Ali Khamenei, as the American and Israeli militaries did in the opening hours of the present operation, and not hope for full-scale regime change. All people of goodwill should be hoping for that outcome — for the Iranian people to rise up like lions and throw the yoke of tyranny off their necks once and for all, delivering a long-sought victory for the American national interest in the process.

But it’s entirely possible full-scale regime change won’t happen. The people of Iran just witnessed tens of thousands of their countrymen brutally gunned down during the anti-regime uprisings of late December and early January. They are an unarmed populace facing Nazi-esque regime jackboots, in the form of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij paramilitary.

All of that, then, raises one final question: Is it possible for there to be victory in Operation Epic Fury, and for the Iranian regime to be neutralized as a threat to the United States and our interests, if there isn’t full-scale regime change in Tehran?

In theory, the answer is yes. Venezuela provides a model.

Delcy Rodríguez, the current leader, is a hardened Marxist-Leninist in the mold of her predecessors Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. But Rodriguez has been fully cooperative with the United States since the astonishing January operation to extract Maduro for the simple reason that she has no real choice in the matter: She remains in power, yes, but only on the condition of an “offer” presented by Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio that, to borrow from Vito Corleone in “The Godfather,” Rodríguez “can’t refuse.” Rodríguez has thus been fully cooperative in areas such as American oil extraction and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the United States.

In theory, a similar arrangement is possible with a decimated, chastened regime in Tehran. And some experts predict that such an arrangement will characterize the regime in Iran a year or two from now. In practice, however, there is the ever-thorny problem that has frustrated and perplexed Westerners for decades when they attempt to reason with zealous Islamists: They do not fear death. A socialist like Delcy Rodríguez can, ultimately, be reasoned with; an Islamist like Mojtaba Khamenei (or his successor), perhaps not.

The cleanest solution to the Iran quagmire at this particular juncture — and the one that most clearly fulfills Trump’s “unconditional surrender” victory criterion — is indeed full-scale regime change. That is certainly the outcome that would be best for the neutralization of the Iranian threat and the corresponding advancement of the American national interest. I’m far from certain it will happen. But like many, I pray that it will posthaste.

Josh Hammer’s latest book is “Israel and Civilization: The Fate of the Jewish Nation and the Destiny of the West.” This article was produced in collaboration with Creators Syndicate. X: @josh_hammer

WASHINGTON — When President Trump announced that he was taking the United States to war against Iran, he offered a long list of ambitious goals.

He said the operation aimed not only to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, but also to destroy Iran’s ballistic missiles and defang its proxy forces in the Middle East.

Then he added the most audacious objective of all: regime change.

“To the great, proud people of Iran … the hour of your freedom is at hand,” he said. “Take over your government. It will be yours to take.”

That was a striking turnabout for Trump, who campaigned for president in 2016 promising: “We’re going to stop the reckless and costly policy of regime change.”

But it’s far from clear that the president has a coherent plan for replacing Iran’s radical Islamist autocracy with a friendlier regime. Nor is it clear that he’s fully committed to the goal.

On Monday, at a White House event, Trump reiterated the military goals of the operation, but did not mention regime change — suggesting he may be having second thoughts. However, he did describe the current Iranian regime as “sick and sinister.”

Military experts and Iran scholars are virtually unanimous that airstrikes alone, no matter how destructive, are unlikely to transform the Islamic republic into a peaceable, democratic country.

“Air power rarely produces friendly regime change,” said Robert A. Pape of the University of Chicago, a prominent scholar of air power. “Bombing can destroy targets. It does not reliably reshape politics.”

A more likely outcome is that Iran’s militant Islamic security force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, will seize power, experts said. The Washington Post has reported that the CIA also made that assessment before the war began.

A takeover by the Revolutionary Guard would change the names of the people in charge, but it would fall far short of a genuine regime change.

