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Congress Moves To Block Trump Class Battleship Work Until Its Key Weapons Are Mature

Members of Congress are looking to block the U.S. Navy from starting construction of the first nuclear-powered Trump class battleship until the service provides assurances that key weapon systems are “sufficiently mature.” The battleships are to be armed with railguns, high-power laser directed energy weapons, and other advanced weapons that have yet to be fully proven out. Legislators are also looking to compel the Navy to devise a strategy for future subvariants of the FF(X) frigate, including the potential for a version with a built-in Vertical Launch System (VLS). TWZ was first to confirm that the initial FF(X) design would lack a VLS, a decision that has prompted questions and criticism.

The battleship and frigate provisions are included in an early draft of the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for the 2027 Fiscal Year, which the House Armed Services Committee released late yesterday. The Trump class battleship and FF(X) are set to be some of the Navy’s top shipbuilding priorities in the coming years.

A model of the Trump class design on display at the Surface Navy Association’s (SNA) annual symposium in January 2026. A model of the FF(X) frigate is also seen in part at the left. Eric Tegler

Tying the battleship construction timeline to weapon system progress

The section in the proposed legislation regarding the Trump class battleship is brief, reading as follows:

“The Secretary of the Navy may not enter into a contract or other agreement that includes a scope of work for the construction of the lead ship of the Battleship program until the date on which the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that the weapon systems planned for inclusion in such lead ship are at a sufficiently mature technology readiness level.”

The provision does not name any particular weapon systems or define what level of “technology readiness” would be accepted as “sufficiently mature.”

The Navy currently plans to arm the 35,000-ton-displacement Trump class battleships with a mixture of nuclear and conventional missiles, an electromagnetic railgun, a pair of traditional 5-inch naval guns, various laser directed energy weapons, and additional weapon systems for close-in defense. The missiles, which will include hypersonic types, are to be loaded inside very large VLS arrays.

A rendering of a Trump class battleship firing various weapons. USN

In terms of technological maturity, the railgun presents particular questions. Between 2005 and 2021, the Navy had an active railgun program. Despite promising developments, plans for an at-sea test were repeatedly pushed back before the entire effort was shelved. Major technical hurdles were cited as a key factor in that decision. The railgun itself was effectively placed in storage at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico.

However, it emerged earlier this year that the Navy had conducted a new round of testing of the railgun at WSMR in February 2025. Whether the Navy has any plans to pick up where it left off with this prototype design, which was developed by BAE Systems, or pursue a new one remains unclear. General Atomics, which previously supported U.S. Army railgun efforts, has publicly expressed interest in being involved in arming the Trump class.

A picture showing the Navy’s prototype railgun being fired at WSMR.  USN

While the Navy has been very active in developing and fielding laser directed energy weapons, this is another area where the service has faced continued challenges in expanding their operational use. The plans for the Trump class specifically call for a 300-kilowatt-class laser, which is far more powerful than any of the designs the Navy has integrated on its warships to date. The service currently has eight Arleigh Burke class destroyers with the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN), as well as another one of those warships with the High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS). HELIOS is a 60-kilowatt-class design, though there has been talk about scaling up its power rating to 150 kilowatts. ODIN’s power rating does not appear to be officially confirmed, but it is understood to be significantly lower than that of HELIOS. You can read more about all of this here.

The Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Preble fires its HELIOS laser directed energy weapon during a test. US Military

The Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) hypersonic missile, another key component of the future Trump class arsenal, is also still in development. The first test launch from a warship, the stealth destroyer USS Zumwalt, is expected to come next year. IRCPS is the Navy half of a joint program with the U.S. Army, which is working to field a land-based version of the same missile. The Army refers to its complete weapon system as the Dark Eagle. The Army had suffered significant setbacks in the past with the Dark Eagle, but the service had blamed those issues on the launcher rather than the missile.

The hypersonic missile common to the Navy’s IRCPS and Army’s Dark Eagle systems seen being test fired from a launch pad on land. US Military
A briefing slide showing the integration of launch tubes for IRCPS missiles on the USS Zumwalt. The Trump class battleship design is set to include a similar launch tube array for these missiles. USN

More context about what planned weapons systems for the Trump class may have prompted the House Armed Services Committee to include this section in the draft NDAA are likely to emerge as the proposed bill is refined. Nuclear propulsion and other planned aspects of the ship could present their own challenges during development and production. The U.S. Navy has not procured a nuclear-powered surface combatant of any kind since the Cold War.

