opinion

China, through its Belt and Road Initiative, is playing a role in promoting “global prosperity,” as this is the shared goal of the Global South. During the United Nations’ celebration of Global South Day on September 12, 2025, China calls on countries of the Global South to actively participate in and lead the reform of the global economic governance system, which will further unite developing countries and make them companions on the path to development and recovery. Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, China also supports civilizational dialogue and harmony with diversity among various developing countries of the Global South under the umbrella of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as this represents the true nature of the world pursued by the Global South. China proposed “enhancing communication and dialogue and supporting each other in taking a modernization path appropriate to national conditions.” China also announced that it would take the lead in establishing a “Think Tank Cooperation Alliance for the Global South,” which will inject new impetus into mutual learning among the world’s civilizations.

  Chinese President Xi Jinping affirmed, while delivering a speech at the “BRICS Plus Leaders’ Dialogue” on October 24, 2024, that “China will take the lead in establishing a (collaborative alliance of think tanks in the Global South). In this context, the Chinese capital, Beijing, hosted the “Conference of Think Tanks of the Global South” on October 21, 2024. Representatives from more than 70 countries from the Global South participated in the conference, which was held under the theme of “Peace, Development, and Security.”

  China positions the Belt and Road Initiative as a key platform for South-South cooperation. From an academic standpoint, I can classify the BRI as South-South cooperation, triangular cooperation, and a hybrid paradigm for many reasons. From my academic perspective, as an internationally renowned Egyptian expert on Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I believe that China’s Belt and Road Initiative serves as a model for cooperation between China and developing countries in the Global South, as well as for trilateral cooperation. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, under the slogan of “Working together for modernization and building a community with a shared future,” has led to increased political mutual trust between China, developing countries in the Global South, and all countries that have joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. This has been achieved through coordinating positions and policies to reach consensus on regional issues and global challenges, thus strengthening the power of countries in the Global South and raising the voice of developing countries, led by China.

   Here, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward new ideas and proposals for building a “high-level community with a shared future between China and developing countries of the Global South,” with China announcing new measures and procedures for practical cooperation with countries of the South, addressing new topics, such as “state governance, industrialization and agricultural modernization, peace and security, as well as high-quality cooperation within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative,” and others, to the mutual benefit of all, in accordance with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s well-known principle of “win-win and mutual benefits for all.”

 China’s Belt and Road Initiative represents a new Chinese journey toward modernization, the advancement of a community with a shared future between China and the global South, and a new chapter in the friendship between the Chinese people and the people of developing countries, generating strong momentum for global modernization.

  From my academic perspective, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is an attempt by China to propose an alternative global economic system in cooperation with developing countries of the Global South, in opposition to US hegemonic policies. China opposes the current global economic order dominated by the United States and its Western allies, which is based on protectionism, unilateralism, and hegemony. Therefore, Beijing is working to present an alternative vision for a global economic system based on cooperation, a point President “Xi” sought to emphasize at the forum, describing his initiative as a comprehensive alternative to the Washington-led global order.

  Unsurprisingly, in the context of this vision, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated his criticism of what he called “unilateral sanctions, geopolitical competition, and bloc policies.” This was an implicit reference to recent US policies toward Beijing, which, in Washington’s view, are a means of mitigating risks, while Beijing views them as aimed at hindering its development and rise.This vision was also expressed in the “white paper,” in which Beijing described the Belt and Road Initiative as an alternative to the current global economic model, which is “dominated by a few countries.”

  Based on the above analysis, we understand the reasons behind China’s support for developing countries in the Global South through its Belt and Road Initiative and its efforts to establish a think tank for an alliance of developing countries in the Global South. For years, China has made no secret of its dissatisfaction with the current US-dominated global order, which it describes as a system built on Western hegemony and treating other countries with duplicity and condescension. It asserts that this system has failed to resolve international crises, emphasizing the need for a new, more just, and effective system. China argues that the current global order is unfair and excludes the interests of developing countries, citing economic disparities, political interventions, and the imposition of Western standards on the majority of the world’s countries.

West Africa is becoming a silent powder keg that could explode into a cataclysmic situation in the next few years. As the world’s attention remains focused on Europe and the Indo-Pacific, Islamic extremist organizations are gaining traction and territory along Africa’s “coup belt.”

Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, all ruled by pro-Russian military juntas, are facing military defeats and setbacks by al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates. A spillover of the conflict could create a domino effect not only on the African continent but also in Europe and among various regional and world powers, all of which have vested interests in Africa.

Jihadist Foothold in the Maghreb

The Sahel region is haunted by a lack of political leadership, miscommunication amongst regional neighbors, and persistent military coups that have allowed extremist organizations to flourish. In the early 2010s, al-Qaeda’s Maghreb branch, AQIM, suffered degradation from counterterrorism operations in Algeria but found reinvigorated life from Mali’s instability.

Taking advantage of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali, jihadist groups affiliated with AQIM rapidly captured major Malian cities in the North and threatened to march South. In response to the jihadist threat, the West would conduct two major French-led interventions in Serval and Barkhane that pushed the al-Qaeda-led extremist factions back but did not defeat them fully.

Several Islamist militia factions and AQIM would formally merge to form Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in 2017 to combat Malian, West African (ECOWAS), and Western forces, along with consolidating their remaining held areas. Using a lack of control on other neighboring borders, JNIM and later ISIS would spill over the insurgency into Burkina Faso, Niger, and others.

Rise of the Russian-Backed Juntas and Wagner Group Atrocities

The fight against JNIM and ISIS would take a major turn due to the rise of the coup belt, which is a domino effect of unstable governments being ousted by military officers, which led to hostile juntas across West Africa. Since 2020, coups have frequently taken place in Mali, Niger, Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Gabon.

The blowback from the repeated coups became detrimental to countering ISIS and JNIM, as the military juntas refused cooperation with Western states that had the capabilities to target jihadists, train fledgling African militaries, and provide valuable intelligence. The Malian junta particularly ended collaboration with France and demanded a French withdrawal from their country, which Paris started in 2022, while the government denied being forced to leave.

Furthermore, the United States would lose its largest drone base on the continent in Niger as the Nigerian junta broke off military cooperation with Washington and demanded a withdrawal. The drift between the junta and the West left a powder keg that Russia would soon exploit.

The Kremlin dispatched the Wagner Group/Afrika Corps to prop up the juntas in the coup belt in a deal to provide ‘protection’ in return for resources. Outside of gas and oil, Russia also uses the black-market illicit resource trade from Africa to help fund its invasion of Ukraine.

Russian mercenaries are enshrined in atrocities along the coup belt, such as wholesale massacres of villages in Mali, sexual assaults, and using locals as slave labor to extract minerals. Furthermore, the presence of Russian mercenaries is turning Africa into another front of the Russo-Ukrainian War as Kyiv’s special forces conduct clandestine operations against the Afrika Korps in the region.

The Russian-backed Juntas Are Rapidly Losing Control

The aforementioned drift between regional blocs such as ECOWAS and Western states capable of providing resources that West African nations don’t have is having a detrimental effect on combating extremism in the region. In Mali, the brutality of the military junta and aligned African Corps mercenaries is now having a blowback, as both forces have attempted to subdue Tuareg separatists unsuccessfully.

In late July of 2024, several dozen Wagner and Malian junta soldiers were ambushed by Tuareg militia in Tinzaouaten, marking the deadliest ambush for Russian mercenaries in Africa in several years. Further losses have led to one-third of Malian territory either being contested or controlled by JNIM or ISIS as of 2025.

Niger’s junta government is also facing setbacks from extremist militias. Without U.S. advisors and the drone base supplementing local Niger forces, ISIS’s Sahel-affiliated IS-GS now has a foothold that encompasses Western Niger’s territory. Digressing from ECOWAS and having a diplomatic conflict with Nigeria, Niger no longer has cross-border cooperation on counterinsurgency operations, which Boko Haram, IS-GS, and JNIM are taking advantage of.

Burkina Faso’s security situation is rapidly deteriorating under Ibrahim Traore, the most pro-Russian junta leader in West Africa. Currently, 40% of Burkina Faso’s territory is under the control of or contested by JNIM.

Russia has been unable to stop the advance of the Islamist extremist groups through its Wagner and Africa Corps mercenaries due to several factors. With the war in Ukraine causing a plethora of equipment losses to the Russian military, Moscow has been unable to fulfill defense contracts of weapon exports to their allies and interests in Africa. After losing influence in Syria, the South Caucasus, and, to a lesser extent, Central Asia, the Kremlin could also lose its key West African juntas as their invasion of Ukraine ties down critical assets.

Implications for Africa and Europe

Growing regional instability in West Africa will have looming negative effects for outlying countries in the region. With the junta’s disengagement in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations with more experienced countries, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other extremist groups will continue to grow or perhaps even take over key provincial capitals, as seen with decades of combating extremism in Somalia.

Jihadist groups historically implemented archaic forms of sharia law that include frequent executions for minor infractions. Because of fears of what JNIM and ISIS will implement, along with atrocities committed by the junta, a brewing, exacerbated refugee crisis could unfold in both Africa and Europe.

