powers

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek this week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian received precisely the kind of political support he had hoped for. The SCO condemned the military attacks against Iran, described them as violations of international law and the UN Charter, reaffirmed Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

But the organisation did not offer to defend Iran. That distinction between political solidarity and collective defence is important. It tells us something not only about the Iranian experience with the SCO, but about the international order that is emerging around it.

For years, discussions about multipolarity have often suggested that the US-led international system would gradually be challenged by an alternative bloc centred around China, Russia and organisations such as BRICS and the SCO. From the perspective of middle powers, joining both institutions seemed to fit neatly into this transformation. Integration into non-Western organisations was supposed to make them less vulnerable to Western isolation and pressure.

The US-Israeli war on Iran has made clear that none of these alternative relationships can produce a security guarantee comparable to those provided by formal military alliances. The lesson is not that multipolarity has failed middle powers. It is that the emerging multipolar order may work differently from what many expected.

Rather than replacing one alliance system with another, it is producing an increasingly dense network of overlapping partnerships in which states gain diplomatic and economic options without necessarily acquiring new security guarantees.

For middle powers, this may be one of the defining characteristics of the emerging order: more room for manoeuvre, but less certainty about who will stand beside them when their security is threatened.

Turkiye provides a particularly revealing example. It has been a member of NATO for more than seven decades and remains embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet Ankara has increasingly demonstrated that alliance membership does not require automatic political alignment with Washington. Turkiye has maintained relations with Russia despite the war in Ukraine, expanded its engagement with China and participated in the SCO as a dialogue partner. At the same time, its differences with the US and Israel over the future regional order in the Middle East have become increasingly visible.

This does not mean Turkiye is abandoning NATO or moving into a Chinese- or Russian-led bloc. Quite the opposite. Ankara’s strategy depends precisely on avoiding such a binary choice. Its NATO membership provides security benefits that the SCO could not replicate. Its relationships with Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf states and other regional actors, meanwhile, expand its diplomatic and economic options.

Brazil represents another good example. Unlike Turkiye, Brazil is not bound to the US through a formal military alliance. But it has traditionally operated within a US-dominated hemisphere where Washington has expected considerable political alignment from regional governments.

Brazil’s refusal to join the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), together with its positions on the Iran war and other recent international crises, reflects its reluctance to accept that regional proximity should translate into automatic strategic alignment.

Yet Brazil is not simply switching sides. Its participation in BRICS, its extensive economic relationship with China and its calls for reform of the international system coexist with important political and economic relations with the US and Europe. Brasília’s objective is not to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing, but to preserve the ability to cooperate with both, and disagree with either.

This may be one of the most consequential opportunities that multipolarity offers middle powers. The rise of alternative centres of economic and political influence reduces the cost of saying no. For decades, weaker states often confronted a difficult choice when facing pressure from a dominant power: comply, resist and risk isolation, or seek protection from a rival bloc.

The proliferation of partners and institutions complicates that calculation. A government that disagrees with Washington may deepen relations with Beijing without becoming a Chinese ally. A state dependent on China economically may strengthen security ties with the US without fully aligning with Washington. Membership in BRICS does not prevent cooperation with Western institutions, just as membership in a US-led security framework does not necessarily preclude engagement with China or Russia.

India has made this logic almost an organising principle of its foreign policy. New Delhi participates in the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia while simultaneously belonging to both BRICS and the SCO. At Bishkek, India supported the SCO declaration defending Iranian sovereignty while Prime Minister Narendra Modi also stressed to Pezeshkian the importance of preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Gulf Cooperation Council member states are pursuing their own version of this diversification. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, for example, continue to depend heavily on their relationships with the US for security, while simultaneously expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, India and other Asian powers and participating in new regional and international arrangements.

None appears eager to replace Washington with Beijing. They want relationships with both. This suggests that the most significant consequence of multipolarity for middle and smaller powers may not be the emergence of a new bloc to which they can attach themselves. It may be the declining necessity of attaching themselves exclusively to any bloc at all.

But greater autonomy comes with a cost. The same flexible arrangements that allow states to avoid choosing sides also provide fewer guarantees when crises become existential. BRICS does not have an Article 5. Neither does the SCO, which explicitly defines itself as a non-military organisation.

