Navy

The U.S. Navy’s top officer says global proliferation of increasingly capable air defense systems underscores the vital need to move ahead with work on the F/A-XX next-generation carrier-based fighter. He further warned that the Navy’s “ability to fly with impunity” using non-stealthy types like the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, even against smaller nation-state adversaries like Iran and non-state actors, is now “fleeting.”

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Daryl Caudle talked about F/A-XX and the threat ecosystem during a live question-and-answer session at the Apex Defense conference in Washington, D.C., yesterday. Breaking Defense was first to report on Caudle’s remarks. F/A-XX has been in purgatory since the Pentagon announced its intention to shelve it last year, primarily to prevent any competition for resources with the U.S. Air Force’s F-47 sixth-generation fighter. Congress is now pushing ahead with legislation that could jumpstart the Navy’s next-generation fighter program. Boeing and Northrop Grumman are currently in the running for F/A-XX. Lockheed Martin was reportedly eliminated from the competition last March. Boeing is also the prime contractor for the F-47.

The “next-generation airframe, F/A-XX, is so vital,” Caudle said yesterday. “This [carrier] air wing of the future design is so important for so many reasons … nothing delivers the mass of an air wing if you want to deliver mass fires.”

“I know these things are expensive, and I know the defense industrial base is compressed, but we have got to figure out how to walk and chew gum here with aircraft,” he added. It is worth noting here that both Boeing and Northrop Grumman have pushed back publicly, to different degrees, on concerns that the U.S. industrial base cannot support work on two sixth-generation fighter programs simultaneously.

You can listen to Adm. Caudle’s full opening remarks at the Apex Defense conference and the follow-on question-and-answer session in the video below.

CNO APEX REMARKS

Caudle has long been outspoken in his support for F/A-XX, which is the Navy’s planned successor to its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets. In addition to being very stealthy, the sixth-generation jets would come with increased range and other advancements, giving the Navy’s carrier air wings a major boost in kinetic capability. F/A-XX will also be able to perform electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, as well as contribute to battle space management.

The CNO highlighted many of these expected capabilities in his comments yesterday. He also called particular attention to how “vital” F/A-XX will be because of “the CCAs [Collaborative Combat Aircraft drones] that it will command and control.”

“But the bigger part is … just the ever-lowering cost of entry” when it comes to air defense threats, Caudle said. “The folks that used to be not in [the] headspace that I needed a stealth aircraft of this level to fly a mission into their country, will gain capability that the F-18 will not match against.”

“This is an ever-evolving theme, and when you’ve got partnerships … well coupled with each other across China and Russia and Iran and North Korea, and terrorist groups that are getting that kit from all of those through back-channel ways, our ability to fly with impunity with our existing airframes is fleeting,” he continued. “So, if I don’t start building that [F/A-XX] immediately, you’re not going to get it for some time.”

“I hate to say it, sounds cliche, but you know, when things heat up in Iran, guess who steamed over there? Right? It was the United States Navy and the Abraham [Lincoln Carrier] Strike Group,” the Navy’s top officer added. “So you can imagine what that looks like 10 years from now, with a different Iran, with different capability, that can go against F-18 capabilities of today.”

U.S. military operations in and around the Middle East in the past two years have provided substantial evidence to underscore Caudle’s remarks. There were multiple reported instances in which Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen were able to threaten existing fourth and fifth-generation U.S. fighters, at least to a degree, with their relatively modest air defense capabilities. Sources differ on the total number, but the Houthis were also able to successfully down 20 or so MQ-9 Reaper drones.

TWZ has previously explored in detail the scale and scope of Houthi air defenses, as well as their ability to punch above their weight, and not just against U.S. forces. Infrared sensors and seekers, including the repurposing of heat-seeking air-to-air missiles as surface-to-air weapons, have been a major factor, given that they are not impacted by radar cross-section-reducing features on stealthy targets. They are also passive, meaning that they do not pump out signals that can give opponents advanced warning that they are being tracked and targeted.

Infrared capabilities can also help in cueing traditional radars, and pairing the two together offers benefits for spotting and tracking targets, whether they have features to reduce their radar and other signatures or not. This also just allows the radars to not have to start radiating (and expose themselves as a result) until very late in the engagement cycle. The Houthis have also focused heavily on mobile systems that are hard to find and fix in advance, and that present additional complications given their ability to pop up suddenly in unexpected locations.