Russia has used armed conflicts in Africa to its advantage, particularly due to the refugee crisis, which plays into Moscow’s hybrid warfare strategy. Using Islamist insurgencies that fuel the refugee crisis towards Europe plays into the Kremlin’s strategy of attempting to prop up pro-Russian political parties under the guise of anti-migration, as seen in Hungary, Slovakia, Germany, France, and others.

Regional security and stability are crucial to the interests of Africa, the West, and the East. The lack of governance enacted by the juntas, along with their failures in counterinsurgency, is now having negative consequences on the continent. Unless the coup-belt officers turn course and allow regional coordination to combat al-Qaeda and ISIS, the jihadists will continue to gain ground and perhaps create a major base of operations not seen since ISIS’s ‘caliphate’ that stretched across large swaths of Iraq and Syria.

From the Cuban Missile Crisis to the war in Ukraine, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union—and later post-Soviet Russia—have followed a dangerous pattern: miscalculation and misadventure followed by blowback. Both sides have pursued strategies and have plunged into involvements that backfired, damaged their own national interests, and destabilized international security. Unless this history is faced honestly, there is a risk that the two nuclear superpowers will continue repeating mistakes with unintended catastrophic consequences.

Early in the Cold War, American policy often failed to adjust to important shifts in Moscow. After Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, seasoned diplomats and analysts urged Washington to test whether the new Soviet leadership might pursue a less confrontational line. The father of U.S. containment policy, George F. Kennan, though no longer in government, warned against treating the Soviet Union as immutable and pointed to “evidence of flexibility, of experimentation, of responses to circumstance.” Charles E. Bohlen, who succeeded Kennan as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1957, reported that the Kremlin’s new collective leadership appeared intent on consolidating power at home and sought a breathing spell from confrontation.

Scholars such as the influential Sovietologist Philip Edward Mosely argued that Khrushchev’s language of “peaceful coexistence” reflected more than mere propaganda. Within the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Harold Stassen, who served as the president’s special assistant for disarmament from 1955 to 1958, pressed for serious consideration of Soviet arms-control proposals. All of these voices were basically brushed aside by an increasingly hawkish and rigid national security establishment. The costs of that rigidity became clear in the confrontation that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous moment of the Cold War, demonstrating the dangers of poor judgment and misperception and the terrifying reality of deterrence through Mutual Assured Destruction. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev misjudged U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s resolve, believing he could install nuclear missiles in Cuba without provoking confrontation. In Washington, officials failed to appreciate how threatening their deployment of 15 intermediate-range Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey and 30 more in Italy as part of NATO strategy appeared to Moscow. Khrushchev’s move was in part a direct response to this strategic imbalance.

The crisis ended when Moscow agreed to withdraw its missiles from Cuba in return for a public pledge by the U.S. not to invade Cuba and a secret agreement to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy. What one side saw as deterrence, the other viewed as provocation—and the result was near catastrophe. Although Khrushchev won concessions, the perception of a humiliating retreat fatally weakened him, contributing to his removal from power in 1964.

In the U.S. the outcome was remembered mainly as a triumph. Kennedy’s public image as a tough leader capable of standing up to Soviet aggression was markedly enhanced following the earlier failed U.S. invasion of Cuba—the 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle—which had raised doubts about his leadership capabilities. But the deeper lesson—that both sides had stumbled into a confrontation that could have destroyed humanity—was only partly appreciated. The crisis led to the establishment of a teletype “hotline” between the White House and the Kremlin to prevent future miscommunications and to a series of arms control agreements. But Moscow embarked on a massive nuclear buildup over the next quarter-century. Moreover, Cuba’s security was strengthened, solidifying its position as a Soviet client state—just 90 miles from the U.S.—emboldened to eventually intervene militarily, overtly and covertly, in conflicts in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.

Afghanistan, 9/11, and NATO’s Enlargement

Afghanistan was another defining episode. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor from 1977 to 1981, later acknowledged that U.S. aid to Afghan rebels secretly began months before the Soviet invasion in 1979, with the deliberate aim of luring Moscow into a costly conflict. When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December of that year, the effort escalated dramatically. Billions in U.S. and Saudi funds flowed through Pakistan’s intelligence services to arm the mujahideen, and the introduction of Stinger missiles shifted the balance of the war. President Ronald Reagan expanded it into the largest-ever U.S. covert operation.

The conflict became what Mikhail Gorbachev called a “bleeding wound,” hastening the Soviet Union’s collapse. But the blowback was horrific. Afghanistan became a crucible of jihadist radicalization, producing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and ultimately drawing the U.S. into two decades of war following the terrorist group’s September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S. homeland.

The Cold War’s end was expected to usher in a new era of peace and stability. Instead, decisions taken in the 1990s and 2000s deepened mistrust. As former Warsaw Pact states sought NATO membership, Washington viewed enlargement as stabilizing. Russian leaders, however, saw it as betrayal, claiming they had been given assurances during German reunification that NATO would not move eastward.

Boris Yeltsin protested, Vladimir Putin internalized the grievance, and resentment hardened. Washington assumed Russia was too weak to resist. But enlargement, intended to consolidate peace, became a seed of future confrontation.

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the most consequential blunder of the post–Cold War era. Putin underestimated Ukraine’s resilience and misjudged the resolve of the Western alliance. Far from fracturing, NATO was revitalized. Ukraine’s identity was strengthened, and severe Western sanctions isolated Russia from the West, making it heavily reliant on China for trade, technology, and diplomatic support.

The invasion also ended Europe’s longest tradition of neutrality. Finland joined NATO in 2023. Sweden, neutral since the Napoleonic era, followed in 2024–25. Instead of curbing NATO, Russia’s war of aggression produced NATO’s largest expansion in decades and transformed the Baltic Sea into what has frequently been called a “NATO lake” owing to control by the alliance of almost the entire Baltic coastline and key strategic islands.

Nearly eight years to the day before Russia’s invasion, Henry Kissinger had warned in a March 2014 op-ed article in the Washington Post that “Ukraine should not join NATO” and should instead become a neutral East-West bridge, while U.S. and European policy should avoid feeding Russia’s fears that its security or existence was under threat. That advice was ignored. Encouraged to believe it could partner with NATO and eventually be accepted as a member of the alliance, Ukraine became a flashpoint of confrontation and the stage for the largest and most devastating war in Europe since World War II.

In short, from the brinkmanship of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the proxy war in Afghanistan, from NATO expansion to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, actions born of misjudgment have resulted in outcomes neither side intended—with each insisting the other is solely to blame.

Russia’s authoritarian rule suppresses serious discussion and debate. But in the U.S. and allied nations, the aversion to meaningful discourse is harder to excuse. Democracies owe their citizens an honest accounting of past errors to learn from them, not to justify or excuse Moscow’s behavior.

If policymakers keep turning from history, the dangerous dynamic of blunder and blowback will continue—with risks no generation should be asked to bear.

The announcement of Archbishop Damianos’ resignation from St. Catherine’s Monastery in Sinai, after decades of leadership, has brought to light more than an internal monastic dispute. It has exposed a larger power struggle at the intersection of ecclesiastical diplomacy and international politics. The controversy surrounding the monastery, one of the most historic centers of Orthodoxy in the Middle East, has turned into a stage where rival patriarchates, foreign influence, and states assert their presence.

For many observers, Damianos’ departure was not simply the end of an era but the culmination of months of escalating tension between the Monastery, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, and wider Orthodox dynamics influenced by Moscow.

Jerusalem’s contested claims

At the heart of the dispute lies the claim of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem over Sinai. In its official response, Jerusalem characterized Damianos’ statements as “anti-ecclesiastical” and questioned even the authorship of his lengthy announcement, suggesting manipulation by third parties. Ecclesiastical circles interpret this as a deliberate strategy of delegitimization, portraying the elderly Archbishop as incapable of independent action in order to undermine his authority.

Beyond rhetoric, Jerusalem has consistently sought to present Sinai as canonically dependent on its patriarchal throne, despite the historic sigillion of Patriarch Gabriel IV in 1782, which sealed the monastery’s autonomy. For Damianos and his supporters, such attempts constitute ecclesiastical encroachment and a direct violation of centuries-old canonical order.

Moscow’s shadow over Sinai

Damianos’ final announcement did not spare Moscow either. He accused the Russian Church of fueling division within Orthodoxy and exploiting internal fissures of the Sinai brotherhood. According to his account, networks and organizations aligned with Russian influence attempted to capitalize on the crisis, promoting narratives foreign to Orthodox theology and tradition.

For ecclesiastical diplomacy analysts, this dimension is crucial. It situates the Sinai crisis within the broader confrontation between Constantinople and Moscow over primacy in the Orthodox world, extending the arena of contestation from Ukraine to the deserts of Sinai. The monastery thus becomes more than a spiritual center; it is a geopolitical outpost in the struggle for influence.

