Pakistan

Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the top United States diplomat in Islamabad on Wednesday, hours after US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor described Indian-administered Kashmir as “an important part of India” during his first visit to the territory.

Islamabad rejected the remark and reasserted Kashmir’s status as disputed territory.

The visit by Gor, who also serves as President Donald Trump’s special envoy for South and Central Asia, was the first standalone trip by a serving US ambassador to Indian-administered Kashmir since 2019, and the first since India stripped the territory of its autonomy that year.

His remarks were made publicly, alongside Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, adding to Islamabad’s irritation.

The episode also comes at a delicate moment for Washington’s ties with both South Asian rivals, as Pakistan courts Trump’s administration more closely than it has in years, and as the US tries to balance that relationship against its strategic partnership with India.

So, what exactly did the US ambassador say, why has it caused such offence, and does it change anything? Al Jazeera explains.

What did the US ambassador say?

Sergio Gor, a 38-year-old former Trump aide who was confirmed as US ambassador to India in January, spent two days in Srinagar and Ladakh this week.

After meeting Abdullah in Srinagar, he told reporters he was thrilled to be visiting “an important part of India” for the first time.

He also said Washington was reconsidering its “do not travel” advisory, citing improved security under Abdullah’s administration.

The advisory at the moment places Jammu and Kashmir at a “Do Not Travel” level, citing terrorism and civil unrest, though it exempts the eastern territories of Ladakh and Leh.

Islamabad’s response came the same Wednesday evening. The Foreign Ministry summoned Charge d’Affaires Natalie Baker, who currently heads the US mission in the country.

The ministry lodged what it called a “strong demarche”, rejecting the “characterisation of Indian-administered Kashmir as a ‘part of India’” and reasserting it as an internationally recognised disputed territory awaiting final disposition under United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The statement called Gor’s remarks factually incorrect and said they negated Washington’s longstanding position on the dispute.

It also thanked Trump for his offer – made after India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire ending their four-day war last year – to help resolve the Kashmir question, urging Washington to keep its public language consistent with that position.

Why does Kashmir trigger such a reaction?

Kashmir is a Himalayan region claimed by both India and Pakistan since British colonial rule ended in August 1947.

India and Pakistan each administer part of the territory but claim it in full and have fought several wars over it.

A UN Security Council resolution passed in 1949 called for the territory’s final status to be decided by a plebiscite, which has never been held.

In June, European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas signed a joint statement with Pakistan’s foreign minister in Islamabad that bracketed Kashmir alongside the war in Ukraine and called for its resolution “through dialogue and diplomacy”.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs rejected the reference, saying those with no standing in the matter should refrain from commenting on it.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has drawn similar protests from Delhi at least twice after voicing support for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir.

Trump himself triggered a dispute in 2019 when, during a meeting with then-Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, he claimed Prime Minister Narendra Modi had personally asked him to mediate on Kashmir. Modi’s government swiftly denied the account in parliament.

For Pakistan, US language on Kashmir’s disputed status is an important external validation of its effort to internationalise the issue.

For India, meanwhile, any suggestion that Kashmir remains open to outside mediation cuts against the foundation of its position.

What has the US position been, historically?

The US has officially maintained that Kashmir is disputed and its status should be settled between India and Pakistan, taking into consideration the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

American officials have repeated some version of “our policy has not changed” across successive administrations, including in 2019, when a senior US diplomat told Congress that India’s move had not altered Washington’s view of the Line of Control as a “de facto” boundary.

Formally, Washington has avoided recognising sovereignty over the territory for either country.

A major turning point came in 1999, when President Bill Clinton told Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that Pakistani forces would have to withdraw from Kargil in Indian-administered Kashmir, following the fighting there between the two countries in the region.

Analysts widely saw the episode as the beginning of Washington’s tilt towards Delhi.

But after the two countries’ most intense clash in decades last year, Trump claimed credit for the ceasefire and offered to “work with you both” on a Kashmir “solution”.

Pakistan welcomed the offer and nominated Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize. India rejected suggestions of US mediation, saying the ceasefire had been reached through direct military talks.

Jauhar Saleem, Pakistan’s former foreign secretary and president of the Islamabad-based Institute of Regional Studies, told Al Jazeera that Gor’s remark should not be mistaken for a change in US policy.

“US policy on a question as consequential as Jammu and Kashmir cannot be read from an off-the-cuff formulation during a visit by a US ambassador posted in India,” Saleem said. “Any change in policy would be reflected in Washington’s formal statements, State Department language and, in fact, should be at the level of the White House.”

He said such lapses were not new.

“Sometimes ambassadors fall prey to what we call ‘localitis’, and in an attempt to please their hosts can make comments entirely out of line with their country’s stated policy, creating unpleasant situations,” he said. “This is a classic example and has therefore evoked an expected strong demarche from Pakistan’s Foreign Office.”

Saleem said Trump’s repeated offers to mediate between Pakistan and India, “which was not appreciated in New Delhi”, showed that Washington’s position remained unsettled at the top rather than shifting towards India. “I would actually expect a clarification from Washington soon,” he added.

Will it affect Pakistan-US ties?

Saleem, who summoned a US ambassador in Islamabad during his tenure as foreign secretary in late 2022 over what he called “a very objectionable remark” by then-President Joe Biden, said a demarche was not primarily a tool to punish Washington. Biden had described Pakistan as “one of the most dangerous nations in the world”.

“A demarche is not just made to increase the cost of a policy; rather it is made to press a point and ask for an explanation,” the former ambassador told Al Jazeera. “The US response was constructive [then], and will be in this case as well, I believe.”

He said the Pakistan-US relationship was too broad-based for one ambassador’s remark to unsettle it, pointing to Pakistan’s role as a peacemaker between the US and Iran, economic cooperation, counterterrorism, regional security, Afghanistan, defence cooperation, “and of course Pakistan’s relationship with the Trump administration itself”.

Tariq Rashid Khan, a Pakistani former military general and diplomat, described the episode as “issue-specific boundary-setting”.

Islamabad’s protest, he told Al Jazeera, signals that a close strategic partnership with Washington “does not mean acceptance of any position on Kashmir contrary to Pakistan’s stated position”.

“Kashmir remains an unfinished agenda of the 1947 partition, which is why even one sentence can become strategically significant,” he said.

For Saleem, the significance lies less in Gor’s specific words than in what any drift in language could set in motion.

“Jammu and Kashmir is not just a territorial dispute; it is an issue of national identity, legitimacy and security for Pakistan,” he told Al Jazeera. “Neither Pakistan nor India can afford to let the international community’s vocabulary on Kashmir drift even slightly, because both sides believe that language today can become precedent tomorrow.”

Aizaz Chaudhry, a former Pakistani ambassador to the US, told Al Jazeera he believed Gor’s remarks “might be his personal comments”, adding that the US position on the disputed territory is well known.

“Our demarche is only a reminder that the US envoy in Delhi must comply with the US position on the subject. The Kashmir dispute is a longstanding issue that must be resolved for the larger peace and stability of South Asia,” Chaudhry said.

Much like it is a tradition for a footballer to take away the match ball after scoring a hat-trick, a bowler will pocket the cricket ball after claiming a five-wicket haul.

But what happens if two bowlers take five-wicket hauls in the same innings?

