Pentagon

This is just a small selection of the designs that have been seen to date. Firms in China have been particularly active in this regard, and developments in that country have often also been tied to work on swarming capabilities.

中国电科陆空协同固定翼无人机“蜂群”系统

中国电科大规模无人机蜂群任务全流程试验

Container-like launchers for uncrewed aerial systems, often mounted on trucks, have already been in service in many countries for years. This includes Iran, where they are used to launch Shahed-type kamikaze drones, as can be seen in the video below.

Баражуючий іранський боєприпас «Shahed 136»

However, many of these systems are focused squarely on the launch aspect and lack the recovery and refit capabilities that DIU has outlined for CADDS. Chinese drone firm DJI and others in the commercial space are increasingly offering container-like ‘docks,’ but which are often designed to accommodate just one uncrewed aerial system at a time.

What is particularly interesting here is how many of the stated CADDS requirements actually sound very similar, at least in very broad strokes, to a containerized system capable of launching, recovering, and recharging thousands of small, electrically-powered quadcopter-type drones at the touch of a button that the Chinese company DAMODA rolled out last year. That launcher, dubbed the Automated Drone Swarm Container System, is for drone light shows for entertainment purposes rather than military use.

Behind the Scenes of DAMODA Automated Drone Swarm Container System.✨

China just dropped a new level of drone swarm tech | One-click auto-deploy of thousands | by DAMODA

Still, as we previously wrote:

It is worth reiterating that DAMODA’s Automated Drone Swarm Container System, at least as it exists now, is clearly designed for entertainment industry use first and foremost. Though the company’s drone light show routines are certainly visually impressive and often go viral on social media, they are pre-scripted and conducted in a very localized fashion. What the company is offering is not a drone swarm capable of performing various military-minded tasks in a highly autonomous manner at appreciable ranges from its launch point.

At the same time, large-scale drone light shows put on by DAMODA (and a growing number of other companies), do highlight, on a broad level, the already highly problematic threats posed by swarms. The new Automated Drone Swarm Container System underscores the additional danger of these same threats hiding in plain sight. The steady proliferation of advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning, especially when it comes to dynamic targeting, will only create additional challenges, as TWZ has explored in detail in this past feature.

This is not theoretical, either. As mentioned, in June [2025], Ukrainian forces launched multiple drone attacks on airbases across Russia with the help of covert launchers loaded on the back of unassuming civilian tractor-trailer trucks. This entire effort was dubbed Operation Spiderweb and took months of planning.

Even in an overt operational context, readily deployable containerized systems capable of acting as hubs for drone operations across a broad area with limited manpower requirements could offer a major boost in capability and capacity. Ships, trucks, and aircraft, which could themselves be uncrewed, could be used to bring them to and from forward locations, even in remote areas. If they can support a “heterogeneous mix” of uncrewed aerial systems, a single container could be used to support a wide array of mission requirements, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, kinetic strikes, and/or communications signal relay.

An inherent benefit of a drone swarm, in general, is that each individual component does not have to be configured to perform all of the desired tasks. This creates additional flexibility and resilience to threats, since the loss of any particular drone does not necessarily preclude the swarm from continuing its assigned missions. There are tangential design and cost benefits for the drones themselves, since they can be configured to carry only the systems required for their particular mission demands.

Army Aviation Launches Autonomous Pack Hunters

TWZ previously laid out a detailed case for the many benefits that could come along with loading containers packed with swarms of drones onto U.S. Navy ships. Many of those arguments are just as relevant when talking about systems designed to be employed on land. Containerized systems are often readily adaptable to both ground-based and maritime applications, to begin with.

Drone swarms are only set to become more capable as advancements in autonomy, especially automated target recognition, continue to progress, driven by parallel developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning, as you can read more about here. Future highly autonomous swarms will be able to execute various mission sets even more efficiently and in ways that compound challenges for defenders. Massed drone attacks with limited autonomy already have an inherent capacity to just overwhelm enemy defenses. In turn, electronic warfare systems and high-power microwave directed energy weapons have steadily emerged as some of the most capable options available to tackle swarms, but have their own limitations. Even powerful microwave systems have very short ranges and are directional in nature, and electronic warfare systems may simply not work at all against autonomous drones.

In terms of what DIU is now looking at for CADDS, the stated requirements are broad. It remains to be seen what options might be submitted, let alone considered for actual operational U.S. military use.

