The head of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power stepped down Wednesday as part of a “planned leadership transition,” Mayor Karen Bass’ office announced.
Janisse Quiñones, who took the helm at DWP in 2024, is returning to Puerto Rico, where she is from, to help modernize the island’s electric grid.
In a statement, Bass said that Quiñones brought “steady leadership and engineering expertise to LADWP.”
“During her tenure, LADWP reinforced electric grid and water system reliability, enhanced coordination during wildfire events, and advanced investments to strengthen resilience amid increasing climate pressures,” the statement said.
Quiñones’ hefty salary of $750,000, which drew attention when she was hired, was meant to be competitive with private utility companies. She previously was a senior vice president of electric operations at Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
Quiñones managed the DWP through the Palisades fire, when a key reservoir was empty as firefighters battled the blaze.
Some argued that the reservoir, which had been drained to repair its cover, led to lower water pressure and hampered the firefight.
The DWP has pushed back, saying the repairs were necessary to protect public health and that even if the reservoir had been full, there still would have been water pressure issues, considering the extraordinary demand on the system during the fire.
A state investigation found that even if the reservoir had been full, the flow rate in the pipes “would have been a limiting factor in maintaining pressure and the system would have been quickly overwhelmed.”
Los Angeles Fire Department Chief Jaime Moore has taken over an agency under intense scrutiny — and he’s getting paid handsomely to do it.
Moore, who was appointed by Mayor Karen Bass in October, will earn $473,600 a year, the City Council decided Tuesday — $18,000 more than his predecessor, Kristin Crowley, made when she was ousted by Bass in February 2025 for her handling of the Palisades fire.
The LAFD and the mayor continue to face intense scrutiny over their handling of the Palisades fire, which killed 12 people and destroyed thousands of homes in January of last year, as well as the watering down of the LAFD after-action report on the fire.
When Crowley started as fire chief in 2022, her annual salary was $367,100.
Soon after that, the city amended its salary ranges for department heads to keep up with inflation, said Matt Szabo, the city’s top budget analyst.
On Monday, Crowley filed a whistleblower lawsuit claiming that Bass “orchestrated a campaign of retaliation” to protect her own political future and paper over her failures during the Palisades fire.
The LAFD did not immediately comment on Moore’s salary, which was recommended by the mayor and the City Council’s Executive Employee Relations Committee before going to the full council on Tuesday.
“Investing in strong and experienced leadership fortifies public safety for residents,” said a spokesperson for council President Marqueece Harris-Dawson, who chairs the employee relations committee.
Moore’s salary is fairly comparable to that of other city and county public safety leaders.
The chief of the Los Angeles County Fire Department, Anthony Marrone, made $475,000 in base pay in 2024, according to county data.
Los Angeles Police Chief Jim McDonnell was sworn in at a $450,000 salary in 2024 — less than the $507,500 the Board of Police Commissioners had initially recommended. McDonnell’s salary as of Tuesday was still about $450,000.
McDonnell’s salary was a significant jump over the initial pay of his predecessor, Michel Moore, who earned $350,000 when he first assumed the position in 2018.
The LAFD has about 3,200 uniformed fire personnel, while the LAPD has about 8,700 sworn officers.
Both McDonnell and the new fire chief make far less than Janisse Quiñones, general manager of the Department of Water and Power, who was sworn in at $750,000 a year. Salaries for DWP executives must remain competitive with those of utility company execs to retain top talent, according to the city’s Office of Public Accountability, which recommended Quiñones’ salary.
She makes much more than Marty Adams, the previous department head, who earned about $447,000 a year when he departed.
Moore, a 30-year LAFD veteran, has spent his first months as chief dealing with persistent questions about the department’s management of the Palisades fire.
A week after the fire, a Times investigation found that top LAFD officials did not fully staff up and pre-deploy all available engines and firefighters to the Palisades and other high-risk areas, despite a forecast of dangerously high winds.
Bass cited the failure to keep firefighters on duty for a second shift as one reason she dismissed Crowley.
