Find out what this Netflix-Spotify move could mean for sports, entertainment, and your portfolio.
The future of streaming media just got a whole lot more interesting. I certainly didn’t see it coming, and I bet no one else did either. Last week, Netflix (NFLX 0.40%) and Spotify(SPOT 2.01%) teamed up to put some of Spotify’s top podcasts on the video-streaming veteran’s global platform.
Netflix and Spotify’s groundbreaking podcast partnership isn’t just another content deal. It’s a glimpse into a radically different entertainment ecosystem. Former rivals become allies, audio-only podcasts turn into TV shows, and the very definition of “content” becomes beautifully, chaotically fluid.
This is the streaming evolution nobody saw coming: Specialist platforms finally realizing that collaboration might just be the ultimate competitive advantage.
What’s happening?
Early next year, you’ll see a handful of Spotify podcast shows on the American Netflix service. The partnership starts with a couple of true crime talk shows, a larger set of popular culture and lifestyle shows, and a really heaping helping of sports-oriented podcasts. Other markets will gain access to these series later, though the exact timing and geographical reach remains unknown.
Spotify sees the team-up as an effective way to grow people’s access to these podcasts, including ultra-premium stuff like The Bill Simmons Podcast. As a reminder, Spotify paid $185 million for Simmons’ Ringer studio in 2020 and presumably even more for a renewal of that deal in March 2025.
Netflix’s management highlighted the growing popularity of video-style podcasts, giving subscribers one more content type to enjoy.
Image source: Getty Images.
Netflix gets sports content on the cheap
I think it’s a stroke of genius from both sides of the dealmaking table, though Netflix probably gets the sweeter end of this deal.
Netflix suddenly expands its burgeoning sports coverage very quickly by getting podcast rights, and without paying billions of dollars for direct event coverage deals. Leagues like the NFL, the NBA, and MLB want a lot of money for their game-tracking deals. For example:
Comcast‘s (NASDAQ: CMCSA) NBCUniversal division is reportedly close to a three-year deal with Major League Baseball, priced at $200 million per year.
The National Basketball Association signed an 11-year coverage deal in the summer of 2024, splitting the rights among NBCUniversal, Amazon(NASDAQ: AMZN) Prime Video, and Walt Disney‘s (NYSE: DIS) ESPN for about $7 billion per year.
As for the National Football League, Netflix has nibbled on a few specific games, but the big contracts are found elsewhere. Comcast, Disney, Paramount Skydance(NASDAQ: PSKY), Amazon, and Fox(NASDAQ: FOX) are all paying billion-dollar sums per year for their specific slices of NFL media rights. Even YouTube entered this arena, as the Alphabet(NASDAQ: GOOG)(NASDAQ: GOOGL) subsidiary inked a seven-year deal for Sunday Ticket coverage at $2 billion per year.
The financial details of the Netflix/Spotify partnership are not known, which suggests the payments may be small enough to not require public disclosure. After all, both partners are expecting positive outcomes from this contract. But even if Netflix is spending a few hundred million dollars, it still found a cheaper way to tap into the lucrative sports market.
Audio meets video (and beyond)
I think of podcasts as an audio-centered media format, but this deal was an eye-opener. Adding a few high-end cameras and decent lighting to the radio-like studio instantly creates a video stream instead, and a lot of people prefer that format. From the podcast creators’ point of view, I’m sure it doesn’t hurt to upgrade the studio environment and pay more attention to the visuals.
So the edges and borders between different content types are getting smudged. Spotify is doing video content and Netflix is adding audio-centric shows. And it won’t stop there. I mean, Netflix has dozens of video games already, and there’s a hidden “snake” game in the mobile Spotify app. Digital entertainment is digital entertainment, and specialists in one particular media type can easily expand to other fields.
That’s particularly true for the well-heeled global giant that started the video-streaming industry in 2011. Netflix has the resources to keep its business growth going by exploring new media types. Recent examples even include brick-and-mortar stores and the upcoming Netflix House experience centers in Philadelphia and Dallas.