England seamers Ollie Robinson and Josh Tongue came up with a solution after they snared five apiece on the opening day of the first Test against Pakistan.

“Robbo said we can split the ball in half,” Tongue told Test Match Special. “The groundstaff have kindly done that.

“It’s the first time I’ve seen that happen. I’m sure I’ll be putting that up somewhere.”

Robinson showed off his half in a media conference and explained: “We were walking off the field.

“Josh said it and I said: ‘We actually should do that, it would be quite cool.’

“You don’t really have too many halves of a cricket ball, so it would be something that we never forget.”

The efforts of the pace-bowling duo helped Joe Root get off to an ideal start on the first day of his second stint as England Test captain.

Tongue claimed 5-46 and Robinson 5-51 to skittle Pakistan for 171 after England won the toss. The home side moved to 112-2 by the close in Leeds.

Tongue and Robinson are the first pair of England bowlers to register five-wicket hauls in the same Test innings since Steve Harmison and Monty Panesar against Pakistan at Old Trafford in 2006.

They led England off the field at Headingley hand in hand, hatching their plan to make one ball into two halves.

“Wayne Bentley, the team manager, took it down to the groundstaff,” said Robinson.

“I said: ‘Do you reckon they will be able to do it?’ Within five minutes he brought it back up and it was done. It’s really nice.”

Ollie Robinson and Josh Tongue both took five-wicket hauls to put England in early control of the opening Test against Pakistan at Headingley, as the home side closed on 112-2 at stumps on day one, just 59 runs behind the tourists’ first-innings total of 171.

READ MORE: Robinson & Tongue give Root an ideal start to England’s new era

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Josh Tongue removes Salman Ali Agha and Ali Usman in back-to-back balls but falls just short of the hat-trick as Khurram Shahzad hits the third delivery emphatically for four on day one of the opening Test between England and Pakistan at Headingley.

FOLLOW LIVE: England v Pakistan – Day One

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Root, England’s greatest batter and a veteran of 166 Tests, said he hoped his “natural persona” is suited to bringing a sense of calm to the men’s national team.

Off-field issues dominated last winter’s tours, including an incident involving Harry Brook being punched by a nightclub bouncer in Wellington and the team’s drinking during a mid-Ashes trip to Noosa, culminating in a heavy 4-1 defeat by Australia.

The issues continued into the summer when Stokes broke a team curfew, setting in motion a chaotic six weeks that resulted in a 2-1 series defeat by New Zealand, Stokes’ retirement and the sacking of McCullum.

Fellow New Zealander Stephen Fleming has been appointed as McCullum’s replacement, but batting coach Marcus Trescothick will take interim charge of the Test side for the three-match series against Pakistan.

Root, who has already led England in 65 Tests having held the role between 2017 and 2022, said one of his “big challenges” is “trying not to be Ben Stokes”.

“He is a very unique player with unbelievable qualities that I don’t think are easy to replicate,” Root said. “I don’t think there is any point trying to.

“It is going to have a slightly different look to it but that is OK.

“There has been a lot of good stuff that has happened in the past four years that will serve us really well.

“It is about not ripping it up, just fine tuning and evolving that and taking that to the next level. We have got to find a way of evolving the team without him.”

More to follow

Supreme Court grants jailed ex-PM Imran Khan transfer to hospital for nearly a month after concerns were raised over his blood pressure.

Islamabad, Pakistan — Pakistan’s Supreme Court on Tuesday ordered the transfer of Imran Khan, former prime minister and founder of the opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, from Rawalpindi’s Adiala prison to Islamabad’s Shifa International Hospital within two days, accepting a demand his party had been making for months.

Uzair Bhandari, one of Khan’s lawyers, told Al Jazeera the three-member bench also ordered a medical board be formed to oversee Khan’s treatment, including the ex-prime minister’s sister, Dr Uzma Khan, and his personal physician, Dr Faisal Sultan.

“The court also directed that Khan’s family be allowed to meet him at the hospital and that he be permitted to speak with his sons, who live abroad,” Bhandari said.

The next hearing has been fixed for September 16, and Khan should remain hospitalised until at least then as per the order, according to the lawyer. This will be the longest period that Khan will be physically outside jail premises since he was imprisoned in August 2023, convicted in several corruption-related cases that he and his party insist are politically motivated.

The order followed a report Adiala jail’s superintendent submitted to the court on Monday, detailing a cardiac board’s August 10 review of Khan, 73, which recorded fluctuating blood pressure and anxiety linked to restricted contact with his family.

During Tuesday’s hearing, the court pressed Pakistan’s advocate general over gaps in the report, saying Khan’s “pulse and heart condition were not normal” and that his vital organs “had started being affected”.

Courts had twice declined similar transfer requests since February, including an Islamabad High Court ruling that ordered a medical board’s assessment instead.

Zulfi Bukhari, a senior PTI leader, told Al Jazeera the ruling reinforced the party’s longstanding position that Khan needed independent, specialised treatment outside Adiala jail.

“Medical care provided within the prison system is no substitute for a thorough evaluation by independent specialists of his choosing,” he said, adding that PTI had consistently called for Khan’s transfer to Shifa International and access to his own doctors.

Government officials have insisted any transfer required judicial authorisation rather than executive discretion.

Rana Sanaullah, adviser to the prime minister, told the Senate on Monday that Khan was receiving “the best available medical treatment” and that his condition did not support PTI’s concerns.

The order lands amid a wider standoff over access to Khan, which PTI has increasingly framed as the precondition for reviving talks with the government. The government, for its part, has renewed efforts to engage in dialogue but to no avail as yet, while PTI leadership has announced a countrywide protest on September 27.

One week on from Saudi ⁠⁠Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye signing their ⁠joint defence agreement, the Turkish defence ministry revealed more details about the alliance on Thursday. They include plans to hold ⁠⁠joint military exercises and to deepen cooperation between their defence industries.

The bid to deepen security cooperation between three of the biggest economies among Muslim-majority countries comes amid heightened military tensions and conflicts in the Middle East.

Over the course of the US-Israeli war on Iran, Saudi Arabia has been repeatedly hit by Iran, which says it is targeting US military assets in the Gulf.

Pakistan’s ⁠⁠foreign ministry said that the agreement states ⁠⁠that an armed ⁠⁠attack on any one of the ⁠⁠three countries would be ⁠⁠regarded as an ⁠⁠attack against them all –  similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause.

At a weekly briefing in the Turkish capital Ankara on Thursday, the Turkish defence ministry said the pact’s fundamental goal was to ensure defence and military ties were put on a “more institutional and sustainable” footing.

“Under the accord, strategic political and military mechanisms plan to be established involving the defence ministers, foreign ministers, and chiefs of general ⁠⁠staff/armed forces commanders and that coordination among the three countries will ⁠⁠be conducted at the highest level,” it said.

What do we know about the Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Pakistan pact?

It follows a visit by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, accompanied by army chief Asim Munir, to Saudi Arabia to perform the Umrah pilgrimage in Mecca.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also travelled to Saudi Arabia on Friday to meet Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Turkiye, which has NATO’s second-largest army, has said the pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan and major oil ‌‌exporter Saudi Arabia was open to expansion – Egypt has been touted as a potential candidate — and did not seek to replace any existing alliances.

How have similar defence pacts fared?

The mutual defence pact is similar to several others in the region and beyond, yet many have had mixed records in practice.