The new chief has swerved between candid reflection over the department’s failures during the Palisades fire and lashing out at the media over what he has called a “smear” campaign against firefighters who bravely worked to put out the catastrophic blaze.
Moore appeared to be referencing a Times report that a battalion chief ordered crews to roll up their hoses and leave the area of the Jan. 1 Lachman fire, even though firefighters had complained that the ground was still smoldering and rocks remained hot to the touch. Days later, the Lachman fire reignited into the Palisades fire.
Moore has also tried to walk a fine line on the LAFD’s after-action report, which was meant to spell out mistakes and suggest measures to avoid repeating them.
The author of the report, Battalion Chief Kenneth Cook, declined to endorse the final version because of changes that altered his findings and made the report, in his words, “highly unprofessional and inconsistent with our established standards.”
The most significant change to the report involved downplaying LAFD officials’ pre-deployment mistakes.
Moore has admitted that the report was watered down to “soften language and reduce explicit criticism of department leadership,” while saying he would not look into who directed the watering down. But Moore has also said that he will not allow similar edits to future after-action reports.
Shortly before releasing an after-action report on the Palisades fire, the Los Angeles Fire Department issued a confidential memo detailing plans to protect Mayor Karen Bass and others from “reputational harm” in connection with the city’s handling of the catastrophic blaze, records obtained by The Times show.
“It’s our goal to prepare and protect Mayor Bass, the City, and the LAFD from reputational harm associated with the upcoming public release of its AARR, through a comprehensive strategy that includes risk assessment, proactive and reactive communications, and crisis response,” the memo states, referring to the acronym for the LAFD’s report.
The 13-page document is on LAFD letterhead and includes email addresses for department officials, representatives of Bass’ office and public relations consultants hired to help shape messaging about the fire, although it is not known to whom it was eventually distributed. The Times obtained the memo, titled “LAFD AARR: Strategic Response Plan,” from the LAFD through the California Public Records Act.
Labeled “for internal use only,” the memo, which is unsigned, aims to shape news media coverage of the report’s findings, including through efforts to “minimize tough Q&A” by asking to hold closed-door briefings with the Fire Commission and City Council. The memo is undated but notes that “This plan has been updated with the latest timeline as of 10/7.” The after-action report was released to the public on Oct. 8.
The Times disclosed in December that the report had been altered to deflect criticism of the LAFD’s failure to pre-deploy engines and crews to the Palisades ahead of the Jan. 7, 2025 fire, among other shortcomings in the city’s preparations for and response to the deadly disaster.
Mayor Karen Bass joins L.A. City Council and community safety leaders at City Hall in downtown Los Angeles on February 17, 2026.
(Christina House/Los Angeles Times)
Bass has repeatedly denied that she was involved in any effort to water down the report, which was meant to spell out mistakes and suggest measures to avoid repeating them after a fire that killed 12 people and destroyed thousands of homes. But two sources with knowledge of Bass’ office have said that after receiving an early draft of the report, the mayor told then-Interim Fire Chief Ronnie Villanueva that it could expose the city to legal liabilities.
Bass wanted key findings about the LAFD’s actions removed or softened before the report was made public, the sources told The Times early this month. The mayor has said that The Times’ story based on the sources’ accounts was “completely fabricated.”
Representatives of Bass’ office and the LAFD did not immediately comment this week on the 13-page “strategic response plan” memo.
The disclosure about the effort to protect the mayor’s reputation comes after other records revealed that she was leading damage control efforts around both the after-action report and an announcement by federal prosecutors that the Palisades fire was caused by a rekindling of a smaller blaze.
The LAFD was facing scrutiny over why it failed to put out the earlier blaze.
“Any additional interviews with the Fire Chief would likely depend on the Mayor’s guidance,” LAFD spokesperson Capt. Erik Scott wrote in an Oct. 9 email to a Bass aide, Villanueva and others. “Regarding a press conference, I would be cautious as it could invite a high volume of challenging questions, and this would also be contingent on the Mayor’s direction.”
