NATO

Entry to Lithuania still allowed for certain travellers, including EU citizens and humanitarian visa-holders.

Lithuania is tightening its border with Belarus for a month after waves of balloons carrying contraband cigarettes entered its airspace.

Lithuania’s cabinet decided Wednesday to continue halting traffic at the Salcininkai crossing in the southeast until the end of November, while heavily restricting passage at its only other crossing, Medininkai, near the capital Vilnius, according to the BNS news agency.

Interior Minister Vladislav Kondratovic said the measures would “send a clear message to our not-so-friendly neighbour” over the balloon incursions, which disrupted air traffic at Vilnius airport over the weekend and prompted it to first close the two crossings.

Diplomats, Lithuanian citizens, nationals of the European Union and NATO member states and their family members, as well as foreigners with valid Lithuanian permits, will still be allowed to enter Lithuania through Medininkai, BNS reported. The exemption also applies to holders of humanitarian visas.

Passenger trains between Belarus and Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave wedged between Poland and Lithuania, will not be affected. Russians holding a transit document allowing travel to Kaliningrad can also still cross at Medininkai, according to Lithuanian officials.

Prime Minister Inga Ruginiene said the restrictions could be extended. “We cannot fail to respond to a hybrid attack against Lithuania,” she told reporters.

The measure will primarily affect thousands of Belarusian workers who regularly travel between the two countries, but Lithuanian businesses that continue to work with Minsk will also be impacted, Ruginiene said.

‘Mad scam’

Belarus condemned Lithuania’s initial border closure after last week’s balloon incident and called on its neighbour to first look for accomplices within its own borders.

“Lithuanian politicians have decided to exploit the situation and place all the blame on Belarus, thus covering up their own inability (or unwillingness?) to find the smugglers’ contractors” inside Lithuania, said a statement by the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

“If air balloons loaded with cigarettes are flying there, I guess they need to solve the issue on their end,” added Belarus’s President Alexander Lukashenko, noting that his country would apologise if its involvement is established.

Lithuania, a NATO and EU member on the Western alliance’s eastern flank, views the balloon disruption as a deliberate act of sabotage by Russia-allied Belarus.

Its concern is heightened by repeated drone intrusions into NATO’s airspace, which reached an unprecedented scale last month. Some European officials described the incidents as Moscow testing NATO’s response, which raised questions about how prepared the alliance is against Russia.

In Belgium, Defence Minister Theo Francken said an investigation was under way after “multiple drones were spotted again” overnight Tuesday into Wednesday above a military base in Marche-en-Famenne in the east of the country.

For the first time since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a NATO member has formally invoked Article 4 of the alliance’s founding treaty after a major airspace breach. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna tells Talk to Al Jazeera why repeated Russian provocations are more than isolated incidents – they’re a test of NATO’s credibility. As United States President Donald Trump questions the value of collective defence, Tsahkna warns that Europe’s security consensus is fraying and hesitation could invite danger.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte visits the US as Trump proposes freezing the battle lines in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Moscow is accused of running sabotage and espionage operations across Europe, targeting nations supporting Ukraine.

Authorities in Poland have arrested eight individuals across the country on suspicion of espionage and sabotage.

In a brief statement on social media, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on Tuesday that the case is developing and that “further operational activities are ongoing” without providing further details.

The detentions come amid accusations that Russia is operating a network of spies and saboteurs across Europe.

Referring to the prime minister’s post, the coordinator of Poland’s special services, Tomasz Siemoniak, said that the detained people are suspected of engaging in espionage and planning attacks.

They were arrested due to “conducting reconnaissance of military facilities and critical infrastructure, preparing resources for sabotage, and directly carrying out attacks”, he said.

While Warsaw has not directly linked the arrests, officials have said previously that Poland has been targeted with such attacks in a “hybrid war” waged by Russia to destabilise nations supporting Ukraine.

Several other European countries have also pointed the finger at Moscow as they have suffered similar attacks since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Polish authorities have detained dozens of people over suspected sabotage and espionage over the past three years or so.

Moscow denies the accusations, insisting that they are the result of “Russophobia”.

In May last year, Polish authorities arrested three men for an arson attack. In September, Lithuanian prosecutors broke up a network that they said planned arson and explosive attacks in several European Union states.

