oversight

A longer version of this piece in Spanish was published on Marisela’s Substack.

After the systemic rupture that the US incursion of January 3 represents, chavismo has embarked on its third great metamorphosis, carrying out a profound reengineering in a context of tutelage and transactional pragmatism. In my view, the Venezuelan State is undergoing a deep transformation rather than facing an imminent transition to democracy. Nevertheless, the government of Delcy Rodríguez is pursuing this transformation with remarkable speed and bluntness.

The survival of the chavista system has required the sacrifice of its original forms, forcing a mutation that uses economic opening as social anesthesia and the sophistication of repression as a guarantee of stability.

From the oil embargo on Cuba to microeconomic measures that we will discuss in the following lines, these milestones are the material proof of a power that has chosen to fill itself with realism, and to sacrifice its traditional epic narrative.

The case of Alex Saab and friends

A most scandalous event over which public officials have remained silent is the alleged arrest of Alex Saab. Saab was removed as Minister of Industries and National Production on January 17. Although Delcy initially presented the move as a departure to assume new responsibilities, it ultimately marked the beginning of his demise in Venezuela. According to reports from The New York Times, La Nación, and Infobae, SEBIN agents detained Saab and businessman Raúl Gorrín, the owner of TV network Globovisión, who has long navigated sanctions and power and lost his media and political shield almost simultaneously with the capture of Maduro. The novel element in this second arrest of Saab is that reports describe an operation carried out with the knowledge and cooperation of the FBI. It would appear that the new leadership in Caracas is willing to hand over key figures to US authorities in exchange for validation and stability.

Both men immediately disappeared from the public radar. Two weeks later, the Spanish broadsheet ABC claimed that the Trump administration has demanded judicial cooperation from Delcy regarding nine figures close or formerly close to the government, including Maduro’s son (known as Nicolasito), Tareck El Aissami (arrested by Maduro in 2024) and, of course, Alex Saab and Raúl Gorrín. The report describes Saab as “the man who knows where the money is.” The dismissal on February 23 of Saab’s wife, Camilla Fabri (appointed vice minister for international communication a year earlier) reinforces the hypothesis of Saab’s detention.

In the mining sector, foreign capital has abandoned concessions due to the absence of minimal infrastructure and the suffocating control of armed groups.

In theory, the US would be seeking access to Saab’s testimony and archives in order to finish dismantling the money laundering and drug trafficking networks surrounding Maduro’s inner circle. Following his arrest in Cape Verde in 2020 and a prolonged legal battle in Florida over his alleged diplomatic immunity, Saab was released and sent back to Venezuela in December 2023 through a complex prisoner exchange. Upon arrival, he was granted a high political profile and appointed president of the International Center for Productive Investment, positioning him as the key operator for attracting foreign capital under sanctions.

The Saab-Gorrín case demonstrates that chavismo’s ongoing metamorphosis involves sacrificing the financiers who helped evade sanctions in previous years. Even after leading an intense campaign for Saab’s release in 2023, National Assembly president Jorge Rodríguez has shown no hesitation in serving in a government that makes him disappear on the orders of a foreign power. Ruling chavismo now seeks to present itself before Trump as a renewed, pragmatic actor and, above all, one unified under a centralized command without visible fractures. The official silence surrounding this issue stems from the fact that the capture of strategic allies buys the Rodríguez siblings time to manage the internal divisions this would inevitably generate.

Supervised economic liberalization

Since early January, the government has accelerated decrees and measures of economic opening that were previously unthinkable, such as the Hydrocarbons Law’s reform. The objective is to accelerate economic timelines in order to demobilize political demands. However, while the government is betting on a rapid economic rebound to pre-empt any possibility of opposition reorganization, a deep gap is beginning to emerge between the rhetoric of hope and the reality of purchasing power, which continues to deteriorate.