Such alliances have the potential to deter large-scale interstate wars against their members, analysts say. But their effectiveness drops once conflicts move into a ‘grey zone’, which can include military occupation, settlements, internal repression or proxy violence.

Experts say they often serve merely as a signal of a strengthened political alliance rather than being a true collective defence.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 1949

NATO grew largely out of Cold War fears of aggression and expansionism by the Soviet Union.

The US, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom signed the initial treaty on April 4, 1949.

The group has expanded into a 32-member alliance, with Sweden being the most recent member two years ago.

Many argue that NATO was a factor behind the Soviet Union’s reluctance to directly attack Western European member states during the Cold War, and vice versa with the Warsaw Pact.

The US also entered multiple bilateral treaties with different countries in the 1950s and 1960s. This provided Washington with strategic reassurances to its pact partners and went some way to shape their domestic and foreign policies.

A key provision of the NATO treaty, the so-called Article 5, states that if one member of the alliance is attacked in Europe or North America, it will be considered an attack on all members. That effectively put Western Europe under the ‘nuclear umbrella’ of the US.

NATO has invoked Article 5 only once in its history, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the US.

According to NATO, the alliance plays an important role in fighting “terrorism”.

Arab League Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty, 1950

The League of Arab States, or Arab League, was established in 1945 to promote economic, political and social cohesion among emerging Middle Eastern states Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

It came amid the formation of Israel and its threats to countries in the region.

In 1950, Arab states signed a mutual defence treaty, stating that an attack on one is an attack on all – at least on paper.

Inter‑American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947

Following the Second World War and the start of the Cold War, leaders in the Americas signed this treaty in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, also known as the Rio Treaty.

Its core principle was that an attack on one member country counts as an attack on all.

This treaty was invoked during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the September 11 attacks in 2001.

The ANZUS Treaty, 1951

In September 1951, the US, New Zealand and Australia signed a treaty pledging to meet the common dangers in the Pacific region.

Following the September 11 attacks, ANZUS was invoked for the first time.

In 1986, the United States suspended its ANZUS security obligations to New Zealand over Wellington’s anti‑nuclear policy. This effectively froze New Zealand out of the alliance, while US–Australia cooperation continued.

US-Japan Security Treaty, 1951

The US and Japan pledged in a bilateral agreement to act and meet the common danger in case either of them faced an armed attack.

This agreement was signed in 1951 in San Francisco alongside the World War II peace treaty.

While the treaty was never invoked, about 50,000 US military personnel are stationed in Japan.

US-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty, 1953

Following the end of the Korean War, the US and South Korea pledged to help each other from external armed attacks. This treaty came into effect in 1954.

While it was never invoked, it gave the US a legal framework to station about 28,500 troops in South Korea.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s Peninsula Shield Force 1984

The GCC is a political and economic alliance of six countries in the Arabian Peninsula: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The GCC was established in Saudi Arabia in 1981, aiming to promote economic, security, cultural and social cooperation between the six member states.

In 1984, the GCC established a standing coalition land force, the Peninsula Shield Force, tasked to defend the six-member states amid the Iran-Iraq War.

It is composed of infantry, armour, artillery and combat support elements from each of the states, with 40,000 personnel.

The 2000 Joint Defence Agreement was signed to develop a joint military industry for arms manufacturing.

In September 2025, when Israel attacked Hamas leaders in Qatar, the GCC pledged to “activate a joint defence mechanism”.

Treaty on European Union (TEU), 2009

The modern EU was officially formed in 1993 in the Netherlands with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

In 2009, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) created the mutual defence obligation which was signed into EU law.

Under Article 42(7) of the TEU, if one EU member is the victim of “armed aggression”, others have an obligation to aid and assist by all the means in their power.

France has invoked this clause only once, in 2015, following the Paris attacks that killed 130 people. Other EU members provided bilateral military support — including deployments to French‑led operations abroad — so that France could redeploy troops to strengthen security at home.

Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), 2002

The CSTO is a Russia-led military alliance that includes some former Soviet republics.

Established in 2002, its members comprise Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus.

Article 4 of the CSTO states that aggression against one is considered aggression against all, with an obligation to provide necessary aid, including military.

The CSTO has deployed troops once, in 2022 in Kazakhstan upon the request of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to help manage demonstrations caused by rising fuel prices.

A series of Houthi attacks in recent weeks, which are among the deadliest in years, is raising fears that Yemen could be sliding back towards all-out war as conflict spreads across the Middle East.

A 2022 truce led to the end of heavy fighting between the pro-Iranian Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces, which had been ongoing since September 2014.

But a series of clashes over the last month between the two sides – intensifying in the last two weeks – has led to civilian and military casualties and threatened to reignite the war.

Here is what we know.

What are the latest attacks?

The Houthis have killed a number of civilians in a series of attacks on the government-controlled west coast port of al-Makha, also known as Mocha.

There was also an attack on a commercial vessel in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait on Tuesday, which Yemen’s coastguard said killed six people and injured 10 others. The Houthis said the vessel was carrying weapons.

It followed the Houthis targeting Yemeni government military sites in eastern Yemen with drones and rockets, killing at least 30 government soldiers and causing further clashes. The Houthis have also attacked Saudi Aramco’s Jazan oil refinery.

In response, Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), said the internationally -recognised government would not accept “a new truce that reproduces previous experiences”.

“No action by the Houthi militias will go unanswered or unchecked,” al-Alimi said, according to Yemen’s Saba news agency.

But he also appeared to leave space for a political way back, saying the Houthis could still “lay down their arms, engage in political life and compete through the ballot box on an equal footing with all other Yemenis”.

What is behind the latest tensions?

The Houthis seized the capital Sanaa in 2014 and have since fought a war with the government for control of the country.

Although the intensity of the war declined significantly after the 2022 truce, no comprehensive peace settlement followed.

The fragile status quo came under increasing pressure after the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28 .

On July 13 , Yemeni government forces – which are backed by Saudi Arabia – attacked Sanaa airport, reportedly to prevent an Iranian aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation from landing. The government accuses Iran of arming the Houthis.

The rebel movement responded by launching missiles towards Saudi Arabia. Then, on July 20 , the Houthis announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, threatening oil shipments diverted towards the Red Sea and attacking Saudi Aramco facilities in Jizan and Yanbu.

Is Saudi Arabia changing its approach?

As the attacks have intensified, Saudi Arabia has begun to take a more proactive approach to its security – both in Yemen and across the region, according to experts.

Some analysts believe the prospect of the Houthis ultimately blocking Bab al-Mandeb – the narrow strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean – may have helped push the Saudis to change their strategy.

Saudi Arabia was somewhat insulated from Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz because it could use its East-West Pipeline to transport oil from fields in the east to the Red Sea, bypassing the strait.

If the Houthis were to severely restrict shipping through Bab al-Mandeb, that would threaten the Red Sea route for one of the world’s largest oil exporters.

Last month, Riyadh announced a new international alliance intended to protect shipping in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks. Dozens of countries were invited, with the kingdom saying 13 had agreed to participate.

It is also deepening its security relationships with Pakistan and Turkiye through a new joint defence agreement, while Saudi coordination with Washington also appears to be strengthening.

The Saudi Defence Minister, Khalid bin Salman, recently met US Vice President JD Vance amid reports that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had secured US support for potential military action against the Houthis.

