On the eve of the 2025 AFCON, football’s governing body in Africa create new four-year cycle and form a Nations League.
Published On 20 Dec 202520 Dec 2025
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African football is getting a major shake-up with the creation of the African Nations League and conversion of the biennial Africa Cup of Nations to a four-year cycle.
Patrice Motsepe, the president of the Confederation of African Football, announced the changes Saturday during his news conference before the 2025 Africa Cup hosted by Morocco.
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Motsepe said that the 2027 Africa Cup, to be hosted by Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, will go ahead as planned and that the following edition – originally scheduled for 2029 – will be moved forward to take place in 2028. The next Africa Cup after that will be in 2032.
This would allow the first African Nations League to take place in 2029. Motsepe said it would involve each of the continent’s 54 members, divided into four geographical zones, with games in September and October before the finals are held in November.
“What is new is that … in Africa there’s going to be a competition every year where the best African players who play in Europe and worldwide will be with us on the continent,” Motsepe said.
CAF officials did not immediately specify if the African Nations League will be held on a biennial or annual basis.
Meanwhile, Caf has increased the prize money for the winners of Afcon from $7m (£5.2m) to $10m (£7.5m).
The surprise announcement about the future of Afcon was made by Motsepe after a meeting of Caf’s executive committee in Morocco before the start of the 2025 finals in Rabat on Sunday.
The biennial hosting of Afcon has long caused issues with the football calendar, with the vast majority of recent tournaments held midway through the European club season.
However, Caf remained committed to scheduling the tournament every two years – not least as it needs the revenue raised from the finals to reinvest in the game on the continent.
But the Covid-19 pandemic and weather conditions in host nations in Central and West Africa meant the 2021 and 2023 editions in Cameroon and Ivory Coast respectively were staged in January and February instead.
Fifa’s expanded 32-team Club World Cup was held in June and July this year, forcing Caf to opt for mid-season dates once again.
The dates for the finals in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 2027 are yet to be announced, and that will be swiftly followed by another Afcon in 2028 – with the hosts of that edition yet to be decided.
After that, the continent’s biggest tournament will become a quadrennial tournament taking place in the same year as the European Championships.
Motsepe said the decision had been made in conjunction with Fifa president Gianni Infantino and the world governing body’s general secretary Mattias Grafstrom – and that Caf “have to compromise”.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
The first full deployment of the U.S. Army’s new Sentinel A4 air defense radar will be in the area around Washington, D.C., also known as the National Capital Region (NCR). The A4 variant offers a significant boost in capability over preceding versions, especially for spotting and tracking lower and/or slower flying targets like cruise missiles and drones.
An Army officer discussed the capabilities of and plans for the road-mobile Sentinel A4, the formal designation of which is AN/MPQ-64A4, with Secretary Pete Hegseth during a show-and-tell at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, this past weekend. Members of the media were also present. Hegseth conducted several engagements in the Huntsville area during his trip, which was primarily centered on a ceremony marking the designation of the arsenal as the new headquarters for U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM).
A trailer-mounted Sentinel A4 radar, at left, seen behind a 6×6 Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) truck with a generator serving as its prime mover. US Army
“The plan is to be in full-rate production [of the Sentinel A4] at the end of FY 26 [Fiscal Year 2026], sir, and our first fielding will be actually in the National Capital Region,” the Army officer told Hegseth, as can be heard in the video below. “In January, we’re sending a Sentinel A4 to the National Capital Region to start that immigration process earlier, so that when it is fielded late next year, we’re ready to go.”
War Sec. Pete Hegseth Visits The New Site For U.S. Space Command Headquarters In Huntsville, Alabama
The officer noted that the Army already has a Sentinel A4 radar in South Korea, representing an early operational capability. The deployment to the Korean Peninsula has already been providing valuable feedback for the planned full fielding of the sensor in the NCR next year. You can read more about what is known about the air defense network already in place in the NCR, which includes National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and Avenger air defense systems, as well as a wide array of sensors, in previousTWZreporting. Existing variants of Sentinel are already regularly used in combination with NASAMS and Avenger.