For its part, the Navy has said it will leverage significant prior work on weapons and other systems to help reduce risk and ensure the battleship program remains on schedule.

“We intend to, with all we can do, use pull-through technologies, [including] things from that we’ve worked on with DDG(X),” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle said at a hearing earlier this month. “It will have the SPY-6 radar. It will have the Baseline 10 Aegis combat system. It will pull through, of course, the A1B Ford class reactor plant and all the design that goes with that. The only thing inherently new to it will be the actual hull itself, and so most of the fixtures in it. And I would say the directed energy [weapons] and up gunning, that will also be new.”

One of the “mistakes that we’ve done before, quite frankly,” is “we’ve started to build before the design is mature enough,” the CNO also said at a roundtable on the sidelines of the Navy League’s Sea Air Space 2026 in April. “And we want to make sure that we’re at [sic] least a very, very high level – I won’t try to give a percentage, but you can think like 80% or more design – before the first weld is done.”

The Navy is understood to still be in the very early phases of laying out the Trump class design.

Another rendering of a future Trump class battleship. White House/USN

The provision in the draft NDAA could easily delay the start of work on the first of these battleships, which could set back the entire schedule for the program. As it stands now, the Navy is looking to order the lead ship, set to be named the USS Defiant, in Fiscal Year 2028. With an estimated price tag of $17 billion, this ship would cost more than each of the next three Ford class aircraft carriers, and is not expected to enter service in 2036. The Navy also currently plans to buy 14 more battleships between Fiscal Years 2029 and 2055. As TWZ has previously explored in detail, many significant questions remain about the future of the Trump class, including whether the program will ultimately come to fruition at all.

Plans for future FF(X) frigate subvariants

In its current form, the draft NDAA would also require the Secretary of the Navy to “submit to the congressional defense committees a strategy for the iterative development of the FF(X) class frigate” within 180 days of the bill becoming law. The Secretary would also be compelled to provide a briefing to update legislators on their progress in devising this strategy within 90 days.

The strategy would have to include the following:

  • “Information on the estimated timeline for each planned variant (commonly known as a ‘‘Flight’’) of the FF(X) class frigate”
  • “Details on the integration of additional capabilities for future Flights of the frigate, such as vertical launch systems or improved sensors, and implications for the space, weight, power, and cost of the hull form.”
  • Any additional mission sets or combat functions that may be added to the concept of operation for FF(X) class frigates.”

The Navy has already confirmed that the FF(X) design will based on that of the Legend class cutter currently in service with the U.S. Coast Guard. As mentioned, the fact that the first of these frigates, at least, will lack a VLS array has raised significant questions about this program.

A rendering of the FF(X) frigate. USN
The US Coast Guard’s Legend class cutter USCGC Hamilton. USCG

The FF(X) configuration that has been shown so far will have essentially the same integrated armament as the Navy’s much-maligned Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The limitations of both subclasses of LCS explicitly led the Navy to pursue the Constellation class frigate. Despite the Constellation class being based on the established Franco-Italian Fregate Europea Multi-Missione (FREMM; European Multi-Mission Frigate in English), repeated design changes turned the program into a boondoggle. It was finally cancelled last November.

The Constellation class would have featured a 32-cell Mk 41 VLS array. There had already been a debate about whether this was sufficient VLS capacity to meet operational requirements, something TWZ previously explored in detail.

A rendering of a Constellation class frigate. USN

The Navy’s current stated vision for the Flight I FF(X) configuration is to utilize containerized weapons and other systems to make up for gaps in integrated capabilities. The frigates are also expected to act as motherships for future fleets of uncrewed surface vessels, which could provide additional distributed weapons and sensor capabilities and capacity.

A briefing slide with details about the FF(X) design, including its armament package, shown at the Surface Navy Association’s (SNA) 2026 annual symposium. Eric Tegler

“While Flight I of the FF(X) Class (currently planned as at least the first 2 ships) does not incorporate a traditional fixed VLS battery, it retains the capability to deploy VLS-equivalent payloads through modular, mission-tailored configurations,” according to the Navy’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request. “This approach provides an inherent growth path for VLS and other capabilities through containerized solutions in early flights, reinforcing the platform’s adaptability while mitigating cost, schedule, and integration risks associated with fixed VLS installation.”

