Navy

Islamabad, Pakistan — More than 16 months after India and Pakistan fought a four-day air war, firing missiles and drones at each other, the South Asian neighbours came the closest since then to a military face-off — this time in the Arabian Sea.

Indian and Pakistani naval vessels collided on Tuesday, setting off tit-for-tat accusations. Pakistan’s government summoned India’s top diplomat in Islamabad on Wednesday, mirroring action New Delhi had taken hours earlier when it summoned Pakistan’s charge d’affaires and lodged a protest of its own over the incident.

The collision is the first direct military encounter between the nuclear-armed neighbours since their four-day conflict in May 2025, when Indian air strikes and Pakistani retaliation brought both countries closer to full-scale war than at any point in decades.

So far, details of what happened remain disputed. Neither government has released video, track data or an independent account – and each statement places the blame on the other’s vessel.

But analysts say it underscored the risks of unintended incidents in the seas that could potentially escalate into broader crises, when India and Pakistan have few military and diplomatic mechanisms left in place to defuse tensions.

Two accounts

According to Pakistan’s Foreign Office statement issued on Wednesday evening, the navy has been conducting its biennial SEASPARK-26 exercise inside its exclusive economic zone since September 1 .

A country’s EEZ extends 200 nautical miles (370km) from its coast. Its territorial waters are only 12 nautical miles (22km) from the coast, with the rest of the EEZ in international waters. While vessels from other countries can pass through a nation’s EEZ in international waters unencumbered, they cannot exploit the waters economically: that right belongs only to the country whose EEZ it is.

Pakistan said that an Indian vessel, identified as the guided-missile destroyer INS Kolkata, had “repeatedly” tried to enter the exercise area since September 7 .

On September 15 , it said, Kolkata made a “dangerous” change of course that brought it into contact with a Pakistani vessel identified in local media as PNS Hunain, an offshore patrol vessel.

“Pakistan strongly rejects this belligerent Indian action,” the Pakistani Foreign Office said, calling it a violation of a 1991 bilateral agreement requiring warships to stay at least three nautical miles (5.5km, 3.4 miles) apart in international waters.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs said the warship was on “routine surveillance” in international waters when a Pakistani vessel approached at high speed and manoeuvred unsafely.

Neither government has named the vessels in its own on-record statement, and India has not confirmed or denied the Kolkata identification.

The two navies last collided in June 2011, when Pakistani frigate PNS Babur brushed against Indian frigate INS Godavari in the Gulf of Aden, while escorting a merchant vessel freed from Somali pirates.

Each side blamed the other then too. That row faded within weeks.

The risks

Retired Vice Admiral Ahmad Saeed of the Pakistan Navy said the pattern — two ships pressing close without a clear intent to collide — was familiar from Cold War-era “bumping” incidents between Soviet and US ships in the Black Sea.

But he argued that India and Pakistan are worse placed to manage similar encounters.

“There’s no bilateral Incidents at Sea agreement, the kind the US and USSR signed in 1972, and no navy-to-navy hotline,” Saeed told Al Jazeera. “Article 10 sets a distance, but it gives no manoeuvring rules and no procedure for investigating an incident afterwards. That gap is exactly why each side can just accuse the other.”

Article 10 of the 1991 confidence-building agreement between the two nations requires warships to stay at least three nautical miles (5.6km, 3.5 miles) apart in international waters.

Saeed said the greater risk was what might follow the collision: sharper tactics such as fire-control radar lock-ons or helicopter overflights and eventually “a contact with actual casualties.”

Muhammad Shareh Qazi, a Lahore-based security and maritime analyst, however, pointed to the same 1991 agreement, which he said requires 30 days’ written notice before a military exercise, as well as international collision regulations that apply to both countries as signatories to the UN maritime convention.

“If this collision really had the potential to escalate militarily, you’d have noticed by now,” Qazi said. “There’s a tool for that, called chaff, fired just above the bow or stern purely to signal you could escalate if needed. Nothing like that happened here.”

Both navies also have their own internal accountability channels, he added, with a captain found to have acted without authorisation facing a court martial process separate from any diplomatic protest.

On fishermen routinely detained for straying across the Sir Creek boundary, which is not demarcated between India and Pakistan further south, Qazi said the link to incidents further out at sea was indirect but real.

“Clear demarcation could help close those ambiguities over time, by reducing the ambiguity around where and how these interactions are expected to occur,” he added.

Saeed was more cautious about how contained an incident like this would remain.

“This hasn’t stayed quiet. Both governments went public with protests within a day of each other,” he said, adding that what made the moment riskier than 2011 was that “both publics are primed after last year’s conflict, which was not the case in 2011.”

Similar close-quarters confrontations have become more frequent between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

In the most recent flare-up, on July 24 , Philippine officials said a Chinese vessel came within about seven metres (23 feet) of a Philippine fisheries boat near Scarborough Shoal, the Philippine-claimed reef that China has controlled since 2012, and that Chinese coast guard ships fired water cannon at Philippine vessels.

Whether this week’s collision follows that pattern or fades like the 2011 incident depends less on the ships than on what comes next diplomatically, Qazi said.

“If, in the next 24 to 48 hours, an official statement suggests there was a genuine cause to manufacture an incident for the purpose of escalation, then yes, there may be a real possibility of this happening again,” he added.