Anders Bylund has positions in Alphabet, Amazon, Netflix, and Walt Disney. The Motley Fool has positions in and recommends Alphabet, Amazon, Netflix, Spotify Technology, and Walt Disney. The Motley Fool recommends Comcast. The Motley Fool has a disclosure policy.
When Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto stood beside his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi at Al-Ittihadiya Palace in Cairo on Saturday, the joint declaration they signed marked more than a diplomatic formality; it signalled the rebirth of a transcontinental bond, anchored in history, redefined by pragmatism, and sharpened by today’s geopolitical realities.
Indonesia and Egypt have agreed to elevate their long-standing ties to a “strategic partnership”, setting a new tone for bilateral cooperation in sectors as wide-ranging as defence, education, trade, energy and cultural exchange. While this may read like a typical diplomatic communiqué, Prabowo’s visit and the deepening of ties with Cairo reflect a broader and more deliberate shift: Indonesia is seeking to diversify its global alliances, particularly in the Middle East, at a moment when traditional poles of power — Washington and Beijing — are both proving increasingly precarious partners.
Indonesia’s expanding outreach in the Middle East is no coincidence. Cairo is the third stop on Prabowo’s tour through the region, which includes high-level meetings in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar and Jordan. This multi-nation effort is part of Jakarta’s evolving strategy to forge a more independent and dynamic foreign policy, one that not only resists alignment with the world’s dominant powers, but also prioritises partnerships grounded in mutual benefit and shared values.
For Egypt, too, the move makes sense. In a world destabilised by trade wars, multipolar realignments and ongoing regional tensions, Cairo is increasingly looking eastward. Egypt’s active engagement with ASEAN — a bloc wherein Indonesia is the largest economy — underscores its ambitions to tap into the economic dynamism of South-East Asia, particularly in areas like trade, food security and digital infrastructure.
The economic logic is compelling.
Bilateral trade between Indonesia and Egypt reached $1.7 billion in 2024, making Egypt Indonesia’s top trading partner in North Africa. Indonesian exports — palm oil, coffee beans and coconut oil — flow steadily into Egyptian markets, while Egyptian companies have invested in nearly 100 projects in Indonesia, including major ventures in energy and infrastructure. Egypt sees Indonesia not just as a partner, but as a regional hub, a gateway to the ASEAN market and a conduit for broader Afro-Asian collaboration.
But economics alone don’t define this partnership. A key pillar of this Cairo visit was a joint call to address one of the most urgent and morally pressing issues of our time: the war in Gaza.
Both nations are aligned vocally in their support for Palestine. Prabowo, whose administration is bound constitutionally to uphold the end of colonialism in all its forms, made it clear that Indonesia sees the plight of the Palestinian people not just as a regional tragedy, but also as a universal injustice. Al-Sisi, leading a country that shares a border with Gaza and has played a crucial role in mediation efforts, echoed the urgency of halting Israeli aggression and beginning immediate reconstruction.
The joint statement from the summit rejected the forced displacement of Palestinians, condemned illegal Israeli settlements and reaffirmed commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. This alignment is more than rhetorical; it is strategic. As the United States continues to waver in its Middle East posture and China treads cautiously, Indonesia and Egypt see an opening to act, not as neutral observers, but as active proponents of peace grounded in regional legitimacy.
There is another dimension here that deserves attention: defence cooperation. While, traditionally, Indonesia has focused its military relationships on ASEAN allies and Western powers, its partnership with Egypt opens the door to a different kind of military diplomacy, one rooted in shared challenges and experiential learning. Egypt’s unique experience dealing with border tensions in Libya, Sudan and the occupied Palestinian territories offers valuable lessons for Indonesia as it recalibrates its security doctrines in a more unpredictable global landscape.
President Prabowo’s visit to the Egyptian Military Academy and his praise for the country’s training programmes were not just photo opportunities; they were symbolic gestures pointing toward future collaborations in defence education, joint training and possibly co-development of security technologies.
