Navy

Romania’s military detonated part of the Danube riverbed to redirect water towards the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant after prolonged drought and extreme heat pushed the river to record-low levels.

Aug. 3 (UPI) — Britain’s Reform U.K. party vowed Monday that if elected it would use the Royal Navy to turn back small boats bringing migrants across from France and Belgium, in what it said would be the largest military operation in the English Channel since World War II.

The policy launched at a news conference in London calls for the military to “intercept” the boats and return them to France or Belgium, with the party claiming “Operation Fortress” had the backing of former senior military brass and that it was in line with international law because its purpose was humanitarian.

Reform U.K. Home Affairs spokesman Zia Yusuf told the BBC that it would be possible for Britain to return the migrants without agreement from France, arguing that international law required they dealt with migrants on their territory and not let them continue onto Britain.

States are permitted to pull people from the sea but can only bring them to another country with the agreement of that country.

Yusuf acknowledged the move could spark a “diplomatic argument” between Paris and London.

Under agreements with the United Kingdom, authorities on the continent prevent thousands of migrants from setting sail for England, but those that do manage it are met by U.K. Border Force and Coast Guard vessels which take the migrants aboard and bring them ashore to ports in the south of England.

The announcement came hours after new Labour Prime Minister Andy Burnham vowed he would be “relentless” in combatting small boat crossings after some 60,000 migrants overwhelmed the border of the Spanish territory of Ceuta on the north African coast on Thursday and Friday.

Britain is separated from Ceuta by the channel, several European countries and more than a thousand miles, but Burnham said his concern was with “the broader issue of the Schengen [free travel] Area and our relationship with it,” saying he would seek regular dialogue with the European Union on the matter.

The Schengen Convention of 1990 abolished border controls across 29 mostly EU member European countries. Migrants arriving in Europe are supposed to be processed in the first safe country they reach but in practice they’re often allowed to move on, via several countries, to their desired destination. Migrants wanting to get to Britain end up in northern France, or the Belgian coast.

Burnham stressed that in order to defeat people trafficking gangs organizing the boat crossings refugees needed “safe routes” of reaching Britain. Currently, people must get to Britain before they can claim asylum, an almost impossible hurdle for nationals of countries from which most migrants hail without resorting to traffickers.

The number of people crossing the English Channel in small boats fell 43% in the first seven months of this year, compared with the same period in 2025, according to Home Office data. However, numbers have fallen in all of the past four years after peaking in 2022.

The U.S. Navy has shared details about its vision for a new family of modular surface-to-air missiles that is expected to include a version that will arm future variants of the Virginia class submarine. This would be an all-new capability for the service, at least as far as we know. All of the members of the Naval Modular Missile (NMM) are set to be based around a common Terminal Stage Interceptor (TSI), creating a range of capabilities in very different form factors. This, in turn, opens a door to new options for larger and/or mixed loadouts in vertical launch systems on surface warships and submarines.

New information about the Navy’s NMM concept is contained in a draft request for solutions contracting notice recently posted online, which Aviation Week was first to report on. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) hosted an NMM Industry Day event earlier this year to get feedback from prospective vendors. The NMM effort traces its roots back to at least 2021, but the Navy has only released limited details about its plans for these new missiles in the past.

“The United States Navy (USN) is seeking a new, modular interceptor to serve as the basis for the Naval Modular Missile (NMM) program, a next-generation initiative designed to revolutionize surface naval capabilities through multi-mission utility, enhanced capacity, and a modular open architecture,” according to the recent draft request for solutions notice. “The NMM TSI is a modular, highly capable multi-mission interceptor that leverages state-of-the-art technology to provide effectiveness across the entire mission space.”

“The TSI is ten inches in diameter and consists of five modules,” which are “the Seeker Assembly Module (SAM), Lethality Module (LM), Command Module (CM), Terminal-Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM), and Control Actuation Module (CAM),” the notice adds. “This TSI will be integrated with multiple booster stacks and canisters to achieve a robust family of multi-mission and multi-platform variants.”

To start with, the contracting document describes the desired TSI as “highly agile” and “multi-mission capable,” but does not lay out any hard performance or capability requirements.

When it comes to the TSI’s seeker, there are certainly multiple options for prosecuting an aerial intercept, including active radars, imaging infrared sensors, and passive radiofrequency (RF) capabilities. Though we do not know yet what the Navy’s requirements here might be, a multi-mode seeker system could also be extremely valuable as the countermeasure ecosystem continues to expand.

An interceptor with a high degree of agility would also be required for any NMM variants intended to address high-supersonic and/or hypersonic targets, especially ones with their own ability to maneuver significantly during mid-course and/or terminal phases of flight. The Navy has made clear in the past that addressing the threats posed by ever more advanced supersonic and hypersonic anti-ship missiles, including air-breathing types, as well as ballistic and hypersonic designs, is a top priority. This has only been underscored by lessons learned from recent conflicts in and around the Middle East, as well as observations from the war in Ukraine. Those threats are only expected to be magnified in any future high-end fight against an adversary like China or Russia. Both of those countries have been investing heavily in the development and fielding of new high-speed anti-ship missile capabilities.

All this being said, the TSI element is perhaps the least interesting part of the overall NMM concept the Navy has now outlined. The service envisions at least four distinct NMM “All-Up-Rounds,” or AURs, topped with the common interceptor. As described now, the missiles are very different in form and function.

There is a Long-Range (LR) version that “brings multi-mission, hypersonic capability to the Mk 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS),
leveraging existing USN investments in a 21” rocket motor and fully integrating with future Long-Range Fires kill chains,” according to the recent notice. A single LR NMM will be able to fit inside a Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cell.

A 21-inch rocket motor is a key component of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA anti-ballistic missile interceptors in Navy inventory today. A similarly sized rocket motor is also a central feature of the still-in-development supersized Block IB version of the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6). Existing variants of the SM-6 are multi-purpose missiles that can be employed as anti-interceptors, including against certain hypersonic threats, as well as surface targets. The rendering the Navy has shown now of the LR version of the NMM is very much in line with the overall designs of the SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6 Block IB.

In addition, the Navy wants slimmer extended and medium-range NMMs that can be dual- and quad-packed into a single Mk 41 VLS cell, respectively. These are called the DP-ER and QP-MR versions. It’s worth noting here that the service uses similar extended and medium-range terminology today to describe different variants of the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2). Those missiles are primarily employed as surface-to-air interceptors, but have a limited secondary surface-to-surface capability, as well. However, SM-2s can only be loaded singly in Mk 41 VLS cells. The Navy is now in the process of integrating the Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptor into the Mk 41, offering another alternative to SM-2, but those missiles will also be loaded one per cell, at least initially.

The last and most notable version of the NMM that the Navy has outlined now is an extended-range version intended to be launched from future subvariants of the Virginia class nuclear-powered attack submarine equipped with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). The VPM consists of four large vertical launch tubes and is set to be integrated first on Block V Virginia class boats. The so-called ER-S member of the NMM family would be loaded into those tubes via a seven-cell Multiple All-Up-Round Canister (MAC) adapter, first used on Ohio class guided missile systems.

The Navy does not currently have an operational submarine-launched surface-to-air capability at all, at least that we know about. This is something that has been explored by navies globally to varying degrees for decades, as you can read about more in this past TWZ feature. We will come back to this later on.

The NMM concept presents clear potential benefits operationally. The Navy’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request indicates the service is aiming to eventually supplant all of its existing Standard missiles with NMM types. The new modular missile family could conceivably replace other munitions. With a new common TSI interceptor, even shorter-range NMM versions could offer expanded capability against an array of aerial threats in different envelopes. The Navy’s description of the LR type, at least, as a multi-mission weapon, also points to new capability against surface targets.

It’s also important to point out that the Navy says the LR and ER-S versions will be capable themselves of traveling at hypersonic speeds, helping to close any kill chain faster, even at extended ranges. This would be especially important for engaging incoming hypersonic threats, something the Navy can only currently do with versions of SM-6, to at least some degree. Depending on the full scope of capabilities the Navy has planned for NMM, this could open the door to new options for strikes on time-sensitive or otherwise fleeting surface targets.

The DP-ER and QP-MR versions would bring valuable additional magazine depth. Currently, the lower-end Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) is the only surface-to-air interceptor in Navy inventory that can be multi-packed into VLS cells on its surface ships. Greater magazine depth means more engagement opportunities before having to reload, a process that currently requires Navy warships to leave their stations and head to a friendly port. During those transits, they may also be more vulnerable due to limited remaining ordnance. Especially in the face of growing threats to established port facilities, the Navy is also pursuing new at-sea reloading capabilities to create additional operational flexibility and reduce vulnerability. These issues have also been highlighted by recent U.S. operations in and around the Middle East.

ESSM Blk 2 GTV 1 Firing

The NMM plan would present benefits logistically and when it comes to production, too. Multiple contractors could be brought on to produce TSIs and the different rocket motors, creating opportunities for competition and cost savings, as a result. It could also help with ramping up production at scale. The recent NMM contracting notice says the Navy could leverage multiple vendors just to produce the modular components of the TSIs, and that the service is aiming for a production rate of 1,000 interceptors per year within five years of a contract award.

These are all considerations that are top of mind for the U.S. military at present when it comes to anti-air interceptors, as well as other munitions. Higher-end surface-to-air missiles have historically been very long-lead-time items with the delivery timelines measured in months, if not years. This has already created serious issues for sustaining stockpiles that have been exacerbated by a succession of crises in the Middle East, as well as the need to support allies and partners, especially Ukraine.

Overall, NMM “will provide the US Navy, Joint Force, Allies and Partners with advanced defensive and offensive capability to out-pace the threat. As the effective range, capability and capacity of adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems have increased, the US Navy and Joint and Allied forces are at increased risk,” the Navy’s budget documents explain. “Additionally, adversary capacity and expected large raid engagement tactics will demand US and Allied forces increase their platforms’ defensive capacity (depth of magazine) or be forced to resupply frequently in the midst of combat operations. The adversary’s increased capacity comes with increased capability in the form of highly-maneuverable, complex threats that will stress the current U.S. weapon systems capabilities.”

Then there is the additional matter of the submarine-launched capability. As stressed from the start, the explicit inclusion of the ER-S version in the NMM plan is especially significant since this is not something the Navy is known to have access to at all right now. TWZ has previously explored in detail the potential benefits, as well as drawbacks, of arming submarines with anti-air interceptors.

Historically, the most immediate use case for a submarine-launched anti-air missile capability has been localized defense against anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, as seen in the video below. The threat of a submarine shooting back could have a deterrent effect, too. Still, a submarine could have to get close to the surface and otherwise expose its position to prosecute such an engagement. A submarine launching anti-air interceptors is not automatically guaranteed to achieve a kill, either. This all raises a question of the value proposition compared to simply trying to evade detection and escape pursuers. There are rules of engagement and other questions to be answered, as well, as you can read more about here.

DCNS A3SM submarine launched MICA surface to air missile

However, the extended-range nature of the ER-S NMM variant raises the possibility of a different concept of operations involving a deep integrated and fully networked kill web, which is an area the Navy has already been investing in heavily. In this context, submarines might offer broader additional anti-air engagement capacity as part of a larger defensive posture around carrier strike groups, other surface action groups, and even potentially friendly assets on island outposts or along other coastlines, although this is unlikely to be the primary use of this capability set.

Submarines offer inherent survivability benefits and can operate discreetly across broad areas for extended periods of time. This, in turn, could create additional challenges for opponents who would have to account for the potential of additional surface-to-air capabilities to be hiding underneath the waves. Similarly, ER-S-armed submarines could be used proactively to take out enemy aircraft in areas far forward of any other friendly forces, and without opponents knowing they are there to begin with. This could be an especially valuable tool for targeting airborne early warning and control planes and other prized strategic force multiplying platforms. Targeting data could come from many sources, including future air moving target indicator space sensing layers, but also from warships equipped with the Aegis combat system or aircraft, including future sixth-generation F/A-XX fighters operating beyond the reach of their weapons capabilities. Acting as forward remote ‘shooter’ nodes, submarines would be very unpredictable and dangerous counter-air assets. Ukraine, for instance, has leveraged remote forward ‘shooter’ concepts in a similar manner, albeit on land, to great success.

Tied in with offboard sensor networks, submarines loaded with ER-S missiles might be able to conduct more general anti-missile defense missions, as well. For instance, a submarine would offer a new and different way to position such a capability closer to enemy territory, and potentially without their knowledge, from where boost-phase intercepts might be attempted. Missiles, especially larger ballistic types, are particularly vulnerable in the boost phase after launch. However, taking advantage of that has historically been complicated by the fact that the launch points are generally expected to be in more heavily defended areas.

If ER-S can also be employed as a hypersonic surface-to-air missile, it would give submarines armed with them additional operational flexibility. A VPM-equipped Virginia class submarine could also carry ER-Ss as just one part of a mixed ordnance load. VPM tubes are designed to accommodate a variety of munitions, including Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles and Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) hypersonic missiles.

In the missile defense context, the submarine with mid-course ballistic missile and/or hypersonic missile interceptors onboard could provide a more forward launch point for midcourse interception of these weapons. This would provide another layer of defense, especially in anti-access combat scenarios, allowing for the traditional missile defense layer, farther to the rear, to deal with whatever breaks through.

This all sounds great, but there is one problem with actually using this kind of capability in a sustained operational context. Firing off a larger interceptor from a submarine gives off a huge signature — infrared, radar, and acoustic. This is exactly what submarines operating forward try to avoid at nearly all costs. So how exactly this would be mitigated is unclear at this time. Clearly, there is a risk-reward calculus to all operations, but having a hugely valuable asset loaded with sensitive technologies and lives give away its position deep in enemy territory to shoot down a plane or missile would be a choice that would have to be made very carefully. The submarine could have a long way to run to safer territory if its presence were detected.

If nothing else, ER-S would create a submarine-based anti-air capability, and its very presence would impact adversary anti-submarine warfare playbooks. When it comes to chasing down U.S. submarines from the air, the hunted could now shoot back.

The Navy does still appear to be relatively early on in the process of outlining the NMM concept, let alone moving down a path that could lead to an operational capability. The requirements for NMM, including the submarine-launched capability, could well evolve further down the line, or even be truncated to focus first on a lower-risk spiral. As it stands now, the Navy is asking for $311 million to support NMM development in Fiscal Year 2027, which it says is a “new start” effort.

“The Department [of the Navy] is implementing diverse procurement strategies to enable rapid acquisition,” the service’s budget documents also note. “These will include the use of Other Transaction Authorities, ‘Marketplace’ acquisition platforms, and alternative concepts to increase supply and suppliers in addition to traditional FAR-based procurement strategies.”

Still, the NMM plan that the Navy has outlined now shows that it is pursuing a significant leap in anti-air capability that will be employed across its fleets, including on certain Virginia class submarines.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The U.S. Navy is seeking a multi-mission maritime security vessel to “launch, recover, and support a mix of manned and unmanned air and surface platforms,” a Navy spokesperson told us on Tuesday. The ship will “support the U.S. Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM) enduring mission to collaborate with partner nations on maritime security operations in the Eastern Pacific and Southern Caribbean.”

“The Special Mission Vessel is envisioned as a versatile ‘mothership’ designed to significantly enhance maritime domain awareness and response capabilities,” the spokesperson added. “These operations are crucial for conducting command and control, surveillance, and interdiction missions across vast stretches of the open ocean.”

The Navy was responding to our questions about a request for information (RFI) about the ship that was published Monday on the government’s contracting website. The request comes as a contract for the ship currently performing this mission expires in 2028, which we will discuss in more detail later in this story.

The need for a vessel like this exists as U.S. forces continue a long battle with drug traffickers in the region, including ongoing strikes on boats claimed to be operated by smugglers. The strikes have generated a great deal of controversy, with claims they violate the rules of armed conflict and have been carried out without Congressional or judicial approval. The White House and Pentagon have pushed back on those claims.

You can see one of the most recent incidents in the following video.

To obtain this special mission ship, the Navy is looking for “both the design and new construction of a vessel, as well as the acquisition and necessary modification of an existing vessel,” the RFI explained. Interested parties should “seek to use existing, non-developmental platforms to the maximum extent possible.”

While the Navy is open to how the ship is ultimately developed, there are a number of requirements it must meet. 

The Navy wants a steel monohull or catamaran that’s between 300 and 400 feet long and can travel at a 10-knot minimum sustained speed with a range of 9,600 nautical miles.

The ship should be capable of “conducting primary operations and surviving in a Beaufort Wind Scale 6 or greater” and be capable of “performing boat launch and recovery operations in Beaufort Wind Scale 4,” the RFI added.

Under the Beaufort system, Scale 6 refers to conditions with wind speeds of 22 to 27 knots and maximum wave heights of 12 feet. Scale 4 is wind speeds of 11 to 16 knots with maximum wave heights of five feet.

In addition, the ship should be able to stay at sea for “at least 30 days without underway replenishment or resupply for maximum number of personnel,” the RFI noted.

The ship’s flight deck/helicopter pad needs to be able to launch and recover Sikorsky SH-60, MH-60 Seahawk, MH-60T Jayhawk and MH-65 Dolphin helicopters. It should also be capable of “launching and recovering vertical take-off Class 2/3 UAS platforms” and have a minimum of “20×20 ft dedicated clear deck space for UAS recovery and storage” as well as “sockets for minimum of two [20-foot-equivalent] containers for UAS control and maintenance.”

When it comes to small boats, the ship is required to have a “non-deck-crane-based small boat launch and recovery system capable of supporting various boats between 24 ft and 44 ft in length and weighing up to 35,000 lbs,” according to the RFI. It also needs a “small crane (fixed/portable or ‘yellow gear’) for emergency recovery of UAS/USV or other watercraft.”

This ship has to serve as a floating gas station for a wide array of other craft.

“The vessel shall be capable of receiving and storing various grades of fuel for propulsion, ships auxiliaries and delivery to small boats and craft,” according to the RFI. “The vessel must be designated as a refueler vessel and meet U.S. Coast Guard requirements to ensure safe and effective refueling operations.”