The U.S. Navy’s newest stated requirements for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) effort point toward a drone that sounds very much like an advanced uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), rather than a smaller and less capable autonomous ‘loyal wingman’ intended to economically augment crewed fighters. Overall, the new requirements serve as a tacit admission that the Navy is still looking for the kind of drone that it previously explored with extreme promise in the X-47B and Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program. The UCLASS requirements were abruptly shelved and replaced with an uncrewed carrier-based tanker effort, which resulted in the MQ-25 Stingray. This act was seen by some as one of the most controversial and puzzling procurement decisions in modern naval aviation history.

The traditional loyal wingman or CCA concept generally envisions uncrewed ‘fighter’ aircraft whose primary purpose is to complement crewed companions. This typically involves extending the crewed platform’s sensor reach, carrying additional weapons, and opening up a greatly expanded tactics playbook. An advanced UCAV, by contrast, is fundamentally an independent combat aircraft in its own right, designed to deliver weapons and other effects similar to what a crewed platform can provide without requiring a crew onboard or nearby. As such, it is more capable, survivable, and an overall ‘exquisite’ asset with a heavier payload, more capable of taking the place of a crewed aircraft in certain roles, rather than augmenting them, although there is nothing keeping them from working in a loyal wingman type role if required.

Yesterday, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) released a new Request for Information (RFI) that lays out an unusually demanding set of requirements for a CCA Increment 1 prototype. Among other things, the Navy wants an aircraft capable of operating from its aircraft carriers, carrying plentiful weapons, conducting strike missions in highly contested environments, and operating both independently and as part of a larger crewed-uncrewed team.

The combination of these requirements provides a much clearer picture of what the Navy wants its future carrier-based combat drones to be capable of.

Perhaps the most striking requirement concerns weapons carriage. The Navy says the Increment 1 CCA must have the ability to carry four externally mounted weapons weighing up to 2,500 pounds each throughout the target flight envelope and during carrier certification activities. That equates to a potential external weapons load of 10,000 pounds, although it should not necessarily be interpreted as the aircraft’s normal operational configuration. By way of comparison, a very heavily loaded F/A-18E/F Super Hornet might launch with close to 17,000 pounds of weapons and stores — though that is far from common.

Meanwhile, the kinds of drones that the U.S. Air Force is currently exploring under its own separate CCA Increment 1 effort, namely the General Atomics YFQ-42A Dark Merlin and Anduril YFQ-44A Fury, are air-to-air optimized. Their primary loadout is widely expected to be a pair of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, which is just a fraction of the Navy’s newly stated payload requirement.

The RFI NAVAIR put out yesterday also specifically asks respondents to address internal weapons carriage, with both capacity and survivability among the factors the Navy will consider. Internal stores carriage would offer obvious advantages in reducing an aircraft’s radar signature and preserving aerodynamic performance.

The Navy also wants the aircraft to have a substantial combat radius while carrying its required weapons load, as well as the ability to spend at least 30 minutes on station while retaining sufficient fuel reserves to return to the carrier.

For a CCA, carrier operations add another layer of complexity. The aircraft must be capable of catapult launches and arrested landings from both Ford and Nimitz class carriers, while operating within existing carrier deck, elevator, hangar, and support constraints.

Autonomy is similarly central to the concept. The Navy wants mission and flight autonomy that can support the aircraft from launch through recovery, along with the ability to incorporate third-party mission software. The prototype is also expected to demonstrate both individual and multi-aircraft autonomous operations. While crewed-uncrewed teaming is a fundamental part of the concept, the latest requirements make it clear that the aircraft will not depend on a crewed aircraft continuously supervising its actions.

The video below from Collins Aerospace offers a notional look at what crewed-uncrewed teaming involving carrier- and land-based CCA-type drones might look like in the future.

Collaborative Mission Autonomy

In terms of the survivability requirement, the Navy specifically wants the aircraft to operate in highly contested environments and is asking industry to provide approaches for assessing and managing survivability during collaborative operations. The consideration of internal weapons carriage is another indication that signature reduction and survivability are important design considerations, pointing to a low-observable (stealthy) platform.

All of this begins to blur the distinction between the Navy’s Increment 1 CCA plan and a traditional survivable UCAV concept.

That does not necessarily mean the Navy is abandoning the CCA concept entirely in favor of resurrecting the carrier-based UCAV concept. Rather, it suggests that the distinction between the two becomes blurred as requirements overlap. There also remains the strong possibility (or more likely probability) that the Navy will seek to explore CCA designs closer to what the Air Force, as well as the U.S. Marine Corps, are pursuing. This could potentially include development of carrier-based versions of one or more of those designs under a future increment.

The new RFI is also consistent with the Navy’s broader Air Wing of the Future effort (AWOTF).

An earlier NAVAIR sources-sought notice released in July outlined an expansive vision for future carrier-based uncrewed aircraft covering missions including surface warfare; strike warfare; anti-submarine warfare; air warfare; electronic warfare; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR&T); mobility; and logistics. That notice also pointed toward aircraft capable of attacking targets at least 1,000 nautical miles from the carrier without requiring aerial refueling, while leaving open the possibility of extending that reach with tankers.

Intriguingly, the new RFI does not include an explicit maximum range target, but based on the payload requirements alone, this would be very considerable, reflecting the Navy’s concerns about fighting a future conflict across the vast distances of the Pacific. Traditional advanced UCAVs usually have a combat radius measured in thousands of miles, not hundreds, far exceeding the reach of their crewed fighter counterparts.