The same month, Latvia’s security service announced the detention of a man suspected of passing military intelligence to Russia, and British police arrested three people suspected of running sabotage and espionage operations for Russia.

The United Kingdom has also repeatedly accused Russia of orchestrating sabotage and spy operations on its soil and beyond. The Kremlin has accused London of blaming Moscow for “anything bad that happens”.

Drones increasing concern

This autumn, drone incursions have added to the European security concerns, with Belgium, Denmark and Germany among several countries reporting sightings.

The incursions provoked airport closures in both Germany and Denmark.

“We are at the beginning of a hybrid war against Europe,” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said. “I think we are going to see more of it … We see the pattern, and it does not look good,” she added.

Tusk pledged to urgently upgrade Poland’s air defences after NATO forces shot down several drones over his country last month.

The European Union, recognising the inefficiency of using multimillion-euro weapons to battle cheap drones, has reacted to the incursions with proposals to develop a “drone wall” on its eastern borders.

In recent months, a new baseline idea has taken hold in European and United States debates on Ukraine: “Article 5‑like” guarantees. In March, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni was the first to suggest a mechanism inspired by Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which provides for collective action in the event of an attack on a member. US President Donald Trump’s team then promoted a US “Article 5‑type” guarantee outside NATO in August. In September, French President Emmanuel Macron capped this shift by gathering 26 European partners in Paris to pledge a post-war “reassurance force”.

These proposals may sound reassuring, but they should not. In a world where we face nightly drone raids, blurred lines at sea, and constant pressure on critical infrastructure, replicating NATO’s words without NATO’s machinery would leave Ukraine exposed and Europe no safer.

Russia’s activity inside NATO territory has moved from rare to routine. On September 10, two dozen Russian-made drones crossed into Polish airspace during a wider strike on Ukraine; NATO jets shot down those that posed a threat, and Poland activated Article 4 of the NATO Charter, which allows for consultations in the event of a threat.

In the following weeks, Denmark temporarily shut down several airports after repeated drone sightings. Days later, French sailors boarded a tanker suspected of being part of a Russia-linked “shadow fleet” and of taking part in the drone disruptions.

Germany also reported coordinated drone flights over a refinery, a shipyard, a university hospital, and the Kiel Canal. Meanwhile, across the Baltic Sea, months of damage to undersea cables and energy links have deepened concern.

Each of these episodes is serious. Yet, none of them clearly crossed the legal threshold that would have triggered collective defence under Article 5.

That is the core problem with “NATO‑style” guarantees. Article 5 is powerful because it establishes that an attack on one is an attack on all, but it still needs a political process that begins with consultations and leaves each ally free to decide how to respond. It was written for visible aggression: Columns of troops on a border; ships firing across a line; fighter jets attacking territory.

Today’s reality is different. Drones launched from outside Ukrainian territory, one-night incursions over allied infrastructure, or cable cuts by vessels are meant to sit just under formal thresholds. A copy of Article 5 outside NATO’s integrated command, without a standing allied presence or pre-agreed rules for Ukraine, would be even slower and weaker than the original.

When mulling a security mechanism for Kyiv, allies need to recognise that it is no longer a security consumer; it is a security contributor. After Poland’s incident, allies began asking for Ukrainian counter-drone know-how. Ukrainian specialists have deployed to Denmark to share tactics for fusing sensors, jamming, and using low‑cost interceptors.

NATO leaders now say openly that Europe must learn how to defeat cheap drones without firing missiles that cost hundreds of thousands of euros. This is a notable shift: Ukraine is not just receiving protection; it is helping to build it.

Ukraine’s allies also need to remember what happened in 1994. Under the Budapest Memorandum, Kyiv gave up the world’s third‑largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for political “security assurances” from several countries, including Russia and the US. Those assurances were not legally binding.

In 2014, Russia seized Crimea and fuelled war in Donbas while denying its troops were there, using soldiers without insignia to keep the situation ambiguous. Even if Ukraine had been in NATO then, that ambiguity would have raised doubts about whether Article 5 applied. In 2022, Russia invaded openly.

Clearly, non-enforceable promises and debates over thresholds do not stop a determined aggressor. This is why we need guarantees that trigger action automatically, not statements that can be argued over in the moment.