When it comes to crew and passengers, the ship needs berthing for up to 69 people, with 20 to 25 civilian mariner staterooms, and open berthing for 29 to 44 embarked crew members. It also needs secure detainee space “with suitable AC/ventilation for 10 – 12 people.”

The mothership is not required to be heavily armed, but should support Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection .50 caliber machine gun mounts. It additionally must have a 160-square-foot armory for storing, maintaining and issuing military small arms and a 100-square-foot magazine for storing ammunition and ordnance.

In a broad sense, many of the requirements the Navy is seeking match the Kellie Chouest, the vessel currently performing a similar mission for SOUTHCOM. It is a 310-foot ship that can travel at 13 knots, berths 53, has a helicopter pad, several 20-foot containers and cranes and winches for launching and recovering smaller ships. As we noted earlier in this story, the Kellie Chouest, which has been chartered for years by the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC), is nearing the end of its latest four-year contract, set to expire on March 31, 2028, the command told us.

That timeline fits with the Navy’s plans for the ship described in the RFI.

“The Navy intends to issue a formal Request for Proposal upon receipt of FY27 appropriations,” the service’s spokesperson explained. “The RFI is a standard part of the federal acquisition process, allowing the U.S. Navy to conduct market research and understand the capabilities available in the industry. The proposed Special Mission Vessel is included in the President’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget. By issuing this RFI, the Navy is inviting industry partners to propose innovative concepts that meet the foundational requirements for a vessel designed for this critical mission set.”

It is possible that the Navy could decide to just renew a contract for the Kellie Chouest, or this new ship could be added alongside her if her contract is renewed. We’ve reached out to the Navy, MSC, and SOUTHCOM for more details. SOUTHCOM declined comment about the Kellie Chouest‘s current operations, or what kinds of drones it launches now, but in a previous interview after the command posted an image of the vessel, a SOUTHCOM official offered some insights into what the ship does.

“It provides support to get after cartels and illicit trafficking,” a SOUTHCOM official told us several months ago. “When we do an operation, it provides our partner nations a platform. They use the ship as a base of operations where they can get intelligence, get fuel, get life support.”

“The Ship Special Mission (SSM) Kellie Chouest is contributing to missions to disrupt cartel and narcotrafficking networks across the Eastern Pacific,” SOUTHCOM said in an April 28, 2026, post on X. “The ship…is serving as a forward operating base for partner nations across the Eastern Pacific — directly supporting counternarcotics operations alongside Panama, Costa Rica, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico.”

Advancing Western Hemisphere security and countering narcoterrorism:
The Ship Special Mission (SSM) Kellie Chouest is contributing to missions to disrupt cartel and narcotrafficking networks across the Eastern Pacific. The ship, shown here in a file photo from 2021, is serving as… pic.twitter.com/HUwAl8jctr

— U.S. Southern Command (@Southcom) April 28, 2026

Four days earlier, in a post about the Colombian Navy’s seizure of 3.2 tons of marijuana in the South Pacific, valued at $3.4 million, the command explained that the Kellie Chouest “provided direct assistance to Colombian forces, demonstrating our longstanding and highly effective partnership in dismantling drug cartels and narcotrafficking networks throughout the region.”

The U.S. military is proud to have supported this successful, Colombia-led counterdrug operation. The team at @jiatfs and the MV Kellie Chouest provided direct assistance to Colombian forces, demonstrating our longstanding and highly effective partnership in dismantling drug… https://t.co/PPG5k0hjro

— U.S. Southern Command (@Southcom) April 24, 2026

The ship’s last reported position was off the coast of Guatemala 20 days ago, according to the MarineTraffic tracking site.

The Kellie Chouest is one of several converted vessels used by the U.S. military as special mission ships. The Carolyn Chouest, another ship built by the Edison Chouest Offshore conglomerate, is another example. Operated by MSC, it was converted into a sea base platform specially configured to support U.S. special operations forces in the Pacific region and is currently located near Indonesia, according to MarineTraffic. You can read more about it in our story here. 

Another commercial ship that has been turned into a U.S. military sea base is the MV Ocean Trader – a roll-on/roll-off cargo vessel modified to carry special operators, their vehicles, and all their other gear. This ship is far larger and more advanced than the other vessels mentioned here, though. Given its ability to support special operations missions, including launching a variety of smaller boats, UAVs and multiple helicopters, Ocean Trader often appears in conflict zones around the globe. It was spotted in the Caribbean last year during the Trump administration’s pressure campaign on Venezuelan drug cartels that culminated with the capture of Nicolás Maduro. You can read more about Ocean Trader and its capabilities in our deep dive here.

The Navy could get a new vessel purposely built for this maritime security role, or one — like the Kellie Chouest — converted to it, or sign a new contract for that vessel. The service could also keep the contract in place for Kellie Chouest and add this new vessel to operate in addition to it. Considering the focus the Trump administration has put on Central and South America, this wouldn’t be surprising.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The U.S. Navy is pumping $70 million into the development of a ground-launched version of CoAspire’s Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile-Extended Range (RAACM-ER) cruise missile. RAACM-ER was unveiled just earlier this year. Continued work on the design will now be done under a program aimed primarily at giving U.S. allies and partners a new, lower-cost way to strike moving targets at sea and on land.

CoAspire announced today that it had received what is known as an Other Transactional Agreement (OTA) in support of the Navy’s Coalition Heterogenous Affordable Offensive Strike (CHAOS) program. The OTA process is a contracting mechanism that U.S. government agencies use to help speed up advanced research and development and prototype efforts.

“Under a $70m Prototype Other Transactional Agreement (OTA) with CMG Networks on behalf of Naval Aviation Systems Consortium, CoAspire will design, build, test, and deliver to Program Acquisition Executive for Munitions and its program office, PMX-201, an affordable, ground-launched, mid-range, cruise missile system that can attack both land-based and moving maritime targets,” according to a press release from CoAspire. “The end-use Foreign Military Sale (FMS) customers are allies and coalition partners needing an affordable yet highly effective maritime strike weapon that can be easily manufactured at scale.”

Whether or not the Navy has also selected other companies to move ahead with their designs under CHAOS is unknown, and TWZ has reached out to the service for more information.

RAACM-ER is a turbojet-powered cruise missile. It has a body with a trapezoidal shape that is reminiscent, in very broad strokes, of Lockheed Martin’s stealthy AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and derivatives thereof.

“Physics is physics,” Doug Denneny, founder, CEO, and owner at CoAspire, told TWZ‘s Jamie Hunter at the Navy League’s annual Sea-Air-Space exhibition earlier this year. “When people look at shapes, they look similar, but just like an Airbus looks like a Boeing, but what they have different inside is really what matters, and that’s how we differ in many ways.”

CoAspire’s missile has a GPS-assisted navigation system and a long-wave infrared seeker in the nose. The guidance package allows for the engagement of moving targets, as well as static ones based on fixed target coordinates. Passive infrared seekers are immune to radiofrequency countermeasures, such as jammers or decoys. They also do not pump out signals that could alert a target to the incoming danger. All of this creates advantages over active radars for terminal homing.

When RAACM-ER made its public debut, the company said the design could be fired from ground-based launchers or ones on ships, as well as be employed by aircraft. However, an air-launched version was the only one on display. Surface launch requires the addition of a rocket booster to the tail of the missile, as seen on the model in the picture at the top of this story. That booster falls away after launch.

As an aside, CoAspire is also now developing what it says is a separate surface-launched version of RAACM-ER, called GHOST, for the U.S. military’s Low-Cost Containerized Missiles (LCCM) program. The core RAACM-ER design also evolved conceptually from an earlier missile simply called RAACM, but they are entirely different. The original RAACM was developed under a U.S. Air Force program called the Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM), which has also been aimed primarily at supporting allies and partners, starting first with Ukraine.

When designing RAACM-ER, “our engineers came to us and said, ‘Hey, if we’re going to make a bigger one, should we make it look just the same?’ I mentioned earlier that RAACM was made that shape just to ease integration,” Denneny also told Jamie Hunter at Sea-Air-Space. “We’re an engineering company, so we said, ‘Let’s optimize fuel volume, let’s optimize survivability features, let’s optimize physics so that this thing can go as far as possible and take the sensors needed. That’s why it’s in this slightly different shape.”

How far RAACM-ER, now described as a “mid-range” missile, can go in any of its configurations is unclear. When it was first unveiled, the missile looked to be well suited for the Family of Affordable Mass Missiles-Beyond Adversary’s Reach (FAMM-BAR) effort, which is seeking lower-cost designs with maximum ranges of 1,000 nautical miles or more. This is roughly the same reach as is offered today by variants of the surface-launched Tomahawk cruise missile.

However, at Sea-Air-Space, Denneny separately told Naval News that RAACM-ER had roughly twice the reach of the original RAACM, which would be around 485 nautical miles (900 kilometers) based on previously stated ERAM program requirements. This would put the design more in the category, at least range-wise, of the air-launched AGM-158B JASSM-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) land-attack cruise missile. An extended-range version of the JASSM’s Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) cousin that is now in development is expected to have similar reach.

“CoAspire hasn’t discussed range capabilities of our products, so any assumptions/estimations would be speculation,” a representative for the company told TWZ today when asked for further clarification.

Even with a range of 485 nautical miles, RAACM-ER would offer a notable boost in capability over many other anti-ship cruise missiles in service today with U.S. allies and partners, as well as the U.S. military itself. For example, the reported maximum reach of extended-range variants of the Harpoon is in the 150-mile realm. Current-generation versions of the increasingly popular Naval Strike Missile (NSM) have a stated range of at least 162 miles.

In more general terms, extended reach expands the total area that a single launch platform can hold at risk, while also keeping it further away from potential threats. Longer-range munitions also offer additional flexibility to respond to targets that might emerge suddenly or other changing developments in the battlespace.

How large a warhead RAACM-ER carries is unclear. Trading warhead weight and bulk for fuel, as well as reducing total payload weight, would help extend range. A smaller warhead would have impacts on the missile’s effectiveness. At the same time, certain targets would also not necessarily require something like the 1,000-pound-class warheads found on many Tomahawk variants to achieve the desired effect. When it comes to ships, especially, destroying or even just severely damaging key systems on a ship can achieve a mission kill that substantially reduces the vessel’s combat effectiveness or might even force it back into port for a protracted period of time.

See Tomahawk missile strike a ship

Providing increased capability at a cheaper price point is also a key aspect of the CHAOS program. It was also top of mind for CoAspire in the development of RAACM-ER, though an estimated unit price for the missile has yet to be released. Current-generation Harpoons can range in price from $1.4 to $2.25 million, depending on variant, based on publicly available cost data. NSMs are also in the roughly $2 million price range. The latest versions of the Tomahawk are even more expensive.

“The most important thing is affordable mass. [This] means keeping the cost down, so that the nation and our allies can purchase these at scale. That’s number one,” CoAspire’s Denneny told us at Sea-Air-Space. “Number two is to use as many commercial off-the-shelf parts, so that we are not locked into a single supplier for anything. The final thing is to have something that can survive enemy countermeasures, and also hit the target, whether it’s stationary or moving. Those are the main requirements.”

“An additive approach also allows for rapid modifications and a reduction in tooling and touch labor that results in cost reductions and program improvements without breaking a production line for re-tooling,” CoAspire’s press release today also notes. “It also allows for the development of new variants in months compared to years needed by other missile manufacturing methods.”

Providing new standoff strike weapons in mass to allies and partners would have knock-on benefits for the U.S. military in future coalition operations. This would distribute an additional tier of capability across more friendly forces, helping to reduce reliance on American forces and foreign militaries that field higher-end munitions.

All of this could make the ground-launched version of RAACM-ER, and any other missiles developed under the Navy’s CHAOS program, attractive to the U.S. military, as well. As already noted, the GHOST version of RAACM-ER is already under development now as part of the LCCM program, which is a U.S. Army effort.

As TWZ regularly draws attention to, munitions expenditures in recent operations against Iran and other conflicts globally in the past few years have underscored the increasingly critical need for new designs that are both cheaper and easier to produce. This is vital for ensuring sufficient stockpiles of key munitions, including stand-off strike weapons, at the start of a conflict and making sure that the arsenal can be replenished as fighting continues. It is important to note that lower-cost types are not expected to supplant more expensive and exquisite capabilities now or in the future, but instead complement them.

Just in the past few months, the U.S. military has moved to lay the groundwork for the acquisition of tens of thousands of new, lower-cost stand-off munitions over the next three to five years. CoAspire is one of several companies to have received framework deals as part of these efforts. These agreements cover surface and air-launched designs being developed in support of the aforementioned LCCM and FAMM programs, respectively. It’s also worth noting here that the ERAM program, which was also foreign-focused at the outset, has already been feeding into FAMM.

With all this in mind, today’s announcement regarding CHAOS is another important win for CoAspire. This also underscores U.S. military-wide efforts to reduce reliance on traditional prime contractors and do more to leverage small and non-traditional firms for new major weapon system programs.

With the new vote of confidence from the Navy, along with the previous LCCM framework deal, CoAspire’s RAACM-ER continues to emerge as a particularly notable development for the U.S. military and its allies and partners.

Update: 2:25 PM ET –

The U.S. Navy has now provided TWZ with some additional details regarding today’s announcement about the CHAOS program.

The Navy awarded an Other Transaction Authority agreement to CoAspire for Phases 1 and 2 of the Coalition Heterogenous Affordable Offensive Strike (CHAOS) prototype effort, July 17, marking PAE Munitions’ direct investment in the emerging low-cost cruise missile market,” according to a Navy spokesperson. “The award is a significant milestone in developing an affordable maritime strike capability for security assistance partners while expanding the defense industrial base through competition and accelerating a new entrant into the Navy’s precision strike portfolio.”

“The Navy has requested appropriated funds to begin integration of this low-cost maritime capability on Navy platforms as part of the FY27 budget request,” they added. “PAE Munitions expect[s] at least one more industry agreement on CHAOS as part of its competitive strategy.”

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

July 17 (Asia Today) — A senior U.S. lawmaker proposed building as much as 80% of some American naval vessels in South Korea while reserving sensitive technology and final assembly for the United States.

Rep. Ami Bera of California, the top Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee overseeing East Asia and the Pacific, said Thursday that relying exclusively on domestic shipyards was unrealistic because the United States lacks sufficient workers and production capacity.

Bera spoke at a South Korea-U.S. shipbuilding and maritime innovation forum hosted by the Korea Foundation and the RAND research organization in Arlington, Va.

“To say we are going to build everything in the United States is wrong,” Bera said, urging Washington to make greater use of allied manufacturing capacity.

He suggested that South Korean shipyards could produce hulls and other components accounting for 75% to 80% of a vessel, while highly sensitive systems could be manufactured and installed in the United States.

Bera also proposed a distributed construction model under which components would be produced at different locations before being brought to the United States for final assembly.

“If we do not have the workers or construction capacity in the United States, we have to build where ships can be built,” he said.

Bera said combining the capabilities of the United States and its allies would strengthen deterrence and help prevent a military conflict with China.

Technology controls and visas remain obstacles

Bera said President Donald Trump had discussed nuclear-powered submarine construction with South Korea.

Such cooperation would require the two countries to address technology sharing and export control restrictions, he said.

Bera cited the security partnership among the United States, Britain and Australia as a possible model for resolving issues related to joint naval construction.

The partnership, commonly known as AUKUS, includes plans for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines with American and British assistance.

Bera also called on the United States to facilitate the entry of South Korean engineers and technicians needed to support investments by Korean shipbuilding companies.

He described the detention of more than 300 South Korean workers in Georgia in September as an “embarrassing fiasco” and said the visa problem must be resolved.

The United States has encouraged South Korean companies to invest in American manufacturing while immigration restrictions have complicated the deployment of specialized Korean personnel to construction sites and shipyards.

Expert says U.S. rebuilding could take decades

Shin Jong-gye, a professor emeritus of naval architecture and ocean engineering at Seoul National University, said China’s overall shipbuilding capacity by gross tonnage was more than 230 times that of the United States.

He said China had more than 50 dry docks large enough to accommodate aircraft carriers.

Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia is the only U.S. shipyard capable of designing and building nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

Shin said the United States must expand both its physical shipyard capacity and its ability to build vessels quickly and efficiently.

South Korea, Japan and China benefit from building commercial and naval vessels within the same industrial ecosystems, allowing them to share technology, workers and supply chains, he said.

The United States lacks a comparable commercial shipbuilding base and therefore cannot obtain the same economies of scale, Shin said.

South Korea, Japan and China together account for more than 95% of global commercial shipbuilding.

Shin said rebuilding an industry requires accumulated experience, technology and repeated construction cycles.

He estimated that rebuilding the U.S. shipbuilding sector independently could take 20 to 30 years, while cooperation with South Korea could significantly shorten the process.

Shin proposed initially building complete ships in South Korea while developing supply chains in the United States. American production could then be expanded gradually.

He said protecting South Korean intellectual property, providing appropriate compensation and resolving visa restrictions for Korean specialists would be essential.

Hanwha, HD Hyundai respond to Navy request

Michael Coulter, president and chief executive officer of Hanwha Defense USA, said protectionism was one of the largest obstacles to industrial cooperation.

He said South Korea and the United States often viewed each other primarily as export markets rather than partners sharing a common industrial base.

Coulter said the U.S. Navy had issued a request for information after consulting the South Korean government and Korean shipbuilders.

The request examined the possible use of a vessel construction manager who would help finalize a ship’s design before construction begins.

South Korean shipyards generally complete designs before starting construction, while U.S. Navy projects often undergo design changes after work has begun, increasing costs and delaying delivery, Coulter said.

The U.S. government has asked Hanwha about options ranging from building combat vessels and supplying motors to constructing hulls in South Korea before installing American technology, he said.

Coulter said, however, that the administration and Congress had not reached a unified position.

He called on the two countries to integrate portions of their industrial bases rather than treat each investment or contract as a conventional export transaction.

