Privatizations

Venezuelan Parliament Approves Law to Open Electricity Sector to Partial Privatization

The Venezuelan government has turned to foreign corporations to complete unfinished hydroelectric projects. (El Universal)

Caracas, November 10, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly approved on Tuesday a reform of the Organic Law of the Electrical System and Service to open the electrical grid to the private sector amid a crisis of rising demand and recurring blackouts.

The new legislation stipulates that power generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization can now “be carried out by the state-owned operating company, as well as by mixed-ownership and private companies holding the corresponding authorization.”

“The reform will allow private entities to provide electricity services,” National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez told reporters after the legislative session. “It will make self-generation possible, allowing private companies to generate and supply electricity to businesses, industries, shopping centers, etc. This will help increase supply.”

The Venezuelan parliament had preliminarily approved the reform in June. A commission incorporated adjustments to the text, which deputies reviewed across several parliamentary debates before Tuesday’s final vote. The final text, seen by Venezuelanalysis, will be published in the National Gazette in the coming days.

The updated law puts an end to the state monopoly over electricity established by former President Hugo Chávez. A 2007 law identified the sector as “strategic for the nation” and merged several companies into the National Electric Corporation (CORPOELEC). 

Under the new rules, private companies can set up new power plants, build transmission infrastructure and charge a fixed toll, or receive distribution and commercialization rights in specific areas.

In addition, they can also receive concessions of state assets for a maximum of 25 years, with the responsibility of returning them to CORPOELEC or another designated state entity at the end of the period. The state will retain exclusive control over all hydroelectric generation in the Caroní basin as well as transmission and distribution responsibilities in “strategic” areas.

The law also provides that disputes or disagreements of any kind that cannot be settled amicably by the parties may be brought before Venezuelan courts or resolved “through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.” US licenses allowing Western corporations to deal with Venezuela have demanded that disputes be settled in the US, the UK, France, or Singapore.

Regarding oil companies, the law stipulates that they must “ensure a reliable and stable supply of electricity for the execution of primary activities” through self-generation, cogeneration, or third-party contracts designed to secure operational autonomy. Oil and independent power generation firms will also not require state authorization to generate electricity for their internal networks, unless they connect to the national grid.

Rodríguez stressed that the changes do not to amount to privatizing electricity services but rather constitute an “expansion.”

“An appropriate sanctions framework has been established, along with guarantees for private entities to participate. This is not privatization, but an expansion that allows private companies to provide services, particularly to large consumers,” he stated.

The head of the legislature added that electricity consumption tariffs will be computed in foreign currency and converted using the official exchange rate set by the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV). He also disclosed a policy of subsidies intended to shield vulnerable sectors.

“This will primarily benefit people who, because of their income level, cannot afford the full tariff, unlike industries or major retailers,” he concluded.

The legislation also establishes a National Electric System Superintendency, empowered to establish tariffs, initiate administrative investigations, and impose penalties on those who violate the law. Operators may face fines of up to 2 percent of their gross revenue for failing to comply with regulations governing electrical installations, disregarding instructions issued by competent authorities, refusing to provide requested information, or obstructing inspections.

Consumers, meanwhile, may be fined between US $50 and $10,000 for unauthorized use of electricity, with similar penalties for unauthorized consumption, and ten times larger ones for connecting equipment that causes disturbances. The same range of fines applies to tampering with, damaging, or modifying meters and supplying electricity to third parties without authorization, among other violations.

The new law also allows the Venezuelan government to grant tax breaks to private corporations at its discretion to “promote the expansion, efficiency, or environmental sustainability” of the electric system.

The electricity reform, which follows major legislative pro-business overhauls to the mining and energy sectors, comes amid a persistent electricity crisis that sees most of the country face daily blackouts, sometimes lasting up to 12 hours.

Residents have staged recurring protests. On Monday, a crowd blocked the Argimiro Gabaldón highway connecting Barcelona and Puerto La Cruz in Anzoátegui State for several hours.

The Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict (OVCS) registered 531 protests related to electricity services nationwide in September. For her part, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has criticized the demonstrations, affirming that “burning tires does not add a single megawatt to the electric grid.”

Venezuela currently produces only around 12,000 MW, roughly 40 percent of its installed capacity, and faces a generation deficit of over 4,000 MW. Venezuelan authorities have pledged to add 1,300 MW to the grid before the end of the year and have negotiated agreements with GE Vernova, Siemens, and IMPSA to bring paralyzed power plants back online.

Targeting short-term improvements, CORPOELEC recently signed an agreement with Turkish company Karpowership to lease two power-generating vessels that would add 200 MW to the grid in western Zulia State, one of the states hardest hit by electricity shortages. 

However, Venezuelan officials have not provided additional details on the contract, including its cost, duration, and fuel supply.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.



Source link

The Turkish Soap Opera of Venezuela Business Dealings

Turhan Mildon appears to have leveraged is White House connections to retain his Venezuela ventures. (Venezuelanalysis)

In Venezuela, reality feels more and more like a puzzle. We have to look at what officials choose to say and not say, what is leaked, what remains behind the curtain, and try to weave a plausible narrative out of that.

The government’s opacity has become the norm. There are key decisions about the country’s future with little to no public explanation, contradictory statements, figures that are hard to believe or put into context. Affairs that should be debated and familiar to everyone are shrouded in uncertainty.

For years, the justification was that the US blockade forced everything to be kept secret, so that the enemy would not use that information to its advantage. Then, when corruption scandals broke out, we were told it was the price to pay for doing business under sanctions.

