Pakistan

Mountaineer Nirmal Purja among those feared missing after avalanche hit Broad Peak, Pakistan alpine club says.

Ten climbers, led by renowned Nepali mountaineer Nirmal Purja, are feared missing after an avalanche in northern Pakistan where they were on a climbing expedition, the country’s alpine club said.

“The Alpine Club of Pakistan (ACP) has received deeply concerning reports of an avalanche that struck a team of climbers on Broad Peak (8,047m) in the Karakoram mountain range,” the club said late on Thursday, adding that the team was led by Purja and could not be reached since the incident.

Broad Peak is the 12th-highest mountain in the world.

The ACP said the expedition comprises 10 people, including five from Nepal, one from Pakistan, one from Oman, one from China, one from the United States, and another foreign climber whose nationality it did not disclose.

“The entire team has reportedly been out of communication since the avalanche,” the club said.

“Every possible effort is being made to ensure that helicopter support and all available rescue resources are mobilised at the earliest opportunity, subject to weather and operational conditions,” it added.

Purja, 43, also known as Nims Dai, has broken multiple climbing records since becoming a full-time mountaineer and tour guide in 2018, after leaving the British military.

He climbed all 14 “eight-thousanders” (peaks above 8,000 metres, or 26,000 feet) in six months and six days between April and October 2019, a record at the time.

In 2021, Purja completed the first winter ascent of K2 as part of a team of nine other Nepalese climbers.

Pakistan is facing accusations that its security forces have killed dozens of unarmed protesters in the past week of demonstrations in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Al Jazeera’s James Bays asked panellists on Inside Story if Islamabad is borrowing tactics from Indian-administered Kashmir.

Deadly clashes reported in Pakistan-administered Kashmir amid first round of voting for regional elections on July 27.

Watchdogs have raised concerns over mounting reports of deadly clashes during regional elections in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, where a banned activist group has boycotted the vote and staged protests.

The clashes between police and protesters earlier this week killed more than 30 people in the region, according to the leaders of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC).

In a video statement on Wednesday shared by Arab News Pakistan, JAAC committee member Sardar Umar Nazir claimed 20 of the group’s supporters had been killed during a march on Monday, when the first round of voting took place.

He listed reports of at least 10 other protesters being killed the following day in the towns of Rawalakot, Mirpur and elsewhere, including during sit-ins.

“Our demand was peaceful, it was peaceful, we tried to keep it non-violent and bullets were fired at it,” said Nazir in the video statement.

Pakistani authorities said a member of the security personnel was killed and five more were injured in clashes on Monday.

Rights group Amnesty International called the reports of lethal force against protesters in the area “disturbing” and urged an investigation.

Pear Pandya, a senior analyst at conflict monitor ACLED, said the violence in Pakistan-administered Kashmir “is bound to overshadow the legitimacy of the entire electoral exercise”.

Monday’s first-round vote – covering the districts of Mirpur, Kotli and Bhimber – will be followed by two more rounds on August 2 and August 10.

Pakistan’s primary governing party, ⁠the PML-N, won nine out of the 13 seats that were up for election on Monday.

No justification to ‘mete out violence’

JAAC was banned by the local government under “anti-terrorism laws” in June, causing deadly protests to erupt in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Banking, roads and internet services have largely been disrupted since then, hindering the flow of information.

Pakistani officials have justified the crackdown by alleging that armed and India-backed fighters joined the Kashmiri protesters. India has rejected similar accusations in the past.

Amnesty has called the ban on JAAC unlawful and said it does not provide justification for authorities to “mete out deadly violence against protesters”.

The rights group has also urged Pakistani authorities to ”restore all communications access and allow media and independent observers into the area”, its acting regional director for South Asia, Isabelle Lassee, said.

‘Controversial’ seats

One of JAAC’s central demands regarding the regional elections is the abolition of 12 assembly seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees.

JAAC supporters say the seats are used by major Pakistani political parties to tip the composition of the local parliament in their favour with those who mostly live outside the region.

To form a regional government, the PML-N would likely need the support of some of the 12 representatives, said Hasan Askari, ‌a political analyst.

“But when their government is dependent on those 12 controversial seats, how would it be able to find a solution for this issue?” Askari told the Reuters news agency.

Even among the candidates that did not boycott the vote on Monday, the results were contested. Parties accused each other of ballot ‌box ‌stealing and vote rigging.

West Indies take a 1-0 lead in the two-Test series after Jayden Seales dominates with the ball on day 4 in Trinidad.

Paceman Jayden Seales ‌claimed his fourth five-wicket haul to bowl the West ⁠⁠Indies to ⁠a 90-run victory over Pakistan in the opening Test match in Tarouba, Trinidad and Tobago.

After eking out a 29-run first-innings ⁠lead, the West ⁠⁠Indies made 181 in their second innings to set Pakistan a target of 211 on Tuesday, the fourth day of play.

Seales (5-20) and his pace ⁠colleagues returned to produce a superb fast-bowling display at the Brian Lara Stadium, routing Pakistan for 120 in a little over 40 overs, with one day of play remaining.

Pakistan captain Babar Azam made an unbeaten 58 and combined ‌with number 11 Mohammad Abbas (23) in a brief resistance, but the West ⁠⁠Indies’ victory appeared a formality after the tourists slumped to 71-9.

Pakistan number three Shan Masood, who fractured his finger during his first-innings knock of 109, batted at number eight in the second innings. He made three before ⁠Seales dismissed him.

Captain Roston ⁠Chase dedicated the victory to West Indies great Garry Sobers, who died earlier this month.

“We wanted to make him proud and had a chat about it ⁠before the match. I hope he is smiling down on us,” Chase said afterwards.

“I ⁠love the direction this team is ⁠heading. We’re not relying on one or two players; everyone is chipping in at crucial moments.”

Babar said Pakistan’s lack of partnerships proved costly.

“Today, as a batting ‌unit, we weren’t up to the mark. We kept losing wickets back-to-back, and the batting failed. That’s something we’re working ‌on,” ‌he said.

The second and final Test match in Port of Spain begins on Sunday.

First Test, Tarouba (day four of five)

West Indies 311 (Hope 92; Ali 4-50) & 181 (Joseph 38; Abbas 5-22)

Pakistan 282 (Masood 109; Greaves 5-27) & 120 (Azam 58*; Seales 5-20)

West Indies won by 90 runs; lead series 1-0

Scorecard

Jayden Seales claimed 5-20 as the West Indies pace attack ruthlessly crushed Pakistan to clinch a 90-run victory just after tea on day four of the first Test.

Set 211 for victory, Pakistan were reduced to 71-9 in their second innings on a deteriorating pitch and had looked on course to be bowled out for their lowest total in Tests against the hosts.

However, a battling 10th-wicket partnership between Babar Azam and Muhammad Abbas worth 49 runs took the match into the evening session.

The Pakistan skipper made an unbeaten 58, before Seales secured the success at the Brian Lara Cricket Academy in Trinidad when he had Abbas trapped lbw for 23.

West Indies skipper Roston Chase dedicated the victory to the late Sir Garfield Sobers, who died recently and would have turned 90 on the day they wrapped up victory.

“We wanted to make him proud and had a chat about it before the match. I hope he is smiling down on us,” said Chase.

“I also want to thank the Trinidad crowd for coming out and supporting us. It was not a big crowd but it gave us enough energy and support to go out there and perform.”

Having resumed on 126-7, West Indies managed to add 55 runs for their last three wickets in the morning session.

Shamar Joseph top-scored for the hosts with 38 off 27 balls, including four sixes, while Kemar Roach made a dogged 18 off 63 balls.

Abbas was the pick of the Pakistan bowlers as he claimed 5-22.

Their chase started to unravel before lunch when Seales removed Imam-ul-Haq, Azan Awais and Salman Agha.

Justin Greaves, who had taken five wickets for no runs on day three during an incredible spell of five wicket maidens, bowled Mohammad Rizwan before he trapped Aamer Jamal lbw as West Indies tightened their grip.

Shan Masood batted with a fractured finger and briefly delayed the inevitable before he spooned a catch to backward point as Pakistan’s resistance faded.

Babar was defiant in his knock, but ultimately ran out of partners as his side slumped to their eighth consecutive defeat in Tests away from home.

He said: “We played good cricket in the last few days but today we were not up to the mark as a batting unit.

“There was uneven bounce in the pitch but we should have looked to build partnerships. The basics stay the same, you have to survive the new ball and look to score when it gets a bit old.”

Pakistan will attempt to level the two-match series in the second Test in Port of Spain, which begins on 2 August.

First Test, Tarouba (day three of five)

West Indies 311 (Hope 92; Ali 4-50) & 126-7 (Chanderpaul 35, Abbas 3-14)

Pakistan 282 (Masood 109; Greaves 5-27)

West Indies lead by 155 runs

Scorecard

West Indies all-rounder Justin Greaves took five wickets without conceding a run in an incredible spell of bowling on day three of the first Test against Pakistan.

Greaves, who is playing in his 17th Test, claimed his maiden Test five-wicket haul to help dismiss Pakistan for 282 in response to West Indies’ first-innings total of 311.

The 32-year-old Barbadian’s spell – five consecutive wicket maidens – was all the more remarkable given he had bowled six overs earlier in the day for 27 runs without taking a wicket.

“When I came on captain Roston Chase just said ‘continue to be disciplined in what you are doing’ and to see if I can get some wickets for the team,” Greaves said.

“The ball nipped around and I got some reward. Anytime I get the ball in hand the team looks to me to be that solid player for them [and] try to dig us out of situations.

“To get five wickets for the first time in Test cricket, I’m really happy, but there’s still a lot of work to do in the game.”

Pakistan captain Shan Masood was Greaves’ first wicket at the Brian Lara Cricket Academy in Trinidad when he was bowled for 109 in the 64th over following a superb set-up.

Greaves had pushed the ball wide to the left-hander from over the wicket before he tailed a delivery back into Masood who played down the wrong line and inside edged on to his stumps.