Hong Suk-hwan, president and chief executive officer of HD Hyundai USA, proposed a two-track strategy involving investment in U.S. shipyards and partnerships with existing American companies.

Hong said HD Hyundai had built about 5,000 vessels during the past 50 years and could apply its skilled workforce, manufacturing experience and supply network to the United States.

He also proposed a “bridge strategy” in which American workers would train at South Korean shipyards for about three years while ships were being constructed there.

The trained workers could then return to the United States as supervisors and production managers at American shipyards.

U.S. law limits overseas warship construction

Brittany Clayton, a senior operations researcher at RAND, said complicated U.S. defense procurement procedures, unpredictable orders and design changes during construction remained major barriers to cooperation.

The Navy, Defense Department and Congress all play roles in funding and policy decisions, making rapid action difficult, she said.

Clayton said companies needed consistent and predictable demand from the U.S. government before making long-term investments.

She also cited proposed legislation restricting the overseas construction of American combat vessels.

Rep. Jared Golden of Maine, whose district includes the Bath Iron Works shipyard, introduced an amendment to the fiscal 2027 defense authorization bill that would restrict foreign construction of combat ships.

Clayton said distributed construction could provide an alternative, with components built at multiple locations before being integrated and tested in the United States.

She also suggested beginning cooperation with strategic sealift vessels, which contain fewer sensitive military technologies than combat ships.

The Senate Armed Services Committee included language in its fiscal 2027 defense authorization legislation that would permit the acquisition of up to two noncombat vessels from allied shipyards, including bulk fuel carriers and strategic sealift ships.

Trump said Wednesday that his administration was examining shipbuilders in South Korea and other countries and could purchase some vessels built outside the United States.

Kristin Gunness of San Diego State University said the university had signed an agreement with Samsung Heavy Industries to establish a marine engineering and shipbuilding center.

She said the university was also developing exchange programs with Seoul National University and other South Korean institutions.

Shin proposed short-term educational programs involving retired South Korean professors and American universities to train ship designers and production managers.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260717010006342

The U.S. Navy is envisioning a future force of carrier-based uncrewed aircraft capable of attacking enemy forces at least 1,000 nautical miles away from the ship. They would also have to be able to do this without needing to refuel in mid-air, though tankers could further extend their reach. This, along with other details, offers the first real sense of the combat drone capabilities the Navy wants to add to its future carrier air wings.

The range target was included in a very broad request for information (RFI) contracting notice regarding a future Air Wing of the Future (AWOTF) “family of systems,” which Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) put out this week. NAVAIR is looking for prospective drone designs that could perform any combination of eight distinct missions. These are surface warfare; strike warfare; anti-submarine warfare; air warfare; electronic warfare; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T); mobility; and logistics. A breakdown of how these missions are defined, in general terms, in the RFI is provided below.

It should be noted here that the Navy says the family of AWOTF platforms already includes the MQ-25A Stingray tanker drone, which will have a secondary surveillance and reconnaissance role, as well as future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). The Navy is still very early on in the process of defining what it wants its CCA drones to be able to do, even just initially. As TWZ has noted in the past, the MQ-25’s core design and baseline performance, specifically its extreme endurance and low-signature design, also leave open the possibility that it could be adapted to strike, advanced ISR, and other missions in the future.

“For missions involving attacking the enemy, the system must be capable of delivering effects a minimum of 1,000 NM [nautical miles; approximately 1,151 miles statute miles or 1,900 kilometers] from the CVN without refueling,” the RFI NAVAIR issued yesterday says.

The drones must be “fully compatible with both Nimitz class and Ford class CVN launch and recovery systems,” per the RFI. “The system must demonstrate increased combat effectiveness over current 4th generation platforms at a given spot factor.”

Spot factor here is the amount of physical space the platform occupies, which is a very important consideration for carrier-based aircraft, where room on the flight deck and below is at a premium. Though the focus is on prospective carrier-based designs, the RFI also highlights the Navy’s interest in vertical takeoff and landing capable drones that could operate from destroyers or other vessels. This is something the service has openly discussed in the past and that we will come back to later on.

The Navy also wants any potential designs to be “capable of integration into existing U.S. Navy Unmanned Carrier Aviation (UCA) control systems.” Furthermore, the service is asking prospective vendors to explain how their concepts “address flight autonomy (e.g., carrier pattern, taxiing) and mission autonomy (e.g., dynamic tasking / retasking, threat evasion, automated aerial refueling) maturity,” and whether “their solution is single-role, multi-role, or a modular/variant-based approach.”

The video below from Collins Aerospace offers a notional look at what crewed-uncrewed teaming involving carrier and land-based CCA-type drones might look like in the future.

Collaborative Mission Autonomy

The range requirement is particularly interesting. As adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubbles continue to expand in scale and scope, carriers and their air wings will be pushed further and further away from target areas. Having aircraft, crewed and uncrewed, that can cover those extended distances will be vital. Having CCA-type drones, in particular, with ranges similar to or greater than that of the crewed fighters they are expected to be paired with, is also key to enabling that particular concept of operations.

Not necessarily needing tanker support to complete those missions will also be a boon. Aerial refueling capacity is always in high demand during sustained conflicts, as underscored by the recent fighting with Iran, and that need will be further magnified in a future high-end fight against a near-peer opponent like China. Those same tankers would, by extension, also be top targets for enemy forces.

The new uncrewed carrier-based aircraft RFI from NAVAIR outlines exactly this reality:

“Aligned with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) issued by the Department of War, and the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Fighting Instructions, the Navy is seeking capability improvements to expedite transition from a 4th-generation-centric Carrier Air Wing (CVW) to a 5th/6th-generation manned-unmanned AWoTF. This transition supports the Golden Fleet initiative and the Navy Warfighting Concept, which is a proactive approach leveraging global maritime maneuver to gain sea control, impose sea denial, and project power independently. Unmanned systems are critical to increasing Carrier Strike Group (CSG) strike capacity, extending CVW operational reach, and introducing advanced methods for executing Naval Aviation missions in a Highly Contested Environment (HCE). The objective is to evaluate the feasibility of fielding platforms with extended range and payload capacity, while minimizing deck footprint and integrating with established CVN infrastructure.”

Currently, the tactical core of the Navy’s carrier air wings remains the fourth-generation F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter, along with its EA-18G Growler electronic warfare cousin. Fifth-generation F-35C Joint Strike Fighters are starting to be increasingly in the rotation. The service is also still planning to acquire a new sixth-generation combat jet, currently referred to as F/A-XX, and is hoping to settle on a design in the coming months.

A 1,000 nautical mile range target is in line, at least in broad strokes, with what the Navy is looking for in terms of combat radius for F/A-XX. The service has said in the past that the sixth-generation jets will offer a 25 percent increase in range over the existing tactical combat jets. This would be roughly 837.5 nautical miles (just over 1,551 kilometers) based on the stated combat radius of the F-35C (670 nautical miles, or close to 1,241 kilometers). The F-35C has the longest reach, with a relevant payload, of any tactical jet in the Navy’s current inventory. The service has also previously expressed interest in finding new ways to extend the unrefueled range of its F/A-18E/Fs and EA-18Gs.

In addition, the U.S. Air Force has previously said the combat radius of its new sixth-generation F-47 fighter and its initial fleet of CCA drones will be “1,000+” and “700+” nautical miles, respectively. As TWZ has noted in the past, the estimated combat radii of both the F-47 and F/A-XX are significant, but also notably not as drastic an increase as many had been expecting or may think is necessary given the aforementioned evolution of the threat ecosystem.

As an aside, it is interesting to remember that the Navy’s abortive Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program had been aiming for a platform with a combat radius of up to 2,000 nautical miles when operating in the strike role. There was also a requirement to be able to fly surveillance and reconnaissance orbits in areas 1,200 nautical miles from the deck of a carrier. UCLASS payload requirements fluctuated, but a pair of X-47B stealthy demonstrator drones tested during the program were designed to carry two 2,000-pound-class munitions internally.

UCLASS showed much promise, and the X-47Bs achieved many firsts for carrier-based drones. Despite this, UCLASS was transformed into the radically different Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) program in the mid-2010s, which then led to the MQ-25. This was a shift that seemed abrupt to many and was done for reasons that are still not entirely clear, as TWZ has previously explored in detail in a seminal feature readers can find here.

Northrop Grumman’s X47-B Completes 1st Carrier Catapult Launch

Northrop Grumman X-47B | First to Complete Autonomous Aerial Refueling

As mentioned, the Navy is still refining the requirements for its planned carrier-based CCA drones. Anduril, Boeing, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman are all on contract now to develop conceptual designs. So far, what we have seen are designs intended to operate from carriers in a broadly traditional manner using existing catapults and/or arresting gear. General Atomics has publicly put forward a carrier-based member of its highly modular Gambit family of drones, which are based around the common chassis concept that you can read more about here. Boeing has also previously shown a rendering of a carrier-based version of its MQ-28 Ghost Bat, a drone developed by the company’s Australian subsidiary. The Navy has also expressed specific interest in Ghost Bat.

It is also worth pointing out that the NAVAIR RFI uses the term “combat radius” but also frames the requirement around “delivering effects” out to the desired range without the need for refueling. This might leave the door open to concepts that use stand-off munitions and/or other capabilities to extend the functional reach of the drone, even if its actual combat radius is under 1,000 nautical miles.

As mentioned earlier, the RFI also discusses VTOL drone operations for vessels other than carriers. Concepts of operations that involve launches from carriers (or other ships) and recovery at tertiary points at sea (or on land) could also have impacts on the range equation. Depending on their design and performance, drones could be launched from forward locations and then recover aboard carriers further to the rear, too.

Shield AI has notably talked about exactly this kind of flexibility as being a key benefit of its still-in-development X-BAT stealthy jet-powered combat drone. X-BAT is designed to take off and land vertically using nothing more than a trailer-based launch and recovery system. Shield AI is aiming for a maximum range of 2,000 nautical miles for the drone, which you can learn about in far more detail here

X-BAT: Earth Is Our Runway

The Navy, in cooperation with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), has explored other relevant ship-based uncrewed VTOL concepts in the past, as well.

AdvaNced airCraft Infrastructure-Less Launch And RecoverY (ANCILLARY)

There are also drone designs that can be launched and/or recovered in very different ways. The U.S. Marine Corps’ first CCA-type drone will be a version of the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie that can operate from traditional runways, as well as make rocket-assisted takeoffs using static launchers. Earlier Valkyrie variants can also be launched using the latter method, and are recovered via parachute. The new MQ-58s for the Marines will still need to touch down on a runway at the end of a sortie, but this mix of capabilities still offers significant additional operational flexibility.

Beyond exploring specific design concepts and capability mixes, NAVAIR’s RFI makes clear that the Navy is very much still refining its overall vision for what the uncrewed complement of future carrier air wings will look like. Senior service officials have said in the past that the goal is for the total makeup of carrier air wings to eventually be 60 percent or more uncrewed.

At the same time, the Navy has acknowledged that it has been moving more slowly than the Air Force and Marines with its plans to develop and field a carrier-based CCA fleet. The NAVAIR RFI also points to efforts now to expand that work, but it remains unclear when operational CCAs, or any other future uncrewed members of the AWOTF, will appear on the decks of U.S. carriers. The Navy has consistently said that it is focused first on fielding the much-delayed MQ-25, which will then help serve as a ‘pathfinder’ for other drones. The service is now targeting next year to finally reach initial operational capability with the Stingray, something that was originally scheduled to happen in 2024.

What we do know now is that the Navy also sees a combat radius of at least 1,000 nautical miles as a key threshold requirement for uncrewed tactical elements of its future carrier air wings.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Following hints last week and an announcement on Monday by President Donald Trump, the U.S. blockade of Iran is back on in full force. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), in its latest update, stated that two commercial vessels were redirected and one was kinetically disabled in the first 24 hours. More than 20 U.S. warships, depicted in the graphic above, are operating in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, along with hundreds of aircraft dispersed across various bases, vessels, and forward arming and refueling points in the Middle East. “The U.S. military remains vigilant and prepared to ensure full compliance,” CENTCOM said.

The mechanics of the reinstated blockade appear to mirror the first, which CENTCOM outlined in an article published on X. “CENTCOM forces will enforce the blockade against vessels transiting to or from Iranian ports and coastal areas. The U.S. military continues to support traffic flow through regional waters for all vessels not violating the blockade.” Additional information was provided to commercial mariners in a formal notice issued by U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT). “The blockade encompasses the entirety of the Iranian coastline to include but not limited to Iranian ports and oil terminals.” The blockade applies to all traffic, regardless of flag, according to the notice, but “will not impede neutral transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz to or from non-Iranian destinations.”

The U.S. maintains a considerable naval presence, centered around two carrier strike groups (CSG) that have been operating in the northern Arabian Sea for months. Both carriers, USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H.W. Bush, are each escorted by up to three guided-missile destroyers, with one serving as the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Commander. An additional seven destroyers from surrounding combatant commands are also independently deployed, as well as one guided-missile cruiser, USS Princeton, a littoral combat ship, USS Tulsa, and an expeditionary sea base (ESB), USS Miguel Keith. The independent destroyers serve multiple missions and are often attached and operate with other major naval assets, including the Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) and ESBs.

Two ARGs with Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) embarked are also underway in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Amphibious assault ship USS Boxer, dock landing ship USS Comstock, and amphibious transport dock USS Portland sailed into U.S. 5th Fleet in early July. The Tripoli ARG, which had been operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) since March, moved deeper into the Indian Ocean and entered the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR. The group is composed of USS Tripoli, USS New Orleans, and USS Rushmore.

The U.S. employed several different methods to kinetically disable Iranian-linked commercial vessels that failed to comply during the first blockade. In April, USS Spruance fired shots from her 5-inch Mk 45 gun into the engine room of the Iranian cargo ship M/V Touska. The following month, an F/A-18 Super Hornet launched from USS Abraham Lincoln disabled M/T Hasna by opening fire on its rudder with a 20mm cannon. U.S. aircraft fired two Hellfire missiles into the engine room of M/T Jalveer in June as she attempted to transport oil from Iran through the Gulf of Oman.

“Enforcement actions include disabling and destructive fires upon vessels who do not demonstrate immediate compliance with blockading/boarding forces,” NAVCENT warned in the notice to mariners. On July 15, U.S. aircraft fired Hellfire missiles into the smokestack of M/T Belma, an unladen Curacao-flagged oil tanker in international waters attempting to sail toward Kharg Island, according to CENTCOM.

Additional Navy ships are operating in adjoining regions, and not pictured in the graphic, according to ship spotters, public AIS, and satellite imagery. At least one destroyer, USS Gonzalez, is operating in the Red Sea under U.S. 5th Fleet. Further north, in the Mediterranean Sea, four destroyers are deployed. Three of the four, USS Roosevelt, USS Arleigh Burke, and USS Paul Ignatius, are forward deployed out of Rota, Spain, and USS Thomas Hudner is homeported in Mayport, Florida.

The U.S. submarine force is not shown in the graphic but elements of it are present in the CENTCOM theater. At least two fast-attack submarines are operating with the CSGs, and potentially more are on independent deployments and protecting assets like the ARG. A guided-missile submarine, which can be loaded with 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles and Navy SEALs, is also often prowling the region, too.

Blockade 1.0 was lifted when the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by both parties on June 17, but the blockading forces never left the region, and U.S. naval force posture has been unchanged since. At this point, however, the MOU is worth little more than the paper it was written on, as both sides have effectively declared it dead.

Note: Positions are general approximations.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@teamrecurrent.io

July 14 (Asia Today) — The U.S. Navy has asked major South Korean shipbuilders for information about their ability to design and build destroyers and fleet support vessels, potentially opening the world’s largest naval market to South Korea’s shipbuilding industry.

The requests for information mark a significant step in Washington’s effort to address shipyard capacity constraints and strengthen its maritime industrial base with help from key allies.

The development comes as South Korea and the United States expand cooperation under MASGA, short for Make American Shipbuilding Great Again, a bilateral initiative intended to revitalize U.S. shipbuilding through investment, workforce development, technology cooperation and naval vessel maintenance.

The prospective U.S. market could dwarf South Korea’s recent efforts to win Canada’s next-generation submarine program, estimated by the industry at about 60 trillion won, or approximately $43 billion. Long-term U.S. naval construction and modernization spending could reach about 1.6 quadrillion won, or roughly $1.2 trillion, according to industry estimates cited in South Korea.

U.S. Navy examines Korean shipbuilding capacity

Naval News reported Friday that the U.S. government had issued two requests for information involving destroyer-class surface combatants and medium-sized fleet tankers.

HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean responded to requests covering both destroyers and support vessels. Samsung Heavy Industries submitted information concerning fleet replenishment ships, an area in which it has extensive commercial tanker-building experience.

A request for information is an early market-research procedure rather than a formal order or bidding process. It allows a U.S. government agency to assess potential suppliers, technical capabilities, prices and delivery schedules before deciding whether to proceed with a procurement program.

The inquiries are nevertheless notable because U.S. law and defense procurement rules generally require Navy vessels and major hull components to be built in American shipyards.

Changes to existing law or a congressionally approved national security exemption would probably be required before a U.S. warship could be constructed at a South Korean yard.

The outreach reflects growing concern about delays, workforce shortages and limited production capacity within the U.S. shipbuilding industry. The U.S. Government Accountability Office has repeatedly reported that Navy shipbuilding programs are running years behind schedule and billions of dollars over budget.

U.S. policymakers are also seeking ways to respond to China’s rapidly expanding naval and commercial shipbuilding capacity.

Korean companies highlight destroyer experience

HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean have experience designing and constructing some of the South Korean Navy’s most advanced surface combatants.

South Korea’s Sejong the Great-class and Jeongjo the Great-class destroyers use the U.S.-developed Aegis combat system, which is also installed aboard the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

That experience could make South Korean shipbuilders attractive partners in vessel design, component manufacturing or joint production, although U.S. technical, security and domestic-content requirements would remain major obstacles.

South Korea’s latest Aegis destroyers displace more than 8,000 tons and incorporate advanced radar, missile defense and stealth-related technologies.

