MoU

The memorandum of understanding (MoU) the United States and Iran have signed is not a peace treaty. It is not even a credible framework for one. A vocal chorus of critics has rushed to portray it as a humiliation – evidence that President Donald Trump was manoeuvred into negotiations and extracted a poor deal from a regime that outplayed him.

That reading mistakes a mirage for reality. The Trump administration entered these talks with a precise understanding of what the Iranian regime is, what it wants and what any agreement with it is actually worth. No one in that negotiating team harbours the illusion that Tehran intends to honour commitments that constrain its core ambitions. The MоU is not a peace settlement. It is a mutually understood pause – a tactical intermission chosen by both sides for reasons that have nothing to do with trust and everything to do with time.

To grasp why, one needs only consult Iran’s unbroken record. That record is not a matter of interpretation or political dispute. It is a documented history of agreements made, commitments given and obligations systematically abandoned whenever honouring them conflicted with the regime’s objectives.

The pattern is consistent enough to constitute a doctrine: Iran negotiates under pressure, signs what is necessary to relieve that pressure and resumes its course once the immediate threat has passed.

The deeply flawed 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was the most prominent recent demonstration of this cycle. Presented as a landmark of multilateral diplomacy, it was in practice a subsidised intermission – a breathing space Iran used to consolidate resources, sustain its proxy networks and continue advancing its strategic programme. The JCPOA did not change Iranian behaviour. It funded and protected it.

The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign was a direct response to that lesson: A regime of this kind cannot be managed through diplomatic lifelines. It can only be constrained by pressure severe enough to leave it no viable alternative to compliance.

The new MoU does not signal that Iran has changed. Its calculus remains what it has always been – survival and expansion, pursued through whatever tactical posture the moment requires. When pressure mounts, Iran negotiates. When pressure eases, Iran advances. Its negotiators are, by all available evidence, prepared to offer assurances they have no intention of keeping. This is not a failure of diplomatic craftsmanship. This is simply the nature of any negotiation with a regime like Iran’s.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Iranian nuclear programme. As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has repeatedly committed to transparent cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It has repeatedly broken those commitments, blocking inspections, constructing clandestine enrichment facilities, destroying evidence and systematically deceiving the international community. The pattern is not one of occasional noncompliance. It is deliberate, sustained deception in pursuit of a single unwavering objective: the acquisition of a nuclear weapon.

A state genuinely committed to civilian nuclear energy has no need for a vast and enormously expensive domestic enrichment programme. Nuclear fuel can be purchased – from Russia, among others – at a fraction of the cost and without the international confrontation such a programme inevitably provokes.

Iran has chosen the far more costly and dangerous path for one reason: Enrichment is not a means to an end, but the end itself. Its rulers are committed to a nuclear weapon, and that commitment has survived changes in personnel, shifts in rhetoric and decades of pressure.

It will not be bargained away – and here lies the critical point that no amount of diplomatic optimism can paper over. Iran’s rulers are not pragmatic actors engaged in a conventional cost-benefit calculation. Their goals are theological and strategic in a way that places them beyond the reach of ordinary negotiation.

They do not govern in the interests of the Iranian people. The sanctions they have endured have devastated ordinary Iranians – driven up poverty, hollowed out the middle class, denied the population access to medicines and opportunity. None of that has moved the regime one degree from its course.

This is a regime that could, if it chose, transform its position entirely. It could make peace with its neighbours, normalise relations with the international community, shed the sanctions that have devastated its economy and dramatically improve the lives of Iranians. The price is not beyond reach: abandon the nuclear weapons programme, cease development of offensive ballistic missiles and end the sponsorship of terrorist proxies. Iran’s rulers have refused that bargain consistently and completely.

That is the essential context for understanding what the Trump administration is actually doing. It would be a serious misjudgement to read this MoU as evidence of American weakness or strategic confusion. The team that designed and executed the most effective pressure campaign against Iran in recent memory is not naive about this adversary.

Trump enters this pause knowing that Iran will not honour commitments that genuinely constrain it. He is not expecting otherwise. Neither side, in all likelihood, operates under any such illusion – which is precisely what makes the critics’ alarm about a “bad deal” somewhat beside the point.

You cannot be cheated by an agreement you never expected the other party to keep.

What this MoU represents is a mutually understood strategic pause, a breathing space both parties have chosen, for entirely different reasons, over immediate confrontation. Iran needs economic relief. A regime facing internal decay and a depleted treasury has strong incentives to buy time, replenish its resources and wait out what it calculates to be a finite window.

Tehran is acutely aware that Trump has roughly two and a half years remaining in office. From its perspective, survival through that period is itself a form of victory.

Washington’s calculus is different in kind. Keeping the Strait of Hormuz open is an immediate, non-negotiable goal – a choked strait means an energy price shock with global consequences. Beyond that, the US has its own repositioning to accomplish. Military inventories drawn down through recent operations are being restocked. Strategic options are being preserved and expanded.

A pause that enables that rebuilding, while avoiding a premature confrontation on unfavourable terms, is not a concession. It is preparation.