Aamer Jamal had his middle stump uprooted in Greaves’ next over as the seamer speared one through his defences.

Greaves then trapped Ali Usman lbw before he had Mohammed Rizwan and Mohammad Abbas both caught behind as Pakistan lost their last seven wickets for just 38 runs.

West Indies reached stumps on day three on 126-7 in their second innings – a lead of 155 runs – to leave the match finely poised.

Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan-administered Kashmir, formally known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), has spent the summer under an unofficial state of emergency.

Since early June, nearly 40 people have been killed in clashes between protesters and security forces, with sit-ins and road blockades regular features in the region over this period.

Banks remained shut for two weeks. Mobile and internet services remain suspended across most of the territory. Poonch division, which borders India and has been the epicentre of the unrest, was effectively sealed off for weeks, disrupting the supply of flour and other essentials to a region that depends heavily on them.

The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), the movement behind the protests, was banned by the local government on June 5, days before a planned demonstration.

Its leadership has since been arrested, has gone underground or has continued organising from sit-in camps in Rawalakot, the administrative headquarters of Poonch division.

Its demands, once centred on subsidised flour and cheaper electricity, have expanded to 38 points, chief among them the abolition of 12 assembly seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees.

All of this is unfolding as the region prepares to vote. Elections for the 45-seat Legislative Assembly, originally scheduled for July 27, have been split across three dates.

Mirpur division votes as planned, Muzaffarabad division and the 12 seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees follow on August 2, while Poonch division, where tensions remain highest, goes to the polls on August 10.

JAAC’s leadership is not on the ballot and has urged supporters to boycott the vote.

Of all the movement’s demands, one issue has proved impossible to resolve: the 12 refugee seats. The government says they cannot be touched without a constitutional amendment. JAAC wants them abolished outright.

Between those two positions lies a legal argument stretching back nearly a century, and a more fundamental question: who gets to decide who governs Muzaffarabad?

A dozen seats, one dispute

Of the AJK Legislative Assembly’s 45 elected seats, 33 are filled from constituencies within the territory.

The remaining 12 are reserved for refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir who now live in different parts of Pakistan.

The arrangement traces its roots to electoral arrangements introduced in 1960, reinforced through laws in 1964 and 1970, before being formalised in AJK’s 1974 Interim Constitution and reaffirmed by the constitution’s 13th Amendment in 2018.

Chaudhry Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, a former chief justice of the AJK Supreme Court, said the basis for the seats goes back further still, to the AJK government’s founding declaration of October 24, 1947, which he said reflected “the collective will of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir”.

Refugee representation, he told Al Jazeera, has “a firm historical basis” rooted in that document. He rejects any suggestion that the seats are unconstitutional.

“They have both historical grounding and constitutional support,” he said. “These seats cannot be described as unconstitutional.”

Pakistan-administered Kashmir’s electorate has grown from 3.2 million voters in 2021 to more than 3.8 million this year, according to Election Commission figures.

Within that, the 12 refugee constituencies account for roughly 439,000 registered voters, scattered across cities including Lahore, Rawalpindi and Sialkot, rather than concentrated in a single geographical area like AJK’s territorial constituencies.

And that’s a problem, says Kashif Abbasi, a JAAC committee member.

“This election is meant for people who actually live in AJK,” he told Al Jazeera. “These 12 seats sit outside AJK’s jurisdiction. This doesn’t happen anywhere else.”

From flour to the assembly floor

JAAC’s demands were not always centred on the refugee seats. Its original charter was almost entirely economic, focusing on subsidised flour, electricity at cost price, and a share in the benefits from the Mangla and Neelum-Jhelum hydropower projects.

The refugee seats first appeared in the group’s expanded charter, submitted in October 2025.

Even then, JAAC did not initially seek their outright abolition. In written proposals submitted on May 30 this year, the group offered two alternatives.

It proposed retaining symbolic refugee representation until the Kashmir dispute is permanently resolved or replacing the 12 assembly seats with four seats in the AJK Council, the Islamabad-chaired body that exercises legislative authority over AJK’s federal-facing affairs.

The 14-member council, chaired by Pakistan’s prime minister, oversees subjects including electricity, banking and parts of taxation, areas that largely fall outside the AJK assembly’s authority. The territory has no representation in Pakistan’s national parliament.

“Our suggestion was that these seat-holders should instead be given representation on the Kashmir Council, and that their assembly seats be eliminated, with that money used elsewhere in the territory,” Khawaja Mehran, a member of JAAC’s core committee, told Al Jazeera recently.

Both proposals were rejected at an All-Parties Conference in Muzaffarabad on June 3.

Constitutional barrier

In June, the AJK Supreme Court addressed the issue directly.

The court held that the seats are protected under AJK’s constitution and can only be abolished through a formal constitutional amendment. They cannot be removed through executive action or public pressure.

A constitutional amendment, the judges wrote, is “a solemn constitutional act, not a concession to be wrested from a government under duress”.

Zia, the former AJK chief justice, said the opinion changed little about the existing legal position.

“These seats simply cannot be abolished without a proper constitutional process,” he told Al Jazeera, adding that, with the outgoing assembly’s term having ended, no such process is possible until a new legislature is elected.

The government’s account

Abdul Majid Khan, AJK’s former finance minister and himself from a refugee family, rejects the idea that the seat holders form an unaccountable political bloc.

He points instead to the size of the territory’s budget. AJK’s roughly 310 billion rupees (about $1.1bn) budget last year, he said, far exceeds the development funds allocated to the 12 refugee constituencies – nowhere near enough, in his view, to make them the powerful bloc JAAC describes.

“These are people who migrated for a larger cause,” Khan told Al Jazeera, referring to Kashmiris who fled Jammu, across the border, during the violence of 1947 following the partition of the subcontinent and settled across Pakistan in the decades that followed.

Refugee representation, he said, has existed since AJK’s first parliamentary election in 1975, when the territory’s first prime minister was himself from a refugee family.

At the June 3 conference that rejected JAAC’s proposals, AJK Prime Minister Faisal Mumtaz Rathore said any decision on the seats “can only be taken by the elected representatives in the House”, adding that most of JAAC’s other demands had already been met.

Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif told the National Assembly on June 11 that the future of the 12 refugee seats should be decided by voters, not under pressure from street protests.

He urged JAAC to contest the issue in the election rather than demand its resolution beforehand, asking: “How could you exclude them from the electoral process?”

A senior government official in Poonch, whose division has witnessed the worst of the unrest, took an even harder line.

“This is no longer a rights movement,” the official told Al Jazeera, requesting anonymity since he was not allowed to speak to the media, adding that the protesters were not only “challenging the authority of the state”, but also provoking the public through “inflammatory speeches and actions”.

Who holds power?

In mid-July, JAAC leader Umar Nazir Kashmiri told supporters at a sit-in in Rawalakot, Poonch division, that the group had written directly to army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir after concluding that its concerns were not reaching him “through official channels”.

He thanked Munir by name for “understanding the grievances of the people of Kashmir”.

Shaheen was more direct. “We believe real authority currently sits with Rawalpindi,” he told Al Jazeera, referring to Pakistan’s military establishment rather than the civilian government. “That’s why we’re forced to negotiate through that channel, since nobody else actually holds the authority.”

Ershad Mahmud, a Canada-based researcher on Kashmiri displacement and politics, said that “Islamabad’s bureaucracy, military and intelligence establishment have reduced AJK’s elected leadership to a largely symbolic role”.

The current crisis, he told Al Jazeera, has once again shown that the local leadership “lacks the authority to negotiate a political settlement with its own people”.

Unmet promise?

The dispute over the refugee seats is unfolding within a framework that predates Pakistan-administered Kashmir itself.

Under a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolution adopted on January 5, 1949, and endorsed by the UN Security Council, Kashmir’s final status was to be determined “through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite”.

Nearly 80 years later, that has yet to happen on either side of the Line of Control.

Mahmud, who is also the author of Poonch: Identity, Politics and Resistance, argues the refugee seats endure partly because they continue to serve Islamabad’s interests.

“They let Pakistan maintain its position that AJK represents the entire former State of Jammu and Kashmir, not merely the territory it administers,” he told Al Jazeera. “And allows Pakistan-based political parties to influence government formation in Muzaffarabad.”

Islamabad, he said, treats the seats “as an instrument of its Kashmir policy and political influence”.

Hassan Kamal Wattoo, a Lahore-based constitutional lawyer, argues that giving greater autonomy to AJK “strengthens Pakistan’s case on the international stage”.

“There is no tension between real autonomy for AJK and an eventual plebiscite,” he told Al Jazeera.

Anam Zakaria, a historian and author of Between the Great Divide: A Journey into Pakistan-Administered Kashmir, however, argued that there was a deeper contradiction within AJK’s constitutional framework.

On the one hand lies India’s “longstanding and ongoing systemic violence and human rights abuses in [Indian-administered] Kashmir”, she said, arguing that nothing Pakistan has done or does in the part of Kashmir it administers can be compared with what’s happened in Indian-administered Kashmir, where tens of thousands of people have been killed in violence involving armed rebels and security forces since 1989.

At the same time, she pointed out, candidates seeking public office in Pakistan-administered Kashmir must first swear allegiance to AJK’s accession to Pakistan.

That requirement, she told Al Jazeera, also “in itself contradicts the right to self-determination” and sidelines Kashmiris who hold a different vision for the region’s future.

The Question Islamabad Has Not Answered

On the night of 16 March 2026, Pakistani warplanes struck a walled compound in Kabul’s ninth police district. Afghan officials say more than four hundred people died. The United Nations mission in Afghanistan has independently confirmed at least two hundred and sixty nine deaths and some one hundred and twenty injuries. Islamabad’s account was simple: the site held ammunition and military infrastructure, and any civilian harm followed from secondary explosions rather than the strike itself. Four months later, Amnesty International published an investigation reaching the opposite conclusion, built not on Taliban testimony but on satellite imagery spanning three years, verified video, and independent geolocation of the wreckage. On 9 July, Amnesty asked Pakistan’s foreign ministry for the evidence behind its military target claim. As of publication, no response has arrived. That silence, more than any single photograph, is now doing the analytical work in this dispute.