What would work is a package that is tougher than Article 5 on the issues that matter against a sub‑threshold attacker: Time, automaticity, presence, intelligence, and production.

First, there needs to be automatic triggers. A legally ratified “if‑then” mechanism should activate within hours when clear markers are met: State‑origin drones or missiles entering Ukrainian airspace from outside; mass drone incursions into border regions; destructive cyberattacks or sabotage against defined critical infrastructure. The initial package would include both military steps and heavy sanctions. Consultations would adjust the response, not decide whether there will be one.

Second, there needs to be a joint aerial and maritime shield that treats Ukrainian skies and nearby seas as one operating picture. Allies need to keep persistent airborne radar and maritime patrol coverage; fuse sensors from low to high altitude; delegate rules for downing drones along agreed corridors; combine electronic warfare, directed‑energy and radio‑frequency tools, and low‑cost interceptors with classic surface‑to‑air missiles. The test is economic: Europe must make Russian drone raids expensive for Moscow, not for itself.

Third, there must be visible presence and ready logistics. Before a ceasefire is concluded, allies need to build forward logistics: ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance hubs in Poland and Romania with a standing air bridge into Ukraine. Following an agreed ceasefire, they can rotate multinational detachments, air defence crews, maritime patrol teams, and engineers through Ukrainian ports and airfields. The aim would be not to establish permanent bases, but to ensure any renewed attack instantly draws in several capitals.

Fourth, there needs to be an intelligence compact. Allies need to move from ad hoc sharing to an institutional arrangement with Ukraine that integrates satellite, signals, open‑source, and battlefield sensors into common, near‑real‑time products. Fast attribution is central: The right to defend yourself relies on what you can prove, and deterrence relies on an adversary knowing you can prove it quickly.

Fifth, there needs to be a production deal. Multi‑year funding should anchor co‑production in Ukraine of drones, air‑defence components, and artillery rounds, alongside European and US plants making the high‑end systems Ukraine and Europe still lack. Allies should commit to buy Ukrainian systems at scale and tie guarantees to contracted output, not to communiques. Empty magazines make empty promises.

These measures would not copy the letter of Article 5. They would meet a different threat with tools that can counter it. Europe’s recent experience, in Poland’s skies, at German shipyards, at Danish airports, and in the Baltic Sea shows how an adversary can apply steady pressure without triggering classic definitions of “armed attack”.

If Ukraine receives only “NATO‑style” language, it will inherit those same gaps outside the alliance. If instead Ukraine and its partners lock in automatic responses, a shared air picture, visible presence, real‑time intelligence, and an industrial base that keeps pace, they will build something stronger: A guarantee that works in the world as it is, not the world at it was.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The proposal, which forms part of the ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’, is one of several flagship EU projects to prepare the bloc for a potential attack from Moscow.

The European Commission is in discussions to adopt a new counter-drone initiative to protect European Union airspace from Russian violations, as it seeks to strengthen border security with its own advanced drone technology after a string of drone incursions were reported in a host of EU and NATO member countries over the past month.

The proposal, which was included in a defence policy “roadmap” presented on Thursday, will aim for the new anti-drone capabilities to reach initial capacity by the end of next year and become fully operational by the end of 2027, according to a draft of the document.

It will then be presented to EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas, European Commission Executive Vice President for Security Henna Virkkunen, and European Commissioner for Defence Andrius Kubilius.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said last month that it was time for Europe to build a “drone wall” to protect its eastern flank, hours after some 20 Russian drones reportedly entered the airspace of EU and NATO member Poland.

The concept has since morphed into a broader “European Drone Defence Initiative” including a continent-wide web of anti-drone systems in an effort to win support from EU capitals.

The drone initiative is one of several flagship EU projects aiming to prepare the bloc for a potential attack from Russia as its more than three-year-long war in Ukraine grinds on.

In the meantime, as a counterpoint, Russia’s federal security chief said on Thursday that Moscow has no doubt about NATO’s security services’ involvement in incidents with alleged Russian drones over EU territory, Russian news agency RIA Novosti cited him as saying.

Following the drone incursion into Poland, other incidents were reported at airports and military installations in several other countries further west, including Denmark, Estonia and Germany, although there has not been confirmation that the drones were sent by the Kremlin.