HD Hyundai Heavy Industries has also been developing export-oriented destroyer designs and has pursued partnerships with U.S. defense contractors and shipbuilders.

Hanwha Ocean has established a direct foothold in the United States through its acquisition of Philly Shipyard in Pennsylvania. The company has announced plans to expand the yard’s capacity and introduce South Korean production technology.

The company has also completed maintenance work on U.S. Military Sealift Command support ships at its Geoje shipyard in South Korea.

The USNS Wally Schirra, a Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo and ammunition ship, entered the Geoje facility in September 2024 for maintenance, repair and overhaul work. The ship departed after approximately six months of repairs.

Such projects allow South Korean yards to demonstrate their ability to meet U.S. Navy technical standards and delivery requirements, while helping Washington reduce maintenance backlogs.

MASGA moves from proposal to implementation

The Navy inquiries come as the two governments seek to turn MASGA into a broader industrial partnership.

South Korea proposed the initiative as part of trade and security negotiations with the Trump administration. The package includes investment in American shipyards, training for U.S. workers, supply-chain development and maintenance services for U.S. naval vessels.

South Korea and the United States signed a memorandum in May establishing a bilateral shipbuilding partnership initiative and plans for a Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center in Washington.

The program is expected to support cooperation among government agencies, shipbuilders, research institutions and equipment suppliers in both countries.

U.S. officials have increasingly acknowledged South Korea’s mass-production capabilities. U.S. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll praised South Korean defense manufacturing during a congressional hearing in April, citing Hanwha as an example of an effective industrial production model.

The U.S. administration has also pushed for faster construction of commercial and naval vessels as part of its effort to restore the country’s maritime industrial capacity.

Legal and political barriers remain

Despite the growing cooperation, an RFI does not guarantee that South Korean shipyards will receive orders for U.S. Navy vessels.

Congress would have to address laws that restrict foreign construction of naval vessels. U.S. labor unions and domestic shipbuilders could also resist proposals they believe would transfer American jobs or defense production overseas.

A possible compromise could involve South Korean companies investing in U.S. yards, supplying ship components or jointly constructing vessels in both countries rather than building complete American warships in South Korea.

South Korean shipbuilders could also provide designs and production management systems while final assembly takes place at an American facility.

Industry specialists said the South Korean government will need a coordinated strategy involving the presidential office, defense and industry ministries and diplomatic officials if Korean companies are to secure a meaningful role.

They said technical competitiveness alone may not be sufficient because major defense contracts are also shaped by alliance politics, domestic employment considerations and long-term security relationships.

South Korean companies recently faced difficulties in European and Canadian defense competitions despite offering competitive prices, technology and local production plans.

The prospective U.S. programs therefore represent both a major commercial opportunity and a test of Seoul’s ability to coordinate industrial policy with security diplomacy.

For South Korean shipbuilders, the immediate goal is not necessarily the full construction of U.S. destroyers at Korean yards. Securing design work, component orders, maintenance contracts or joint-production projects would still mark an important expansion of the country’s naval defense industry.

The Navy’s decision to formally examine South Korean capabilities indicates that cooperation once considered politically difficult is now under active consideration.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260714010005100

Individuals training to become U.S. Navy tactical jet pilots can still get carrier qualifications in T-45 Goshawk jet trainers, even though it is no longer a graduation requirement. If there is time and space available, they can join future E-2 Hawkeye pilots, as well as foreign student aviators training with the Navy, for whom this is still a requirement, at least for now.

The Navy is separately in the process of evaluating new ways to ensure it can keep providing key carrier aviation training, at least in the virtual realm, as it moves ahead with plans to replace its T-45 fleet. The service’s next jet trainer will not even be required to perform carrier landing touch-and-go training.

TWZ had reached out to the office of the Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) for an update on carrier aviation training plans last week. This followed the release of a new batch of pictures showing T-45s conducting carrier qualifications aboard the Nimitz class aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower at the end of June. CNATRA also forwarded some of our queries to Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), which offered additional details about the full ‘systems of systems’ being pursued under the Undergraduate Jet Training System (UJTS) program that will take the place of the just under 200 Goshawks in inventory today.

“Those photos consisted of 26 student naval aviators from the following pipelines: 17 E-2 students, seven international military students and two strike students,” a spokesperson for CNATRA told us to begin with. “Carrier qualifications are not required for strike students, but if aircraft and deck time are available, we will select a small number of strike students to participate alongside E-2 and international military students.”

“Carrier qualifications remain an integral part of the E-2 and international military student training pipeline,” they added.

“The determination of when a student conducts carrier qualifications is dependent on several factors, including the student’s position in the training pipeline at the time the opportunity becomes available,” they also explained when asked for more details. “More specifically, CNATRA and the fleet determine that a carrier has the deck time and aviation assets available to support training operations, and the Training Air Wings evaluate their rosters to determine if there are students at the right phase of their training where a carrier qualification evolution is appropriate.”

As noted, as part of the UJTS effort, the Navy is already moving to acquire a new jet trainer to directly replace the T-45, which will not be required to perform carrier landing touch-and-goes or similar training called Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) at facilities ashore. FCLP, as it exists now, is structured in a way that “simulates, as near as practicable, the conditions encountered during carrier landing operations,” per the Navy. This historically served as a lead-up to full carrier qualifications.

F-18 Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP). Touch-and-Go Landing.

With carrier qualifications already eliminated from the strike pipeline syllabus, this prompts further questions about what will happen to the syllabus for E-2 and foreign student aviators after the T-45s are retired for good. For most prospective strike pilots, the current curriculum already means they will not touch down on a real carrier until after they are winged and flying a front-line aircraft.

“The UJTS system must be capable of training student pilots to land on a carrier,” Navy Capt. Duane Whitmer, head of the UJTS program office at NAVAIR, told TWZ in a statement. “As [the] T-45 is planned to be operational through 2040 and UJTS is currently going through source selection, any discussion regarding CNATRA carrier qualification syllabus requirements once UJTS is fielded would be premature.”

“We are essentially explaining the same requirement from different angles. UJTS is a comprehensive ‘system of systems’ encompassing both the physical aircraft and advanced simulators,” he added. “By design, this approach ensures the FCLP training capability exists within the overall program, even though the RFP [request for proposals for the T-45 replacement] does not explicitly mandate FCLP to touchdown in the aircraft itself. We are currently in source selection to evaluate how industry proposes delivering this capability across the combined system, [but] any discussion regarding future CNATRA syllabus changes remains premature.”

For years now, the Navy has made clear that it sees advances in virtualized training, as well as automated carrier landing capabilities like Magic Carpet and its successors, as having fundamentally altered the training landscape. The service has also said that eliminating FCLP and carrier qualification requirements will help move student aviators through training faster amid chronic pilot shortages. There is a cost-benefit argument to be made, as well.

Flight Ready: Live, Virtual, Constructive

Flight Ready: Magic Carpet

Despite all this, concerns and criticism have been and continue to be voiced about the broader ramifications of cutting elements long considered critical to naval aviation training. As TWZ regularly noted, virtualized aviation training environments have become very impressive in recent years, but still cannot be expected to truly replicate live training. It’s also worth pointing out here that the Navy’s E-2 fleets do not currently benefit from automated carrier landing developments, though the Navy is now moving to change that with a Precision Approach Landing Capability (PALC) upgrade.

“Carrier qualifications demand the highest levels of focus, skill, and teamwork,” Navy Capt. Travis Suggs, CNATRA operations officer, was quoted as saying in an official Navy news item about the training conducted on Eisenhower last month. “Watching our future pilots and our international military students successfully catch the wire aboard the Dwight D. Eisenhower is a testament to the quality of our training pipelines, the dedication of our instructors, and the immense capability of the ship’s crew.”

There remains a window for the Navy to potentially adopt something of a different approach as it firms up the rest of its UJTS ‘systems of systems’ plans. The Sierra Nevada Corporation’s (SNC) proposed T-45 replacement, called the Freedom jet, is still being designed to be capable of conducting FCLP training. SNC has also now partnered with Northrop Grumman and General Atomics on this effort.

Freedom Family of Training Systems (FoTS)

In addition, the expectation was that removing the FCLP training requirement for the Navy’s next jet trainer would help open the field to more competitors, including ones based on types intended for operation from bases on land. However, this has not come to pass. SNC is one of just two major competitors still in the running after Boeing dropped out last month. Lockheed Martin, which had teamed with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), bowed out in April. A team led by Leonardo and Textron is still competing with a proposal centered on the M-346N aircraft. Both the Freedom jet and the M-346N are also notable twin-engine designs. The T-45, as well as the proposals from Boeing and Lockheed Martin/KAI, are all single-engine designs.

We Fly Aboard The M-346 That Could Become The Navy’s Next Jet Trainer

It is worth noting here that the Navy’s UJTS plans have already been evolving for years amid repeated delays with the program, which first emerged publicly back in 2020. The original goal was to have a T-45 replacement enter operational service in 2028. The Navy is now aiming to just pick a winning design next year, after which it will take some amount of time to complete the aircraft’s development and begin actual deliveries.

In the meantime, the aging T-45s have faced their own struggles in recent years. This includes a spate of reported hypoxia-like physiological episodes among pilots that led to the development of a new oxygen system. Engine issues have also hounded the fleet. In recent years, there have been several Goshawk crashes, some of which have been fatal, due to a variety of factors. The most recent of these came in May, but the individuals on board thankfully survived.

The Navy’s overall vision for training future aviators continues to solidify, with the new jet trainer being just one component. Just how much training ends up moving into virtualized spaces remains to be seen.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The U.S. Navy has now made it clear it is at least exploring an alternative to the still-in-development AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range (AARGM-ER). When the Advanced Emission Suppression Missile (AESM) effort first emerged earlier this year, the stated requirements did sound curiously similar to what the service wants from the AGM-88G. There was also mention of an all-new need to be able to engage radio frequency-emitting targets in the air, as well as on the surface, but this is no longer being emphasized, at least publicly.

The new contracting notice raises questions about the future of the AARGM-ER program, which the Navy told TWZ in April was still on track to be fielded later this year. The service had also previously announced a “strategic pause” in purchases of AGM-88Gs, but only for the 2027 Fiscal Year. The AARGM-ER is a direct evolution of the existing AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM).

Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) issued a new AESM request for information (RFI) yesterday. NAVAIR had previously put out a contract notice regarding this new missile back in February, but subsequently took it down.

NAVAIR is now looking “to conduct market research to identify potential sources capable of providing an AARGM-ER equivalent missile system,” according to the new RFI. This “consists of the All-Up-Round (AUR) missile to include hardware and software, as well as any unique logistics elements, trainers, AARGM-ER equivalent flyout model, and all system verification elements.”

“The purpose of this RFI is to conduct market research to identify potential sources capable of providing a mature design (TRL >6) missile system which consists of the All-Up-Round (AUR) missile to include hardware and software, as well as any unique logistics elements, trainers, flyout model, and all system verification elements,” the notice adds. “This AUR must be compatible with existing launch platforms.”

TRL here refers to the U.S. government’s Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale, which is used to categorize the maturity of munitions and other systems. TRL 6 is defined as an effort that has produced a “representative model or prototype system” that has been “tested in a relevant environment.” The “relevant environment” here can include high-fidelity laboratory conditions or be otherwise simulated.

The latest desired requirements for AESM are very broad and fully in line with what the Navy has said for years that it expects to gain from the fielding of the AGM-88G.

AESM needs to have “extended range,” allowing it to be “capable of engaging targets at significant standoff distances.” It has to include an “advanced anti-radiation seeker with broad frequency coverage” and the “ability to target modern and advanced radar systems.” In terms of “lethality,” the goal is to achieve a “high probability of kill against a wide range of targets.”

Like the AARGM-ER, AESM needs to be suitable for internal and external carriage on at least certain variants of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets are also listed as threshold launch platforms.

The original AESM RFI in February had laid out more specific requirements, which are absent in the new contracting notice. This includes an explicit call for prospective vendors to describe their proposed missile’s “ability to engage air-to-air and air-to-ground targets.”

There has been no mention in the past about an air-to-air engagement capability for the AGM-88G. It’s unclear whether this is still an area of interest for AESM. TWZ has reached out to the Navy for more information about the current state of AESM and how that factors into plans for AARGM-ER.

With added air-to-air engagement capability, AESM would open the door to new operational possibilities and could be more complementary to AARGM-ER. As we previously wrote after the first RFI was released:

“U.S. military interest in very-long-range air-to-air capable anti-radiation missiles traces all the way back to the Cold War, primarily as a means for engaging enemy airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) planes. Anti-air weapons designed around this role are often colloquially referred to as ‘AWACS killers,’ a reference to the U.S. E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. A very-long-range air-to-air missile could be used against other aerial targets, as well.”

…

“All that being said, the value of an ‘AWACS killer’ missile is clear-cut. AEW&C are critical surveillance and battle management assets. Shooting them down deprives an opponent of those capabilities, inherently reducing their ability to effectively maneuver air assets and share important information, including with other nodes on the ground or at sea, as well as in the air. Knocking out these flying radar stations, which can be especially well-suited to spotting lower flying threats from their high perches, just hampers an enemy’s overall situational awareness.“

“The issue, of course, is that AEW&C planes typically orbit well behind the front edges of a conflict, creating additional challenges for targeting them. This is where something like AESM could come into play. A weapon of this type could engage other aerial targets by zeroing in on the radiofrequency emissions they pump out. This could include electronic warfare aircraft, and potentially other aerial targets. AESM might be able to take on a more general anti-air role with the addition of an active radar and/or imaging infrared seeker, as well as datalinks allowing for the use of networked targeting data. AARGM and AARGM-ER both feature an active millimeter-wave radar seeker to enable them to hit fleeing ground targets, but a similar concept could be adapted for air-to-air use.”

“For the Navy, as well as other branches of the U.S. military, this is all particularly relevant in the context of a potential future high-end fight with China, which has made major investments in its fleets of AEW&C and electronic warfare planes. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has also been pursuing ever-longer-ranged anti-air missiles, including types that could be used to target American AEW&C platforms, as well as other key support aircraft.”

AESM would also still have the ability to be employed in an air-to-surface mode like the AGM-88G and its predecessors. Having a single missile with hybrid anti-air/anti-radiation capabilities would offer very useful added flexibility, especially for addressing threats that might suddenly appear during a sortie. This would also offer magazine depth benefits, since a launch aircraft loaded with AESMs would inherently have more engagement opportunities against a wider target set than one carrying a mixture of AARGM-ERs and traditional air-to-air missiles.

AARGM F-18

This could slot in well with the rest of the Navy’s planned future air-launched missile ecosystem, which at least currently includes the AGM-88G, as well as the AIM-174B air-launched version of the multi-purpose Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) and the AIM-260 advanced air-to-air missile. These missiles fit into ever-expanding ‘kill web’ architectures made up of deeply integrated networks of sensors and other assets from across the services, spread across the air, land, sea, space, and even cyberspace domains. TWZ previously explored all of this in a detailed feature you can find here.

How The Navy’s New Very Long-Range AIM-174 Will Pierce China’s Anti-Access Bubble

It’s also worth remembering that the U.S. Air Force has worked with the Navy on similar hybrid anti-air/anti-radiation missile efforts in the past. The Air Force also just recently put out its own call for information about a prospective common missile with a range of at least 1,000 miles, that could come in air-to-air and air-to-surface versions. AESM might further emerge as a joint-service effort and/or one that involves foreign participation.

At the same time, the downplaying of more specific capabilities in the rebooted AESM RFI can only prompt questions about the future of the AGM-88G. The Navy has been actively pursuing AARGM-ER since 2018. The missile’s increased speed and range are viewed as vital for future conflicts, especially when it comes to ensuring survivability and effectiveness of non-stealthy launch platforms as adversary anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) bubbles continue to expand in scale and scope.

However, the AARGM-ER program has encountered technical issues in development and suffered significant delays. The original goal was for the missile to reach initial operational capability (IOC) on the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G in 2023. The Navy is now aiming to hit that milestone by September of this year. There are foreign customers also still in line to receive AARGM-ERs, and Italy is notably a full partner in the missile’s development. The Air Force is pursuing a derivative, called the Stand-in Attack Weapon (SiAW) and reportedly designated the AGM-88J, intended to provide a more general strike capability.

“U.S. procurements for the AARGM-ER program are planned to resume once the system has successfully completed all necessary testing and software updates. Our immediate priority is ensuring the weapon passes these rigorous testing milestones to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in September 2026,” a Navy spokesperson told TWZ back in February about the status of the program and the aforementioned strategic pause. “After validating the software and testing, the plan would be to ramp up production to clear a backlog of over 150 missiles, with U.S. procurements officially restarting in FY28 [Fiscal year 2028]. In the interim, FY27 production will be allocated to Foreign Military Sales to fulfill our commitments to five signed international cases.”

It is worth noting here that the Navy seeking a functional equivalent to the AGM-88G does not automatically mean it is considering supplanting that missile entirely. Diversification of the supply chains, especially by leveraging new and non-traditional vendors, has become a top priority across the U.S. military in recent years. Efforts to broaden the defense industrial base, with an explicit emphasis on less reliance on traditional prime contractors, have surged further since President Donald Trump started his second term. More industrial base diversity offers benefits for scaling up production of subcomponents and complete systems. Another key aspect of these initiatives has been avoiding getting locked into a single vendor for key programs, helping to foster competition that can drive down costs.

Having an alternative source of missiles that are even just roughly similar to the AARGM-ER capability-wise could be very valuable for bolstering stockpiles now and ensuring they can be replenished in the future, especially in the midst of a sustained high-end fight. The lead time for the acquisition of exquisite munitions is often measured in months, if not years. Concerns about the sufficiency of U.S. stockpiles of key missiles have already been growing in recent years due to a succession of global crises, something TWZ has regularly called attention to. This has become an even more pressing topic given the expenditures of critical munitions during the latest conflict with Iran. The Pentagon has signed several new deals with various companies in the past year or so to expand and accelerate production of existing and new missiles, underscoring just how significant the demand signal has become. Still, it will take time for those contracts to bear fruit, reinforcing the value of having additional streams of relevant munitions.

