Missile

The U.S. needs to change the way it tracks and defends against future missile threats, the deputy commander of U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) said on Tuesday. The need to do so comes as changes in missile technology are moving faster than the current defeat system can keep up with.

“Historically, if you start from the high end here, missile defense and missile warning were operating on separate and distinct stovepipe networks,” Lt. Gen. Rick Zellman said during a panel at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium (SMD) in Huntsville, Alabama, attended by TWZ. “Missile warning, of course, was going to detect a launch and let people know something’s coming inbound and see a duck and cover and whatnot, and missile defenders were looking to get a little bit more fidelity in their track and be able to shoot down an incoming missile,” he continued. “But today we don’t really have any ballistic missiles. Everything is maneuvering. Everything is complex, and so we can’t provide warning without providing a lot more observations on these missiles.”

As a result of the evolution in missile technology, “the lexicon that we’re starting to see is missile tracking, right?” the general proffered. “And so missile warning and missile defense are really coming together in that realm. Missile warning was a space legacy mission area, and of course missile defense is missile defense. And you can see how these things are coming together. So really, the distinction between missile warning is almost obsolete at this point.”

The U.S. military has space-based early warning sensors that are integrated into its existing sensing, and has been for decades. But these warn of launches, they generally don’t track a weapon throughout its flight cycle. For some years now, work has been underway to substantially expand on space-based missile defense capabilities, to include the start of the fielding of new satellite constellations to help track ballistic missiles, as well as hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and other threats, during the mid-course portion of their flights. This is on top of a major push to move other kinds of terrestrial sensing to orbital layers, some of which could potentially have a secondary missile defense role.

To achieve the objective of fusing missile warning and tracking functions together, “we have to leverage a couple of really good partners,” Zellman stated, pointing to two in particular. One is the Space Development Agency (SDA), tasked with quickly delivering needed space-based capabilities to the U.S. military. The other is the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), charged with developing, deploying, and sustaining layered and integrated missile defense capabilities.

The SDA, noted the general, “is developing a number of missile-tracking satellites as part of their tranches that they’re launching.” The MDA, meanwhile, has “a long history of integrating battle management,” Zellman discussed.

“So those two together are really helping Space Command take separate disparate stovepipe information and bring it together,” he stated.

“It also has to talk about decision speed, and this really is going to require us to look at more than man-in-the-loop [MITL], and maybe a man on the loop [MOTL] situation,” he noted. MITL is when a human is fully engaged in assessing and controlling the operation compared to MOTL, which usually relies on more heavily automated systems where the human approves critical decisions, usually based on distilled data presented by the system. AI is becoming a large part of making that possible in an increasingly successful way.

The reason to make this change, Zellman explained, is that “we have to make these decisions faster, and that data flow has to be able to enable our layered defenses – whether that’s coming from a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense], or a Patriot, or directed energy, or SM-3, or space-based interceptors in the future – all that is going to be dependent on our decision speed.”

“At the heart of all this for the United States Space Command is one of our unified command plan responsibilities, and that is as a global sensor manager,” the general said. 

“We don’t use sensors dedicated to a single mission,” he explained. “They may have originally been conceived to do space domain awareness or missile warning, or in some cases, missile defense, but we try to take the goodness of all those sensors and use them for all three of those mission areas.”

Under SPACECOM, “we take those sensors and we dynamically task them and prioritize accordingly, so we can support multiple commands around the globe. And that really, once again, gets to the theme about defending at home and abroad is being able to support these multiple commands simultaneously.”

The command’s “modern systems, whether it’s a long-range discrimination radar or some of our systems that have been around a little bit longer – like an upgraded early warning radar – they’re all inherently multi-mission,” Zellman put forth. “A single radar can see an object in space and give me space domain awareness information, and a little bit later it can see a missile launch and provide warning, and then hopefully down the road a bit more… provide essentially a track so that we can shoot an interceptor at it and kill it.”

“All these three things can be done in the same duty cycle with that same system, and so we have to be able to dynamically task these systems to ensure that whichever is the priority mission at that time is the one that is being serviced,” the general cautioned. “Historically, space domain awareness information went to space operators, and I would argue missile warning information probably went to both space operators and the missile defense community. But today, that information has to all be put in one data location, and we pull the information we need for the mission we have at hand.”

Long Range Discrimination Radar Capabilities

“We recognize that what we do in space at Space Command is really fundamental to what the missile defense community has to do for missile defense,” Zellman vocalized. “So that really talks about the high end. Let’s talk about the low end.”

Lt. Gen. John Rafferty, commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and Joint Task Force-Gold “mentioned some of this today,” Zellman noted, referring to an earlier SMD panel. “We see, I think, the low end on Epic Fury. Sure, the missiles are more high end, but we’ve seen our adversary employ a number of one-way attack systems that are coupled with these ballistic missile volleys, and we are really at this point in the history of warfare because of the democratization of space.”

“Space isn’t a sanctuary,” the general shared. “It’s no longer just the playground of nations with a lot of money. The commercialization of space has created what many call essentially a transparent battlefield. And because I can see everything all the time with commercial ISR, it’s given our adversaries capabilities that they haven’t had in the past.” 

“That ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance], if you couple it with a platform that has access to GPS or some other PNT [position, navigation and timing] system, and then you add in another layer of over-the-horizon comms, like say from an Iridium or a Starlink, and you have a pretty lethal asymmetric weapon system that our adversaries can get a hold of.”

Regardless of how much integration and automation occurs, it’s still a people business in Zellman’s eyes.

“So whether it’s a combination volley of attack drones or hypersonic glide vehicles, the mission at SPACECOM remains the same, and that’s to synchronize global missile defense and space domain awareness using a common set of information,” Zellman said. “But that synchronization doesn’t just happen in a vacuum; it happens with the joint warfighters that are standing on watch.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

SEOUL, Aug. 11 (UPI) — North Korea fired a ballistic missile toward the East Sea on Wednesday, the militaries of Seoul and Tokyo said, its second such launch in less than a week as the United States and South Korea gear up to kick off their major summertime joint military drill.

The missile was fired from the Wonsan area on North Korea’s east coast at around 6 a.m., South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a text message to reporters.

“The detected North Korean missile flew over 700 kilometers (435 miles), and South Korea and the U.S. are currently conducting a detailed analysis regarding its exact specifications,” the JCS said.

The military did not specify the type of missile involved, although the distance the projectile traveled falls within the range of short-range ballistic missiles.

South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities tracked and shared information on the launch from its initial stage, while Seoul also exchanged information related to the ballistic missile with Japan, the military added.

“Under a robust South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture, the military is closely monitoring North Korea’s various movements and maintaining the capability and readiness to overwhelmingly respond to any provocation,” the JCS said.

Japan’s Defense Ministry also detected the launch, saying the missile flew about 429 miles, reached a maximum altitude of roughly 56 miles and fell outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi condemned the launch at a press briefing, saying the North’s weapons tests “threaten the peace and security of our country, the region, and the international community.”

Koizumi said the launch violated relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and noted that Japan had lodged a strong protest with North Korea through diplomatic channels at its embassy in Beijing.

Hawaii-based U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said it detected the launch and was consulting with regional allies and partners.

“Based on current assessments, this event does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel or territory, or to our allies,” the command said in a statement.

The launch came days before the United States and South Korea are set to begin their annual summertime joint military drills. The 11-day Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise kicks off Monday and will focus on preparing for evolving threats from North Korea, military officials said earlier this week.

North Korea routinely denounces the allies’ joint exercises as rehearsals for an invasion and frequently responds with weapons tests. On Thursday, Pyongyang fired a short-range ballistic missile toward the East Sea.

The allies stressed that the joint exercise is defensive in nature.

“We’re up here today announcing Ulchi Freedom Shield to the entire world before it even starts,” U.S. Forces spokesman Col. Ryan Donald said at a press briefing Monday. “UFS is not a pretext, it’s not a provocation. It’s a transparent, longstanding defensive training event.”

Gen. Michael Guetlein, the top U.S. military officer in charge of the Golden Dome missile defense shield, says he is confident that the initiative will be able to deliver the desired capabilities within its current stated budget of $185 billion. Operational elements of the huge new architecture are currently scheduled to start coming online in mid-2028. This is despite independent estimates that the required ‘system of systems’ could cost exponentially more to develop, field, and maintain. At the same time, Guetlein has now warned that work on Golden Dome could abruptly end, at least for a time, regardless of its total price tag, if a huge budgetary hurdle is not overcome.

Guetlein, whose current title is Director of Golden Dome and is presently assigned to the U.S. Space Force, shared new details about the initiative during a talk today at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, at which TWZ is in attendance.

“What is the bill to the nation? How much national treasure are we asking the American public to commit to the defense of the homeland?” Guetlein said in his introductory remarks. “I’m on record, and I’m still up here saying the exact same number: $185 billion. We started at 175 billion dollars, and we added 10 more billion [dollars] worth of accelerating space capabilities that we thought the nation needed, that were not part of our original architecture.”

“That is a lot of money. It’s one of the biggest systems that we’ve ever put together as a nation. We [have] got to keep it affordable,” Guetlein continued. “There’s two other cost estimates out there that are exceptionally larger, but I’m going to tell you those cost estimates are not estimating what we are building.”

The general did not specify what cost estimates he was referring to, but the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has put out two top-level figures since the initiative was first unveiled in 2025. CBO’s first estimate in May 2025 said the complete architecture could cost up to $542 billion to develop, deploy, and then operate over a period spanning two decades. The office put out a second estimate in May of this year that said the full price tag might actually be nearly $1.2 trillion over the same 20-year timespan. At that time, CBO also explicitly said its analysis had been hampered by a lack of publicly available information about exactly what the so-called “objective architecture” for Golden Dome actually entails.

There are other independent estimates of Golden Dome’s full cost that are even higher than CBO’s May 2026 projection.

“We’re building something completely differently, and that architecture is coming together, and is being proven every single day,” Guetlein stressed today. “We have radars on contract. We have launchers on contract. We have space-based interceptors on contract. Hypersonic ballistic tracking system on contract. Space data network is on contract. Our construction contracts have been let [sic], and we are moving out with haste to get after what the President [Donald Trump] asked us to do in the summer of 2028.”

Space-based interceptors are notably vital to the Golden Dome plan as it has been described publicly to date. They are also central to CBO’s $1.2 trillion cost estimate, which projected that it would be necessary to have 7,800 of them in orbit at any one time for the architecture to work as intended.

