nuclear

Iran may negotiate on how it uses nuclear facilities, but it will not destroy uranium or allow it to be moved overseas, senior researcher Sultan Al-Khulaifi says.

SEOUL, May 7 (UPI) — North Korea is not bound by the global treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, its U.N. envoy said Thursday, calling efforts to force Pyongyang to comply with the pact a “wanton violation” of international law.

Kim Song, North Korea’s permanent representative to the United Nations, made the remarks in a statement carried by the state-run Korea Central News Agency during an ongoing review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at U.N. headquarters in New York.

The United States and other countries at the conference are “groundlessly taking issue with the present status and exercise of sovereign rights of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a nuclear weapons state outside the treaty,” Kim wrote, using North Korea’s official name.

“The position of the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state does not change in accordance with rhetorical assertion or unilateral desire of outsiders,” he said. “Clarifying once again, the DPRK is not bound by the NPT in any case.”

North Korea formally withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and in 2022 passed a law declaring itself a nuclear state. Leader Kim Jong Un later called the country’s nuclear status “irreversible,” and Pyongyang amended its constitution to codify the expansion of its nuclear forces.

Pyongyang has repeated the assertion frequently, including during a rare address to the U.N. General Assembly in September, when a senior diplomat vowed the North would “never give up” its nuclear weapons.

In a 2025 report, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that North Korea possesses about 50 nuclear warheads and has enough fissile material for about 40 more. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said in January that North Korea was producing enough weapons-grade material to build between 10 and 20 nuclear weapons annually.

The envoy’s statement comes ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China next week, where speculation has persisted that the trip could provide an opportunity to revive leader-to-leader diplomacy with Kim Jong Un.

Trump held a pair of high-profile summits with Kim during his first term in office and has suggested on several occasions that he would meet with the North Korean leader again.

Kim appeared to leave the door open to renewed diplomacy with Washington in remarks last year, saying he retained “fond memories” of Trump but warning that denuclearization was off the table.

On Monday, a White House official told Yonhap News Agency that a Trump-Kim meeting was “not currently on the schedule.”

Pyongyang says its status as nuclear-armed state ‘will not change based on external rhetorical claims’.

North Korea’s envoy to the United Nations has declared that Pyongyang will not be bound by any treaty on atomic weapons and that no external pressure will change its status as a nuclear-armed state.

Ambassador Kim Song’s statement – carried by state media on Thursday – came as the United States and other countries criticised North Korea’s nuclear programme at the ongoing UN conference reviewing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has since conducted six nuclear tests, promoting multiple UN Security Council sanctions.

The country is believed to hold dozens of nuclear warheads.

“At the 11th NPT Review Conference currently under way at UN headquarters, the United States and certain countries following its lead are groundlessly calling into question the current status and exercise of sovereign rights,” Kim said, according to the official Korean Central News Agency.

“The status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a nuclear-armed state will not change based on external rhetorical claims or unilateral desires,” he added.

“To make it clear once again, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will not be bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty under any circumstances whatsoever.”

He continued that the country’s status as a nuclear-armed state has been “enshrined in the constitution, transparently declaring the principles of nuclear weapons use”.

North Korea has long insisted that it will not give up its nuclear arsenal, describing its path as “irreversible” and pledging to strengthen its capabilities.

It has sent ground troops and artillery shells to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and observers say Pyongyang is receiving military technology assistance from Moscow in return.

The nine nuclear-armed states – Russia, the US, France, the United Kingdom, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – possessed 12,241 nuclear warheads in January 2025, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported.

The US and Russia hold nearly 90 percent of nuclear weapons globally and have carried out major programmes to modernise them in recent years, according to SIPRI.

The nuclear issue has been at the heart of the US and Israel’s war on Iran, with US President Donald Trump saying that Tehran – a signatory to the NPT – can never have a nuclear weapon.

Iran denies seeking an atomic weapon and has long demanded Washington acknowledge its right to enrich uranium.

The Department of Energy is seeking millions of dollars for work in part on a new bunker-busting nuclear weapon called the Nuclear Deterrent System-Air-delivered (NDS-A) in its latest budget request. At present, there is only one specialized air-delivered deep-penetrating weapon known to be in America’s nuclear stockpile, the B61-11 gravity bomb, and there have been discussions about a potential successor for decades now.

The Fiscal Year 2027 budget request for the Department of Energy, which was released last month, includes a new line under Weapons Activities for Future Programs. The Department is asking for $99.794 million in the next fiscal cycle to support those efforts.

“The Increase represents the start of one new Phase 6.X program, currently known as Phase 1 Nuclear Deterrent System-Air-delivered (NDS-A), as well as supporting production assessments for two new Rapid Capability Team (RCT) projects,” according to a public summary of what the Future Program funding would support.

The Department of Energy, in cooperation with the U.S. military, develops, produces, and sustains nuclear weapons, and uses a multi-phase rubric to categorize where they are in their respective life cycles. The Phase 6.X process is itself broken into several stages, spanning all the way from the definition of the basic concept of a weapon and its requirements through to full-scale production.

Where the NDS-A may already be in the process is unknown, but the mention of “Phase 1” here could point to Phase 6.1, which is the basic concept assessment stage. Beyond that it will be air-delivered, there are also no details currently available publicly about the weapon’s design, including whether it will be based on something already in the stockpile. It is also not known if it will be an unpowered bomb or a missile/rocket-assisted weapon of some kind. We will come back to this point later on.

“The Nuclear Deterrent System-Air-delivered will provide the President with additional nuclear options to defeat Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, ensuring that adversaries cannot place their most valued assets beyond the reach of America’s nuclear forces,” a spokesperson for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) told TWZ when asked for more information. “The program is moving aggressively, and further information will become publicly available when it is strategically beneficial to the United States.”

Within the Department of Energy, NNSA is specifically responsible for nuclear weapons-related activities.

As noted, at present, the B61-11 is the only air-delivered nuclear weapon in the U.S. stockpile today that is specifically designed to address this target set. The B61-11 is based on the earlier B61-7, but is substantially different in form and function. It has a heavily reinforced outer shell, possibly with a depleted uranium penetrating nose section, and a rocket booster at the rear to help it penetrate down into underground facilities. Sources differ on the maximum yield of the B61-11, but it is said to either be between 340 and 360 kilotons (identical to that of the B61-7) or to be closer to 400 kilotons. There are also reportedly fewer than 100 of these bombs in the stockpile.

You can learn more about the entire B61 family, the first versions of which entered service in the 1960s, here.

For a time, the newer B61-12 variant, which has a precision guidance package in a new tail kit, was considered as a potential successor to the B61-11. The B61-12 is also a dial-a-yield design with multiple yield settings, but the highest one is reportedly 50 kilotons. The logic was that improved accuracy would allow for more precise placement of the bomb, and, by extension, of its explosive force. This, in turn, would make up for its lack of deep-penetrating capability and more limited yield. The plan to supplant the B61-11 with the B61-12 was subsequently abandoned.

B61-12 Flight Test with F35-A Lightning II

More recently, a more powerful B61-13 variant, which features the same precision guidance tail kit as the B61-12, was developed explicitly to provide “the President with additional options against certain harder and large-area military targets.” This version is understood to have a maximum yield in line with the B61-7. However, the U.S. government has also previously said that the B61-13 is not intended as a direct replacement for the B61-11, according to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).

The U.S. military also has B83-1 nuclear gravity bombs in the stockpile, which are of a completely different design from the B61 series and have a far more powerful megaton-class maximum yield. By virtue of that high yield, the B83-1 is also intended to be used against certain deeply buried and otherwise hardened facilities, as well as large-area targets.

In the early 2000s, NNSA, in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, did explore the possibility of developing a B61-11-like bomb on the basis of the B83-1, as well as a new deep-penetrating version of the B61 itself. In 2005, Congress brought a halt to work on what was dubbed the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).

There have been hints since then, however, about possible revivals of the RNEP concept and/or other plans for a true successor to the B61-11.

What may be prompting the requirement for the NDS-A now is unknown. There are deeply-buried targets only a nuclear weapon can realistically destroy. The development of the B61-11 is understood to have been prompted heavily by one such facility in particular, Russia’s Kosvinsky Kamen bunker. Kosvinsky Kamen is a key node in the Russian nuclear command and control enterprise and was built under a mountain of the same name in the northern Urals. The nature of its location and design also means it could serve as a so-called “continuity of government” site for senior leadership to operate from before or after a nuclear strike or in response to some other major emergency.

However, the landscape of deeply-buried, hardened facilities that U.S. authorities would be interested in holding at risk has grown substantially in the past two decades since work, at least publicly, on RNEP came to an end.

The Russian and Chinese governments have been expanding on their already significant arrays of subterranean facilities. In China, this includes the construction of vast fields of new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, as well as work on a new underground command center outside of the capital, Beijing, just in recent years.

Other, smaller countries, like North Korea and Iran, have been investing in new underground and other hardened facilities, as well. This has been driven in many cases by concerns about the prospect of conventional strikes carried out by the U.S. military and others.

In the past year, the matter of Iran’s deeply buried nuclear facilities, and the limits of U.S. conventional options for prosecuting those targets, has been an especially hot-button issue. During Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025, U.S. B-2 bombers struck Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow and Natanz with 30,000-pound-class GBU-57/B conventional bunker buster bombs. The outcome of that operation remains a subject of heated debate and is deeply intertwined with the justifications for U.S. and Israeli forces launching the latest campaign against Iran in February. U.S. officials are now at a crossroads with how to proceed with operations targeting Iran, which has now turned to a maritime blockade, at least for the time being, following the announcement of a ceasefire in April.

The video below is a montage of imagery from GBU-57/B MOP tests over the years.

GBU-57 MOP test

Broader concerns about just getting the B61-11 to its intended target in the future may also be a factor driving plans now for the new NDS-A nuclear bunker buster. Unpowered bunker buster bombs, nuclear or conventional, need to be released relatively close to their targets. The kinds of facilities that the B61-11 is intended to be employed against are deep inside hostile territory, behind layers of integrated air defenses. Major potential adversaries, as well as smaller nation states and even non-state actors, are only expected to expand the scale and scope of their defensive architectures in the coming years. With all this in mind, it is not surprising that the more survivable B-2 is currently the only platform certified to employ the B61-11, as well as the conventional MOP. It is more or less a given that both of those weapons will be integrated onto the forthcoming B-21 Raider for the same general reasons.