To assess the supposed implementation of these measures, I spoke with economist Manuel Sutherland to unpack the speculation that currently dominates public debate. According to his analysis, the exchange rate system has not undergone structural change: the allocation of foreign currency remains discretionary. Financial flows reveal a complex triangulation in which oil revenues are deposited in a fund in Qatar and then routed to an account at the US Treasury Department. From there, major banks acquire foreign currency through auctions restricted to the purchase of American goods. This process, executed in an opaque environment by private banks, occurs alongside discussions of tax exemptions for certain goods, such as vehicles.

Contrary to public perception, there has been no acceleration of privatization, while in the mining sector, foreign capital has abandoned concessions due to the absence of minimal infrastructure and the suffocating control of armed groups. What initially appeared to be a fast-tracked path toward economic recovery under American supervision now seems to be advancing at the same pace as, or even behind, political changes. The dissonance that once represented a danger for democratization (rapid economic liberalization coexisting with political stagnation) is not occurring. On the contrary, the slow economic rebound is unable to keep pace with the acceleration of political dynamics, which has gained renewed vigor through the mobilization of relatives of political prisoners. While the economy remains trapped in inertia and opacity, the political chessboard is being shaken by social pressure that the government appears not to have anticipated in its calculations for stability.

Amnesty and softer repression

By managing to adapt to this new scenario, chavismo shows it retains room of maneuver to ensure its permanence. This continuity is guaranteed by opening strategic pressure valves in response to the two main sources of coercion: internal social pressure and external pressure. The tactical softening of repression manifests itself as an unfolding of chavismo toward more sophisticated forms of exercising power. During the opening of the judicial year, the acting president delivered a striking speech announcing an amnesty law. The timeframe established for the law (1999-2025) functions as a symbolic rupture with the era that precedes her. All of this seeks to project renewed leadership based on the pillars of efficient technocracy and a pacifist façade.

The Amnesty Law thus operates as both a pacification mechanism and a transactional trophy for the Trump administration. A trophy meant to reduce the political cost of external pressure without implying any real dismantling of the repressive apparatus. It is a functional mutation that attempts to stabilize the system through a new version of authoritarian peace that can only be challenged if social pressure and mobilization manage to move beyond the mirage of this merely symbolic rupture.

Venezuela has ended up suffocating Cuba more effectively than the Helms-Burton Act.

However, attempts to “unify” the country through this law have had the opposite effect. Instead of extinguishing the spirit of struggle, it has revived it. On February 6, while the amnesty bill was still being debated, National Assembly president Jorge Rodríguez appeared at an infamous detention center before the mothers of political prisoners who were on vigil. Rodríguez established a novel form of blackmail: if the law were approved within a record seven days, their children could be released. None of this happened. The discussion was delayed, and once the law was enacted, the release process proved extremely slow. In addition, new cases of abductions and disappearances have emerged, while those who have been released leave prison without fear and determined to remain in the streets. None of this had been anticipated by Jorge Rodríguez.

This whole process, which is still ongoing, has brought the tacit recognition of political prisoners, the implementation of mass release measures, and the positioning of political prisoners within the public discourse—an issue the Maduro government always preferred to deny.

Oil embargo on Cuba and sales to Israel

The abrupt halt in crude shipments to Cuba—confirmed through maritime tracking by specialized firms—has also not been officially acknowledged by Venezuela. Reuters has been the leading outlet reporting the drop in shipments. According to its investigations, based on internal documents from the state oil company PDVSA and export data, Venezuela has prioritized cargoes destined for companies such as Chevron in order to secure foreign currency flows, leaving supply to Cuba in operational limbo. What is new? The beginning of a phase of energy suffocation for Havana led by Venezuela.

Despite the evidence of reduced shipments, neither Caracas nor Havana has issued statements acknowledging a suspension. What has been officially reported, however, is the dismantling of Cuban missions in Venezuela. Official Gazette No. 6,885 published decrees ordering the intervention, restructuring, and liquidation of emblematic social programs such as Mission Barrio Adentro and the Housing Mission.