Much remains to be learned about the Navy’s exact intentions with AESM and how it fits in with the current plans for AARGM-ER. What we do know now is that the service is actively looking at options for a new missile that offers at least equivalent capability to the AGM-88G.

Update: 4:30 PM ET –

An annual assessment of multiple high-profile U.S. military procurement programs that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released today provides some additional context about the AARGM-ER program.

“The AARGM-ER program continued to experience significant delays due to software problems discovered during testing. Software development challenges were also a main driver of prior delays. According to the program, a February 2025 flight test failed due to a software issue, which it attributed to a lack of rigor in the contractor’s software development and testing process,” per GAO’s report. “The program did not use a modern approach to software, and the program office did not have visibility into software metrics, which could have provided insights into issues sooner. Program officials stated that the contractor updated its software development processes, and the program instituted additional software reviews for future flight tests.”

“The program is conducting four flight tests in fiscal year 2026 before fielding an initial operational capability,” the report adds. “According to program officials, the December flight test was successful. The program expected to reach initial operational capability in July 2024, but officials now expect to do so over 2 years later in September 2026.”

The Congressional watchdog’s assessment also speaks to continued challenges with production.

“The AARGM-ER program continues to experience production delays. The program reported that the delays were related to missile qualification, hardware capability, and software problems discovered during testing. Program officials expect initial missile deliveries to start in mid-2026,” the report explains. “Initial missile deliveries were originally planned for late 2023. According to program officials, they withheld certain payments to the contractor due to the delays. The program also told the contractor it will not accept missile deliveries until qualification and flight tests verify the missile is safe to employ and performs as expected. The program expects to complete missile qualification in June 2026. We found that starting production before demonstrating a system will work as intended—which the Navy did—increases the risk of discovering deficiencies that require costly, time-intensive rework.”

It is worth noting here that the AESM RFI released yesterday also calls for lower-cost designs that could be produced at a rate of 600 missiles per year. This is twice the production scale outlined back in February.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

A search is underway for a missing aircrewmember after a U.S. Navy MH-60S Seahawk helicopter assigned to the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) “conducted an emergency water landing in the Arabian Sea,” the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet stated in a post on X. “There is no indication the emergency was caused by hostile action.”

“Three of the helicopter’s four crew members have been recovered and are in stable condition aboard George H. W. Bush,” 5th Fleet added. “U.S. Navy assets in the region are currently searching for other aircrewmen still missing. The cause of the incident is under investigation.”

The incident took place at 3:30 a.m. EDT, 5th Fleet stated.

The mishap occurred amid tense ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and Iran to end the war. This marks the second time in the past few weeks that a U.S. military helicopter aircrew had to be rescued after a crash in the region.

The crew of a U.S. Army AH-64 Apache were rescued from the Gulf of Oman overnight June 9 by a Corsair drone boat. President Donald Trump said Iranian forces downed the attack helicopter.

This is a developing story.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

July 2 (UPI) — A search is ongoing for an aircrewman who went missing after the Navy helicopter they were aboard performed an emergency landing in the Arabian Sea, the U.S. military said.

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command said in a brief statement that the MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter with four people on board made the emergency landing at 3:30 a.m. EDT Wednesday.

Three of the helicopter’s crew were recovered and were listed in stable condition, while the fourth member remained missing.

U.S. Navy assets in the region are searching for the missing aircrewman, it said.

Little information about the incident has been made public. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command said there was no indication that hostile activity prompted the emergency landing.

“The cause of the incident is under investigation,” it said.

The helicopter was assigned to the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush, which departed Norfolk, Va., on March 31, according to U.S. Fleet Forces Command. The aircraft carrier has been in the Arabian Sea since at least May 3, according to a statement from U.S. Central Command, which said it was deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to support maritime security and stability in the Middle East.

The United States has been at war with Iran since Feb. 28. The two sides are negotiating an end to the war amid a cease-fire.

This is a developing story.

The Pentagon and the U.S. Air Force have fully abandoned an attempt to axe the acquisition of E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, and to use E-2D Hawkeyes to help fill the resulting gap. In something of a twist, the Pentagon has proposed cutting U.S. Navy E-2D purchases, as well as raiding a classified Air Force account, to keep the E-7 program going. The House Appropriations Committee has now pushed back on the E-2D part of that plan. The back-and-forth underscores the critical importance of airborne early warning and control aircraft and the strain on existing U.S. fleets.

Defense News drew specific attention to the new jostling over funding for the E-7 in a report earlier today. Breaking Defense had been among the first to report the basic points yesterday. The House Appropriations Committee had released the details in a report accompanying a draft defense spending bill for the 2027 Fiscal Year, which we will come back to in a moment.

To recap quickly, roughly a year ago, the Pentagon and the Air Force disclosed their intention to axe the E-7 program, which had suffered delays and cost overruns, and acquire additional E-2Ds as an interim gap-filler. Questions about the future survivability of the Wedgetail were also raised. The Air Force’s long-term goal was then and still is now to eventually push most air moving-target indicator (AMTI) tasks into space, though that is still years away from truly becoming a reality. Congress subsequently intervened to save the Wedgetail, appropriating billions for the effort in Fiscal Year 2026. The E-7 was again missing from the Air Force’s proposed 2027 Fiscal Year budget, which raised the prospect of a new battle with Congress.

Top Pentagon and Air Force officials subsequently said that the viewpoint on the Wedgetail had fundamentally changed, and submitted an amendment to the budget request to include funding for the program. Per a memo earlier this month from Russell Vought, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) at the White House, this was done in two ways. $898,549,000 was taken from “Other Procurement, Air Force” section of that service’s budget proposal, while another $650,549,000 came out of “Aircraft Procurement, Navy.”

The combined $1,549,098,000 was moved into the “Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force” account. According to Vought’s memo, the funding would go toward “priority requirement to deliver two E-7 Wedgetail prototype aircraft and continue Engineering Manufacturing and Development activities for a program of record.”

The Air Force already has seven E-7s on order now, including the two jets to support rapid prototyping efforts. It is unclear when the service expects to begin flying Wedgetails operationally. Before the attempt to cancel the program, the target date for initial operational capability had already slipped from 2027 to 2032. It should be noted here that variants of the E-7 are already in service in Australia, South Korea, and Turkey, and that the United Kingdom is set to field a fleet of Wedgetails, too.

The report the House Appropriations Committee released yesterday included important additional context about the latest funding plans.

“While the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2027 did not include funding for the E–7 Wedgetail program, the Secretary of the Air Force and Secretary of Defense testified before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that they support this critical platform and have submitted a budget amendment to the Office of Management and Budget to restore funding for the platform,” it explained. “The shift in mindset at the Department of Defense translated to requested transfers from the Special Update Program in Other Procurement, Air Force, and the E–2D program in Aircraft Procurement, Navy for a total investment of $1,549,098,000 for E–7 in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force in fiscal year 2027.”

“While the Committee wholly supports the E–7 program and funding realignment, the Committee also restored the E–2D program to six aircraft for fiscal year 2027,” the report added. “The Committee understands the operational necessity of the E–2D platform; the complementary nature of the E–2D and E–7; and believes that more aircraft, not fewer, are necessary to support our warfighters now and in the future.”

It is not immediately clear whether the draft spending plan that the House Appropriations Committee has now put forward still includes the full $1,549,098,000 for the E-7 program, as well as the restoration of funding for the E-2D purchases. The memo from OMB had stressed that its intent in shifting funding around was not to add to the roughly $1.5 trillion topline for its proposed 2027 Fiscal Year defense budget. Congress can, of course, appropriate additional funds as it sees fit, and often does.

Regardless, this new debate over how and where to find funding for the E-7 highlights larger issues surrounding airborne early warning capacity within the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy.

“The conflict in Iran has reinforced the need for the Air Force to maintain a credible airborne battle management capability, currently being met with the Air Force’s E–3 Airborne Warning and Control System and the Navy’s E–2D Hawkeye programs,” the House Appropriations Committee’s report also notes. “As the E–3 is set to retire, the E–7 Wedgetail will serve as [a] modern replacement for lost battle management capability, commensurate and interoperable with assets already being utilized by key allies.”

This is all true, as TWZ has previously stressed in detail, long before the latest conflict with Iran erupted in February. Airborne early warning and control is absolutely vital to the prosecution of modern air operations, and even more so now in an age of exploding drone and cruise missile threats. The substantial deployment of E-3s to Saudi Arabia was one of the clearest indicators that a major campaign against Iran was increasingly imminent. The same had been true about the lead-up to the operation to capture ex-Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro.

Not mentioned in the report, however, is the Air Force’s slashing of the E-3 fleet in recent years, the service’s repeated deferral of any plans to acquire a replacement for those aircraft, and the loss of Sentry on the ground in an Iranian attack in March. The strain on the Air Force’s E-3s has been readily apparent for years now.

The House Appropriations Committee report also leaves out any broader context about the planned E-2D purchases for Fiscal Year 2027. When it released its proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2025 back in 2024, the Navy had no plans to order more Hawkeyes, at least over the next five years. In its 2026 Fiscal Year budget request, the service asked for funding for four E-2Ds, presumably as part of the plan to cancel the E-7. Congress subsequently appropriated funding for three Hawkeyes in that fiscal cycle.

When it rolled out its latest budget request earlier this year, the Navy outlined all-new plans to buy 12 E-2Ds – six in Fiscal Year 2027, two in Fiscal Year 2028, and four in Fiscal Year 2029 – explicitly “to replenish accelerated service life burn down of existing force structure due to Overland Airborne Early Warning (AEW) tasking.” This underscores operational strain on the Hawkeye fleet, which can only have been further added to by operations in relation to Iran over the past few months. This also points to E-2Ds supplementing E-3s in providing overland coverage.

Just yesterday, the White House sent Congress a separate supplemental funding request for nearly $90 billion, primarily to help cover various costs associated with the war against Iran.

How exactly the E-7 program gets funded in Fiscal Year 2027, as well as what happens to the plans to order more E-2Ds, remains to be seen. The House Appropriations Committee’s draft defense spending plan could still evolve in various ways in the coming weeks and months, and will need to be reconciled with companion legislation making its way through the Senate. Once Congress passes the bill, President Donald Trump will still need to sign off on it, too.

It’s also worth noting that other potential options for providing additional airborne early warning and control capacity in the interim are emerging.

What is clear is that both the E-3 Sentry and E-2D Hawkeye fleets remain as critical as ever, but have been even more stressed by recent operations against Iran, with new E-7s still years away from entering service.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

More than three decades after decommissioning the USS Long Beach, the Navy is finally preparing to dispose of what’s left of the world’s first nuclear-powered surface combatant. The cruiser – which already had its distinctive boxy superstructure as well as its bow and stern sections removed – has been moored at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility since being decommissioned in 1995.

After a long process to determine what to do with Long Beach, the Navy on Wednesday put out a call for companies willing and able to perform the extremely complex and lengthy operation to transport, dismantle, de-militarize, and dispose of what was once a 721-foot-long ship that displaced 15,540 tons, including its two defueled reactor plants. Long Beach was launched in 1959 and commissioned two years later.

You can read more about the ship, its unique character, armaments and exploits in our two-part interview with a master chief who served on Long Beach here and here.

This marks just the second time the Navy has opted to select a commercial yard to dismantle a nuclear-powered warship. The first was the ex-USS Enterprise, the world’s first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier from the same era as Long Beach. It is vastly more complex and expensive to dispose of nuclear-powered vessels than conventionally powered ones because of all the radiological concerns, even long after the reactors have been defueled.

We’ll get into more details about how difficult, time-consuming and costly a process this could be later in this story when we examine the pitfalls of the Enterprise situation, admittedly a much more complex undertaking for various reasons we will explain. However, first we need to understand how Long Beach got to this point.

The decision to go forward with the Long Beach dismantling process came after a Naval Vessel Historical Evaluation (NVHE) in April determined that the ship was ineligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) despite its history as the first surface combatant ever to have nuclear propulsion and combat service that ranged from the Vietnam War to Operation Desert Storm.

USS Long Beach (CGN-9)

“The ship was deactivated in 1994 and towed to Newport News Shipbuilding where the entire superstructure was removed and the reactors were defueled,” according to the NVHE. “After this work was completed in the winter of 1995, the hull was towed through the Panama Canal to Puget Sound where it has been waiting to be recycled.”

In 2012, the ship was sold for scrap.

“Long Beach had 10,000 tons of steel, 300 miles of electrical cable and 450 tons of aluminum, earning it the voice radio call sign ‘Alcoa’ after the aluminum maker of the same name,” Reuters reported at the time.

“More than a dozen scrap dealers have expressed interest in taking part in sealed online bidding for the hull, with more than 7.35 million pounds (3.33 million kg) of steel, aluminum and copper wiring, galley equipment, tables, chairs, lockers and bunks,” Government Liquidation president Tom Burton told the news outlet.

“It’s a two-year process but it could take 18 to 26 months,” Burton said. “What’s left is an inert hull.”

USS Long Beach CGN-9

It remains unclear what happened to that scrap sale. We reached out to the Navy for answers.

The Puget Sound Naval Shipyard subsequently completed a limited-scope hull preservation availability in 2015 that resulted in the removal of the bow and stern, according to the NVHE records. It was ultimately decided not to save the ship by placing it on the NRHP because “major alterations have been made in design that do not maintain the historic design of the vessel (loss of the superstructure and major hull elements),” the review found. “Character defining features of USN warship have been lost, such as main armament, superstructure, bow, and stern. Does not evoke the aesthetic of a 20th Century USN warship.”

Moreover, a 60-day period for stakeholders to comment expired earlier this month with no responses.

With all the hurdles to ultimate destruction now out of the way, the Navy will host an Industry Day meeting on June 24 and 25 in Washington, D.C. for companies interested in learning more about what is involved in the final dismantling of the USS Long Beach.

Whoever gets the job will first have to transport it from Puget Sound to the shipbreaking yard by “dry transport via semi-submersible barge, deck barge, or semi-submersible heavy lift vessel” because the ship’s “current structural condition precludes an open ocean tow,” according to the RFI.

“Dismantling and disposing of ex-Long Beach is necessary in order to comply with Navy policy for inactive nuclear-powered ships stricken from the Naval Vessel Register, and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) statutory responsibilities,” the RFI explains. “The requirement for disposal includes dismantling, demilitarizing, and recycling the remnant hull sections at an authorized commercial facility in accordance with applicable federal, state, and local laws, and removing and packaging the reactor plant components for transportation and disposal as low‑level radioactive waste (LLRW) at an authorized radioactive waste facility or facilities.”

There are no timelines or cost estimates associated with the RFI, nor is there any guarantee that a request for proposal will be issued. We’ve reached out to the Navy for more details.

Our past reporting offers some insights into the tremendous time and money it takes to dismantle a nuclear-powered warship, as evidenced by the saga of the aforementioned Enterprise. However, it should be noted that there are some big differences between that vessel and Long Beach. The carrier is far larger and more complex, had eight reactors compared to two, and had less prep work done in advance.

In 2019, the Government Accountability Office found that it could cost the Navy more than $1.5 billion to fully dispose of Enterprise.

The GAO report also stated that a complete process could take more than 15 years to finish.

From our previous story about the dismantling of the ship known as the Big E: 

“The Navy officially decommissioned Enterprise, also known by its hull number CVN-65, in February 2017, after more than five decades of service. The ship had already effectively been in mothballs since 2012 and Newport News Shipbuilding completed a lengthy ‘inactivation’ process, which included removing nuclear fuel, mission systems, and other items from the ship, in April 2018.

‘At approximately 76,000 tons, CVN-65 will require an unprecedented level of work to dismantle and dispose of as compared to previous ships,’ GAO’s review, which the congressional office published on Aug. 2, 2018, said. ‘Regardless of the approach the Navy chooses, CVN-65 will set precedents for the processes, costs, and oversight that may be used to dismantle and dispose of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in the future, such as the Nimitz-class carriers which the Navy will begin to retire in the mid-2020s.’”

The first of those, the USS Nimitz, the Navy’s oldest operational carrier, is scheduled to be inactivated in 2027, the Navy told us.

On March 13, the Navy signed a $95.7 million contract with Huntington Ingalls Inc. “for advance planning and long-lead-time material procurement to prepare and make ready for the accomplishment of the inactivation and defueling of USS Nimitz (CVN 68). Work will be performed in Newport News, Virginia, and is expected to be completed by March 2027.”

Meanwhile, the Navy originally projected that it would cost somewhere between $500 and $750 million to scrap the Enterprise, but by 2013, this figure had grown to over $1 billion. The difficulties involved forced the service to push back the start of the process more than once.

The regulatory and logistical picture was equally tangled. The Navy and the NRC disagreed on what standards should apply if a private company did the work, and NRC only has direct authority in 13 states, potentially limiting where the job could even be done. Conducting the work at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard — the Navy’s proven approach — risked worsening an already serious maintenance backlog for active ships. The commercial route could be faster and cheaper, but no private yard had ever handled military nuclear reactors at this scale, and the highly classified nature of U.S. naval reactor design added another layer of complexity. 

You can read more about the challenges involved with breaking up a nuclear behemoth in our deep dive into the problems with the Enterprise effort here.

The Decommissioning Of The USS Enterprise

The challenges of disposing of Enterprise, however, continued even after a final decision was made about what to do with the vessel.

On May 30, 2025, the Navy awarded a $536.7 million contract to dismantle the ship to NorthStar Maritime Dismantlement Services, LLC, of Vernon, Vermont, according to Pentagon records. The work was initially expected to be completed in November 2029.

“It was the first time a U.S. nuclear-powered warship will be dismantled through a commercial effort, representing a significant milestone in responsibly and safely closing out the legacy of one of the most iconic nuclear-powered warships,” the Navy noted at the time, according to USNI.