The Northrop Grumman video below includes a computer-generated clip depicting a space-based interceptor engaging a target outside the Earth’s atmosphere, starting at 0:13 in the runtime.

Northrop Grumman Third Quarter 2025 Highlights

“We have our first operational site. We are digging dirt around the homeland, getting ready for the capabilities that the President asked us to deliver in the summer of 2028,” Guetlein also said, but did not elaborate on where that work was being done or its exact purpose.

“We’ve had two tests. We can’t talk about those tests, but those tests were phenomenally successful, and they demonstrated that the capabilities that we are putting together, both command and control, our sensor network, and our effectors, are going to be effective against the threats as they are currently designed,” the Golden Dome director added.

“We had committed to the President last year that we would do a major test every single year. So in January this year, I gave a challenge to the Missile Defense Agency of what test I needed to happen in the summer of 2026, and we executed that test,” Guetlein did note later on in the talk. “It was the most complex test with the most threats in the air in the history of WSMR [the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico]. MDA pulled that off and executed that test in six months, and met every single test objective that I gave them.”

“So the MDA team, plus the WSMR team, plus SMDC [the U.S. Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command], plus PAE Fires [the Army’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Fires], plus Fort Bliss [in Texas], plus a whole host of other agencies, all came together in less than six months, starting from scratch, and delivered what I will argue is the most complex integrated missile defense test that we have pulled off as a nation,” he continued. “But that test is a fraction of what we got to do to deliver what they’ve asked us to do in [20]28. So the test in [20]27 will be even more complex.”

Despite all of this apparent progress and significant authority to keep pushing ahead, Guetlein warned today that Golden Dome is facing a potentially insurmountable budget impasse. This has to do with how the initiative has been paid for so far, with core funding coming from outside normal defense spending streams via a process called reconciliation.

“When the President submitted his President’s Budget over to the Hill for FY27 [Fiscal Year 2027], I was not in the top line. I’m in what they call mandatory funding, which is another reconciliation-type funding bill,” Guetlein explained. So, yes, we have a CR [continuing resolution], and we’re not going to shut down the federal government, but a CR doesn’t help me under Golden Dome because I don’t have a top line to fall back to to get that percentage of the continuing resolution.”

Continuing resolutions are short-term spending bills Congress passes to keep the government running in the absence of the approval of a full annual budget.

The defense budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year that the Trump administration submitted earlier this year was already historically large, in part because of expected reconciliation funding. The $1.5 trillion “topline” was broken down into a base budget of $1.1 trillion and then “$350 billion in additional mandatory resources through reconciliation.”

“So we’ve got to figure out, as a nation, a different way of funding Golden Dome, at least for [20]27. Right now, that’s under reconciliation,” Guetlein added. “I will tell you that if they don’t figure it out, there is no Golden Dome because there is no funding.”

Guetlein said today that $22.5 billion has been appropriated for Golden Dome so far, and that 95 percent of that money is already committed to specific work.

“I do believe, as a nation, we’re going to figure this out just because the sense of urgency is so great, but it is a challenging budget environment,” he continued.

As an aside, the Senate, which is currently controlled by President Trump’s Republican Party, just passed its version of the new continuing resolution last week. It notably omitted certain defense spending provisions the White House had sought, including $1 billion for work on the Trump class battleship program, another top priority for the administration. That bill still needs to be reconciled with a separate temporary spending bill making its way through the Republican-controlled House of Representatives before it can be sent to President Trump’s desk to be signed into law (or vetoed).

On top of all this, there has been some bipartisan pushback to further use of the reconciliation process and related mechanisms to boost defense spending outside of the U.S. military’s base budget.

“I think it’s safe to conclude there will not be another reconciliation bill,” Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell, a Republican, said during a hearing on the U.S. Air Force’s proposed 2027 Fiscal Year budget back in June.

It is also worth noting here that a significant delay in additional funding could have a cascading impact on Golden Dome and its aggressive schedule. The Pentagon could also seek to redirect funds from other parts of its budget, but this could then have similar effects on other efforts. Guetlein did tell reporters after his talk at the SMD Symposium that the Pentagon is looking at contingency options to keep Golden Dome running in the absence of direct funding, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“Several of the space capabilities that we are investing in are also being invested in by the Space Force,” he said, per Air & Space Forces Magazine‘s report. “So, if Golden Dome is not able to continue to invest in those type of capabilities, then the Space Force could decide at that time to continue the investments.”

“Because we have diversified execution of a lot of these capabilities, and a lot of these capabilities are already requested by combatant commands, there are some alternatives that we can pursue. We have not made any decisions on any pathway,” he also noted.

Still, this all comes a the U.S. military is currently in the midst of a host of other major modernization programs, many of which are also deemed critical to national security. This is especially true of costly and expansive programs now underway to update all three legs of America’s nuclear deterrent triad, as well as the command and control architectures that underpin them.

Based on Guetlein’s comments today, Golden Dome now looks to be approaching its first major watershed moment, with this budgetary dilemma set to have significant impacts on how the initiative continues to progress.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Pyongyang conducts second weapons test in less than a week as Seoul, Washington gear up for annual military exercises.

North Korea has launched a ballistic missile towards the Sea of Japan, according to Seoul and Tokyo, marking the second such test from Pyongyang in less than a week.

The launch on Wednesday came as South Korea and the United States announced plans to hold their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield military drills starting on August 17.

“Our military detected at around 6:00 am [21:00 GMT Tuesday] a ballistic missile launched by North Korea from the Wonsan area towards the East Sea,” South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a message to reporters, referring to a body of water also known as the Sea of Japan.

South Korea’s military said the missile flew more than 700km (435 miles).

It said it has boosted its surveillance posture and that it was closely exchanging information on the launch with Washington and Tokyo.

Japan’s Defence Ministry said on social media that the suspected ballistic missile had “already fallen”, without providing further details.

“North Korea has never simply let a South Korea-US joint military exercise pass without a response,” Lim Eul-chul, a North Korea expert at Kyungnam University, told the AFP news agency.

“This is a message that Pyongyang is closely watching the upcoming drills and could stage a provocation if it deems one necessary.”

US-South Korea drills

The Ulchi Freedom Shield training is to start on Monday and run for 11 days. Its scale will be similar to previous years, with 18,000 South Korean soldiers taking part, according to South Korea’s military.

North Korea has in previous years denounced the exercises as a rehearsal for invasion, and responded to the drills with weapons tests and harsh rhetoric. Seoul and Washington, however, have repeatedly said their training is defensive in nature.

On August 6, South Korea, the US and Japan detected the launch of a short-range ballistic missile from North Korea in what was Pyongyang’s first ballistic weapons testing activity since late June.

North Korea did not confirm the reported launch.

Pyongyang has ratcheted up its criticism of Tokyo’s defence policy, issuing statements at least seven times since July.

On Tuesday, North Korean state media condemned Japan’s latest defence white paper as a “re-invasion-minded” document, saying it “groundlessly described” Pyongyang as ⁠the greatest strategic challenge to “justify its reckless arms buildup”.

North Korea has also been accused of playing a more active role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Tuesday that Moscow had used a North Korean ballistic missile during an attack that killed seven workers at a Ukrainian steel plant in the southeastern city of Zaporizhzhia.

South Korea plans to upgrade a key Army battle tank and an anti-ship missile program for the Navy in an effort to boost military capabilities against evolving enemy threats, the arms agency said Tuesday.

It will launch a 3.43 trillion-won (US$2.43 billion) project to upgrade the K2 main battle tank to be equipped with an active protection system (APS) to intercept anti-tank missiles and drones, a drone and improvised explosive device (IED) jammer and a remote-controlled weapons station (RCWS), the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said.

The APS system is dubbed a smart shield system that uses radar to automatically spot incoming enemy missiles or drones and attack them.

The drone and IED jammer blocks enemy radio signals and the RCWS enables the crew to safely aim and fire from inside the armored vehicle.

The K2 upgrade program will run from 2028 through 2046, with the new tanks expected to enter into service in 2033, DAPA said.

The agency will launch another upgrade project for the new Haeseong-II long-range anti-ship missile, aiming to double its strike range, backed by a more powerful turbofan engine.

With a budget of around 1.63 trillion won, the military aims to complete the development by 2033 and start mass production in 2034.

The upgraded Haeseong-II missiles are expected to be mounted on South Korea’s next-generation KDDX destroyer, a source familiar with the matter said. The government recently signed a formal contract with Hanwha to build its lead ship.

The upgrade plans were approved during DAPA’s key decision-making meeting on Tuesday.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

For most golfers, the biggest hazards are ponds and sand traps. President Donald Trump, the target of frequent attempts on his life, including while golfing, has bigger threats to worry about, especially from Iran. Which is why images and videos have emerged showing U.S. Army Humvee-based Avenger system short-range air defense systems (SHORAD) in the background when Trump hits the links.

The latest such imagery was from Sunday, when Trump was attending the final round of the LIV Golf Bedminster tournament at his New Jersey golf course.

One photo shows Trump wielding a wedge with an Avenger behind concertina wire in the background. There is another photo of an Avenger, but it is unclear it is the same one. There are certainly other protection platforms we don’t see, especially electronic warfare systems.

The White House on Monday confirmed the authenticity of the photos to us.

The following video shows the Avenger and an AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel air defense radar in the background.

As if to highlight the concerns, while Trump was at Bedminster on Sunday, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) F-16 Fighting Falcons intercepted two general aviation aircraft that violated the Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) airspace over the area.

“All general aviation aircraft were safely escorted out of the area by NORAD aircraft,” the command stated on X.

On Aug. 1, the White House shared a video of Trump talking with soldiers at Bedminster. In the background was an Avenger.

“I’m not worried about missiles and drones,” the president joked.

“We got it covered,” a colonel responded with a smile, pointing his right thumb over his shoulder to the Humvee-mounted SHORAD system.

The Avengers, which fire Stinger heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, are a fast-reacting point defense asset, and do make some sense for protecting a golfing president. They have been upgraded to deal with drones and there is also a known rooftop Avenger missile turret near the White House for air defense purposes, which was installed not long after 9/11.

When deployed to assist the Secret Service in protecting POTUS, the Avenger systems are operated by the 263rd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, NORAD told us. A spokesperson declined to provide further details about how often the Avengers are used this way.

Drone technology, including first-person view types and those equipped with fiber optics, is rapidly proliferating around the world and Iran has been both a user and distributor of these weapons.

Trump, as we noted earlier in this story, has already been the subject of several assassination attempts and threats. A number of these threats involve golf. The most recent incident came earlier this month. 