Cultural and educational exchange, too, are seeing renewed investment.
Egypt already hosts more than 15,000 Indonesian students, most notably at Al-Azhar University, a vital bridge in Islamic education and interfaith dialogue. The announcement that Egypt will expand its scholarship programme for Indonesians speaks to a soft power relationship that transcends politics; a commitment to building enduring people-to-people ties.
So why now? The answer lies in the shifting sands of geopolitics. As the world drifts toward a post-American and post-unipolar order, middle powers like Indonesia and Egypt are reasserting themselves, not as followers of global hegemons but as architects of their own regional futures.
For Indonesia, forging deeper ties with Cairo is not about choosing sides in the new Cold War between the US and China. It is about transcending that binary altogether; about carving a space where developing nations, through solidarity and strategic pragmatism, can assert agency on the world stage.
The strategic partnership between Indonesia and Egypt may not dominate global headlines. It could, though, offer a template for how nations of the Global South collaborate, not through dependency, but through dignity. And in a world sorely lacking in moral clarity, Jakarta and Cairo’s unified call for peace in Palestine may well be one of the few voices speaking with both principle and purpose.
When Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto stood beside his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi at Al-Ittihadiya Palace in Cairo on Saturday, the joint declaration they signed marked more than a diplomatic formality; it signalled the rebirth of a transcontinental bond, anchored in history, redefined by pragmatism, and sharpened by today’s geopolitical realities.
Indonesia and Egypt have agreed to elevate their long-standing ties to a “strategic partnership”, setting a new tone for bilateral cooperation in sectors as wide-ranging as defence, education, trade, energy and cultural exchange. While this may read like a typical diplomatic communiqué, Prabowo’s visit and the deepening of ties with Cairo reflect a broader and more deliberate shift: Indonesia is seeking to diversify its global alliances, particularly in the Middle East, at a moment when traditional poles of power — Washington and Beijing — are both proving increasingly precarious partners.
Indonesia’s expanding outreach in the Middle East is no coincidence. Cairo is the third stop on Prabowo’s tour through the region, which includes high-level meetings in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar and Jordan. This multi-nation effort is part of Jakarta’s evolving strategy to forge a more independent and dynamic foreign policy, one that not only resists alignment with the world’s dominant powers, but also prioritises partnerships grounded in mutual benefit and shared values.
For Egypt, too, the move makes sense. In a world destabilised by trade wars, multipolar realignments and ongoing regional tensions, Cairo is increasingly looking eastward. Egypt’s active engagement with ASEAN — a bloc wherein Indonesia is the largest economy — underscores its ambitions to tap into the economic dynamism of South-East Asia, particularly in areas like trade, food security and digital infrastructure.
The economic logic is compelling.
Bilateral trade between Indonesia and Egypt reached $1.7 billion in 2024, making Egypt Indonesia’s top trading partner in North Africa. Indonesian exports — palm oil, coffee beans and coconut oil — flow steadily into Egyptian markets, while Egyptian companies have invested in nearly 100 projects in Indonesia, including major ventures in energy and infrastructure. Egypt sees Indonesia not just as a partner, but as a regional hub, a gateway to the ASEAN market and a conduit for broader Afro-Asian collaboration.
But economics alone don’t define this partnership. A key pillar of this Cairo visit was a joint call to address one of the most urgent and morally pressing issues of our time: the war in Gaza.
Both nations are aligned vocally in their support for Palestine. Prabowo, whose administration is bound constitutionally to uphold the end of colonialism in all its forms, made it clear that Indonesia sees the plight of the Palestinian people not just as a regional tragedy, but also as a universal injustice. Al-Sisi, leading a country that shares a border with Gaza and has played a crucial role in mediation efforts, echoed the urgency of halting Israeli aggression and beginning immediate reconstruction.