However, the effort unraveled over a legal battle over how the Navy handled final bid submissions, ultimately resulting in the service being “ordered to pause the project and reassess bids, while the appeal now puts the future of the contract back in question,” according to NBC15 News. “The Navy is expected to re-award the contract by June 2026.”

We have reached out to the Navy to find out the status of that contract as well.

USS Enterprise to be dismantled in Alabama

Even as the Navy is working to dispose of its first nuclear-powered surface combatant, it is planning for the newest one. The Navy says its proposed Trump class battleships will be nuclear-powered as well.

It remains to be seen how the complications the Navy has faced trying to dismantle Enterprise will affect the disposal of Long Beach and what lessons will be applied, if any. The answers to some of those questions should come into sharper focus next week when interested parties get to ask the Navy for themselves at the Industry Day.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

WASHINGTON — After Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth cut nine Navy officers, including all the women, from a promotion list, several female officers say they see the unusual intervention as a sign that their careers now have a ceiling and worry for the future generation of female military leaders.

The Navy had selected 31 sailors to promote from the rank of captain to one-star admiral, but Hegseth recently intervened to strike nine people from the list, including three women and two Black men, according to a Defense official who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss information not permitted to be released publicly.

As a result, the Navy is not promoting a single woman to the one-star admiral rank this year even though women make up about one-quarter of all Navy officers and nearly one-third of the sea service’s midgrade ranks, according to military data from 2024.

The Associated Press spoke with eight female Navy officers of varying ranks and time in service after Hegseth’s cuts, which were reported earlier by the New York Times, became public. They spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of retribution from their superiors.

The more junior officers said they saw the development as a sign that their careers would become politicized if they rose too far in the ranks, and some said they felt they now had a limit on how far they could be promoted. Some said it made them feel less valued within the military and wondered whether that wasn’t part of the intent.

The Pentagon has not offered any rationale on why the women, or any of the other six people, were removed from the promotion list.

Sean Parnell, the Pentagon’s top spokesman, said on social media last week that “military promotions are given to those who have earned them” and that the Pentagon “will never consider the color of a service member’s skin or their gender as a factor in promotions.” The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request seeking further comment.

The Navy’s process for choosing which officers to promote to the one-star rank has been relatively constant and transparent over the years. The service convenes a group of officers, called a promotion board, that examines the records of eligible officers and chooses those deemed to be the most qualified.

The board that selected the initial slate of 31 officers for promotion was directed by then-Navy Secretary John Phelan, an appointee of President Trump, to “recommend for promotion the best qualified officers within their respective competitive category.”

The order from Phelan, who abruptly departed his post in April, said the board should consider an officer’s performance, competence and character, among other traits, as part of those qualifications.

It also said that given China’s prominence in the Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy, “special consideration shall be given to officers who have excelled in their knowledge of the political military affairs and U.S. strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region, and operational contingency planning for Indo-Pacific war plans.”

Hegseth has long argued, without offering evidence, that women in the military benefit from preferential treatment and are not suited for combat roles.

“For too long, we’ve promoted too many uniformed leaders for the wrong reasons based on their race, based on gender quotas, based on historic so-called firsts,” Hegseth told hundreds of military leaders in September.

The approach, he asserted, made the Pentagon “less capable and less lethal.”

‘A break from tradition’

Phelan’s order said the Navy cannot discriminate based on criteria such as race and sex, and it specifically noted that “this guidance shall not be interpreted as requiring or permitting preferential treatment of any officer or group of officers on the grounds of race, religion, color, sex.”

The full list of 31 people to be promoted was approved by Phelan, other Navy leaders and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Dan Caine, before it reached Hegseth, who chose to make the changes, the Defense official said.

While Hegseth is within his rights to intervene in the list, “it’s just not the norm” and is “a break from tradition,” said Katherine Kuzminski, a researcher specializing in military recruiting and retention at the Center for New American Security think tank. She said that promotions historically have been seen as “the services’ business.”

Kuzminski noted that “this is a decision that’s not being made by the Navy — it’s being made by the secretary of Defense,” and she said Hegseth’s growing interference in operational aspects of the military services such as promotions is creating “tension” about what “normal” will look like going forward.

Some of the more senior Navy officers who spoke with the AP expressed concerns about the message it sends to the next generation of young sailors.

In addition to pulling the recent promotions of three women to admiral, Hegseth shortly after he took office fired Adm. Lisa Franchetti, the service’s top officer and the first woman to hold the job. He never explained his rationale.

Since then, he also has fired two other female three-star admirals without explanation.

Some of the officers who spoke to the AP said that while they were encouraging female sailors to stick with the Navy, they acknowledged that message is coming at a difficult time.

Kuzminski said the rhetoric and actions surrounding women in the military “affects individual service member decision-making and it also affects family unit decision-making,” including whether people make a career of the military.

Kuzminski said that following the months-long hold on military promotions by Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) during the Biden administration, surveys showed that partisan politics spilling into the day-to-day lives of troops affected their decision-making.

One officer said this impact was not confined to women.

In conversations with other sailors in her unit, she said that male sailors were hesitant to deal with what appears to be a growing politicization of simply following the orders of previous administrations.

Toropin writes for the Associated Press.

For decades, the massive MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter has served as the Navy’s primary airborne mine countermeasure platform, dragging massive mine hunting sleds through waters all around the globe. However, the Sea Dragon’s days are now numbered, with the last 11 aircraft scheduled to sunset sometime next year. With the MH-53E’s demise on the horizon, we reached out to one of its former pilots, Steve Jones — a man who came to know this monster intimately during the Global War On Terror. He had plenty of stories to tell and provided us with a new understanding of the often misunderstood counter-mine mission.

The MH-53E’s mission is also, of course, extremely topical right now thanks to ongoing tensions with Iran. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently told senators that the Islamic Republic mined “large segments” of the Strait of Hormuz, endangering shipping in the region.

As it currently stands, the mighty Sea Dragons, which are considered one of the military’s most dangerous to fly due to numerous fatal mishaps, are being phased out in favor of the smaller MH-60S Seahawk paired with a suite of new aerial mine countermeasures systems, as well as other new technologies, like uncrewed underwater and surface vessels. The Navy’s overall mine hunting force is going through a transition that is controversial, to say the least, with many questioning if the Pentagon is investing enough resources in this critical missions set.

With all these issues in play, in an exclusive, wide-ranging, two-hour interview, Steve Jones offered in-depth insights about the Navy’s airborne counter-mine mission, the Sea Dragon’s capabilities and dangers, current mine sweeping operations, as well as everything from what it was like to narrowly avoid getting entangled with a surfacing sub to his experiences ferrying celebrities like Robin Williams and Tom Jones around a war zone.

So, with the stage being set, let’s get into this incredible exchange.

Some of the questions and answers have been lightly edited for clarity.

Q: How did you end up becoming an MH-53 Sea Dragon pilot?

A: During the time that I selected, you could choose SH-60 Seahawks, you could choose CH-46E Sea Knights and the MH-53 Echo. You could choose SH-3 Sea Kings, but they were kind of winding down the H-3s, which is the same as the presidential helicopter Marine One that they fly now, but they were flying out of Norfolk and Puerto Rico, primarily for VIP transport. 

So, I looked at the 53 for a lot of reasons. One, I liked the instructors that came from that community in the advanced helicopter training. And two, I just thought the helicopter just really looked awesome, and it was big, and so that’s why I chose it, and I just thought it would be a good personality fit, work fit for me, and it ended up being that way.

Q: What are the main differences between the Navy’s MH-53E and the Marines’ CH-53E Super Stallion?

A: It’s primarily the same aircraft. Except our aircraft has larger fuel sponsons, so we could carry more gas. The reason for that is ideally we’d want to be able to fly an hour to where the mission objective was, be able to stay on station for about an hour, and be able to fly back. That requires at least three and a half, four hours of gas and extra fuel in those side sponsors. And that allowed us to do that. So instead of a small sponson with two tanks, we had one big sponson with four fuel tanks that were inside each of the sponsons on either side of the aircraft.

Q: So how much gas would that larger sponson hold?

A: About 22,000 pounds of gas.

Q: Talk about the training and some of the biggest challenges of flying that huge aircraft. 

A: Typical Navy training is two years of flight school, and then after flight school, we went to our Replacement Air Group, which we call the RAG, that was in Norfolk, Virginia. You spend about a year, or up to 10 months, in Norfolk, Virginia, learning primarily how to fly the helicopter, how to land the helicopter, and we do that in the combination with the Airborne Mine Countermeasure Squadron. We used aircraft from Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron (HM) 14 to learn how to fly the different mission sets and learn aircraft familiarization. And then from there you either get assigned to HM-14, which was in Norfolk, Virginia, or HM-15, which was in Corpus Christi, Texas. HM-15 has now moved to Norfolk, Virginia. [Editor’s note: HM-14 sunsetted in 2022.]

The training takes about 10 months. Mine was a little bit longer because when I actually joined that community, the aircraft were down because of a crash off the coast of Corpus Christi, Texas. There was a problem called ‘thermal runaway,’ where the bearings in the main rotor head would fail, and they would seize together and get hot, and we lost a few sailors from HM-15. And until they figured out why and how to prevent it, it took about a year for those aircraft to come back up, so I was in Norfolk for maybe about a year and a half, almost two years, before I got to Corpus because of that bearing issue.

Q: What was it like when you finally got out there and learned how to fly while pulling a mine countermeasure sled?

A: There’s different types of equipment that you use and it takes a special kind of person to be able to maintain the situational awareness – both flying the aircraft and what’s happening in the back – because there’s dangers in the back. You have a very confined area, lots of equipment, and under lots of tension, and so the very first couple of times, the instructor is kind of handling everything, and you’re just kind of riding along.

Then eventually you start to do more tasks, physical tasks, in terms of flying and maintaining a stable platform for the men and women that are working in the back, and then over time those skills translate into a larger situational awareness, where you’re now a mission commander – where you’re flying the aircraft, but also, conducting the mission in the back is your primary responsibility. The positions are second pilot or co-pilot, and then you become a Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC), which is like the captain, and then you become an Airborne Mine Countermeasures Mission Commander (AMCM MC), meaning you’re flying the aircraft, you’re the commander of the aircraft, but you’re also commanding the mission.

Q: Did you become a mission commander?

A: I did. So I was fully qualified in the MH-53 Echo in my squadron, so I was a mission commander. I worked the maintenance side, so I was the maintenance check pilot and functional check pilot. It takes a lot of maintenance, and then post maintenance, and you have to do post maintenance flights to be able to make sure the aircraft is safe for anyone else to fly. So I spend most of my time in those areas in that squadron.

Q: What are the MH-53’s unique quirks and advantages?

A: One of the advantages was pure brute strength. You had three GE engines, so you could handle lots of torque, and the way that we hunted and swept for mines was pulling sleds in the water, which causes thousands and thousands of pounds of stress, so it’s really like a forceful instrument in the water. The operation requires the coordination of not only meteorologists and Operations Specialists, which are like intel specialists in mine warfare, but then you have the maintainer, you had two pilots and a crew chief, plus it could be up to four people in the back, depending on the type of gear you’re stowing in the back, so it really takes coordination from the front.

The disadvantage is that it’s a very expensive aircraft to operate. Every hour of flight, required 24 hours of maintenance, and if a squadron had 10 helicopters, which we did at one point in time, you’re looking at the largest deployable squadrons in the Navy, like 600-plus people to operate these aircraft.

With everybody working together, we advertise that we could be anywhere in the world in 72 hours, where there’s a mine threat. We could break down the helicopters, put them in a C-5 and then reassemble them anywhere in the world in 72 hours. After 9/11, for Operation Iraqi Freedom, we did deploy by C-5. We took half the helicopters to Sicily and the other half went to Bahrain and took 11 C-5s in order to move a squadron that size into those two locations, so big footprints, lots of money, lots of parts.

Q: How fast could the Sea Dragons fly?

A: The 53 is a fast helicopter. One of the fastest out there. We were limited to 150 knots for airframe preservation. Under towing conditions, we typically flew between 18 and 25 knots, depending on the device in the water.  Each vehicle had different performance parameters to properly deploy the device. Under rapidly changing conditions we always had to maintain proper speed and altitude control. 

Q: The Sea Dragon has experienced a notoriously high rate of mishaps. Did that ever concern you? What do you think contributed to this record?

A: It did. If you’ve ever seen one or been on one, been close to one, or heard one, you’ve got 100-foot long machine with millions of moving parts, right? 

Our maintenance crews were very good, I always felt safe flying. I think you have to if you choose to fly that particular weapon system, but there were a lot of accidents. And I knew folks that were killed in MH-53 accidents who I went to flight school with, and buddies.

Maintaining MH-53E’s

It’s a very complicated machine that did a very important mission, and accidents do happen, both mechanically, but also because of pilot error. In combination, you end up losing a lot of airframes. Besides the United States, there is only one other nation that flew that airframe, and that was the Japanese for their mine sweeping operation. It’s a very complicated, expensive machine, and that’s why not very many people flew it.

Q: Did the danger concern you?

A: You know, you’re in your 20s, right? So you feel a little bit invincible. I’ll tell you a story. When I switched from 53s and started flying C-130s, after the Haitian earthquake, I flew into Guantanamo Bay, and my old squadron was there on the same ramp as we were. So I walked over to see who I still knew there, and they had a 53 turning on the deck there, and I was just going, ‘wow, I couldn’t believe I used to do that,’ and not thinking about how many things have to go right in order to have a good day. And I just kind of said to myself, ‘it’s really a young person’s game,’ because you gotta kind of hit the ‘I believe’ button on a lot of things, because there’s just a lot of opportunity for negativity to come in. Weather, environment, and then the mechanics of things.

Q: What were the biggest factors contributing to the Sea Dragon mishaps?

A: With any aircraft system, the largest factor that contributes to any accident is the human factor. Yes, engines will fail, components will fail, but a lot of times it was human error that caused the ultimate catastrophe because when an emergency happens, you have three criteria in order to gauge when you should land.

The two critical ones are ‘land immediately,’ meaning if you do not ditch in the water or put the aircraft down, it is going to come apart in flight. The other critical criteria is ‘land as soon as possible,’ meaning as soon as you have a safe place to land, then you land as soon as possible. Then you have another condition where you can continue to fly, but flying is not recommended. And so that decision factor between land immediately and land as soon as possible, it’s a bit of a gray area, right? You have a set of skills you can fly, but you can never time when the aircraft is going to come apart.

Navy ‘Sea Dragon’ Helicopter Unsafe For Flight | NBC Nightly News

For example, in the Corpus Christi crash, they knew that they had a problem. I’m not second-guessing the pilot, but it was in that gray area between land immediately and land as soon as possible.

The aircraft commander chose to try to bring the aircraft closer to the beach, so you could survive a ditch, because putting a helicopter in the water – nothing is guaranteed, right? Then you have no control. However, bring it closer to the beach means you’re flying that much longer. So land immediately, there could have been more survivors.

Not to ‘Monday morning quarterback’ anything. I probably would have made the same call. And then with the new equipment that was put on the aircraft, there are lights now placed in a monitoring system that kind of took the gray area out of those decisions when it came to thermal runaway with the main rotor head. So now the decision is clear. Land immediately if certain indications happen, and land as soon as possible if certain indications happen. Prior to 2000, we didn’t have that.

Q: The Sea Dragon community has been well-documented for being neglected by the Navy. What was your experience when you were flying it? Why do you think that was?

A: It’s a unique mission set. It kind of came online during the Vietnam War and Haiphong Harbor, and clearing those mines, and then again in Desert Storm, when the USS Tripoli was hit by a mine.

Mining sea straits is a very cheap way to stop a huge navy, such as the one that we have in the United States. However, the Navy, in my opinion, didn’t necessarily see the value in that mission. There are very limited resources. There’s only so much money to go around, and large strike groups and ships just took priority. We were always probably a little bit underfunded, in my opinion, for a mission that’s important, which you can see today with the Strait of Hormuz. But it was definitely a huge problem that many people did not talk about during the first two Gulf Wars.

Q: Why was it a huge problem?

A: Well, when you try to move a carrier strike group into a small area like the Persian Gulf, by putting mines in the water, you create doubt in a captain’s head. The captain is responsible for thousands and thousands of lives, and the battle group commander is responsible for thousands and thousands of more lives, plus the strategic reason of why they’re there. If a mine is discovered, then everything has to pause. You can’t land Marines on the beach, you can’t move the strike group closer to the shore. The ability for you to project power ashore, all that kind of comes to an end. 

Q: How does the MH-53E go about this unique mission set? Can you walk us through what a mission would look like from start to finish? 

A: Depending on the intel, you’ll have a threat and the threat could be you suspect that there’s mines in the water, or that you know that there’s mines in the water. So, typically it’s ‘you suspect,’ right? And we used the AN/AQS-14, or “Q-14.” There’s about three different versions of the Q-14. It’s a side-looking sonar, which you drag in the water – we call it the fish. We would fly the fish at certain depths based on the terrain and what was in the water. That was called mine hunting. 

So initially you would always kind of begin with a hunting mission, where we could, or the OS operator, or the console operator would mark what they view as a mine-like contact. You’re really kind of looking at the sonar and distinguishing between man-made objects and natural objects. If you believe it’s a man-made object, and then you would mark a tape. You could also, real time, send that image back to the ship, but that capability came a little bit later.

We also had devices that allow you to sweep. A mine can be triggered by different mechanisms. Sometimes they’re triggered by contact.

Some mines are acoustically triggered, meaning you can set that mine to blow up for a certain type of ship acoustics. For instance, a destroyer has a different set of acoustics from an amphibious ship, from an aircraft carrier. If you want to let 1,000 destroyers pass you or a submarine and then wait for the aircraft carrier, you can tune it to that way. So we had devices that could mimic the sound signatures of different ships, and you could tow that in the water, you could tow it really fast. One of the reasons why we were successful is that we could do large areas of the ocean relatively quickly. 

The last piece for sweeping is the magnetic variation. Each ship is a metal hull, and as a ship is moving through the water, it has a magnetic signature, and then we have gear, which you could tune to mimic certain types of ships in the water, in order to have them explode behind the gear that we’re towing in the water.