That being said, as TWZ regularly highlights, stealth aircraft are not invisible or invulnerable. This reality is part of the argument for the planned integration of the new nuclear-tipped AGM-181 Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) air-launched cruise missile onto the B-21, as well as the venerable and non-stealthy B-52. LRSO will also just extend the B-21’s reach, with that aircraft already expected to be an extremely long-range platform. This all raises the possibility of the NDS-A being a powered design offering some degree of standoff capability.

As an aside here, powered designs have also been part of the discussions about potential conventional successors to the MOP. A follow-on to the GBU-57/B, the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP), is now in development, but it is unclear whether or not that will be a powered weapon. Still, when it comes to the NDS-A, it seems more likely that it will be a traditional bomb that adapts elements of existing designs, including the B61-11, -12, and -13.

Whether or not the NDS-A effort reaches fruition also remains to be seen. The previous RNEP effort prompted significant criticism, including from members of Congress, in part because of concerns about what steps it might prompt other countries to take in response. At the same time, there has been a change in tenor in U.S. nuclear policy in recent years, driven by other global developments, especially efforts by the Chinese to rapidly and substantially expand their stockpile.

There is also a question of affordability. The U.S. military is already in the midst of a major modernization push across all three legs of America’s nuclear deterrence triad that is set to cost hundreds of billions of dollars in the coming decades. This could impact support for funding another ‘new’ nuclear weapon, even if it is derived from an existing design.

More definitely remains to be learned about the NDS-A program and the design of that weapon. What is clear is that the Department of Energy is requesting funding to kick off at least the initial development of a new air-delivered nuclear bunker buster that could succeed the B61-11.

UPDATE: 5:27 PM EST –

It has been brought to our attention that some additional details about the NDS-A effort have been tucked away in U.S. budget requests in recent years.

In its Fiscal Year 2025 budget, the Air Force asked for, and ultimately received just over $39 million for work on NDS-A, but under a budget line titled “Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat System (HDBTDS) Prototyping.”

“The Air-delivered Nuclear Delivery System (NDS-A) is a new start project to address a capability gap identified in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). A congressionally directed study based on the NPR led to endorsement of the Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG) and initiation of this project,” according to the 2025 Fiscal Year budget documents. “The Air Force will work with the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its National Laboratories to develop a prototype NDS-A system to demonstrate the capability to close this gap in the near term.”

“Early development will include Model and Simulation (M&S) analysis of several nuclear explosive package (NEP) options to refine the proposed NEP,” the budget documents add. “Ground tests may include wind tunnel, static ejection, vibration and thermal, cable pull-down, and sled tests. Flight tests will be performed by USAF F-15E developmental flight test aircraft, with final prototype demonstrations flown on B-2 aircraft.”

The video below shows flight testing of the B61-12 using a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle.

B61-12 full-weapon system demonstration at Tonopah Test Range

In the Air Force’s proposed 2026 Fiscal Year budget, the line item was renamed “Nuclear Delivery Systems Prototyping,” but references to NDS-A by name were also omitted. A nearly $18 million year-over-year increase in requested funding (from roughly $39 million to almost $57 million) was attributed “to greater emphasis on prototype design after completion of Modeling and Simulation of mission effectiveness of design space options; increased procurement and development of components; the initiation of subsystem and test unit assembly; and the initiation of ground tests of the Prototype Weapon Assemblies.”

The Fiscal Year 2025 and 2026 budget documents do not provide any details about the design of the weapon or say what aircraft it will be integrated onto operationally.

More details about the current state of the Air Force side of this program are likely contained in the service’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request documents. However, at the time of writing this update, they are inaccessible online.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

May 1 (Asia Today) — Former U.S. Six-Party Talks envoy Joseph DeTrani said North Korean leader Kim Jong Un still wants to normalize relations with the United States but is demanding that Washington recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.

DeTrani said U.S. leverage in negotiations with North Korea has weakened sharply compared with the period around the 2005 Six-Party Talks joint statement, as Pyongyang has significantly expanded its nuclear and missile capabilities and China and Russia have effectively shielded the North.

He opposed calls by some Korea specialists in the United States for arms control negotiations with North Korea, saying Washington should maintain complete, verifiable denuclearization as its ultimate goal. At the same time, he said the United States should pursue interim freeze measures, including a halt to nuclear testing and production of fissile material.

DeTrani made the remarks Wednesday during a presentation and discussion with Greg Scarlatoiu, president of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, at the annual International Council on Korean Studies conference, “Challenges of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance 2026,” held at the Hudson Institute in Washington.

DeTrani previously served as director of the National Counterproliferation Center under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and as U.S. representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. He spent 13 years handling negotiations with North Korea and participated in intelligence work that first confirmed the North’s highly enriched uranium program.

DeTrani said the Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement from the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks was meaningful because it explicitly confirmed North Korea’s commitment to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”

The statement also committed North Korea to returning at an early date to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The United States affirmed that it had no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and no intention to attack or invade North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons.

But DeTrani said North Korea refused U.S. demands during both plenary and bilateral talks to explicitly include its highly enriched uranium program in the agreement, explaining why the final text did not directly mention the program.

He said North Korea would not have agreed to the 1994 Agreed Framework if Washington had tried to explicitly include highly enriched uranium, adding that Pyongyang has consistently shown since around 2000 that it wanted to pursue such a program for nuclear weapons development.

DeTrani said the U.S. negotiating “tool kit” was relatively strong in 2005 but has lost much of its effectiveness by 2026.

He said Wang Yi, now China’s foreign minister, played an active and constructive role as chair of the Six-Party Talks at the time. Today, however, China and Russia are effectively accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and blocking additional U.N. Security Council sanctions, he said.

DeTrani said China still controls about 90% of North Korea’s foreign trade and oil supply, but added that it is difficult to expect Beijing to use that leverage to move Pyongyang in the direction Washington wants.

On Russia, DeTrani said North Korea is likely receiving assistance for its satellite, nuclear and missile programs in exchange for sending more than 12,000 troops, artillery shells and ballistic missiles to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, following the June 2024 comprehensive strategic partnership treaty between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Still, DeTrani warned against assuming that the alignment among North Korea, China and Russia is permanent. He said historical distrust between Pyongyang and Beijing, along with geopolitical competition between Moscow and Beijing, remains a source of internal friction.

DeTrani estimated North Korea now has 50 to 60 nuclear weapons based on fissile materials such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium and could expand that arsenal to 100 weapons within several years.

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi warned during a visit to South Korea on April 15 that North Korea is expanding uranium enrichment capabilities at Yongbyon and at a new facility resembling the Kangson enrichment site in satellite imagery, describing the program as having advanced to a “very serious” level.

DeTrani said North Korea recently displayed the Hwasong-20, a solid-fuel, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle capability and an estimated range of 15,000 kilometers, demonstrating a potential ability to reach the entire United States.

He said North Korea has more than 400 ballistic missiles, ranging from short-range systems to long-range intercontinental missiles, and is focusing on solid-fuel, road-mobile short-range systems such as the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25.

DeTrani also said Kim recently visited the second 5,000-ton destroyer, Choe Hyon, and that North Korea aims to build a third and fourth destroyer while securing 12 nuclear-capable destroyers by 2030.

He said North Korea is constructing an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered submarine, a move he described as strengthening the second leg of a nuclear triad intended to preserve retaliatory nuclear capability even after a first strike.

DeTrani said another major change is North Korea’s nuclear doctrine, which now allows for automatic preemptive nuclear use if there is an imminent or perceived imminent threat to the leadership or command and control system.

“With satellite and imagery intelligence, I think we have verification capabilities and will not be deceived,” DeTrani said. “But North Korea remains a black hole, and there is still a great deal of information we cannot access.”

DeTrani said Kim, like his father Kim Jong Il and grandfather Kim Il Sung, understands that normalization with the United States could restore international confidence and open the door to institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

He said Kim’s request at the February 2019 Hanoi summit for relief from U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed since 2016, in exchange for steps related to the Yongbyon nuclear facility, reflected that calculation.

DeTrani said President Donald Trump had built a degree of trust with Kim, and that Kim has conditionally signaled a willingness to meet Trump again.

But DeTrani said in his presentation that it would not be surprising if North Korea had given up on the United States and South Korea, given the Iran conflict, tensions between the United States and NATO, and China and Russia’s de facto acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status.

He said if Washington recognizes North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, Pyongyang would claim victory and use that recognition to extract more concessions from China and Russia.

Asked about proposals for nuclear nonproliferation or arms control talks with North Korea, DeTrani said, “I absolutely disagree.”

Such an approach, he said, would reinforce the North Korean regime’s belief that the United States will eventually accept it as a nuclear weapons state and would damage the broader nuclear nonproliferation system.

DeTrani identified North Korea’s nuclear program as the biggest challenge facing the U.S.-South Korea alliance in 2026. He also cited additional alliance issues, including debate over the possible use of about 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea in a Taiwan Strait or South China Sea contingency and support for keeping the Strait of Hormuz open.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260501010000029

A Ukrainian attack on the captured Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant kills a worker, according to the site’s Russia-installed authorities.

Ukrainian officials say Russian drones have again attacked the southern port city of Odesa, injuring at least 11 people, including two children, and damaging homes and important infrastructure.

Odesa Governor Oleh Kiper said the attack affected three districts, hitting residential buildings, vehicles and civilian facilities, including a hotel, warehouses and funicular railway. Windows shattered in many buildings and the port area sustained damage.

“All specialised and municipal services are working to mitigate the consequences. Law enforcement agencies are documenting the latest war crimes committed by Russia against the peaceful population of [the] Odesa region,” Kiper said.

Russian attacks killed one person in the southeastern Zaporizhzhia region, according to Governor Ivan Fedorov.

“A 59-year-old man died as a result of an enemy attack on the Zaporizhzhia region,” Fedorov wrote on Telegram.

A Ukrainian drone attack killed an employee at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which was captured by Russian forces and is shut down.

“A driver was killed today when a Ukrainian Armed Forces drone struck the transport department at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,” said a statement from plant managers who were installed by Russia.

Regional governor Fedorov said Russian forces launched 629 strikes across 45 settlements in the region in a single day, with at least 50 reports of damage to homes and infrastructure.

Russian officials reported Ukrainian drone attacks in the Belgorod border region, where at least one person was killed and four women injured, alongside damage to buildings and vehicles.

Stalled diplomatic efforts

The attacks come as diplomatic efforts to end the war remain stalled. Donald Trump said on Sunday that he has had “good conversations” with Presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

“We’re working on the Russia situation, Russia and Ukraine, and hopefully we’re going to get it,” Trump said on Fox News.

“I do have conversations with him, and I do have conversations with President Zelenskyy, and good conversations,” he said.

