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During a recent meeting of Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi, on Friday, October 17, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Abdelatty reiterated that “the resolution of the Palestinian question” remains central to the progress of the IMEC connectivity project and strengthening the strategic ties between India and Egypt. His comments captured the essence of the challenge that confronts the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), that grand infrastructure schemes in this region cannot be separated from enduring political conflicts. Abdelatty’s emphasis indicated that IMEC, which was launched with so much enthusiasm at the 2023 G20 Summit hosted by New Delhi, will only move from rhetoric to reality if its architects reconcile geography with geopolitics.

The Strategic Vision: What IMEC proposes

IMEC was announced as a transformative connectivity framework which aims to link India, the Arabian Peninsula, and Europe through maritime, rail, energy, and digital networks. The project promised to reconfigure the trade routes and foster sustainable growth by involving India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Israel, and the EU with the support of the United States and major European economies. It also emerged as a counterpart initiative against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the “IMEC vs BRI” debate is as much about the narrative competition as about logistics. Yet translating that narrative into a functioning framework is a complex process.

IMEC’s blueprint comprises two interconnected legs. An eastern maritime route between India and Gulf ports and a northern corridor of railways across Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel leading into Europe. Furthermore, it envisions plans for electricity grids, a hydrogen pipeline, and digital fibre networks. The idea is to reduce shipping time between India and Europe by nearly 40% and diversify global supply chains away from vulnerable checkpoints such as the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

Barriers to the Vision

The road to the execution of this vision remains riddled with obstacles. IMEC’s future depends on bridging political divides and closing financial gaps. The physical links across the Arabian Peninsula are still incomplete, and key rail segments between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel exist largely on paper. Different technical standards and varied customs regimes with no unified authority to synchronise investment or implementation make the project susceptible. Moreover, the funding model lacks transparency. Neither a dedicated corpus nor a multilateral mechanism has been finalised, which leaves the corridor vulnerable to delays and competing priorities.

Furthermore, there is uncertainty due to diplomatic and security dynamics. The Israel-Gaza war has frozen Saudi-Israeli normalisation efforts that initially spirited the IMEC. Egypt’s renewed engagement suggests that Cairo intends to shape any connectivity framework that intersects its sphere of influence. Given the role of Egypt in the control of the Suez Canal and its political weight in the Arab World, Cairo’s participation is crucial. Abdelatty’s linkage of IMEC’s viability to progress on the Palestinian question implies that diplomatic legitimacy will precede logistical cooperation. Unless the participants address the regional trust deficit, the corridor politics may remain trapped between ambition and ambiguity.

Divergent Priorities of Participants

Each participant in IMEC has divergent goals. For India, the project aligns with its “Act West” policy and its long-time desire to consolidate middle-power status through connectivity leadership. For the Gulf monarchies, IMEC represents a channel to diversify beyond hydrocarbons and attract investments in technology and management. Europe views it as a hedge against over-dependence on Chinese infrastructure. To reconcile these varied interests, it is required to focus on continuous negotiations and proper planning. Tensions among Gulf states and between regional powers such as Iran and Turkey could further complicate the situation. The overlapping interests may blur the line between cooperation and competition, which will undermine cohesion before the corridor gains momentum.

From India’s viewpoint, IMEC holds immense significance if managed strategically. It will not only strengthen the supply-chain resilience but will also enhance energy security and expand India’s diplomatic footprint in the Middle East. The corridor perfectly aligns with global efforts to provide transparent alternatives to Chinese financing, for instance, the U.S.-led Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. However, this association might expose IMEC to great power rivalry, turning a development initiative into another strategic sport. This might dilute the economic rationale of the corridor.

Egypt and the Latest Turning Point

A new dimension has been added as Egypt re-emerges as a key stakeholder in the project. Cairo’s interests not only stem from geography but also from economic logic. The Suez Canal is the lifeline of the Egyptian economy, so any alternative corridor must complement rather than compete with it. Abdelatty’s emphasis on integrating political stability with economic planning reflects a broader regional lesson that peace and prosperity must progress together. Incorporating Egypt as a central player through port linkages or co-investment in logistics could enhance IMEC’s legitimacy and reliability. Contrary to this, if Egypt gets excluded, it may trigger diplomatic resistance or perceptions of marginalisation.