Athens and Cairo as indispensable actors

The role of Greece has emerged as pivotal. Damianos repeatedly underlined that without the active involvement of Athens, the monastery would have faced existential threats. The recent law 5224/2025, combined with constitutional guarantees, was presented as a shield of protection for the monastery’s legal and institutional identity.

At the same time, Egypt remains a decisive interlocutor. The court decision of Ismailia in May 2025 that challenged elements of the monastery’s status placed the issue squarely within the Egyptian legal framework. Damianos himself acknowledged that any durable solution requires a tripartite understanding between Athens, Cairo, and the monastery’s leadership.

This triangular dynamic underscores that the future of Sinai cannot be separated from Greek–Egyptian relations, a strategic partnership already central in the Eastern Mediterranean. The monastery, therefore, becomes both a symbol and a test of bilateral trust.

Ecclesiastical diplomacy at a crossroads

The broader Orthodox world has also been drawn into the crisis. Several patriarchates expressed support for Sinai, including Constantinople, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Serbia, while Jerusalem remained isolated in its claims. The silence of Moscow, combined with its indirect involvement, reinforced perceptions that Sinai has become a flashpoint in the Orthodox fragmentation that Russia has often been accused of exacerbating.

For Constantinople, Sinai’s autonomy is not negotiable. For Jerusalem, asserting control is both a matter of prestige and regional influence. For Moscow, exploiting divisions serves its wider strategy. And for Athens, safeguarding the monastery is part of its cultural diplomacy and historical responsibility toward the Eastern Christian heritage.

A power game with lasting implications

The resignation of Damianos closes a personal chapter but opens a much larger one. The crisis of Sinai illustrates how monastic autonomy, canonical tradition, and national diplomacy intersect. What appears as an ecclesiastical quarrel is, in fact, a power game of influence that involves patriarchates, states, and international alignments.

The outcome of the succession process, and whether a unified brotherhood can emerge, will determine not only the monastery’s internal cohesion but also the credibility of Greek–Egyptian partnership and the balance within Orthodoxy.

For analysts of ecclesiastical diplomacy, Sinai has become a microcosm of the wider struggle shaping the Orthodox world: the tension between autonomy and control, between local tradition and geopolitical leverage. The desert of Sinai, where Moses once received the Law, is today a battlefield of influence where spiritual heritage collides with political ambition.

Lord Palmerston’s maxim that “We have no eternal allies nor perpetual enemies. “Our interests are eternal and perpetual,” aptly describes the rapidly changing nature of India-China relations. Border strife has been the norm between the two nations for decades, shaping their strategic stances. However, October 2024 saw a minor thaw in relations, with New Delhi and Beijing coming to terms with a major agreement on patrolling protocols along the disputed LAC. This breakthrough led to a series of high-level diplomatic engagements in a carefully measured but pragmatic manner. More importantly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping engaged in direct bilateral talks at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, which was followed by a defense ministers’ conversation during the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting in November. The momentum then carried over into December in the form of the revival of the India–China Special Representatives Meeting, one of the important strategic platforms that had been asleep for five years. Although these developments do not eliminate deeply ingrained strategic distrust, they demonstrate a realist convergence; both nations are putting national interests ahead of ideological or historical animosities, embracing engagement rather than isolation as a way to manage competition and maintain regional stability.

In August 2025, Mr. Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Affairs Minister, visited India after three years for the improvement of the relationship between the two nuclear and emerging regional states. During his stay in India, Wang Yi co-chaired the 24th round of the Special Representatives’ Dialogue on the Boundary Question between India and China with the National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval. He also had bilateral discussions with Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar and met Prime Minister Modi. His visit after the 2020 Galwan clashes between India and China primarily concentrated on bilateral issues like border stabilization, economic cooperation, and regional security.

Therefore, Mr. Wang Yi’s visit to India marks a recalibration of ties based on a healthy and stable India-China relationship that serves the long-term interests of both countries.Secondly, the visit preceded PM Modi’s trip to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, his first visit in seven years, thereby laying the groundwork for stronger bilateral engagements. Thirdly, the visit came at a crucial time, as both countries face pressure from shifting US trade orientations, resulting in a push for pragmatic recalibration of ties and a strategic embrace on both sides.

However, during the month of February 2025, the Indian government ordered the erasure of 119 Chinese applications from the Google Play Store and, by June, announced a five-year tariff on imports of Chinese industrial inputs, which read as putting up a false facade of resistance against Beijing. However, the most compelling contrast comes from the diplomatic posture of India; calling for normalization with China while acting tough on them quite literally sounded like shouting at a neighbor while still borrowing sugar from them. Abandonment by America becomes evident for Modi; therefore, his choice of dialogue with Beijing reinforces both strategic weakness and duplicitous diplomacy. After many years during which warnings on Chinese expansionism were issued, the border may remain tense, but New Delhi seems determined to maintain good relations with China. This very decision of shaking hands underscored India’s inability to match China on political, strategic, and economic fronts. Meanwhile, Wang Yi’s parallel visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan highlight Beijing’s much broader regional priorities, reminding New Delhi just how far it is from being at the very center of China’s diplomacy.

The SCO Summit in Beijing saw the attendance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who sought to mend ties between China and India after a period of tension; however, unresolved grievances cast serious doubts on the sustainability of this rapprochement. In the short term, ties may improve, since India has realized how great the necessity for cooperation with China has become in pushing its economic ambitions. This necessity to engage China more aggressively is driven especially in light of strained relations with the US under Trump’s steep tariffs. However, deep sensitivities on sovereignty and territorial integrity argue against any form of a sustainable relationship with China, beginning at the Sino-Indian border conflict and continuing through Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir to China’s stance on Tibet. Mutual suspicion over regional engagements also exists, fueled by Beijing’s relations with Pakistan and New Delhi’s burgeoning naval cooperation in Asia. Contrasting language in the Modi–Xi meeting readouts, with India stressing a “multi-polar Asia” while China glossed over it, further reflects differing perspectives on the regional order. Through the stopover of Modi in Japan before going to Beijing and participation in the SCO Summit while skipping China’s Victory Day celebrations, it shows India’s cautious attempts to consolidate strategic autonomy, moving closer to both China and Russia while not disturbing the US or the West. If there is not any forward movement on the substantive disputes, the tensions will resurface in time, making any sustainable rapprochement between India and China again very unlikely, even if large-scale conflict does not seem to be a strong possibility.

In short, India and China may converge temporarily out of pragmatism, but without resolving core disputes, trust will remain elusive. New Delhi’s balancing act between Beijing, Washington, and Moscow highlights both its ambitions and vulnerabilities. Lasting peace requires more than symbolic summits—it demands substantive compromises on sovereignty, security, and regional influence. Until then, rapprochement will remain fragile, an uneasy truce rather than a genuine transformation.

The Middle East in 2025 is still a powder keg, a place where dreams of peace get chewed up by the gritty, messy reality of the region. Donald Trump is swinging big with his “peace through strength” slogan, doubling down on his love for Israel. His grand plan? Pump up Israel’s military muscle, hit Iran where it hurts, and get Arab nations to play nice with Israel. Sounds like a neat fix, right? But it’s slammed headfirst into a wall of troubles: the never-ending Palestinian crisis, the boiling rage of people across the region, and the flat-out refusal of countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to let Israel call the shots. Those recent strikes on Iran’s nuclear plants? They haven’t brought peace; they’ve just cranked up the odds of a full-blown disaster.

Where “Peace Through Strength” Comes From

               Trump’s whole Middle East game plan boils down to one idea: flex enough muscle, and diplomacy will follow. He’s got Israel pegged as the region’s anchor, betting that backing it to the hilt while smacking Iran’s nuclear sites will somehow calm the storm. That’s why he’s cheering on Israel’s fights against groups like Hezbollah and Hamas and pushing hard to spread the Abraham Accords. But here’s the kicker; this plan’s all about brute force, not sitting down to talk, and it’s turning a blind eye to the Middle East’s messy politics and deep-rooted feelings. Israel’s dependence on Uncle Sam’s cash and weapons just shows how wobbly this idea is from the start.

               This strategy, born from the alliance between America’s hard-right and Israel’s leadership, mistakenly believes military might can forge peace; a brutal approach that ignores the region’s history and heart. By dismissing the people’s realities and internal politics, the plan is inherently fragile. It hasn’t cooled tensions; it’s ignited them, proving you can’t bully your way to calm.

The Palestinian Challenge

               The biggest snag in Trump’s big vision is Palestine. The war in Gaza’s been a gut-punch to the region, breaking hearts and making it tough for Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, to buddy up with Israel. Gulf leaders are under fire from their own people; they can’t just sign deals that leave Palestinians in the dust.              Without a real ceasefire and a promise to give Palestinians a state of their own, any talk of peace is just hot air. Netanyahu’s crew, egged on by hardliners, keeps betting on bombs over talks, digging everyone into a deeper hole. With no real plan for what’s next in Gaza, the region’s spiraling toward chaos and new waves of defiance.