The air defense assets the Houthis have arrayed over the past decade or so are directly reflective of developments in Iran, which has put a similar focus on infrared capabilities and mobile systems. Though B-2 stealth bombers were the centerpiece of the Operation Midnight Hammer strikes on Iranian nuclear sites last year, stealthy F-22 and F-35 fighters were still used to help clear the way by targeting air defense sites in the country.

This all, in many ways, reflects broader air defense global trends that have been emerging in China, Russia, North Korea, and elsewhere. As Adm. Caudle noted yesterday, there has also been cooperation on various levels between America’s adversaries, well beyond Iran and the Houthis, on the development and proliferation of more capable air defense systems.

The threat picture also goes beyond individual anti-air weapons and sensors. Fully-networked integrated air defenses, which offer a multitude of benefits when it comes to operational flexibility and more efficiently utilizing available resources, are only set to become a bigger part of the equation. These networks will be able to detect, successfully track, and engage targets in ways that federated air defense systems cannot. The barrier to entry in acquiring these capabilities is likely to keep dropping as time goes on, as well.

The Navy does still, of course, see F/A-XX as critical to projecting carrier-based airpower into denser, higher-end air defense threat ecosystems, especially in any future conflicts against a major competitor like China or Russia. A year ago, the U.S. Air Force released a report projecting that American aircraft will be challenged by anti-air missiles with ranges up to 1,000 miles by 2050.

“This [F/A-XX] is, again, a global solution, not just for a pressing scenario,” Adm. Caudle said yesterday.

As an aside, it is interesting to point out that the air defense arsenal of another smaller country, Syria, has been credited with helping ensure the F-22 survived post-Cold War drawdowns in defense spending. The program was severely truncated later on as a cost-cutting measure, a decision that has been increasingly questioned in hindsight.

The F/A-XX saga still has yet to play out, but Iranian air defenses, in particular, look to have emerged as a major factor in whatever the future might hold for that program.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

An elite U.S. Navy test and evaluation squadron, the VX-9 “Vampires” based out of NAWS China Lake, are now flying the U.S. Air Force’s F-35A model. The Navy traditionally flies the carrier-capable F-35C and the Marines fly both the short-takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B and the F-35C.

The news that the seagoing service is operating the A model of the Joint Strike Fighter came from aviation photographer @Task_Force23, who captured the VX-9 F-35A as it did a low-approach at Mojave Air and Space Port on January 23rd. He was kind enough to share his photos with our readers.

The aircraft in question was 17-5240, an F-35A that had previously served in a test capacity with the USAF’s 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron based at Nellis Air Force Base. As for how the jet ended up being flown by the USN, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) tells us:

“We have a service agreement whereby the Air Force can loan the Navy an aircraft and they have done that before.”

We have asked additional questions about the arrangement to the JPO, we will update this post when we hear back.

Regardless, it makes sense that Navy can pull from the Air Force’s much larger F-35A fleet for test and evaluation duties, the activities of which often benefit both services due to the joint nature of the F-35 program. The entire F-35C production target for the Navy and Marines is 273 aircraft (as of 2024), and many of those aircraft are yet to be ordered and delivered. In comparison, the USAF had well over 500 F-35As in its inventory at the start of fiscal year 2025. That number has only grown.

The F-35C that the Navy flies has much larger wings than the A, allowing it to approach the carrier at lower speeds. It also has a beefier landing gear for carrier operations, a robust tail hook, and it carries more fuel, among other tweaks. While the two fly similar and conversion from F-35C to A is likely relatively seamless, the C model is restricted to 7.5Gs compared to the A’s 9Gs. Due to the big wing and G restriction, they perform different in areas of the envelope, such as turns. High speed performance is also a bit different due to the big wings on the C. But those differences are fairly minimal, especially for test duties of a relatively mature aircraft that often have more to do with avionics, software, and weapons integration than raw performance and flying qualities. There are other use cases VX-9 could have for F-35As, as well, but generally this would be a capacity issue.

Still, it is certainly… different… seeing an F-35A emblazoned with NAVY on its side and VX-9’s iconic bat on its tail.

Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com

ST. PAUL, Minn., Jan. 26 (UPI) — A aging, decommissioned destroyer that plays a little-known, but vital, role in maintaining the self-defense systems of Navy warfighting ships is on its last legs, but there’s no clear plan to replace it, government watchdogs say.

The Government Accountability Office reported last week that the 564-foot Self-Defense Test Ship, which before being decommissioned in 2003 was a Spruance-class destroyer known as the USS Paul F. Foster, is aging quickly and is beset by problems

That could compromise its one-of-a-kind role as a vessel fitted to undergo missile attacks as a way to test the Navy’s shipboard self-defense systems.