A Conflict Escalating Since October

The Omid strike did not occur in isolation. Cross border hostilities between Pakistan and the Taliban administration have intensified since October 2025, and the UN mission in Afghanistan has documented more than seven hundred and fifty civilian casualties in the first three months of 2026 alone, spread across a series of Pakistani air operations against targets it describes as militant infrastructure. The Omid center, a drug rehabilitation facility expanded after 2021 to house roughly two thousand patients, was neither obscure nor newly built. Its treatment programs featured in a 2023 Al Jazeera documentary, and signage identifying the site as a medical facility was visible above its main gate. This is the backdrop against which the competing claims about the March strike have to be weighed. It is a theatre where verification has become as contested as the fighting itself, and where each side’s evidentiary standard has become a proxy for its wider legitimacy claim.

How Open Source Evidence Reshaped the Dispute

The strongest version of Pakistan’s position would rest on operational intelligence unavailable to outside observers: a genuine military use of the site that satellite imagery and testimony could not capture, perhaps weapons storage concealed within a facility that also treated patients. That is a coherent claim in the abstract, and cross border conflicts involving non state or quasi state administrations often do see dual use of civilian infrastructure. The problem for Islamabad is not that this claim is inherently implausible. It is that four months of opportunity to substantiate it, including a direct written request from an investigating body, has produced silence rather than documentation.

Set against that silence is a body of evidence that does not depend on Taliban cooperation. Amnesty’s investigators analysed satellite imagery of the compound from April 2023 through 15 March 2026, tracking the site’s physical layout and, in imagery from just three days before the strike, the presence of large numbers of people in the patient and administrative areas. A video recorded in 2025 and verified by the organisation shows the interior housing arrangements for patients. Separately, and this is the detail that most changes the analytical picture, broadcast journalists reviewing Pakistan’s own released strike footage identified at least four buildings struck with guided munitions, while a conflict researcher affiliated with the open source investigation group Bellingcat independently geolocated the strikes to the rehabilitation center’s buildings using imagery unconnected to either Amnesty or the Taliban administration.

This matters because it breaks the framing in which the dispute is simply Pakistan’s word against an adversary regime’s word. Geolocation from Pakistan’s own footage and independent satellite analysis are not Taliban sources, and they are not filtered through UNAMA’s access constraints in Afghanistan, real as those constraints are. A rigorous critique of Amnesty’s methodology would need to engage with this layer of evidence directly rather than treating the investigation as resting solely on interviews inside Afghanistan. It does not.

None of this settles the question of what Pakistani planners believed they were targeting at the moment of the strike, which is a distinct question from what the site actually was. Precision guided strikes can be aimed at accurate coordinates built on flawed intelligence, and an honest accounting of the incident would distinguish between deliberate targeting of a known medical facility and a targeting failure rooted in faulty threat assessment. Pakistan’s silence forecloses that distinction rather than resolving it in its own favour. A government confident in a genuine intelligence failure, as opposed to a deliberate strike, has strong incentive to say so, since the reputational and legal exposure of the two scenarios differs sharply. The absence of any account, four months on, is itself informative.

There is a genuine access problem in Afghanistan that deserves acknowledgment rather than dismissal. Restrictions on UN personnel operating inside the country, including limits on female staff, have long constrained what any investigating body can independently confirm through interviews on the ground. That constraint is real and worth stating plainly. But it is analytically distinct from the evidentiary chain that actually carries this case, since satellite archives, geolocation of released military footage, and broadcast forensic review do not depend on access to Afghan territory at all. Conflating the two, treating a legitimate critique of ground level access with a wholesale dismissal of imagery based verification, is where the strongest version of Pakistan’s defence collapses into a weaker one. Under international humanitarian law, the burden of demonstrating that a strike met the tests of distinction, precaution and proportionality sits with the party that carried it out, not with the investigating organisation. Silence does not discharge that burden. It simply leaves the imagery based record as the only account on file.

The Stakes Beyond One Strike

This dispute reaches well past the fate of one investigation into one strike. Pakistan is not a party to the Rome Statute, and the UN Security Council has shown no appetite for a binding inquiry into cross border strikes in Afghanistan, leaving no institution with the authority to compel either side toward resolution. Into that vacuum, open source verification, satellite archives, independent geolocation, forensic review of released military footage, has effectively become the closest available substitute for enforcement, even though it carries no legal power to compel compliance or impose consequences. How this case resolves, or fails to resolve, will help set the operating norm for a growing number of asymmetric conflicts in which a state conducts cross border strikes against a non state or quasi state administration controlling the affected population. If credible, independently corroborated evidence of civilian harm at a protected medical site produces no formal accountability, the lesson other militaries draw from this dispute will be that silence is a survivable strategy, and that the proportionality and precaution requirements of international humanitarian law can be managed through delay rather than compliance. That is the systemic risk this case actually tests, well beyond the question of what happened at one rehabilitation centre in March.

Three Paths From Here

Three trajectories are plausible over the coming months, none of them mutually exclusive in sequence.

The likeliest path, on available evidence, is continued silence accompanied by informal briefings to allied capitals disputing Amnesty’s methodology without engaging its strongest evidentiary points, particularly the independent geolocation. This preserves ambiguity domestically while avoiding a formal admission that could carry legal exposure under international humanitarian law. It is a moderately likely outcome, on the order of an even chance or somewhat better given precedent in comparable disputes involving other militaries.

A less likely but plausible path is a formal Pakistani rebuttal that engages directly with the satellite and geolocation evidence, offering an alternative account of what the imagery shows or asserting an intelligence failure rather than deliberate targeting. This would be the more legally cautious route and would represent a meaningful shift from the current posture. Call this a modest possibility, distinctly less likely than continued silence but not remote.

The least likely path in the near term is a referral to an international investigative mechanism with independent access, given both Pakistan’s incentive to avoid binding scrutiny and the Taliban administration’s own resistance to international access inside Afghanistan, which cuts against any process requiring cooperation from both sides. This remains a low probability outcome absent significant diplomatic pressure from third parties with leverage over Islamabad.

The clearest near term indicator to watch is whether Pakistan’s foreign ministry issues any substantive written response to Amnesty’s evidentiary request before the anniversary of the strike in March 2027. A specific, documented reply, even one contesting the findings, would mark a break from the pattern observed since March. Continued non response through that date would itself be a data point confirming the first scenario.

The Precedent Being Set

What is being tested in Kabul is not only one contested strike but the durability of official denial once satellite archives, geolocation researchers, and broadcast forensic review become standard evidentiary tools in conflicts fought behind restricted access. For Western policy planners, the operative signal is the widening gap between what open source verification can now establish and what official statements are willing to confirm, a gap increasingly shaping how allied governments calibrate cooperation. For investors reading South Asian risk, cross border escalation between Islamabad and Kabul remains an active, under priced variable, with legal exposure now harder for militaries to contain through silence alone. For rights and development organisations, the case is a template for how methodology itself becomes the battleground before accountability is even reached.

Silence was once a viable strategy for governments awaiting the news cycle to move on. Satellites do not move on.

Indian authorities release the two men after years in prison although both remain under tight court-imposed restrictions.

Indian authorities have released prominent Kashmiri human rights activist Khurram Parvez and journalist Irfan Mehraj on bail after years in prison on “terrorism” financing charges although both remain under tight court-imposed restrictions.

The two men walked free from a New Delhi jail late on Wednesday, their relatives said, as India’s National Investigation Agency seeks to overturn their bail – the latest chapter in what rights groups call New Delhi’s sweeping crackdown on activists, journalists and dissidents in India-administered Kashmir since 2019 when it scrapped the region’s autonomy, granted under the Indian Constitution.

Parvez, programme coordinator for the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS), was arrested in 2021 by the National Investigation Agency at his home in Srinagar.

Mehraj, a freelance journalist who worked with the same rights group as a researcher, was arrested in 2023.

Both face charges of “funding terrorism” and “propagation of secessionist agenda” under India’s stringent “antiterrorism” laws, which in effect allow authorities to hold people without trial indefinitely.

The National Investigation Agency accuses the two of using the JKCCS to fund militant-linked activities and promote a separatist agenda. Both men deny the allegations.

A lower court granted them bail last week, but the agency appealed. The Delhi High Court refused on Tuesday to suspend the release order although it imposed tougher restrictions on the men’s movements and activities while it hears the appeal.

Under their bail conditions, the two must arrange their own stay in the capital, where they are facing trial, and cannot travel to Kashmir, according to a court document seen by the news agency AFP. Proceedings in the case will continue in the coming weeks.

Human rights violations

The JKCCS has for decades documented alleged rights violations by Indian government forces in Kashmir, including torture and unlawful killings, and has drawn attention to thousands of unmarked graves in border areas suspected of holding victims of “enforced disappearances”.

International rights groups, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, have consistently called for the men’s release, saying they were jailed for their work.

In 2023, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention said Parvez’s arrest was an “act of reprisal for his human rights work, and an attempt to silence him and Kashmiri civil society as a whole”.

After their release, the Paris-based International Federation for Human Rights and the World Organisation Against Torture said the two were arrested on “trumped-up charges” and called on Indian authorities to drop the case, describing the proceedings as politically motivated.

Journalists in Indian-administered Kashmir say they have faced harassment and arrests since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government annulled the region’s partial autonomy.

From 2019 to 2023, more than 3,600 people were arrested there under “antiterrorism” laws, more than half of whom remain in prison, according to government figures.

Muslim-majority Kashmir has been divided between India and Pakistan since their independence from British rule in 1947. Both countries claim the territory in full.

Rebel groups have fought the Indian government since 1989, demanding independence or a merger with Pakistan. The conflict has killed tens of thousands of people, mostly civilians.