Fast forward to the present, and the blockade has given way to US neocolonial tutelage. But opacity has only gotten worse. Sometimes Trump officials are the ones explaining what happens in our country. The greatest example is the recent oil deal, but there is another sector plagued by these dark interests: the cement industry, which is especially important now amid the post-earthquake reconstruction needs.

A few days after the June 24 double earthquake, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez ordered an audit of Vencement, a company belonging to the Miller Holding conglomerate, whose CEO is Turkish businessman Turhan Mildon. In March 2025, the young entrepreneur reportedly received a concession to operate 10 cement plants owned by the Venezuelan state. The factories belong to the Socialist Cement Corporation, created by Chávez in 2009 after nationalizing the industry.

The concession to Mildon was greenlit by former Minister of Industry Alex Saab, who was surrendered to US agencies in May to face money laundering charges. In that case, we likewise did not have the privilege of an official explanation[a] for why a naturalized Venezuelan-Colombian dual citizen could be “deported” to the US, contrary to the constitution.

With the announced review of cement contracts, and in line with Washington’s directive of cutting out the insiders who had privileged treatment during the Maduro government, Rodríguez unilaterally canceled the concession, alleging non-fulfilment of investment targets.

This sector has been mired in controversy due to the shortages of cement and speculation with its prices. Though production costs for a 42-kilo cement bag are around $8, scarcity or hoarding often led to prices above $35. With the official investigation, there was an order to surveil the plants, block any removal of material, and restrict Vencement personnel from doing inventory or fulfilling existing orders.

But Vencement was not Mildon’s only venture in Venezuela. In November 2025, Saab intervened in the Lamar Group, a company from Zulia State that produced and exported shrimp, which was awarded to the Turkish businessman. The official explanation was that Lamar’s former owner, José Enrique Rincón, was involved in financing an alleged coup attempt against Maduro. In parallel, the government handed Café Madrid and Fama de América, two coffee producers nationalized around 15 years ago, to Mildon as well.

According to Forbes Turkey, Miller Holding and its affiliates, particularly in Venezuela and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Mildon also became extremely influential overnight, had $2.6 billion in profit in 2025. Nevertheless, because the companies are not publicly traded, it is hard to assess their true value. The business sector in Turkey is hardly a paragon of transparency either.

Mildon stated in the same interview that he felt “very sad” when US forces kidnapped Maduro in January, but added that he was not concerned about his businesses. “In my grandfather’s time, professional experience was key. Nowadays, it’s who you know,” the businessman said.

This prompts  multiple questions. How did Mildon get a concession for a sector as strategic as cement, not to mention his other endeavors? His representatives claimed that there were four other competitors, but government sources told the New York Times that the private businesses that receive state assets to operate under “strategic alliances” are handpicked.

Furthermore, Mildon claims Vencement is currently producing 4.5 million tons of cement per year, whereas the NYT reported that, according to data shared by government insiders, output is actually around a third of that. Maybe authorities would like to clarify?

Another obvious question is, why Mildon? Some mention his family’s ties to the Turkish government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with Mildon’s conglomerate receiving over a dozen important contracts in recent years. Amid US sanctions against Venezuela, risk-taking Turkish businessmen secured juicy opportunities in Venezuela. Others add that a separate advantage was Mildon getting access to inner circles thanks to his relationship with María Eugenia Ceballos, daughter of Chief Admiral and former Interior Minister Remigio Ceballos. Surely love cannot trump a fair bidding process, or can it?

It looks like it, because Mildon’s Turkish soap opera was not canceled with Maduro’s kidnapping and Saab’s handover. Mildon reportedly managed to preserve his assets in Venezuela after getting engaged and married to Alina Habba, a lawyer with close ties to Trump who worked in the Justice Department.

Habba, who also possesses quite the dubious CV for all the influence she wields, got the US president to pardon Venezuelan banker Julio Herrera Velutini, who had been charged with bribery and fraud before being convicted of a campaign finance violation misdemeanor. Habba received a $50 million contract, while still working in the Justice Department, from Concord Partners, a company created by the Herrera Velutini family in Florida. This honestly looks like Olympic-level competition for lack of transparency and shady deals.

But returning to Mildon and Habba, their lavish wedding at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York featured senior Trump officials such as US Attorney General Todd Blanche, FBI Director Kash Patel, and White House attorney Will Scharf.

Apparently, Mildon’s new romance led Rodríguez to change course, declaring that the cancelation of the cement contracts had been a clerical error. On October 13, the Miller conglomerate issued a press statement clarifying that none of its agreements had been canceled.

Beyond the Turkish soap opera that has taken hold in Venezuela, we go back to the fundamental question: what conditions do private businesses need to clear before getting hold of strategic Venezuelan state companies? Who is following up on the investment, production, and fiscal commitments? What mechanisms ensure that these concessions will lead to any economic benefits apart from corporate profits? It seems like all these questions get trumped by contractors’ White House connections .

One of the characteristics of the Venezuelan political shift in recent months has been the sanctification  of private investment. Amid legislative reforms and commissions charged with determining which “non-strategic” assets should be privatized, key sectors such as electricity or the basic industries might soon be in the hands of multinational corporations.

I’m not a big believer in trickle-down economics, in this case that Venezuelans’ well-being will come once corporate profits are assured. But if on top of that, business is the outcome of the most vulgar influence trafficking, we are truly doomed. This soap opera needs a plot twist.

Jessica Dos Santos is a Venezuelan university professor, journalist and writer whose work has appeared in outlets such as RT, Épale CCS magazine and Investig’Action. She is the author of the book “Caracas en Alpargatas” (2018). She’s won the Aníbal Nazoa Journalism Prize in 2014 and received honorable mentions in the Simón Bolívar National Journalism prize in 2016 and 2018.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Source link