But in Yemen, the shift in the Saudi position may have been more visible when the Saudis intervened against the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) at the end of last year. That allowed Yemen’s fractious anti-Houthi coalition to coalesce around the Yemeni government and present a more united front against the rebels.

Simon Mabon, professor of international relations at Lancaster University in the UK, said Saudi policy on the issue has changed significantly.

“After years of attempting to de-escalate and work towards an accommodation with the Houthis, Riyadh appears to have concluded that approach is no longer viable,” Mabon told Al Jazeera.

“Saudi Arabia’s concern has become particularly acute because conflict around the Strait of Hormuz has increased the importance of alternative oil and shipping routes through the Red Sea.”

But rather than trying to totally defeat the Houthis and retake the capital Sanaa, Mabon said Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government now appear to be focused on pushing Houthi forces away from the coast.

“That’s a marked shift from what we had been seeing previously,” he said.

Could Pakistan and Turkiye be drawn into the war?

The Saudi-Pakistan-Turkiye agreement potentially raises the stakes of any further Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said the latest attacks were being interpreted by some experts as a direct defiance of the new defence pact.

Pakistan has been directly affected by the recent escalation. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said three Pakistanis were killed and another person injured in a Houthi attack on a vessel in the Red Sea.

“Pakistan strongly condemns the Houthi attack on a non-combatant commercial vessel,” Dar said, adding that the government was in contact with Saudi and Yemeni authorities.

But experts say the defence pact does not mean that Pakistani or Turkish troops will join the war in Yemen on behalf of their ally.

Wolfgang Pusztai, a security policy and defence analyst, told Al Jazeera that the agreement so -far is “just ink on paper”.

What role is Iran playing?

Iran has long cultivated a so-called “axis of resistance” of governments and groups opposed to Israel and the United States, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, armed groups in Iraq and Syria and the Houthis in Yemen.

The Houthis supported Iran towards the end of March by launching attacks towards northern Israel and have since threatened to expand their operations in the Red Sea.

Last month, Iran reportedly asked the Houthis to prepare to close the Red Sea oil route if the US attacked Iranian power infrastructure.

A source close to the Houthis told Reuters that missiles and drones had been positioned near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait in Yemen’s highlands overlooking Hodeidah and the Gulf of Aden.

Mohammed Albasha, a Yemeni American analyst and former spokesperson for Yemen’s embassy in Washington, said the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia should therefore also be understood within the broader US-Iran confrontation.

“By threatening Saudi shipping there, the Houthis can increase pressure on both Riyadh and Washington, while supporting Iran in its wider confrontation with the United States,” Albasha said.

Is another all-out war imminent?

Analysts say the crucial question is whether the latest attacks are intended to pressure the Saudi and Yemeni governments, or whether the Houthis believe they are simply taking the initiative in a new potential ground war.

The Houthis also say Saudi Arabia is using the port of al-Makah to reinforce and resupply government forces and believe Riyadh and its Yemeni allies are preparing an offensive against Houthi-held territory.

Nadwa Al-Dawsari, Associate Fellow at the Middle East Institute, said those fears may be fuelling the current escalation.

“Since January, there has been significant progress towards bringing Yemen’s different government forces under a more unified command,” Al-Dawsari told Al Jazeera.

“Government forces have also demonstrated growing air capabilities, carrying out air and drone strikes against Houthi missile and drone launchers and other military sites.”

“The Houthis’ objective in this recent escalation is to disrupt these preparations before government forces are ready, degrade their capabilities and force them onto the defensive.”

Ultimately, she said, the Houthis are trying to shape the rules of any coming confrontation so that “if escalation takes place, it happens on their own terms”.

While a Saudi-led ground offensive is not inevitable, the Houthis have also shown over the past decade that they cannot be defeated by air power alone, Mabon said.

“Yemen’s mountainous terrain makes a ground campaign exceptionally difficult, while Riyadh has little appetite to become trapped again in a prolonged war,” he said.

A Saudi-backed offensive led by Yemeni government forces is still more plausible than a large Saudi ground deployment, he added.

The consequences of major fighting on the ground between the two sides will inevitably mean that civilians will suffer most.

“Amidst all of this, the tragedy is that people in Yemen are paying the price,” Mabon said.

“It wasn’t long ago that Yemen was facing one of the worst humanitarian crises since the Second World War. People are struggling, and continued fighting will make it far worse.”

Three nations to group ministers, hold ⁠joint exercises and deepen defence industry cooperation under the pact signed last week.

Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will group senior ministers, hold ⁠joint exercises and deepen defence industry cooperation under a military pact signed between the regional powers last week, Turkiye’s defence ministry says.

The three countries on August 7 signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on August 7, which stipulates that an armed attack against any member would be regarded as ‌an attack on all, similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause.

At a weekly briefing in Ankara on Thursday, the Turkish defence ministry said the pact’s fundamental goal was to ensure defence and military ties were put on a “more institutional and sustainable” footing.

“Under the accord, strategic political and military mechanisms plan to be established involving the Defence Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Chiefs of General ⁠Staff/Armed Forces Commanders, and that coordination among the three countries will ⁠be conducted at the highest level,” it said.

The ministry added that joint military exercises involving land, naval and air forces, as well as air defence and unmanned systems were planned, in ⁠addition to deeper defence industry cooperation.

“The aim is to provide not only product and system supply, but also joint ⁠development and production, technology cooperation, and sustainable maintenance and ⁠logistics support,” it said, adding that unmanned and autonomous systems, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence capabilities would be prioritised.

Turkiye, which has NATO’s second-largest army, has said the pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan and top oil ‌exporter Saudi Arabia was open to expansion — with Egypt as a potential candidate — and did not seek to replace any existing alliances.

The ministry also said Turkiye ‌was ‌participating in meetings in Jeddah aimed at establishing an international coalition to protect Red Sea shipping.

On developments in the Middle East, ministry spokesperson Rear Admiral Zeki Akturk said lasting peace and stability in the region would be possible if Israel ends its occupation and attacks in Gaza and Lebanon.

He said Israel continues attacks that have deepened the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, as also reflected in United Nations reports.

“Israel’s rejection of the 15-point Gaza Plan has been another indication that it is pursuing a policy of regional expansionism. On the other hand, despite the framework agreement that was signed, Israel similarly continues its attacks and military activities in southern Lebanon,” Akturk said, referring to the plan proposed by the United States.

“We once again emphasise that it is essential for the international community to take a more determined and stronger stance against Israel’s actions by upholding international law and humanitarian values in order to establish peace and stability in the region,” he said.

Iran continues to deny claims by the United States that it controls the Strait of Hormuz as talks aimed at negotiating a peace deal between the two sides falter.

US President Donald Trump repeated his claim that the US is in “total control” of the critical waterway on Wednesday, but was met with angry denials from Iran, which has stated that it will not reopen the strait until demands regarding US aggression, reparations and sanctions are met.

“Claims and repeated posts by US officials that the Strait of Hormuz is no longer blocked do not change the reality,” Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) posted on X on Wednesday.

“The Strait of Hormuz remains blocked and will not be reopened until Iran’s conditions are accepted,” it added.

Here’s what we know about the latest developments in the strait, through which one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies are shipped during peacetime, and the prospects for ongoing talks.