Muzaffarabad, Pakistan-administered Kashmir: The traffic crawled beneath densely strung election bunting.

Overhead hung the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz’s (PMLN) green tigers. Further down, Pakistan Peoples Party’s (PPP) red and black flags bearing the party’s arrow encircled the clock tower at Lal Chowk, a square near Muzaffarabad’s main market, built to honour the original Lal Chowk across the Line of Control in Indian-administered Kashmir’s Srinagar.

Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, does not look like a city in the grip of a crisis. It looks like a city preparing for an election.

Both are true.

Since early June, the territory has witnessed weeks of protests and sit-ins that have killed dozens. The protests are tied to elections for the region’s provincial legislature that were scheduled for July 27, but that on Monday were divided into voting now to be held on three separate days. Voting in the region’s Mirpur division will continue as planned on July 27. Elections in Poonch division, which has been the hotbed of protests, will now be held on August 10.

Voting in Muzaffarabad and for 12 other seats reserved for refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir who now live elsewhere in Pakistan will be held on August 2, the region’s Chief Election Commissioner Justice (retired) Ghulam Mustafa Mughal told Al Jazeera, citing security concerns arising from the unrest as the reason for the changed schedule.

It is those reserved seats for refugees that are at the heart of the agitation, with protesters demanding that they be scrapped, arguing that only those living in Pakistan-administered Kashmir should now be eligible to contest in elections to the regional legislature.

And it is in the backdrop of those tensions that the region is now readying to vote.

“I have never joined them, I never participated in their protest,” a 60-year-old driver, bespectacled and bearded, said of the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC), commonly known as JAAC, the movement whose protests have dominated the politics of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, particularly Poonch division, in recent months.

“But my only reason to support them is that all the people in this movement are poor people, my sympathies are with them. They are the ones fighting and demanding for my rights,” the driver, who requested anonymity, told Al Jazeera, as he finished his lunch at a roadside hotel in Muzaffarabad on July 20.

When it came to the election, however, he was unequivocal: he would not vote.

“We should be part of the democratic process, but the person you want to vote for isn’t allowed on the ballot,” he said, referring to the JAAC, which was banned in June. “A vote is a responsibility, and it should only be given to those who deserve it. Right now the candidates on offer are all corrupt, and I will not be giving my vote.”

An election amid unrest

The Kashmir region, a scenic but disputed Himalayan territory, has been at the centre of multiple wars between Pakistan and India since both gained independence from British rule in 1947.

While both countries claim the region in full, they administer separate parts of it.

Home to more than four million people, Pakistan-administered Kashmir, locally known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), has a semi-autonomous government with its own president, prime minister and Supreme Court.

The election was always going to be shaped by the latest crisis, JAAC’s fifth major mobilisation since the movement was founded in September 2023.

But Mughal, AJK’s chief election commissioner, said Poonch was the only division where, he said, “we have a bit of security-related concern”.

He is not the only official insisting the electoral process remains on track.

In Muzaffarabad, Deputy Commissioner Munir Qureshi pointed to bustling markets, heavy traffic and an active campaign trail as evidence that daily life continues largely uninterrupted.

“It is not our job to tell people to go and vote,” he said. “If they decide, for whatever reason, not to show up, it is their democratic right.”

The city, he added, has five constituencies and 890 polling stations, with additional security personnel requested ahead of polling day.

What neither official addressed directly, however, is the absent party hanging over the election.

The banned JAAC is absent from the ballot in any form. Some of its members who attempted to contest as independents had their nomination papers rejected.

The movement’s sit-ins have entered their second month across Rawalakot, Sudhnoti and other parts of Poonch division, closer to the Indian border, while its leadership has openly urged the public to boycott the vote.

How the region votes – or not – will tell whether the election carries legitimacy in the eyes of the people of AJK.

A movement outside the ballot box

The protests that have shaped this election began more than two years ago over prices.

JAAC was formed in 2023 around 10 demands, including subsidised wheat, cheaper electricity, and a government commitment to curb the perks and pensions enjoyed by AJK officials and elected representatives.

The Pakistani government intervened in May 2024, agreeing to provide subsidies, while a charter of demands signed by the AJK government in October that year was intended to resolve most of the movement’s concerns.

By this June, however, JAAC’s focus had shifted to the 12 assembly seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees settled in Pakistan, which it wants abolished.

The group argues the seats give outsiders influence over AJK’s governance and budget, while residents themselves have no say over who occupies them.

On June 5, the AJK government declared JAAC a proscribed organisation under anti-terrorism legislation ahead of a planned June 9 protest, just weeks before the election.

Within days, police had arrested dozens of JAAC members and supporters, including the movement’s leader and public face, Shaukat Nawaz Mir.

What followed was the deadliest period of unrest AJK has witnessed in years.

The death toll remains disputed by JAAC and the authorities, but even conservative estimates place it at nearly 30 people since early June, including protesters and law enforcement personnel.

Access to Pakistan-administered Kashmir was also restricted, with entry into Poonch division almost entirely blocked for weeks, disrupting supplies of flour and other essential goods to a region dependent on routes from Muzaffarabad and Mirpur.

Banks remained closed for two weeks, leaving residents without access to cash. Mobile and fibre internet services have also remained suspended across almost the entire territory, with exceptions only for banks and a handful of government offices, including district administrations and the Election Commission.

And the Election Commission itself has become an institution whose role faces questions from the JAAC.

Sardar Amanullah, a JAAC member from Sudhnoti district in Poonch division, more than 155km (96 miles) south of Muzaffarabad, said he had submitted nomination papers as an independent candidate, only for them to be rejected.

“I don’t think these are free and fair elections,” he said. “When you cannot let people’s representation out there, the government keeps finding ways to reject our papers,” he told Al Jazeera.

Chief Election Commissioner Mughal offered a different account.

“There were only two or three people who submitted their nomination papers, who claim to be affiliated with JAAC, and their papers were rejected by the returning officer since their names were mentioned in FIRs and the Fourth Schedule,” he said, referring to police reports and Pakistan’s anti-terrorism watchlist.

Abid Shaheen, a JAAC core committee member from Bagh district, was more blunt. With the group now proscribed, he described the vote as “a selection, not an election”.

A dozen seats, one dispute

Of the AJK Legislative Assembly’s 45 general seats, 12 are reserved for Kashmiri refugees who settled in Pakistan after 1947: six linked to Jammu and six to the Kashmir Valley.

The arrangement dates back to legislation introduced in the 1960s and was later entrenched in AJK’s 1974 Interim Constitution.

In June, the AJK Supreme Court, ruling on a presidential reference, held that the seats could only be abolished through a formal constitutional amendment passed by the assembly, not through public protest.

AJK’s electorate has grown from just over 3.2 million in 2021 to more than 3.8 million this year, according to Election Commission figures.

Within that, the 12 refugee constituencies alone have expanded from about 405,000 voters to nearly 439,000. JAAC argues that the increase has further amplified the influence of seats that were never intended to carry such political weight.

Since AJK adopted its current parliamentary system in 1975, all 10 general elections have produced governments aligned with the party in power in Islamabad.

Zulfiqar Ali, a Muzaffarabad-based political analyst, argued that the seats themselves have rarely determined who governs AJK.

“Across all the governments AJK has had, these 12 seats have played no significant role in actually making or breaking a government,” he said. “That role has always belonged to native AJK politicians, or whichever party holds federal power in Islamabad.”

Islamabad, meanwhile, has shown little interest in rethinking the refugee seats.

Defence Minister Khawaja Asif told the National Assembly last month that abolishing the seats under pressure from street protests would amount to “sabotaging the electoral process”.

The campaign that resumed late

For the parties actually on the ballot, the crisis all but wiped out campaigning in June.

“Frankly speaking, the campaigning was dead due to the protests all June,” said Iftikhar Gillani, a PMLN candidate contesting from Muzaffarabad.

“The campaign only picked up in the last few days,” Gillani told Al Jazeera after meeting supporters at a polling station on July 20, where government officials were casting advance ballots.

Dressed in a white shalwar kameez and repeatedly wiping his face with a tissue on a severely humid Monday afternoon, Gillani argued that many Kashmiris distinguish between supporting JAAC and participating in the election, even if some committed supporters may stay away from the polls.

“People here are cognisant of the importance of the election and understand that they don’t have to mix their support for JAAC with their responsibility to participate in the polls,” he said. “But there is obviously no denying that there is a chunk of the population which fully believes in JAAC, and they might not cast their votes.”

A 28-year-old PMLN activist, who requested anonymity to speak candidly, said the internet shutdown had forced campaign workers to abandon social media in favour of door-to-door canvassing and loudspeakers mounted on vehicles to publicise the party’s manifesto.

But, he added, the election had also exposed social divisions unlike any he had witnessed before, fuelled by the JAAC-led protests.

“Families are divided over this,” he said. “Those who don’t support JAAC are being called supporters of our oppressors.”

The PPP, which currently governs Pakistan-administered Kashmir, has maintained the more visible street presence.

Its flags dominate Lal Chowk, and a Saturday night corner meeting near the square drew a crowd of supporters waving the party’s arrow banner close to midnight.

But Sardar Mukhtar, a PPP candidate in Muzaffarabad, acknowledged the changed mood.

“The campaign environment is not like previously. I personally feel that turnout might not be as strong as in the past,” he told Al Jazeera from his camp office, where party workers crowded in to catch a glimpse of the candidate.

The party’s clearest position has come from its chairman.

In a letter to JAAC’s negotiating committee last week, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari proposed establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to “examine the present situation, establish the relevant facts, consider the grievances and positions of all sides”.

He also urged JAAC to suspend its protest once such a commission was agreed, while calling on the state to halt further action pending its findings.

Bilawal is scheduled to address a public rally in Muzaffarabad on July 24.

AJK’s Prime Minister Faisal Mumtaz Rathore, the PPP’s most senior leader in the territory, has been more measured on the campaign trail, telling reporters after the revised election schedule was announced only that “the current environment is not suitable for the state” and that “problems can only be solved through dialogue”.