Still, DIU has laid out a real emerging capability gap amid the current push to field various tiers of drones to a degree never before seen across America’s armed forces, which counterinsurgency launch systems look well-positioned to fill.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The new guidance from JIATF-401 talks about “critical infrastructure” mostly in terms of civilian sites ranging from power plants to sports venues. Drones do present real and still growing threats to critical civilian infrastructure, something TWZ has been calling attention to for years now. The Pentagon explicitly said the document had been released as part of work it has been doing in cooperation with the White House’s FIFA Task Force, which is preparing for the United States to host the World Cup later this year. However, it is made clear that the contents are equally applicable to helping protect military facilities from uncrewed aerial systems.

“When we talk about Homeland defense, we’re not just talking about military bases, power grids and ports; we’re talking about places where Americans gather. With major international events like the World Cup on the horizon, the security of our stadiums, for example, is a national priority,” U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, Director of JIATF-401, said in a statement accompanying the release. “Whether it’s a forward operating base, an outdoor concert venue or a stadium hosting the World Cup, the principles of risk assessment and physical protection outlined in this guide remain the same. This new guidance provides a common playbook for our forces to work closely with federal and local partners to ensure a safe and secure environment against the growing challenge of nefarious drones.”

The new counter-drone guidance’s central concept is a framework called HOP, standing for Harden, Obscure, Perimeter.

“Hardening does not mean enclosing an entire facility, but selectively introducing obstacles that disrupt predictable aerial access,” the document explains. “Even modest obstacles can deter low-cost, consumer-grade drones and force higher-risk flight profiles.”

As noted, the guidance highlights nets and tensioned cables as examples of this kind of cost-effective hardening. It also recommends closing retractable roofs and otherwise covering any other roof openings where and when it is feasible to do so. Underscoring the immediate focus on the World Cup, the document notes that “netting used to protect fans from projectiles can be repurposed to disrupt sUAS [small uncrewed aerial systems] flight and observation.”

The guidance also recommends the construction of more substantial “permanent or semi-permanent structural shielding, including concrete walls, enclosures, or hardened roofs designed to protect critical systems from overhead approach, observation, or objects released from a UAS.”

We will come back to all of this in a moment.

The “Obscure” component of the HOP framework focuses on making it harder for drones and their operators to find their targets in the first place. This can include an array of different tactics, techniques, and procedures, such as physical camouflage and decoys, as well as regular changes to how personnel and assets move through a facility. “If a drone cannot easily identify targets, crowds, or critical systems, its effectiveness drops sharply,” the new guidance notes.

Lastly, there is the “Perimeter” portion of the HOP framework, which is centered on expanded security zones around a specific site and ways to improve general situational awareness. “Pushing the effective perimeter outward forces drones to operate at greater distance, which strains battery life, degrades video and control links, increases the chance of operator exposure, [and] creates a larger safety buffer if a drone is downed.”

As an aside, the recently announced new counter-drone authorities for the commanders of U.S. military bases include the ability to respond to threats inside expanded zones beyond the facility’s immediate “fence-line.” The right-sizing of perimeters around domestic facilities and their enforcement has been a particularly complex issue for the U.S. government when it comes to counter-drone policies in recent years. Potential second-order impacts to surrounding areas, especially in densely populated urban environments, have to be taken into account and mitigated. This all imposes limits on the kind of assets that can be employed to neutralize drone threats once they’ve been detected, as you can read more about here.

As mentioned, the “Harden” part of the HOP frame stands out given how U.S. military officials have treated the topic in the past, at least publicly.

“We will have the need for bases, the main operating bases from which we operate,” U.S. Air Force Gen. Kevin Schneider, head of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), said during a panel at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2025 Warfare Symposium last March. “The challenge becomes, at some point, we will need to move to austere locations. We will need to disaggregate the force. We will need to operate out of other locations, again, one for survivability, and two, again, to provide response options.”

Schneider added at that time that his service was faced with the need to “make internal trades” in how to apply available funding, including “do we put that dollar towards, you know, fixing the infrastructure at Kadena [Air Base in Japan] or do we put that dollar towards restoring an airfield at Tinian.”

“I got tons of airfields from tons of allies, and we have access to all of them. The problem is, I can only protect a few of them,” now-retired Air Force Gen. James Hecker, then head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), another member of that same panel, had also said. “We can’t have that layered [defensive] effect for thousands of airbases. There’s just no way it’s going to happen.”

“I’m not a big fan of hardening infrastructure,” Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach, then head of PACAF, had also said at a media roundtable at the Air & Space Forces Association’s main annual symposium back in 2023. “The reason is because of the advent of precision-guided weapons… you saw what we did to the Iraqi Air Force and their hardened aircraft shelters. They’re not so hard when you put a 2,000-pound bomb right through the roof.”

It is worth noting here that traditional high-end guided missiles and other precision-guided munitions are no longer necessarily required to carry out strikes of this kind. Drones costing thousands of dollars, and able to be launched from very long distances away, can now execute precision attacks.

Wilsbach is now Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the service’s top officer.