Trump has never wavered in his commitment to eliminating Iran as a strategic threat – not through wishful diplomacy, but through the kind of pressure that forecloses options. That commitment did not expire with the signing of this MoU. The question for Tehran is not whether American resolve exists but whether it can be outlasted. That is a wager the Iranian regime has made before and lost.

The international community will, as usual, observe from a careful distance. Many nations will urge Iran to be stopped while taking few steps to stop it, criticising US action and inaction with equal facility.

Trump understands this dynamic. It is the foundation of his approach to alliances – the insistence that partners bear proportionate burdens rather than simply drawing on American resolve while contributing little of their own.

The MoU will not resolve the Iranian problem. It was not designed to. When its terms expire or when Iran decides it has served its purpose, the nuclear programme will resume its advance, the proxies will be better resourced, and the Strait of Hormuz will once again become a flashpoint.

That outcome is not a possibility. Given Iran’s record, it is a near-certainty. The only consequential variable is whether the US and those willing to stand alongside it will be better positioned to act decisively when that moment arrives. Far from a mirage, the evidence suggests that is precisely what this administration is working to ensure.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

Tehran, Iran – The memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed last week between Iran and the United States appears to be in jeopardy after a second day of military strikes, as well as the a framework agreement that entrenches Israeli forces on Lebanese soil.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on Sunday released video showing the launch of ballistic missiles overnight, with a message written on them in English and Persian saying US President Donald Trump was insisting on a “defeated war”.

The IRGC said it had fired missiles and drones towards the US Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait and the US Fifth Naval Fleet in Bahrain in retaliation for a second day of US strikes. It threatened more attacks if the deal is violated again by the “deceitful” US, which, along with Israel launched air attacks across Iran on February 28.

The exchanges of fire come after the US coordinated the transit of vessels out of the Strait of Hormuz in cooperation with Oman and the International Maritime Organization.

Many ships were being directed through Oman’s waters, which prompted the IRGC to hit a container ship and a tanker with explosive-laden drones in an attempt to force traffic to pass through Iranian waters instead.

Speaking to reporters in neighbouring Iraq on Sunday, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran will exercise sole management and oversight of the critical waterway for the next 30 days before allowing full traffic to resume.

He also emphasised the first clause of the June 17 MoU, which says military operations must immediately and permanently end on all fronts, including Lebanon, and urged Washington to exert pressure on Israel to stop attacking southern Lebanon.

The governments of Israel and Lebanon reached a US-brokered framework deal on Friday that allows Israeli forces to remain in southern Lebanon, until Tehran-backed Hezbollah is fully disarmed. That appears to contradict the MoU signed with Iran.

Hezbollah swiftly rejected the agreement, calling it “humiliating, shameful and a surrender” of Lebanon’s sovereignty.

Negar Mortazavi, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, said she expected the Lebanon issue to negatively impact the MoU because Hezbollah was not on board and the Lebanese government’s previous ceasefire deals with Israel have been repeatedly violated.

She also told Al Jazeera that Iran has found tremendous leverage with the Strait of Hormuz, treating it as a “golden card”, as the disruption to oil exports has heavily impacted markets and made the war unpopular among many, including in the US.

“They are using that leverage to the max and not going back to the status before the war, pretending like no war happened,” she said, adding that Iranian authorities and the IRGC have sought to centre themselves in the process of coordinating transit through the strait.

“They’re saying they want traffic to go through in coordination with them, and I think they will be able to exert that kind of power,” she said.

On Saturday, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei released an image of their first publicised trilateral meeting since the start of the war more than four months ago.

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen or heard from since succeeding his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in a US-Israeli attack on the first day of the war. But a new written text message attributed to him on Sunday said: “What is certain is that the criminals must be seized by the collar and made to face the punishment for their criminal acts”.

Supporters of the Islamic Republic cheered on the latest IRGC attacks against US interests as they continued demonstrating on the streets overnight into Sunday as hardline politicians and analysts called for further attacks until Iran gets better concessions.

On the state-linked talk show, Tamam Rokh, political analysts said Tehran should significantly strengthen its ties with Moscow and Beijing.

“We could do many things with help from Russia and China to damage US strategic equipment in the region like vessels, refuelling aircraft and electronic warfare,” pro-state analyst Ali Samadzadeh said on the programme on Saturday.

“There was no movement in Tehran to tie Beijing and Moscow to the war, and this major flaw exists in the form of the negotiations and the text of the MoU as well,” he said.

More than 60 hardline legislators on Sunday postponed plans to protest against the closure of parliament since the start of the war after its presiding board said it would meet to reconvene the assembly, following Ali Khamenei’s burial next month.

Many others say demands for extracting major concessions from the US and Israel do not correspond with the reality of the situation after months of war.

“In terms of military power, we couldn’t do anything about the US blockade and we didn’t think the crisis would get so serious,” pro-state commentator Vahid Ashtari told crowds at a street event in Tehran.

