What It Really Takes to Invest in Venezuelan Oil Today
Today Trump brought the heads of Exxon, Chevron, ConocoPhillips and many other oil giants into the White House. He talked about something like a $100 billion investment, promised U.S. protection, and warned Russia and China to keep their hands off.
But there is a fundamental difference between systems imposed by the state (like China), versus the U.S. In China, if the top leader says “go build,” a company might grumble in private but it will die trying. In the U.S., you can’t order private companies to sink tens of billions into a country and just hope they salute. There are shareholders, lawyers, insurers, boards, and risk people involved. The oil tycoons will happily try to join forces, but the market is their true boss. Trump has to convince the private sector that the money will be safe and that’s exactly where up to this point, the new regime in Venezuela is still failing the test.
An oil project doesn’t get approved because someone “likes the idea” or gets mandated. First, the company tries to prove the oil is really there and worth extracting (surveys, test wells, production forecasts). Then they price the whole mess: what it’ll cost to fix old equipment or build new stuff, how long it’ll take, and what could go wrong. Finance teams run scenarios like a nervous pilot checking every gauge: oil prices, delays, tax changes, accidents, expropriation. Lawyers obsess over the contract details (who owns what, who can change the rules, where disputes get decided). And here’s the institutional reality check: if courts can’t be trusted, contracts are just paper, and if nobody can say who truly controls the police, the military, and the streets, then there’s no safeguard (especially if there’s reluctance to enact more force by the US). Only if the numbers still work after all that, and the risks can be insured or controlled, does the board sign off on the “final investment decision,” which is the moment the company stops talking and starts spending real billions of dollars. So from first study to first meaningful barrels, you’re usually talking 18–36 months for a brownfield restart (in existing/old facilities), and 3–7 years for a bigger rebuild or new development (which seems to be Trump’s appetite).
These things will be discussed behind closed doors, not in the media show presented today, and we’ll learn more soon enough.
Here’s a prospective roadmap, on what could happen, depending on the type of work:
6 months
The companies already present in Venezuela will probably invest quickly in debottlenecking (“low-hanging fruits”) that requires low investment and gradually increases production.
Most companies will commit to starting an exploratory technical and commercial feasibility process to assemble a development business plan for the country. This only requires bringing in a limited technical team, so upfront costs will be very low, and any of these companies can take the risk without long-term guarantees (if they lose that money and time, who cares). Trump will guarantee security for the personnel sent to Venezuela.
Based on private agreements around buying Venezuelan assets (privatization), new exploration, asset expansion, etc., Trump will instruct the interim leadership so that PDVSA and Congress enable those actions.
The first privatizations begin to be announced (the least complex and most obvious ones), those requiring the least purchase investment and the least production-recovery investment. I think this could happen even before free elections, because as Trump said, most of these companies are used to operating in some of the most sinister places in the world.
Engineering phases move forward to restore basic services needed to operate facilities (especially electricity supply). Stabilizing the country’s electrical system is fundamental for the oil industry.
6 to 18 months
Engineering advances for larger-scale projects that can meaningfully increase production. Again, this is very low-cost for the companies, and they take relatively little risk moving these forward even if they may have to cancel later.
Gradual production increases materialize as the debottlenecking projects (“low-hanging fruit”) come online.
FID (Final Investment Decision) might happen for some small or medium-sized projects, with U.S. guarantees that the government cannot expropriate them.
18 months +
This is where it gets interesting, because a democratic transition becomes fundamental for these companies to make FIDs to buy major PDVSA assets or execute greenfield projects (new plants, new infrastructure, etc.).
Remember: most of these companies are publicly traded. They will invest in projects with the highest returns at an acceptable level of risk. If the Trump administration cannot guarantee long-term stability through a healthy democracy, it’s likely these companies won’t risk huge sums of money.
The pace will also be dictated by expectations for oil prices at the time. If prices are expected to be low, investment will move more slowly.
This entire analysis also somewhat ignores the complexity of human talent in the country. It will be uphill to find the talent needed to execute these projects and operate the plants, and that could stretch timelines even further. Venezuela once had it, but it’s now dispersed all over the world (including Venezuela).
That’s why the political transition has to move fast. If Trump wants serious capital to be involved, the reforms have to be visible and irreversible, starting with unmistakable signals that the old regime’s habits are gone. A clean first step that could be an important signal: free every political prisoner. Not a symbolic handful. All of them.
Big projects don’t live on election cycles, they live on 10–20-year timelines for ROI. If investors think the whole arrangement can be shaken up after the 2028 election (due to the Democrats retaining the White House), they’ll hesitate, or they’ll demand terms so protective that Venezuela’s interim regime won’t like them.
Venezuela’s economic restart and Venezuela’s political liberation are the same project. You don’t get one without the other. If the transition wants oil money to actually land it has to build the boring stuff that makes capitalism work: credible courts, enforceable contracts, and proof that the control of violence is achieved.

