For its part, NATO has launched a new mission and beefed up forces on its eastern border, but it is playing catch-up as it tries to tap Ukraine’s experience and get to grips with the drone threat from Moscow.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said on Wednesday that NATO was now “testing integrated systems that will help us detect, track and neutralise aerial threats” for use on the bloc’s eastern flank.

Ukrainian officials say Russia’s incursions into other countries’ airspace are deliberate.

“Putin just keeps escalating, expanding his war, and testing the West,” Andrii Sybiha, Ukraine’s foreign minister, said last month after the drones were spotted in Poland.

Other NATO allies have also claimed the incursions were deliberate.

However, experts in drone warfare say it is still possible that the incursions were not deliberate.

Russia has denied deliberately attacking any of the European countries, instead accusing them of making false allegations to cause tensions.

While Brussels wants to have the drone project fully up and running by the end of 2027, there is scepticism from some EU countries and fears that the bloc is treading on NATO’s toes.

“We are not doubling the work that NATO is doing; actually, we are complementing each other,” said Kallas.

Ukraine says it will need $120bn in defence funding in 2026 to stave off Russia’s more than three-year war.

Germany has pledged more than $2bn in military aid for Ukraine, as the government in Kyiv signalled that it would need $120bn in 2026 to stave off Russia’s nearly four-year all-out war.

Speaking on Wednesday at a Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting in Brussels, German Foreign Minister Boris Pistorius said that Western allies must maintain their resolve and provide more weapons to Ukraine.

“You can count on Germany. We will continue and expand our support for Ukraine. With new contracts, Germany will provide additional support amounting to over 2 billion euros [$2.3bn],” Pistorius told the meeting in Brussels, which was also attended by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Ukrainian Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal.

“The package addresses a number of urgent requirements of Ukraine. It provides air defence systems, Patriot interceptors, radar systems and precision guided artillery, rockets and ammunition,” Pistorius said, adding that Germany will also deliver two additional IRIS-T air defence systems to Ukraine, including a large number of guided missiles and shoulder-fired air defence missiles.

In recent months, the transatlantic alliance started to coordinate regular deliveries of large weapons packages to Ukraine to help fend off Russia’s war.

Spare weapons stocks in European arsenals have all but dried up, and only the United States has a sufficient store of ready weapons that Ukraine most needs.

Under the financial arrangement – known as the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) – European allies and Canada are buying US weapons to help Kyiv keep Russian forces at bay. About $2bn worth had previously been allocated since August.

Germany’s pledge came as Ukraine’s Western backers gathered to drum up more military support for their beleaguered partner.

Shmyhal put his country’s defence needs next year at $120bn. “Ukraine will cover half, $60bn, from our national resources. We are asking partners to join us in covering the other half,” he said.

Air defence systems are most in need. Shmyhal said that last month alone, Russia “launched over 5,600 strike drones and more than 180 missiles targeting our civilian infrastructure and people”.

The new pledges of support came a day after new data showed that foreign military aid to Ukraine had declined sharply recently. Despite the PURL programme, support plunged by 43 percent in July and August compared to the first half of the year, according to Germany’s Kiel Institute, which tracks such deliveries and funding.

Hegseth said that “all countries need to translate goals into guns, commitments into capabilities and pledges into power. That’s all that matters. Hard power. It’s the only thing belligerents actually respect.”

The administration of US President Donald Trump hasn’t donated military equipment to Ukraine. It has been weighing whether to send Tomahawk long-range missiles if Russia doesn’t wind down its war soon, but it remains unclear who will pay for those weapons, should they be approved.

Spain argues NATO funding should address real threats, not arbitrary targets, amidst Trump’s tariff retaliation plans.

The European Commission and Spain’s government have dismissed US President Donald Trump’s latest threat to impose higher tariffs on Madrid over its refusal to meet his proposed NATO target for defence spending.

Trump said on Tuesday that he was “very unhappy” with Spain for being the only NATO member to reject the new spending objective of 5 percent of economic output, adding that he was considering punishing the Mediterranean country.

“I was thinking of giving them trade punishment through tariffs because of what they did, and I think I may do that,” Trump added. He had previously suggested making Spain “pay twice as much” in trade talks.

Trade policy falls under the remit of Brussels, and the European Commission would “respond appropriately, as we always do, to any measures taken against one or more of our member states”, commission spokesperson Olof Gill said in a press briefing on Wednesday.