The most important question in the current context is whether IMEC can survive the cyclical turbulence of the world’s most unstable region. The region where energy markets are unstable and unresolved conflicts fuel the mistrust among participating states. Moreover, the delays in implementation might erode momentum. To demonstrate progress and sustain the confidence of investors, IMEC needs measurable milestones such as pilot projects, customs harmonisation or digital integration.  Even partial success, such as improved India-Gulf maritime connectivity or cooperation in renewable energy, could build credibility.

The Way Forward for IMEC

IMEC challenges the prevailing assumptions about how connectivity projects emerge in contested regions on a conceptual note. It suggests that strategic corridors can no longer depend solely on geopolitical alliances. They require inclusive governance, transparent financing, and conflict-sensitive design. Egypt’s diplomatic stance on the palestinian question and IMEC implies that development without justice is unsustainable. For India, the opportunity lies in using its credibility with multiple actors, such as Arab states, Israel, Europe and the U.S. to keep the corridor protected from zero-sum politics. This would present New Delhi not just as a participant but also as a facilitator.

In conclusion, IMEC is both a promise and a puzzle. It incorporates the aspiration for cooperative connectivity but remains hostage to the very divisions it aims to bridge. Abdelatty’s statement in New Delhi, which echoed across regional capitals, was less a warning than a reminder that infrastructure cannot transcend politics and it must be engaged with constructively. The corridor might evolve from a strategic deal into a genuine intercontinental partnership if India and its allies can translate this vision into sustained diplomacy and practical implementation. However, if it fails, IMEC will join the long list of visionary projects that turned out unsuccessful in the Middle East.

WASHINGTON — At a moment when hope for peace seemed lost, senior U.S. officials, led by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in 2012 that would be touted for years as a historic diplomatic achievement. She would later campaign on her strategic prowess for the presidency against Donald Trump.

In 2014, a similar ceasefire was brokered between the two parties during yet another war by Clinton’s successor, John Kerry, also seen at the time as a diplomatic coup. But in the first 72 hours of that ceasefire, without clarity on the precise lines of an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Hamas operatives ambushed an Israeli Defense Forces patrol decommissioning a tunnel, throwing peace in doubt. The remains of the Israeli soldier caught in that raid have been held by Hamas ever since.

History shows that Trump’s achievement this week, brokering a new truce between Israel and Hamas after their most devastating war yet, is filled with opportunity and peril for the president.

A lasting ceasefire could cement him a legacy as a peacemaker, long sought by Trump, who has harnessed President Nixon’s madman theory of diplomacy to coerce several other warring parties into ceasefires and settlements. But the record of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shows that consistent interest and engagement by the president may be necessary to ensure any peace can hold.

Hamas and Israel agreed on Wednesday to implement the first phase of Trump’s proposed 20-point peace plan, exchanging all remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas since its Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel in exchange for 1,700 detainees from Gaza, as well as 250 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences in Israel.

Only the first phase has been agreed to thus far.

Guns are expected to fall silent Friday, followed by a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces that would initially leave roughly half of the Gaza Strip — along its periphery bordering Israel — within Israeli military control. A 72-hour clock would then begin after the partial withdrawal is complete, counting down to the hostage release.

Achieving this alone is a significant victory for Trump, who leveraged deep ties with Arab partners built over his first administration and political clout among the Israeli right and with its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to bring the deal to a close.

The president’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, had been working toward a ceasefire for months, starting back during the presidential transition period nearly one year ago. He found little success on his own.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio writes a note before handing it to President Trump during a White House meeting Wednesday.

(Evan Vucci / Associated Press)

It was Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law who designed the Abraham Accords in Trump’s first term and maintains close ties with Netanyahu and Arab governments, took an unofficial yet active role in a recent diplomatic push that helped secure an agreement, according to a U.S. official familiar with the matter.

“None of this would have happened without Jared,” the source said.