In terms of the Sentinel A4’s capabilities, “what this radar does is provide 360-degree air surveillance, day or night, [in] adverse weather conditions and the most harsh environments, … [to] identify, track and classify cruise missiles, rotary-wing [aircraft], fixed-wing [aircraft], [and] UAS [uncrewed aerial systems],” the officer explained to Hegseth. It also has the ability to spot and track incoming artillery rockets, shells, and mortar rounds.
Sentinel A4: Bringing Next-Gen Radar Capability to the U.S. Army and Allies
The officer said that many of its more specific capabilities are classified. They did say that it offers a 75 percent increase in detection range over the previous AN/MPQ-64A3, and the ability to track many more targets simultaneously. Much of this is a product of the new active electronically scanned array (AESA) found on the Sentinel A4. As a general rule, AESA radars offer improvements in terms of range, fidelity of tracks, resistance to countermeasures, and overall situational awareness compared to mechanically-scanned types. Depending on how the array itself is configured, AESAs can also perform a much wider array of functions at once.
Army personnel seen working on an older version of the MPQ-64 Sentinel radar. US Army
The Sentinel A4 “does have growth potential,” the Army officer highlighted to Secretary Hegseth during the event. “The current array that you see here is 60 percent populated, but we do have the ability to increase how much is in the array, which allows us to meet future threats.”
That the Sentinel A4’s true operational debut is set to be in the NCR is unsurprising, given the extreme importance of defending the skies over and around Washington, D.C. This is already by far the most heavily monitored and densely defended airspace in the United States.
At the same time, the U.S. military, as a whole, has made no secret of its growing concerns about drone and cruise missile threats, which are very much reflected in the new capabilities found on the new A4 variant of Sentinel.
It’s also worth noting that the NCR has seen a number of false alarm air defense scares over the years. Increased detection capability and general improved situational awareness could help with preventing, though not eliminating, such incidents in the future.
All this being said, the aerial threat ecosystem extends beyond the NCR, and the new capabilities offered by the Sentinel A4 radar will be relevant to Army operations globally. The service has plans to significantly expand its overall air defense force structure in the coming years.
It is possible that plans to send the Sentinel A4s to the NCR, specifically, also presage the deployment of other new air defense capabilities to the area. Sentinel radars are a primary sensor for the Army’s new middle-tier Enduring Shield air defense system, which currently uses the AIM-9X Sidewinder as its interceptor. The service is pushing to acquire a second interceptor option for Enduring Shield, primarily to offer increased capability against faster-flying cruise missiles. Overall, the system is analogous to NASAMS in many ways and would be well-suited to the NCR air defense mission.
One of the palletized launchers at the core of the Enduring Shield system. Leidos
The Army currently has two Enduring Shield platoons, one in South Korea and one at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington State. The service is hoping to have a battalion’s worth of the systems by Fiscal Year 2027.
In general, the Army sees Enduring Shield as particularly important to reducing the immense strain on its highly in-demand Patriot surface-to-air missile systems. The service has said that Enduring Shield and Patriot could even be fielded together in composite units in the future. TWZ has been calling attention to the worrisome inadequacy of the Army’s Patriot force to meet current operational needs, let alone the requirements of any future high-end figure, for years now.
If nothing else, Army air defenders protecting the skies over and around Washington, D.C., are set to get an important boost in their ability to spot and track threats, especially cruise missiles and drones, in the coming year.
The Africa Cup of Nations, commonly known as AFCON, will be held in Morocco this year and kicks off in the capital, Rabat, on Sunday.
Host nation Morocco take on Comoros in the opening match of the four week tournament.
The final will be held on January 18 at the 69,500-capacity Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium in Rabat.
Nine venues across six cities have been selected for the continental showpiece event.
The 24 participating teams have been drawn into six groups, with 68 matches in total.
The group stage will run until December 31, with the knockout stage starting on January 3.
Here are the details on the teams, groups, format, match fixtures, kickoff times and venues for AFCON 2025:
Teams and groups
⚽ Group A: Morocco, Mali, Zambia, Comoros ⚽ Group B: Egypt, South Africa, Angola, Zimbabwe ⚽ Group C: Nigeria, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania ⚽ Group D: Senegal, DR Congo, Benin, Botswana ⚽ Group E: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan ⚽ Group F: Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique
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Format
The top two teams of each group, along with the best four third-placed teams, will advance to the knockout stage, beginning with the round of 16. That is followed by the quarterfinals, semifinals and the final. There is also a third-place playoff between the two losing semifinalists.