The trade deal between the European Union and the United States signed in July was the right platform to address any issues, Gill added.

“The defence spending debate is not about increasing spending for the sake of increasing it, but about responding to real threats,” Spain’s Economy and Trade Ministry said in a statement.

“We’re doing our part to develop the necessary capabilities and contribute to the collective defence of our allies.”

Spain has more than doubled nominal defence spending from 0.98 percent of gross domestic product in 2017 to 2 percent this year, equivalent to about 32.7bn euros ($38bn).

Defence Minister Margarita Robles said allies weren’t discussing the 5 percent target for 2035 in Wednesday’s meeting because they were prioritising the present situation in Ukraine, but wouldn’t completely rule out a shift in Spain’s position.

Targeted tariffs by the US against individual EU member states are rare, but there are precedents, said Ignacio Garcia Bercero, a senior fellow at the Brussels-based economic think tank Bruegel.

In 1999, the US hit the EU with 100 percent punitive tariffs on products such as chocolate, pork, onions and truffles in retaliation for an EU import ban on hormone-treated beef. But those tariffs excluded Britain, which at the time was still a member of the trade bloc.

The US could impose anti-dumping penalties on European products that are mostly produced in Spain, said Juan Carlos Martinez Lazaro, professor at Madrid’s IE business school.

In 2018, Washington imposed a combination of duties of more than 30 percent on Spanish black table olives at the request of Californian olive growers. Spain’s share of the US market plummeted from 49 percent in 2017 to 19 percent in 2024.

Another option would be moving the naval and air bases the US has in southern Spain to Morocco – an idea floated by former Trump official Robert Greenway – which would damage the local economies through the loss of thousands of indirect jobs.

For decades, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) prepared for war, confident in its advantage over any adversary. Its member states invested heavily in state-of-the-art weapons. Stealth aircraft, precision weaponry, secretive submarines and city-sized aircraft carriers stood as the guardians of the West.

This power appeared unshakable until recently. On September 10, during another massive Russian aerial attack on Ukraine, more than 20 Russian drones crossed into neighbouring Poland. The NATO member had to scramble multimillion-euro military equipment – F-16 and F-35 fighter jets, military helicopters and Patriot surface-to-air missile systems – in order to shoot down potential threats. Several drones were shot down, including three Shaheds and several cheaply made foam dummies.

That interception operation was not only costly, but it also busted the myth of Western military might. Trillions of dollars in investment in the military industrial complex could not protect NATO borders from two dozen inexpensive drones.

In the following days, unidentified drones shut down airports in Norway, Denmark and Germany, costing airlines millions of euros; in Belgium, drones were also spotted near a military base.

The European media is full of stories about unidentifiable drones, air defences, and speculation over possible directions of a Russian strike. Romania? Poland? The Baltic States? Along the entire eastern border of the European Union, there is no place where the population feels truly safe.

It is hard to imagine the scale of chaos should Russian forces actually go on the offensive. How many countries would act under NATO’s Article 5, which allows for collective action against a military threat against a single member, and how swiftly? By then, where would the Russian forces be?

The central question remains: can the North Atlantic alliance and its modern military technology stop such an advance?

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that the answer is no. Russian forces display a persistence in combat possible only under dictatorial regimes, where soldiers are indoctrinated and fear their own command more than the enemy.

Modern methods of warfare against armies modelled on World Wars I and II are not nearly as effective as generals once claimed. One just has to look at the front line in Ukraine and the constantly evolving military strategies.

Faced with a formidable military power with seemingly unlimited budget and unconstrained military reach, the Ukrainians had to adapt quickly. They began deploying drones against Russian armour, but the enemy did not remain idle against these attacks. It started constructing improvised metal cages over tank turrets to absorb explosions.

Precision strikes with Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) cluster munitions taught them to disperse ammunition in small points, avoiding concentrations of troops and equipment.

Drones on both sides monitor the front line, but it is scorched earth: no movement of tanks or infantry can be seen. Russian advances proceed covertly, mostly at night, with two- or three-man teams crossing bombardment zones, gradually assembling for surprise attacks. Troops on both sides are dug deep underground; what is visible is only the casualty count — several thousand each week.