Speaking with reporters from the White House, Trump took a victory lap over the truce, claiming not only credit for a hostage and ceasefire deal but the historic achievement of a broader Middle East peace.

“We ended the war in Gaza and really, on a much bigger basis, created peace. And I think it’s going to be a lasting peace — hopefully an everlasting peace. Peace in the Middle East,” Trump said.

“We secured the release of all of the remaining hostages,” he added. “And they should be released on Monday or Tuesday — getting them is a complicated process. I’d rather not tell you what they have to do to get them. They’re in places you don’t want to be.”

An opening emerged for a diplomatic breakthrough after Israel conducted an extraordinary strike on a Hamas target in Doha, shaking the confidence of the Qatari government, a key U.S. ally. While Doha has hosted Hamas’ political leadership for years, Qatar’s leadership thought their relationship with Washington would protect them from Israeli violations of its territory.

Trump sought a deal with Qatar, a U.S. official said, that would assure them with security guarantees in exchange for delivering Hamas leadership on a hostage deal. Separately, Egypt — which has intelligence and sourcing capabilities in Gaza seen by the U.S. government as second only to Israel’s — agreed to apply similar pressure, the official said.

“There’s an argument here, that presumably the Qataris are making to Hamas — which is that they lost, this round anyway, and that it’s going to take them a very long time to rebuild. But the war must come to an end for the rebuilding to start,” said Elliott Abrams, a veteran diplomat from the Reagan, George W. Bush and first Trump administrations.

“On Friday, the Nobel Peace Prize will be announced, and he won’t get it,” Abrams said, adding that, if the deal falls through, “I think the Israelis are going to be saying to him, ‘This is a game. They didn’t really accept your plan.’”

“I don’t think, in the end, he’ll blame the Israelis for ruining the deal,” Abrams continued. “I think he’ll blame Hamas.”

MAGNOLIA, Ky. — The leafy soybean plants reach Caleb Ragland’s thighs and are ripe for harvest, but the Kentucky farmer is deeply worried. He doesn’t know where he and others like him will sell their crop because China has stopped buying.

Beijing, which traditionally has snapped up at least a quarter of all soybeans grown in the U.S., is in effect boycotting them in retaliation for the high tariffs President Trump has imposed on Chinese goods and to strengthen its hand in negotiations over a new overall trade deal.

It has left American soybean farmers fretting over not only this year’s crop but the long-term viability of their businesses, built in part on China’s once-insatiable appetite for U.S. beans.

“This is a five-alarm fire for our industry,” said Ragland, who leads the American Soybean Assn. trade group.

The situation might even be enough to test farmers’ loyalty to Trump, although the president still enjoys strong support throughout rural America. If no deal is reached soon, farmers hope the government will come through with aid as it did during Trump’s first term, but they see that as only a temporary solution. Trump said Thursday he was considering an aid package.

U.S. and Chinese officials have held four rounds of trade talks between May and September, with another likely in the coming weeks. No progress on soybeans has been reported.

Getting closer to harvest, “I’m honestly getting worried that the time is running out,” said Jim Sutter, chief executive of the U.S. Soybean Export Council.

Political pressure is growing

After Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese goods, China responded with tariffs of its own, which now total up to 34% on U.S. soybeans. That makes soybeans from other countries cheaper.

China’s retaliatory tariffs also hit U.S. growers of sorghum, corn and cotton; and even geoduck divers have been affected. But soybeans stand out because of the crop’s outsize importance to U.S. agricultural exports. Soybeans are the top U.S. food export, accounting for about 14% of all farm goods sent overseas.

And China has been by far the largest foreign buyer. Last year, the U.S. exported nearly $24.5 billion worth of soybeans, and China accounted for more than $12.5 billion. That compared with $2.45 billion by the European Union, the second-largest buyer. This year, China hasn’t bought beans since May.

With U.S. farmers hurting, the Trump administration is under growing pressure to reach a deal with China. As talks drag on, Trump appears ready to help.

“We’re going to take some of the tariff money — relatively small amount, but a lot for the farmers — and we’re going to help the farmers out a little bit,” Trump said, during what he called a transition period.