The joint statement from the summit rejected the forced displacement of Palestinians, condemned illegal Israeli settlements and reaffirmed commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. This alignment is more than rhetorical; it is strategic. As the United States continues to waver in its Middle East posture and China treads cautiously, Indonesia and Egypt see an opening to act, not as neutral observers, but as active proponents of peace grounded in regional legitimacy.
There is another dimension here that deserves attention: defence cooperation. While, traditionally, Indonesia has focused its military relationships on ASEAN allies and Western powers, its partnership with Egypt opens the door to a different kind of military diplomacy, one rooted in shared challenges and experiential learning. Egypt’s unique experience dealing with border tensions in Libya, Sudan and the occupied Palestinian territories offers valuable lessons for Indonesia as it recalibrates its security doctrines in a more unpredictable global landscape.
President Prabowo’s visit to the Egyptian Military Academy and his praise for the country’s training programmes were not just photo opportunities; they were symbolic gestures pointing toward future collaborations in defence education, joint training and possibly co-development of security technologies.
Cultural and educational exchange, too, are seeing renewed investment.
Egypt already hosts more than 15,000 Indonesian students, most notably at Al-Azhar University, a vital bridge in Islamic education and interfaith dialogue. The announcement that Egypt will expand its scholarship programme for Indonesians speaks to a soft power relationship that transcends politics; a commitment to building enduring people-to-people ties.
So why now? The answer lies in the shifting sands of geopolitics. As the world drifts toward a post-American and post-unipolar order, middle powers like Indonesia and Egypt are reasserting themselves, not as followers of global hegemons but as architects of their own regional futures.
For Indonesia, forging deeper ties with Cairo is not about choosing sides in the new Cold War between the US and China. It is about transcending that binary altogether; about carving a space where developing nations, through solidarity and strategic pragmatism, can assert agency on the world stage.
The strategic partnership between Indonesia and Egypt may not dominate global headlines. It could, though, offer a template for how nations of the Global South collaborate, not through dependency, but through dignity. And in a world sorely lacking in moral clarity, Jakarta and Cairo’s unified call for peace in Palestine may well be one of the few voices speaking with both principle and purpose.
New Delhi, India – When United States President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin meet in Alaska on Friday, their summit will be followed closely not only in both those countries, Europe and Ukraine – but also more than 10,000km (6,200 miles) away, in New Delhi.
Since the end of the Cold War, India has juggled a historically strong relationship with Russia and rapidly blossoming ties with the US. New Delhi’s relations with Washington grew particularly strong under the presidencies of George W Bush and Barack Obama, and remained that way during Trump’s first term and under Joe Biden.
At the heart of that US warmth towards India, say analysts, was its bet on New Delhi as a balancing force against Beijing, as China’s economic, military and strategic heft in the Asia Pacific region grew. With Soviet communism history, and China, the US’s biggest strategic rival, Washington increased its focus on Asia – including through the Quad, a grouping also including fellow democracies India, Australia and Japan.
But a decade after Obama famously described the US and India as “best partners”, they appear to be anything but.
Trump has imposed a 50 percent tariff on Indian imports, among the highest on any country’s products. Half of that penalty is for India’s purchases of Russian oil during its ongoing war with Ukraine – something that the Biden administration encouraged India to do to keep global crude prices under control.
Meanwhile, China – which buys even more Russian oil than India – has received a reprieve from high US tariffs for now, as Washington negotiates a trade deal with New Delhi.
That contrast has prompted questions over whether Trump’s approach towards China, on the one hand, and traditional friends like India on the other, marks a broader shift away from the US pivot to Asia.
President Donald Trump and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi shake hands during a news conference in the East Room of the White House, in Washington, DC, on Thursday, February 13, 2025 [Alex Brandon/AP Photo]
Troubles for India, and Modi
Since the early 2000s, successive governments in New Delhi have embraced closer ties with Washington, with its stocks rising in the US as an emerging strategic partner in security, trade and technology.
Trump made that relationship personal – with Modi.