Is Europe prepared for this type of war? Are NATO soldiers capable of surviving for weeks in foxholes and ruins, without communicating, to avoid detection and destruction?

A survey conducted by Gallup last year suggests the answer is no. In Poland, 45 percent of respondents said they would voluntarily defend their country if war threatened. In Spain, the figure was 29 percent; in Germany, only 23 percent; in Italy, a meagre 14 percent; the EU average was 32 percent.

More than three years into the war with Russia, Ukraine itself is suffering from severe shortages of personnel. Forced conscription has become increasingly unpopular, and draft evasion is widespread, according to Ukrainian media and Western observers. Even with Western weapons and funding, the shortage of soldiers limits Ukraine’s ability to hold the line or conduct meaningful offensives.

Currently, the active personnel of NATO’s European allies number around 1.47 million; that includes the United Kingdom. That seems considerable, until it is compared with Ukraine, where an 800,000-strong army has been facing a 600,000-strong Russian force over a 1,000-kilometre (621-mile) front for more than three years, gradually retreating.

Then there is also the difficult question of how many countries would actually send troops to the eastern front, and in what numbers. Would the NATO member states on the eastern flank be left to fend for themselves, only supplied with arms by their Western allies? And would that lead to tensions within the alliance, and its possible paralysis or even breakup?

Europe has only two options to feel even partially secure: either continue to spend trillions of euros rapidly expanding its own military capabilities, or try to put an end to the Russian aggression by providing full financial and military support to Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated that his nation requires $60bn annually to fend off Russian aggression. It is a heavy burden for the West, especially in these challenging times. Yet it is negligible compared with the price Ukraine is paying — in money, military and civilian lives, lost territory, and destroyed infrastructure.

While Europe hesitates with calculators in hand, Ukraine fights. Every day the war continues, the risk of it spreading westward increases.

The time for swift decisions is now.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Allied forces launch joint patrols near Russia after reports of drone incursions into allied airspace.

The United Kingdom has said two Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft joined a 12-hour NATO patrol earlier this week near Russia’s border, following a series of Russian drone and aircraft incursions into alliance airspace.

“This was a substantial joint mission with our US and NATO allies,” Defence Minister John Healey said on Saturday, as concerns rise that Russia’s war in Ukraine will spill over into Europe.

“Not only does this provide valuable intelligence to boost the operational awareness of our Armed Forces, but sends a powerful message of NATO unity to [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and our adversaries,” he added.

The mission involved an RC-135 Rivet Joint surveillance jet and a P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft flying from the Arctic region past Belarus and Ukraine, supported by a US Air Force KC-135 refuelling plane.

British officials said the operation followed several incursions into the airspace of NATO members, including Poland, Romania, and Estonia.

Growing airspace tensions

In recent weeks, Poland and its allies have reinforced air defences amid increasing Russian drone activity. Earlier this month, Warsaw deployed additional systems along its border with Ukraine – which stretches about 530km (330 miles) – after unidentified drones briefly entered Polish airspace.

Poland temporarily closed part of its airspace southeast of Warsaw in late September during a major Russian assault across Ukraine. It was the second such incident this year, with Polish and NATO forces previously intercepting Russian drones that crossed the border – marking their first direct military engagement with Moscow since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022.

Elsewhere, airports in Germany, Denmark, Norway and Poland have at times also temporarily suspended flights due to sightings of unidentified drones. Romania and Estonia have directly accused Russia, which has dismissed the claims as “baseless”.

Putin has pledged a “significant” response to what he called “Europe’s militarisation”, rejecting suggestions that Moscow plans to attack NATO as “nonsense”.

“They can’t believe what they’re saying, that Russia is going to attack NATO,” he said on Thursday at a foreign policy forum in Sochi. “They’re either incredibly incompetent if they truly believe it because it’s impossible to believe this nonsense, or they’re simply dishonest.”

Putin said he was closely monitoring Europe’s military build-up and warned that Russia would not hesitate to respond. “In Germany, for example, it is said that the German army should become the strongest in Europe. Very well. We hear that and are watching to see what is meant by it,” he said. “Russia will never show weakness or indecisiveness. We simply cannot ignore what is happening.”

Relations between Moscow and the European Union have continued to deteriorate since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, driving the bloc to strengthen its collective defences amid fears the war could spill across NATO borders.