What’s the latest on the US-Iran standoff?

Iranian forces are currently preventing ships that do not have its express approval from navigating through the narrow strait, which passes through territorial waters of Iran and Oman.

Despite Trump’s claim that the US has control over the strait, shipping traffic through the key waterway has dropped to a one-week low as a result of Iran’s blockade.

Meanwhile, the US is operating a naval blockade on Iranian ports both in and around the strait. On Tuesday, US forces targeted a Panama-flagged vessel they said was headed for an Iranian port, in the Gulf of Oman, and which they alleged had failed to respond to warnings.

On Thursday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the US “has long miscalculated due to intelligence failures”, including when launching its war on Iran, which it did alongside Israel with strikes on Tehran on February 28.

In a post on X, Araghchi said Washington’s actions in the Strait of Hormuz were “an even bigger miscalculation”.

“Worse than fake news is fake intelligence,” he said.

Hojjatoleslam Hossein Taeb, the commander of the paramilitary Basij Organisation – an affiliate of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – reiterated that the strait is “under Iran’s control and management”.

“Today you see that the Strait of Hormuz is under the management and control of the Islamic Republic, and our country continues on its path in complete security,” Taeb said on Thursday, according to Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency.

“The Americans saw the power of the Islamic revolution,” he added.

What do we know about Iran-Oman talks?

Iran says it is not talking directly to the US about the strait. Instead, it says it is holding talks with Oman, which it proposes to share in the future management of the strait.

Following the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the US on June 17, under which Iran undertook to keep the strait open for 60 days, there were soon disagreements about control of the waterway and the routes that ships should take. Iran fired on some ships it said had not followed its permitted route, leading to a renewal of hostilities with the US.

Iran also disagreed with the US over whether it could charge fees to ships passing through the strait. As a result, the strait – which was fully and freely open to all shipping before the US launched its war on Iran – has become the main obstacle to the progression of wider peace talks.

Now, talks between Iran and Oman are aimed at ironing out these issues.

On Tuesday, Qatar said negotiations between Iran and Oman over the strait had reached “an advanced stage”.

“As mediators, we want the Strait of Hormuz reopened as soon as possible,” Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman Majed al-Ansari said during a news conference.

Negotiators are trying to reach a compromise that would allow commercial shipping to resume while addressing the security concerns of both Iran and Oman.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman has said talks with Oman are focused on “establishing safe inbound and outbound shipping lanes” that “uphold sovereign rights while also addressing the national security considerations of both Iran and Oman”.

Last week, Iran said it had agreed on the coordinates for these shipping lanes with Oman.

What do we know about broader peace talks between Iran and the US?

Iran says it is not speaking directly to the US because it has violated the June 17 MoU by restarting strikes on Iran in July.

Now, Pakistan is making efforts to mediate peace talks. It said on Tuesday it was working to bring the US and Iran “to the negotiating table”, as Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi held talks with senior Iranian officials in Tehran.

In April, the US and Iran held face-to-face negotiations, with US Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attending talks in Islamabad. On June 17, the two sides remotely signed the MoU, which was supposed to kick-start a 60-day negotiation process. However, various disagreements prevented that process from getting off the ground, and talks have stalled since then.

Alan Eyre, a distinguished diplomatic fellow with the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, told Al Jazeera earlier this month that the only important negotiations taking place right now are Iran-Oman talks over the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran says it is not worth talking directly because it “can’t count on anything the US says”, Eyre said.

Commenting on the possibility of future talks between the longtime foes, Negar Mortazavi, senior fellow at the US-based Center for International Policy, said the key question is whether the escalatory rhetoric from both sides is “opening negotiating positions or actual red lines”.

“If both sides are prepared to compromise, there is still a path towards ending the conflict and reopening the strait,” Mortazavi told Al Jazeera on Wednesday.

“If they are not, Hormuz could remain restricted, and the confrontation risks becoming another prolonged, open-ended conflict in the Middle East.”

What are the latest demands from Iran and the US?

At the end of last week, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council set out new conditions it says the US must meet before the Strait of Hormuz can fully reopen.

The six conditions include an end to US threats against Iran and insults to what Zolghadr described as the country’s national and religious values; a permanent end to attacks against Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and Iraq; the lifting of the US naval blockade and withdrawal of naval and air forces from around Iran; compensation for damage from what he called two “imposed wars”; the lifting of sanctions; and the unconditional release of frozen Iranian assets.

Trump told reporters at the White House on Monday that his administration was going to seek payment for “50 years” of damage caused by Iran, framing the move as a direct response to Tehran’s claims.

The payments, he said, would cover deaths among US forces in the region as well as civilian protesters in Iran, claiming that 52,000 people have been killed in Iran in the past four months. Tehran says some 3,117 people died in antigovernment protests that swept the country in January, prior to the launch of the US-Israel war. In February, the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reported about 7,000 deaths, including 6,500 protesters.

On Thursday, Al Jazeera’s Tohid Assidi reported, citing observers, that Iran is focused on two primary issues.

“First was the security assurances Iran sought, ensuring that a reached deal could pave the way for a period of stability in the country,” Assidi said.

“Second were economic concerns, primarily articulated in demands for the US naval blockade to be removed and sanctions frozen, which represented the key demands coming from the Iranian side,” he added.

Despite the rhetoric from Trump, analysts have told Al Jazeera that the US may have to concede to some of Iran’s demands as it faces growing pressure domestically to avoid another escalation.

The US media have reported that concerns over dwindling defensive munitions have contributed to Trump’s decision not to carry out his threatened large-scale strikes against Iran.

Leaders of Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement last Friday, pledging to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression and stating that an armed attack on any one of the three would be regarded as an attack on all.

The pact comes as the three countries navigate growing regional tensions, including concerns over Israel’s expanding military reach and Iran’s regional influence.

Together, these countries form a sizeable military bloc. Riyadh is a top oil exporter, Ankara has NATO’s second-largest military, and Islamabad is the only nuclear-armed Muslim country.

In this explainer, Al Jazeera breaks down their combined land, air and naval strength.

Joint land, air and naval strength

Together, the three countries combine nearly 1.4 million active military personnel, 3,400 aircraft, 6,000 tanks and more than 340 naval assets according to the 2026 Global Firepower Index, which ranks the defence capabilities of 145 countries.

The index scores each country’s potential war-making capability across land, air and sea, drawing on factors including manpower, equipment, natural resources, finances and geography.

• Manpower: Combined, the three countries include about 1.4 million active personnel, backed by large paramilitary and reserve forces. Pakistan provides the largest pool of active personnel at 660,000, followed by Turkiye at 481,000 and Saudi Arabia at 247,000.
• Air power: Together they operate 3,415 military aircraft including fighter jets, helicopters, transporters and training military aircraft. Pakistan possesses some 1,397 aircraft, followed by Turkiye at 1,101 and Saudi Arabia with 917.
• Land forces: The three countries field some 6,046 tanks and more than 179,000 armoured vehicles, alongside thousands of artillery systems and multiple-launch rocket systems. Pakistan has the highest number of tanks at 2,677, Turkiye has 2,284 and Saudi Arabia, 1,085.
• Naval power: Their combined fleets include 344 naval assets, including 33 frigates, 24 corvettes and 22 submarines. Turkiye comes out top here with 192 naval assets, followed by Pakistan’s 120 and Saudi Arabia’s 32.
• Defence spending: Their combined defence budgets amount to about $124.4bn annually. Saudi Arabia has the largest military budget of the three at $63.9bn in 2026, while Turkiye set aside $51.4bn and Pakistan $9.1bn according to Global Firepower.