“Authorities arrested a suspect who was allegedly photographing and recording security preparations ahead of a scheduled fundraising dinner at the Trump National Golf Club in Rancho Palos Verdes, California,” Fox News reported. “The suspect, Jeanine John Taele, 38, was found carrying a 16-round magazine loaded with ammunition, while investigators recovered an additional pistol and a fake ‘security protection agent’ badge from his truck.”

Prior to that, there was an attempt against Trump on Sept. 15, 2024, at the Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Florida. 

As Trump golfed, a Secret Service agent conducting a perimeter security sweep saw the partially obscured face of a man in the brush along the fence line near the sixth hole, according to a Justice Department media release at the time. 

“The agent observed the barrel of a rifle aimed directly at him,” the release stated. “As the agent began backing away, he saw the rifle barrel move, and the agent fired” at the man, later identified as Ryan Wesley Routh, 58, of Hawaii. Routh survived and is currently in prison awaiting trial.

A few months earlier, on July 13, 2024, at a campaign event in Butler, Pennsylvania, a man fired a shot at Trump, then the Republican presidential nominee. Thomas Matthew Crooks, 20, of Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, was later killed, and a bloodied Trump was whisked away. 

Prior to those attempts, Iran made a golf-related threat against Trump.

An image highly suggestive of a drone targeting the then-former President Trump on a golf course in a “vengeance” strike in retaliation for the death of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani was posted on Twitter by an account for Iran’s then-Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The U.S. military killed Soleimani in a drone strike in Iraq in January 2020, which had already prompted public threats from Iranian officials, including against Trump specifically.

Twitter suspended the @khamenei_site account around 15 hours after the post when the image first appeared on Jan. 21, 2020.

Khamenei himself was killed Feb. 28 during the opening night of Operation Epic Fury.

There has been extreme concern for Trump’s safety following the launch of that operation, with an Iranian revenge hit on the president being more plausible now than ever. This has triggered major changes in safety protocols, some of which have made headline news.

The Avenger isn’t the only specialized vehicle used to protect Trump while he golfs. As we previously reported, during a golf outing with his son Eric at his course in Scotland last year, Trump was trailed by an armored Polaris Ranger X utility task vehicle (UTV) designed to provide ballistic protection. The vehicle, dubbed Golf Force One by the press, was “part of the Presidential fleet of specialty vehicles,” a White House spokesperson told The War Zone at the time. The White House provided no further details. Trump was in Scotland to host a meeting with former British Prime Minister Keir Starmer at his resort, where security was beefed up.

So the next time you are having a tough time on the course, just remember this. At least you probably don’t need a Stinger-launching weapons system to ensure you make it safely to the clubhouse.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

China’s test of a nuclear-capable missile into the Pacific has exposed the growing divisions among Pacific island nations over the increasing militarisation of a region they have sought to preserve as an “Ocean of Peace”.

The July launch, China’s first known ballistic-missile test into the Pacific since September 2024, took place just hours after Fiji and Australia signed a major defence treaty, marking Fiji’s first formal alliance. The timing highlighted the increasingly complex security environment in a region where China, the United States and their allies are competing for influence.

More than a month after the test, Pacific Islands foreign ministers were unable to agree on a collective statement condemning Beijing’s missile launch, despite individual leaders expressing concern about the growing military presence in the region.

Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko described the test as “totally inappropriate”, while stressing that China remained a close friend and ally of Papua New Guinea. He said Beijing had provided advance notice of the launch but had not given details about where the missile would land.

China defended the test, saying it had been conducted safely and urging countries not to over-interpret the launch.

Growing Military Activity in the Pacific

The missile test came after a year of increasingly visible military activity across the Pacific, a region that has become a major arena of strategic competition between the United States and China.

Chinese naval deployments and live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea have coincided with U.S.-allied military exercises around Guam and Hawaii. Warship visits and expanding security partnerships have also increased across the region.

The United States retains a substantial military presence in the Pacific, including in Hawaii, Guam and the Marshall Islands.

For Pacific island governments, the growing military presence creates an increasingly difficult choice. Security partnerships can provide valuable capabilities for surveillance, disaster response, policing and training, but they can also increase the possibility that Pacific territory and waters become incorporated into wider strategic competition.

Tuvalu permanent foreign secretary Pasuna Tuaga expressed concern about the broader militarisation of the region, including security arrangements such as the AUKUS partnership between Australia, Britain and the United States.

Pacific Nations United in Principle but Divided in Practice

Pacific leaders endorsed the Ocean of Peace Declaration in September 2025, committing themselves to protecting the region and strengthening international peace and security.

The initiative reflected a long-standing desire among Pacific states to ensure that their security agenda is not dictated by larger external powers.

The defence agreement between Australia and Fiji, known as the Ocean of Peace Alliance, emerged from this broader regional framework.

But the growing number of security partnerships has created an inherent contradiction. Pacific governments want greater security capabilities while simultaneously opposing the militarisation of their region.

Australia and other partners argue that defence cooperation can strengthen regional resilience. Critics, however, fear that expanding bilateral arrangements could eventually leave Pacific nations with less influence over how their territory, waters and infrastructure are used.

Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Rick Houenipwela said the regional agenda must remain “conceived by the Pacific, shaped by the Pacific and only by the Pacific.”

Yet the failure to produce a unified response to China’s missile test demonstrated just how difficult that principle is to implement.

China Divides Regional Consensus

The disagreement over the missile test reflects the different political and economic interests of Pacific island nations.

Kiribati and Nauru, which have deepened their relations with Beijing after switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan, did not support the wording of the proposed statement, according to an official familiar with the discussions.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters blamed foreign influence for the failure to reach consensus, although he did not identify a particular country.

The disagreement demonstrates that Pacific nations do not share a uniform approach toward China.

Some governments see Beijing as an important economic and diplomatic partner, while others are increasingly concerned about its military activities and the strategic implications of its expanding regional presence.

At the same time, many Pacific governments remain wary of becoming closely aligned with either China or the Western powers.

The Security Dilemma Facing the Pacific

The central problem for Pacific nations is the tension between security and strategic autonomy.

Countries require surveillance capabilities, military training, disaster-response mechanisms and other security resources. Defence partnerships can provide those capabilities.

But greater reliance on external powers can also make it more difficult for Pacific governments to maintain an independent regional agenda.

Fiji Foreign Minister Sakiasi Ditoka acknowledged this tension, saying countries wanted to be free from “war-making paraphernalia” while also recognising that some security capabilities helped keep them safe.

Fiji’s participation for the first time in U.S.-led RIMPAC military exercises further illustrates this balancing act.

The country is simultaneously promoting the idea of an Ocean of Peace while becoming more involved in established regional security structures.

Analysis: The Pacific Is Becoming a Strategic Battleground

The significance of China’s missile test goes beyond the launch itself. It has exposed the growing gap between the Pacific’s aspiration to remain an “Ocean of Peace” and the strategic realities surrounding it.

The region is increasingly being shaped by competing security partnerships, military exercises and the expanding strategic presence of major powers. China is becoming more active militarily, while the United States, Australia and their partners are strengthening their own defence relationships.

For Pacific island states, the challenge is therefore not simply whether to oppose China’s military activities. It is how to respond to them without allowing the Pacific’s security agenda to become dominated by great-power rivalry.

The failure to agree on a common statement is particularly significant because regional unity is one of the Pacific’s strongest tools for maintaining its diplomatic autonomy. When governments cannot agree on how to respond to a major security development, external powers gain greater room to shape the regional agenda.

At the same time, completely rejecting security partnerships would leave many Pacific states without capabilities they consider increasingly necessary. The result is a difficult balancing act: accepting enough external security assistance to address genuine threats while preventing those partnerships from transforming the region into a military theatre.

China’s missile test therefore exposes a deeper strategic dilemma. The more Pacific states seek security through external alliances, the greater the risk that the region becomes militarised; yet the more they reject those partnerships, the harder it may become to respond to an increasingly competitive security environment.

The upcoming Pacific Islands Forum leaders’ meeting in Palau is likely to bring these questions back to the centre of regional diplomacy. The key issue will be whether Pacific nations can establish a collective security approach that protects their interests without allowing the strategic competition between China and Western powers to define the future of the region.

With information from Reuters.

Iran-backed Houthis have resumed attacks on Yemen’s al-Makha port in the Red Sea, striking Saudi weapons depots with missiles and drones. Yemen’s military says at least seven people were killed.

The latest Houthi attacks come less than 24 hours after an earlier barrage struck al-Makha (Mocha) and its commercial port.

Yemen’s Houthis have launched a new wave of missile and drone attacks on the Red Sea port city of al-Makha (Mocha), extending an assault on government-held areas along Yemen’s western coast and killing at least 11 people.

The latest attacks came on Sunday evening, less than 24 hours after an earlier barrage struck al-Makha and its commercial port. Yemeni government forces said air defences intercepted six drones during the renewed assault, while two ballistic missiles fell into the sea without hitting their targets.

Footage broadcast by the Houthi-affiliated Al Masirah TV showed several ballistic missiles and drones being launched. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said the operation targeted Saudi troop concentrations and weapon depots in the area, according to the Reuters news agency.

At least 11 killed

Earlier on Sunday, Attacks on al-Makha killed at least 11 people, including eight military personnel and three civilians, and wounded 32 others, according to the latest toll cited by the AFP news agency.

The strikes also caused extensive damage at al-Makha’s port. Government authorities said buildings and commercial facilities were hit, while The Associated Press reported damage to port infrastructure, commercial goods and food supplies.

Government forces also said they intercepted and destroyed an unmanned explosive boat approaching the commercial port.

During the renewed attacks later on Sunday, the National Resistance Forces, which are aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognised government, urged residents of al-Makha to remain indoors, accusing the Houthis of carrying out indiscriminate shelling.

Houthis say Saudi military buildup prompted attack

The Houthis said the operation involved a large number of ballistic missiles and drones and was launched in response to an alleged continued Saudi military buildup, including the reinforcement of allied forces with weapons and equipment along Yemen’s western coast and in Taiz province.

Houthi political council member Hizam al-Assad separately claimed that continuing explosions, fires and columns of smoke from the port were caused by large quantities of weapons and military equipment stored there.

Attacks extend to al-Khokha

The escalation was not limited to al-Makha, but also targeted the al-Khokha district, south of the coastal city of Hodeidah.