               This war’s not just hurting Israel’s rep in the Middle East; it’s tanking it worldwide. Israel’s operations, with their heavy toll on civilians, have lit a fire under Arab anger and slashed global support for Israel. Even countries that got on board with the Abraham Accords are feeling the heat at home to back off. It’s plain as day: without tackling Palestine head-on, no peace plan’s got a shot. Leaning on military might hasn’t steadied the region; it’s kicked it into a tailspin.

               Big players like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt aren’t about to roll over for Israel’s power grab. Saudi Arabia laid it out straight: no Palestinian state, no deal with Israel. Turkey, which used to be on decent terms with Israel, is now one of its loudest critics, thanks to Gaza and Israel’s chummy ties with Greece and Cyprus. Turkey’s bulking up its military and missiles, carving out its own path in the region. Egypt and other Arab states are also holding back, scared of the blowback if they jump on Israel’s bandwagon. This pushback screams one truth: you can’t force peace at gunpoint.

               Even Gulf states like the UAE and Bahrain, who signed onto the Abraham Accords, are getting jittery. They’re worried that sticking too close to Israel without progress on Palestine could spark trouble at home. Turkey’s stepping up in Syria and playing peacemaker, trying to cut Israel’s influence down to size. These rivalries show that banking on Israel to run the show doesn’t bring folks together; it splits them apart. Real peace? It’s still a distant dream.

Striking Out on Iran

Those recent hits on Iran’s nuclear sites, part of Trump’s go-hard-or-go-home strategy, didn’t land the way he hoped. Reports say only one of three targets got knocked out, and the others are set to fire back up soon. Iran’s digging in, moving its nuclear work to underground hideouts, proving bombs alone can’t stop them. Worse, these strikes have trashed any chance of Iran trusting talks, jacking up the risk of a bigger fight. Instead of breaking Iran’s spirit, this move’s just made it more stubborn.

               The plan’s fallout is chaotic. Fearing a collapsed Iran would mean disaster and refugees, Gulf states are balking at the U.S.-Israel warpath. They’re keeping ties with Tehran to avoid a bigger blowup, proving the region isn’t buying a “peace through strength” doctrine. By juggling relations with both sides, they’re pulling the rug out from under a strategy that puts Israel first and ignores the complex realities on the ground.

The Shaky Ground of the Abraham Accords

               The Abraham Accords, once Trump’s shiny trophy from his first term, are wobbling in 2025. They’ve warmed things up between Israel and some Gulf states, but good luck getting Saudi Arabia or Qatar to join without a fix for Palestine. Public fury over Gaza’s bloodshed has Arab leaders walking a tightrope; they can’t afford to get too cozy with Israel without paying a steep political price. This shakiness proves one thing: a plan that bets everything on Israel’s clout can’t pull the region together.

               Trying to grow the Accords has hit a brick wall too. Countries like Oman and Qatar, who were once open to chatting, are backing off, squeezed by their own people and the region’s vibe. It’s a loud wake-up call: without real movement on Palestine, the Accords won’t turn into some grand regional love-fest. They’re more like quick deals for cash and military perks, not the deep roots needed for lasting peace. It’s another strike against forcing things through.

Israel’s Lonely Road

               Israel’s moves, especially in Gaza, have left it standing alone on the world stage. Even old pals like the European Union are pulling back, though they’re not ready to throw punches. By scoffing at international law with a “rules are for losers” attitude, Israel and the U.S. have dented Israel’s cred as a regional heavyweight. This isolation, plus the crushing cost of war, is wearing down Israel’s staying power.

               This global cold shoulder’s also messing with Israel’s ties to big players like China and Russia, who are calling out U.S. and Israeli military stances while eyeing their own slice of the Middle East pie. This global rivalry, paired with fading support for Israel in world forums, has kneecapped its regional swagger. Without legitimacy at home or abroad, a plan built on firepower can’t deliver lasting peace. It’s a screaming case for real diplomacy and regional teamwork.

               Inside Israel, Netanyahu’s got a firestorm on his hands. Failing to lock in a full Gaza ceasefire or free all hostages has folks fed up, exposing deep cracks in the country. Israel’s die-hard belief that guns can bring peace doesn’t match the region’s reality. The war’s brutal cost, for Palestinians and Israelis alike, shows this road’s a dead end. Without a clear plan for Gaza’s future or a legit Palestinian setup, Israel’s just asking for more trouble and upheaval.

               These homegrown woes are tangled up with money and social struggles. Crazy-high war spending, shrinking foreign cash due to global isolation, and political knife-fights between hardliners and moderates are tying Netanyahu’s hands. This mess, plus pushback from the region and the world, shows that Israel running the show isn’t just a long shot; it’s a one-way ticket to more chaos.

               Trump’s big dream for Middle East peace, riding on Israel’s military might and a chokehold on Iran, has gone up in smoke because it ignored the real issues—Palestine above all. This muscle-over-talks approach hasn’t brought the region together; it’s lit a match under people’s anger and sparked pushback from local governments. Hitting Iran might’ve scored a few points for a minute, but it didn’t stop their nuclear plans; it just killed any hope of sitting down to talk. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, by saying no to Israel’s grip, have made it crystal clear: peace won’t happen without justice and respect for Palestinian rights. Israel’s growing loneliness, the wobbly Abraham Accords, and its own internal fights all shout that “peace through strength” has only churned up more trouble. A calm, steady Middle East needs real diplomacy, respect for people’s rights, and the guts to face the root of the fight, not just leaning on force and control.

California’s top law enforcement official has weighed in on Monday‘s controversial U.S. Supreme Court ruling on immigration enforcement.

Atty. Gen. Rob Bonta condemned the decision, which clears the way for immigration agents to stop and question people they suspect of being in the U.S. illegally based solely on information such as their perceived race or place of employment.

Speaking at a news conference Monday in downtown L.A., Bonta said he agreed with claims the ACLU made in its lawsuit against the Trump administration. He called indiscriminate tactics used to make immigration arrests a violation of the 4th Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.

Bonta said he thinks it is unconstitutional “for ICE agents, federal immigration officers, to use race, the inability to speak English, location or perceived occupation to … stop and detain, search, seize Californians.”

He also decried what he described as the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on its emergency docket, which he said often obscures the justices’ decision-making.

“It’s disappointing,” he said. “And the emergency docket has been used more and more. You often don’t know who has voted and how. There’s no argument. There’s no written opinion.”

Bonta called Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh’s opinion “very disturbing.”

The Trump-appointed justice argued that because many people who do day labor in fields such as construction or farming, engagement in such work could be useful in helping immigrant agents determine which people to stop.

Bonta said the practice enables “the use of race to potentially discriminate,” saying “it is disturbing and it is troubling.”

The U.S.-China competition is intensifying in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the maritime domain, and it is increasing the risk of a dangerous miscalculation. Both countries are rapidly building up their navies, reinforcing their deterrence posture, and heading for riskier military encounters. Yet while the buildup of hard power is accelerating, crisis management mechanisms are left shockingly underdeveloped.

Such dynamics remind one of the most unfortunate security failures in modern history: the pre-WWI Anglo-German naval race. Similarly, at the time, rising powers clashed at sea, backed by nationalist ambitions and rigid alliance systems, while mechanisms for de-escalation and maritime communication were nonexistent. Eventually, a fragile security environment was formed, prone to escalation from small events into a global conflagration.

Today, the U.S. and China are taking a similar path. If the United States does not urgently invest in an institutionalized crisis management mechanism alongside its defense modernization, it could lead to a strategic trap that is “ready to fight but unprepared for de-escalation.”

Risk of Escalation: Today’s U.S. and China

Like Germany’s pre-1914 maritime expansion under the Kaiser’s rule, China is attempting to modify the regional order by its naval power. In 2023, China’s PLA Navy commissioned at least two Type 055 destroyers and multiple Type 052D and Type 054A frigates, totaling more than 20 major naval platforms (including submarines and amphibious ships). Simultaneously, sea trials of Fujian, China’s third aircraft carrier—the most technologically advanced naval vessel in the fleet—have begun. In addition, coupled with A2/AD capabilities such as anti-ship ballistic missiles, including DF-21D and DF-26, such a military buildup can be considered a clear intent to complicate U.S. Navy operations in the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea.

The U.S. response was strong and swift. Under the context of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), Washington has invested more than 27 billion USD since FY 2022 in forward basing, pre-positioning of munitions, and enhancing maritime operational resilience in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, the U.S. Navy is continuously investing in Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, Virginia-class fast-attack submarines, and unmanned platforms. Strategic clarity is increasingly shaped by operational deterrence, and a greater number of U.S. naval platforms are now being forward deployed in contested waters.

Yet, just like before WWI, investment in military hardware is ahead of investment in crisis management systems. The gap between military capability and the mechanisms to manage conflicts is increasing, and such misalignment was what led the European countries to disaster in 1914.