During Trump’s first term, he shared the stage twice in public rallies with Modi, as they also exchanged frequent bear hugs and described each other as friends.
But none of that could save New Delhi when Trump hit India with tariffs only matched by the levies issued against goods from Brazil.
“The tariff moves have triggered the most serious rupture in the US-India relations in decades,” said Milan Vaishnav, the director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
For months after Trump threatened tariffs on Indian imports, New Delhi tried to placate the US president, refusing to get drawn into a war of words. That has now changed, with India accusing the US of hypocrisy – pointing out that it still trades with Russia, and that Washington had previously wanted New Delhi to buy Russian crude.
“One thing is clear: Trust in the United States has eroded sharply in recent days, casting a long shadow over the bilateral relationship,” Vaishnav told Al Jazeera.
To Praveen Donthi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, the crisis in the relationship also reflects a dramatic turn in the personal equation between Modi and Trump. The state of ties, he said, is “a result of a clash of personalities between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi”.
India has previously faced the threat of US sanctions for its close friendship with Russia, when it decided to buy S-400 missile defence systems from Moscow. But in 2022, under the Biden administration, it secured a waiver from those proposed sanctions.
“Not long ago, India could avoid sanctions despite purchasing S-400 weapon systems from Russia. However, now, India’s policy of multi-alignment clashes with President Trump’s transactional approach to geopolitics,” said Donthi.
To be sure, he pointed out, America’s Cold War history of bonhomie with Pakistan has meant that “a certain distrust of the US is embedded in the Indian strategic firmament”. The Trump administration’s recent cosiness with Pakistan, with its army chief visiting the US this year, even getting a rare meeting with the president at the White House, will likely have amplified those concerns in New Delhi.
But through ups and downs in India-US ties over the years, a key strategic glue has held them close over the past quarter century: shared worries about the rise of China.
“A certain bipartisan consensus existed in the US regarding India because of its long-term strategic importance, especially in balancing China,” said Donthi.
Now, he said, “the unpredictable Trump presidency disrupted the US’s approach of ‘strategic altruism’ towards India”.
It is no longer clear to Asian partners of the US, say experts, whether Washington is as focused on building alliances in their region as it once said it was.
President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi walk around NRG Stadium waving to the crowd during the ‘Howdy Modi: Shared Dreams, Bright Futures’ event in Houston, the US, September 22, 2019 [Evan Vucci/AP Photo]
Turn from Asia
Under the Obama administration in 2011, the US adopted what was known as the “Rebalance to Asia” policy, aimed at committing more diplomatic, economic and military resources to the Asia Pacific region, increasingly seen as the world’s economic and geopolitical centre of gravity.
This meant deeper engagement with treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia, strengthening security ties with emerging partners such as India and Vietnam, and pushing forward trade initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
The idea was to shape a regional order that could balance China’s rise.
During Trump’s first term, the economic leg that gave the pivot its weight hollowed out. The US withdrawal from the TPP in early 2017 removed the signature trade pillar, leaving behind a strategy that leaned heavily on military cooperation and less on binding economic partnerships.
Yet, he refrained from the bulldozing negotiations that have shaped his approach to tariffs, even with allies like Japan and South Korea, and from the kind of tariffs Trump has imposed now on India.
“There is currently a period of churn and uncertainty, after which clarity will emerge,” Donthi said. “There might be some cautious rebalancing in the short term from the Asian powers, who will wait for more clarity.”
India, which, unlike Japan and South Korea, has never been a treaty ally to the US – or any other country – might already be taking steps towards that rebalancing.
President Barack Obama, left, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have coffee and tea in the gardens of the Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, on January 25, 2015 [Carolyn Kaster/AP Photo]
Russia-India-China troika?
Faced with Trump’s tariff wrath, India has been engaged in hectic diplomacy of its own.
Its national security adviser, Ajit Doval, visited Moscow earlier this month and met Putin. Foreign Minister S Jaishankar is scheduled to travel to the Russian capital later this month. Also in August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is expected to visit New Delhi. And at the end of the month, Modi will travel to China for a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, his first trip to the country in seven years.