Al-Jumhuriya television, which is affiliated with the National Resistance Forces led by Presidential Leadership Council member Tareq Saleh, said the government-appointed governor of Hodeidah, al-Hassan Taher, survived an assassination attempt on Sunday after a Houthi ballistic missile struck his residence in the district.

From recent satellite imagery, the Russian Navy now looks to be using nets to protect submarines from drone attacks at a highly strategic base on the country’s far eastern Kamchatka Peninsula. There are also signs that Russian forces have been taking new steps at a separate base along the Black Sea to shield submarines against uncrewed aerial threats. The appearance of the nets over the submarines at the base in Kamchatka point to how Russia’s concerns about drone threats have extended to critical facilities far removed from the battlefields of Ukraine.

TWZ obtained the imagery showing the netting in place over submarines at the Russian Navy’s base at Rybachiy from Vantor. Business insider was first to report on these images. Rybachiy is notably the homeport for the vast majority of Borei and Borei-A class nuclear ballistic missile submarines, or SSBNs, in service in Russia today. It is also home to various other guided missile and attack submarines assigned to the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet.

Images of Rybachiy from Vantor taken on August 4, seen at the top of this story and below, show several different types of submarines fully covered by nets. What is visible in the imagery is broadly consistent with netting that Russian forces have employed in and around Ukraine as a countermeasure against kamikaze drone attacks against assets on the ground and in the water. Similar netting has also observed in use by other armed forces elsewhere globally.

Russian forces at Rybachiy look to have started using these nets back in May based on additional imagery from Vantor. The imagery from May and August show crane barges being used to help erect the nets around submarines at their moorings.

As an aside, floating booms are also seen strung around the piers at Rybachiy. This is something else that is now commonplace at naval bases across Russia, and can help provide an additional barrier to certain threats on or near the surface, particularly explosive-laden kamikaze drone boats.

On Tuesday, the Ministry of Defense in the United Kingdom also published additional imagery from Vantor of the Russian Navy’s base in Novorossiysk along the Black Sea taken back on June 13. The images show several Kilo class attack submarines partially submerged in port. Three of the boats also appear to have anti-drone armor screens installed over their conning towers. A cursory review of additional satellite imagery in Planet Labs’ archive suggests screens were a relatively new additional at that time.

“The Russian Black Sea Fleet has equipped three of its four Kilo class submarines with counter-UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] cages covering the vessels’ conning towers. This was applied as a preventive measure in response to Ukraine’s increased ability to strike targets further from the front line,” according to an accompanying assessment from British authorities earlier this week. “Analysis of commercial satellite imagery dated 13 June 2026 identified that three of the submarines had loosened their moorings and had submerged within the basin. Whilst the majority of the hull was below the surface, their conning towers remained above the waterline, explaining the need for the counter-UAS cage.”

“The fourth submarine, which had not been fitted with a counter-UAS cage, had slipped its mooring lines, manoeuvred away from nearby surface vessels and submerged within the harbour, its conning tower visible above the waterline,” the British government’s assessment continued. “The lack of a counter-UAS cage likely signifies this vessel has been de-prioritised compared to the other three.”

TWZ has also now obtained the June 13 image of Novorossiysk directly from Vantor, as well as another one taken on June 17, which shows the submarines surfaced and at their moorings as usual. This, in turn raises questions about whether or not the boats were submerged in response an attack or indications that one might be imminent. There could be another explanation for why the submarines were temporarily submerged in port, including a force protection readiness exercise in preparation for such an incident.

Growing threats posed by uncrewed aerial systems, as well as uncrewed surface vessels (USV), have already had a marked impact on the establishment of new defensive capabilities and force protection postures at Russian naval and other facilities. This is especially true of sites in more immediate proximity to Ukraine.

Back in 2024, satellite imagery of Novorossiysk notably showed that forces there had painted a silhouette of a submarine and built an actual mock conning tower on a pier at the base. This reflected a broader trend at the time to implement countermeasures against Ukrainian munitions with autonomous image-matching targeting capabilities.

Also in 2024, what looked to be additional overhead protection against drone attacks appeared on the Delta-IV class nuclear ballistic missile submarine Tula at the Russian Navy’s base in Gadzhiyevo in the country’s far northern Murmansk region. What was seen fitted to Tula at that time very rudimentary compared to what has now been seen erected over submarines at Novorossiysk and Rybachiy, which offers far greater and more elaborate coverage . More extensive counter-drone screens have also now appeared on other types of Russian naval vessels.

Ukrainian forces only continue to expand the area, both at sea and on land, that they can hold at risk with uncrewed systems, as well as more traditional missiles. As it stands now, Ukraine uses its ever more diverse arsenal of long-range kamikaze drones and cruise missiles to strike targets across whole swaths of Western Russia, including around the capital Moscow, on a near daily basis.

Footage of a Ukrainian FP-2 attack drone slamming into a Russian Wildberries distribution center in Yekaterinburg this morning.

The Russian distribution center, hit by multiple Ukrainian drones, is now ablaze. pic.twitter.com/W2r9t6f9q1

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) August 7, 2026

Ukrainian kamikaze USVs also regularly prowl the Black Sea. Submarines at Novorossiysk, as well as bases on the occupied Crimean Peninsula, have been the wide array of targets struck. There sas another daytime USV attack just yesterday on the Russian-occupied port of Yalta in Crimea. It’s also worth noting here that Ukraine has developed USVs capable of launching kamikaze UAS, combining those two capabilities and creating additional threat vectors Russia’s force have to contend with. In addition, Ukraine now has the ability to hit even moving targets using long-range drones equipped with miniaturized satellite communications terminals. This leaves even ships not sitting static in port very much at risk, which Ukraine has highlighted in recent months as it goes after Russia’s logistics ships in the Sea of Azov, a campaign that is only accelerating and spreading.

As noted, the appearance of the nets at Rybachiy, which sits thousands of miles from Ukraine, speaks to how much further the threat of drone attacks has expanded. This goes beyond long-range strikes, as well. Ukraine’s unprecedented Operation Spiderweb attacks on Russian airbases last year highlighted the dangers posed by near-field attacks launched from deep inside hostile territory closer to their actual targets. Bases in Russia’s far eastern regions were among those targeted in the clandestine operation. Ukrainian forces have also launched attacks on Russian-linked ships in the Mediterranean Sea.

СБУ показала унікальні кадри спецоперації «Павутина», у результаті якої уражено 41 військовий літак стратегічної авіації рф

➡️ https://t.co/OSxqEsI9CD pic.twitter.com/aGSZNEsoX3

— СБ України (@ServiceSsu) June 4, 2025

The russian terrorist state no longer has the ability to produce Tu-95s or any kind of strategic bomber. This is a tremendous victory for Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/SVeQE78v0h

— Michael MacKay (@mhmck) June 1, 2025

It also worth mentioning here that just this week, a small quadcopter drone equipped with explosive payload was discovered at next to Ukrainian An-124 cargo plane at an airport in Germany. CNN reported today that U.S. authorities have now assessed that uncrewed aerial system to have belonged to a Russian intelligence service. This follows year now of concerning drone incursions over military bases and other critical infrastructure across Western Europe.

Just this week, the US assessed that an explosive-laden drone discovered at an airport in Germany overnight on Wednesday belonged to a Russian intelligence service, a US defense official in Europe told CNN — https://t.co/axn5uQRTiG

— Haley Britzky (@halbritz) August 7, 2026

Uncrewed aerial threats large and small are not at all limited to the context of the conflict in Ukraine and spillover from it into Europe, either. Drones have been a major factor in the conflict this year with Iran, as well as in other crises in and around the Middle East in recent years.

With the barrier to entry so low, drone threats are only becoming more commonplace globally as they proliferate to increasingly more capable degrees even among smaller nation state armed forces and non-state actors. For the U.S. government, counter-drone defenses for military installations and other critical infrastructure within the homeland, as to protect forces abroad, has become a major priority. Still, American authorities continue to lag in many respects in responding to the serious dangers that very present already.

Altogether, the expansion of counter-drone defenses around submarines at the Russian Navy’s bases at Rybachiy and Novorossiysk reflect very immediate threats emanating from Ukraine, but are also a sign of larger trends globally. Similar force protection measures could well continue to emerge elsewhere, and not just in Russia.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Australia will become the first nation outside the United States to field the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), following the announcement of a nearly A$736 million (approximately $480 million) procurement that will significantly expand the Royal Australian Air Force’s air combat capabilities. The acquisition comes as Australia, like the United States, is increasingly focused on maintaining an edge in beyond-visual-range air combat against China’s rapidly advancing airpower, including long-reaching air-to-air missiles.

The acquisition was announced by Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles during Exercise Pitch Black in Darwin, the country’s premier multinational air combat exercise. The missiles will be acquired through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

“This announcement is the latest milestone in the delivery of long-range, high‑tech capabilities for our Defense Force,” Marles said. “The Albanese government continues to deliver critical capabilities that will allow the ADF to strike at a longer range, deter any adversary and protect our national interests. It is fitting to make this announcement at Exercise Pitch Black, which is an important demonstration of Australia’s commitment to the peace, stability and security of our region.”

According to the Australian government, the Lockheed Martin AIM-260 will first be integrated onto the RAAF’s F/A-18F Super Hornet fleet before being fielded on the F-35A and the EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft. Looking further ahead, the RAAF’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) is a likely candidate to be armed with JATM. It has already fired an AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) from an external pylon, and the forthcoming Block 3 version of the drone will offer internal weapons carriage, too.

The integration of the AIM-260 on the EA-18G appears to be a new announcement; previously, the priority U.S. platforms to receive the missile were the F/A-18E/F and the F-22. However, considering the commonality between the Super Hornet and the Growler, integration should be straight-forward.

“JATM missiles are some of the most sophisticated air-to-air weapons in the world, and Australia will be the first country to operate them outside the United States,” added Australian Minister for Defense Industry, Pat Conroy. “This investment will deliver the most advanced capability for our ADF to detect and counter threats, and keep Australians safe. This is made possible thanks to the Albanese government’s record investment in Defense, including up to A$36 billion [approximately US$23.4 billion] over the next decade for Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance.”

The AIM-260 has been under development for years, but its capabilities remain highly classified. It is intended to succeed the AMRAAM, offering substantially greater range and improved performance against advanced threats while remaining compatible with existing fighter aircraft launchers and weapons bays restrictions. The AMRAAM is currently the primary beyond-visual-range air combat weapon currently used by the RAAF’s F/A-18Fs and F-35As.