Historical Parallels: The Anglo-German Trap

The Anglo-German naval race that occurred from the 1890s to 1914 reminds us of the current situation in the Indo-Pacific. Due to its industrial confidence, nationalist ambition, and strategic anxiety, Germany challenged the UK’s naval supremacy. In response, the UK reinforced its maritime dominance, built the revolutionary HMS Dreadnought, and eventually triggered a vicious cycle of competitive arms racing.

Despite the growing perception of risk, naval arms control was unsuccessful. The construction freeze proposed by the UK was refused by Berlin, and diplomatic overtures, including the 1912 Haldane Mission, collapsed due to distrust, lack of transparency, and domestic political pressures.

Effective crisis management did not exist. Maritime incidents that occurred in the North Sea and the Mediterranean were not arbitrated while diplomacy was intermittent and reactive. When the two sides tried to slow down the arms race, strategic distrust was deeply embedded. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand transmogrified into a world war not because of one party’s aggression but because there was no off-ramp. Similar vulnerabilities exist in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

The Crisis Management Gap

Although some formal structures (military hotlines) exist between the U.S. and China, such instruments turn out to be continuously ineffective during crisis situations. During the 2023 Chinese balloon incident, Beijing did not respond to the U.S.’s urgent request for a hotline call. After Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit in 2022, China suspended the senior defense dialogue.

Meanwhile, risky close encounters are increasing. For example, in June 2023, a Chinese J-16 fighter intercepted a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft in a dangerous manner. In the same month, a Chinese destroyer violated navigation safety norms by crossing directly in front of USS Chung-Hoon in the Taiwan Strait.

These incidents are not individual events but systemic ones. And such events are occurring while there are no reliable institutionalized communication protocols between the two sides, where both are under a constant alert status.

To correct this, it is advisable for Washington to create a Joint Crisis Management Cell within INDOPACOM. This center should include liaison officers from the U.S., Japan, and Australia and be empowered to rapidly activate de-escalation protocols when a high-risk maritime incident occurs, even if high-level political channels are stagnant. This crisis management cell should utilize pre-negotiated crisis response templates—similar to an air traffic controller managing near-miss procedures—and guarantee the clarity and continuity of communication.

At the same time, the U.S. should embark upon a U.S.-China maritime deconfliction agreement, modeled upon the U.S.-Soviet INCSEA accord of the Cold War era. That accord, negotiated in 1972, defined maritime encounter procedures and communication protocols, and it proved durable even during the height of the Cold War. The modern version of INCSEA does not necessitate trust but is a functional necessity when heavily armed parties are operating at close range.

Strategic Effectiveness, Rather Than Symbolic Hardware

In the early 20th century, the UK’s naval expansion was not necessarily strategically consistent. Occasionally prestige overwhelmed operational planning, and doctrine lagged behind technological innovation. The U.S. should avoid falling into a similar trap.

Modern U.S. Navy planning should emphasize systems that actually provide effectiveness in a contested environment. In that sense, unmanned systems, including the MQ-9B SeaGuardian, long-range munitions like LRASM, and resilient RC2 structures are necessities. Such capabilities could enable U.S. forces to function even under missile saturation and communication denial situations.

Logistical innovation is also crucial. Forward bases situated in Guam, the Philippines, and Northern Australia should be diversified and strengthened to serve as maritime resupply nodes and distributed logistics hubs.

In addition, all these elements should be coordinated across domains. The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, and allies’ coordinated integrated capacity would be sine qua non for effectively projecting power and managing military escalation.

Alliance Management and Entanglement

Although entangled alliances did not trigger WWI, they did contribute to its rapid escalation. The risk lay not only in misjudgment but also in the absence of a common structure that could manage shocks within complexly interconnected treaty systems.

The U.S. faces a similar risk. While the U.S. is maintaining defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, it is deepening its alignment in the region with AUKUS and the Quad. But many of these arrangements lack joint crisis response protocols or clear role expectations concerning the Taiwan contingency or conflictual situations in the South China Sea.

To mitigate such inherent risk, Japan should proactively lead in creating a Strategic Escalation Forum by 2026. This forum would summon decision-makers of the U.S.’s key allies—Australia, India, and the ASEAN countries—and jointly plan crisis responses, define thresholds, and establish mechanisms that provide political signaling during escalation.

As for South Korea, it should clarify its stance of non-combat in a Taiwan contingency through declaratory policy. This would confirm that South Korea would not dispatch troops to the Taiwan Strait, yet it could include commitments of logistics support, cyber operations, and intelligence sharing. Such a stance would lessen Beijing’s misunderstanding and alleviate allies’ concerns while enabling Seoul to prevent itself from being entrapped by a high-intensity scenario.

At the same time, Washington should initiate scenario planning on how AUKUS and Quad partners could contribute to coordinated crisis management, not necessarily through combat roles but through measures including ISR, sanctions enforcement, and strategic signaling.

The Future Path: To Prevent Another 1914

U.S.-China naval competition will not disappear, at least in the foreseeable future. Yet Washington has a choice: it could escalate through inertia, or it could manage competition through strategy. It is important to construct more submarines and missiles, yet that alone is insufficient. The genuine risk lies in the absence of an institutionalized safety mechanism.

If Europe was engulfed in the 1914 war due to unmanaged arms races and rigid alliances, the Indo-Pacific could also face a similar fate. If leaders in Washington do not create a structure that could absorb shocks and prevent escalation, the Taiwan Strait, just like Sarajevo, could become a spark.

The historical lesson is to plan for great powers not to collide with one another, rather than leaving them to rush toward an inevitable collision.

Washington should act now—not after a collision, but before—by institutionalizing a de-escalation mechanism before the strategic environment becomes rigid. The window of opportunity for prevention is still open, but it is narrowing.

IT may not be an imposing castle and there’s no Claudia Winkleman but Downing Street has become the stage for a real-life version of The Traitors.

Sir Keir Starmer set the scene for weeks of vicious plotting when he banished his faithful deputy from the Cabinet.

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His gushing letter to Angela Rayner after she was forced out was true to the hit TV series.

It could be summed up as: “So sorry, Ange. I really like you and I really, really hope it isn’t you. But I’ve got to go with my gut.”

But it hasn’t washed with her admirers who now see her as a standard bearer for Labour’s Left.

The problem for the PM is whether his ousted sidekick will be recruited by The Traitors — a clique of MPs and activists hellbent on revenge.

They think Sir Keir is the real traitor — a class traitor — and are ready to unleash anger and resentment that has been building up over the past 14 months.

‘Knives are out’

When Ms Rayner quit as Deputy PM and Housing Secretary, she also stood down as Labour’s Deputy Leader — an elected position.

The search for her successor will become a divisive and bloody battle for the soul of the party.

One activist declared: “It’s going to be carnage. The knives are out already — and many of them are aimed at Starmer’s back.

“Most MPs can’t stand him or his politics, and over the past week their hatred has gone off the scale.”

Ms Rayner and her supporters are not the only people to harbour a grudge against the PM.

Her departure forced him into a hasty Cabinet reshuffle in which several of her colleagues were also thrown under the bus.

One minister dumped in Sir Keir’s shake-up even vowed privately: “I’m going to f*** him up.”

The deputy leadership race could now turn into a proxy war to destabilise the PM and find his successor.

There are whispers about a stalking horse to pave the way for Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham to steal the crown and, bizarrely, that Ed Miliband is pondering a bid for a leadership comeback.

The scandal has also exposed the Prime Minister’s indecision and weakness — flaws he once levelled at Boris Johnson.

Sir Keir allowed Ms Rayner to cling on to her job for eight days after it was revealed she had avoided paying £40,000 stamp duty on her swish new seaside property at Hove, East Sussex.

It was clear that at the very least she was guilty of rank hypocrisy and had to go.

One of his biggest tests will be the Budget on November 26

You’d think after being gifted £2,400 of free spectacles, Sir Keir would have seen what was coming.

But he left it to an ethics adviser to reach the inevitable conclusion — and even then, the PM didn’t sack her but let her resign.

Sir Keir knows he must fix the economy and stop the boats if he has any chance of winning the next General Election.

But the Left has been angered and emboldened, and their opening salvos are likely to be fired at the Labour Conference in Liverpool later this month.

One of his biggest tests will be the Budget on November 26, when drastic action is needed to plug the £50billion black hole in Britain’s finances.

Normally, all the pressure would be on Rachel Reeves to deliver. But the PM sidelined the Chancellor last week to take personal charge of economic policy.

He appointed his own economics guru and poached Ms Reeves’s geeky number two Darren Jones as well as the Chancellor’s chief tax adviser to join his No10 team.

One disgruntled source said: “Keir has made it clear he plans to own the next Budget.

“If that’s the case, he can shoulder all the blame when it goes down like a bag of cold sick.”

Cabinet heavyweight Pat McFadden has been put in charge of forcing through welfare reform, months after benefit cuts were ditched amid a backbench rebellion. His task just got a lot harder.

Time to get a grip

Another big mission — which eclipses any TV challenge Claudia could set — is to tackle the asylum crisis.