Whatever the possible range target, the planned weapons load also points to a substantial airframe. Indeed, the deck-space requirement outlined in the RFI is relevant here. The CCA’s “spot factor” cannot exceed that of an existing fourth-generation fighter, meaning that it could potentially be as large as an F/A-18E/F.

Otherwise, however, the latest CCA Increment 1 RFI is considerably more concrete.

The Navy wants a first flight of a prototype within 24 months of a contract award and carrier certification during a three-year development effort. It also wants a path toward an affordability target of around $30 million per aircraft. This kind of price point would put it at the top end of the CCA concepts we have seen so far, and is fairly ambitious for a higher-end UCAV.

Navy officials said in 2024 that the CCA’s unit cost target was around $15 million, reflecting the idea that the aircraft would be sufficiently inexpensive to be expendable under some circumstances. The new RFI instead asks industry to outline a path toward an affordability target of $30 million per aircraft. That is still a fraction of the cost of a modern carrier-based fighter, but it suggests the Navy is willing to pay considerably more for an aircraft with substantially greater weapons capacity, range, autonomy, and survivability.

As to the companies that might respond to the RFI, in August of last year, the Navy confirmed that Anduril, Boeing, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman were all on contract for “conceptual” CCA designs. At that time, the service also said Lockheed Martin had been hired to work on a common control architecture for the drones. Lockheed Martin is already the prime contractor for the control stations and associated software the service is integrating onto its carriers now to support the MQ-25.

The new RFI, however, marks a shift from the conceptual studies described last year toward a specific prototype effort. The Navy is seeking industry input as it shapes the acquisition strategy, with responses due September 18.

In the past, the Navy has said it is aiming for the total makeup of carrier air wings to eventually be 60 percent or more uncrewed, although the precise balance is still to be determined and will certainly be informed by the lessons of Navy CCA Increment 1. Exactly how the CCA might fit in with the Navy’s sixth-generation crewed fighter – known as F/A-XX – is another intriguing prospect, but would clearly be optimized to work alongside that platform.

Now, back to the Navy’s earlier effort to develop a high-end, stealthy, carrier-based UCAV capability. Northrop Grumman built two X-47B demonstrators for that program, both of which underwent extensive flight testing, including carrier operations and aerial refueling. The aircraft flew from 2011 for around half a decade. As of 2022, both X-47Bs had been earmarked for eventual public display at museums.

The two X-47Bs had offered far more than a glimpse of what a carrier-based UCAV capability might look like, and the base design was set to evolve into an operational type. These were large, stealthy UCAVs with thousands of pounds of payload and endurance that far outstripped crewed naval fighter aircraft. The follow-on UCLASS program aimed to see the capabilities the X-47 demonstrated put into operation via a new aircraft procurement effort. However, it transformed into the radically different, less ambitious, tanker-focused Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) program in the mid-2010s. This, as noted, led to the MQ-25 Stingray.

To this day, the cancellation of UCLASS remains a very sore spot and is widely seen as a nearsighted and even reckless decision. This mirrored earlier moves by the USAF, which had demonstrated how revolutionary UCAV capabilities could be, only to entirely walk away from the concept. In fact, that service went even further, appearing to erase those developments from recent memory. You can read all about this bizarre and troubling inflection point in American air power history and the glaring questions surrounding it in this past feature.

Fast forward to today, and the Navy is getting the MQ-25, which is primarily a tanker, but clearly, that was not the only mission set that influenced its exotic design. In fact, these Navy requirements could open the door for the Stingray platform to potentially fulfill at least parts of the Navy uncrewed combat drone role in a ‘cleaned-up,’ stealthier configuration, something we have explored in depth in the past.

Overall, the takeaway here is that the Navy’s latest CCA requirements raise the intriguing possibility that its earlier UCAV ambitions are resurfacing, this time under the CCA banner. This is happening as China is moving very quickly with its own stealthy UCAVs, a number of which are in testing, and one of which is very mature and is navalized for shipboard operations – the GJ-11 Sharp Sword. The GJ-11 sounds very similar to the Navy’s requirements wish list, including its ability to act independently and teamed with crewed counterparts, as well as its general size and need for survivability.

While an RFI only represents an early part of the contracting process, in practical terms, it looks like the Navy is asking whether industry can finally make good on the past promise of a U.S. Navy UCAV.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Three foreign frigates – Japan’s Mogami class, the South Korean Chungnam class, and the Istanbul class from Turkey – are reportedly included in a study of ships the U.S. Navy could procure. The Trump administration has been openly pushing to leverage ships designed in friendly countries to rapidly bolster the Navy’s fleet while also working to rebuild America’s shrunken domestic shipbuilding capacity. So, it is worth examining what each design brings to the table, as well as the broader opportunities and major hurdles procuring any of them would represent.

USNI News was first to report on Tuesday that the Japanese, South Korean, and Turkish frigates are included in an ongoing Navy study, citing anonymous sources. The review is in direct response to one of the provisions in a larger memo President Trump sent out last month, titled “Rebuilding the United States Navy and America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base.” This also comes amid strong opposition in Congress to the basic idea of buying foreign warships for the Navy.