As you can read about here, the first picture of the AIM-260 emerged in May of this year, involving an F/A-18F from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 31 (VX-31) carrying the weapon on the fuselage station outboard of its right engine intake. Flight testing of the JATM is known to have started years earlier, however.

Although official specifications have never been released, the AIM-260 is reportedly designed to hit targets out to at least 120 miles, if not substantially further. It was designed in response to China’s long-range PL-15 air-to-air missile, restoring the U.S. and allied advantage in beyond-visual-range aerial combat. Being developed by the U.S. Navy in cooperation with the Air Force, the missile is expected to combine a compact form factor similar to the AIM-120 with significantly greater engagement range, allowing aircraft to carry the same number of weapons without sacrificing performance. It is also designed for internal carriage.

As TWZ has previously written:

“An advanced rocket motor with highly loaded propellant has long been seen as a likely route to give the AIM-260A significantly greater range, as well as speed, over the AIM-120 without making the new missile larger. A core known requirement for the JATM is that it has to have the same general form factor as the AMRAAM, in large part to ensure that it can fit inside the internal bays on stealth fighters like the F-22 and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In addition to crewed aircraft, AIM-260As are expected to arm future stealthy drones like the ones under development under the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program.”

…

“The AIM-260A’s rocket motor is also likely to be a dual-pulse design that retains energy across the flight envelope to further extend range and help dramatically with endgame maneuverability. Thrust vectoring capability would also be a requisite to give the missile sufficient agility in the absence of additional control surfaces.”

…

“An active electronically scanned array radar (AESA) seeker is likely. Multi-mode seeker capability, potentially with imaging infrared and passive radiofrequency (RF) guidance capabilities, could be extremely valuable in the face of an ever-expanding countermeasure ecosystem, although we have no idea if this is a feature now or not. It’s also possible it could be introduced in later variants. Advanced networking capabilities would be a key feature, allowing the missile to get additional targeting information from an array of third-party sources. This is especially important for engaging targets beyond the reach of the launch platform’s own sensors, and it can allow the aircraft firing the missile, especially a stealthy one, to avoid having to switch on its radar and increase its vulnerability to detection as a result. Multiple networked JATMs might even be able to prosecute engagements cooperatively.”

U.S. Air Force officials have publicly acknowledged that the PL-15 was a key driver behind the AIM-260 program. According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the Chinese missile “out-ranges the U.S.-made AIM-120C/D AMRAAM series and has a comparable maximum range to the Meteor.”

The PL-15 is already widely fielded, while China has also developed even longer-range air-to-air missiles, including the much larger PL-17. This weapon is widely believed to be optimized for engaging high-value support aircraft, such as aerial refueling tankers and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, at extreme distances. We have previously taken a closer look at the still largely mysterious PL-17 here.

Those two Chinese missiles are also expected to be joined by a new weapon currently referred to as the PL-16. The missile appears to have been developed to allow the J-20 to carry six long-range air-to-air missiles internally, rather than the four PL-15s it currently accommodates. While expected to retain a broadly similar overall design to the PL-15, the PL-16 is believed to use a compressed-carriage configuration, reducing its size to maximize the J-20’s internal missile load. In that respect, the PL-16 appears conceptually similar to the AIM-260, in its emphasis on internal carriage capacity.

The air-to-air threat in the Indo-Pacific is only set to increase, with the potential for the carriage of larger numbers of even bigger and further-reaching air-to-air missiles in the capacious weapons bays of new-generation Chinese combat aircraft.

As TWZ has reported in the past, the U.S. Air Force envisions a future in which counter-air missiles could engage targets at ranges of up to 1,000 miles by 2050. While such capabilities remain decades away and far exceed the reach of today’s longest-range air defense missiles, the projection underscores the trajectory of long-range aerial warfare and the growing emphasis on extending engagement distances.

Another U.S. response to China’s growing long-range air-to-air missile capability is the AIM-174B, currently carried by U.S. Navy F/A-18E/Fs. Derived from the SM-6 surface-to-air missile family, it is substantially larger and heavier than the AIM-260, trading compact size for dramatically greater engagement range.

How The Navy’s New Very Long-Range AIM-174 Will Pierce China’s Anti-Access Bubble

RAAF officials have previously indicated that Australia has no plans to acquire the AIM-174B, according to FlightGlobal.

Australia’s decision to procure the missile aligns with its broader effort to modernize the Australian Defence Force’s long-range strike and air defense capabilities amid an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific security environment, in which the threat posed by China’s rapidly expanding military capabilities is paramount. Canberra’s recently released 2026 National Defence Strategy emphasizes the importance of a layered air and missile defense architecture capable of countering advanced regional threats.

The government says the AIM-260 will provide the RAAF with a more credible deterrent against hostile aircraft while complementing existing air-to-air missiles and the Australian Defence Force’s expanding inventory of ground-based air defense systems. The acquisition will also improve interoperability with U.S. forces, particularly as both countries increasingly operate together in the Indo-Pacific.

While the government has not disclosed delivery schedules or the number of missiles to be acquired, Australia is now set to become the AIM-260’s first export customer, giving the RAAF access to one of the world’s most advanced beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles once it enters operational service.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Ukraine’s military intelligence says North Korea is preparing to deploy a missile unit to western Russia, which would mark another major expansion of military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang. The report comes as Kyiv warns its dwindling ballistic missile defenses are costing civilian lives.

Andrii Cherniak of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) told Reuters that the deployment will involve approximately 90 North Korean personnel stationed in Russia’s Voronezh region — which borders Ukraine — alongside the Russian military’s 112th Guards Missile Brigade. Ukrainian intelligence assesses the unit could ultimately field six launchers and as many as 120 KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), although the final composition is expected to be determined during senior-level talks next month.

The Ukrainian intelligence assessment has not been independently verified.

If confirmed, the deployment would represent a further deepening of North Korean support for Russia, after supplying Russia with ammunition, smaller numbers of ballistic missiles, and troops.

The Ukrainian Air Force today said Russia launched another major overnight strike combining drones with ballistic missiles. Preliminary figures showed Ukrainian air defenses shot down 98 of the 115 drones launched, but failed to intercept a single ballistic missile. As well as the inherent difficulty of intercepting these threats, this statistic also points to the exhaustion of its Patriot interceptor stockpiles.

The attack killed at least 17 people and injured dozens more after strikes hit multiple locations across Kyiv.

President Volodymyr Zelensky directly linked the casualties to continued shortages of advanced air-defense systems.

“Ballistic missile interceptors could have saved the lives of those killed today,” Zelensky wrote on social media. “It is very important that our partners understand that delays in supplying them, or an unwillingness to provide anti-ballistic systems, lead directly to such horrific casualties and destruction.”

Ukraine has spent months urging Western partners to provide additional Patriot batteries and interceptor missiles, which remain among the few systems capable of defeating ballistic missile threats such as Russia’s Iskander and North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24. While Ukrainian forces routinely claim to intercept the majority of incoming drones and many cruise missiles, ballistic missiles continue to present one of the most difficult threats to defend against.

Last month, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested Washington might grant Ukraine a license to manufacture Patriot interceptors domestically before later appearing to back away from the proposal, saying the technology was “a hard thing to give away.”

According to Ukraine’s military administration, seven sites across Kyiv were struck during the latest attack, which began shortly after midnight. Zelensky said the primary targets included civilian industrial facilities, among them a brewing company and warehouses storing construction materials.

“Partners who are not yet ready to play a more active role in supplying interceptors can help by implementing new sanctions. A significant share of Russia’s ballistic missile production is still not under sanctions,” Zelensky wrote on X. “Even now. New steps are needed — from the G7, the European Union, and everyone who supports the protection of life. Thank you to those who are willing to help in this way.”

Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said rescue operations continued throughout the day.

“There may still be people under the rubble,” he said.

Emergency crews rescued two survivors from a destroyed warehouse near the city center. Klitschko said 24 people were injured, including an ambulance driver, while four remained in critical condition. The strikes also ignited multiple fires at warehouses and industrial sites, while Ukrainian authorities reported an ammonia leak triggered by one of the impacts.

The latest attack coincides with what Ukrainian intelligence says was Russia’s first use of North Korean ballistic missiles since August 2025.

Cherniak told Reuters that Pyongyang recently delivered another batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia, along with additional personnel. He said Russia ultimately expects to receive 120 North Korean ballistic missiles and six launchers.

According to Ukrainian authorities, one of the newly delivered North Korean missiles struck the central Ukrainian village of Radushne last week, flattening a residential home and killing at least five members of the same family.

In the strike on Radushne, for the first time in a while, the Russians used a North Korean missile, according to preliminary data. Of course, more examinations will follow, and everything will be verified, but as of now – it is a North Korean ballistic missile. The alliance… pic.twitter.com/UtTTNGwBUb

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) July 30, 2026

Clearly, any increase in Russia’s ballistic missile inventory poses a serious challenge for Ukraine’s already strained air defenses. The situation is likely to become more difficult heading into the coming winter, when Russia normally steps up its strikes against Ukraine’s electrical grid.

The KN-23, known in North Korea as the Hwasong-11A, is a traditional SRBM that can reach out to around 800 kilometers (497 miles) and has a 500-kilogram (1,102-pound) class unitary high-explosive warhead. It offers greater range than Russia’s 9M723 Iskander SRBM, which carries a similarly sized warhead but has a range of 500 kilometers (311 miles). This weapon has also been fired from adapted railcars, a concept you can read more about here.

As for the KN-24, or Hwasong-11B, this has a range of approximately 410 kilometers (255 miles), making it more of a battlefield support SRBM, but still sufficient for Russia to strike many targets within Ukraine. It is often considered a North Korean analog of the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

However, the North Korean SRBMs are considered less accurate than their Russian-made counterparts and have been associated with strikes causing significant civilian casualties.

According to a report from Ukrainian state prosecutors, around half of the KN-23s that had been launched by Russia between late December 2023 and late February 2024 not only deviated from their trajectory but also exploded in midair.

An investigation by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) into the wreckage of a KN-23/KN-24 missile used by Russia in Ukraine found that the missile contained more than 290 foreign-made electronic components, with approximately 75 percent linked to U.S. companies, 16 percent to European firms, and the remainder to Asian manufacturers. This suggests that North Korea continues to obtain critical Western technology despite longstanding international sanctions and points to continued limitations in Pyongyang’s high-technology production capabilities.

🚨 🇺🇦🇷🇺🇰🇵 Analysis of the debris from one of the North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russia at Ukraine found it was constructed with more than 290 non-domestic electronic components. Many of them were produced by US companies in the last 3 years.