“The hatred between President Putin and President Zelenskyy is ridiculous. It’s crazy. And hate is a bad thing. Hate is a bad thing when you’re trying to settle something, but it’ll happen.”

Zelenskyy said he signed agreements on security and energy cooperation with Azerbaijan during a visit to Baku, adding that Kyiv had discussed the possibility of future talks with Russia there.

Videos and other imagery bearing witness to the awesome destructive power of nuclear detonations remain some of the most enduring legacies of the Cold War. But of the more than 2,000 nuclear weapons tests that have been carried out since 1945, only very, very few have involved a live weapon dropped from a fighter-bomber.

A nuclear strike performed by the Su-7

At least one such test took place in the Soviet Union, however. On his X account, Sam Wise, an aviation analyst at Janes, brought our attention to footage that purportedly shows that test, or at least portions of it.

The test in question was especially notable in that it involved a free-fall tactical nuclear bomb that was delivered by a crewed fighter-bomber, specifically a Su-7 Fitter attack jet, in an end-to-end test.

Of those 2,000-plus nuclear tests, only a small fraction involved bombs dropped from aircraft of any kind — roughly 200 to 250 according to records compiled by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Those tests almost always involved bombers, aircraft with multiple engines, several crew members, and, often, dedicated to delivering nuclear weapons.

The vast majority of nuclear tests were conducted underground, at sea, or on land. In the latter case, the devices were typically detonated from an elevated position, either atop a tower or suspended from a balloon. This better replicated the conditions of a typical nuclear detonation, with the weapon engineered to explode in an air burst above the ground, for maximum effect.

One reason for the relative scarcity of air-dropped nuclear bomb tests was the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which pushed testing underground.

At the same time, dropping a live nuclear weapon from a crewed aircraft brings additional risks for relatively little benefit.

At the beginning of the nuclear age, air-dropped tests were useful to prove that bombs could be delivered, but they were inefficient in terms of scientific measurement and riskier to conduct from a safety point of view. Dropping a nuclear device from an aircraft adds variables (altitude, speed, trajectory) that complicate measurements. If something goes wrong, you risk losing a plane, or worse, an accidental detonation or contamination spread.

Based on the available information, it appears that the U.S. military never tested a live tactical nuclear bomb dropped by a tactical combat jet, despite the very many platforms, both Air Force and Navy, that were cleared to carry them operationally.

It should be noted that the U.S. Air Force did detonate one tactical nuclear weapon after launch from a fighter. However, this involved an air-to-air rocket, the nuclear-tipped Genie, which was fired on this occasion from an F-89 interceptor, in 1957’s Operation Plumbbob John.

Project Genie : Air-to-air rocket nuclear testing

France does appear to have conducted a live test of an air-dropped tactical nuclear bomb, with an AN52 dropped from a Jaguar attack jet in August 1972, to help prove that weapon for service.

Returning to the Soviet Union, on August 27, 1962, pilot Lt. Col. A. I. Shein took off in a single-seat Su-7B, with a live 244N nuclear bomb carried on the centerline station below the fuselage. He then headed for the Semipalatinsk test site on the Soviet steppe. Also known as “The Polygon,” the Semipalatinsk range was the main test site for Soviet nuclear weapons. It is in the Abai region, in what is now Kazakhstan.

Shein put the jet into a climb at an angle of around 45 degrees. This was an ‘over-the-shoulder’ toss maneuver, typical for fighter-bombers of this era. This involved the attacking aircraft pulling upward before releasing its bomb to compensate for the weapon’s gravity drop in flight. The result would put the weapon on the target, without the aircraft having to pass over it. Instead, the jet would complete a half roll and (hopefully) avoid the blast effects so it could escape. The launch maneuver sequence, as shown in the video, is apparently simulated, or at the least, heavily edited.

Shein later recalled:

“I take off, the excitement subsides, I enter the combat course, and make an approach. Everything is normal, I make an approach for a combat release, bring the aircraft into a nose-up attitude, and monitor the G-forces. After four seconds, I hear a signal, then a second, a short third, and I press the ‘release’ trigger. The green light goes out, indicating the release has been completed. The bomb’s release is felt by the shaking of the aircraft. I continue the nose-up attitude. For control, I note the release angle; it is almost constant and equal to 44–50 degrees. After passing the top point, I then descend at a 50-60 degree angle, perform a half-roll, increase engine speed and, consequently, aircraft speed, descend to the lowest possible altitude, and try to get as far and as quickly as possible from the target.”

This method required a bomb computer to calculate the release point. For the U.S. Air Force, this was the Low Altitude Bombing System, or LABS, while the Su-7 was fitted with the equivalent PBK-1 device, a separate box that was added to the left side of the instrument panel. In this context, PBK denoted Pritsel dliya Bombometaniya s Kabrirovaniya, or toss-bombing sight.

A video shows a U.S. Air Force B-47 bomber flying the LABS maneuver:

Boeing B-47 Stratojet (Low Altitude Bombing System) LABS Maneuver

After release from the Su-7, the bomb exploded at an altitude of around 800 feet, at the coordinates of 50.4°N and 77.8°E. The detonation had a yield of 11 kilotons.

As for the Su-7, this was the Soviet Union’s first-generation supersonic attack jet. It was rapidly equipping fighter-bomber regiments, and nuclear strike would become one of its most important duties.

The streamlined 244N was the first mass-produced Soviet tactical nuclear bomb specifically intended for carriage by supersonic jets.

A photo showing the earlier, non-streamlined RDS-4 tactical free-fall bomb:

RDS-4 “Tatyana” was a Soviet atomic bomb that was first tested with a yield of 27 kilotons at Semipalatinsk Test Site, on August 23, 1953. The Soviet Union’s first mass-produced tactical nuclear weapon. pic.twitter.com/c7xdODw0tZ

— NUKES (@atomicarchive) August 24, 2023

At this point, it should be noted that there is a possibility that the video shows not the 244N, but an IAB-500, a so-called ‘imitation bomb’ that replicated the shape, dimensions, weight and flight characteristics of the nuclear device. Filled with a mixture of liquid petroleum and white phosphorus, it also produced a large fireball that subsequently turned into a mushroom cloud.

With that in mind, the video could at least show portions of an IAB-500 test, although the location and the original voiceover point squarely to the 1962 Semipalatinsk test. The apparent installation of a camera pod below the Su-7’s wing, to record the detonation, also suggests a nuclear test rather than training.

Regardless, the 244N was successfully tested and was put into operational service in several variants, including with different yields up to a maximum of 30 kilotons. Most of these bombs were deployed by Soviet units stationed close to what would have been the front line in the event of a confrontation with NATO: in East Germany, Hungary, and Poland.

Starting in 1967, Western intelligence began to note training activities involving nuclear weapons at Soviet airbases in East Germany, including Su-7s taking part in LABS-type maneuvers.

In one of its reports from 1967, the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) noted that its staff identified Su-7s from Grossenhain Air Base performing at least four LABS practice delivery runs on October 7 of that year.

“The aircraft passed over the airfield at approximately 2,000 feet, pulled up into vertical climb to 3,500 feet, pitched over, flew inverted for several seconds, then rolled over again departing to the west.”

Two days later, the USMLM reported “A very active program of local navigational, touch-and-go landings, LABS maneuvers, and possible range activity flown by Grossenhain-based Fitter and [two-seat Su-7] Moujik” aircraft.

Air-dropped tactical nuclear weapons still play a significant role in Russia’s military strategy, as evidenced by recent moves to station tactical devices in Belarus. Many Russian combat aircraft have variants capable of carrying nuclear bombs, and most Russian air-launched missiles weighing over around 1,000 pounds have the option of a nuclear warhead.

Russia really wants West to see they’re doing a tac nuke exercise. After several exercise videos they put the head of the 12 GUMO in front of a Belarusian Su-25 (possibly at Lida air base) loaded with what is said to be “training nuclear ammunition.” https://t.co/h9rHp2qvGv pic.twitter.com/sTzAqSNd9f

— Hans Kristensen (also on Bluesky) (@nukestrat) June 13, 2024

Starting in the 1960s, the 244N was superseded by a modernized development of the same weapon, the 10-kiloton RN-24, as well as the one-kiloton RN-28. These were carried, among others, by the MiG-21 and Su-7.

These bombs were followed in the 1980s followed by the RN-40 and RN-41, carried by the MiG-23, MiG-27, MiG-29, Su-17, Su-24, and Su-27.

To this day, the IAB-500 also remains in use to train combat jet pilots in nuclear bomb delivery. Alongside it, although much less known, and barely ever seen, are tactical nuclear bombs, the descendants of the 244N that was proven in a unique test back in 1962.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

April 22 (Asia Today) — Global nuclear industry leaders gathered in Busan on Tuesday, highlighting the growing role of nuclear power in meeting surging electricity demand driven by artificial intelligence and data centers.

The Korea Atomic Industrial Forum opened its annual conference at BEXCO, bringing together policymakers, industry leaders and researchers under the theme “Nuclear energy for the AI era.”

This year’s event is being held alongside the Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference, which returned to South Korea for the first time in 14 years, and the Busan International Nuclear Industry Exhibition. Organizers expect around 19,000 participants.

The event features representatives from 19 countries and 156 companies, making it the largest exhibition of its kind to date.

Participants emphasized that rapid growth in AI technologies is fundamentally reshaping global energy demand. Electricity consumption by data centers is projected to reach 1,300 terawatt-hours by 2035, while AI-related power demand is expected to grow at an annual rate exceeding 120% through 2028.

To meet this demand, major technology companies have significantly increased investments in nuclear energy, with total spending surpassing $30 billion over the past 18 months.

Government policy is also shifting. The United States has set a target to expand nuclear capacity to 400 gigawatts by 2050 – roughly four times current levels – while about 15 new nuclear reactors are expected to come online globally in 2026.

Keynote speakers included Mesut Ozman of Fermi Nuclear, who is leading an 11-gigawatt nuclear project in Texas, and Tomas Ehler of the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade, along with other senior officials and industry executives.

The conference also includes sessions focused on Southeast Asia, where countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam are exploring nuclear energy adoption.

Discussions are covering a wide range of issues, including reactor lifetime extensions, carbon neutrality, artificial intelligence, energy security, small modular reactors and radioactive waste management.

South Korean companies are also expanding their global footprint. Hyundai Engineering & Construction is participating as an engineering, procurement and construction partner in negotiations for four AP1000 reactor projects, while Doosan Enerbility is supplying key components such as reactor vessels and steam generators.