A containerized VLS, in particular, would be far more limited in capacity than a traditional built-in Mk 41 and Mk 57 array.

At the same time, the Navy’s budget documents make clear that there are already plans for “studies for future flights [that] will consider expanded capabilities including Vertical Launch Systems, and Anti-Submarine Warfare systems.”

Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), the shipbuilder behind the Legend class design on which the FF(X) will be based, has shown multiple concepts for derivatives with integrated VLS arrays and other additional capabilities in the past, as seen in the video below.

Patrol Frigate Variants - Information Video thumbnail

Patrol Frigate Variants – Information Video




When it comes to the battleship and FF(X) provisions in the draft NDAA, it is also important to remember that this legislation is not yet finalized and could easily change in the weeks and months ahead. The House’s version of the bill will also need to be reconciled with what the Senate puts forward, a process often marked by lengthy negotiations. The House and Senate will both need to pass the finalized version, and then the President has to sign it into law.

As the name makes clear, the battleship program is of particular significance to President Donald Trump, which will be an important factor in these processes. Even before his first term, Trump had expressed interest in returning battleships to the Navy’s combat fleets, but there had been no indications of any formal moves to pursue this ship before last year. With the schedule the Navy has laid out now, major decisions about how to proceed in the production of these ships, if at all, will fall to the next administration. There are already massive competing priorities, and some members of Congress have already questioned whether the battleship effort is the best use of available resources.

It’s also worth noting here that Trump has long been very outspoken when it comes to Navy shipbuilding design decisions, especially from an aesthetic perspective.

The House Armed Services Committee has at least taken steps now toward putting a hold on production of the first Trump class battleship until it is confident that key weapon systems are mature, as well as pushing the Navy to lay a formal plan for future versions of the FF(X) frigate.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Joseph has been a member of The War Zone team since early 2017. Prior to that, he was an Associate Editor at War Is Boring, and his byline has appeared in other publications, including Small Arms Review, Small Arms Defense Journal, Reuters, We Are the Mighty, and Task & Purpose.


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US Congress moves to deepen military ties with Israel: Why it matters | Military News

Lawmakers in the United States are quietly advancing a proposal that could deepen military ties between the US and Israel in unprecedented ways, at a time when public support for Israel among Americans is increasingly fractured.

Among the provisions included in the 2027 National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) released this week is Section 224, the “United States-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation Initiative”.

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The NDAA, which Congress passes annually to set military policy and authorise defence spending, will undergo further debate and amendments before becoming law. Some legislators have already signalled opposition, with Representative Thomas Massie saying he would seek to remove the provision if it reaches the House floor.

The measure remains at an early stage, but analysts say if passed, it would limit political oversight over the defence relationship.

Analysts added that it could mark a significant shift in the US-Israel relationship, moving beyond a model centred on American military aid towards deeper institutional integration between the two countries’ defence industries and militaries.

Critics argue that such a move would make support for Israel less a matter of political choice and more a structural feature of US national security policy, embedding the relationship within joint military and industrial programmes that would be difficult to unwind.

What does the proposal include?

Section 224 incorporates elements of the US-Israel Future of Warfare Act legislation introduced by Representative Ronny Jackson, according to Track AIPAC. While the legislation did not advance as a standalone bill, key elements of it were instead folded into the NDAA.

The provision would require the US defence secretary to designate an official responsible for coordinating military cooperation between the two countries. According to the text, that official would be tasked with “synchronising cooperative efforts between the United States and Israel”, including “bilateral defence technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration and industrial cooperation”.

The legislation envisages cooperation across a wide range of military technologies. It specifically identifies as priority areas; “counter-unmanned systems including aerial, maritime and ground platforms”, “anti-tunnelling and subterranean threats”, and “missile and air defence technologies”.

The proposal also seeks to deepen collaboration on emerging technologies, including “artificial intelligence, quantum machine learning and autonomous systems”, as well as “directed energy and advanced sensing”, “cyber defence, electronic warfare and digital resilience”, and “biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and medical defence”.

The inclusion of “network integration” and “data fusion” has drawn particular attention because it suggests significantly closer integration of military information systems between the two countries.

The United States and Israel already cooperate on defence projects, including missile defence systems such as Iron Dome. However, analysts say that Section 224 would expand cooperation into nearly every major area of emerging military technology, and could create a “lock-in” between the two countries military infrastructure.