Per that memo, the Secretary of the Navy (currently Acting Secretary Hung Cao) was directed to “submit a plan to the President … that includes timelines and resourcing requirements, for a new competitive acquisition approach for surface combatants with sufficient inherent capabilities to perform anti‑submarine warfare, surface warfare, and convoy escort duties.” The memo also said the “plan should address meeting the requirements for Consolidated Cargo Replenishment at Sea (CONSOL) Tankers and — separately — Roll-On, Roll-Off Vessels.”

The study could lead to “an international warship competition [that] could include building up to two of the ships in foreign shipyards before transitioning to domestic yards as part of the Trump administration’s push to rapidly expand the fleet, three industry sources familiar with the deliberations confirmed,” according to USNI News‘ report. The outlet also said the Navy declined to “directly address the potential for an open competition for a new frigate” when asked.

The acquisition approach described here is in line with what the Trump administration is currently calling the “Finland Model,” which entails construction of an initial batch of ships overseas before moving further production to yards in the United States. The name comes from a partnership the U.S. and Finnish governments announced last year regarding the construction of new icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard. Canada’s Seaspan Shipyards is also involved in that plan.

Broader plans to explore foreign surface combatant designs for the U.S. Navy, and potentially more to acquire one of those ships, were mentioned in the Pentagon’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request released earlier this year. President Trump, former Secretary of the Navy John Phelan, and other U.S. officials have also openly raised the possibility of cooperation with shipbuilders in Japan and South Korea, specifically, including with regard to surface combatants. USNI‘s report says that the Istanbul class was included in the current review after it came up in discussions between Trump and Turkish officials on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara in July.

Turkish Navy I-Class Frigate TCG ISTANBUL (F-515) – Istanbul Strait, October 29th, 2023

Many questions remain, but there are clear signs the Trump administration wants to move in pursuing the acquisition of foreign naval vessels. The particular focus on frigates also aligns with a clear Navy need for new ships in that size class.

Why frigates?

Before exploring the specific designs the Navy is now said to be reviewing, it is worth taking a step back to understand why frigates are so important to the service’s shipbuilding plans, in general. The United States has not technically operated frigates since the retirement of its last Oliver Hazard Perry class type in 2015. The expectation had been that the Freedom and Independence class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) would fill the resulting gaps. However, those ships struggled for years with a variety of major issues over the years and still have not lived up to their promised potential, despite certain strides having been made in expanding their operational employment in recent years.

The Navy’s announcement of a new frigate program in 2019, dubbed FFG(X), was widely seen as a rebuke of the core concepts behind the LCS. This, in turn, led to the Constellation class frigate, which became a debacle unto itself and was finally canceled last year. It is important to point out the Constellation design was based on the established Franco-Italian FREMM frigate. The expectation was that only relatively minor changes would be made before putting the ship in American service. In the end, the U.S. derivative had only 15 percent design commonality with its European ‘parent,’ which directly contributed to the demise of the program.

A new FF(X) frigate program has since emerged. Through that effort, the Navy is now in line to get ships derived from the U.S. Coast Guard’s Legend class National Security Cutter (NSC), with the goal being to have the first one in the water by 2028. However, those frigates, at least the ones built in the initial tranche, will lack a Vertical Launch System (VLS) and certain other features that were seen as critical for the preceding Constellation class. This has immediately raised questions about the operational utility of these new small surface combatants, as TWZ has previously explored in detail.

None of this diminishes the Navy’s current desire for new frigates, and more of them, to provide smaller, lower-cost platforms that can be used to bolster larger surface action groups or operate more independently in roles that do not require larger, more capable designs. When fielded in sufficient volume, they can also free up other types of surface combatants for other, higher priority duties or similar help relieve strain on those fleets.

Today, the Navy’s fleet of Arleigh Burke class destroyers “gets used with a very high demand signal combatant commanders. The Navy can’t operate with only one size of ship,” Rear Adm. Brian Metcalf, the Navy’s Deputy Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Maritime for Combatants, said in an official video in June. “The [FF(X)] frigate will fill that gap. They can be used in less contentious waters. They can be used as high-value escorts. There are all kinds of things the frigate can fill the gap for and allow destroyers to execute the high-end mission set.”

With all this in mind, it is not surprising that the Navy would be seeking to further bolster its future frigate fleets on a shorter timetable by leveraging foreign shipbuilders. There are also clear benefits to taking advantage of capable, in-production designs, which leads us to the Mogami, Chungnam, and Istanbul classes.

The Mogami class

Japan’s Mogami class, with its stealthy design characteristics, has long been a standout among modern frigates currently in production globally. The ship is designed as a multi-mission platform with anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and mine warfare capabilities, the latter of which includes both mine-hunting and mine-laying.

TWZ has covered the ship in detail in the past, writing:

“The original Mogami class design (also known as the 30FFM), the first of which only entered Japanese service in 2022, is already a very modern design with its shape featuring some stealthy characteristics. The 436-foot-long, 53-and-a-half-foot-wide, 5,500-metric-ton displacement frigates have a combined diesel and gas (CODAG) propulsion system that allows for fuel-efficient normal cruising operations and an additional burst of speed in combat. The ships have an active electronically scanned array (AESA) main radar, as well as a host of other advanced sensors and mission systems. One of the Mogami‘s most distinctive features is its NORA-50 UNIted COmbined Radio aNtenna (UNICORN) mast on top of the main superstructure, which contains various antennas. The frigates also have especially futuristic-looking Combat Information Centers (CIC)…”

“Armament-wise, the baseline Mogami class frigate has two four-round launchers for Type 17 anti-ship cruise missiles, a SeaRAM close-in defense system loaded with RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM), and a five-inch main gun in a turret at the bow. There are also two remote weapon stations, each armed with a .50 caliber machine gun, on top of the bridge for additional protection against close-in low-end threats.”