The only way most farmers survived Trump’s trade war in his first term was with tens of billions of dollars in government payments. But that’s not what most farmers want.

What farmers expect from Trump

“The American farmer, especially myself included, we don’t want aid payments,” said Brian Warpup, 52, a fourth-generation farmer from Warren, Ind. “We want to work. We work the land, we harvest the land, the crop off the land. And the worst thing that we could ever want is a handout.”

Farmers are looking to Trump for a long-term solution.

“Overwhelmingly, farmers have been in President Trump’s corner,” said Ragland, the president of the soybean association. “And I think the message that our soybean farmers as a whole want to deliver is: ‘President Trump, we’ve had your back. We need you to have ours now.’”

He said farmers appreciate the willingness to provide some short-term relief, but what they ultimately need are strong, reliable markets. “Our priority remains seeing the United States secure lasting trade agreements — particularly with China — that allow farmers to sell their crops and build a sustainable future with long-term customers,” he said.

Ragland, 39, hopes his three sons will become the 10th generation to till his 4,500 acres in Magnolia, Ky. Unless something changes soon, he worries that thousands of farmers may not survive.

Coming into this year, many farmers were just hoping to break even because crop prices were weak while their costs had only increased. Trump’s tariffs, which helped make their crops uncompetitive around the world, drove prices down further. And tariffs on steel and fertilizer sent costs up even more.

Darin Johnson, president of the Minnesota Soybean Growers Assn., said he still has faith in the Trump administration to reach a good trade deal with China.

“I think where the patience is probably wearing thin is the time,” said Johnson, a fourth-generation farmer. “I don’t think anybody thought that we were going to take this much time, because we were told 90 deals — 90 deals in 90 days.”

China’s negotiating strategy

The U.S. soybean industry grew in response to Chinese demand starting back in the 1990s, when China began its rapid economic rise and turned to foreign producers to help feed its people. Protein-rich soybeans are an essential part of the diet.

While China relies on domestic crops for steamed beans and tofu, it needs far more soybeans for oil extraction and animal feed. In 2024, China produced 20 million metric tons of soybeans, while importing more than 105 million metric tons.

American farmers have come to count on China as their biggest customer, and this has “given the Chinese a point of leverage,” Sutter said. By holding off on buying U.S. soybeans, China is seen as trying to leverage that purchasing power in the trade talks.

“I think that’s the strategy,” said Sutter of the U.S. Soybean Export Council. “I think that’s why China is targeting soybeans and other agricultural products, because they know that farmers have a strong lobby and farmers are important to the U.S. government.”

Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, didn’t answer specific questions on soybean purchases but urged the U.S. to work with Beijing.

“The essence of China-U.S. economic and trade cooperation is mutual benefit and win-win,” Liu said.

China turned to Brazil when Trump launched his first trade war in 2018. Last year, Brazilian beans accounted for more than 70% of China’s imports, while the U.S. share was down to 21%, World Bank data show. Argentina and other South American countries also are selling more to China, which has diversified to boost food security.

What American farmers are doing in response

U.S. farmers also are broadening their customer base, said Sutter, who recently traveled to Japan and Indonesia in search of new markets. Taiwan pledged to purchase $10 billion worth of soybeans, corn, wheat and beef in the next four years.

“There’s strong diversification efforts underway,” Sutter said. But “China is so big, it’s hard to replace them overnight.”

Farmers are working to boost consumption at home, too. Growth in biodiesel production has taken in some of the soybeans that were once exported. Other beans are crushed to produce soybean oil and soybean meal. The United Soybean Board is investing in research into the benefits of using soybeans to feed dairy cows and hogs.

But Iowa farmer Robb Ewoldt, a director with the Soybean Board, knows that such domestic uses are growing only gradually.

“We cannot replace a China in one shot,” Ewoldt said. “It’s not going to happen. We need to be realistic in that.”

Tang and Funk write for the Associated Press. Tang reported from Washington and Funk from Omaha. AP journalists Dylan Lovan in Magnolia, Obed Lamy in Warren and Steve Karnowski in Minneapolis contributed to this report.