In the region’s legislature, he has previously said that the JAAC bears “the primary responsibility for this situation,” while conceding that “we have not absolved ourselves of responsibility as a government”.

What the election can’t fix

For Ali, the Muzaffarabad-based political analyst, the real issue lies not in the vote itself but in everything that has unfolded over the past few years.

He pointed to commitments the government made to JAAC in October 2024 that remain unfulfilled, including promises to devolve development budgets to local councillors and eliminate the perks and privileges enjoyed by politicians.

“However, people will vote,” he told Al Jazeera. “Because the entire system is designed in a certain way, tying government jobs and small favours to elected representatives. So turnout will be fine, but it will not resolve people’s fury and anger.”

Ershad Mahmud, a Canada-based researcher and author of Poonch: Identity, Politics and Resistance, sees the problem differently, arguing that the election is diminished by who is missing from the ballot.

“PTI did win last time, and they have significant following, as well as JAAC,” he said, referring to Imran Khan-founded Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, which ruled Pakistan from 2018 to 2022 before being ousted through a vote of no confidence.

PTI also formed the AJK government after the 2021 election, but since 2023 the territory has had four prime ministers.

Mahmud argued that with two major democratic forces absent from the contest, many voters will stay away as well.

“I don’t think this election will be seen as legitimate. The distance from Muzaffarabad to Islamabad is more than 120km [75 miles]. But the mental distance is now 1,000km [621 miles],” he told Al Jazeera.

An uncertain verdict

However, not everyone has reached the same conclusion.

Muhammad Ramzan, a property dealer from Mirpur division in the south of the territory, supported JAAC when its demands centred on subsidised wheat and lower electricity prices.

His support cooled once the movement shifted its focus to abolishing the 12 refugee seats, a campaign he considers disconnected from the concerns of residents and his own livelihood.

“Even I am curious,” he said. “Earlier they asked for roads or electricity or school, but now that they have changed their focus to 12 seats, I am flabbergasted why would they do that.”

He intends to vote, although he expects turnout to fall, with much of the boycott driven by younger voters aged between 18 and 35 who remain committed to JAAC.

“There are a lot of people like me,” he said, describing his gradual drift away from the movement.

But he remains doubtful that the election will resolve the crisis.

“I fear that things will go bad,” he said quietly.

In the United Arab Emirates, women hold half of all parliamentary seats, a threshold reached by only six national legislatures on Earth. In Afghanistan, a fellow member of the same fifty seven nation bloc, girls are barred by law from any education beyond primary school, the only country where that is true. On July 12 and 13, 2026, delegates from all fifty seven states gathered in Islamabad to adopt a single shared declaration on women’s empowerment. The distance between those two realities is the actual subject the declaration had to confront, whether its authors framed it that way or not.

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation represents fifty seven states and close to 1.9 billion people, a demographic scale matched by few multilateral bodies. What it conspicuously lacks is a shared starting point on gender equality, and the scale of that lack is easy to understate until the two ends of the distribution are placed side by side. The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2025 ranks the United Arab Emirates 69th of 146 economies overall, with full parliamentary parity and women occupying nearly two thirds of federal leadership roles. It ranks Bangladesh 24th of 148, the strongest performer in South Asia for a second consecutive year, having closed 73 percent of its overall gender gap after decades of expanding a legislative quota from 7 percent of seats to 30. At the opposite pole, three of the only five economies anywhere in the world governed by an entirely male cabinet, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, are OIC members, and Oman remains the sole national parliament on the planet with no women seated in it at all. Afghanistan sits outside even that range. It is the only country on Earth barring girls from secondary and higher education by law, a policy that currently excludes close to 2.2 million girls from formal schooling altogether.

This is the span the Islamabad Declaration was written into, and it is worth pausing on what that span actually implies. A framework broad enough to be endorsed by both Abu Dhabi and Kabul’s immediate neighbors within the same bloc can, almost by construction, say very little about what any single government is actually required to do. Language capacious enough to cover a country with full parliamentary parity and a country that bars girls from secondary school is language calibrated for consensus, not for consequence. The more useful question, then, is not whether the declaration reads as ambitious, most instruments of this kind do, but whether the bloc has built, or shows any sign of building, a mechanism capable of moving its weakest performers rather than simply narrating the achievements of its strongest.

Where the record earns genuine credit

Some of what the OIC claims for itself withstands scrutiny, and is worth crediting on its own terms rather than dissolved into a general skepticism about summit diplomacy. Female enrollment in tertiary education has expanded meaningfully across member states, and the bloc’s own reporting places women at just over 39 percent of researchers across OIC countries, ahead of the roughly 34 percent global average. Maternal and child health outcomes have improved alongside it. But the most persuasive evidence for what actually moves the needle sits not in the declaration’s language but in the legislative record beneath it. Global data from the Inter Parliamentary Union shows that countries employing electoral quotas elected women at a rate of 31.2 percent in 2024, against 16.8 percent in countries without them, a gap of nearly two to one that survives across regions and income levels. Bangladesh’s own trajectory, from a 7 percent quota to 30, tracks that pattern almost precisely, and the United Arab Emirates reached full parliamentary parity through a comparable top down legal commitment rather than the slow accretion of social change. Where OIC member states have adopted binding, specific instruments, quotas above all others, the results are visible and replicable in the data. That is a genuine and transferable finding, and it rests on firmer ground than most of the rhetoric surrounding it.

The economic weakness the whole bloc shares, to varying degrees

Set the political headlines aside and the bloc’s collective vulnerability comes into sharper focus around economic participation. The OIC’s own assessment puts female labor force participation across member states at roughly 41 percent against 76 percent for men, and estimates some 106 million young people across the bloc as neither employed, in education, nor in training, with young women disproportionately represented among them. Southern Asia, the region anchoring several of the OIC’s most populous members, registers the weakest economic participation score of any region tracked in the Global Gender Gap Report, a full thirty five points separating its best and worst performing economies from one another. Even the UAE and Bangladesh, the bloc’s clearest political success stories, have not resolved this dimension with anything like the completeness they have brought to representation, which suggests economic inclusion answers to different levers than legislative quotas do, and that the declaration’s language on finance, entrepreneurship, and employment access is, whether by design or accident, aimed at the harder of the bloc’s two structural problems.

The test the declaration cannot argue its way around

Afghanistan is where the claim that voluntary declarations carry real weight meets its sharpest and least forgiving test. At the same Islamabad conference, delegates stated plainly that the Taliban’s restrictions on women harm the image of Islam and are inconsistent with Islamic teaching, echoing an OIC position from previous years that described the restrictions as contrary to the faith the bloc exists to represent. The Muslim World League, the largest Islamic non governmental organization in the world, has separately and repeatedly urged the Taliban to reverse the bans. The response from Kabul has been unambiguous. Spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid has told international audiences that women’s rights are fully protected under the group’s interpretation of Sharia, and Taliban officials have characterized the education ban as an internal matter closed to outside comment, a position firm enough to have stalled unrelated talks over frozen central bank assets as recently as May 2026.

The stakes of this reach well beyond Afghanistan’s borders. If the bloc’s most unified and most theologically grounded criticism, the accusation that a member state’s policy is contrary to Islam itself, produces no observable change in that state’s conduct, it becomes a reasonable proxy for how much practical force softer, less unified language on labor force participation or quota adoption is likely to carry anywhere else in the bloc. The Islamabad Declaration has no enforcement mechanism for Afghanistan, and, tellingly, does not appear to need one in order to be adopted, since adoption requires only consensus on wording, not compliance with it.

Taking the structural counterargument seriously

There is a coherent case that expecting more than this from the OIC misreads what kind of institution it actually is. A consensus body spanning constitutional monarchies, parliamentary republics, and a Taliban administered emirate cannot plausibly issue binding standards on domestic labor law or family structure without member states either declining to sign or signing without any intention of compliance, an outcome arguably worse than the present voluntary model. Under this reading, the declaration’s proper function is to establish a shared reference point and let reputational pressure and peer example, the UAE and Bangladesh held up as internal proof of concept, do the work that binding law structurally cannot. The newly launched Islamabad Initiative on Women’s Digital Inclusion, a voluntary platform for digital literacy, entrepreneurship, and technology access, is built entirely on that theory of change: participation by choice rather than compliance by mandate. Judged against that more modest theory rather than against an enforcement standard it was never designed to meet, the declaration may be performing precisely as intended, and the fair critique is not that it fails at its stated purpose, but that its stated purpose may simply be too modest for the scale of the problem it describes.

Three paths from here

The most probable trajectory, roughly half of plausible outcomes by our estimate, is that the demonstration effect model continues largely undisturbed: the UAE and Bangladesh keep improving and are cited internally as proof the model works, the bloc’s lowest tier, Afghanistan most starkly, remains unmoved by rhetorical pressure however strongly it is worded, and the aggregate figures stay roughly flat because gains concentrated at the top fail to transmit downward through the distribution.

A second and less likely path, perhaps three in ten, sees middle tier member states, those possessing neither the UAE’s resources nor Afghanistan’s total exclusion, adopting elements of the proposed Gender Equality Dashboard or the digital inclusion platform in a genuine if partial way, narrowing the bloc’s middle even while its extremes remain fixed in place.

A third and least likely path, perhaps one in five, involves the range widening further still, driven by continuing instability among the bloc’s weakest performers, Afghanistan foremost among them but potentially compounded by conflict or governance stress elsewhere, at a pace that outstrips whatever gains the top and middle of the distribution manage to produce.

The indicator worth watching

The clearest available test is not whether the OIC issues further statements on Afghanistan, since it plainly will, but whether the Gender Equality Dashboard or the Digital Inclusion Initiative produces any actual, published, comparative country level data within the current reporting cycle. A voluntary framework that generates public comparison functions differently, in practice, from one that generates only communiques, since comparison is the mechanism from which reputational pressure, the model’s only real lever, actually derives. A second and narrower indicator is whether Afghanistan’s formal relationship with OIC gender programming registers any change whatsoever, even nominal engagement, as distinct from continued flat rejection, since that alone would be the first sign that unified religious framing carries weight the bloc’s other instruments do not.