Voters are desperate to see this Government deliver on its promises soon

Sir Keir staged a clear-out of the Home Office at the weekend, removing Home Secretary Yvette Cooper and two of her ministers following their failure to stop the boats and close migrant hotels.

Hardly a surprise, as Sir Keir has had more success removing ministers than asylum seekers.

He has ushered in tough-talking former Justice Secretary Shabana Mahmood — who supports chemical castration for serious sex offenders — to head up the dysfunctional department.

The PM knows that if she is unable to get a grip of the nation’s number one concern, he won’t be given time to send in a third team.

Voters are desperate to see this Government deliver on its promises soon.

Sir Keir returned from his summer break to declare he had begun “phase two” of his plan to change Britain.

If it continues like this, there won’t be any time for a phase three.

Voters will ask Sir Keir to reveal whether he’s a Faithful or a Traitor.

Then banish him from Number 10.

REFORM MP Lee Anderson wants schoolkids to wave Union Flags and sing the National Anthem at morning assembly.

Not so much Cool ­Britannia as School Britannia.

WHILE the nation was entranced by the Angela Rayner scandal, the Green Party elected a former hypnotherapist as its new leader.

Zack Polanski once claimed he could help women who wanted larger breasts by unlocking the power of their minds.

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Now he’s turned his attention to growing his membership before persuading the rest of us to reverse Brexit.

I can only imagine how he’ll do that.

Perhaps he’ll mesmerise us into a second referendum with an election speech which goes: “Look into my eyes, look into my eyes.

One, two, three . . . you’re back in the EU.”

Cambodia is one of the key hubs for gambling operations in Southeast Asia. Online and offline gambling have expanded to neighboring countries, contributing to the proliferation of transnational crimes such as human trafficking, online scams, and labor exploitation. Women are the most vulnerable group to exploitation and violence. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), there are at least 100,000 victims of human trafficking working in Cambodia (UNODC, 2023). High poverty rates and limited job opportunities in the country increase people’s vulnerability to becoming trapped in these crimes. Many victims are offered well-paid jobs, but in reality, they are often forced to work, sexually exploited, and subjected to abuse.

Gender inequality and patriarchal structures in Southeast Asia exacerbate women’s vulnerability to human trafficking, sexual violence, and economic subordination. The Indonesian Embassy in Phnom Penh recorded 1,761 Indonesian citizens who were victims of online scams in Cambodia, with the majority of them identified as women (Sekarwati, 2024). This situation indicates that transnational crimes based on illegal gambling not only threaten a country’s economic stability and national security but also create humanitarian crises and strengthen gender inequality in the region.

Conceptual Framework

 Feminism does not interpret gender in a biological context but rather as a social construct that creates a hierarchy between masculinity—associated with strength and rationality—and femininity, which is often considered inferior. This hierarchy produces inequality between women and men (Baylis et al., 2014). Feminism also emphasizes the importance of integrating women’s experiences and voices into global political analysis (Enloe, 2014). This perspective is emancipatory, as it explains the subordination of women in marginalized positions within the patriarchal international system. Therefore, feminism can be used to analyze state policies, particularly in the areas of security and transnational crime, which have traditionally focused on state interests and control over individuals, without considering the impact on women as the main victims.

Legalization of Gambling and Reproduction of Patriarchy by the Cambodian Government

Besides being the largest gambling center in Southeast Asia, Sihanoukville is a thriving hub for fraud and human trafficking operations. In 2020, there were 193 casinos in the city, indicating tremendous growth for gambling in Cambodia (Sok, 2023). The Cambodian government is taking advantage of gambling bans in neighboring countries such as Thailand and China by legalizing casino operations in areas such as Sihanoukville. This allows foreigners who cannot gamble in their home countries to play in Cambodia. This also attracted foreign investors from China to open a gambling industry in Cambodia since the Chinese government has strict restrictions on the gambling industry. In addition, Cambodia facilitates the development of gambling by providing various facilities to Chinese syndicates, such as tax exemptions, as the government considers the gambling industry an important source of revenue. In 2019, this sector contributed US$85 million to the country. Therefore, the Cambodian government considers that the gambling industry has a corresponding effect on other sectors, such as the economy, tourism, and services (Luo, 2023).

By legalizing the gambling industry, the Cambodian government is prioritizing economic interest over human security. In this context, economic gains take precedence over women’s security and rights. From a feminist perspective, this policy reflects a patriarchal structure in which women are positioned as objects to be controlled for economic purposes. Their bodies and labor are exploited as tools to generate profit, without adequate protection or recognition of their rights. As mentioned before, the gambling industry is closely linked to the economic, tourism, and service sectors, where women are the most vulnerable group, often exploited as sex workers and servants for foreign gamblers in Cambodia. The government’s policies uphold gender inequality and reinforce a patriarchal system that subordinates women. Women are physically and sexually exploited to satisfy men’s interest, while the state, through the legalization of gambling, legitimizes this objectification. As a result, certain men and elites benefit, while social justice and gender equality are neglected.

The state plays a role as an institution that maintains patriarchy through gender-discriminatory laws, policies, and political practices (Walby, 1990). The Cambodian government fails to provide job opportunities and develop a strong economic sector for its citizens; hence, the gambling industry is considered one of the most profitable sectors. As a result, women in the region are easily trapped in these crime syndicates due to limited employment opportunities and poverty.

Exploitation and Objectification in the Gambling Industry in Cambodia

            The prevalence of gambling and other transnational crimes in Cambodia makes the country both a transit point and destination for victims of human trafficking in Southeast Asia (De Leon, 2024). Trafficked women are often subjected to gender-based violence, including being forced into inappropriate work, overworked with inadequate wages, and assigned tasks that threaten their safety and security. Women are particularly vulnerable to being manipulated into working as ‘prostitutes.’ There is even a form of unconscious ‘voluntary’ prostitution, in which prostitution is perceived as a means of earning a living. From an abolitionist feminist perspective, prostitution violates human rights, and women involved in this activity are considered victims of human trafficking. According to Kathleen Barry, women who believe they are voluntarily engaged in prostitution are, in fact, victims of manipulations by crime syndicates, which create a false consciousness as a survival strategy (Lobasz, 2009).

            Furthermore, online gambling advertisements on illegal websites often display images of beautiful women in sexy and seductive clothing. In this context, women are objectified to influence the public to visit these online gambling sites, reflecting the gender bias that places women in a subordinate position to men (Ikhsani, 2023). In the development of online gambling, women’s bodies are exploited for the economic benefit of certain elites, often men. The state overlooks this exploitation as long as it does not threaten national security as a whole. Women’s voices are rarely heard in discussions about gambling; they are often treated merely as statistics rather than as subjects who experience structural violence rooted in the patriarchal system and reinforced by socially constructed stereotypes.

The Impact of Gambling Expansion in Cambodia for Indonesia

            From Indonesia’s perspective, the impact of online gambling expansion in Cambodia is significant. According to the Indonesian Ministry of Immigration and Corrections (2024), between 2020 and 2023, a total of 1,233 Indonesian citizens fell victim to human trafficking in Cambodia. This situation is exacerbated by limited employment opportunities in Indonesia, which drives citizens to seek work abroad without realizing the potential risk of exploitation. Moreover, the Indonesian government estimates that more than 3 million Indonesian citizens are involved in online gambling activities that cost the country around USD 20 billion (UNODC, 2024). The high poverty rate in Indonesia encourages many of its citizens to play online gambling to find an easy way to earn money. This widespread practice has a negative impact on women, especially housewives, who are vulnerable to domestic violence due to a gambling-addicted partner. This addiction triggers financial conflicts as perpetrators divert funds for household needs to gambling. In many cases, the perpetrator forces his spouse to commit crimes such as stealing or even ‘exploiting’ his wife to pay all his gambling debts. According to the Central Statistics Agency of Indonesia (BPS), in 2024 there were 2,889 divorce cases caused by gambling (Revo M, 2025).

            Furthermore, women face the double burden of earning a living to meet household needs while simultaneously taking care of the home. In some cases, women endure domestic violence from their partners because they feel powerless to report it. They also face negative stigma from their social environment as a result of their partner’s involvement in online gambling. This reflects a social system in Indonesia that tends to blame the victim rather than the perpetrator, labeling women as being incompetent in managing the household, poor at handling finances, or even failing to take care of their husbands (Kamalludin, 2024).

State Security vs. Human Security

            In 2020, the Cambodian government enacted the Law on the Management of Commercial Gambling, which provides for the licensing and regulation of commercial gambling. However, the government had already officially banned all forms of online gambling in 2019. This policy was not solely aimed at protecting the interests of its citizens but rather at maintaining diplomatic relations with China. China has been exercising its soft power in Southeast Asia by collaborating with Cambodia to transform Sihanoukville into an economic city (Luo, 2023). From a feminist perspective, this policy reflects elements of masculinity, as the government prioritizes interstate cooperation over the human security—particularly women—who are increasingly vulnerable to being re-trafficked or even criminalized by the state.