This analysis was conducted… pic.twitter.com/YHwwAZG0Wo

— Colby Badhwar (@ColbyBadhwar) February 20, 2024

North Korea first began supplying KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia in late 2023. Cherniak said Pyongyang delivered approximately 150 ballistic missiles between late 2023 and August 2025. Ukraine also says North Korea has supplied millions of much-needed artillery projectiles and deployed around 14,000 troops to Russia’s Kursk region under the countries’ 2024 mutual defense agreement.

Cherniak said roughly 9,500 North Korean troops remain in Kursk but are not currently engaged in combat operations against Ukraine. Zelensky said last month that Russia is seeking an additional 30,000 North Korean troops and is preparing facilities in the Voronezh region to receive them.

Overall, North Korean-supplied missiles make up only a very small fraction of the weapons used in Russian strikes on Ukraine, but there has long been concern about the direction the burgeoning military relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang could take. There have been particular concerns that Russian expertise in the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons — as well as other weapons and technologies — could be provided to North Korea.

North Korea: Kim Jong-un shows unseen nuclear weapons to Russia’s defence minister

The reported new deployment comes as Russia appears to be increasing its reliance on ballistic missiles to exploit one of Ukraine’s most significant military vulnerabilities. With few signs that Russia has been able to further ramp up production of its own Iskander missiles, an increased supply of North Korean ballistic missiles would take advantage of a gap in Ukrainian air defenses and further threaten its cities, energy infrastructure, and other targets. The bigger concern is not simply another shipment of missiles, but the prospect of Russia tapping into an expanding North Korean production base financed by Moscow, allowing it to sustain high-volume ballistic missile attacks for far longer than it otherwise could.

Ukraine’s ability to defeat ballistic missiles of any origin has become increasingly constrained by the availability of interceptor missiles. Patriot remains the primary system capable of reliably engaging Iskander, KN-23, and KN-24 ballistic missiles, but the U.S.-made interceptors are expensive, produced in relatively modest numbers, and are also needed to meet U.S. and allied needs around the world. European-supplied SAMP/T batteries also provide a limited anti-ballistic capability, but have been provided in only limited numbers so far.

Global demand for Patriot interceptors has surged amid conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, straining U.S. and allied inventories and production capacity. Those constraints have become significant enough that Congress has questioned whether the Pentagon can sustain higher transfer rates to Ukraine even as Kyiv presses for more interceptors. Meanwhile, although the United States continues discussing licensed Patriot production with Ukraine, any domestic manufacturing effort would take many months—if not years—to produce missiles in meaningful numbers, leaving Kyiv dependent on allied deliveries for the foreseeable future.

Whether or not the reported North Korean missile unit deployment materializes, the operational trend is becoming increasingly clear. Russia is continuing to expand the scale and complexity of its long-range strike campaigns, pairing mass drone attacks with growing numbers of ballistic missiles specifically intended to exploit one of Ukraine’s most difficult defensive challenges. As Kyiv’s leadership continues to press for additional Patriot batteries and interceptor missiles, the consequences of those shortages are becoming increasingly evident with every large-scale strike.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

China’s ballistic missile arsenal has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past two decades. Once centered on a relatively small force of nuclear missiles designed primarily for deterrence, which we discussed in the first part of this series, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) now fields the world’s largest — and one of the most diverse — conventional and nuclear-armed ballistic missile forces. Among its increasingly advanced regional ballistic missiles are several types that are capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, further complicating crisis stability.

Ranging from short-range systems optimized for a Taiwan contingency to intermediate-range weapons capable of striking Guam and threatening U.S. naval forces deep into the Western Pacific, these regional missiles have become the backbone of Beijing’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. The land-based examples are road-mobile, solid-fueled, and increasingly precise. Some are fitted with hypersonic or maneuvering warheads to further complicate the work of an adversary’s air defenses. As of last year, the Pentagon assessed that China fielded 600 missiles in the ‘boosted hypersonic’ category, which includes systems carrying hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) as well as air-launched ballistic missiles, also covered in this article.

This guide examines China’s principal short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile systems, how they evolved, and the roles they are expected to play in any future conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

In this context, a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) refers to a ballistic missile with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), typically intended for battlefield or nearby regional targets; a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) covers ranges of 1,000-3,000 kilometers (621-1,864 miles) and is designed to strike targets across a broader region; and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) has a range of 3,000-5,500 kilometers (1,864-3,418 miles), enabling it to reach distant regional targets.

This article also discusses multiple missiles that carry either a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) or a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV). These weapon types can potentially be adapted to hit moving vessels. A MaRV follows a roughly ballistic path to its impact point, maneuvering to improve terminal accuracy and defeat missile defenses. If paired with a seeker, among other alterations, they can potentially be used to strike ships. Meanwhile, unlike a traditional ballistic reentry vehicle, an HGV is designed to be boosted to high speed and released before proceeding along a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path to its target. It remains maneuverable throughout much of its flight, allowing it to change course and vary its altitude. That combination of sustained hypersonic speed and unpredictable flight profile makes it far more difficult to successfully engage, while also reducing the time air defenses have to defend against it — provided they even have weapons that can successfully do so.

Short-range ballistic missiles

The PLARF fields multiple variants of the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-16 SRBM families. Among their most important roles is to hold Taiwan and the southern reaches of the Japanese archipelago at risk. Ongoing modernization efforts to improve accuracy, survivability, and operational flexibility underscore the continued importance of these systems, particularly for a cross-Strait campaign. Just as significant is their sheer quantity, which would enable sustained strikes against the many military and infrastructure targets that would need to be engaged in a major conflict.

DF-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2)

The origins of the DF-11 can be traced back to 1985, and work on a new single-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile. The initial requirement called for a 300-kilometer (186-mile) range, matching that of the widely used Soviet Scud-B, using a similar road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). However, development trailed the DF-15, culminating in a successful flight test in mid-1990.

The DF-11 entered PLARF service in 1992, but work on an improved version reportedly began almost immediately. Development of the DF-11A started as early as 1993 and focused primarily on extending the missile’s reach to approximately 600 kilometers (373 miles), effectively doubling the range of the original design. Following its maiden flight in 1997, the program was publicly acknowledged the following year, and the DF-11A formally entered Chinese service in 1999.

China also developed a specialized bunker-busting variant known as the DF-11AZT, reportedly entering service in 2013. Believed to use the DF-11A airframe, the missile replaces the standard high-explosive payload with a penetrator warhead optimized for attacking hardened and fortified targets. Images of the system surfaced in Chinese media in 2016, followed by the release of footage showing a 2013 test launch the following year.

Although rumors have periodically claimed the DF-11 family can carry a nuclear warhead, the available evidence does not support that assessment. Today, it appears that only one brigade still operates the system.

DF-15 (CSS-6)

China began developing a new generation of conventionally armed, mobile SRBMs during the 1980s, mainly with export customers in mind. The DF-15 has evolved through several iterations, although publicly available information on the missile family remains fragmented and, in some cases, contradictory. The first major upgrade, the DF-15A, reportedly entered service in 1996 and has occasionally been described as being capable of carrying a nuclear payload. However, the only PLARF brigade still believed to operate the variant is consistently identified in open-source assessments as a conventional missile unit. Estimates of its maximum range are equally inconsistent, with figures ranging from the original 600 kilometers (373 miles) to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles).

A more substantial redesign followed with the DF-15B (CSS-6 Mod 3), which reportedly entered operational service around 2006 before making its public debut during China’s military parade in 2009. The most obvious external change is its triconic reentry vehicle fitted with control fins, a configuration widely interpreted as incorporating a MaRV warhead.

Around 2013, another variant, the DF-15C (CSS-6 Mod 2), reportedly entered service. Based on the shape of its warhead, the missile is widely believed to be optimized for attacks against hardened and deeply buried targets, much like the previous DF-11AZT.

The DF-15 remains in service with only a small number of PLARF brigades and appears to be steadily giving way to the newer, longer-ranged, and more capable DF-16.

In 2022, the PLARF fired multiple DF-15s into the waters around Taiwan during live-fire drills following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This reflects the fact that missiles in this category remain central to any contingency involving the island.

DF-16 (CSS-11)

Another conventionally armed mobile SRBM, the DF-16 has steadily replaced the DF-15. Although it made its public debut during China’s 2015 military parade, the missile is widely believed to have entered PLARF service several years earlier, around 2011 or 2012. Nevertheless, Much about the DF-16 remains unclear.

The DF-16 closely resembles the older DF-15, but lacks the prominent aerodynamic fins found on its predecessor. This suggests the missile relies on a more advanced guidance and flight-control system capable of maintaining stability without the need for large external control surfaces. There is also some uncertainty about its range: this could potentially surpass 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), a threshold that would place it in the MRBM category.

Stills from a video showing a test of a DF-16 with a submunitions warhead:

DF-16 from mid 2010s, with a submunition warhead.

Employment of submunition warheads against land based targets is well established, but for the PLA, their use for large and medium naval targets from AShBMs are more interesting especially from a mission kill pov. pic.twitter.com/m6S4QFAgDS

— Rick Joe (@RickJoe_PLA) March 8, 2026

A version equipped with what appears to be a MaRV, commonly identified as the DF-16A (CSS-11 Mod 2), was spotted in footage of a Chinese military exercise released in early 2017, indicating it was already operational by that point. Chinese state media later revealed another DF-16 warhead configuration in 2018, widely interpreted as evidence of a further variant, the DF-16B (CSS-11 Mod 3?). Despite the emergence of multiple versions, open-source reporting consistently indicates that the DF-16 family is intended exclusively for conventional strike missions.

Medium-range ballistic missiles

Over the past decade, Beijing has invested heavily in modernizing both the quality and quantity of its medium-range ballistic missile forces. Today, it fields a diverse mix of MRBMs, backed up by long-range land-attack cruise missiles, capable of executing both conventional and nuclear missions across the Indo-Pacific. All of these MRBMs are road-mobile, carried on wheeled TELs, and powered by solid-fuel rocket motors, allowing them to disperse rapidly, launch with minimal preparation, and complicate efforts to destroy them either before or after firing.

DF-17 (CSS-22)

One of the PLARF’s most significant recent additions is the DF-17, the world’s first operational ballistic missile designed from the outset to deliver an HGV. Publicly unveiled during China’s 70th anniversary military parade in 2019, the system is estimated to have entered service shortly beforehand.