Trump has said he doesn’t believe ground troops will be necessary, although he hasn’t ruled them out. He hasn’t offered a plan for pushing Iran’s theocratic rulers out of power beyond continuing the airstrikes. The outcome on the ground, he said Sunday, is up to ordinary Iranians.

“Be brave, be bold, be heroic and take back your country,” he said in a video message on Sunday. “America is with you. I made a promise to you, and I fulfilled that promise. The rest will be up to you, but we’ll be there to help.”

In an interview with the New York Times, he said he hopes the Revolutionary Guard will simply “surrender” to the opposition forces it was brutalizing only a month ago.

In effect, he is abandoning the so-called Pottery Barn rule — “You break it, you own it” — that was popularized by then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell before the Iraq war in 2003. Trump’s message to Iranians looks like: “I’ll break it, you own it.”

Iran’s democratic opposition is fragmented

The central problem with Trump’s apparent theory of regime change, scholars say, is that the Revolutionary Guard and other security services are well-organized and well-equipped, but the country’s democratic opposition is fragmented.

“Even if the clerical regime were to fall, the security forces are best positioned to take its place,” warned Richard N. Haass, a former top State Department official in the George W. Bush administration.

Meanwhile, he added, “the political opposition is not united or functioning as a government-in-waiting. It is not in a position to accept defections [from the regime], much less provide security.”

Some experts argue that there is more the administration could be doing to improve the prospects for regime change, without putting troops on the ground.

Haass faulted the Trump administration for failing to work more closely with the Iranian opposition to prepare it for a role in a potential future government.

Others said the United States should now make it clear that it would provide substantial economic aid to a new Iranian regime, but only if its behavior is benign. Iran’s economic crisis, its worst in recent history, helped spark the popular uprising in January that the regime suppressed at the cost of thousands in lives.

“There are more steps the administration could be taking now to help the democratic opposition,” said Kelly Shannon, a visiting scholar at George Washington University. “Close coordination with dissidents on the ground. Protection from the security forces if they open fire. Money, including support for a general strike fund. Assistance with ensuring internet access for all Iranians. And ensure that airstrikes don’t hit Evin Prison or other prisons where dissidents are being held; a lot of potential opposition leaders are in there.”

Scenarios for the future

If the Revolutionary Guard remains intact, Iran experts have described several different scenarios for the regime that may emerge.

One might be called the Venezuela scenario: an Iran ruled by officers from the current regime who have agreed to cooperate to some extent with the United States. This would resemble the situation in Venezuela, where the United States captured President Nicolás Maduro but left the rest of his regime in power.

Trump has already endorsed that quick-fix scenario and said he’s willing to open talks with the newly named successors to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike. “What we did in Venezuela, I think, is the perfect, the perfect scenario,” he told the New York Times.

Another option might be called the Hamas scenario: a battered and weakened Islamic Republic could stay in power but remain hostile to the United States, even after losing much of its military infrastructure.

A third possibility would be the Libya scenario: an Iran in which the regime has been toppled, and several factions battle for power. That’s what happened in Libya after the United States and other countries used air power to help overthrow longtime dictator Moammar Kadafi.

But none of those scenarios would be the transition to democracy that many Iranians hope for — the more positive version of regime change.

Trump’s search for offramps

Trump, meanwhile, sounds as if he is already looking for an opportunity to declare victory and withdraw.

In an interview with Axios on Saturday, he said he believes he has several “offramps” from the war.

“I can go long and take over the whole thing — or end it in two or three days and tell the Iranians, ‘See you again in a few years.’”

“He seems to be looking for an offramp,” Haass said. “He may say ‘It’s up to the Iranian people’ and leave the opposition to its fate…. He might claim a victory in terms of obliterating — or, I guess, ‘re-obliterating’ — Iran’s nuclear program and downgrading its ballistic missiles.”

“But he would still face a danger in that scenario. If it comes down to a physical confrontation [between the regime and the opposition], the opposition could be killed in even larger numbers before. … After offering regime change as one of the reasons for the war, we may not only fail to produce regime change; we could see a second massacre.”