Complementary military powers

Andreas Krieg, an academic, security analyst and political risk consultant specialising in the Middle East and North Africa, said the pact’s significance lies in how the three countries’ different capabilities could complement one another.

“Saudi Arabia contributes capital, geography, infrastructure and political convening power. Turkiye contributes an increasingly sophisticated defence-industrial base, drones, missiles, sensors, electronic warfare, naval systems and NATO-derived military expertise,” he said.

Meanwhile, Pakistan contributes manpower, a large professional military establishment, operational experience, defence production and nuclear capability.

What does the alliance mean for each country?

For Saudi Arabia, the pact diversifies its defence partnerships beyond the United States, adding Turkiye’s advanced military capabilities and Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, amid growing threats to vital maritime corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb.

Pakistan is one of nine states that possess nuclear weapons, which it first tested in 1998. The country of more than 250 million people relies heavily on China for its arms imports.

Turkiye, which joined NATO in 1952, has no nuclear weapons of its own but hosts US warheads under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements.

David Des Roches, a former director of Arabian Peninsula affairs in the US Department of Defense, told Al Jazeera that the deal also serves Saudi arms diversification amid Western export unpredictability, since Turkiye and Pakistan can supply items like 155mm artillery shells at scale.

For Turkiye and Pakistan, it opens Saudi financial markets for their defence industries – both have manufacturing capacity exceeding what their own economies can sustain.

Zaid M Belbagi, managing partner at Hardcastle Advisory, told Al Jazeera that, for the US, the stakes are high. “Pakistan is a recipient of US aid, Saudi Arabia is the largest foreign buyer of US military equipment, and Turkiye is NATO’s second-largest army after the United States – so the spectre of the US within this agreement is quite interesting,” he said.

Krieg added that the US remains highly important, particularly for intelligence, advanced missile defence, and high-end military technology – but said that regional actors want to convert their own resources into usable power rather than purchasing from Washington.

“The old model was overwhelmingly hub-and-spokes, with Washington at the centre and individual states looking primarily to the United States for security. What is emerging now is horizontal connectivity between regional powers,” said Krieg.

Which other countries could join the pact?

Egypt is the only country whose potential membership has been publicly raised by a signatory. Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan called Egypt a “natural partner” and said he expected Cairo to join once technical issues are resolved.

Krieg said Egypt’s military weight, strategic geography and control of the Suez Canal would make it a significant addition to the pact.

But Cairo may be wary of binding military obligations and the impact on its existing agreements, analysts said. “Egypt may join only if the language protects its aid relationship with Washington, doesn’t undermine existing alliances and peace treaties, and maintains its own freedom to decide when and where it fights,” said Karim Elgendy at Chatham House.

Voting postponed in seven of 11 Poonch division constituencies as boycott calls and violence mar the region’s legislative elections.

Islamabad, Pakistan – Voting is under way in the third and final phase of Pakistan-administered Kashmir’s Legislative Assembly elections, but just four of the 11 constituencies originally scheduled to vote are going to the polls due to unrest in the region.

More than 800 polling booths in Bagh and Haveli districts of Poonch division in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), as the region is known, opened at 8am (03:00 GMT) on Monday and will close about 5pm (12:00 GMT). About 460,000 people are registered to vote.

AJK Prime Minister Faisal Mumtaz Rathore, who belongs to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), is defending his seat in Haveli.

In Bagh, two former prime ministers are in the fray – Sardar Tanveer Ilyas of the Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party against Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan of the Muslim Conference.

Elections in the remaining seven constituencies, five in Poonch and two in Sudhnoti district, were postponed last week over security concerns. Officials said a new polling date will be announced in the coming days.

The postponement came after weeks of protests by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a local pressure group demanding the abolition of 12 seats in the regional legislature reserved for displaced Kashmiris living elsewhere in Pakistan.

Violence during the JAAC-led protests killed more than 50 people, according to residents and rights groups. The government has not shared an official death toll but said at least seven police and paramilitary personnel have been killed.

The JAAC, which has called for a boycott of the legislative elections, was banned by the authorities in June under “antiterrorism” laws.

The authorities have also banned international media from reporting from the region. Their reporters were told this month to leave and seek clearance from the government before returning to Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Monday’s vote is the last of the three-phase polls for the 53-member Legislative Assembly.

The Mirpur division voted on July 27, and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN), which governs Pakistan, won nine of its 13 seats. The PPP took four. Polling in the Muzaffarabad division and 12 refugee constituencies across the country took place on August 2 with the PMLN winning 15 seats and the PPP six.

Election authorities recorded a turnout of 46 percent in the first phase and 53 percent in the second – both below the more than 60 percent recorded in 2021 and 2016.

The scaled-back vote reflects months of unrest centred on Poonch division, the JAAC’s stronghold, where an intermittent internet shutdown has stretched beyond 50 days.

Tehran, Iran – Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have expanded their mutual defence pact to add Turkiye, raising questions about the emergence of a new security architecture at a time when the United States and Iran have yet to reach a final deal to end their war.

Under the agreement signed in Mecca on Friday, any external armed attack on either of the three countries will now be considered an attack on all.

The trilateral pact was announced more than five months after the US and Israel launched a bombing campaign against Iran, triggering a conflict that quickly spread to the Gulf and disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, however, have been careful not to antagonise any regional or international actors while finalising what they said was the result of years of hard work and negotiations. They have stressed the pact, which does not identify a specific threat, is not targeted against any country – particularly Iran – and does not abrogate or replace any existing agreements with others.

In Tehran, the reaction has largely been subdued, with officials mostly focusing on aspects of regional and Muslim cooperation and what they perceive as a declining role for the US.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Friday that when Muslims stand together, “we can face every challenge by malicious outsiders head-on”.

“Time to rely only on ourselves and embrace true brotherhood,” he wrote on X, without directly mentioning the trilateral agreement signed hours earlier.

But Iran certainly sees some reasons to be concerned in the long run, according to Hamidreza Azizi, a researcher and analyst on Iran and Middle Eastern geopolitical dynamics.

The associate at Clingendael Institute told Al Jazeera that the timing is important, since the agreement comes after months of a war in which Saudi Arabia has faced attacks from the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen and armed groups in neighbouring Iraq.

“From Tehran’s perspective, the concern is therefore not only that the pact could strengthen Saudi deterrence, but that it could eventually facilitate coordinated pressure on Iran in Yemen, Iraq, and even economically through Turkiye and Pakistan,” he said.

On Sunday, the Houthis claimed another successful drone strike on the Saudi Aramco refinery in Jizan. Saudi Arabia confirmed a fire was extinguished without inflicting casualties, but did not mention the cause.

Separately in Yemen, Houthi missiles and drones struck the Saudi-backed and internationally recognised government’s Red Sea port of al-Makha, with officials reporting at least seven people killed, 15 wounded and severe infrastructure damage. The Yemeni group, which has also been hitting or turning back Saudi-linked ships in the Red Sea over recent weeks, said it targeted weapons depots.