Before releasing the after-action report, the LAFD formed an internal crisis management team and brought in the public relations consultants, Beverly Hills-based Lede Co., to help shape its messaging about the fire. In the 13-page strategy memo, Lede, whose fee was covered by the nonprofit Los Angeles Fire Department Foundation, is tasked with helping to manage and monitor news media coverage of the report.
The latest set of documents obtained by The Times includes a “Tough Q&A” with proposed answers to questions that news reporters might ask Bass and Villanueva. The questions for Bass centered around the budget and former Fire Chief Kristin Crowley’s claims that budget restrictions hampered the department’s ability to fight the Palisades fire, with the proposed answers emphasizing that the budget was not cut.
Ronnie Villanueva speaks during his appointment as interim LAFD Chief on Feb. 21, 2025.
(Drew A. Kelley / Long Beach Press-Telegram via Getty Images)
Villanueva’s proposed answers focused on the “unstoppable” nature of the fire and improvements LAFD has since made to ensure adequate staffing on red flag days.
Other internal emails reviewed by The Times show that Bass met with Villanueva about the after-action report in mid-July.
The mayor’s role in altering the after-action report and managing its release has become an issue in her reelection campaign. Bass previously said through a spokesperson that her office merely encouraged the LAFD to fact-check references in the report about city finances and the forecast of high winds leading up to Jan. 7. The mayor later told The Times that the report was “technical,” saying, “I’m not a firefighter.”
The changes that ended up in the final report were significant, with some Palisades residents and former LAFD chiefs saying they amounted to a cover-up.
A week after the fire, The Times exposed LAFD officials’ decisions not to fully staff up and pre-deploy all available engines and firefighters to the Palisades and other high-risk areas before the dangerous winds hit. Bass later removed Crowley, citing the failure to keep firefighters on duty for a second shift.
An initial draft of the after-action report said the pre-deployment decisions “did not align” with policy, but the final version said the number of companies pre-deployed “went above and beyond the standard LAFD pre-deployment matrix.”
Fire fighters work to extinguish flames during the Eaton fire on Wednesday, Jan. 8, 2025 in Altadena, CA.
(Jason Armond/Los Angeles Times)
The author of the report, Battalion Chief Kenneth Cook, declined to endorse the final version because of changes that altered his findings and made the report, in his words, “highly unprofessional and inconsistent with our established standards.”
Even with the deletions and changes, the report delivered a harsh critique of the LAFD’s performance during the Palisades fire, pointing to a disorganized response, failures in communication and chiefs who didn’t understand their roles. The report found that top commanders lacked a fundamental knowledge of wildland firefighting tactics, including “basic suppression techniques.”
Fire Chief Jaime Moore, an LAFD veteran whom Bass named as chief in November, has said he is focused on the future and not interested in assigning blame for changes to the report. But he said he will not allow similar edits to future after-action reports.
The after-action report included just a brief reference to the Lachman fire, a small Jan. 1, 2025, blaze that rekindled six days later into the Palisades fire.
The Times found that a battalion chief ordered firefighters to roll up their hoses and leave the Lachman burn area the day after the fire was supposedly extinguished, despite complaints by crew members that the ground still was smoldering.
After the Times report, Bass directed Moore to commission an independent investigation into the LAFD’s handling of the Lachman fire.
LAFD officials have said that most of the 42 recommendations in the after-action report have been implemented, including mandatory staffing protocols on red flag days and training on wind-driven fires, tactical operations and evacuations.
A long-awaited set of reports on how to build a fire-resilient Pacific Palisades, commissioned by Los Angeles city officials for $5 million, found that much of the hilly enclave remains out of compliance with standards for evacuating during a disaster.
The reports, by the city and the global infrastructure firm AECOM, also recommended that the city complete significant brush clearance work, bolster its water system and move electrical wires underground.
All of the recommendations are frequent asks from Palisades residents. Many have already been discussed at length by independent experts. They will inform the city’s “Long-Term Recovery Plan” for rebuilding infrastructure and improving wildfire resilience after the Palisades fire killed 12 people and destroyed thousands of homes in January 2025.