In addition, international correspondents in Caracas, such as Sarah Kinosian, have reported the departure of Cuban medical personnel and military advisers. These reports cite internal sources in ministries and testimony from health workers who have been notified that their contracts are ending and that they must return immediately to the island.

Within a span of only a few minutes, the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry published and then deleted from all its platforms a statement expressing solidarity with the Islamic Republic of Iran following recent bombings.

How long can the rupture between Caracas and Havana remain hidden in discourse? And what implications does it hold for the Latin American left, which has remained silent about Venezuela’s authoritarian drift in order to preserve a utopian narrative? The only official source regarding the oil embargo on Cuba came from Miguel Díaz-Canel, who admitted that “we are going to live through difficult times” and announced a plan to deal with “acute fuel shortages,” acknowledging that no crude has arrived since December. As one of history’s paradoxes, Venezuela has ended up suffocating Cuba more effectively than the Helms-Burton Act.

Another shift that also lacks official confirmation is the presumed resumption of oil sales to Israel, reported only by Bloomberg and maritime tracker Kpler. Although the government has dismissed these reports as fabricated news through its communications minister, the flow of roughly 200,000 barrels toward the Haifa refinery suggests a reality consistent with the scenario of tutelage and its geopolitical ramifications (Venezuela severed relations with Israel in 2009).

The erosion of the anti-imperialist narrative

An episode that occurred on March 1 offers a window into the speed with which the government has decided to push through a compliant policy shift and how it appears to be redefining its strategic ties. Within a span of only a few minutes, the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry published and then deleted from all its platforms a statement expressing solidarity with the Islamic Republic of Iran following recent bombings.

The episode suggests a latent tension between the discursive inertia of certain officials and the logic of tutelage guiding the government’s current decisions. More than a mere coordination error, the incident could be interpreted as a symptom of constant monitoring of Venezuelan foreign policy by the US embassy in Caracas, or of unclear internal guidelines regarding this shift, where preserving negotiation channels with Washington must prevail over historical ideological loyalties.

The novelty of this shift lies not only in the rhetorical distancing, but in the fact that the internal fissure has become visible. For the first time in decades, the opportunity cost of maintaining a symbolic alliance with Tehran appears to be perceived by the political leadership as greater than the benefit of ideological consistency. This exercise in digital cleansing reinforces the hypothesis of a system that will prioritize the stability of financial flows guaranteed by American tutelage over the rhetoric of confrontation, marking a drastic departure from the alliances that once sustained chavismo.

The reality is that there has been a change in governmental behavior. Not only has the government implemented measures that clash with the historic conduct of a regime attached to the ideological agenda of the revolution, but it has also shown clear difficulty in the communication management of these measures. This suggests they may respond to a strategy of obedience to the occupying power while exploiting certain windows of opportunity for remaining in power.

Delcy Rodríguez’s government knows that exposing the measures recently adopted could generate even deeper cracks within the internal structures of chavismo. So now, in many instances, we just have silence.

Feb. 18 (Asia Today) — An alleged financial link between a National Intelligence Service employee and a graduate student accused of sending a drone to North Korea has fueled questions about oversight and accountability within South Korea’s intelligence community, an Asia Today columnist wrote Tuesday.

The case surfaced last month when authorities disclosed that a man in his 30s had allegedly sent an unmanned aerial vehicle to North Korea. Initial investigations focused on possible involvement by the Army Intelligence Command.

However, political and intelligence sources cited in the column questioned why the National Intelligence Service, widely regarded as the control tower of South Korea’s intelligence apparatus, was not initially central to the probe.

The controversy deepened when investigators said an NIS Grade 8 employee had engaged in financial transactions with the graduate student. A joint military-police task force reportedly applied charges including general treason, a serious offense involving harm to national military interests or aiding an enemy state.

The NIS said the matter involved “a personal financial transaction by an administrative department employee” and denied any organizational link to North Korea-related operations. The agency argued that without proof of institutional involvement, the actions of an individual cannot be attributed to the entire organization.