So you hunt, that means you’re searching, and then you sweep, and then that means you’re clearing. Sometimes you can clear using other technology, such as sometimes the Avenger class ships would go in and sweep, and not us. Sometimes you would use dolphins to work with EOD teams in order to sweep mines. It just depends upon the threat, on what the second tool is used after you hunt.

Navy Dolphins Practice In Key West How To Find Mines In The Ocean

The most time that I spent was in the hunting phase of the mission set. In Bahrain, every week, a couple days a week, we would hunt. We would do the Strait of Hormuz. We would do the approaches into Saudi Arabia for the tankers. We would do the approaches into the Suez Canal, just to be sure that there are still no mines in that area.

That is for what we call change detection, meaning you map the ocean floor, and then over time, because of consistency, you’ll be able to tell if something changed. If something changed, then you went in to investigate further. It’s constant because the ocean floor is constantly moving, and then somebody could easily place a very cheap object that could be devastating.

Q: Walk me through how a mission would take place.

A: The intel can be good sometimes, sometimes the intel is lacking. The weather has to be at a certain sea state in order for it to be successful, and you can’t do it at night, right? You have to do it during a daytime in littoral situation, so you’re pretty close to shore and you are susceptible to threats that are on the beach. That is the mission set and if you don’t know where the mines are, that’s why you begin with hunting. The Q-14 is a relatively quick device to deploy. You can pull it in the water relatively fast. Then you can real-time send images back, or you can collect tapes to study for that change detection.

When you’re going out for a mission, you’ll have your standard aircraft brief, where the crews get together and talk about the state of the aircraft, the conditions, the environmental conditions of today. And then you’ll get into the mission brief on where the ship is, or where the shore is, and where actually the square, or the box, or the rectangle is, where we’re going to conduct a mission. We talk about the distances from that point that we’re going to deploy the gear, because it takes time to be able to do that, and then we’ll enter what we suspect is a minefield or an area of interest from which we want to be able to tow in.

Minesweeper Exercise

Then we fly what we call tracks. It’s almost like rows on a field, like cornrows, and we go up, down, up, down, and you have to stay within track by feet, okay? If you, if you stray as little as 20 feet off track, then you have to redo that track, because you want to have a continuous picture of the ground. And so it may take two or three sorties to cover an entire minefield.

And then times where the device may have strayed off track. It takes time, but we can do it quicker than a ship doing it on its own, like the Avenger class ship, and so between the aircraft brief and the mission brief, and executing, it’s like a six, seven hour day in the heat or in the cold, depending on where you are.

This is the Navy’s Largest Helicopter | MH-53 Sea Dragon

There’s no air condition on that helicopter. So everybody’s working in those conditions based on the information that we bring back. Then the tactics folks that are supplied to us by COMINEWARCOM  (Commander, Mine Warfare Command), which was our bosses, those intel folks will say what needs to happen next, meaning there’s nothing that needs to happen now, or we need to investigate this further. And then they pick the next tool for us to be able to deploy, or they go with the EOD and dive teams to go take a closer look.

Q: How fast are you flying, and how high are you flying? How deep do the sleds go?

A: The helicopters are anywhere between 25 and 75 feet over the water, depending on the gear, because the speed in which we pull through the water is extremely important. You could go as fast as 25 knots in some cases, which is about the top speed, or you’d have to go as slow as 12 knots.

Mine Countermeasures Unit Drops a Slocum Glider from a MH-53E Sea Dragon

Q: How deep do the sleds go?

A: The depth of some of the gear is classified, or at least it was at my time. I’m not sure now, but you could go relatively deep. It’s under lots and lots and lots of tension, and the reason why you had to go very deep is that some gear has to be able to get to the sea floor at certain distances, because there’s also the subsurface fleet that is operating down there, and mines will affect them as well.

Q: What’s the tension like when you’re dragging a sled?

A: You’re looking at around 15,000 to 20,000 pounds of tension. The aircraft will kind of buckle. You look at the side of a 53, it has a crease from the tension that goes on it.

If there is a swell in the sea state, sometimes the Doppler radar – which would kind of track how fast you’re going forward, backwards, or sideways – it’ll go from forward to negative, meaning we’re actually getting pulled backwards by the sea state. And the engines would automatically just start – the torque would come in as the blade did a bigger bite out of the air. And the aircraft will kind of turn, because of the torque. It’ll kind of turn and whine, and you’re just flying an out of balance flight, nose down.

Q: Did you ever have the sled get tangled up behind you?

A: Yes. It can get caught on things in the water, and the tension will spike. If the tension spikes too high, or the gear gets fouled in something, you always have the option to guillotine or cut the gear.

Q: Did the aircraft have other devices that helped in the mine hunting mission?  

A: Yes. In addition to the Q-14, we had the Mk 104 acoustic device, mine chain cutting devices and the Mk 105, a huge gas generator, which produces electrical charges in the water for those magnetic-seeking mines that change the magnetic variation.

HM-15 Sailors Recover Mk 104

There’s at least six devices that I know of that are used for hunting mines, including something as simple as what we call a MOP, which is stands for Magnetic Orange Pipe, which is what they used in Vietnam.

Essentially you have this pipe, it looks like a telephone pole, which is about the size of a telephone pole or larger, and it’s orange. It has a positive charge on one end and negative on the other end. It’s just a magnetic pipe that we would tow in the water. It’s probably the easiest thing that you can tow, and the simplest, but it’s looking for those magnetic variations. The problem with the magnetic orange pipe is you can’t change it, so it’s set for a certain amount of tactics. You can see how that could become obsolete in today’s environment.

Q: How does the Sea Dragon integrate with other mine hunting capabilities, like the Avenger class ships or other assets?

A: We worked as a team, but obviously we’re a tool in that larger mine warfare strategy. We were the speed aspect of that, meaning we could have left holes, but if you’re trying to move at the speed of war, then sometimes we were the tool that was required. And if you have 72 hours to be somewhere, speed is required. We could do that to be sure that the fleet can continue to do what it needs to do, but if you’ve got time, then you could sail a ship or move one of those slower small boats into that environment, that makes sense.

Q: Did you ever work together with Avenger class ships?

A: Maybe in the same AOR, but other than an exercise where you would see an Avenger class ship working the tow area, and then we will be working our tow area. It was under controlled condition. When I was doing change detection, and during work conditions, we were operating concentrated on our mission set, they’re probably concentrating on their mission set, and between the two pictures, they came together in the operation center to have a very clear picture.

Q: When was the Sea Dragon actually used for this mission operationally? How did it perform?

A: It was used throughout Iraqi Freedom, from Shock and Awe to the pull-out to the drawdown. If not every day, every week there was change detection in mine operations, because it’s always a threat. It’s a very cheap weapon that non-state actors can get off the black market. One mistake or one mishap causes devastating consequences for the individuals on that ship, but also the mission, so it’s a constant threat, and still is a threat. 

During my time, actively hunting for mines to be sure that those straits and those approaches remain clear, dominated my entire career in the community. From the time I started  and then I towed to my last days in the squadron, which was in 2005.

Q: How did the Sea Dragon perform?

A: I would say, since there was not a mishap, it performed as designed. It doesn’t mean that the mines were not there. During Iraqi Freedom, mines were put in the water, but we didn’t have the mishaps like we had before that I can recall. So I would say it was a success.

Q: Any close calls during any of your sled-towing flights? 

A: I got disoriented one time with vertigo. Like I mentioned earlier, you’re on an out-of-balanced flight, so your ears are doing one thing, your eyes are doing another thing, and sometimes there’s low fog over the water early in the morning. Under tow there was a time where I got vertigo and put the aircraft in an undesired state, but there’s two pilots. I recognized it and told the aircraft commander ‘I’ve got vertigo.’ He took the control and saved it. Being that close to the ground, getting vertigo could have devastating effects, right? We just ended up releasing the gear that day.

Q: How do the big rearview mirrors help with towing?

A: Mirrors are super important for situational awareness when lowering the equipment into the water and for ensuring the tow cable is staying on track. The co-pilot is crucial while under tow because they are responsible for making sure the aircraft remains clear of obstacles and threats. The pilot flying will be head-down monitoring performance of the helicopter and the gear deployed. The pilot flying will maintain navigation in the minefield and overall safety. When flying, looking out of the windows was a brief luxury. 

Q: Tell me about the time you encountered a surfacing sub while dragging your sled.

A: It was sometime in 2003 or 2004. We were flying over the Strait of Hormuz, towing a side-looking sonar to do bottom mapping. I’ve got a very loud helicopter in the air and a sonar that’s pinging on the bottom, so it probably was not a surprise where we were to the submarine, but their location was a surprise to us.

It’s a bright sunny day. The water looked beautiful, and we’re just doing a random tow. And all of a sudden, this big black submarine surfaced right in front of us. Just popped out of the water, and right in line with our track.

I think I was maybe 50 feet over the water and the gear is behind me. Now I have to turn like a semi truck, having to turn myself and the gear all at the same time to maneuver around the submarine. I said something like ‘holy shit’ and I remember I banked to the right because I think it was the easiest thing to do. There’s more space.

We ended up able to clear the sub, but it had a startling effect. So either they were in the wrong spot or we were in the wrong spot, I couldn’t tell you. But no one came and knocked on the door, saying that I did something wrong. So I’m gonna leave it as if they were in the wrong spot.

Q: What was it like aerial refueling such a monstrous helicopter and did you use it operationally often?

A: Very intimidating at first. However, it is all about training. Yes, you are very close to the other airplane, but that is not your focus. Your focus is on check points. Align your check points and the aircraft will plug. Once you connect and position the aircraft above the wing and propeller wash, the ride is smooth. When I switched over the flying C-130s, it would have been nice to go full circle, but never got the chance to give fuel.

We almost did aerial refueling during a possible mission scenario, but the plan was scaled back and we ended ship hopping. I only used the boom in training. I’m sure it happened, but didn’t know anyone who did it. They were there for a reason, and we trained for it.

Q: What’s the operational situation regarding Iran at the time you were flying?

A: Annoying. They have a lot of islands that are in the Persian Gulf that are their territory, and sometimes during operations, when you’re either delivering cargo or going to field a tow, it puts you in close proximity with those islands. At the same time, if it’s necessary, you could have your own boat team in the water as well. It was post-Cole [a reference to the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole just a few years earlier by explosive-laden suicide boats at the port of Aden in Yemen. The blast ripped a 40-foot-wide hole near the destroyer’s waterline, killing 17 U.S. sailors and injuring nearly 40 other crew members.]

A Suicide Boat Attack Leaves the USS Cole Reeling from the Damage | Combat Ships | Smithsonian

So you have fishing boats in the water, and you don’t know who’s on that boat that is getting close to your ship. But when you got close to Iranian territory, they will speak up on the radio, and tell you to turn around, that you’re approaching their territory,. Even though you know exactly where you are, and you know exactly where this island is, they’re still going tell you are in violation of their airspace. 

Then it’s always a constant threat, right? So, if I were to have to ditch a helicopter or airplane in the water, they’ve got boats in the water. You wouldn’t want to get captured by them, where they could say you are in violation of their sovereign territory by mistake, and then it becomes an issue.

We were flying helicopters without GPS, so you’re using visual navigation maps and whatnot.  I’m sure there’s a GPS on those birds now, but at the time, I had a handheld GPS from Academy Sport, where I marked the islands myself, so I knew exactly where I was, or at least the best that I could manage with the equipment, to be sure that was in the right position. 

Q: Did they ever directly threaten you while you were on those missions?

A: No. They talked about violating their airspace, but they never intercepted or anything like that. I think that would be a huge mistake. It would not be a good day for them.

Q: Tell us about other locales where Sea Dragons operated.

A: We had detachments in South Korea for the North Korean threat from underwater mines. We did exercises in the Pacific. We did exercises with Japan because there’s a threat of mine in those straits, like the Strait of Malacca. 

There’s obviously a threat in the Pacific theater. But because of the situation with Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, I spent most of my time in the Middle East.

Q: Were there any difference between operating in the Persian Gulf area and the Pacific, or Europe?

A: A lot of the effectiveness of what we do is dependent upon water. The salinity of the water, the sea state, the amount of garbage and trash that’s in the water. So those environmental threats change the tactics. That’s why you need to practice out there.

In terms of the purpose of the mission, that does not change, but how you go about it does change. If you’re closer to a near-peer actor, it’s going to require better intelligence, different types of equipment in order to counteract the threat. I would say the Iraqi Navy was not near-peer in terms of mine tactics, but the Chinese could probably be very different in terms of mine tactics. They would be a more sophisticated enemy in this case, which would heighten everything.

Q: Did the Iraqi Navy or the Iraqis present a threat to your aircraft? Did they harass you, fire at you?

A: No, not during my time. I think maybe possibly during the first Gulf War. The threat was that there, it was always a threat when you’re operating close. So yes, something could have happened. They’ve got boats, they’ve got men in the water.

Q: What are your thoughts about the current MCM missions taking place now in the Middle East? Just how hard is it to clear an area of mines like the Strait of Hormuz?

A: I would say that it is difficult. All mine clearing operations are difficult because you’re talking about the needle in the haystack. Like literally, and you know they’re deploying something that can be hoisted by one person and thrown overboard into the water or by a machine, and you can deploy a lot of mines in a very short time in a concentrated, tactical way, or randomly. It really doesn’t matter, it’s still a threat. 

I would say it is difficult because people talk about how narrow and small the Strait of Hormuz is, but you have to remember the earth is large, and there is just a sheer volume of water, and square miles or square kilometers on which something can happen.

It is a very daunting task, and so having more MH-53E helicopters probably wasn’t the solution for the future.

From reading, and then from hearing from my peers that are still in, the tactics are different, but also the equipment that they use to detect this threat is also different. It is faster. It is unmanned. You can deploy more assets quicker because you’re not relying upon one machine or two machines at one time being deployed.

What kind of sea mines is Iran using in Strait of Hormuz?

Q: What equipment are they using now? What are the differences?

A: I retired in 2017 and it has changed dramatically. For one, it is more integrated into the fleet, so you’ll have multi-mission capabilities, meaning an MH-60Ss can be used for different sets of missions, from delivering cargo, to deploying different sensor arrays. You have AI for detection assistance. You have side-looking sonar, which instead of being towed are now on underwater unmanned vehicles. So I think more of what you’re looking at now is a mission package of sensors that can be deployed.

When you have sensor sets, it’s integrated into the larger Navy strategic picture better. I think that that was lacking in the past in a way, because you have to cover such a large volume of area, you need more sensors and eyes to be able to do that, and I think that’s the strategy today.

Q: Do you talk to any of the current pilots/crews of the last squadron flying them? What do they say about the current status of the fleet? Are they involved in the mine clearing operation in the Strait?  

A: So I talked with folks, there’s still some folks that are still active duty. Some of them have transitioned out of the 53 pilot-wise and have transitioned into the MH-60S community and so they are deploying those tactics and new systems.

I would say it is probably still a neglected community in their opinion. Everybody’s fighting for resources, but I think when you’re talking about the current situation with Iran in the straight, there’s always a time where mine countermeasures become a very hot topic, because people do forget about it. 

Q: Are the MH-53Es still performing airborne counter-mine missions?

A: I’m not sure. 

Q: What other missions does the MH-53 community perform? Can you talk about your experience with those and what they entail?

A: When you have that much capability, you move a lot of things. And so we did a lot of moving cargo. I could move an F-14 Tomcat engine with the afterburner completely attached. I could move it at 150 knots from shore to ship internally, so I didn’t have to sling it underneath the aircraft in a pod. I can have the engine assembled together and be able to move it. So we moved things that the C-2 Greyhound couldn’t.

The primary mission was mines, the secondary cargo and people. We would do people movement, if a better ride wasn’t available to move an admiral or someone for an important meeting, then we would do so. Obviously, you know, it’s a very dirty ride.

Q: What admirals did you move?

A:  I can’t remember the admirals, because they kind of all blend together, but we did move fun people. We did Tiger Woods for all the USO engagements. Blink 182. We did Tom Jones, Robin Williams, a number of NASCAR folks and other celebrities. We did a lot of that.

Q: What was Robin Williams like?

A:  Funny. He was on from the time that we picked him up in Bahrain, and then giving him the brief. He liked talking with sailors and making jokes. Tom Jones was memorable because he’s got the hair right, and he didn’t want to wear a cranial or helmet on his head to mess up his hair before he did the show, and so that became a thing. But you know, the hair won out. The hair was not going to get covered by the helmet.

Q: What will the Navy miss when that last squadron is finally retired next year and there are no more Sea Dragons flying? Can the MH-60S handle the job?

A:  With the Greyhounds going away, I think even with the CMV-22, which is a very capable aircraft, a very fast aircraft, but in terms of lift capacity internally, there’s something to that. If it’s outsized or weirdly shaped or is on wheels, the MH-53E is your catch-all aircraft. The Navy will miss that and the large numbers of people that we can move.

During the start Operation Iraqi Freedom, when I was in Sigonella we spent four days offloading the Marine Corps battalion landing team from the Iwo Jima on to Souda Bay for them to be flown into the northern part of Iraq. With those two helicopters and in one helicopter with Helicopter Detachment 4, we moved hundreds and hundreds of Marines from a ship to the shore for them to be staged in order to be moved into Iraq in a matter of days. I don’t think that same amount of capability in terms of volume of moving at that speed can be done with what’s available today. So I think they’re going to miss the kind of the ad hoc nature of having a big aircraft to move odd things. It’s good to be a generalist sometimes.

Q: What about the mine countermeasures mission? Is there anything that the Navy will miss from the capabilities of the 53 from that standpoint?

A: I can’t speak on it with the new equipment, because I’ve never operated it, but I think what the Navy won’t miss is the price tag, and maybe the lack of full mission capability. We operated a lot of times in that partial mission capability, because of the complexity of the equipment and the machine, and then you have to get the equipment and the machine to work together, the machine being the helicopter. I don’t think the Navy will miss that part of it.