In the knockout stages, if a match is level at the end of normal playing time, teams will play 30 minutes of extra time and, if required, a penalty shootout.
Egypt are the most successful team in Africa with a record seven AFCON titles, though they last won the trophy in 2010 [File: Amr Nabil/AP]
Match schedule
⚽ Group Stage
December 21
Group A: Morocco vs Comoros (Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium, 8pm/19:00 GMT)
December 22
Group A: Mali vs Zambia (Stade Mohammed V, 3:30pm/14:30 GMT)
Group B: Egypt vs Zimbabwe (Adrar Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Group B: South Africa vs Angola (Marrakesh Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
December 23
Group C: Nigeria vs Tanzania (Fez Stadium, 1pm/12:00 GMT)
Group C: Tunisia vs Uganda (Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium, 3:30pm/14:30 GMT)
Group D: Senegal vs Botswana (Ibn Batouta Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Group D: DR Congo vs Benin (Al Barid Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
December 24
Group E: Algeria vs Sudan (Moulay Hassan Stadium, 1pm/12:00 GMT)
Group E: Burkina Faso vs Equatorial Guinea (Stade Mohammed V, 3:30pm/14:30 GMT)
Group F: Ivory Coast vs Mozambique (Marrakesh Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Group F: Cameroon vs Gabon(Adrar Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
Rest day on Christmas
December 26
Group A: Morocco vs Mali (Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium, 1pm/12:00 GMT)
Group A: Zambia vs Comoros (Stade Mohammed V, 3:30pm/14:30 GMT)
Group B: Egypt vs South Africa (Adrar Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Group B: Angola vs Zimbabwe (Marrakesh Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
December 27
Group C: Nigeria vs Tunisia (Fez Stadium, 1pm/12:00 GMT)
Group C: Uganda vs Tanzania (Al Barid Stadium, 3:30pm/14:30 GMT)
Group D: Senegal vs DR Congo (Ibn Batouta Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Group D: Benin vs Botswana (Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
December 28
Group E: Algeria vs Burkina Faso (Moulay Hassan Stadium, 1pm/12:00 GMT)
Group E: Equatorial Guinea vs Sudan (Stade Mohammed V, 3:30pm/14:30 GMT)
Group F: Ivory Coast vs Cameroon (Marrakesh Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Group F: Gabon vs Mozambique (Adrar Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
December 29
Group A: Comoros vs Mali (Stade Mohammed V, 6:30pm/17:30 GMT)
Group A: Zambia vs Morocco (Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium, 6:30pm/17:30 GMT)
Group B: Angola vs Egypt (Adrar Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
Group B: Zimbabwe vs South Africa (Marrakesh Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
December 30
Group C: Tanzania vs Tunisia (Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Group C: Uganda vs Nigeria (Fez Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Group D: Benin vs Senegal (Ibn Batouta Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
Group D: Botswana vs DR Congo (Al Barid Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
December 31
Group E: Equatorial Guinea vs Algeria (Moulay Hassan Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Group E: Sudan vs Burkina Faso (Stade Mohammed V, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Group F: Gabon vs Ivory Coast (Marrakesh Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
Group F: Mozambique vs Cameroon (Adrar Stadium, 8:30pm/19:30 GMT)
Rest days on January 1 and 2
External view of the 69,500-capacity Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium in Rabat, which will be used for the AFCON final on January 18 [Emre Asikci/Anadolu via Getty Images]
⚽ Round of 16
January 3
Winner Group D vs 3rd Group B/E/F (Ibn Batouta Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Runner-up Group A vs Runner-up Group C (Stade Mohammed V, 8:30pm local/19:30 GMT)
January 4
Winner Group A vs 3rd Group C/D/E (Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Runner-up Group B vs Runner-up Group F (Al Barid Stadium, 8:30pm local/19:30 GMT)
January 5
Winner Group B vs 3rd Group A/C/D (Adrar Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Winner Group C vs 3rd Group A/B/F (Fez Stadium, 8:30pm local/19:30 GMT)
January 6
Winner Group E vs Runner-up Group D (Moulay Hassan Stadium, 6pm/17:00 GMT)
Winner Group F vs Runner-up Group E (Marrakesh Stadium, 8:30pm local/19:30 GMT)
President Trump admitted Tuesday that he used the slur “shithole countries” to disparage Haiti and African nations during a 2018 meeting with lawmakers, bragging about a comment that sparked global outrage during his first term.