            In addition, the large number of Indonesians involved in illegal gambling practices in Cambodia has prompted the Indonesian government to tighten security measures and cooperate with Cambodia through the Cambodia-Indonesia Bilateral Meeting on Immigration Matters to eradicate this crime. Feminist perspectives criticize government policies for being overly masculine, as they tend to prioritize state security and interstate cooperation. Feminist scholars also critique traditional theories that prioritize state interest over individual security, ultimately placing the safety of victims below the security needs of the state. In terms of interstate cooperation, policies developed by regional and international organizations primarily focus on strengthening borders, enhancing cooperation, improving law enforcement, and tightening the control of document production. These approaches concentrate on punishing perpetrators without addressing the structural problems that make victims vulnerable to exploitation by transnational crime syndicates. Moreover, because state policies are focused on state security, victims are often treated as criminals and deported without any support services. This lack of protection leaves them vulnerable to being trafficked again (Lobasz, 2009).

Conclusion

Feminist perspectives offer a critical space for women’s voices in international politics, especially in addressing the impact of illegal gambling and transnational crime. Gender inequality in social structures and patriarchal culture makes women the most vulnerable to exploitation, violence, and subordination. The case of gambling in Cambodia shows how women’s safety and rights are marginalized in favor of the state’s masculine interests. The state upholds the patriarchal system through policies that prioritize national security over individual protection. Therefore, it is important for governments, both at the domestic and regional levels, to consider gender-sensitive policies to prioritize human security that guarantees the rights, safety, and dignity of every citizen, ensuring protection without gender discrimination.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 25th summit, held early September in Tianjin, China, unprecedentedly redefined its diverse future ambitions; global governance, sustainable development, and security are emerging as the cornerstones—and China is at the forefront of this transition. With strategic alliances in the background, India and Russia, together with SCO’s regional members and the Global South, are unwaveringly playing complementary roles towards establishing a more inclusive, participatory, and fairer world. In other words, the SCO summit served as a space for dialogue and multilateral cooperation, working to strengthen regional security, economic development, and political collaboration.

Our latest insight into reports: Chinese President Xi Jinping affirmed in his opening speech at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, that “the SCO represents a model for a new type of international relations, and that we must advocate for equal and orderly multipolarity in the world, inclusive economic globalization, and promote the construction of a more just and equitable global governance system.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech was unanimously approved by all participating leaders, especially with UN Secretary-General António Guterres also stating emphatically that “China plays a fundamental role in supporting global multilateralism.” From a multitude of different perspectives, Jinping’s strategic position to lead the new geopolitical architecture is primarily to challenge the prevailing western-controlled unipolar order. His “peace or war” narrative signals an effort to position China as a primary actor in global decision-making processes and to position China and its partners as influential drivers.

It’s worth noting that China is leveraging current global instability to advance a multipolar framework and further pursuing an assertive shift in global power dynamics, directly challenging the longstanding dominance of Western nations. Significantly, Xi Jinping’s proposal to pursue consistently a bold commitment to world peace and sustainable development, seeking a broad representation in multilateral institutions and organizations (including the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank), is explicitly grounded in renewing primary principles that respect diversity. A concrete example is the call for UN Security Council reform, where China supports expanding representation to better reflect today’s world, including countries from Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Why Multipolarity Matters to Russia

It is well-known and glaringly visible across the world that China has comparatively wider or broader consolidated economic clout and has displayed these past several years, indiscriminately strengthening its economic cooperation with Latin American, African, and Asian countries. On the other side, Russia seemed to be selecting its own ‘reliable partners,’ which offered some limitations despite the official position advocating for tectonic multipolarity. Russia’s world is, more or less, divided into ‘friends and enemies’ according to its definition and understanding of one world, one planet.

Following the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has been exploring economic transformation, modernizing and upgrading its economy, as seen unfolding now. And of course, there have been challenges and obstacles. In practical terms, Russia has come a long way with its current perestroika and glasnost in the country and its relations with former Soviet neighbors and consolidating foreign policy around the world.

In conclusion of his official visit to the SCO summit in China, Vladimir Putin, at the final media conference on September 3rd, pointed out that most of the documents adopted by participants look to the SCO’s future in the emerging new world. “In this context, I would like to point out China’s global governance initiative. More importantly, this initiative is aimed at promoting positive sentiments between the countries that attended the summit in China and potential partners among the countries that are not willing today to proclaim their readiness for new partnership.”

As part of the partnership, Putin stressed that “Russia has always opposed Ukraine’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But we have never questioned its right to conduct its economic and business activities as it wishes, including joining the European Union.” As for whether the multipolar world has formed or not—generally, its contours have certainly taken shape. Multipolarity does not mean the emergence of new hegemons. Among many other countries with similar perspectives, Russia and China consistently advocate for a fairer world order based on the global majority. There are economic powerhouses, such as India and China, and either within the SCO or within BRICS, all participants in international affairs should have equal rights, and all should be in the same position from the standpoint of international law. 

Putin’s expressions throughout the SCO summit, interlaced with candid viewpoints on the emerging world—in fact, the current world system—should concentrate on building relations and interactions on the basis of the world’s majority. “The idea—I mentioned this earlier—is that the world should be multipolar, meaning that all participants in international communication should be equal, and more equal than others should not exist, and the unipolar world must cease to exist, including in the interests of those, at least in the interests of the peoples of those countries, whose leadership still upholds this moribund and, one might even say, already obsolete system,” underscored Putin at the media conference.

China’s Comparative Advantages as Global Leader

China is situated in the Asian region. Despite its large population of 1.5 billion, which many have considered an impediment, China’s domestic economic reforms and collaborative strategic diplomacy with external countries have made it attain superpower status over the United States. While United States influence is rapidly fading away, China has indeed taken up both the challenges and unique opportunities to strengthen its position, especially its trade, investment, and economic muscles.

Arguably, China has worked on all aspects of its economy and external investment footprints; these combined are now recorded as its grandiose achievements. Still, for example, China is engaging in a long-term competition with the U.S., and that is the challenge for the United States. China’s global investment and trade are just unimaginable and give the country global power.

It has systematically transformed its economy at the same time and maintained the political structure. Its major cities and coastal areas are far more prosperous compared to rural and interior regions. Of course, the United States has also developed its individual states, while Russia’s regions look not too far different from the typical Soviet era.

Experts vehemently argue and vividly show how useful the population (demography) has been as a factor for China’s success down the years. It is a matter of how to get the population to support the growth of the economy. With the 1.5 billion population, China has brought more people out of extreme poverty than any other country in history. China reduced extreme poverty by 800 million. The United States has a population of 380 million, two times more than Russia, which has a meager 140 million in relation to the size of the country. In one of his previous speeches, Putin declared that Russia’s population could reach 146 million by 2025, mainly as a result of immigration. Russia has been expelling foreign labor out of the country instead of deploying this labor to the regions, in industries and agricultural fields, to increase its exportable presence in the countries in need and in the external markets.

It is highly likely that Russia would be missing its opportunity, especially due to a shortage of labor. It has to develop its regions and modernize most of the Soviet-era industries to produce export goods, not only for domestic consumption. Its investment and trade in consumables is only developing at a snail’s pace compared to China. While China’s Belt and Road Initiative has expanded significantly over the previous years, Russia is more focused significantly on oil and gas as export products. In recent years, Russia has significantly strengthened bilateral ties with Asian countries such as China, India, North Korea, and Vietnam. With new agreements signed at the 25th SCO summit, China and India would be extending their economic tentacles to Russia’s Far East, producing in the special industrial zones and exporting massively across, utilizing the northern transport corridor to the European Union. 

Certainly, superpower status has to be attained by practical, multifaceted, sustainable development and maintaining appreciably positive relations with the world. In a global context dominated by diverse tensions, Beijing already presents itself as a stable and reliable alternative for international collaboration. From the analysis, China is practically up to this world’s leadership.

Background: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Eurasian political, economic, and security bloc, has become a key platform for China and Russia to promote alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. Against the backdrop of strained ties with the United States and global economic turbulence, the bloc converged in Tianjin, China, with leaders from over 20 non-Western countries in attendance. 

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is steadily increasing its influence in addressing pressing international issues. It serves as a powerful driver of global development processes and the establishment of genuine multilateralism. As of today, in addition to its ten (10) full members, the SCO also engages two observer states—Mongolia and Afghanistan—as well as 15 dialogue partners. It was established in 2001 and has actively worked to promote peace, security, trust, and cooperation across the Eurasian continent. 

On August 31, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was in Tianjin, China, to attend the 25^th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Türkiye has begun to regularly attend SCO summits in recent years. President Erdoğan attended the Samarkand summit in 2022 for the first time as president. He then continued the tradition by attending the Astana summit in 2022 and the Tianjin summit this year. With Erdoğan’s participation in the SCO summit, the Turkish media’s coverage of the summit also increased. Especially when browsing news channels, I see that with Erdoğan’s arrival in Tianjin, various news stories and commentators are evaluating the importance of the SCO and the summit. However, as always, Turkish TV channels and news outlets continue to compare the SCO with the EU and NATO while covering SCO news. Comparing the SCO and the EU is like comparing apples and oranges; they are functionally different structures, yet this comparison comes up every year. On the other hand, while some TV commentators point out that there is no complete unity within the SCO and BRICS and that there are internal contradictions, they generally do not mention the rift within NATO. However, even their statement that Türkiye’s participation in the SCO summit is not a sign that it will break away from the West clearly shows how much of a dissenting voice Türkiye is within NATO. Furthermore, there is no mention of the rift between Trump and the EU within NATO following Donald Trump’s election as US President.