“The Mogami design was originally slated to feature a 16-cell Mk 41 launch system array, but the seventh ship in the class, the JS Niyodo, which was commissioned in May, was the first to be fitted with it. The first six of these frigates were delivered without this capability, but they are expected to be back-fitted with it in the future. Mk 41 cells on Mogami class frigates are expected to be primarily filled with domestically-developed A-SAM or U.S.-designed RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles. Four ESSMs can notably be loaded in a single Mk 41 cell.”

The Mogami class frigates also have a flight deck and hangar designed to accommodate a single Seahawk helicopter. The ships can also deploy uncrewed underwater and surface vessels (UUV/USV), as well as rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs), via a ramp at the stern.

MHI in Japan has also developed an enlarged derivative that is close to 466 feet long, almost 56 feet at its widest, and displaces some 6,200 metric tons. This version also features a 32-cell VLS array, along with an upgraded radar, other improved sensors, and updated mission systems. Last year, the Australian government announced it would be acquiring a fleet of these ships with certain unspecified country-specific features as part of its SEA 3000 program.

The Australian deal is one of, if not still the most significant foreign arms sale for Japan since the end of World War II. It also helps ensure that the Mogami production line will remain hot for years to come. For the U.S. Navy, sharing a frigate with two of America’s two highest-profile allies in the Pacific, and which could therefore be readily serviced in those countries, would be very advantageous.

The Mogami is also a contender to become New Zealand’s next frigate, and there have also been discussions about sales to Indonesia. The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force only has two more of these frigates on order, the last of which is expected to be commissioned into service by March of next year.

The Chungnam class

The Chungnam class (also sometimes referred to as the FFX-III or FFG-III) is the latest frigate for the South Korean Navy, and feature a mix of anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities. The first example entered service in that country in 2024. These ships are just over 423 feet long, approach 49 feet at the widest point in the hull, and displace some 4,300 tons with a full combat load. The design is based on the earlier Daegu class, which was itself an evolution of the preceding Incheon class that traces its roots back to the late 1990s.

As was the case on the Daegu class, the Chungnam class uses combined diesel–electric or gas (CODLOG) propulsion, which offers benefits for power management and efficiency, as well as when it comes to reducing maintenance requirements and operating costs. The design features a prominent integrated mast structure with four fixed-face arrays for the main multi-function AESA radar near the top. The ships have additional radars and other sensors, as well as an electronic warfare suite.

Each one of the Chungnam class frigates has a 16-cell K-VLS array. Domestically developed K-SAAM surface-to-air missiles and Haeseong I anti-ship cruise missiles (also called the SSM-700L or C-Star), as well as K745A1 Hong Sang Eo (Red Shark) vertically-launched anti-submarine rockets, can be loaded into these cells.

The armament package on these ships also includes a five-inch main gun in a turret at the bow, a pair of triple torpedo tubes, and a Close-in Weapon System II (CIWS II) armed with a seven-barrel 30mm Gatling-type cannon.

The Chungnam class frigates also have a flight deck and hangar for a single helicopter at the stern.

As it stands now, the South Korean Navy has two Chungnam class frigates in service and has plans to acquire four more over the next few years. The lead ship in the class was built by HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, which is also one of the principal designers of the ship. A different shipbuilder, SK Oceanplant, built the second ship in the class, ROKS Gyeoungbuk, and is now working on the third and fourth examples. Hanwha Ocean is reportedly in line to build the last two ships in the class for South Korea. Hyundai and Hanwha have pitched export designs based on the Chungnam class, with both firms notably in the running to supply new frigates to Thailand.

S. Korea shows off shipbuilding prowess by launching 2nd next-gen frigate in 5 months

Hanwha has already been making steady inroads in the shipbuilding industry in the United States, including the acquisition of the Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 2024. Hyundai has reportedly been working to do the same. Just last month, Hanwha publicly announced a new $1.2 billion bid to buy out Australian shipbuilder Austal’s U.S. subsidiary, Austal USA. Austal notably built the Independence class LCSs for the U.S. Navy and continues to supply that service with other vessels. Austal subsequently said it was considering the South Korean offer.

The Istanbul class

Turkey’s Istanbul class (also known as the Istif class or just I class), developed under the country’s MILGEM national warship program, is not a design that has typically come up in previous discussions about potential foreign-made frigates for the U.S. Navy. It is described as a multi-role frigate with anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine capabilities. The lead ship in this class, TCG Istanbul, entered Turkish Navy service in 2024.

Türkiye’s Modern Naval Power: The I-Class Frigates

At around 371 and a half feet long and with a beam of just over 47 feet, as well as a displacement of some 3,000 tons with a full combat load, the Istanbul class is notably smaller than either the Mogami class or Chungnam class. Like the Mogami, it uses CODAG propulsion. The Turkish design is understood to have leveraged lessons learned from the Project GENESIS program to upgrade the country’s second-hand ex-U.S. Navy Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, as you can learn more about here.