“I think a type of blind idealism has emerged that believes we are on top and at the peak, so we shouldn’t make a deal. But there are facts on the ground. We have some missiles and drones to carry out an asymmetric defence, but we have no fighter jets to fly to the US and hit Trump. Not only could we not avenge [Khamenei], we could not avenge Haj Qassem either,” he added, in reference to General Qassem Soleimani, who was assassinated by the US in 2020.

After two nights of attacks, Iran’s financial markets also reacted poorly, with the national currency losing gains since the signing of the MoU to trade at about 1.7 million rials against the dollar in Tehran’s open market on Sunday.

The main index of the Tehran Stock Exchange also lost more than 100,000 points to stand at just over five million points at the end of trading on Sunday, the second day of the working week in Iran.

Vahid, a 37-year-old mechanic who also deals in car parts in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, told Al Jazeera that while the market has marginally improved since the signing of the deal with the US, it is still treading on thin ice.

He said parts for foreign cars are becoming harder to find, while prices have been rising rapidly for both domestic and foreign vehicle parts.

“I think the war will start again over the coming months and some in the bazaar think the same,” he said.

Bahrain and Kuwait have condemned Iran’s retaliatory attacks after a second day of US strikes on Iran. Tehran University academic Hassan Ahmadian argues the US is trying to find its way out of the Memorandum of Understanding that Trump signed 10 days ago, ending the war.

Iran has said it remains committed to implementing the MoU signed with the United States. However, Tehran warned that it would take reciprocal measures if Washington fails to honour its obligations under the agreement.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has signed a US-Iran memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the war between the two countries. US President Donald Trump and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian signed on Wednesday.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Esmaeil Baghaei, has announced that a memorandum of understanding with the United States has been finalised and signed electronically by both sides.

He added that the agreement has already gone into effect.

“The text of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding was finalised with the signatures of the presidents,” Baghaei told the news agency IRNA. “Now it is time to test the implementation of the agreement.”

Wednesday’s statement appears to confirm that the US and Iran have agreed to suspend military operations, paving the way for further negotiations.

Given that both sides signed the agreement electronically, Baghaei noted that there would be no signing ceremony on Friday in Geneva, Switzerland, as had previously been expected.

Negotiating teams, however, still plan to be in the Swiss city. A decision on a possible in-person meeting between them is expected in the coming hours, though for now such plans are paused, according to Baghaei.

While the office of US President Donald Trump has yet to issue a formal statement on the signing, Al Jazeera correspondent Mike Hanna explained that a White House spokesperson confirmed earlier in the day that it happened.

But Hanna warned that the memorandum is likely to face domestic backlash in the US, where Trump had been under right-wing pressure to take a hard line against Iran.

“There’s a great deal of dissatisfaction with the memorandum of understanding, as it has been outlined to the public at this particular point, even among some Republicans who have expressed the concern that Iran is being treated leniently,” Hanna said.

He also emphasised the administration’s position that the memorandum is not a full-fledged deal but rather a prelude to more negotiations.

“The administration is fighting hard to persuade the American public and American politicians that this is not a defeat for the United States,” Hanna said.

Since February 28, the US and Israel have been jointly engaged in a war against Iran, though a temporary ceasefire suspended much of the most intense fighting on April 8.

Trump has repeatedly said his goal in launching the war was to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Since the memorandum was revealed, he has highlighted the document’s assurances that Iran will not seek a nuclear weapon, though Tehran has long denied any intention of doing so.

But according to a US account, the memo goes beyond the question of nuclear weapons. It sets up a 60-day timeline for a final deal to be struck, and it indicates that the US will rally “regional partners” to create a $300bn for Iran’s reconstruction.

US sanctions would also work towards lifting its sanctions against Iran, and the country would issue waivers for the export of Iranian fuel.

Iran has touted those terms as a victory. On Wednesday, chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf told Fars, an Iranian state news agency, that the US had failed to achieve its goals with Iran and pointed to the memo as proof.

“The agreement is a record of US failure,” Ghalibaf said. “People will see it and judge.”

He also explained that the Strait of Hormuz would not return to “pre-war conditions” after the 60-day period for negotiations stipulated in the agreement. He suggested that Iran will expect payments for use of the waterway.

“I emphasise again that the Strait of Hormuz will never return to the previous conditions,” Ghalibaf said.

“Iran has the right to sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, and of course, we will receive a fee for services.”

That position is likely to put pressure on the Trump administration, which had pledged that the strait, a key waterway for trade, would be “permanently toll-free”.

Since the start of the war, Iran has blocked the waterway, sending global prices for fuel, fertiliser and other goods soaring.

The US had responded with its own blockade of Iranian ports, though that effort is slated to end under the memorandum.

Both sides, however, have emphasised that the memorandum of understanding is not a final agreement on all issues of dispute. More negotiations are expected to resolve lasting impasses.

“It will only become a deal, as such, at the end of the 60-day negotiation period. At least, that’s the intention,” Hanna reported.

US and Iranian negotiators have reached a memorandum of understanding on a proposed 60-day ceasefire extension, according to US sources, but the deal still requires President Donald Trump’s approval.