The unique vessel is equipped with the SSDS Mk 2, the command-and-control system aboard the Navy’s amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, which can be operated by remote control without any crew onboard as a safety precaution as it faces incoming missiles.

The insights it provided about the effectiveness of shipboard self-defense systems were used extensively by the Navy to address the needs of the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier and the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer in the last decade, and the test ship is expected to continue to carry out more vital tests over the next few years.

But even after extensive upgrades in 2024 and 2025, the ship is on its last legs and could become inoperable at any time, the GAO warned, leaving the Navy without a clear plan for some way to replace its functionality quickly.

“The Self-Defense Test Ship is critical to the Navy’s ability to test and understand how ship self-defense systems will behave as missiles approach a ship,” said Shelby Oakley, director of contracting and national security acquisitions for the GAO and lead author of last week’s report.

He told UPI there’s a risk of a gap in U.S. testing and training capabilities if the test ship goes out of commission with no replacement immediately available — which could have dire repercussions as U.S. naval forces confront missile-wielding foes such as Yemen’s Houthi rebels in the Red Sea.

“Due to the speed of incoming missiles, the systems must function with precision. Without a test ship, the Navy is reliant on computer modeling to evaluate operational performance of self-defense systems at close range,” he said.

“Thus, without a test ship, the Navy would have less confidence that the systems will protect the ship from incoming fire, which could result in disastrous consequences in the heat of battle.”

The risk of having a gap in such test capability is amplified “when considering the steady advances in the weapons available to potential U.S. adversaries,” Oakley added.

The vessel underwent 14 months of repairs at Naval Base San Diego beginning in April 2024, after which it returned to its home base at Port Hueneme, Calif.

While it was out of commission, technicians examined and mended fuel tanks, the firefighting system, the fire main pipe and sea water service valves, according to the Naval Sea Systems Command.

Its superstructure was also inspected for corrosion and its deck was restored.

But Navy officials told the GAO during the lay-up period that regardless of any further maintenance it may receive in the next few years, “continuing to effectively operate it to the end of the decade will be a challenge based on its poor condition.”

The issue has come up as the Navy is struggling to achieve the goals of the Trump administration and bipartisan majorities in Congress to grow the size of the fleet.

The service has failed to consistently produce new ships at the scale, speed and cost demanded by the government due to “a series of interwoven, systemic issues,” such as ever-shifting specifications by military officials and the inability of defense contractors to find a stable and adequate workforce, according to a December report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Amid those challenges, a concrete plan to replace the self-defense test ship remains elusive. The Navy explored several options to do so in the decade between 2013 and 2023, including extending the service life of the current vessel, replacing it with commercial ships or decommissioning and converting another destroyer.

The last option appeared to become less feasible when Secretary of the Navy John Phelan extended the service lives of the five DDG 51 class destroyers that were identified as potential replacements.

A request for comment by UPI to the secretary’s office was not returned. But in a brief written response included in the GAO report, officials of the Navy’s Operational Test and Evaluation Force, or OPTEVFOR, concurred that a new test ship is needed and that a “capability gap” may be created due to the lengthened decommissioning schedule of the DDG 51 class destroyers.

They also confirmed the test ship is scheduled to be retired after a new round of testing for the SSDS Mk 2 system slated to begin in fiscal year 2027.

While the vessel can still be used, its down time due to maintenance needs are increasing and it’s becoming increasingly hard for the Navy to plan around them, said defense analyst Christine Cook, a senior fellow at the bipartisan Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“The age and condition of the ship means that it would be useful for the Navy to develop a plan and make investments in a new one,” she told UPI. “However, the question is always, what will the Navy not be able to do with the funds spent on a new test ship?

“Recommendations on gaps don’t always ask this question, but it is one that Navy programmers have to grapple with,” she said. “A delay in developing a plan for a replacement ship does not mean that the test ship is not available — but it does create some level of future risk.”

The Navy’s larger shipbuilding challenges are indirectly affecting the situation because the sluggish pace of new production is forcing its leaders to keep existing vessels in service longer, Cook added.

“If the Navy wants to keep ships operational longer because shipbuilding constraints mean that it can’t access sufficient new builds, then there may not be a ship available for retrofitting,” she said.

“The goal of growing the size of the Navy may require delaying ship retirements, which also means that the fleet needs more maintenance, competing with the ability to maintain the test ship.”