The Czech Republic is also pursuing an expanded nuclear strategy, aiming to increase the share of nuclear power in its energy mix to as much as 50% to 60% through new projects at Dukovany and Temelin.

As energy demand accelerates in the AI era, industry leaders said nuclear power is increasingly being viewed as a reliable and scalable solution to ensure energy security and meet climate goals.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260422010007146

April 22 (Asia Today) — The Czech Republic said its nuclear power project with South Korea is progressing on schedule, signaling potential expansion of cooperation that could extend to additional reactor construction and broader entry into the European market.

Petr Závodský, head of the Czech project company EDU II, said the Dukovany nuclear project has entered a key design phase just 10 months after the contract was signed with Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power.

“We received the first large-scale engineering package, including the conceptual design, last week,” Závodský said at a conference in Busan. “This marks a major contractual milestone, and site investigations have already been completed.”

He added that the next step is to submit licensing documents to Czech nuclear regulators within a year.

Tomas Ehler said the Czech government selected Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power based on its proven ability to complete projects on time and within budget.

“In nuclear projects, the most important factor is execution capability,” Ehler said. “The Korean proposal was evaluated as the best across all criteria.”

He emphasized that nuclear construction involves complex risks and requires close coordination between partners to identify and manage challenges early.

Officials also addressed concerns over a dispute involving France, saying the issue has effectively been resolved after being dismissed by Czech courts. They added that approval procedures with the European Commission for expanded reactor plans are ongoing and expected to be finalized by early 2027.

The Czech government reaffirmed its strategy to increase nuclear power’s share in its energy mix from about 30% currently to 50%-60% in the coming years.

A final decision on constructing additional reactors at the Temelin Nuclear Power Plant is expected next year, with progress on the Dukovany project serving as a key benchmark.

Ehler said that if both projects move forward with Korean participation, significant synergies could be achieved.

Závodský stressed that the partnership goes beyond a typical supplier relationship.

“The Czech Republic cannot build nuclear plants without Korean companies, and Korean firms cannot carry out the project without Czech partners,” he said. “This is a joint project, not just a client-supplier arrangement.”

Officials added that the cooperation could expand beyond the Czech Republic to other European countries, including Slovakia and Poland.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260422010007168

April 22 (Asia Today) — South Korean President Lee Jae-myung held summit talks with Vietnam’s top leader on Tuesday to strengthen cooperation in nuclear energy, infrastructure and supply chains, as both countries seek to navigate rising global uncertainties.

Lee met with To Lam in Hanoi during a state visit, where the two sides discussed expanding strategic cooperation across key sectors, including energy security and critical minerals.

The talks come as prolonged conflict in the Middle East heightens concerns over global energy supply disruptions, prompting both countries to pursue more resilient and diversified supply chains.

South Korea and Vietnam, each among the other’s top three trading partners, agreed to deepen cooperation not only in trade and investment but also in nuclear power, infrastructure, defense and other strategic industries.

The two countries have set a goal of increasing bilateral trade from $94.6 billion in 2025 to $150 billion by 2030.

Lee is expected to express support for South Korean companies seeking to participate in major Vietnamese infrastructure projects, including a new urban development project valued at about 1.1 trillion won ($740 million) and a new airport project estimated at 102.7 billion won ($69 million).

The leaders are also expected to discuss expanding cooperation in science and technology, climate response, artificial intelligence semiconductors and cultural industries, as well as boosting people-to-people exchanges such as tourism.

Ahead of the summit, Lee said relations between the two countries had reached a “comprehensive strategic partnership” following the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties in 2022.

“Through this visit, we aim to further develop our highest-level cooperation into a more future-oriented and strategic partnership,” Lee said during a meeting with Korean residents in Vietnam.

Lee also paid tribute at the mausoleum of Ho Chi Minh before the summit and is scheduled to attend a state banquet hosted by the Vietnamese leadership.

On Wednesday, Lee is expected to meet Vietnam’s prime minister and National Assembly chair, and attend a business forum with executives from major South Korean conglomerates, including Lee Jae-yong, Chey Tae-won and Koo Kwang-mo.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260422010007161

United States President Donald Trump has claimed that a new nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran will be “far better” than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which the US withdrew from in 2018 during his first term.

On Tuesday, Trump extended the two-week ceasefire with Iran a day before it was set to expire, with hopes for a second round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Key among the US demands is that Iran stop all enrichment of uranium.

Iran has always insisted its nuclear programme is for civilian use only, such as for power generation, which requires uranium enrichment of between 3 percent and 5 percent. To build nuclear weapons, uranium needs to be enriched to 90 percent.

In this explainer, we visualise what uranium is, how it is enriched and how long it could take Iran to make a nuclear weapon.

What is uranium, and which countries have it?

Uranium is a dense metal used as a fuel in nuclear reactors and weapons. It is naturally radioactive and usually found in low concentrations in rocks, soil and even seawater. About 90 percent of the world’s uranium is produced in just five countries: Kazakhstan, Canada, Namibia, Australia and Uzbekistan. Reserves of uranium have also been found in other countries.

Uranium is extracted either by digging it out of the ground or, more commonly, through a chemical process that dissolves uranium from within the rock.

Before it can be used as nuclear fuel, uranium is processed through several different forms, including:

• Yellowcake: Mined ore is crushed and treated with chemicals to form a coarse powder known as yellowcake, which, irrespective of its name, is usually dark green or charcoal in colour, depending on how hot it has been treated.
• Uranium tetrafluoride: Yellowcake is then treated with hydrogen fluoride gas, which turns it into emerald-green crystals known as uranium tetrafluoride or green salt.
• Uranium hexafluoride: Green salt is further fluorinated to create a solid white crystal known as uranium hexafluoride. When heated slightly, this crystal turns into a gas, making it ready for enrichment.
• Uranium dioxide: The gas is spun in a centrifuge machine, which chemically converts it into a fine, black powder.
• Fuel pellets: The black powder is pressed to form black ceramic pellets, which can then be used in a nuclear reactor.

How is uranium enriched?

Natural uranium exists in three forms, called isotopes. They are the same element, with the same number of protons but different numbers of neutrons.

Most naturally occurring uranium (99.3 percent) is U-238 – the heaviest and least radioactive – while about 0.7 percent is U-235 and trace amounts (0.005 percent) are U-234.

To generate energy, scientists separate the lighter, more radioactive U-235 from the slightly heavier U-238 in a process called uranium enrichment. U-235 can sustain a nuclear chain reaction while U-238 cannot.

To enrich uranium, it must first be converted into a gas, known as uranium hexafluoride (UF₆). This gas is fed into a series of fast-spinning cylinders called centrifuges. These cylinders spin at extremely high speeds (often more than 1,000 revolutions per second). The spinning force pushes the heavier U-238 to the outer walls, while the lighter U-235 stays in the centre and is collected.

A single centrifuge provides only a tiny amount of separation. To reach higher concentrations – or “enrichment” – the process is repeated through a series of centrifuges, called a cascade, until the desired concentration of U-235 is achieved.

What are the different levels of uranium enrichment?

The higher the U‑235 percentage, the more highly enriched the uranium is.

Small amounts (3-5 percent) are enough to fuel nuclear power reactors, while weapons require much higher enrichment levels (about 90 percent).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considers anything below 20 percent to be low-enriched uranium (LEU), while anything above 20 percent is considered highly-enriched uranium (HEU).

Low enriched – less than 20 percent

• Commercial grade – 3-5 percent: This is the standard fuel for the vast majority of the world’s nuclear power plants
• Small modular reactors – 5-19.9 percent: Used in more modern reactors and advanced research reactors

Highly enriched – More than 20 percent

• Research grade – 20-85 percent: Used in specialised research reactors to produce medical isotopes or to test materials
• Weapons grade – above 90 percent: This is the level required for most nuclear weapons
• Naval grade – 93-97 percent: Used in the nuclear reactors that power submarines and aircraft carriers

Depleted uranium, which contains less than 0.3 percent U‑235, is the leftover product after enrichment. It can be used for radiation shielding or as projectiles in armour‑piercing weapons.

How long does it take to enrich uranium?

The effort it takes to enrich uranium is not linear, meaning it is much more difficult to go from 0.7 percent natural uranium to 20 percent LEU than it is to go from 20 percent to 90 percent HEU. Once uranium reaches 60 percent enrichment, it becomes much quicker to reach 90 percent weapons grade.

The effort it takes to enrich uranium is measured in separative work units (SWU).

According to the IAEA, Iran is believed to have about 440kg (970lbs) of uranium enriched to 60 percent – enough to theoretically build 10 or 11 low-technology atomic bombs if refined to 90 percent.

Ted Postol, professor emeritus of science, technology and international security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), told Al Jazeera that before the US attack on Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow, the country had at least 10 cascades of 174 IR-6 centrifuges in operation – meaning 1,740 IR-6 centrifuges.

The IR-6 is one of Iran’s most advanced centrifuge models. The country also has tens of thousands of older centrifuges.

Little is known about the conditions of these centrifuges or the stocks of uranium hexafluoride, which are still believed to be buried underground.

Postol has calculated that Iran’s cascade of centrifuges could produce 900 to 1,000 SWUs annually.

“Getting from natural uranium to 60 percent enrichment, which Iran has already achieved, takes roughly five years, and about 5,000 SWUs using Iran’s cascades.”

“If I want to go from 60 to 90 percent, I only need 500 SWUs. So, instead of five years, [by] starting with the 60 percent here, this might take me four or five weeks. Because I am already very enriched,” Postol said.

Using an analogy of a clock, Postol explained: “Let’s say it takes seven minutes to get 33 percent enrichment, and then eight minutes to get to 50 percent enrichment. It only takes me one minute to get to total [90 percent] enrichment.”

How easy would it be for Iran to build a nuclear weapon?

Postol said Iran’s stockpile is held underground, meaning a military strike would not necessarily eliminate the nuclear threat.

A single centrifuge cascade capable of enriching weapons-grade uranium could take up “no more floor space than a studio apartment, making it easily hidden in a small laboratory”, he said, estimating the area at 60sq metres (600sq feet).

“A single Prius Compact Hybrid car can produce enough electric power to run four or more of these cascades at a time,” Postol added, meaning “Iran can covertly convert its 60 percent uranium into weapons-grade uranium metal”.

“What they have done is put themselves in a position where anybody who thinks about attacking them with nuclear weapons has to know that they could be sitting in those tunnels after such an attack, refining [and] enriching the final step they need to build atomic weapons and converting it to metal, and building a nuclear weapon, and that they have the means to deliver it,” Postol said.