The U.S. military has faced pushback from Congress on the topic of hardening. Multiple independent assessments have also raised alarms. TWZ has been following this often-heated debate closely.

There have been signs that the U.S. military’s position on hardening, and that of the Air Force’s more specifically, has been shifting already. In 2024, authorities at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia and Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in North Carolina both put out contracting notices asking for information about nets and other physical barriers to stop potential drone attacks. Langley had become a focal point for the drone threat discussion by that point after the base was subjected to weeks of still largely unexplained drone incursions in December 2023, which we were first to report.

Last year, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) announced that it had developed upgrades for a family of modular, rapidly deployable protective structures specifically to improve their effectiveness against drone attacks.

“The technology is not going to solve this problem for us. We can’t field a system that will stop every drone,” JIATF-401 director Brig. Gen. Ross told TWZ and other outlets during a press call in December in response to a direct question about physical hardening from this author. “At the end of that would be protection, which would be netting or fencing or physical barriers that would prevent a [sic] unmanned system from having its intended effect.”

Brig. Gen. Ross had said that this was among the things JIATF-401 had discussed in meetings with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies as part of World Cup preparations, presaging the release of the new guidance last week.

“As you think about protection, I would go all the way down to protective protection type assets, those will be included in our marketplace. And so if somebody wants to buy a $10,000 radar that has limited range, they’ll be able to buy it on the marketplace. If they want to buy a low cost interceptor for … [small drones] that just uses kinetic energy to defeat a drone – that’s a drone that hits a drone for $1,000 – they’ll be able to buy it on our marketplace,” he added. “If they want to buy physical barrier material, whether it’s a fishing net or a chain link fence, they’ll also be able to buy that as part of that counter-UAS marketplace.”

The central “marketplace” mentioned here, through which elements of the military and other U.S. government agencies can source counter-drone capabilities, is a key initiative that JIATF-401 has been working on and that you can learn more about here.

It is important to stress that U.S. military officials are unified in their position that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to countering drones. Physical hardening is just one part of a layered approach and is not a ‘silver bullet’ solution to protect against all types of drone threats. Active defenses, including electronic warfare jammers, drone-like interceptors like Brig. Gen. Ross mentioned, and more traditional anti-aircraft assets, are still part of the equation, to differing degrees, for defending against drones at home and abroad.

At the same time, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has shown that even limited, lower-cost measures like netting can be useful for disrupting attacks by smaller kamikaze drones and loitering munitions in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

In Shebekino, Belgorod region, 41 apartment buildings have been covered with anti-drone nets. The local creatures are loving it – they joke about it and, as always, endure it with classic patience. pic.twitter.com/Q26fwKX1ut

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) April 3, 2025

Last year, near-simultaneous covert attacks by Ukrainian forces on multiple air bases in Russia utilizing quadcopter-type kamikaze drones underscored the level of damage that even lower-tier uncrewed aerial attackers can inflict on high-value targets. Mass drone attacks are only set to get more threatening as time goes on, as the barrier to entry on automated targeting and swarming capabilities lowers thanks to the steady proliferation of artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies. This, in turn, only increases the challenges for defenders, including the prospect of simply being overwhelmed. For years, TWZ has been separately sounding the alarm on how aircraft sitting on open flightlines are especially vulnerable, in general.

The russian terrorist state no longer has the ability to produce Tu-95s or any kind of strategic bomber. This is a tremendous victory for Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/SVeQE78v0h

— Michael MacKay (@mhmck) June 1, 2025

Outside of the United States, among adversaries and allies alike, there has also been a growing trend toward more physical hardening at air bases and other facilities. China has embarked on a particularly extensive effort to build new hardened and unhardened shelters at air bases across the country. The Chinese have been observed building other kinds of hardened infrastructure, including a new pattern of protected air defense sites along their disputed border with India, as well. Even before the unprecedented drone attacks last year, Russia had also been working to add new shelters, hardened and unhardened, to various air bases, but with a focus on ones closer to the fighting in Ukraine.

Structures that are sturdy enough even just to protect against shrapnel could have broader value, too. Just over a year ago, the Hudson Institute think tank in Washington, D.C., published a report assessing that 10 missiles with warheads capable of scattering cluster munitions across an area with a 450-foot diameter could be enough to neutralize all exposed aircraft on the ground and critical fuel storage at various key airbases. Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Japan and Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, as well as Langley in Virginia, were specifically highlighted, as seen below.

Overall, the Pentagon’s counter-drone prescriptions are still evolving, especially when it comes to defending bases and critical civilian infrastructure within the United States. At the same time, despite public stances that officials have taken in the past, hardened structures and other kinds of physical defenses have become an important part of the current counter-drone playbook.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com