Q: Can the MH-60 do the job?

A: They can do the job, but they don’t conduct it the same way we did. They can’t pull big sleds like we did for underwater sonars because of power and tension. And you can’t send as many crew members in the back in order to make that mission successful. But the 60 is a very capable platform in order to conduct the mission the way they do it now.

Q: What’s the difference between what they do and what you did?

A: They’re deploying sensor arrays and underwater vehicles from the thing, so they have standoff distance. They’re capable of not putting the helicopter in the same proximity to danger. They can’t put a Mk 105 in the water, but they don’t need to, because they have other types of technology to do it. 

Q: What was your most fear-inducing flight in the Sea Dragon?

A: For me, I was on the sea wall in Corpus Christi, Texas, about to do a towing training mission off the coast of Texas. In the 53 you have three engines, and then you have an auxiliary power unit – another gas turbine that’s above the cockpit.

The purpose of the auxiliary power unit is to run the hydraulics and various components and accessories when the engines and the rotor head aren’t turning. The idea is, once you get the engines going and the main rotor is turning, there is a shaft that goes from the main gear box into that auxiliary power unit, where all your generators and hydraulic systems are run. So we had the engines running, we were on the sea wall – we had a hanger, and then we had an apron, and right there was the Corpus Christi Bay.

I was taxiing out to take off from the helipad, and you’re over the water as soon as you take off from the sea wall. Well, that shaft sheared while I was taxiing up. I have to push the cyclic (the stick) forward in order to tip the rotor head forward to pull me along the ground. If you lose hydraulics in a 53 there is no amount of strength that you or the other copilot has to help to change the path of that helicopter. 

When the shaft broke, it meant whatever condition that rotor head was in, it was not going to move, and that rotor head was in position for me to be able to take off, but I did not have enough power in order for me to lift off. Even if I lifted off, I probably would have just careened into the water. 

So we were going in a situation where I heard it pop, and then all of a sudden the controls froze, and I told the co-pilot, Ty Jurica, that I was so concentrated at that point because I could not control the aircraft. I said ‘I don’t have control, I cannot move the controls.’ But Ty’s quick thinking noted that he could get the hydraulic power unit started again, which it takes time to spool up, but he was able to hit the start on the APU, and we managed to spool up to get hydraulics back, and as soon as the pressure came on at 3000 psi, I was able to move the controls again.

We stopped the aircraft where we were, and we shut it down at that particular time, but in a few seconds, maybe, we probably just would have taxiied off over the sea wall, and into a very bad situation.

Q: What was your best memory of a mission you flew, or a moment during one of your missions in your time in the Sea Dragons? Put us in your shoes of what that was like.

A: Oh man, my best day there? There were a lot of good days. A lot of times, we would fly in formation – two ships going out to whether it was an aircraft carrier or whatever – and we would take off before sunrise. When you’re flying in formation low over the water, and the sun is coming up over the Persian Gulf, those are those are great days. Because everything is working. You have two planes actually going to conduct the mission and not training. I don’t care who you are, it’s always a lot of fun. 

You’re going relatively fast. I mean, we’re not Hornets or whatever, but we were low and fast at that time for us, and we thought we were pretty cool.

You couldn’t touch us on those days.

Author’s note: we added three additional sets of questions and answers to this story. We asked Jones about how fast the Sea Dragons could fly, how helpful the big rearview mirrors were when pulling a sled and what it was like conducting aerial refueling in the giant helicopter.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Boeing is now conducting test flights of its MQ-28 Ghost Bat drone out over the Pacific from the U.S. Navy’s base in Point Mugu, California. The company says its main goals are to demonstrate the maturity of the design, originally developed for Australia, and promote export sales. The specific choice of testing location also seems notable given Boeing’s involvement in the Navy’s still-evolving carrier-based Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) plans.

The MQ-28 has now flown at least three times within the Point Mugu Sea Range off the coast of southern California, according to a Boeing press release. The expansive range is routinely used for a wide array of research and development and test and evaluation activities, as well as training. Naval Air Station Point Mugu, part of Naval Base Ventura County, sits right on the coast, surrounded by farmland, with direct access to the range and minimal risk to bystanders. Its location makes it well suited for uncrewed aircraft operations, and it already has a major role in this regard in relation to the MQ-4C Triton and managing target drones.

MQ-28 first international flights

“This testing shows the MQ-28’s ability to operate seamlessly from allied facilities, which helps Boeing demonstrate the aircraft’s maturity and potential export opportunities to international customers outside Australia,” per the press release from Boeing. “Tests at Point Mugu validate autonomous systems while following required airspace, range safety and regulatory approvals.”

Boeing also described this as “MQ-28’s first international operation in allied airspace,” but it is unclear when the first sortie from Point Mugu occurred.

In December, the Pentagon released a video of Secretary Pete Hegseth visiting Naval Air Station Point Mugu with an MQ-28 clearly visible in the background. However, the drone seen in that footage also had an early-style paint scheme with high-visibility orange trim. Pictures and video that Boeing released along with its announcement of the Point Mugu Sea Range flight testing show a Ghost Bat with a two-tone gray livery. It also has an infrared search and track (IRST) sensor system in the nose, something not seen on the example in the Hegseth video. The MQ-28 is a highly modular design, with the nose section designed to be readily swappable.

There have also at least been indications of Ghost Bat flight testing in the United States in the past. The U.S. Air Force previously said it had made use of at least one MQ-28 to support advanced uncrewed aircraft and autonomy development efforts.

Boeing itself released a picture of an MQ-28, again with the early paint scheme and no IRST, at MidAmerica Airport outside of St. Louis, Missouri, back in 2023. In that instance, the Ghost Bat was displayed alongside the demonstrator the company had been using to support the development of the MQ-25 Stingray tanker drone for the Navy.

How many Ghost Bats are currently in the United States is unknown. TWZ has reached out to Boeing for more information.

The MQ-28 has been flying in Australia since 2021, two years after the design was first shown publicly. Boeing’s subsidiary in Australia had already been working on the design before then under the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) Airpower Teaming System (ATS) program. To date, RAAF has received eight Ghost Bats in a pre-production Block 1 configuration.

Boeing is now working to build the first of a batch of nine Block 2 drones, which are seen as an intermediate stepping stone to an operational Block 3 version. The Block 3 type is expected to be substantially larger and have greater range. It will also feature an internal weapons bay that could accommodate a single AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), two GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB), or equivalently sized stores.

Boeing and the RAAF have already conducted at least one live-fire AIM-120 launch from a Block 1 Ghost Bat, with the missile having been carried aloft on an external pylon under the drone’s fuselage.

Uncrewed MQ-28 Ghost Bat showcases its combat capability

Block 1 MQ-28s have also been used to demonstrate other important capabilities in testing to date. This includes crewed-uncrewed teaming with RAAF E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft and F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters. The ability to operate from allied facilities that Boeing says the Point Mugu sorties demonstrate could be valuable just for Australia for future coalition operations.

MQ-28, Wedgetail, Super Hornet: Drone Intercept Behind-the-Scenes

Boeing has also been open about its interest in pursuing sales of the MQ-28 outside of Australia. The company has publicly named Japan as a potential customer and has said it is exploring potential opportunities with other unnamed countries in the Indo-Pacific region. In March, Boeing Australia announced a partnership with Rheinmetall in Germany to pitch the Ghost Bat to that country’s armed forces. A carrier-capable version of the design with a tail hook has been pitched to the United Kingdom in the past, as well.

This latter point brings us to what is largely absent in Boeing’s announcement about MQ-28 flight testing from Point Mugu: the U.S. Navy.

In September 2025, the Navy confirmed that it had awarded Boeing, as well as Anduril, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman, contracts to develop “conceptual” carrier-based CCA drone designs. At that time, the service also announced that Lockheed Martin was under contract for work on an accompanying common control architecture.

In April 2025, Navy Capt. Ron Flanders, public affairs officer at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition (RDA), had also told TWZ directly that “the U.S. has expressed strong interest in leveraging the MQ-28’s AI-driven autonomy and modular design for future air combat operations.”

As mentioned, Boeing is also developing the MQ-25, a production representative version of which just flew for the first time in April. Beyond the important aerial refueling and other capabilities the Stingray is set to bring to the Navy’s carrier air wings, the service routinely describes it as a “pathfinder” to future uncrewed aviation capabilities.

MQ-25A Stingray First Flight

All this being said, the Navy’s CCA plans are still very much evolving. The service, by its own admission, has been trailing behind the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps in the development of CCA-type drones.

Flight testing now from Point Mugu is certainly an important development for the MQ-28 program as a whole, and one Boeing hopes could open the door to new opportunities for the Ghost Bat. Whether or not that includes deeper U.S. Navy involvement remains to be seen.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao’s remarks come as US President Donald Trump gives mixed signals on the sale.

A top United States military official has said Washington is pausing a $14bn arms sale to Taiwan to conserve munitions for its war on Iran.

Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao provided the update to lawmakers during a Senate hearing on Thursday, a week after the weapons sale took centre stage in talks between US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing.

“Right now, we’re doing a pause in order to make sure we have the munitions we need for Epic Fury – which we have plenty,” Cao told the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.

“But we’re just making sure we have everything, but then the foreign military sales will continue when the administration deems necessary.”

Cao said any decision to move forward with the sale – which would be the largest ever weapons transfer to Taiwan – would be made by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

The war has been paused since the US and Iran agreed to a ceasefire on April 8, but the sides have yet to reach a permanent peace deal.

The US Congress approved the weapons package for Taiwan in January, but the sale requires Trump’s sign-off to move forward.

If approved, the sale would surpass a record-breaking $11bn arms package for Taiwan approved by Trump in December.

Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai told reporters on Friday that Taiwan would continue to pursue arms purchases, according to Taiwanese news outlet FTV News.

William Yang, senior analyst for northeast Asia at the Crisis Group, said in a social media post that the pause will “exacerbate anxiety and scepticism about US support in Taiwan and make it difficult for the Taiwanese government to request additional defence budget for the foreseeable future”.

Trump, who has confirmed that he discussed the arms sale with Xi, said last week in an interview with Fox News that he “may” or “may not” approve the package.

Trump has also suggested that the package could be used as a “negotiating chip” – despite a decades-old precedent against consulting with Beijing on arms sales.

China claims self-governing Taiwan as part of its territory, and objects to Washington’s ongoing but unofficial support for Taipei.

The US government does not officially recognise Taiwan but is committed to helping the island to defend itself under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, enacted shortly after Washington severed diplomatic ties with Taipei.

Trump has continued to test the status quo on Taiwan in other ways, saying earlier this week that he would consider speaking to Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te about the arms deal.

Such a move would break with four decades of diplomatic protocol against direct talks with the Taiwanese leader and almost certainly provoke an angry response from Beijing.

Trump held a phone call with former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after his 2016 election win, but their talks took place before he was sworn in as president.

The U.S. Navy sees a future in which uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV) work together with submersibles loaded with SEALs. The service has already been conducting tests to explore how crewed-uncrewed teaming under the waves might work. UUVs could help extend the operational reach of operators riding in SDVs, as well as help reduce their vulnerability, but there are communications and other challenges still to overcome.

Navy Capt. Mike Linn shared details about the Navy’s plans for teaming UUVs and various types of swimmer delivery vehicles (SDV) with our Howard Altman on the sidelines of the annual SOF Week conference yesterday. Linn currently works within the Naval Special Warfare program office (PMS 340), a division of the Naval Sea Systems Command’s (NAVSEA) Program Executive Office for Unmanned and Small Combatants (PEO USC).

“That is the goal,” Linn said when asked about the Navy’s view of teaming UUVs with SDVs, the latter of which the service also refers to as SEAL Delivery Vehicles.

As it stands now, the main workhorse of the Navy’s SDV force is the Mk 11, which is just under 22 and a half feet long. It is operated by a crew of two and can carry six passengers. Also referred to as the Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS), the Mk 11 is what is known as a “wet” submersible design, where the occupants are exposed to water the entire time during their voyage. The Mk 11, like its predecessors, can be launched and recovered from submerged submarines with specialized Dry Deck Shelters (DDS) attached to their hulls.

The Navy has also acquired several new Dry Combat Submersibles (DCS) in recent years, which feature a pressurized cabin with space for a crew of two and eight passengers. This means the larger DCSs can operate at greater depths than the SWCSs. They also deliver their occupants to the destination dry and relatively warm, helping to reduce operator fatigue and certain potential health risks. The DCS does have the limitation of being too big to fit inside existing DDSs. At least publicly, this is understood to translate to the need for support from a mothership on the surface.

There are multiple UUV designs in the Navy’s inventory today, as well. These are largely torpedo-shaped designs intended to be deployed from and retrieved by vessels riding on the surface or submarines. In recent years, the service has been working to expand its ability to launch and recover UUVs from submerged submarines without the need to send out divers to help. Historically, underwater retrieval of UUVs, in particular, has been a largely manual affair, often conducted via DDS.

In terms of the potential benefits of UUV-SDV teams, “underwater systems like the SDV and UUVs afford reach underwater,” Capt. Linn explained. “So, if you can get somewhere in an SDV and then launch a UUV to go do something, then that would make you more capable.”

“You could extrapolate, just as you would have an unmanned wingman in an aircraft, or a maritime surface co-pilot, the same can be said for underseas,” he continued. “So, if you have an unmanned system with you underwater, then I suppose you can use your imagination.”

“A good example might be a harbor,” he added. “Technology is in a state where passing through the mouth of a harbor, a choke point, is maybe much more well defended. Or it is a choke point, and they don’t want to pass there with a big manned platform. So if you send a smaller unmanned platform through, then that’s pretty logical.”

“It can be an overall risk-reducer,” he further noted. A key mission set for Navy UUVs is scouting ahead for mines and other potential hazards, and otherwise helping commanders establish a better ‘view’ of the battlespace above and below the waves. This could all be especially valuable for SEALs during high-risk missions, including ones being conducted covertly or clandestinely.

Capt. Linn was also candid about the challenges the Navy still has to overcome to make this underwater teaming ability a reality. He described both crewed SDVs and UUVs as being “deaf, dumb, and blind” in terms of their current ability to communicate and coordinate with each other to ensure they are both in the right place at the right time.

“Through-water data transfer is difficult, and so the modality that you choose while remaining survivable is kind of difficult. And, also, in order to do that, you have to have pretty well synchronized systems,” he said. “We’re looking at all ways of transferring data through water. It can be acoustic, [and] there’s light-based transfers.”

There are other questions still be answered around how UUVs teamed with the SDVs would operate, including where the uncrewed companions would be launched from. If the SDVs have to carry them to the launch point themselves, this could present additional challenges.

“You’ve got to consider your volume in the SDV, which is not great,” Capt. Linn noted. “Are you going to strap it to the outside?”

He did confirm that testing is already being conducted to delve deeper into this potential pairing. He said that the Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division (NSWC PCD), headquartered in Panama City, Florida, has been leading the charge.

“I think we’re still years away from having something at the reliability level that they want,” Capt. Linn added. “Again, back to the actual ones and zeros, and the modality of data transmission, [being at the] right time, right place,” and doing all of this “where you have to be survivable, that’s difficult.”

As Capt. Linn has made clear, significant hurdles will need to be cleared before UUV-SDV taming can become a reality. However, there are also real operational benefits that would come from pushing toward this goal.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Two US Navy jets collided during an air show at Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho, sending both aircraft crashing to the ground in front of spectators. All four crew members ejected safely before impact.

Two E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft collided during the Gunfighter Skies Air Show in Mountain Home Idaho on Sunday, in a mishap captured in dramatic videos. The four crew members of the aircraft, from Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 129‘s NAS Whidbey Island-based Growler Airshow Team, were able to eject right after the collision and are being evaluated by medical personnel, according to media reports. The incident took place two miles northwest of the base, according to the 366th Fighter Wing’s Facebook page. The Growler Airshow Team puts on two-jet displays.

Video of the incident showed the one of the Growlers close in on the other from behind and then collide, striking the lead aircraft’s rear with its nose from above. They then became entangled together, nose up, and then down, before tumbling to the ground. Four small explosions from ejection seats blasting out of the falling Growlers can be seen before the parachutes of the four crew members opened up. The Growlers hit the ground, exploding into a ball of flames, followed by the crew members floating down in their parachutes.

These still images show another view of the collision.

The crash caused a fire that was since contained, according to the base.

2 E/A-18G Growlers from the VAQ-129 Growler Demo Team are reported to have collided during the Gunfighter Skies Airshow at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho today. Both crews are reported to have ejected safely. pic.twitter.com/k5SWJ9mz1u

— Thenewarea51 (@thenewarea51) May 17, 2026

⚠️ Important

Mid-air collision; Two EA-18G Growlers of the Growler Demo Team have been involved in a mid-air collision at the Mountain Home Airshow pic.twitter.com/9rwv2RGYID

— Open News© (@OpenNewNews) May 17, 2026

Initially, the base was placed on lockdown.

While the exact cause of the mishap isn’t confirmed, the leading Growler may have been in the under-nose blind spot of the trailing one right before impact. This is a condition we have seen become catastrophic in other airshow disasters. We will have to wait and find out if this was indeed a contributing factor.

As the jets rolled vertical, they seemed stacked on top of each other, making ejection extremely dangerous. Remarkably, the ejection sequences cleared the crews of each other’s aircraft.

You can check out what the display is supposed to look like in the video below:

EA-18G Growler Demo – Nellis AFB Airshow 2022

We will provide updates when available.

UPDATE: 9:45 PM EDT –

Navy CDR Amelia Umayam released the following statement:

“On May 17, 2026, two U.S. Navy EA18-G assigned to Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 129 from Whidbey Island, Washington collided in mid-air while performing an aerial demonstration involving four air crew for the Mountain Home Air Force Base Gunfighter Skies Air Show, near Mountain Home Air Force Base at about 12:10 p.m. MDT.

All four of the air crew successfully ejected and they are being evaluated by medical personnel. First responders are on the scene.

The incident is under investigation. More information will be released as it becomes available.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com