Strategic partnerships can provide weapons, investment, diplomatic backing and political support without obligating partners to go to war for one another.

The emerging international system is therefore unlikely to resemble a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, or even a confrontation between two clearly defined blocs. The older alliance system is not disappearing.

NATO remains central to European and Turkish security, while US security relationships remain indispensable across much of Asia and the Gulf. What is emerging alongside it is another layer, a more fluid landscape of overlapping institutions, selective partnerships and transactional relationships.

Multipolarity, in other words, may not require states to choose a new camp. That gives middle and smaller powers greater agency. But it also places greater responsibility for their own security upon them. The world they are entering may offer more partners, more bargaining power and more freedom to say no. What it may offer less frequently is certainty about who will say yes when they ask for protection.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Belgium’s Wout van Aert surged clear of Valentin Paret-Peintre in a sprint to the line to win stage 13 of the Vuelta a Espana.

The duo were part of a huge breakaway that at one point contained 43 riders on the 192.8km route from Almunecar to Loja.

However, they escaped with 3.7km remaining to contest the finish unchallenged, where Van Aert’s greater power told.

Britain’s Matthew Brennan, who has already won three stages, crossed in third behind his Visma-Lease a Bike team-mate and Paret-Peintre.

Overall race leader Enric Mas arrived three minutes later along with all the other main general classification favourites to retain an advantage of one minute and 45 seconds over Primoz Roglic.

“I had it a little bit in my mind [to attack when I did],” Van Aert said. “I saw the profile and I knew there was this last kicker coming into the village.

“This distance [from the finish], a lot of the time, is when people start to think about the sprint.

“If you’re able to open up a gap, then they [the remaining riders in the breakaway] don’t want to close it for each other anymore. It was close enough to the finish to be worth it.”

The peloton faces a difficult day in the mountains on Saturday as the race travels 154.5km from Jaen to La Pandera.

Meanwhile, Dutch sprinter Olav Kooij won a chaotic sprint finish on stage three of the Tour of Britain.

Kooij pipped Tim Merlier at the end of the 181.1km stage that started in Hull and concluded in Beverley, to claim his eighth stage victory at the race, leaving him just two wins short of the record held by Mark Cavendish, who has 10 on his palmares.

Britain’s Lewis Askey finished with the same time in 17th place and hold on to his place at the top of the GC with Belgian Tim Wellens 12 seconds back in second.

About five miles separate Agoura and Westlake high schools, but there seemed to be a great deal more distance between them Friday night, as host Westlake throttled the Chargers 38-7 in a nonleague game.

Most of that gap came via the right arm of sophomore quarterback Ford Green, who dissected the Chargers, completing 14 of 18 passes for 257 yards and four touchdowns. For Green, and the Warriors (2-0), the victory eliminated any lingering doubts about their season-opener last week, a thrilling, 32-26 triple-overtime win against Newbury Park. Though Green threw two touchdowns last week and ran for the winning touchdown, he threw two interceptions and tallied only 139 yards through the air.

Against Agoura (1-1), Green completed his first 10 passes and finished the first half with three touchdowns and 219 yards. He added a fourth touchdown in the third quarter. Westlake finished the scoring in the fourth on a one-yard plunge by running back Nazir Esanbor and a 35-yard field goal by kicker Gabriel Goroyan.

“Last week showed how we fight as a team when we come together, but tonight showed how we can dominate,” Green said.

Though graced with two top-flight receivers in Charles Davis and Demare Dezeurn, both of whom have committed to Cal, Green spread the wealth Friday, completing passes to six Warriors. Those included a 14-yard strike to Davis on the Warriors’ first possession and a 57-yard touchdown pass to freshman Drew Gamboa later in the first quarter. Green also completed a 58-yard second-quarter touchdown pass to Erik Green and a 29-yard pass to Dezeurn early in the fourth.

While praising Green’s composure, accuracy, consistency and feel, Westlake coach Rick Clausen also singled out the offensive line.

“Obviously Game 1 wasn’t what we were looking for, but they practiced really hard this week and focused on what they needed to work on and didn’t worry about the exterior stuff,” he said, “They gave [Ford] the chance to succeed.”

Ford trumpeted the depth of his receiving corps.