TCG Istanbul is armed with a 16-cell MiDLAS VLS array, with past reports saying it is primarily configured to fire Hisar short-to-medium-range surface-to-air missiles. However, just in August, it was revealed that the second ship in the class, the future TCG Izmir, which is undergoing sea trials now, has a new 16-cell version of MiDLAS with visibly longer cells. This would allow the ship to fire larger weapons vertically, such as the Siper medium-range surface-to-air missiles, Atmaca anti-ship cruise missiles, and/or Gezgin land-attack cruise missiles. MiDLAS is a scalable VLS design developed in Turkey as an alternative to the U.S.-made Mk 41.

The initial Istanbul class design already had four deck-mounted launchers that can be loaded with up to 16 Atmaca missiles, in total. The frigates also have a 76mm cannon in a turret on the bow, a Gokdeniz CIWS with a twin-barrel 35mm cannon, two 25mm cannon-armed remote weapon stations, and a pair of twin torpedo tubes.

The main sensor on the Istanbul class is a rotating AESA radar mounted on top of the ship’s main integrated mast structure. It has additional radars and other sensors, as well as electronic support measures and electronic countermeasures systems.

The Istanbul class design also features a flight deck and hangar at the stern, sized around the Seahawk helicopter.

As mentioned, the second Istanbul class frigate for the Turkish Navy is now in sea trials, and the country plans to eventually acquire eight of these warships in total. They are being built through several shipyards in Turkey. Last year, Turkey’s TAIS Shipyards also secured a contract to build at least two Istanbul class frigates for Indonesia.

Growing U.S. roadblocks to any foreign warships

Much remains to be seen about how the U.S. Navy might proceed with the acquisition of new frigates, or any other naval vessels, via foreign shipbuilders. Whether any other relevant, in-production designs are being considered, or could be in the future, is unknown. USNI News‘ report says the current study is scheduled to wrap up in November.

Furthermore, what the Navy might want to do could well turn out to be moot. Members of Congress on both sides of the political aisle have been very vocally pushing back on any plans to acquire foreign warships amid concerns about negative impacts on the U.S. shipbuilding industry.

Current U.S. law would already require the Trump administration to issue a national security waiver to pursue foreign-made naval vessels. A draft of the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for the 2027 Fiscal Year now making its way through the Senate would eliminate the ability to issue such a waiver. In June, members of the House Armed Services Committee separately moved to outright block any spending on foreign-built warships in a separate draft NDAA.

The aforementioned Finland Model, as outlined in Trump’s August memo, is clearly intended to try to assuage Congressional concerns. Under the stated plan, foreign shipbuilders would be required to make major investments in U.S. shipbuilding enterprises and hire American workers as part of any future contract, even if an initial tranche of vessels is built overseas.

“The Administration strongly opposes section 1025, which would prohibit the use of funds for procurement of initial battle force ships to be built in a foreign shipyard, especially while, in accordance with the ‘Finland Model’ first employed with the Coast Guard’s medium icebreaker program, long-term investments are being made in an American brown or greenfield shipyard,” the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) wrote in a statement of Administration Policy in July, specifically in response to provisions in the the House’s NDAA draft. “This prohibition fails to seriously address the challenges posed by current shipbuilding backlogs across six major programs in our ‘prime’ shipyards.”

This latter point here speaks to an already worrisome and still-widening gap between U.S. shipbuilding capacity and that of chief global competitor China. The U.S. government has tried to take steps in recent years to revitalize the American side of the equation, but workforce retention and other factors have continued to present serious hurdles. There are additional concerns now about how the addition of work on the Trump class battleship program will affect America’s naval shipbuilding ecosystem, which the Trump administration has separately pushed back on.

Continuing U.S. shipyard capacity and quality issues raise their own questions about the viability of the Finland Model. The construct inherently limits the U.S. government’s ability to make use of yards overseas and is heavily contingent on the shipbuilding industry in the United States expanding at a rate where it will be able to absorb the additional production demands. With the naval shipbuilding deficit already becoming extremely problematic, buying examples of relevant classes with minimal changes and having them built where production is already established could arguably be the priority, especially in light of the failures of the LCS and Constellation programs.

Ensuring that any U.S.-specific changes to the design are minimal will also be critical for any such plan to be successful. As mentioned, the Constellation class was undone in large part due to a near-constant stream of changes ordered by the Navy, which negated the benefits of choosing a derivative of an in-production design. The service has stressed its intention to avoid any similar pitfalls with its existing FF(X) frigate program, which also has to be factored into the larger domestic shipyard capacity question.

“The President has directed the Navy to aggressively increase domestic shipbuilding capacity, including leveraging the proven shipbuilding skills and industrial expertise of our allies,” Navy Capt. Ron Flanders said in a statement on Tuesday, according to USNI News. “We are actively developing options to fulfill the President’s intent to deliver ships faster while ensuring long-term investment, technology transfer, and workforce expansion within United States shipyards.”

Signs are certainly growing that the Navy is moving closer to kicking off a formal process to acquire foreign-designed warships, which could include Mogami, Chungnam, and/or Istanbul frigates, to help grow its fleets, especially in the face of growing challenges posed by China.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Sept. 2 (UPI) — President Donald Trump has nominated Hung Cao to be secretary of the Navy amid an ongoing shakeup of the U.S. military.

Trump announced his nomination of Cao for a position he has held on an interim basis for months on his Truth Social media platform Tuesday, calling him “a true WARRIOR.”