Back then, Trump had denied making the contemptuous statement during a closed-door meeting, but on Tuesday, he showed little compunction reliving it during a rally in Pennsylvania. He went on to further disparage Somalia as “filthy, dirty, disgusting, ridden with crime.”
Trump was boasting in his speech that he had last week “announced a permanent pause on Third World migration, including from hellholes like Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia and many other countries,” when someone in the crowd yelled out the 2018 remark.
That prompted him to recall the 2018 incident. His telling hewed closely to the description offered at the time by people who were briefed on the Oval Office meeting.
“We had a meeting and I said, ‘Why is it we only take people from shithole countries,’ right? ‘Why can’t we have some people from Norway, Sweden?’” Trump told rallygoers.
“But we always take people from Somalia,” he continued. “Places that are a disaster. Filthy, dirty, disgusting, ridden with crime.”
Back in 2018, Trump’s comments denigrating predominantly Black nations while seeking more migration from predominantly white countries were widely denounced as racist. Some congressional Republicans condemned the comments, and foreign leaders were outraged. Botswana’s government summoned the U.S. ambassador, and Senegal’s president at the time, Macky Sall, said he was shocked, noting, “Africa and the Black race merit the respect and consideration of all.”
But since then, Trump has pushed past many norms and traditions of decorum that had guided his predecessors, both in his first term and in the years since. He often peppers his public remarks with curse words, and this year has dropped the F-bomb as cameras were rolling — on two separate occasions.
On Thanksgiving, in a pair of lengthy posts on social media complaining about immigrants, he demeaned Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz, using a dated slur for intellectually disabled people. Asked by a reporter if he stood by a comment that many Americans find offensive, Trump was unrepentant. “Yeah. I think there’s something wrong with him,” he said.
The catastrophic violence in Gaza has unfolded within an international system that was never designed to restrain the geopolitical ambitions of powerful states. Understanding why the United Nations has proved so limited in responding to what many regard as a genocidal assault requires returning to the foundations of the post–World War II order and examining how its structure has long enabled impunity rather than accountability.
After World War II, the architecture for a new international order based on respect for the UN Charter and international law was agreed upon as the normative foundation of a peaceful future. Above all, it was intended to prevent a third world war. These commitments emerged from the carnage of global conflict, the debasement of human dignity through the Nazi Holocaust, and public anxieties about nuclear weaponry.
Yet, the political imperative to accommodate the victorious states compromised these arrangements from the outset. Tensions over priorities for world order were papered over by granting the Security Council exclusive decisional authority and further limiting UN autonomy. Five states were made permanent members, each with veto power: the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and China.
In practice, this left global security largely in the hands of these states, preserving their dominance. It meant removing the strategic interests of geopolitical actors from any obligatory respect for legal constraints, with a corresponding weakening of UN capability. The Soviet Union had some justification for defending itself against a West-dominated voting majority, yet it too used the veto pragmatically and displayed a dismissive approach to international law and human rights, as did the three liberal democracies.
In 1945, these governments were understood as simply retaining the traditional freedoms of manoeuvre exercised by the so-called Great Powers. The UK and France, leading NATO members in a Euro-American alliance, interpreted the future through the lens of an emerging rivalry with the Soviet Union. China, meanwhile, was preoccupied with a civil war that continued until 1949.
Three aspects of this post-war arrangement shape our present understanding.
First, the historical aspect: Learning from the failures of the League of Nations, where the absence of influential states undermined the organisation’s relevance to questions of war and peace. In 1945, it was deemed better to acknowledge power differentials within the UN than to construct a global body based on democratic equality among sovereign states or population size.
Second, the ideological aspect: Political leaders of the more affluent and powerful states placed far greater trust in hard-power militarism than in soft-power legalism. Even nuclear weaponry was absorbed into the logic of deterrence rather than compliance with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which required good-faith pursuit of disarmament. International law was set aside whenever it conflicted with geopolitical interests.