What this means for institutional readers

For Western multilateral institutions and United Nations agencies, the OIC’s internal variance means that a single engagement strategy toward the bloc on gender issues is analytically weak on its face. The UAE and Bangladesh are credible technical partners on quota design and implementation, while engagement on Afghanistan specifically should continue to run primarily through humanitarian and human rights channels, given that the OIC’s own most unified criticism has already been tested there and found to carry no observable weight.

For investors and development finance institutions assessing exposure across OIC economies, a female labor force participation range running from roughly 22 percent to over 70 percent within a single fifty seven member bloc constitutes one of the more differentiated and independently checkable indicators available for human capital and productivity due diligence on any individual member state, and merits assessment country by country rather than reliance on the bloc’s aggregate language.

For rights focused organizations and donors, the quota evidence, 31.2 percent representation where legal quotas exist against 16.8 percent where they do not, is the single most defensible, causally grounded policy argument available to press within OIC forums, considerably more persuasive than the broader declaratory commitments on empowerment that lack a comparably rigorous evidentiary foundation.

Kashmir clashes have killed 31 since June, leading UN rights chief Volker Turk to appeal for calm

The United Nations human rights chief has called for an independent investigation into deadly unrest in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

On Friday, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Turk, urged Islamabad to launch “prompt, thorough and impartial investigations” into all civilian and security force deaths. At least 31 people have been killed in clashes since last month, in the run-up to regional elections at the end of this month.

The unrest has involved the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), an umbrella group of traders and activists.

While the movement initially formed to protest against rising food prices and utility tariffs, the current flashpoint centres on a legal dispute over legislative seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees. The JAAC demands the abolition of those seats, arguing they allow non-residents to alter local political outcomes.

UN officials expressed alarm over Pakistan’s decision to classify the JAAC as a proscribed “terrorist” organisation under domestic anti-terrorism laws.

The global body warned that utilising anti-terror mechanisms to criminalise peaceful assembly and enforce widespread internet blackouts raises severe freedom of association concerns.

The crisis has amplified the long-running diplomatic feud between nuclear-armed neighbours India and Pakistan, which have both claimed the disputed Himalayan territory in full since their independence in 1947.

According to the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, the crisis hit a deadly new peak on July 14 during intense clashes in the Poonch division, where security forces attempted to clear roadblocks ahead of a planned JAAC “long march” to Muzaffarabad. The escalation resulted in nine deaths – seven civil activists and two law enforcement officers.

Defending the state actions during the violence, Poonch Divisional Commissioner Waheed Khan told Reuters that protesters had blocked a security convoy and attacked officials. “Police and security officials responded in self-defence.”

In New Delhi, the Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said in an official statement released on Wednesday that the unrest was a “direct consequence of Pakistan’s decades-long systemic exploitation” of the region.

Turk has appealed for immediate calm, pushing for “meaningful and inclusive political dialogue” over security-led measures to defuse deep-seated grievances regarding regional autonomy and inflation.

The 14-team 2027 ODI tournament in Africa will have a Super Seven stage but no quarterfinals.

The International Cricket Council (ICC) has announced a revamped format for the men’s 2027 one-day international World Cup that could lead to an additional fixture between India and Pakistan.

The restructure, revealed on Wednesday, comes after concerns were expressed about the prospect of too many dead rubbers, which in turn would lead to sparse crowds at venues, and the number of foregone conclusions at the recent T20 World Cup.

While next year’s edition in Southern Africa remains a 14-team competition, the three lowest-ranked qualifiers will now take part in a preliminary round, and just one of them will progress to a 12-team main group stage.

That will now feature just two pools of six teams with a new “Super Seven” stage replacing the previous “Super Six” round robin.

Significantly, there will be no quarterfinals with the 50-over tournament denied the further jeopardy and interest that comes with an extra round of clear-cut knockout matches.

The ICC, however, insisted in a statement that the new ODI World Cup structure “creates greater context, competitiveness and consequence during the event”.

An additional team in the round-robin phase also increases the prospects of an extra match between India and Pakistan, who share a bitter rivalry that has been soured further in recent years.

The passion for cricket on the subcontinent, which in turn generates lucrative broadcast rights and huge commercial revenues for the ICC, makes a match between India and Pakistan the most valuable in the sport.

But India and Pakistan no longer meet outside ICC events as political tensions between the border nations mean they are in effect barred by their own governments from facing each other.

The last bilateral series India played in Pakistan was in 2006 (Test and ODI series).

Another change approved last week at the ICC’s annual board meeting in Edinburgh will see the next men’s T20 World Cup in 2028 remain a 20-team competition but with 10 sides qualifying from the group stage rather than eight.

The two best-performing teams in the “Super 10” will automatically secure a semifinal spot with a new eliminator stage to decide their opponents.

ICC loans Cricket West Indies $12.82m

In a separate announcement, the ICC said it had approved a $12.82m loan to Cricket West Indies (CWI) “to support the member board”.

Unlike other leading international cricket teams, the West Indies are a regional side, and the relative economic weakness of its constituent Caribbean islands and territories along with the travel distances involved puts the CWI at a considerable financial disadvantage compared with the “Big Three” of India, England and Australia.

During the recent women’s T20 World Cup in England, West Indies captain Hayley Matthews lamented an “unfair” funding ecosystem after her cash-strapped side’s eight-wicket semifinal thrashing by Australia.

“The reason we were so successful back in 2012 to 2016 is because women’s cricket was based off pure talent at that time,” Matthews said.

“The minute that investment comes into the picture, we’ve seen the gap widen a lot. … I feel like it’s a bit unfair sometimes.”

At least 28 people have been killed since protests began in June, as the region braces for a major protest march.

Islamabad, Pakistan – At least nine people were killed in clashes in Pakistan-administered Kashmir on Tuesday, as a planned protest march to the region’s capital, Muzaffarabad, temporarily stalled amid rising tensions.

Security personnel raided a house on the outskirts of Rawalakot town in the region’s Poonch district after receiving a tip-off about a weapons cache, but came under fire, officials said. An officer was killed.

In a separate clash in Sudhnoti district, protesters blocked a security convoy, which officials said came under a barrage of stones and gunfire. Seven protesters and a police officer were killed, according to authorities. Police officials have said that security personnel acted in self-defence.

Deadly protests have periodically rocked the region since the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a group that is leading a major protest movement, was proscribed under anti-terrorism laws on June 5.

Protesters wait in Rawalkot before march on Muzaffarabad

Meanwhile, protesters gathered under the JAAC’s umbrella were still in Rawalkot on Wednesday evening, despite announcing they would set off at 2pm on Wednesday, officials told Al Jazeera. The government has severely restricted internet and phone access in the region, making it harder to reach the protesters directly.

Munir Qureshi, deputy commissioner of Muzaffarabad, said the situation in the capital and surrounding areas was calm.

“Muzaffarabad and its adjoining areas are all clear, and there is no disturbance to public life,” he told Al Jazeera. “Internet access is limited due to the security situation, but otherwise the situation is normal and there is no protest or violence.”

Liaqat Ali Malik, inspector general of police for Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), told Al Jazeera the crowd in Rawalakot was estimated at between 3,000 and 4,000 people.

“There has been no violence today,” he said.

But tensions continue to simmer. The current unrest stems from a long-running dispute over political representation.

Political dispute

At the centre of the dispute are 12 seats in the region’s legislature reserved for Kashmiri refugees who migrated to Pakistan after 1947 and now live outside the region.

The JAAC argues the arrangement allows Pakistan-based political parties to influence the government of Pakistan-administered Kashmir while diverting development funds intended for the region.

Last month, the Supreme Court of the region ruled that the seats are constitutionally protected and cannot be abolished without a constitutional amendment, a decision that hardened the group’s protest campaign.

Elections in the region are scheduled for July 27.

At least 28 people have been killed since protests began on June 4, according to officials, while 79 have been injured.

Authorities said about 4,000 police and paramilitary personnel have been deployed across the region before the planned march to Muzaffarabad.

Khan, the Poonch commissioner, said marchers would not be allowed to pass through Rawalakot and would instead have to use mountain trails to reach Muzaffarabad.

Islamabad, Pakistan – A wooden panelled bookshelf behind him, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran, aimed at extending their ceasefire by creating a pathway towards long-term peace.

Sharif then held up the document for the cameras. That was June 17, the high point of a frenzied diplomatic effort led by Pakistan spanning weeks, which had culminated in the MoU that Sharif signed as a mediator.

Yet less than four weeks later, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, in just the past few days, issued two statements expressing “deep concern” over renewed US-Iran hostilities, with the MoU Islamabad had helped pull together seemingly in shreds.

On Monday morning, the US launched the latest in a series of attacks on Iran, which responded by firing missiles and drones at multiple Gulf and Arab nations that it blamed for hosting US military bases.

Hours later, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told reporters that mediators, including Pakistan, Qatar and Oman, remained engaged and were continuing their efforts, even as he warned that Iran would continue responding to what it viewed as US non-compliance with the MoU.

So far, those efforts have failed to slow down the fighting, even as Pakistan has pressed on with diplomatic outreach.

On Sunday, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar spoke by phone with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, telling him that dialogue and diplomacy remained “the only viable path” to resolving the crisis.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif also spoke to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on Friday, warning that “hard-earned” peace gains were at risk, while Dar held a separate call on Saturday with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud.

To many analysts, one question, above all, now stares at Pakistan and other mediators like Qatar: With the deep distrust between the US and Iran only further expanding following the new bout of fighting, can Islamabad or any other capital once again bring Washington and Tehran back to the negotiating table?

Repeated breakdowns

The renewed fighting marks at least the third occasion since the US-Iran ceasefire signed on April 8 appeared to have collapsed.