India has also indicated that it is open to considering the revival of a Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral mechanism, after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proposed the platform’s resurrection.
The concept of trilateral cooperation was first proposed in the 1990s and formally institutionalised in 2002, an idea Lavrov credited to the late Yevgeny Primakov, former chair of the Russian International Affairs Council.
Although the RIC met regularly in the years following its creation, there has been a gap in recent times, with the last meeting of RIC leaders in 2019, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan.
India’s Modi faces some “very difficult choices”, said Michael Kugelman, a senior fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation. “Clearly, India is not going to turn on Russia, a very special partner. And India does not turn on its friends.”
But doubling down on its strategic independence from the US – or multi-alignment, as India describes it – could come with its costs, if Trump decides to add on even more tariffs or sanctions.
“The best outcome for India immediately is the Russians and Ukrainians agree to a ceasefire,” said Kugelman, “because at the end of the day, Trump is pressuring India as a means of pressuring Russia.”
Even as questions rise over Washington’s pivot to Asia under Trump, such a rebalance will not be easy for countries like India, say experts. Ultimately, they say, the US will find its longtime partners willing to return to the fold if it decides to reinvest in those relationships.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi take part in a photo ceremony before a plenary session of the BRICS 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia, October 23, 2024 [Alexander Kazakov/Sputnik/Pool via Reuters]
The cost of a rebalance
An RIC troika would ultimately be “more symbolic than substantive”, Kugelman said.
That’s because one of the sides of that triangle is “quite small and fragile: India-China ties”.
While there have been “notable easing of tensions” in recent months, “India and China remain strategic competitors,” added Kugelman. After four years of an eyeball-to-eyeball standoff along their Himalayan border, they finally agreed to withdraw troops last year, with Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping meeting in Kazan.
But “they continue to have a long disputed border”, Kugelman said, and trust between the Asian giants remains low.
Vaishnav of the Carnegie Endowment agreed.
“There may be opportunistic venues and moments where the countries’ interests converge. But I think, beyond defence and energy, Russia has little to offer India,” he said. “With China, while we may see a thaw in economic relations, it’s difficult to see a path to resolving broader security and geostrategic disputes.”
Jon Danilowicz, a retired diplomat who worked in the US State Department, said that a total breakdown of the US-India partnership is in neither’s interest. “The cooperation in other areas will continue, perhaps with less open enthusiasm than had been the case in recent years,” he said.
Meanwhile, the Trump tariffs could help Modi domestically.
“Trump’s hardball tactics could bolster Modi’s domestic standing. They highlight Washington’s unreliability, allowing Modi to frame himself as standing firm in the face of the US pressure,” said Vaishnav.
Modi had been facing pressure from the opposition over the ceasefire with Pakistan after four days of military hostilities in May, after 26 civilians were killed in an attack by gunmen in Kashmir in April. The opposition has accused Modi of not going harder and longer at Pakistan because of pressure from Trump, who has claimed repeatedly that he brokered the ceasefire between New Delhi and Islamabad – a claim India has denied.
“Any further appearance of yielding – this time to the US – could be politically costly. Resisting Trump reinforces Modi’s image as a defender of national pride,” added Vaishnav.
Many analysts have said they see Trump’s tariffs also as the outcome of as-yet unsuccessful India-US trade talks, with New Delhi reluctant to open up the country’s agriculture and dairy sectors that are politically sensitive for the Indian government. Almost half of India’s population depends on farming for its livelihood.
Modi has in recent days said that he won’t let the interests of Indian farmers suffer, “even though I know I will have to pay a personal cost”.
“He is demonstrating defiance to the domestic electorate,” said Donthi, of the International Crisis Group.
Ultimately, though, he said, both India and the US would benefit if they strike a compromise that allows them to stop the slide in ties.
“But the warmth and friendliness won’t be present, and this will be evident for some time,” Donthi said.