“We need Patriots like Hung leading our Navy and Marine Corps, and I can think of no one better than him to make sure our Great Navy and Marine Corps remain the FIERCEST and BEST Force the World has ever seen,” the commander in chief said.

“The Senate needs to confirm this Warfighter, ASAP, so he can continue the fantastic work he has been doing over the past 4 months.”

Cao has served as acting secretary of the Navy since April when his predecessor, John Phelan, was reportedly forced to leave the position over clashes with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Deputy Defense Secretary Stephen Feinberg and Cao.

The announcement comes as there has been a high turnover rate in U.S. military leadership during Trump’s second administration, with high-ranking officers resigning, quitting or purged. On Monday, it was reported that Army Secretary Dan Driscoll resigned following months of clashes with Hegseth.

Cao in a statement late Tuesday thanked Trump for the nomination, saying “it’s an honor of a lifetime to lead the great warriors of the Navy and Marine Crops team.”

“I’m grateful for your leadership and support as we continue to get after shipbuilding and ensure the defense of the homeland.”

If confirmed by the Senate, Cao, as secretary, will oversee the entire Navy from recruiting to equipping and mobilizing as well as be in charge of construction, outfitting and repairing naval ships, equipment and facilities, among other responsibilities.

“Congrats to Hung Cao on being nominated as our nation’s next @SECNAV,” Sen. Rick Scott, R-Fla., said online.

“I know you will work hard to support our incredible Sailors and Marines.”

Leidos (LDOS) on Tuesday highlighted a Navy contract worth as much as $56.7 million to study psychological health and operational readiness among U.S. military personnel.

The award isn’t new. The Department of Defense originally announced it on July 10, 2025, identifying it

The U.S. Navy made a major splash this weekend when it revealed the existence of the AIM-424 Malice Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile (LRAAM), which is already deep in development. At the same time, the service also highlighted plans for a new Compact Air-to-Air Missile (CAAM) optimized for shorter-range engagements and internal carriage on stealthy fighters like the F-35 and future drones as part of its larger future missile vision. Readers can first get caught up on what is known about the long-range AIM-424 in our initial reporting on that missile here.

As described so far, the core goals for CAAM sound virtually identical to what the service has outlined previously in relation to a “Compact Variant” of the AIM-9X Sidewinder (AIM-9X CV), which TWZ was first to report on. A missile in this general category would offer a boost in magazine depth that could be especially valuable for more localized defense of carriers and other high-value assets against large waves of missiles and drones.

The “Compact Air-to-Air Missile (CAAM) effort is a future inner boundary weapon. Requirements are being evaluated and assessed by N98 [the Air Warfare Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations] at this time,” a Navy official told TWZ when asked for more information. “The Navy does not plan to provide routine updates beyond approved public releases because of operational security and program sensitivity.”

Mention of CAAM was included in the same briefing where the AIM-424 was first unveiled at the Tailhook Association’s annual convention this weekend. A central focus of the CAAM is on “increasing internal carriage capacity for inner boundary weapon,” according to that presentation.

For the Navy, at present, “internal carriage” is a consideration most applicable to the service’s F-35Cs and, by extension, other variants of the Joint Strike Fighter. Internal weapons bays will also be a feature on whatever design the Navy may ultimately select as its future sixth-generation carrier-based combat jet, currently referred to as F/A-XX. Future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) type drones or other uncrewed aircraft the service might acquire in the future could also have internal bays. We will come back to this later on.

The description of CAAM as an “inner boundary weapon” points to a focus on shorter-range engagements, where there could also be less total time to react overall.

In terms of what the Navy’s core requirements for the CAAM might be beyond internal carriage, details are limited. A rendering included in the presentation at Tailhook this weekend shows a relatively generic-looking design with fins only at the tail and a yellow band around the front of the body indicating the presence of a high-explosive warhead.

However, earlier this year, the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD), part of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), did put out a contracting notice regarding rocket motor developments to support CAAM and other developments.

NAWCWD “intends to procure on a Full and Open competition basis to develop and demonstrate technology that results in greatly enhanced kinematic capability for the next generation of tactical missiles,” the notice explained. “To support this technological development efforts, NAWCWD is interested in maturing high total impulse loaded and energy tailorable solid propulsion systems for transition into compact weapon systems, including a Compact Air-to-Air Missile (CAAM).”

“Requirements will include tasking and products needed to provide a Concept Design with build-to-print data package, identify critical technology gaps, conduct critical component and rocket motor experiments, conduct a Design for Manufacturing & Assembly study to identify features required to meet manufacturing and cost goals, and provide a plan to mature the CAAM HLG Concept Design to a maturity state ready to enter a Department of Defense (DOD) Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) program,” the notice added.

“HLG” here stands for “Highly Loaded Grain.” This, in turn, refers to solid-fuel rocket motors designed to maximize output per volume. This is an area of missile technology where the Navy has already been heavily investing for years with a broad eye toward increasing the range and improving the performance of future missiles. Furthermore, a missile with an HLG rocket could offer substantially increased capability over a similarly-sized design with a non-HLG motor. This, in turn, offers particular advantages when designing missiles for carriage in internal bays with rigid dimensions.

“The Next-Generation Highly Loaded Grain project team has matured the technology and seeded the development of future mission-modular propulsion systems that can increase weapon ranges by up to 1.5x while maintaining inner boundaries for short-range and time-critical missions,” according to one fact sheet detailing notable achievements by NAVAIR’s Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCAD) in 2023. Note here also the explicit mention of ‘inner boundary’ design considerations.