Erdoğan attended the SCO summit with a large delegation consisting of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, National Intelligence Chief İbrahim Kalın, National Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, Industry and Technology Minister Mehmet Fatih Kacır, and Trade Minister Ömer Bolat, and held comprehensive bilateral talks at the summit. Throughout the summit, Erdoğan met with the heads of state of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and China for bilateral talks. In general, Türkiye has deep cooperation with SCO countries in the fields of energy, trade, tourism, and investment. In particular, Türkiye has a large trade volume with Russia and China. For instance, during his bilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Erdoğan emphasized Türkiye’s cooperation with Russia in the fields of trade and energy and invited Putin to Türkiye, demonstrating the strength of bilateral relations. At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin also emphasized bilateral cooperation and thanked Erdoğan for his mediation and efforts towards peace regarding the Russia-Ukraine War. It should not be forgotten that Türkiye has not strained its relations with Russia since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War, taking a different stance from NATO.

In his article titled “A Shared Path to Peace and Justice” published in the People’s Daily prior to his trip to China, Erdoğan emphasized that Türkiye was pursuing peace diplomacy on the Russia-Ukraine and Gaza issues and that China was playing a leading role in establishing a just world. The emphasis on a just world in Erdoğan’s article is always part of the multipolar world discourse. For many years, Erdoğan has used the expectation of a multipolar world order and the emphasis on “a just world” as his own unique discourse, saying that “the world is bigger than five.” While highlighting the same issues in both his speech at the SCO summit and his meeting with Xi Jinping, Erdoğan did not fail to emphasize Türkiye’s geostrategic position as an energy and transportation hub in the Middle Corridor.

Deepening Turkish-Chinese Relations in Recent Years

Erdoğan’s trip to China for the SCO Summit carries significance within the context of deepening Turkish-Chinese relations in recent years. With this visit, Erdoğan visited China for the first time in six years. Erdoğan last made an official visit to Beijing in 2019. The two heads of state last met in July 2024 at the SCO summit in Astana. Since Chinese President Xi Jinping last visited Türkiye in 2015 for the G20 Summit in Antalya, Türkiye has been hoping for Xi Jinping to make an official visit to Türkiye for many years. In fact, President Erdoğan indicated after the BRICS summit in Kazan that Xi Jinping would pay an official visit this year. Xi’s official visit to Türkiye may have positive repercussions for the bilateral relations that have developed in recent years.

There has also been a significant increase in visits to China by state officials and AKP strategists in recent years. Most recently, in June 2024, bilateral relations progressed positively with the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. After a long hiatus, Fidan became the first high-level official to visit Urumqi and Kashgar in Xinjiang. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and conveyed the messages that “Türkiye fully supports China’s territorial integrity” and “Urumqi and Kashgar are Turkish Islamic cities. They are a bridge between China and the Islamic world. The unity of the people is our wealth.” During his visit to China, Fidan also expressed Türkiye’s desire to join BRICS, and President Erdoğan emphasized his wish to attend the BRICS summit in Kazan. In our meetings with various diplomats and businesspeople following Fidan’s visit to China, they emphasized that China had a positive impact on Turkish businesspeople. Direct flights between Urumqi and Istanbul even began after Fidan’s visit to Xinjiang. Then, in June 2024, he visited the capital Beijing with AKP Deputy Chairman Efkan Ala and a delegation, and a “Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation” was signed between the AKP and the CPC. In November 2024, Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek visited Beijing. In February 2025, a delegation led by Deputy Minister of Trade Mahmut Gürcan visited Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, and a Turkish Pavilion was opened in the Urumqi Free Trade Zone. On the other hand, it should be noted that Türkiye’s former Ambassador to Beijing, İsmail Hakkı Pekin, played a positive role in the development of Turkish-Chinese relations and was well-liked by the Chinese. For instance, Ambassador İsmail Hakkı Musa stated in an interview with Global Times that “Türkiye does not subscribe to anti-China rhetoric and hopes to enhance economic cooperation with China.”

Conclusion

All countries that are members and dialogue partners of the SCO are in favor of establishing a more just and multipolar world. In this regard, they follow a political line consistent with Türkiye’s interests and Erdoğan’s rhetoric of a fair world. Many countries, such as Russia, China, Iran, and India, are subject to Western and US tariffs. In this regard, the establishment of a more just financial system is the most significant demand. Although there are contradictions among the member states of the organization, they find common ground on the establishment of a more just order and financial system despite their differences. In particular, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s message in his speech that we should seek common ground while putting aside differences. In this case, it shows that they have put their differences aside and found common ground in multipolarity. On the other hand, countries such as China and India are both global production centers and energy and mineral-rich countries like Russia, Iran, and Kazakhstan, and Türkiye has deep relations with these countries. However, Türkiye’s predicament between BRICS and the SCO on one side and the EU and NATO on the other should not be left to Türkiye’s special position, historical alliance tradition, and the AKP’s indecisiveness in foreign policy. Türkiye should adopt a strategy of gaining effective positions in the SCO and BRICS institutions by leveraging its deepening relations with Russia and China in recent years and ensuring a solid position in the emerging multipolar world.

It was on August 8 that Priyanka Gandhi went quite out of her way, calling Israel’s war in Gaza genocide and using international human rights parlance. It was an exercise of raw political courage in Indian politics, when politicians avoid criticizing Tel Aviv out of fear of antagonizing Israel in case, they risk losing the favour of an increasingly strategic partner of New Delhi and Tel Aviv. But the reply was not that of the Indian government but Indian ambassador to Israel Reuven Azar, denouncing her remark as the work of “shameful deception.” His action was a first ever public rebuke of an Indian politician, a flagrant disregard for diplomatic propriety.

This raw intervention by a visiting envoy revealed an uncomfortable reality, India’s political leadership under Narendra Modi. This is increasingly coming to accept the presence of outside players inserting themselves into domestic political debates. By not condemning or even admonishing the outburst by the envoy, the Modi government left room for an embarrassment.

Diplomats are generally expected to practice restraint, especially in nations where political sensitivities are high. Azar’s statement, however, crossed the line into India’s internal affairs, raising questions about whether New Delhi is sacrificing its sovereignty at the altar of strategic partnerships.

The muted response from the government revealed how India-Israel relations have evolved. Once cautious and balanced, New Delhi’s position on the Israel Palestine conflict has undergone a sharp realignment. The Modi government has grown more transactional in its international relations placing more value on arms sales, intelligence sharing, and corporate alliances than on historical conceptions of non-alignment or subaltern solidarity. This realignment of the mind, long articulated as Hindu nationalism as a form of Zionism, has played itself out domestically as well, particularly in Kashmir, where settler-style governance becomes more apparent. Moreover, opposition parties like Congress and Shiv Sena criticized the ambassador’s comments, saying that the government of India could not safeguard its dignity. But the silence of the government was deafening.

It was a syndrome where foreign policy is less about India’s independent voice than using strategic bargains with powerful allies. This was witnessed again when New Delhi abstained from joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in condemning Israeli bombings of Iran, upholding selective usage of values. In putting transactional advantage over regional interests and human rights, India is compromising its credibility.

This compromising of credibility is not hypothetical just in foreign affairs. In the household as well, the Modi government’s autocratic instincts muzzling opponents, bullying critics, and taking minorities off at arm’s length have fashioned a climate where even visiting envoys find themselves empowered to speak truth to power. Reuven Azar’s diatribe thus not only defied diplomatic etiquette but also addressed the frailties of an India so widely seen as rolling over for it on the world stage. If a nation permits its local discourse to be shaped by foreigners free of cost, the distinction between sovereignty and dependence gets erased. The larger problem is that India is willing to offer up national pride as a sacrifice at the altar of materialistic gain. In making defence and economic arrangements, the government has forgotten the symbolic value of diplomatic ego. The scandal related to the Israeli envoy is a betrayal of how India’s rulers, present themselves as world brokers, but simultaneously have let others trample over Indian politics. Laxity in diplomatic lines can be perilous as it opens the door for future intrusions, watering down India’s global brand as also its democratic self. Last but not least, the dressing down Priyanka Gandhi received was more than a personal rebuke. It was an indication of India’s growing dependence on strategic alliances and its failure to protect its sovereignty. To protect both its democratic legacy and diplomatic mantra, New Delhi must reassert limits, impose diplomatic standards, and prioritize principles over deals. Otherwise, these incidents will continue to leave India open to accusations of not being an emerging power but rather a vulnerable one susceptible to foreign interference in its internal affairs.