The columnist wrote that regardless of whether the agency was formally involved, sustained contact and financial dealings between an intelligence officer and a suspect in a North Korea-related case raise concerns that go beyond individual misconduct.

The commentary also questioned whether internal control systems functioned properly and whether warning signs were missed. It noted that less than two years have passed since a separate intelligence leak involving a civilian employee at the military intelligence service.

The writer argued that the issue ultimately points to the broader condition of South Korea’s intelligence oversight system and called for a thorough investigation to address public doubts.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260218010005525

Feb. 12 (UPI) — The U.S. government issued a warning to Peru after a judicial ruling limited that nation’s oversight over the Chancay megaport, one of the country’s main port infrastructures operated by China’s Cosco Shipping.

“We are concerned by recent reports indicating Peru may be unable to oversee Chancay, one of its most important ports, under the jurisdiction of predatory Chinese owners,” the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs said in a statement posted on X.

The publication underscored “Peru’s sovereign right to supervise critical infrastructure in its own territory” and questioned the origin of investment in the megaport located north of Lima.

“Let this serve as a warning to the region and the world: cheap Chinese money costs sovereignty,” the U.S. authority said.

In recent years, Beijing has expanded its presence in strategic sectors, such as infrastructure, energy and technology, across Latin America — a trend that has drawn concern among U.S. policymakers.

Chancay, opened in 2024, aims to become a key logistics hub linking South America with Asia. The project has been presented as a milestone for Peruvian trade and part of China’s growing footprint in regional port infrastructure.

The State Department’s statement followed a ruling by a Peruvian court that limited the authority of the Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso Público, known as Ositran, the national transport infrastructure regulator, over the Chancay terminal, according to local outlet RPP Noticias.

The decision upheld an injunction awarded to Cosco Shipping Ports, the Chinese state-owned majority shareholder in the port. The company argued that Chancay was fully financed with private capital, operates without a state concession contract and functions under an administrative authorization granted by Peru’s National Port Authority.

The ruling ordered Ositran to refrain from regulating, supervising, auditing or sanctioning activities at the port. It said subjecting the terminal to that regulatory framework would violate the claimant company’s constitutional rights to property, free enterprise and legal certainty, according to newspaper La República.

The court also said that public use is a functional characteristic of port services, but does not automatically trigger the legal framework applied to state-concession ports.

In practice, the decision means the regulator cannot intervene directly in terminal operations or impose administrative controls. However, the ruling does not eliminate all state oversight.

Instead, supervisory responsibilities would be redistributed among various Peruvian regulatory bodies, with Ositran excluded from comprehensive regulation except in limited circumstances.

Ositran President Verónica Zambrano said the agency will appeal the ruling, arguing the company may seek to avoid Peruvian regulations.

“They are a public-use company providing services to the public. That condition creates legal consequences, including oversight by Ositran, because we supervise public transport service providers,” Zambrano told news channel Canal N.

She added Peru’s National Port Law defines a port administrator as an operator of public-use transport infrastructure and said this applies to Cosco Shipping.

Separately, Peru’s Cabinet Office issued a statement on X regarding the judicial process involving Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Peru S.A. Authorities said they will defend private investment while respecting Peru’s regulatory framework.

Ministers added that if conditions outlined in the ruling affect Ositran’s supervisory role, the government will use legal remedies available under existing law.

As part of the National Security Strategy promoted by President Donald Trump’s administration, the U.S. president has called a summit for March 7 in Miami with several Latin American leaders considered strategic allies.

The meeting aims to consolidate a regional bloc aligned with Washington amid growing Chinese investment, trade and diplomatic influence in Latin America, Infobae reported.

Among the invited leaders are Argentine President Javier Milei, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, Paraguay’s Santiago Peña, Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa, Bolivia’s Rodrigo Paz and Honduras’ Tito Asfura.

In addition to economic issues, the agenda includes coordination on security matters, particularly the fight against drug trafficking and the management of migration flows.