Third, the economistic aspect: The profitability of arms races and wars reinforced a pre–World War II pattern of lawless global politics, sustained by an alliance of geopolitical realism, corporate media, and private-sector militarism.
Why the UN could not protect Gaza
Against this background, it is unsurprising that the UN performed in a disappointing manner during the two-plus years of genocidal assault on Gaza.
In many respects, the UN did what it was designed to do in the turmoil after October 7, and only fundamental reforms driven by the Global South and transnational civil society can alter this structural limitation. What makes these events so disturbing is the extremes of Israeli disregard for international law, the Charter, and even basic morality.
At the same time, the UN did act more constructively than is often acknowledged in exposing Israel’s flagrant violations of international law and human rights. Yet, it fell short of what was legally possible, particularly when the General Assembly failed to explore its potential self-empowerment through the Uniting for Peace resolution or the Responsibility to Protect norm.
Among the UN’s strongest contributions were the near-unanimous judicial outcomes at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on genocide and occupation. On genocide, the ICJ granted South Africa’s request for provisional measures concerning genocidal violence and the obstruction of humanitarian aid in Gaza. A final decision is expected after further arguments in 2026.
On occupation, responding to a General Assembly request for clarification, the Court issued a historic advisory opinion on July 19, 2024, finding Israel in severe violation of its duties under international humanitarian law in administering Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. It ordered Israel’s withdrawal within a year. The General Assembly affirmed the opinion by a large majority.
Israel responded by repudiating or ignoring the Court’s authority, backed by the US government’s extraordinary claim that recourse to the ICJ lacked legal merit.
The UN also provided far more reliable coverage of the Gaza genocide than was available in corporate media, which tended to amplify Israeli rationalisations and suppress Palestinian perspectives. For those seeking a credible analysis of genocide allegations, the Human Rights Council offered the most convincing counter to pro-Israeli distortions. A Moon Will Arise from this Darkness: Reports on Genocide in Palestine, containing the publicly submitted reports of the special rapporteur, Francesca Albanese, documents and strongly supports the genocide findings.
A further unheralded contribution came from UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, whose services were essential to a civilian population facing acute insecurity, devastation, starvation, disease, and cruel combat tactics. Some 281 staff members were killed while providing shelter, education, healthcare, and psychological support to beleaguered Palestinians during the course of Israel’s actions over the past two years.
UNRWA, instead of receiving deserved praise, was irresponsibly condemned by Israel and accused, without credible evidence, of allowing staff participation in the October 7 attack. Liberal democracies compounded this by cutting funding, while Israel barred international staff from entering Gaza. Nevertheless, UNRWA has sought to continue its relief work to the best of its ability and with great courage.
In light of these institutional shortcomings and partial successes, the implications for global governance become even more stark, setting the stage for a broader assessment of legitimacy and accountability.
The moral and political costs of UN paralysis
The foregoing needs to be read in light of the continuing Palestinian ordeal, which persists despite numerous Israeli violations, resulting in more than 350 Palestinian deaths since the ceasefire was agreed upon on October 10, 2025.
International law seems to have no direct impact on the behaviour of the main governmental actors, but it does influence perceptions of legitimacy. In this sense, the ICJ outcomes and the reports of the special rapporteur that take the international law dimensions seriously have the indirect effect of legitimising various forms of civil society activism in support of true and just peace, which presupposes the realisation of Palestinian basic rights – above all, the inalienable right of self-determination.
The exclusion of Palestinian participation in the US-imposed Trump Plan for shaping Gaza’s political future is a sign that liberal democracies stubbornly adhere to their unsupportable positions of complicity with Israel.
Finally, the unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 2803 in unacceptably endorsing the Trump Plan aligns the UN fully with the US and Israel, a demoralising evasion and repudiation of its own truth-telling procedures. It also establishes a most unfortunate precedent for the enforcement of international law and the accountability of perpetrators of international crimes.
In doing so, it deepens the crisis of confidence in global governance and underscores the urgent need for meaningful UN reform if genuine peace and justice are ever to be realised.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