With an estimated range of 1,800-2,200 kilometers (1,118-1,367 miles), the DF-17 can reach targets across Taiwan, South Korea, and most of Japan, as well as U.S. military facilities throughout the First Island Chain. Traveling at speeds reportedly approaching Mach 10, the DF-17 could cover its maximum range in roughly a dozen minutes, representing a far more difficult target for existing air and missile defense systems.

The PLARF would likely employ the DF-17 during the opening stages of a conflict to neutralize high-value assets, including integrated air and missile defense sites, long-range radars, command-and-control nodes, and other time-sensitive targets, thereby improving the effectiveness of follow-on strikes by less advanced missile systems.

Although Beijing maintains that the DF-17 is conventionally armed, Chinese media and senior U.S. military officials have suggested the missile may also possess a nuclear capability. If confirmed, it would join several other PLARF missile systems believed to be dual-capable, further complicating an adversary’s ability to distinguish between conventional and nuclear strikes during a crisis, and potentially increasing the risk of miscalculation.

Reports have also periodically pointed to the development of an anti-ship variant, which would further expand the DF-17’s role within China’s growing long-range precision strike arsenal.

DF-21

The origins of the DF-21 can be traced back to the late 1970s, when China began working in earnest on solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Following successful tests of a large-diameter solid rocket motor in 1978, development of the road-mobile DF-21 accelerated (as did work on a larger solid-fueled missile that would eventually evolve into the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile and its submarine-launched counterpart, the JL-2, both described in the first part of this feature).

The DF-21 completed its maiden successful test in 1985 and rapidly entered operational service with the PLA. The original DF-21 carried a single nuclear warhead and formed the backbone of China’s first generation of solid-fuel strategic missile forces. Its range is estimated at more than 1,750 kilometers (1,087 miles).

Even before the original DF-21 entered widespread service, work had begun on an improved version. Approved in 1986, the DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2) focused on reducing structural weight while increasing propellant capacity, extending the missile’s range and improving overall performance. Flight testing began in 1991, and by the mid-1990s the PLA had begun replacing the original DF-21 with the upgraded variant.

The DF-21 subsequently evolved from a purely nuclear deterrent into a remarkably versatile missile family. Around 2004, the PLA fielded the DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 4), widely believed to be the first conventionally armed member of the series. Designed for precision land attack, the missile introduced an entirely new mission for the DF-21 but also highlighted a growing escalation risk. The DF-21C appears to have been retired, with surviving units reportedly having transitioned to newer missile systems.

Public information on a supposed DF-21B remains sparse. The designation may have referred to an intermediate development fitted with a MaRV before that technology matured into the much better-known DF-21D.

China’s Dong-Feng 21 “carrier killer” Salvo Launch

It was the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) that really brought the missile family into the spotlight, as one of China’s most closely watched strategic weapons. Public attention surged in 2010 after a senior U.S. Navy officer stated that the missile had reached initial operational capability. Equipped with a MaRV and designed specifically to attack moving warships, the conventionally armed DF-21D became the world’s first operational anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and quickly earned the nickname “carrier killer” (since applied to several other weapon systems). Western sources attribute the DF-21D with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers (932 miles).

The concept reflected Beijing’s broader A2/AD strategy, which seeks to hold U.S. carrier strike groups at risk and complicate U.S. military intervention inside the First Island Chain. U.S. defense reports had been tracking the program since the mid-2000s, and subsequent reports indicate the DF-21D has been tested against both land-based carrier mockups and actual targets at sea, underscoring China’s continued investment in long-range precision strike capabilities.

While both the DF-21C and DF-21D are conventionally armed, there is also a more modern nuclear-armed addition to the family. First reported in 2016, information about this missile is scarce. Some sources refer to this variant as the DF-21E, though this designation has not been seen in an authoritative context in China, and the Western reporting name CSS-5 Mod 6 has meanwhile been applied.

For years, the medium-range DF-21 formed the backbone of China’s regional ballistic missile force, with different variants providing conventional land-attack, anti-ship, and nuclear strike capabilities. That role is increasingly being assumed by the longer-ranged DF-26 IRBM, which significantly expands the PLARF’s reach by bringing Guam, and its concentration of critical U.S. military facilities, within range. The in-development DF-27 looks set to push that range even further, blurring the boundary between an IRBM and an ICBM.

DF-26 (CSS-18)

Increasingly the centerpiece of the PLARF’s regional strike force is the DF-26, which appears to be a substantially enlarged and more capable evolution of the DF-21. Development is believed to have begun before 2010, with the first images emerging from Chinese sources around 2012 before U.S. intelligence publicly acknowledged the missile’s existence in 2014. Mounted on a highly mobile six-axle TEL, the two-stage, solid-fueled DF-26 made its public debut during China’s 2015 military parade and entered operational service the following year.

The DF-26 combines significantly greater range with exceptional mission flexibility. Unlike many earlier PLARF missiles, it is believed to be genuinely dual-capable, able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads that can reportedly be exchanged relatively quickly depending on operational requirements.

In addition to land-attack missions, China has also fielded an anti-ship variant, equipped with a MaRV, and effectively extending the DF-21D’s “carrier killer” concept many hundreds of miles farther out to sea.

The DF-26 is thought to have a range of more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles).

Just as significant as the DF-26’s capabilities is the pace at which it has been fielded. The missile has become one of the fastest-growing elements of the PLARF’s inventory, reflecting Beijing’s increasing emphasis on longer-range conventional strike options. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated that China possessed more than 200 DF-26 launchers by 2020, a figure that had grown to around 250 just two years later. Combined with its ability to strike targets as far away as Guam while performing both conventional and nuclear missions, the DF-26 is poised to remain one of the PLARF’s most important regional strike weapons for the foreseeable future.

DF-27 (CSS-X-24)

A next-generation system, the DF-27, represents the PLARF’s continued modernization. The Pentagon’s 2023 assessment described the DF-27 as still being under development, but a tranche of leaked U.S. intelligence documents earlier that year suggested at least a limited number had already entered service. If accurate, the DF-27 would represent another significant leap in China’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The Pentagon has stated that the missile could have a range of 5,000-8,000 kilometers (3,107-4,971 miles), pushing into the intercontinental-range category. Even at the lower end of this assessment, it could strike targets far beyond the Second Island Chain, including parts of Alaska and Australia, depending on launch location. At the higher end, it would be sufficient to reach Hawaii and potentially parts of the U.S. West Coast from some launch locations.

One missile I was hoping to see in yesterday’s PLA parade was the DF-27—a new long-range hypersonic missile that’s been discussed in the annual DoD China Military Power Report for the last few years.

However, it was missing from the parade…or was it??? pic.twitter.com/GPIGwkMgUG

— Tom Shugart (@tshugart3) September 3, 2025

Available reports indicate the missile is designed to carry an HGV and will likely be fielded in both land-attack and anti-ship variants. That combination could substantially expand the PLARF’s ability to threaten high-value targets across the Western Pacific, extending the reach of China’s A2/AD network farther into areas where U.S. carrier strike groups have traditionally operated under reduced threat.

The missile’s payload remains undisclosed, but given the PLARF’s growing inventory of dual-capable ballistic missiles, it would not be surprising if the DF-27 were ultimately able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.

Air-launched ballistic missiles

Falling into an interesting category is the air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). The ALBM concept is far from new, with designs dating back to the Cold War, although they are currently seeing something of a comeback, with multiple nations around the globe now pursuing their capabilities. China is among them, and the best-known of these weapons, the JL-1, is today considered to constitute the airborne arm of the Chinese nuclear triad.

JL-1

The JL-1 ALBM can be launched by the modernized H-6N missile carrier aircraft of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). These aircraft feature a modified fuselage that allows for the external carriage of these large weapons, as well as an in-flight refueling probe, extending their range.

The JL-1 ALBM is assumed to be the same missile that has been referred to in the past in the West as the CH-AS-X-13, and which is understood to have been in development since at least the mid-2010s. This missile is reported to be an adapted, air-launched version of the DF-21 MRBM and similarly equipped with a MaRV. The possible relationship with the DF-21, and the DF-21D specifically, has prompted previous speculation about the H-6N having an anti-ship role, particularly against U.S. carrier strike groups, as well as being able to hit land targets.

China released first in-flight footage of an H-6N bomber carrying the JL-1 nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile, escorted by two J-20 stealth fighters.

JL-1: Nuclear-capable ALBM, ~8,000 km range, hypersonic reentry, also usable for anti-ship/land-attack. pic.twitter.com/e9uokWFnvz

— Clash Report (@clashreport) August 4, 2026

China has said the JL-1 (presumably coupled with the H-6N) has a range of approximately 8,000 kilometers (4,971 miles), although this is very much unconfirmed.

The latest Pentagon report on Chinese military capabilities refers to the H-6N as a “nuclear weapons-capable bomber,” and that its JL-1 ALBM is a “highly precise theater weapon that would be well suited for delivering a low-yield nuclear weapon.” However, it may also have the option of a conventional warhead.

Imagery has also emerged in the past, as seen below, which has contributed to discussions about the possibility of a second variation on the Chinese ALBM concept, with what may be a wedge-shaped unpowered HGV on top. As with the JL-1, this weapon could also be anti-ship capable.

KD-21

Finally, the H-6K variant can carry the smaller KD-21 ALBM on its center-wing pylons. This designation indicates an anti-ship missile, but it may well have the capability to strike ground targets, too.

In terms of its appearance, the weapon is very similar to the Russian Kinzhal (known in the West as the AS-24 Killjoy), a missile that is launched from adapted MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors and which has been employed in the war in Ukraine, apparently with only mixed success. Like the Kinzhal, which is an air-launched development of the Iskander SRBM, the KD-21 may be derived from a land-based weapon. In particular, the Chinese missile bears a close resemblance to the CM-401 land-based anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), a weapon offered for export. The truck- or ship-launched CM-401 is also capable of hitting static land targets and is said to have a terminal speed of between Mach 4 and 6 and a range of up to 290 kilometers (180 miles).

Missile numbers

Estimating the size of the PLARF’s missile arsenal remains challenging, and, understandably, publicly available figures differ depending on whether they refer to launchers or missiles.

Recent Pentagon assessments estimate the PLARF operates roughly 200 SRBM launchers backed by around 1,000 missiles, approximately 300 MRBM launchers with some 1,300 missiles, and another 300 IRBM launchers fielding roughly 550 DF-26-class missiles.