“They would have all of the technical equipment they need to build the atomic weapons. And they have the missiles, which are also in the tunnels and can be manufactured in addition to what they already have. And the atomic weapon would not need to be tested, because uranium weapons do not need to be tested before they’re used.”

What does the NPT say about enrichment?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), established in 1968, is a landmark international agreement aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran is a signatory to this pact.

The treaty supports the right of all signatories to access nuclear technology and enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, including energy, medical or industrial purposes, with precise safeguards to ensure it is not diverted to make weapons.

Under the NPT, nuclear-weapon states agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist non-nuclear-weapon states in developing them. Non-nuclear-weapon states also agree not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons.

Despite this, most nuclear powers are currently modernising their arsenals rather than dismantling them.

Most of the countries are signatories, except five: India, Pakistan, Israel, South Sudan and North Korea.

What agreements has Iran made about its nuclear programme in the past?

In 2015, under the Obama administration, Iran struck a deal with six world powers — China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the US — plus the European Union, known as the JCPOA.

Under the pact, Tehran agreed to scale down its nuclear programme, capping enrichment to 3.67 percent, in exchange for relief from sanctions.

“The Iranians agreed to it, and they were following the treaty. There was no problem with the treaty at all, absolutely no problem,” Postol said.

“They were allowed to have 6,000 centrifuges, which, if they had natural uranium, they could probably build a bomb within a year if they were secretly using these centrifuges, but that was all under inspection. They were just simply going to enrich to 3.67 percent, which is for a power reactor. They’re allowed to do that by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

But in 2018, Trump pulled out of the deal, calling it “one-sided” and reimposing sanctions on Iran. Iran responded by eventually resuming enrichment at Fordow.

After the US killed Iran’s General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, Tehran stated it would no longer follow the set uranium enrichment limits.

Former President Joe Biden made attempts to revive the deal, but it never came to fruition due to disagreements over whether sanctions should be lifted first or Iran should rejoin the JCPOA first.

Trump has repeatedly said Iran should not have the ability to produce nuclear weapons. It has been one of Washington’s red lines during talks with Iranian officials over the past year, and was also the central justification that Washington used when it bombed Iranian nuclear facilities during the 12-day US-Israel war on Iran last year.

In the current negotiations, Iran has said it is willing to “downblend” its 60 percent enriched uranium to about 20 percent – the threshold for low-enriched uranium. The process of downblending involves mixing stocks with depleted uranium to achieve a lower percentage of enriched U-235 overall.

“From the point of view of showing goodwill, I think it’s good, it shows that the Iranians are thinking of ways to address what the Americans claim are their concerns,” Postol said.

Which countries have nuclear weapons?

Nine countries possessed roughly 12,187 nuclear warheads as of early 2026, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Approximately two-thirds are owned by two nations – Russia (4,400) and the US (3,700), excluding their retired nuclear arsenals.

Some 9,745 of the total existing nuclear weapons are military stockpiles for missiles, submarines and aircraft. The rest have been retired. Of the military stockpile, 3,912 are currently deployed on missiles or at bomber bases, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Of these, some 2,100 are on US, Russian, British and French warheads, ready for use at short notice.

While Russia and the US have dismantled thousands of warheads, several countries are thought to be increasing their stockpiles, notably China.

The only country to have voluntarily relinquished nuclear weapons is South Africa. In 1989, the government halted its nuclear weapons programme and began dismantling its six nuclear weapons the following year.

Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons, with a stockpile of at least 90. It has consistently neither confirmed nor denied this, and despite numerous treaties, it faces little international pressure for transparency.

Data centres, climate targets and energy security – three forces pushing nuclear power back to the forefront of the global agenda. But behind the technological shift lies a human dimension: the story of nuclear host communities, where quality of life has long defied the familiar fears.

Three Forces Behind the Renaissance

In 2024, Microsoft signed a deal to restart a unit at Three Mile Island – the very plant in Pennsylvania whose partial meltdown in 1979 shaped public anxiety about nuclear for decades. The reasoning was simple: the data centres powering AI require enormous quantities of electricity, continuous and ideally carbon-free. A nuclear plant delivers all three. That deal has since become something of a symbol for a much broader shift playing out across dozens of countries.

The industry already calls it a renaissance – not the first in nuclear’s history, but arguably the most structurally grounded. Three things are happening at once: explosive electricity demand from the digital economy, binding climate targets set by governments, and a growing reckoning with the limits of intermittent renewables. Wind and solar are essential to decarbonisation – but they cannot guarantee baseload supply in all weather, at all hours. Nuclear can.

“We need a source that delivers around the clock, every day of the year – sun or no sun, wind or no wind.” That, roughly, is how energy executives frame the problem when they look at what AI actually needs from the grid.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AN UNLIKELY ALLY FOR NUCLEAR

Data centres already account for about 2% of global electricity consumption, and that figure could rise dramatically by 2030 as training and running large language models becomes routine. Google, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft are all in the market for long-term clean power contracts – and nuclear plants are almost the only sellers that can offer both the scale and the certainty those contracts require.

One example already up and running: the Kalinin Data Centre, built directly on the site of the Kalinin nuclear power plant in Russia. It draws up to 80 MW of guaranteed power straight from the plant’s substations – giving it some of the lowest electricity costs in central Russia – and operates to Tier III reliability standards. It has been included in Russia’s national Digital Economy programme. This is not a concept for the future: a nuclear plant is already powering real digital infrastructure today.

In the United States, after decades of stagnation, the first licensing procedures in a generation have begun for new reactors, including small modular reactors – SMRs – that promise lower capital costs and shorter build times. In the United Kingdom, Hinkley Point C is under construction. France has announced six new EPR-2 reactors. Canada has approved a major refurbishment of the Pickering station. These are not isolated decisions. They represent a change of direction that is now systemic.

THE CLIMATE CASE: THE NUMBERS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

Nuclear energy produces less carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour over its full lifecycle than a solar panel, and many times less than a gas turbine. For governments that have committed to climate neutrality by 2050, this is becoming a decisive argument – particularly given that large-scale battery storage, the main alternative for backing up renewables, carries its own considerable environmental costs.

It is no coincidence that at COP28 in Dubai, more than 20 nations signed a declaration committing to triple nuclear capacity by 2050. The list includes the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and South Korea. After years on the political margins, nuclear is back in the official climate conversation.

NUCLEAR CITIES: THE LIFE THAT RARELY MAKES THE NEWS

In the middle of the technology and climate debate, it is easy to miss a different dimension entirely – the human one. Nuclear energy does not exist in the abstract: it lives in specific towns and regions, alongside real communities. And the data on quality of life in those places tell a story that sits rather awkwardly alongside the image embedded in popular culture.

Research from multiple countries consistently finds that cities and regions hosting nuclear facilities tend to have higher household incomes, better infrastructure, stable employment, and often stronger demographic indicators than comparable areas without nuclear presence. A nuclear plant is not simply a generator. It is an anchor employer, a leading taxpayer, and a structural pillar of the local economy for decades at a stretch.

EVIDENCE FROM AROUND THE WORLD

CANADA – Bruce Power (Ontario)

Bruce Power is the largest employer in Ontario’s Bruce County. Ipsos polling found that 93% of local residents consider the company a “good neighbour” and 96% are confident the plant operates safely. That level of sustained public support sits alongside major refurbishment programmes that will go on creating thousands of regional jobs for years ahead.

HUNGARY – Paks

Paks is a small town on the Danube, 100 kilometres south of Budapest. According to Hungary’s Central Statistical Office (KSH), it ranks among the country’s leaders in per capita income – GDP per capita and purchasing power run roughly 1.5 to 2 times the national average. Male life expectancy in Paks is around 75-76 years, against 73 nationally; female life expectancy is 81-82, against 79 across Hungary. 

FINLAND – Eurajoki (Olkiluoto NPP)

The Finnish municipality of Eurajoki, home to the Olkiluoto plant, has a population of around 9,000 and is one of the most financially secure municipalities in the region. In 2022, the plant’s operator TVO paid €20 million in property tax, out of the municipality’s total tax revenue of €57 million. Local authorities describe Eurajoki as debt-free. It also maintains a stable population, which is a genuinely rare achievement for small Finnish communities. 

RUSSIA – Udomlya (Kalinin NPP, Tver Region)

The Kalinin nuclear power plant is the largest electricity producer in central Russia, located 3 kilometres from the town of Udomlya. The plant generates 82% of all electricity produced in the Tver Region and 14% of the output of the entire Central Federal District. It is also a major regional employer: together with contractor organisations, the station accounts for around 30% of all jobs among the working-age population of the Udomlya municipal district. The plant supplies the town with heat and hot water, and the construction of the station marked the beginning of rapid development across the entire surrounding area.

UNITED STATES – Palo Verde (Arizona)

Palo Verde is the largest nuclear plant in the United States and generates more than $2 billion in annual economic impact for Arizona. The station directly employs 2,500 people, with a further 5,800 jobs supported in related industries. It is Arizona’s largest private taxpayer – a contribution that matters directly to the funding of local schools and public infrastructure. 

SWEDEN – Forsmark

A Novus survey from spring 2023 found that at least 86% of residents in Östhammar municipality – where Forsmark is located – support the construction of a permanent spent fuel repository. Nine in ten local residents believe the presence of operator SKB has a positive impact on regional development. 

UNITED KINGDOM – Hinkley Point C (Somerset)

Britain’s largest infrastructure project will employ up to 15,000 workers at peak construction. More than 1,500 apprentices have already been trained, 500 more than originally planned. Three Skills Centres of Excellence in Somerset have put over 8,000 people through training in welding, electrical and mechanical trades. The effects on the regional labour market will be felt for a long time. 

CANADA – Pickering (Ontario)

The Pickering refurbishment is expected to create around 30,500 jobs during construction and sustain 6,700 permanent positions during operation. The project received government approval in November 2025, with construction due to begin in 2027. 

FRANCE – Nuclear host regions

Analysis by France’s national statistics agency INSEE indicates that nuclear plants generate economic clusters that sustain employment and population in smaller municipalities across the country. 

THE PROXIMITY PARADOX: WHY NUCLEAR COMMUNITIES SUPPORT NUCLEAR ENERGY

Sociologists have long noted a pattern that tends to surprise outsiders: the further people live from a nuclear plant, the more they fear it. The closer they live, the more they trust it. A Nuclear Energy Institute study found that 89% of residents within ten miles of a reactor view nuclear energy favourably. Surveys across nuclear host cities in Russia show that 78% of residents feel proud of the industry’s achievements, and more than two-thirds rate its contribution to their city’s development positively. Across 24 such cities, 87% of residents report satisfaction with their quality of life – in some, the figure exceeds 90%.