“I trust every single one of my receivers that they can get the job done and they did,” he said. “And we’re a brotherhood, a family, and the ball gets spread out. Even if one guy is doing really well, I know every one of them will be ready when it’s their time.”

Mayors across England will be given new powers to overrule local councils on some planning decisions.

The change would apply to proposals with more than 150 homes, more than 15,000 square metres of commercial space or buildings over 30 metres.

Mayors in 13 areas including Manchester, Liverpool, the West of England and the West Midlands will gain similar powers to Sir Sadiq Khan in London, who is already able to “call in” planning decisions.

Housing minister Matthew Pennycook said the powers were an “essential part of the toolkit that mayors need to effectively deliver new homes and regeneration”.

The Conservatives questioned whether it was right for councils to lose the “ability to make planning decisions in their own communities”.

The powers will also be available to mayors in the Combined Authorities in North East England, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, York and North Yorkshire, Hull and East Yorkshire, Greater Lincolnshire, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, East Midlands, and Tees Valley.

Housebuilding has fallen in London in recent years, but Pennycook insisted the “call in” powers had helped the mayor “unblock strategic growth sites” in the capital.

In the 2024 general election, the Labour government promised to build 1.5 million homes in England by the end of the decade but housebuilders have warned the target could be missed.

Pennycook said the government was “absolutely determined to stick with that ambition”.

He acknowledged the target was “really stretching” but said nearly 180,000 children were in temporary accommodation and “any smaller target wouldn’t be commensurate with the scale of the challenge”.

In addition to gaining the new “call-in” powers, mayors are set to be able to grant “up-front permission”, which the government says will allow building to begin “without a developer having to apply”.

A consultation on how the powers will work is due to be published next week.

The government has sought to stress that local councils will continue to decide the majority of applications and that all decisions must still follow planning rules.

It has also said mayors will get a “bigger say” over how housing funding is spent in their area, with the government directing national agency Homes England to focus on local mayors’ priorities.

New Prime Minister Andy Burnham, who served as mayor for Greater Manchester for nearly a decade, has repeatedly expressed his desire to transfer more powers to local mayors.

“Challenge does need to be made to local decision-making and actually it cuts both ways,” he told the Sunday Times.

“Sometimes it’s the other way round. It’s the local authority putting forward something that’s unacceptable in terms of the impact on the community. It’s a two-way street.”

Last month, Burnham promised to give all mayors a share of income tax revenue, saying he wanted to “bring power home” to “every postcode”.

Earlier this week, he announced a secondment programme to send high-performing civil servants to work in mayoral offices.

The approach has faced criticism from some in his own party and the Liberal Democrats, who fear it could create a “two-tier system” that discriminates against those areas that do not have an elected mayor.

HOUSTON — Zach Neto was five for six with his 21st homer and a career-high seven RBIs and the Angels scored their most runs in three years to rout the Houston Astros 18-3 on Thursday night.

The Angels (51-77) had a season-high 18 hits and scored their most runs since a 25-1 victory over Colorado on June 24, 2023.

Angels starter Grayson Rodriguez (4-5) gave up just two unearned runs across seven innings while striking out six.

Peter Lambert (8-7) entered as Houston’s most consistent starter but had his worst outing of the season, giving up eight hits and nine runs in 3⅔ innings.

Houston slipped to 64-64 and saw its two-game lead in the AL West drop to one as Texas beat Washington.

In a scary moment in the fifth, Angels left fielder Wade Meckler was hit in the head by a 90-mph sinker from reliever Bryan King. The pitch appeared to hit Meckler on the helmet over his right ear. He was on the ground near home plate for a few minutes and was attended by medical staff before walking to the dugout and exiting the game.

Angels first baseman Nolan Schanuel left in the sixth with right side soreness.

Up next: Angels LHP Reid Detmers (4-8, 3.78 ERA) was set to start against Rangers LHP MacKenzie Gore (7-9, 4.45) in Texas on Friday night. Astros RHP Hayden Wesneski (2-1, 5.16) was set to open a home series against Athletics RHP J.T. Ginn (8-7, 3.53).

Fifteen years since the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya began, and with civil strife leading to the downfall of what was once one of Africa’s wealthiest countries, several actors are seeking to end the civil war and reunite the country.

Among them are the US, which has commercial interests in Libya’s oil fields. Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye are also pushing for a return to “One Libya”, after more than a decade of fighting between two rival authorities for control of the country.