The reports outlined nearly a billion dollars in infrastructure projects through 2033, including more than $650 million for electrical undergrounding and $150 million for water system repairs.
“Full recovery is a long-term, multi-year effort that requires sustained coordination — and it must continue to be community-led,” Mayor Karen Bass wrote in a Tuesday newsletter to Palisades residents that included links to the reports. “This past year has been unimaginable for the Palisades community, but I remain committed to supporting you through every step of the recovery.”
She noted that the Long-Term Recovery Plan would be finalized “in the months ahead.”
A month after the fire, Bass selected Illinois-based Hagerty Consulting to work on fire recovery under a yearlong contract for up to $10 million.
However, in June, Bass announced that AECOM would develop a recovery plan for the city. Hagerty, which had struggled to explain its role at community meetings, ultimately focused on debris removal logistics and finished its work in December, billing the city $3.5 million.
In December, the city authorized payments of $5 million for AECOM’s first set of reports — which were originally due in mid-November — and an additional $3 million to the company for long-term recovery planning.
Palisades residents say they are frustrated at the price tag and feel that the effort has been chaotic and lacked urgency. Some have questioned whether the reports would contain an honest assessment of the situation, given that AECOM is not working independently of the city.
The three AECOM reports consist of recommendations for improving the Palisades’ fire resiliency, a plan for rebuilding public infrastructure destroyed in the fire and how to coordinate traffic and other logistics as the area becomes a construction zone.
The resiliency report found that “almost all” local streets within the Palisades are narrower than permitted by the city fire code — particularly in the Alphabet Streets, Rustic Canyon and Castellammare areas. A “majority” of long dead-end streets did not fulfill the sections of the fire code ensuring that fire engines have enough space to turn around, the report said.
A lawsuit filed in December alleged that the city has routinely failed to comply with similar state regulations when it approved new construction in the city’s “very high fire hazard” areas.
These codes “directly impact the ability to fight fires and for civilians to safely evacuate,” said Jaime Hall, an attorney representing the plaintiffs, who are a group of resident associations in the Santa Monica Mountains and a fire safety advocacy organization. “They’re not just regulations on a piece of paper.”
The resiliency report also found that residents experienced “evacuation warning fatigue” from routine false alarms, making them hesitant to evacuate.
Additionally, many intersections in the Palisades could serve as bottlenecks during evacuations, leading to significant delays, the resiliency report said, basing the conclusion on a traffic pattern analysis. A Times investigation found that the city had not conducted a similar analysis to help comply with state law.
Requirements to clear vegetation around homes, including the state’s upcoming Zone Zero regulations, are not enough to meaningfully reduce wildfire risk in the Palisades, with its steep topography and dense vegetation, the resiliency report found. The city should work with land managers — including the state and county — on measures such as cutting gaps in vegetation for firefighter access, maintaining defensible space around community infrastructure and restoring native vegetation, the report said.
The public infrastructure report listed $150 million for “wet” infrastructure repairs, which included replacing aging and leaky water main pipelines.
The resiliency report outlined further potential improvements to provide more water for firefighting, such as building larger pipelines and additional tanks to move and store more drinking water; improving connections between local water systems; and tapping stormwater, treated wastewater or even seawater from the Pacific.
During the Palisades fire, hillside tanks ran out of water. Many fire hydrants, particularly in higher-elevation areas, lost pressure and ran dry. The resiliency report said that installing pressure monitoring systems could “ensure water availability and prevent dry hydrants by streaming live data to fire crews,” and that remote-controlled valves could also help maintain water pressure during a fire.
The city’s Department of Water and Power is already considering options for improving the Santa Ynez Reservoir, which was empty and awaiting repairs of its floating cover when the Palisades fire erupted.
The city has also committed to placing power lines underground in the Palisades where feasible.
The infrastructure report laid out six undergrounding projects that would cost the city $664 million, after nearly 57% of all electric service points — from power distribution poles to transmission lines — were completely destroyed in the fire.