‘A strong bloc’

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not released a formal statement about the Pakistan-Saudi-Turkiye deal, but a senior official outlined Tehran’s diplomatic thinking in an interview with local media on Saturday.

Hossein Noushabadi, a director general for parliamentary and legal affairs, told the state-linked ISNA news service that the ministry predominantly regards the agreement within the context of a diminishing direct US presence in the region.

The pact “is being viewed as the beginning of the collapse of US security hegemony in West Asia and the Persian Gulf”, said Noushabadi.

“It appears that, in the not-too-distant future, a new regional security order based on cooperation among regional states will replace the power structures imposed by extra-regional actors, heralding the end of the prevailing security and geopolitical paradigm and West Asia’s departure from the sphere of vital US interests,” added the official, who is a former Iranian envoy to Oman.

Political scientist Vali Nasr said he does not believe the pact is currently a threat to Tehran.

“For now, these are all elements of a post-American security order in the Middle East,” the professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University told Al Jazeera.

“This is also as much a balance to the Abraham Accords as a direct challenge to Tehran,” he added, in reference to the US-pushed regional normalisation effort with Israel, which US President Donald Trump last month tied with a civil nuclear deal sought by Saudi Arabia.

Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government at Georgetown University of Qatar, also agreed that decision-makers in Iran do not immediately feel threatened by the pact, especially since they have maintained cordial relations with both Pakistan and Turkiye even under trying circumstances.

“Ultimately, this pact is not that new, nor is it something that, at present at least, has a great deal of substance beyond its symbolic significance. For example, neither Turkiye nor Pakistan would be willing to get involved in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen despite recent Houthi attacks on the kingdom,” Kamrava told Al Jazeera.

Not all inside Iran are content with the pact, however, with some hardline lawmakers and media arguing that it could ultimately be directed against the “resistance front” of Tehran-backed armed forces across the region, and degrade Pakistan’s credibility as a main mediator between Iran and the US and others.

“It’s clear that Arab states finally understand security cannot be imported; it must be built within the region. However, a roadmap is still missing,” Ebrahim Azizi, a member of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said in a more hawkish viewing of the pact.

“Warning: Miscalculation is a historical mistake. Iran has proven that every error comes at a cost. Balance is the only way forward,” he wrote on X.

Ebrahim Rezaei, another member of the commission, also wrote on X that “a paper agreement with Turkiye and Pakistan” will not bring Saudi Arabia security, “just as years of one-sided dependence on the Americans did not bring them security”.

Is Iran missing out?

Clingendael Institute’s Azizi said Tehran’s priority will likely be to avoid turning the pact into an explicitly anti-Iranian coalition amid a war with regional repercussions, and that would mean preserving individual relations with each of the three countries.

He said Tehran can also continue to emphasise its long-standing argument that regional security should ultimately be organised by regional states rather than external powers.

“If those states come to see the pact as providing meaningful protection against Iran or Iran-aligned groups, that would make Iranian membership even more difficult,” said Azizi. “Over the longer term, however, if the arrangement evolves from a balancing coalition into a broader regional security architecture, the question of Iranian participation could look quite different.”

Experts also said it could be a possibility that Iran itself would be seeking potential membership in the pact in a distant future, but that would mean a sustainable end to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and across the region, while expansion to other regional Arab states seems more plausible in the near term. Egypt has already been floated as a candidate, but that could be a complex decision for Cairo to make.

Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North African Programme at Chatham House, said the trilateral pact reflects both short- and long-term security concerns and opportunities for Riyadh, Islamabad and Ankara.

“They are driven together to forge greater diplomatic and defence cooperation in reaction to US unreliability, Israeli revisionism and Iranian retaliation,” she told Al Jazeera.

Turkiye wants to expand its newly formed defence pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to include more countries, says Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, citing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

“Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan told state news agency Anadolu, according to a report published on Saturday.

Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on Friday signed the Mecca Joint Deterrence Agreement, in what analysts say could be a step towards a new security architecture in the region.

So who could join the pact next, and what would an expanded alliance mean for regional security?

What does the pact do?

The Mecca defence pact builds on a previous agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan a year ago.

Regional officials have suggested that the pact could eventually expand to include other countries, strengthening its role as a mechanism for collective security and deterrence.

The pact’s central feature is a NATO-like stipulation that an attack on any one of the three states would be treated as an attack on all of them although the details have yet to be fleshed out.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said the allies will decide through consultations what degree, form and format of support they would ask for in the event of an attack but no country would be considered a threat as long as a member state is not attacked.

Turkish and Saudi officials have stressed that the pact is not meant to supplant any other strategic alliances or relationships while Turkiye, which is a member of NATO, has said the agreement does not target any country, including Iran.

Which countries could join next?

Egypt is the only country whose potential membership has been publicly raised by an official from one of the pact’s signatory countries.

Fidan described Egypt as a “natural partner” and said he expects Cairo to formally join once “technical issues” are ironed out.

“I believe that at the next stage, Egypt will also be among us in the alliance,” Fidan said. “We already act towards one another as if we were alliance members.”

Ali Bakir, professor of international relations, security and defence at Qatar University, said Egypt’s inclusion would “significantly increase the pact’s political weight, regional influence and operational effectiveness” if it materialises.

What might stand in the way of Egypt’s membership?

Egypt already has a solid working relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye, with which it is part of a group called the R4, which consults on regional issues. Egypt has also recently developed stronger military ties with Turkiye despite previous tensions over the Egyptian military’s 2013 overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, the conflict in Libya and the discovery of gasfields in the Eastern Mediterranean.

But analysts said Cairo may be wary of the potential military obligations that could come with a binding defence treaty with states whose interests do not always align with its own as well as the implications for its existing peace treaties.

“Egypt may join only if the language protects its aid relationship with Washington, doesn’t undermine existing alliances and peace treaties, and maintains its own freedom to decide when and where it fights,” Karim Elgendy, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera.

“If the pact stays a political framework with room to calibrate each response, Cairo can live with it and may eventually sign. If it hardens into an obligation that could pull Egyptian forces into someone else’s war, the answer is likely to be negative,” Elgendy said.

Technical issues holding Egypt back could be both “legal and operational”, Elgendy added. “On the legal side, Egypt needs to know exactly what it is committing to defend, and it will want assurances so that a signature never reads as a commitment against Israel or as taking Ankara’s side in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean,” he said.

For Bakir, Cairo’s decision will come down to how it weighs the benefits of membership against the diplomatic complications.  Egypt’s decision on whether to join the pact will hinge on the level of “strategic value” it believes it brings as well as its ability to “manage relations with countries whose interests” contrast with or even “actively oppose” the alliance, he said.

Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera that while Egypt broadly shares the trilateral pact’s security concerns, it “does not share its underpinning threat perception” and may be resistant to “security commitments”.

“Cairo’s preference is to be part of overlapping regional security arrangements that are narrow in scope and are issue-related … rather than being entangled in defence commitments with elevated risks/cost,” Aboudouh said.

He added that Egypt may still opt to join the pact in the future but it would be a “complex decision”.

Which other countries could join?

Several officials have suggested other Gulf countries could eventually join the alliance.

In a post on X, former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani expressed hope that all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would “take the initiative to join” the pact. In addition to Saudi Arabia, the GCC includes Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

Fidan also spoke about the alliance bringing in more regional countries, saying some nations, which he did not name, had already expressed interest. “Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan said.