Here’s what we know:

What happened 15 years ago?

The Libyan uprising erupted during the Arab Spring, when thousands of people in the port city of Benghazi took to the streets to protest against Gaddafi’s more than four decades of absolute power.

Violence against the demonstrations pushed the protesters into an armed rebellion against Gaddafi’s rule, with a civil war starting between the two sides.

A United Nations Security Council resolution authorised an international military intervention force – led by NATO members, the United States, United Kingdom and France – to enforce a no-fly zone and ensure the protection of civilians in Libya. This bombing campaign pushed back Gaddafi’s forces from Benghazi and aided the rebels in seizing territory.

Gaddafi was eventually captured and killed in October 2011, 42 years after he first seized power in a military coup that overthrew King Idris.

How is Libya divided?

Following Gaddafi’s death, a power vacuum emerged, with multiple groups – and their allied militias – competing for power.

Control of the country is now split between two rival administrations: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dheibah, and the eastern, Tobruk-based administration backed by Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA).

The GNU is recognised by the UN and other countries, and officially has authority in the capital and western Libya.

Under Gaddafi, Haftar was exiled in the US for two decades where he holds citizenship.

His forces control vast resource-rich lands in the east, including the strategic port city of Benghazi, reportedly with the backing of Russia.

The UN began formal mediation efforts in 2020 under the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This roadmap advocates for a three-track strategy that includes unifying the two rival administrations, presidential and parliamentary elections, and hosting national dialogue meetings.

The US was a key mediator behind the scenes, and in May 2021, appointed Ambassador Richard Norlan as Special Envoy to Libya, to lead high-level talks between the two sides.

What is the US’s new plan?

Under Massad Boulous, US President Donald Trump’s African and Middle Eastern affairs adviser, and father-in-law to Tiffany Trump, Washington is intensifying efforts to reunite the country. But this can only be achieved if both sides agree to form a single government.

According to leaked details, Trump’s initiative centres on the promise that if the rival governments cooperate, the US would encourage American investment in Libya’s sizable oil fields. This comes as the Libyan Central Bank, which is attempting to finance both authorities, sounds the alarm over the dire economic situation.

While Tripoli has international legitimacy, Haftar’s forces control the oilfields and terminals.

The US is also proposing a power-sharing deal that would see Dheibah continue to lead the government while Haftar’s son and LNA army chief, 35-year-old Saddam Haftar, serves as president.

There are obvious opportunities for US energy companies and economic and political incentives for European countries in a unified and stable Libya.

They include stopping irregular migration from Libya and other North African countries to the EU.

Some criticise the US-led plan as lacking input from the Libyan people. The deal, some say, could entrench the power of political dynasties, which might be best for long-term stability in Libya.

What have the results been?

There are signs that Haftar’s camp, at least, is on board with the US plan. Saddam Haftar, whose father, Khalifa, was based in Virginia until 2011, reportedly met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in DC in July.

Experts attribute the ongoing mediation efforts to the unified national budget of 2026, signed in April – the first in more than a decade.

However, there are still no talks or signs of a unified government forming.

What is Turkiye’s role?

Turkiye, which earlier deployed troops to support the GNU, has also made efforts to mediate between the two sides and is pushing a ‘One Libya’ policy.

Last month, Foreign Affairs Minister, Hakan Fidan, met with Saddam Haftar in Ankara. Earlier this month, Fidan travelled to both Tripoli and Benghazi for high-level talks with Dheibah and Khalifa Haftar.

What has Egypt done?

The Egyptian government has traditionally cooperated with Haftar’s Tobruk government, which is just across the border.

On Wednesday, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with Khalifa Haftar in Cairo and discussed unification talks.

Earlier this month, Dheibah visited Cairo, while Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad travelled to Tripoli.

What is Qatar’s stance?

Qatar has largely backed the UN mediation channels in Libya: the UNSMIL and the UN roadmap for peace.

While it has good relations with the GNU, Qatar seeks stabilisation efforts led by Libyan parties and elections.

In April, Qatar and other states welcomed the unified budget for 2026. A statement issued by Qatar, Egypt, France, Germany and several others called for all parties in Libya to follow the UN roadmap to “advance a Libyan-led political process leading to unified governance and national elections.”