Days after that truce was agreed on, the breakdown of the first round of Islamabad talks led to the US imposing a naval blockade on Iranian ships in the Strait of Hormuz. The US and Iran both attacked ships in the days that followed.

Then, after the MoU was signed on June 17, Iran attacked several ships that it claimed were passing through the Strait of Hormuz without its permission, prompting another escalation with Washington.

But the Iranian tanker strikes last week appear to have raised tensions to new heights.

US attacks on Iran since then have hit at least 10 provinces, killing a soldier, several fishermen in the southern province of Hormozgan, and a firefighter in Sistan and Baluchestan, according to Iranian authorities.

A railway bridge on a trade corridor linking Iran with Central Asia and China was also struck, along with a bridge near Mashhad used by mourners travelling to former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s funeral.

The renewed hostilities have also pulled Qatar, a fellow mediator alongside Pakistan, more directly into the conflict. On Sunday, Iranian missiles and drones hit the Gulf state, with debris from interceptions injuring three people, including a child, according to Qatar’s Ministry of Interior.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has accused Washington of violating “nearly all parts” of the June agreement within 25 days of its signing, citing attacks on transport infrastructure and fishing vessels.

Baghaei said on Monday that Iran had “acted in good faith” throughout, but that “each time the other party has failed to meet its obligations, we did not uphold ours, and we will continue to act in this manner.”

Since the war began on February 28, Islamabad has played the role of mediator.

It hosted talks in April, the first time in four decades that US and Iranian officials sat in a room together.

Its army chief and interior minister have travelled to Tehran several times. In late March, Pakistan also helped secure a Chinese-backed peace framework alongside its own diplomatic efforts.

In June, it helped produce the MoU signed by Pezeshkian and US President Donald Trump, along with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, which was then discussed at the Burgenstock summit in Switzerland.

Yet analysts say Pakistan lacks the means to enforce the agreements it helps broker.

Javad Heiran-Nia, director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, said the MoU was never intended to resolve the underlying dispute.

“The MoU deferred key and substantive issues to future negotiations and functioned primarily as a tactical instrument to halt hostilities and reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping,” he told Al Jazeera.

Iran, he said, sees control of the waterway as “a strategic asset; not merely a coercive lever, but a deterrent tool”, and appears “prepared to accept the risk of war to preserve this strategic advantage”.

Mediators, he added, lack the instruments to resolve the dispute “unless a shift in the balance of power between Iran and the United States emerges as a result of limited military engagements”, pointing to a potential US naval blockade as one of the few developments that could alter the strategic calculus.

Dania Thafer, executive director of the Gulf International Forum in Doha, said Pakistan’s room for manoeuvre had narrowed as both sides hardened their positions over the strait.

“Pakistan is in a situation where it is highly dependent on both parties, as it always has been, but right now, Iran is bent on establishing its control over the Strait of Hormuz,” she told Al Jazeera.

According to Thafer, there is little Pakistan can do to de-escalate while both Washington and Tehran remain in “an escalatory phase”.

“Once they feel they have reached a point where the balance tips in favour of one side or the other, then perhaps they will return to the negotiating table,” she added.

But Qamar Cheema, head of the Islamabad-based Sanober Institute, pushed back on the idea that Pakistan is operating without real tools.

He pointed to US Vice President JD Vance’s recent remarks, where he credited Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir’s role in the process, as evidence that Islamabad’s military-diplomatic channel carries real weight in Washington.

Access itself, he argued, is the instrument.

“Pakistan enjoys trust, and that’s why both sides pick up the phone and call Pakistani leadership any time to remove a stumbling block,” Cheema told Al Jazeera.

Crowded diplomacy, narrowing options

But Pakistan has not been the only diplomatic channel, and according to Heiran-Nia, the dispute over the strait was never really Islamabad’s to mediate.

“Iran had previously removed the Strait of Hormuz issue from Pakistan’s mediation agenda, as the matter was essentially bilateral between Tehran and Muscat,” he said.

Tehran, he explained, did not want the issue to be “defined within a broader negotiation package under Pakistani auspices, which would have afforded Washington room for political manoeuvre”.

Direct Iran-Oman talks followed, but “US military pressure and economic sanctions threats against Oman have placed Muscat under considerable strain, preventing meaningful progress,” according to the Tehran-based analyst.

Meanwhile, he cautioned that Sunday’s attacks on Qatar “could have adverse effects on Qatar’s mediatory role”, although Doha “does not currently appear inclined to withdraw”, adding that “Iran should not assume that Doha’s patience is limitless.”

Mustafa Hyder Sayed, executive director of the Pakistan-China Institute in Islamabad, described the GCC states as caught in an uncomfortable position.

“The GCC countries are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. They want a functional relationship with Iran while not openly declining the use of their bases and territory by the United States, because they understand they cannot choose their neighbours,” he told Al Jazeera.

Meanwhile, Israel, which is not a party to the MoU, has continued military operations in Lebanon, which Tehran cites as an ongoing violation of the agreement.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz said on Saturday that southern Lebanon “would become Gaza”, raising the prospect of further regional escalation.

Who blinks first?

Despite a week of escalating attacks, the core dispute remains unchanged.

Washington and Tehran remain divided over the same issue that stalled negotiations even before the latest round of fighting: Who controls passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and under what conditions?

Iran insists the MoU gave it authority over transit through the waterway. The US disputes that.

On Monday, Trump announced that the US was reinstating a naval blockade of Iranian ships and would charge a 20 percent tariff on all other ships trying to pass through the strait.

Yet, earlier, a possible compromise had briefly emerged.

Heiran-Nia said the parties explored a formula under which commercial vessels would coordinate passage with both Iran and a designated Arab Gulf state, allowing “both parties [to] claim a degree of victory”.

The talks stalled before reaching a conclusion, however, interrupted by the funeral of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who was killed on the first day of the war in joint US-Israeli air strikes.

The conflict has since moved in the opposite direction, with military action aimed at shifting the balance of power rather than reviving negotiations.

“The prevailing trajectory now is the continuation of military strikes in an effort to shift the balance of power. Yet, there remains a risk that strategic calculations on either side could spiral beyond control,” Heiran-Nia said.

Thafer believes that, despite the violence, neither side has formally abandoned the MoU.

“Iran is framing this current round of escalation as a violation of the MoU rather than a reason to exit it, which means there could still be light at the end of the tunnel,” she said.

In her assessment, both sides bear responsibility for violating the agreement, from Iran’s attacks on shipping to Washington’s revocation of Iran’s oil sale licence and the military attacks. Yet the agreement remains, at least formally, in place.

Its future, she said, depends on which side ultimately gives ground over the strait. Iran retains what Thafer described as a “snapback capability” to disrupt shipping whenever it chooses.

“It is, militarily, very difficult to fully neutralise that Iranian capability. We will have to wait and see where the leverage finally sits,” she said.

Cheema, for his part, argued that Iran’s own conduct, more than any mediator’s diplomacy, is what will decide how this settles.

“Iranian authorities seem ambitious and aggressive, and are looking to take risks to project power, which makes it less likely that any agreement will reach a final conclusion. That means interventions from mediators will keep coming.”

With the passing of another government deadline for undocumented Afghans to leave, Pakistan has launched a new crackdown on thousands still living in the country.

In response to criticism, authorities say they are enforcing immigration laws and cite national security concerns.

Hundreds of thousands of Afghans have returned to a country they fled. The UN says they include undocumented migrants, refugees and Afghan citizen card holders.

The campaign has coincided with rising political tensions between Islamabad and Kabul.

But is politics involved in the rising tension between the neighbours? And how is Kabul dealing with the influx of returnees?

Presenter: Scott McLean

Guests:

Obaidullah Baheer – Adjunct lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan

Kamran Bokhari – Senior fellow with the Middle East Policy Council in Washington, DC

Zahid Mahmood – Pakistani defence analyst and former senior officer of the Pakistan Army

Strikes come a day after fighters armed with guns and explosives killed three soldiers in Karachi.

Pakistan’s security forces have carried out a ground operation and air strikes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in response to deadly attacks, killing 29 fighters, officials have said.

In a post on social media, Pakistani Minister of Information Attaullah Tarar said the operation was launched in response to multiple attacks by armed groups across the country.

“Three targets in Paktia, Paktika and Kunar were destroyed during precision strikes,” Tarar said on X, referring to three eastern Afghanistan provinces.

There was no immediate response from Afghanistan.

Pakistan has witnessed a surge in attacks targeting police and security forces in recent years.

Authorities have blamed the Pakistan Taliban, known by the acronym TTP, and allied armed groups for most of the violence.

It comes a day after fighters armed with guns and explosives targeted the regional headquarters of the paramilitary Rangers in the southern port city of Karachi, killing three soldiers.

Security forces killed three attackers and arrested another assailant, whom the military identified as an Afghan national in wounded condition.

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a breakaway faction of the Pakistan Taliban, claimed responsibility for the Karachi attack in a statement on Saturday night.

Tarar said Pakistan’s latest operation along the Afghan border targeted hideouts and safe havens of the Pakistan Taliban.

The Pakistan Taliban are a separate armed group from the Afghan Taliban, although the two are allies.

The Afghan Taliban returned to power in neighbouring Afghanistan in 2021.

The latest operations are likely to further strain the already tense relations between Islamabad and Kabul.

Sunday’s cross-border strikes and ground operation came less than three weeks after Pakistan’s military launched air strikes on what it said were fighter group hideouts in Afghanistan.

They ended about a month of relative calm following what Islamabad had described as an “open war” between the neighbouring countries, despite international efforts to broker a lasting peace.

The escalation follows months of tit-for-tat military action between the countries.

Hundreds of people have been killed in cross-border fighting since February, when Afghanistan launched retaliatory strikes after Pakistan carried out air strikes inside Afghan territory.

Multiple rounds of internationally mediated peace talks have failed to secure a lasting ceasefire.