As mentioned earlier, the Navy has previously used virtually identical language to describe the planned AIM-9X CV, which is also a joint program with the U.S. Air Force.

“The AIM-9X CV repackages the SIP IV technology into a compact airframe optimized for internal carriage on advanced aircraft with improved kinematic performance,” according to the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget request, released earlier this year. “The program will deliver increased capability to the warfighter with greater standoff range, increased aircraft weapon station capacity, and maintains inner boundary performance.”

How exactly the CAAM and the AIM-9X CV programs may be related is unknown, but they clearly have the same general goals if they are not different names for the same development effort. From what was shown this weekend, CAAM is a distinctly different-looking missile from the AIM-9X, and plans for a compact Sidewinder variant or derivative could also be a stepping stone to a new design intended to fill the same general role.

U.S. defense contractors have been publicly showing concepts for compact air-to-air missiles for years now. This includes Raytheon’s Peregrine, unveiled in 2019, which was said to be roughly half the size of an AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) while still offering comparable range. The company said it also had equivalent maneuverability to current-generation Sidewinders. Raytheon is the prime contractor for the AIM-120 and the AIM-9, as well as the newly unveiled AIM-424.

In the late 2010s, Boeing also put forward a concept for a multi-stage Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile (LRAAM), which had a design that raised the possibility of whether the first stage could be used as a more compact, stand-alone weapon. In 2022, Boeing notably received funding for further development of that missile under a contract from the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to “investigate advanced missile sub-system components to support the Compact Air-to-Air Missile [CAAM] and Extended Range Air-to-Air Missile Systems [ERAAM].”

During the 2010s, Lockheed Martin promoted a compact anti-air missile design called Cuda, with a focus on internal carriage, as well. However, Cuda had largely disappeared from the company’s marketing materials by the end of the decade.

Regardless, the use case for such a CAAM-type missile is clear-cut, especially for the Navy and its carrier air wings. In particular, the service is facing a threat ecosystem that is rapidly evolving in scale and scope, including multiple different classes of anti-ship missiles (ballistic, cruise, hypersonic) and long-range one-way attack drones. There is a very real prospect of large-volume and complex attacks made up of very different tiers of weapons incoming from multiple vectors simultaneously, creating a greater risk that both long- and short-range defenses will be overwhelmed. TWZ previously explored this reality in depth in discussing how the long-range AIM-174B, an air-launched version of the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) that was officially unveiled in 2024, fits into the service’s larger plans.

How The Navy’s New Very Long-Range AIM-174 Will Pierce China’s Anti-Access Bubble

Added localized defensive capability and capacity could also be relevant for aerial force packages pressing their way to a target in hostile territory, where similarly growing aerial threats could materialize suddenly and in close proximity. Depending on its capabilities, CAAM might even be able to provide a new layer of defensive capability against incoming anti-air missiles, including for larger aircraft. So, giving individual aircraft more total engagement opportunities will only become more valuable, if not vital, as time goes on.

As noted, stealth platforms with limited internal bay space face particular constraints in this regard. For years, more magazine depth via smaller missiles has been seen as a key avenue for improving payload limitations for platforms like the F-35 and F-22 when operating in their most low-observable (stealthy) configuration. In many scenarios, these aircraft can get closer to their targets without detection, offering different options for the employment of what could be shorter-range weapons. A compact air-to-air missile design that still offers comparable performance to larger existing designs, through the use of a high-load-grain rocket motor and other features, would be even more of a boon. Having something that is capable of short-to-intermediate-range engagements, but that can be loaded in greater numbers internally would expand tactical flexibility, amplify lethality, and increase utility of the aircraft as they can down more targets on a single sortie in certain scenarios.

The continued growth of drone threats, especially those posed by long-range one-way attack types, has added another dimension to this equation. Limited magazine depth limits the ability to rapidly retask stealthy platforms to respond to often unpredictable high-volume drone attacks. Furthermore, the anti-air version of the 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) laser-guided rocket, the U.S. military’s current go-to lower-cost air-to-air weapon against drones, cannot be fired at all from the internal bays on the F-35 or the F-22. CAAM can offer the ability to address these threats better than aircraft like the F-35 and F-22 can today.

A weapon like CAAM would also be especially relevant for future collaborative combat aircraft, which have extreme constraints on payload capacity, internal and external, as well as total takeoff weight. For CCA-type uncrewed aircraft, keeping the airframe size as small as possible to meet requirements is also essential for meeting affordability and producibility targets. Arming these platforms with an AIM-120-sized missile might not necessarily be required, or even be ideal, especially when operating along the leading edge of the air-to-air battle, closer to threats. In those scenarios, having the option of carrying even twice as many missiles per sortie, internally (if available) or externally, even if they have shorter reach, could be hugely beneficial.

There could easily be interest in a CAAM-like missile from other branches of the U.S. military, if it is not already a joint service effort. The Air Force is already known to be involved in the AIM-9X CV effort. The service has publicly pursued new compact and lower-cost air-to-air missile concepts over the years under various different project names. This includes its own CAAM effort, through which Boeing previously received funding.

What is clear now is that the Navy is pushing to maximize the anti-air capabilities of its aircraft at both the shorter- and longer-range ends of the engagement spectrum.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com