Among the Gulf states, Elgendy said, “the names to watch first are Qatar and Kuwait.”

Both countries are “close to all three signatories” and “have the strongest motive to buy extra insurance” after feeling “exposed” during the United States-Israel war on Iran and by Israel’s strike on Doha in September, he said.

Bakir similarly identified Qatar as the “most natural” Gulf state to opt in with Kuwait another possible candidate. He also said Azerbaijan, Syria and Jordan could also join “relatively quickly”.

Elgendy expressed scepticism about the pact transforming into a broader bloc. “This looks like a coalition of the willing that will grow on a case-by-case basis, shaped by each capital’s own risk calculus,” he said.

The pact includes an Article 5-style mutual-defence clause, but questions remain over how it would operate in practice and how Tehran will respond.

Turkish leaders have insisted that the new trilateral defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not directed at Iran.

Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Saturday that the pact does not identify Iran, or any other country, as a common threat.

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement was signed on Friday by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, stating that an armed attack on one of the three countries would be considered an attack on them all.

“There is no common threat that we have put in writing,” Fidan told Turkey’s state-run Anadolu agency, adding that countries that do not attack the signatories would not be considered targets.

An Article 5-style commitment

Fidan described the pact as “technically” similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective-defence clause, under which an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all.

But the response would depend on the circumstances.

A country under attack would have to request assistance and specify what kind of support it needed, Fidan said. That could range from intelligence and logistics to ammunition or the deployment of military units.

The alliance will also establish political and military committees, bringing together foreign and defence ministers and military chiefs, as well as a secretariat in Saudi Arabia.

Fidan said the three countries would work on joint training, intelligence sharing, logistics, threat assessments and military interoperability.

Defence-industry cooperation is also expected to be a notable part of the pact. Fidan said it was one of the main issues discussed by the three leaders in Mecca, including how the countries could benefit from each other’s military technologies.

The Turkish minister said preparations for the agreement had been under way for nearly two years and eight months, suggesting it was not drawn up simply in response to the current tensions involving Iran.

Iran pushes back

Despite Ankara’s assurances, some Iranian officials have questioned the agreement and warned Saudi Arabia against relying on its new partners for security.

Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of Iran’s parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said Saudi leaders should understand that cooperation with Turkiye and Pakistan would not guarantee their security.

Another commission member, Ebrahim Rezaei, similarly dismissed the pact as a “paper agreement”.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi did not directly mention the agreement in a message on X on Friday, but he called on regional states to rely on themselves and pursue what he described as “true brotherhood”.

At the same time, he stressed the strength and readiness of Iran’s armed forces.

Egypt could join next

Fidan portrayed the agreement as part of a broader effort to give regional countries greater responsibility for their own security.

“External hegemons coming into the region do not solve the problems; they make them more acute,” he told Anadolu.

He described Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as the “core countries” of the initiative and made clear that Ankara wants the arrangement to expand.

“Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries,” Fidan said. “We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella.”

Several countries have already expressed interest, according to Fidan, who said he expected Egypt, which he described as a “natural partner”, to join once outstanding technical issues were resolved.

For now, many of the practical details remain to be worked out, including how the three militaries would coordinate in a crisis.

But the planned committees, permanent secretariat and focus on interoperability and defence-industry cooperation suggest the pact is intended to develop beyond a simple mutual defence declaration.

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye have signed a joint defence pact.

It is an alliance that analysts say highlights Riyadh’s desire to diversify its defence partnerships, expanding to Ankara and Islamabad.

The pact was announced at a time of increased regional tension.

Yemen’s Saudi-backed government has launched a military operation against the Iran-aligned Houthis following a series of attacks, while Iran and the US have yet to reach a final deal to end the war.

The trilateral Mecca pact raises questions about the effectiveness of the decades-long US military presence in the Gulf. Does this alliance offer a viable alternative to the security umbrella promised by Washington?

Presenter: Anna Burns-Francis

Guests:

Abdulaziz Alghashian – Senior non-resident fellow at the Gulf International Forum

David Des Roches – Professor at the Thayer Marshall Institute

Zaid M Belbagi – Managing partner at Hardcastle Advisory

The Saudi, Pakistan, Turkiye defence pact faces mixed reactions, with some Iranian officials doubting its security guarantees. Iran and Oman agree on a Hormuz framework, while fighting in Yemen escalates between government forces and Houthis.
Al Jazeera’s @Mohammadfff_ reports.

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The three-match series marks England’s first Test outing since the retirement of captain Ben Stokes and sacking of head coach Brendon McCullum.

Joe Root will captain the side for the first time since being reappointed to the role in July, with Marcus Trescothick serving as interim head coach. McCullum’s replacement, Stephen Fleming, will begin his tenure against South Africa in December.

England’s 16-man squad for the first two Tests against Pakistan: Joe Root (c), Jofra Archer, Gus Atkinson, Shoaib Bashir, Harry Brook, Brydon Carse, Sam Cook, Jordan Cox, Ben Duckett, Matthew Fisher, Emilio Gay, Dan Lawrence, Ollie Pope, Ollie Robinson, Jamie Smith, Josh Tongue.

Lawrence, who earned the last of his 14 Test caps in September 2024, is rewarded for his domestic form. The 29-year-old is the second-highest run-scorer in Division One of the County Championship, with 788 runs at 65.66, including five centuries, in 13 innings.

He is slated to bat at six, filling a middle-order vacancy created by Stokes’ retirement, but is far from a like-for-like replacement for the former captain.

Only Gus Atkinson (79 wickets) has taken more Test wickets for England than Stokes (78) since the start of June 2022. Lawrence, who bowls right-arm off-spin, has taken nine wickets from 178.2 overs in the County Championship this season.

Former vice-captain Pope was replaced by Bethell at number three for the final two Ashes Tests in Australia following an extended period of poor form and was subsequently dropped from the squad against New Zealand.

Like Lawrence, he has performed well in the County Championship, scoring 510 runs at 56.66, including five 50+ knocks, for Surrey, but will not automatically slot back into the side in Bethell’s absence.

Bethell suffered a knee injury during the ODI series against India in July and is set to be replaced by Jordan Cox, who made his Test debut against New Zealand at the Oval, at number three.

England’s men’s national selector, Marcus North, said: “We have selected a squad for the first two Tests that balances rising talent with the experience needed against a quality Pakistan team.

“Dan Lawrence returns following an exceptional season so far with Surrey and we believe he has the right level of experience, maturity and skill to complement our middle order.

“Jordan Cox is well regarded as one of the most exciting talents in English cricket and will have the opportunity to bat at three in place of Jacob Bethell, who sadly misses this series through injury.”

Essex’s Sam Cook returns to the squad for the first time since last summer. The 29-year-old seamer made his international debut against Zimbabwe in May 2025 and was named in the squad for the five-match series against India but did not feature.

Brydon Carse returns after a broken wrist ruled him out of the Indian Premier League and the start of the Test summer while England are sticking with spinner Shoaib Bashir, who featured in the first and third Tests against New Zealand after being overlooked during the Ashes.

Footage shows blast victims hurried into a hospital in northwestern Pakistan, after a suicide bombing at a police station in Kabal near the Afghan border killed at least 14 people. Crowds of people had been protesting nearby when the bomb exploded.