This is not a coincidence, and it has nothing to do with messaging campaigns. It is the product of lived experience. When a nuclear plant is the largest employer in the area, the main source of local tax revenue, and the sponsor of community sports clubs and healthcare facilities, people’s relationship with it is shaped not by what they read in the news, but by the texture of their daily lives.

The Proximity Paradox: Trust Rises Near the Plant

CONCLUSION: AN OLD SOURCE OF ENERGY FOR NEW CHALLENGES

The nuclear renaissance that gathered momentum through the mid-2020s is neither nostalgia nor ideology. It is a practical response to several problems that landed at roughly the same time: exponential growth in electricity demand from the digital economy; climate targets that cannot realistically be met without firm, low-carbon baseload generation; and hard lessons from successive energy crises about the fragility of systems built around a single source or a single supplier.

Against that backdrop, the accumulated experience of nuclear communities around the world: from Eurajoki in Finland to Paks in Hungary, from the shores of Lake Ontario to the Arizona desert, makes for a substantial body of evidence. Living near a nuclear plant is not a losing proposition for a community. More often than not, it has been the foundation of lasting prosperity, decent public services, and demographic stability that many non-nuclear towns can only envy. That, too, belongs in the conversation about what the future of energy actually looks like.

This analysis draws on data from: Deloitte / NuclearEurope (2025); Good Energy Collective / Carnegie Mellon University (2022); Ipsos Canada; Novus / SKB (Sweden, 2023); KSH — Hungarian Central Statistical Office; TVO (Finland); APS — Arizona Public Service; EDF Energy (United Kingdom); Government of Ontario; INSEE (France); Nuclear Energy Institute (United States); IEA; sociological surveys of nuclear host cities in Russia; Rosenergoatom

United States President Donald Trump has said a nuclear agreement currently being negotiated with Iran will be “far better” than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which he withdrew from in 2018 during his first term in office.

The original 2015 accord took roughly two years of negotiations to reach and involved hundreds of specialists across technical and legal fields, including multiple US experts. Under it, Iran agreed to restrict the enrichment of uranium and to subject itself to inspections in exchange for the relaxation of sanctions.

But Trump took the US out of that pact, calling it the “worst deal ever”. Before the initial US-Israeli strikes on Iran at the end of February, the US had made new demands – including additional restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear programme, the restriction of its ballistic missiles programme and an end to its support for regional armed groups, primarily in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

Trump’s latest remarks come amid growing uncertainty about whether a second round of talks will proceed in the Pakistani capital Islamabad, as a two-week ceasefire between the US-Israel and Iran approaches the end in just a day.

So, what was the JCPOA, and how did it compare to Trump’s new demands?

What was the JCPOA?

On July 14, 2015, Iran reached an agreement with the European Union and six major powers – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the US, and Germany – under which these states would roll back international economic sanctions and allow Iran greater participation in the global economy.

In return, Tehran committed to limiting activities that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon.

These included reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium by about 98 percent, to less than 300kg (660lb), and capping uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent – far below weapons-grade of 90 percent, but high enough for civilian purposes such as power generation.

Before the JCPOA, Iran operated roughly 20,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges. Under the deal, that number was cut to a maximum of 6,104, and only older-generation machines confined to two facilities, which were subject to international monitoring.

Centrifuges are machines which spin to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope – enrichment – in uranium, a key step towards potential bomb-making.

The deal also redesigned Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor to prevent plutonium production and introduced one of the most intrusive inspection regimes ever implemented by the global nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In exchange, Iran received relief from international sanctions which had severely damaged its economy. Billions of dollars in frozen assets were released, and restrictions on oil exports and banking were eased.

The deal came to halt when Trump formally withdrew Washington from the nuclear deal in 2018, a move widely criticised domestically and by foreign allies, and despite the IAEA saying Iran had complied with the agreement up to that point.

“The Iranian regime supports terrorism and exports violence, bloodshed and chaos across the Middle East. That is why we must put an end to Iran’s continued aggression and nuclear ambitions. They have not lived up to the spirit of their agreement,” he said in October 2017.

He reimposed crippling economic sanctions on Tehran as part of his “maximum pressure” tactic. These targeted Iran’s oil exports, as well as its shipping sector, banking system and other key industries.

The goal was to force Iran back to the negotiating table to agree to a new deal, which also included a discussion about Tehran’s missile capabilities, further curbs on enrichment and more scrutiny of its nuclear programme.

What has happened to Iran’s nuclear programme since the JCPOA?

During the JCPOA period, Iran’s nuclear programme was tightly constrained and heavily monitored. The IAEA repeatedly verified that Iran was complying with the deal’s terms, including one year after Trump announced the US’s withdrawal from the agreement.

Starting in mid-2019, however, Iran began incrementally breaching the deal’s limits, exceeding caps on uranium stockpiles and enrichment levels.

In November 2024, Iran said it would activate “new and advanced” centrifuges. The IAEA confirmed that Tehran had informed the nuclear watchdog that it planned to install more than 6,000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium.

In December 2024, the IAEA said Iran was rapidly enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, moving closer to the 90 percent threshold needed for weapons-grade material. Most recently, in 2025, the IAEA estimated that Iran had 440kg (970lb) of 60-percent enriched uranium.

What are Trump’s latest demands for Iran’s nuclear programme?

The US and its ally, Israel, are pushing Iran to agree to zero uranium enrichment and have accused Iran of working towards building a nuclear weapon, while providing no evidence for their claims.

They also want Iran’s estimated 440kg stock of 60pc enriched uranium to be removed from Iran. While that is below weapons-grade, it is the point at which it becomes much faster to achieve the 90 percent enrichment needed for atomic weapons production.

Iran has insisted its enrichment effort is for civilian purposes only. It is a signatory to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

In March 2025, Tulsi Gabbard, the US director of national intelligence, testified to Congress that the US “continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon”.

On Sunday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, in a strongly worded statement, said Trump had no right to ⁠⁠”deprive” Iran of its nuclear ⁠⁠rights.

What else is Trump asking for?

Restrictions on ballistic missiles

Before the US-Israel war on Iran began, Tehran had always insisted negotiations should be exclusively focused on Iran’s nuclear programme.

US and Israeli demands, however, extended beyond that. Just before the war began, Washington and Israel demanded severe restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme.

Analysts say this demand was at least partly triggered by the fact that several Iranian missiles had breached Israel’s much-vaunted “Iron Dome” defence system during the 12-day war between the two countries in June last year. While Israel suffered only a handful of casualties, it is understood to have been alarmed.

For his part, Trump has repeatedly warned, without evidence, about the dangers of Iran’s long-range missiles, claiming Iran is producing them “in very high numbers” and they could “overwhelm the Iron Dome”.

Iran has said its right to maintain missile capabilities is non-negotiable. The JCPOA did not put any limits on the development of ballistic missiles.

However, a United Nations resolution made when adopting the nuclear agreement in July 2015 did stipulate that Iran could not “undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”.

Ending support for proxy groups

The US and Israel have also demanded that Iran stop supporting its non-state allies across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and a number of groups in Iraq. Together, these groups are referred to as Iran’s “axis of resistance”.

In May last year, Trump said Tehran “must stop sponsoring terror, halt its bloody proxy wars, and permanently and verifiably cease pursuit of nuclear weapons”, during a GCC meeting in Riyadh.

Three days before the war on Iran began in February, during his State of the Union address to Congress, Trump accused Iran and “its murderous proxies” of spreading “nothing but terrorism and death and hate”.

Iran has refused to enter a dialogue about limiting its support for these armed groups.

Can Trump really get a new deal that is ‘much better’ than the JCPOA?

According to Andreas Kreig, associate professor of Security Studies at King’s College, London, Trump is more likely to secure a new deal that closely resembles the JCPOA, with “some form of restrictions on enrichment, possibly with a sunset clause, and international supervision”.

“Iran might get access to frozen assets and lifted sanctions much quicker than under the JCPOA, as it will not agree to a long drawn-out, gradual lifting of sanctions,” Krieg pointed out.

However, he warned that the political landscape in Tehran has hardened. “Iran now is a far more hardline and less pragmatic player that will play hardball at every junction. Trump cannot count on any goodwill in Tehran,” he said.

“The IRGC is now firmly in charge… with likely new powerful and tested levers such as the Strait of Hormuz,” he said, referring to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which operates as a parallel elite military force to the army and has a great deal of political and economic power in Iran. It is a constitutionally recognised part of the Iranian military and answers directly to the supreme leader.

Overall, Krieg stressed, the US-Israel war on Iran “leaves the world worse off than had Trump stuck to the JCPOA”, even if a new compromise is eventually reached.

Moreover, since the revocation of the JCPOA, the US and Israel have waged two wars on Iran, including the current one. The 12-day war in June last year included attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites and killed more than 1,000 people.

Attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure have continued since the latest war began on February 28, including on the Natanz enrichment facility, Isfahan nuclear complex, Arak heavy water reactor, and the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Nevertheless, King’s College’s Krieg said there is still room for a negotiated outcome if Tehran and Washington scale back their demands.

“Both sides can compromise on enrichment thresholds, and on temporary moratoriums on enrichments. But Iran will not surrender its sovereignty to enrich altogether, and the Trump administration will have to meet them halfway,” he said.

“While the Iranians will commit on paper not to develop a nuclear weapon, they will want to keep R&D [research and development] in this space alive.”

Economic incentives will be central, he added. “Equally, Iran would want to get immediate access to capital and liquidity. Here, the Trump administration is already willing to compromise.”

April 19 (Asia Today) — North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles on Saturday, just 11 days after its previous test, in what analysts describe as an effort to expand and demonstrate its nuclear delivery capabilities.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said the missiles were fired around 6:10 a.m. from the Sinpo area on the country’s east coast and flew about 140 kilometers over the East Sea.

The launch site, near a key submarine facility, has raised the possibility that the weapons could be linked to submarine-launched ballistic missile development, though officials said further analysis is needed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff said it is assessing the missiles’ specifications and whether they were launched from land or underwater.

Sinpo is home to North Korea’s main submarine shipyard, where vessels such as the “Kim Gun-ok Hero” submarine have previously been unveiled.

Recent satellite imagery cited by the North Korea-focused outlet 38 North indicated that another submarine had been moved to dry dock, suggesting possible preparations for additional testing.

Yang Wook, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said the relatively short flight distance raises questions about whether a full submarine-based launch was conducted.

“Given the 140-kilometer range, it is unclear whether this was a full SLBM test, but the location suggests it could be part of efforts to verify repeated launch capability,” he said.