China also hosted the two sides in April, and Beijing later said that Pakistan and Afghanistan had agreed not to escalate their conflict and to explore a solution.

Since last year, Pakistan has carried out multiple strikes along the border and inside Afghanistan, targeting alleged hideouts of the Pakistan Taliban and other armed groups.

Pakistan accuses Afghanistan’s Taliban government of harbouring fighters who carry out deadly attacks inside Pakistan, especially the Pakistan Taliban.

Kabul denies the accusations.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said Iran will not be permitted to charge tolls or fees for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz under any final agreement with Washington, exposing one of the biggest points of friction in negotiations aimed at ending months of conflict across the Middle East.

The dispute comes after Iran announced it would waive planned transit fees through the strait that crosses through its territorial waters for 60 days while talks with the United States continue in Switzerland, suggesting charges could be introduced once the negotiating period expires.

Washington and Tehran signed a preliminary agreement in Switzerland this week to halt hostilities and launched a 60-day diplomatic process focused on sanctions relief, Iran’s nuclear programme and the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz.

Pakistan, which helped mediate the talks alongside Qatar, has said negotiations to end the four-month US-Israel war on Iran are expected to resume early next week, likely on Tuesday.

The future of Hormuz has already emerged as a key sticking point after Iran effectively closed the waterway during the war, severely disrupting maritime traffic through one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints and causing the price of oil to soar.

In peacetime, one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas supplies are shipped for export by Gulf producers through the waterway.

In April, the US imposed a corresponding naval blockade on Iranian naval ports in a bid to stem Iranian oil exports.

While a number of ships have crossed through the strait since the US-Iran agreement was signed last week, uncertainty remains over whether Tehran intends to impose permanent fees or service charges on shipping operators using the route. Here’s what we know – and what else is happening in the Strait of Hormuz this week.

What are the US and Iran saying?

On Friday, Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) said planned fees for ships using the waterway would be suspended during the 60-day negotiation period established under the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed with the US.

Earlier this week, Iran and Oman said in a joint statement that they would study the future administration of the trade route as well as possible charges for services provided there, while maintaining their sovereignty claims over territorial waters bordering the strait.

Speaking at the start of a regional tour in the United Arab Emirates, Rubio rejected the idea of transit fees. “It’s an international waterway. No country is allowed to charge tolls or fees on an international waterway,” he said, adding that he believed “all the countries in this region would agree”.

Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, has signalled that Tehran views the post-war arrangement as fundamentally different from the status quo that existed before the conflict, however. Experts also say that Iran will not give up control of the strait, which has proved to be its greatest point of leverage in the conflict with the US.

“Hormuz will never return” to its prewar status, Ghalibaf said, despite both sides agreeing on Monday to establish “communication mechanisms” aimed at keeping the waterway open.

What does international law say?

International law protects the right of transit through strategic waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz, preventing coastal states from imposing explicit tolls simply for passage through international shipping lanes, even when they are passing solely through territorial waters.

However, countries can charge for specific services, including inspections, navigation assistance, security measures and certain insurance-related requirements, insurance experts say.

Examples include fees associated with transit through the Suez Canal and Panama Canal, as well as some services provided in Turkiye’s Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.

Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, an economist at Germany’s Philipps-Universitat Marburg, told Al Jazeera last month that Iran, like Turkiye, could justify a negotiated mechanism for transit fees or service-based contributions through natural straits as payment for maintaining a safe passageway, reducing environmental risks and providing predictability in a waterway that supports global energy, food and technology supply chains.

A key difference, however, is that while those waterways pass through the territory of a single state in each case, the Strait of Hormuz passes through the territorial waters of both Iran and Oman, while also connecting to waters used by the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf states.

“This sort of arrangement is unprecedented, and there would not be such an outcome, unless there is a complete coordination between the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries and Iran, with the approval of major international powers, such as China and the United States,” Nader Habibi, an Iranian American economist, told Al Jazeera.

How many ships are getting through the strait now?

Ship movements through the Strait of Hormuz remain well below prewar levels, when between 120 and 140 ships transited the passage each day, including tankers carrying about 20 million barrels of oil from the Gulf.

As the strait begins to open up, Oman says it is working with the United Nations’ International Maritime Organization (IMO) on temporary arrangements to facilitate safe transit through the strait, launching an operation to evacuate more than 11,000 sailors stranded in the area after the conflict left hundreds of vessels trapped for months.

Traffic through the strait has also been held back by ongoing concerns about the possible presence of sea mines in the central shipping channels used by international vessels before the war.

The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC), which includes representatives from the US and other maritime partners, has warned ships to avoid the area “due to the existence of mines”.

Other countries, including Japan, are currently weighing up whether to send ships to help with efforts to remove mines from the strait.

While Iran has never confirmed the presence of mines in the strait, when it first issued a map of the waterway for vessels it had approved for transit while the conflict was ongoing, it ordered ships to pass close to its coast to avoid possible mines. Ships had previously passed much closer to the coast of Oman.

The graphic below illustrates how much shipping through the strait dropped off as a result of the US-Israel war on Iran.

Could the dispute over strait fees derail a peace deal?

Mostafa Khoshcheshm, a professor at the University of Applied Sciences in Tehran, told Al Jazeera that Iran is unlikely to abandon plans to introduce long-term service fees in the strait.

“According to the MoU, Iran is not going to charge service fees for 60 days, but afterwards, Iran is definitely going to do that,” Khoshcheshm told Al Jazeera.

He said many Iranians were already unhappy that Tehran had agreed to suspend fees for the duration of the negotiating period.

“The money is not the real core of the issue,” he said. “The point here is how to impose your new protocols in the region. This is highly important for the Iranians.”

Cyrus Schayegh, professor of international history and politics at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told Al Jazeera the success of any new administrative arrangement would depend heavily on regional support.

“I think this is a very big question, and the biggest question is whether they will be able to sell it to the Emirates,” Schayegh told Al Jazeera.

“I think the Emirates will need to be involved in a really substantive way for any sort of new authority to actually work.”

More broadly, he said, the future of Hormuz forms part of a wider debate over Gulf security architecture following the war.

“It is only one piece of a much larger puzzle,” Schayegh said, adding that several regional states now accept that Iran has strengthened its deterrence capabilities following the conflict.

What other issues remain unresolved?

Hormuz is far from the only serious obstacle to a peace deal.

Questions also remain over the future of Iran’s nuclear programme, with Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, saying that access for international inspectors to nuclear facilities damaged during the war would only be addressed as part of a final agreement with Washington.

His comments came after US President Donald Trump claimed Iran had agreed to “the highest level” of nuclear inspections.

Iranian officials insist no commitments were made in Switzerland regarding Tehran’s nuclear programme and say they did not meet representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including Director-General Rafael Grossi.

Regional security remains another major source of disagreement, with Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz insisting Israeli forces will not withdraw from southern Lebanon “even if there is an American demand” to do so.

Meanwhile, Ghalibaf has identified the withdrawal of foreign military forces from the Middle East as one of Tehran’s strategic objectives in the negotiations.

The future of Iran’s frozen assets also remains a sticking point, with Trump indicating Washington is reluctant to release large sums of Iranian funds directly, arguing that money could ultimately benefit the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Instead, he has suggested a mechanism under which some funds would be used to purchase US goods.

“Food is desperately needed in Iran, and we will be purchasing it for them exclusively from the United States,” Trump said. Iran has not confirmed plans to do this.

Australia made it four wins from four at the ICC Women’s T20 World Cup after easing to a 113-run victory against Pakistan at Headingley, with the six-time winners on the verge of the semi-finals with one group match remaining.

READ MORE: Australia thrash Pakistan to edge closer to semis

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Pakistan hosts Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian after mediating the breakthrough US-Iran negotiations in Switzerland.

Islamabad, Pakistan – Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has alanded in Pakistan for a state visit – his first overseas trip since the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28.

His Pakistani counterpart Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar received the Iranian leader at a military base near capital Islamabad on Tuesday.

During his day-long visit, Pezeshkian, who is accompanied by a high-level delegation that includes ministers and senior officials, will hold talks with Sharif, and is also expected to meet with Zardari.

According to Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Senate Chairman Yousaf Raza Gilani, National Assembly Speaker Ayaz Sadiq, and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar will also call on the Iranian leader.

“During the visit, the two sides will review the full spectrum of bilateral relations and explore new avenues to further deepen cooperation across diverse sectors, including trade, energy, border security, people-to-people exchanges, and regional connectivity,” the ministry said in a statement on Monday.

Pezeshkian’s visit follows the crucial first round of talks between the United States and Iran, mediated by Pakistan and Qatar, in the Swiss city of Bürgenstock to end the war on Iran.

As part of the agreement, the US will release $12bn in frozen Iranian funds. The US has also announced a temporary easing of international sanctions on Iran, allowing it to sell its oil and petrochemicals until August 21. The talks concluded with a 60-day roadmap towards a final deal.

It is Pezeshkian’s second visit to Pakistan as president. His first, in August 2025, came days after the 12-day Iran-Israel war, and was also his first overseas trip following that conflict.

The visit is widely viewed as an expression of gratitude for Pakistan’s role in brokering the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, signed on June 18 by US President Donald Trump and Pezeshkian, with Prime Minister Sharif signing the document as a mediator.

The Islamabad MoU launched the formal diplomatic process now under way in Switzerland.

“The visit will also provide an important opportunity to discuss ongoing diplomatic engagements following the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, as well as regional and international developments of mutual interest,” Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in its statement.

The first round of US-Iran talks has ended with both sides agreeing on a roadmap towards a final deal to be reached ‘within 60 days’. Iran said the negotiations resulted in waivers for oil exports and the release of some frozen assets. The parties have also agreed to a ‘de-confliction cell’ to monitor the ceasefire in Lebanon.

US and Iranian delegations have arrived for high-level talks at a hotel in Switzerland. JD Vance, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Pakistani mediators, while Iranian officials including Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi and chief negotiator Bagher Ghalibaf met their Swiss hosts.