Mark Hilborne, a senior lecturer, the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera the proposal goes well beyond the traditional foundations of the US-Israel defence relationship.

“While historically, the US-Israel defence relationship has included US military aid and weapons transfers, joint missile defence programmes such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow, and intelligence and operational cooperation, the proposed agreement increases cooperation to include a wider set of emerging technologies,” he said.

“So this all suggests a much tighter integration – less about provision and perhaps sharing technologies and capabilities, and more about jointly developing these.

“It would point to a more institutionalised relationship, and perhaps one that might survive changing administrations in the US, as some of the development cycles could be very long and would become entrenched,” he said.

Why is it controversial?

The proposal comes amid growing debate in the US over military support for Israel, particularly as Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza continues, and concerns mount over the use of US-made weapons.

Human rights organisations and United Nations experts have repeatedly raised concerns about Israeli military actions in Gaza, where despite a so-called ceasefire in place since last October, at least 850 Palestinians have been killed. Israel is also advancing into southern Lebanon, where it has killed more than 3,000 people since the beginning of March.

These wars have led to increasing scepticism among Americans towards unconditional support for Israel, recent opinion polls suggest.

A New York Times poll in May found that only 30 percent of respondents believed Donald Trump made the right decision in ordering military strikes against Iran, while 64 percent said it was the wrong decision.

An Institute for Global Affairs poll released last week found that only 16 percent of Americans support continuing weapons transfers to Israel without additional restrictions. Thirty-eight percent said the US should stop supplying weapons entirely, while 24 percent said military aid should be conditioned on how the weapons are used.

Opposition has also emerged from parts of the Republican Party, which traditionally has always been aligned with Israel.

Former Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene criticised the proposal on social media, writing: “This is what complete capture to a foreign government looks like, and there hasn’t been a single shot fired.”

Massie, who has opposed military aid to Israel, likewise pledged to introduce an amendment removing the provision from the NDAA. The Republican senator was defeated in the primary elections last month, highlighting the financial and political influence of pro-Israel lobby groups in the US.

Influential conservative commentator, Tucker Carlson, has increasingly criticised US support for Israel, reflecting divisions within the broader MAGA movement. Criticism has also intensified among left-wing Democrats, with many calling for restrictions on military aid to Israel.

What could it mean in practice?

Critics of the measures warn that the proposal could create a form of institutional “lock-in” that makes both countries simultaneously reliant on each other for military development and procurement.

Some analysts say such integration would move key aspects of the US-Israel relationship away from highly visible aid votes or commercial contracting, and into the less transparent world of defence procurement and industrial partnerships at a state-to-state level.

Hilborne from the King’s College said the initiative could also have direct implications for Palestinians. “If joint R&D produces more effective technology, then systems related to surveillance, autonomous vehicles, AI and targeting, and various counter-drone or counter-missile technology would be improved, providing a capability boost to Israeli forces operating in Gaza or the West Bank,” he said.

“This enhanced integration would further embed US technology into Israeli forces. These would all be concerns from a Palestinian perspective.”

Critics also point to the economic implications, where expanded co-production agreements could lead to new manufacturing facilities and defence jobs in the United States, creating a further reliance on Israel.

Hilborne also argued that deeper integration could reduce Washington’s leverage over Israel. “The deeper integration may also mean that the US loses some degree of leverage over Israel, as it would be less able to withhold certain capabilities from Israel,” he said.

“As a consequence, Israel might be emboldened in its policies.”

The proposal could also have implications beyond the US-Israel relationship, according to Imad Salamey, an international relations professor at the Lebanese American University. “The proposed US-Israeli defence integration can be seen as the next phase of the Abraham Accords: moving from normalisation toward a US-backed regional security regime centred on Israel as the dominant military and technological hub,” he told Al Jazeera.

Such a framework would strengthen efforts to contain Iran, limit Turkiye’s independent regional influence and deepen security cooperation with Arab partners, he said.

“For Lebanon and Gaza, it may translate into greater pressure to accommodate Israeli-led security arrangements as part of a broader emerging Middle Eastern order.”

Whether Section 224 survives the legislative process is uncertain.

But its inclusion in the NDAA shows how some politicians, many backed by the pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC, are attempting to bind the two countries’ militaries closer together, creating long-term industrial links that future administrations may find difficult to reverse.

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