If confirmed as an underwater launch, the test would mark North Korea’s latest step in diversifying its nuclear delivery systems, following demonstrations involving land-based missiles and sea-based platforms in recent weeks.

Under its latest defense development plan, North Korea has been expanding a range of strategic capabilities, including short-range ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, cruise missiles and solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile engines.

Analysts say the timing may also reflect broader geopolitical considerations. With the United States focused on conflict in the Middle East, North Korea could be seeking to exploit a perceived security gap while reinforcing its deterrence posture.

Some experts also suggest the launch may be intended to strengthen Pyongyang’s bargaining position ahead of potential diplomatic engagement tied to an expected visit by President Donald Trump to China next month.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260420010005867

A source has told Al Jazeera that Pakistan is expecting a breakthrough tied to Iran’s nuclear programme as Islamabad helps negotiate an end the US-Israeli war on Iran. Pakistani military and government officials met with Iranian and Saudi leaders on Wednesday.

Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant has been targeted four times since the United States-Israel war on Iran began more than a month ago.

And the World Health Organization (WHO has warned of “catastrophic” risks if a radioactive release occurs.

Tehran has accused the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog of inaction – an allegation that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rejects. But it does acknowledge that the situation is of deep concern.

Why are the attacks happening, and what risks do they pose?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Tariq Rauf – Former head of verification and security policy coordination at the IAEA

Abas Aslani – Senior research fellow at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies

Alicia Sanders-Zakre – Head of policy at the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the opening phase of the US-Israeli war against Iran has generated a striking argument in strategic and theological circles alike: that the killing may have removed not merely a political leader but a normative brake on Iran’s possible march toward nuclear weapons. Reports indicate that Iranian decision-making has since hardened under intense military pressure and an increasingly securitised internal environment.

What gives Khamenei’s death a particular doctrinal significance is that he had, over more than two decades, publicly framed weapons of mass destruction—including nuclear and chemical weapons—as contrary to Islam. If that position represented a genuine religious constraint rather than mere diplomatic rhetoric, then his death may have removed more than a leader: it may have weakened the doctrinal restraint that helped keep Iran a threshold nuclear state.

What gives Khamenei’s death a particular doctrinal significance is that he had, over more than two decades, publicly framed weapons of mass destruction—including nuclear and chemical weapons—as contrary to Islam.

Islamic just war theory places moral constraints on indiscriminate violence, constraints that Khamenei appeared to project onto state policy. With that authority now gone, the central question is whether a moral tradition can discipline a state that increasingly experiences its insecurity as existential. Whether the next supreme leader can impose doctrinal restraint on a system drifting toward hard security logic.

The Islamic just war theory

The Islamic conception of war begins from a premise different from the caricatures often projected onto it. Classical Islamic thought does not treat war as an unbounded field of religious violence. Rather, it regulates warfare through a moral-legal framework derived from the Qur’an, the practice of the Prophet, and the juristic traditions that developed in subsequent centuries. The foundational Qur’anic injunction is taken from verse 2:190: “Fight in the way of God those who fight you, but do not transgress. Indeed, God does not love transgressors.” The verse both permits fighting and limits it: war is accepted as a political reality, but not treated as morally autonomous.

The Islamic conception of war begins from a premise different from the caricatures often projected onto it. Classical Islamic thought does not treat war as an unbounded field of religious violence.

The duality of permission and restraint thus runs through the Islamic just war tradition. War may be legitimate in cases of defence, resistance to aggression, or protection of the community. But even a just cause does not license unlimited means. Islamic jurists emphasised proportionality, legitimate authority, fidelity to agreements, and the protection of non-combatants—including women, children, the elderly, monks, and peasants— developing a norm of discrimination that restricted violence to active combatants.

It is from this perspective that nuclear weapons become especially difficult to reconcile with Islamic ethics. A weapon whose essence is mass, uncontrolled devastation, sits uneasily with any tradition that treats non-combatant immunity as morally central. In Islamic terms, the problem is not simply the scale of destruction, but the very structure of the act: the means themselves are transgressive.

 The fatwa: Genuine constraint or strategic cover?

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s reputed opposition to chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War established an early precedent for this kind of doctrinal restraint. Iraq used chemical agents extensively, and Iran suffered enormously—some 20,000 Iranians were killed and over 100,000 severely injured. Yet the Islamic Republic did not respond in kind on a comparable scale. Whether that restraint was entirely theological or also strategic remains debated. Recent evidence suggests limited Iranian chemical weapons development during the war. Still, the episode reinforced the notion that certain weapons lay beyond the moral threshold that Iran’s clerical leadership was prepared to cross openly.

Khamenei extended this logic to the nuclear realm. He first issued an oral fatwa in October 2003 declaring nuclear weapons as forbidden (haram) in Islam, and repeated this position in an official statement at the emergency meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in August 2005. Over subsequent years, Iranian officials repeatedly invoked his religious decree as evidence of the Islamic Republic’s peaceful nuclear intentions.

Khamenei extended this logic to the nuclear realm. He first issued an oral fatwa in October 2003 declaring nuclear weapons as forbidden (haram) in Islam, and repeated this position in an official statement at the emergency meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in August 2005.

But the fatwa’s authenticity and legal weight have always been contested. Some have argued that no formal written fatwa was ever issued and that what Iran marketed as a religious ruling was, in origin, merely the closing paragraph of a message to a 2010 nuclear disarmament conference, later retroactively framed by Iranian diplomats as a fatwa. Others have documented that Khamenei’s pronouncements on nuclear weapons were inconsistent: at times he categorically forbade development, stockpiling, and use; at other times he appeared to permit development and stockpiling while forbidding use.

None of this entirely strips the fatwa of significance. In political systems where legitimacy is partly theological, a public prohibition articulated by the supreme jurist, even if ambiguous in its legal form, raises the political and doctrinal cost of reversal. As one scholar observes, such declarations make it costly for the Islamic Republic to overturn the publicly stated position even if they do not constitute binding juridical rulings in the formal sense.

Succession and the question of doctrinal inheritance

The critical question of whether Khamenei’s successor would inherit his political and moral authority looms large. On March 9, 2026, the Assembly of Experts named Mojtaba Khamenei, the 56-year-old son of Ali Khamenei as Iran’s third supreme leader. Whether he would inherit his father’s doctrinal commitments, especially on nuclear weapons, is far from clear. Not known as a jurist of comparable standing to his father, Mojtaba’s authority derives primarily from his revolutionary and security credentials rather than from the depth of his theological learning, a fact noted critically within Iran’s clerical establishment, which has historically resisted father-to-son succession as uncomfortably monarchical.

Khamenei’s nuclear prohibition carried weight because it came from the state’s highest religious authority. Mojtaba’s standing is far more contested, which means that any comparable prohibition would likely carry less doctrinal force—while any tacit relaxation would accelerate the erosion of the barrier his father maintained. The IRGC commanders who manoeuvred his appointment to power have long been among those pressing for a reassessment of Iran’s nuclear posture.

Islamic restraint vs strategic realism

This leads to the final and perhaps hardest question: would Iran, if acting as a pure realist state, pursue nuclear weapons regardless of the Islamic just war tradition? The realist answer is straightforward. States seek survival in an anarchic international system. When a state faces stronger adversaries, recurring coercion, and the credible prospect of regime-change violence, it has every incentive to pursue the ultimate deterrent. From this perspective, the logic of nuclear acquisition is not theological but strategic: a bomb would promise not battlefield utility but regime survival, deterrence, and insulation from future attack.

And yet Iran is not a pure realist state in the abstract. It is a political order where ideology, clerical authority, national security, and regime survival have long coexisted in uneasy combination. The more interesting possibility, therefore, is not that realism simply replaces theology, but that realism gradually colonises it. In that scenario, doctrine is not openly discarded; it is reinterpreted and subordinated to necessity, allowing the state to retain Islamic language while moving toward a posture that the older Khamenei publicly resisted.

The greater danger is that the Islamic Republic’s language of restraint may cease to anchor policy and instead begin to trail behind it. If so, Iran’s nuclear future will be decided not only in centrifuge halls or command bunkers, but in the struggle between theological limits and strategic fear.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Tehran says it is the fourth attack near the nuclear plant amid the US-Israel war on Iran.

One person has been killed by projectile fragments after United States-Israeli strikes targeted a location close to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The agency, citing confirmation from Iranian authorities, said in a statement on X that there was “no increase in radiation levels” after Saturday’s attack.

Later on Saturday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed the Bushehr facility had been “bombed” four times since the war erupted, criticising what he described as a lack of concern for its safety.

The strike comes as the US and Israel escalate their targeting of Iranian industrial sites, even as experts warn of the high risks of striking nuclear or petrochemical facilities.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi expressed “deep concern about the reported incident and says [nuclear] sites or nearby areas must never be attacked, noting that auxiliary site buildings may contain vital safety equipment”, the statement read.

Grossi also reiterated a “call for maximum military restraint to avoid risk of a nuclear accident,” the IAEA added.

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) confirmed the incident, also in a post on X.

An “auxiliary” building on the site was damaged, but the main sections of the power plant were not affected by the strike, the government agency said, adding that the person killed was a member of security personnel.

It’s the fourth time the site has been attacked since the start of the US and Israel’s war on Iran, the AEOI noted.

The Bushehr plant is Iran’s only operational nuclear power plant. It is located in Bushehr city, home to 250,000 people, and is one of Iran’s most important industrial and military nodes.

Meanwhile, US and Israeli strikes on Saturday hit several petrochemical plants in the southern Khuzestan region, an important energy hub, according to Iranian media.

At least five people are reported injured.

Explosions were heard, and smoke was also seen rising after missiles hit several locations across the Mahshahr Petrochemical Special Economic Zone.

The state-run Bandar Imam petrochemical complex, which produces chemicals, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), polymers and a range of other products, was struck and sustained damage, Iran’s Mehr news agency reported.

A provincial governor in Khuzestan added that the Fajr 1 and 2 petrochemical companies, as well as other nearby facilities, were also hit, according to the Fars news agency. The extent of damage is unclear.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed it shot down an MQ-1 drone over central Isfahan province on Saturday, hours after authorities said they forced down two US warplanes.

Isfahan, which houses an underground uranium conversion and a research site, was one of three facilities bombed during US and Israeli strikes on Iran last June.

Former US Senior State Department official Jennifer Gavito argues why US attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities may be a sign that the war is coming to an end.

The anti-nuclear artists collective whose work is on display at Pitzer College in Claremont never predicted a nuclear proliferation crisis would break out in the Middle East during their exhibit, or how grimly topical their work would quickly become as a result.

“Atomic Dragons,” wrapping April 4 with a closing-day symposium of nuclear experts, is the work of SWANS, which stands for Slow War Against the Nuclear State. The group is made up of artists, activists and academics with ties to the nuclear industry, including children and spouses of nuclear industrial complex workers — putting a new spin on the “nuclear family.”

The show examines the environmental and human cost of the atomic era through an artistic lens, tracing present day nuclear risk back to its Cold War roots.

The SWANS’ warning call has always been clear, but ”Atomic Dragons” took on a whole new meaning when the United States and Israel launched a joint assault on Iran over its illicit stockpile of nuclear materials Feb. 28, three weeks after the show opened.

“We’re at the start of what will be an exceedingly dangerous period in terms of the Iranian nuclear program,” nuclear policy expert Scott Sagan, who co-directs Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, said. “We’re likely to have a major, major conflict over this.”

In a time of acute nuclear anxiety, SWANS is an outlet through which the artists process the fear and gravity of our atomic reality.

Fiona Amundsen, “Yoshino Cherry Tree, Sanyo Buntokuden, Hiroshima (lovingly held),” 2025, from the series, “The Trees are Leaking Light,” 2024-25, 4 x 5 inch negative processed using seaweed, gathered from the ocean current of the Fukushima wastewater release, inkjet washi photograph.

(Chloe Shrager)

“My maybe-naive hope is that the artworks help to provide an avenue into that understanding of the severity of what it means to play with the nuclear,” said Fiona Amundsen, whose arresting film photography of three trees in Hiroshima that survived the 1945 nuclear bomb was developed using contaminated seaweed growing in the Fukushima wastewater release line.

The resulting images are dotted with delicate white flares: trace amounts of radioactive tritium that transferred to the film from the nuclear effluent during the chemical processing, bearing physical witness to the usually invisible effects of radiation.

Amundsen’s work is in keeping with the rest of the show, which fills two halls at the liberal arts school with visual and multimedia works that probe the persistence of radioactive materials. Artifacts from the birth of the nuclear age are also featured, including items recovered from postwar Hiroshima and a letter from the father of the nuclear bomb, Robert J. Oppenheimer.

The artworks are as likely to unsettle as they are to move.

Elin o’Hara slavick labored over an expansive series of photochemical drawings of every above-ground nuclear test — 528 in total, a selection of which are featured in the exhibit— on salvaged darkroom paper from Caltech, the institution that played a role in developing the detonators for the U.S. nuclear bombs dropped on Japan under the top secret Project Camel.

elin o’Hara slavick, selection from “There Have Been 528 Atmospheric Nuclear Tests to Date,” 2022, photo-chemical drawings on outdated and fogged silver gelatin paper.

(Chloe Shrager)

Slavick said she found the abandoned silver-gelatin paper, which was fogged despite being stored in closed boxes, in the basement of the university near a door labeled “Radiation Science,” which led her to believe radiation exposure from Caltech’s Manhattan Project past distorted the photographic paper.

SWANS seems to double as a support group for families impacted by the nuclear industry. Many members believe they’ve lost loved ones to radiation, or were themselves likely impacted by early-life exposure as children of Manhattan Project engineers. The tension between the anti-nuclear artwork and its artists’ familial ties to the production of the very technology they reject is an enticing dance of its own.

Judith Dancoff, “The Milk Pathway (still),” 2023, video, briefcase, antique milk bottles, and tempera.

(Chloe Shrager)

Writer Judith Dancoff links her hyperthyroidism and long-term reproductive issues from a pituitary gland tumor to childhood radiation exposure during a summer spent at the Oak Ridge uranium enrichment site in Tennessee where her father worked as a student of Oppenheimer. Her father died young of cancer, and the story is woven into her featured SWANS work.

One of the largest pieces on display at “Atomic Dragons” is Nancy Buchanan’s interactive full-wall exhibit of documents her father brought home from his government work as a Manhattan Project physicist, alongside material from the FBI file on his mysterious death, on display for viewers to read under looming red letters spelling out “SECURITY.”

Nancy Buchanan, “Security,” 1987, installation with file folders, photos, map pins, and documents.

(Chloe Shrager)

The current crisis in Iran has sent memories bubbling to the surface for the collective, and chills down the spines of viewers.

Many have expressed fears of an Orwellian-style forever war, or worse, the use of the atomic weapon invented “to end all wars” in a twisted attempt to do so, poisoning the region as a byproduct. But nuclear policy expert Sagan said the likelihood of the conflict escalating to involve nuclear weapons is “exceedingly low,” even if Iran has the capability to build them.

Iran possesses enough 60% highly-enriched uranium to build about 10 nuclear weapons if further enriched to 90% weapons grade, he said. This could take a matter of weeks to complete depending on the state of Iran’s enrichment centrifuges, which Trump claimed to have “obliterated” during air strikes in June.

Iran could also craft a primitive nuclear device out of minimally enriched materials for an offensive attack (“60% could actually create an explosion, it just wouldn’t be a very efficient one,” according to Sagan), but George Perkovich, senior fellow for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program and author of “How to Assess Nuclear Threats in the 21st Century,” points out that “you have to build more than one for it to be useful,” especially under the wrath of a nuclear-armed West’s expected response.

What is more likely, and probably more dangerous, experts say, is the now-heightened long-term risk of global proliferation. “This war is going to suggest to some countries that if they want to secure their sovereignty, they need nuclear weapons,” Sagan said.

elin o’Hara slavick, selection from “There Have Been 528 Atmospheric Nuclear Tests to Date,” 2022, photo-chemical drawings on outdated and fogged silver gelatin paper.

(Chloe Shrager)

Since 1968, the world nuclear order has rested on the delicate architecture of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, enforcing the international norm that countries without nuclear weapons won’t try to get them, and countries with nuclear weapons won’t help arm their allies. Now, experts say the rulebook has been thrown out.

“What this does is it breaks the old system that was based on the non-proliferation treaty,” said Perkovich, who has worked on nuclear issues for 44 years. “It’s now ‘might makes right,’ everybody’s on their own, friends versus enemies. I think the terms now change, and we’re not bargaining.”

Though the timing of the military operation in Iran with the “Atomic Dragons” exhibit could not be described as kismet as much as brutally ironic, slavick said the “sick and sad thing” is that “it’s always topical when you’re an American.”

“We do this. We wage wars. We are the leading nuclear country,” she said, speaking to the heart of the SWANS message: In a world where nuclear materials exist, it is not a matter of if humans will be harmed, but when.

There is a historic relationship between visual art and nuclear war, said Jim Walsh, a senior research associate at the MIT Security Studies Program on nuclear weapons risk issues in Iran and North Korea, who is also a speaker at the exhibit’s closing symposium. As the world enters a “more disruptive period” after the post-Cold War cooling of nuclear tensions, he expects to soon see “a flowering of artistic projects,” as nuclear risk reaches a local peak. “It’s a super powerful thing involving life and death, the planet, the entire environment, love and hate,” he said.

“Atomic Dragons,” which also features work created decades ago, highlights questions that are as relevant today as they were at the dawn of the nuclear era: Can we make the world safe enough so we can once again dream? Is the strength of a country found in its military rather than its culture? Is fear our gross national product?

March 27 (Asia Today) — The United States and South Korea have established a new joint command unit aimed at integrating nuclear and conventional forces to strengthen deterrence against North Korea, according to defense officials.

The unit, known as J10, has been set up within U.S. Forces Korea headquarters at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. It is designed to move beyond the traditional concept of a “nuclear umbrella” and enable real-time operational coordination between U.S. strategic assets and South Korean conventional forces.

Originally separated from the U.S. Forces Korea planning directorate in June 2024, J10 is led by a colonel-level commander and serves as a centralized command structure for combined nuclear and conventional operations.

Military experts said the creation of J10 marks a shift from declaratory deterrence to operational readiness, allowing faster execution of joint responses in the event of a North Korean nuclear threat.

The unit is expected to play a key role in implementing decisions made by the bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group established under the Washington Declaration, with the ability to coordinate immediate response measures from the Korean Peninsula.

J10 will oversee operational planning that aligns U.S. strategic assets – such as long-range bombers and nuclear-powered submarines – with South Korean support forces. It is also expected to match response options to specific North Korean threat scenarios to accelerate execution speed.

Previously, U.S. nuclear operations were largely managed by command structures based in the United States. The new arrangement places a dedicated coordination function on the Korean Peninsula, enabling continuous, real-time management of response planning.

Analysts said the move is intended to strengthen integration between South Korea’s “three-axis” defense system and U.S. nuclear capabilities, increasing military pressure on North Korea.

However, officials noted that the effectiveness of J10 will depend on the level of real-time intelligence sharing between the two allies.

A senior official described J10 as “the final piece” in building an integrated extended deterrence framework, adding that its capabilities will be tested in upcoming large-scale joint military exercises.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260327010008515

March 27 (UPI) — The United Nations nuclear watchdog said Thursday it has begun discussions for another localized cease-fire for Ukraine‘s Russia-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to allow for urgently needed repairs.

The plant, Europe’s largest, has been occupied by Russian forces since early in the war, which has repeatedly endangered and damaged the site.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has said that the situation at the plant is challenging and has warned about the risk the war poses to it.

The IAEA said Tuesday that the ZNPP lost connection to its sole remaining main power line after it was damaged and was now dependent on a single backup line that had only recently been reconnected to the plant.

On Thursday, the IAEA said in a statement that its director, Rafael Grossi, had begun discussions with Russia and Ukraine to secure a cease-fire so the necessary repairs could be conducted.

Although the timing for the necessary repairs remains uncertain, Grossi has confirmed that they have “proposed a cease-fire window to both parties, allowing for safe assessment and restoration of the damaged infrastructure,” it said.

The IAEA has brokered five localized cease-fires for Zaporizhzhia, the latest initiated late last month that allowed for repairs to the sole backup power line, which was reconnected to the nuclear power plant on March 5.

The plant is located in Zaporizhzhia Oblast in southeastern Ukraine. Russian forces seized the utility on March 4, marking the first time a civilian nuclear facility has been occupied.

On the grim anniversary of the plant’s fourth year of Russian occupation, Ukraine’s state-run nuclear energy enterprise said the facility “remains one of the most acute risks to European energy and nuclear stability.”

“The seizure of a nuclear facility and its use as a tool for political pressure is a violation of the fundamental rules of the industry,” Energoatom CEO Pavlo Kovtonyuk said in a statement.

“Our task is to protect people and be ready at any moment to resume safe operation of the plant.”