While the number of Chinese SRBM launchers used for the DF-15 and DF-16 missiles, both of which are conventionally armed, has remained static in recent years according to Western estimates, Beijing has prioritized the development and deployment of land-based MRBMs and IRBMs, such as the dual-capable DF-21 and DF-26. From 2018 to 2019, for example, the Pentagon noted that the number of Chinese IRBM launchers and missiles had at least roughly tripled from roughly 30 to 80. In its 2020 report, the Pentagon noted that the PLARF had further increased this number to approximately 200 launchers.

These figures are informed estimates, and they vary noticeably across successive Pentagon reports as intelligence assessments evolve. Even so, they underscore the extraordinary scale of China’s regional strike force and, perhaps more importantly, its substantial magazine depth. This would allow the PLARF to conduct repeated waves of missile strikes in a high-intensity campaign. Current conflicts, especially between Iran and the United States/Israel, as well as in Ukraine, have shown just how critical these weapons are, and underscore that they can be a deterrent just by existing in huge numbers. The cost of air defense is also very high for the one being targeted. These lessons learned will likely accelerate China’s acquisition of more missiles and improved designs.

Taken together, the missile families detailed here illustrate how dramatically the PLARF has evolved from a relatively small strategic force into one of the world’s most capable missile services. Older systems such as the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-21 continue to provide valuable magazine depth, while newer designs including the DF-16, DF-17, DF-26, and emerging DF-27 emphasize greater range, improved accuracy, enhanced survivability, and increased operational flexibility.

Just as importantly, Beijing has increasingly blurred the line between conventional and nuclear deterrence by fielding a growing number of dual-capable missile systems, complicating an adversary’s ability to determine China’s intentions during a crisis.

Coupled with expanding production, continued technological refinement, and the proliferation of hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, the PLARF’s regional missile arsenal has become a central pillar of China’s military modernization and one of the most consequential strike forces in the Indo-Pacific. Any future conflict involving Taiwan, the First Island Chain, or U.S. forces in the Western Pacific is certain to feature these missiles prominently from its opening hours.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Russia launched another large-scale overnight missile and drone attack on the Kyiv region, killing at least 14 people, injuring dozens, and damaging warehouses and civilian infrastructure. The assault highlights Moscow’s continued focus on overwhelming Ukraine’s air defenses while intensifying pressure on the capital.

Heavy Strike Targets Kyiv Region

Emergency officials said Russian strikes killed 14 people and injured 27 across the Kyiv region, while authorities in the capital reported one death and 24 injuries. Warehouses, storage facilities, and industrial sites were among the locations hit, with rescue teams continuing to search through collapsed buildings for survivors.

The attack also triggered fires and an ammonia leak, adding to the challenges facing emergency responders.

Missile Barrage Tests Ukraine’s Air Defenses

According to Ukraine’s Air Force, Russia launched four Zircon hypersonic missiles, 24 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and 115 drones overnight.

While Ukrainian air defenses intercepted or suppressed 98 drones, officials said no missiles were successfully destroyed, underscoring the growing challenge posed by Russia’s expanding use of advanced ballistic weapons.

Patriot Missile Debate Gains Urgency

The latest assault comes as Kyiv continues urging Washington to provide additional PAC-3 Patriot interceptor missiles, one of the few systems capable of intercepting advanced ballistic missiles.

At the same time, discussions continue between the United States and Ukraine over potential domestic production of Patriot missiles, despite uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration’s long-term support for the initiative.

Escalation Continues on Both Sides

Russia said it targeted logistics hubs and supply facilities it claims support Ukraine’s military operations.

Meanwhile, Ukraine continued its campaign against Russian logistics infrastructure, reportedly striking another logistics hub linked to Russian retailer Wildberries, reflecting Kyiv’s broader effort to disrupt Russian supply chains far from the front lines.

Russia Is Increasing Pressure on Ukraine’s Air Defense Network

The latest strike suggests Russia is shifting toward saturation attacks that combine ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and large drone swarms to exhaust Ukraine’s increasingly strained air defense systems. While drones can often be intercepted, advanced missiles such as the Iskander-M and Zircon remain significantly harder to stop, increasing pressure on Kyiv to secure additional Patriot interceptors. At the same time, Ukraine’s retaliatory strikes on Russian logistics networks indicate that both sides are increasingly targeting the infrastructure that sustains military operations rather than relying solely on battlefield gains. As missile stockpiles, interceptor availability, and industrial production become central to the conflict, the war is evolving into a contest of endurance in which logistics and defense manufacturing may prove as decisive as frontline combat.

With information from Reuters.

Future subvariants of the U.S. Navy Virginia class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) fitted with Virginia Payload Modules (VPM) will now be categorized as guided missile types (SSGN) instead. The VPM is a 70-foot hull extension that contains four additional large vertical tubes designed to launch Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) hypersonic missiles, and other payloads. The recategorization decision comes as the service is moving to retire all four of its Ohio class SSGNs by the end of 2029. The Ohio SSGNs are some of the most capable and heavily-in-demand submarines in the Navy’s inventory today.

The Navy currently plans to acquire 19 VPM-equipped Virginia class SSGNs, according to a press release the service put out today. The first boat in this class to feature the VPM will be the future USS Arizona, which is actually the second Block V subvariant being built. The first Block V version, the future USS Oklahoma, will lack a VPM, but the other 10 boats in this batch are expected to have this feature.

Block VI Virginia class submarines are also expected to have VPMs, as well as other upgraded capabilities. However, last week, the Navy announced a new monster $76.6 billion contract award for nine Block VI boats, as well as five additional Columbia class nuclear ballistic missile submarines, or SSBNs. This creates a discrepancy of one submarine (11 Block Vs together with nine Block VIs, for a total of 20, not 19) when it comes to the stated SSGN plans. One possible explanation might be that the outlier is a planned one-of-a-kind seabed espionage subvariant. TWZ has reached out to the Navy for clarification.

Regardless, the decision to formally recategorize Virginia class submarines with VPMs as SSGNs is significant.

“This reclassification is a clear acknowledgment of the increased lethality VPM brings to the undersea fight,” Navy Vice Adm. Rob Gaucher, Director of Submarine Programs, said in a statement. “These VPM-equipped SSGNs will ensure the Navy continues to dominate the undersea domain for decades to come. By integrating this additional payload capacity, we will have the ability to surge strike power to assure our allies, deter aggression, outmatch any adversary, and give our Fleet commanders an incredibly versatile, hard-hitting instrument of national power.”

“Reclassifying Virginia Payload Module-equipped submarines as SSGNs accurately reflects the extraordinary strike capacity, operational flexibility, and global reach these platforms bring to the Fleet,” Navy Adm. Daryl Caudle, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the service’s top office, also said in his own statement. “These submarines will provide our Nation with a powerful and persistent deterrent, expand options for our combatant commanders, and ensure the Navy remains ready to fight and win whenever and wherever called upon.”

Virginia class submarines with VPMs do have significantly greater magazine depth than their predecessor. Block I and II boats had vertical launch system (VLS) arrays capable of firing a dozen Tomahawks. Block III and IV versions have a pair of Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) in place of the earlier VLS configuration, but with the same number of tubes (12) for Tomahawks.

VPM-equipped types will be able to carry 28 more Tomahawks for a total load of 40. Using different inserts, future Virginia class SSGNs will be able to carry other munitions in those tubes. This includes the aforementioned IRCPS hypersonic missiles. The Navy is also now looking to acquire a surface-to-air missile designed to be fired vertically from these submarines, which you can read more about here.

It should be noted here that all Virginia class submarines have four 21-inch torpedo tubes, which also offer another option for launching Tomahawks. They can also be used to fire Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as launch and recover uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV). It’s also possible, if not highly probable, that the VPMs will be capable of launching (and potentially recovering) other payloads, including additional uncrewed platforms.

Some existing Virginia class submarines can be fitted with Dry Deck Shelters (DDS) on top of their hulls for deploying special operations forces, swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs), and other assets, as well. That is a capability that could be carried over to the enlarged SSGNs.

All of this brings us to the matter of the Ohio SSGNs. These boats are best known for being able to carry up to 154 Tomahawks at once, though they more typically deploy with loads of around 100 of those missiles. However, these submarines, which were converted from Ohio class SSBNs, are really multi-mission platforms. Beyond their ability to launch barrages of dozens of Tomahawks, they can act as motherships for special operations forces and uncrewed platforms, as well as serve as underwater intelligence fusion nodes and command centers. You can read more about their capabilities in this past War Zone feature.

“This transition [in categorization from SSN to SSGN] comes at an important moment as USS Georgia, one of the Navy’s four Ohio class guided-missile submarines, begins the inactivation process after more than four decades of exceptional service,” CNO Caudle also said in his statement today. “Georgia and her sister ships proved the enduring value of combining undersea stealth with unmatched clandestine strike capability. The next generation of Virginia class SSGNs builds on that legacy with greater survivability, adaptability, and sustained combat power.”

USS Georgia returned home from its final scheduled operational patrol last month. It is now scheduled to be formally inactivated next year.

At the same time, as TWZ has noted for years, the VPM-equipped Virginia class boats will not be a one-for-one replacement for the Ohio class SSGNs, at least based on what is publicly known about the former’s expected capabilities. Just in terms of missile launch capacity, each one of the converted Ohios is equal to roughly four Block V/VI Virginias. This means the Navy will need to field 16 new Virginia SSGNs before it fills the gap left by the retirement of USS Georgia and its three sisters, and can then start adding capacity with three additional boats. The Navy is facing a broader deficit in VLS capacity across its surface and subsurface fleets in the coming years, due also in part to the impending retirement of the last of its Ticonderoga class cruisers.

It is unclear what other capabilities the Block V and VI Virginia class submarines might have that will help make up for the loss of the specialized intelligence gathering and command and control tasks currently performed by the Ohio class SSGNs. As noted, some existing Virginia class submarines also perform the special operations support mission, but on a more limited level.

“By putting high-volume, long-range precision strike capabilities directly into the hands of the Fleet, these SSGNs will serve as a vital cornerstone for Distributed Maritime Operations and high-end warfighting,” the Navy’s press release today says. “Once operational, these highly survivable platforms will be dynamically employed across crucial global theaters – providing persistent forward presence, reinforcing robust alliance deterrence, and standing ready to project decisive combat power at a moment’s notice.”

On top of all this, the Navy does not expect the full fleet of 19 Virginia SSGNs to be in service until Fiscal Year 2038, at the earliest. This will be nearly a decade after the last Ohio SSGNs sail into mothballs. Concerns are regularly voiced now about the ability of General Dynamics Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding (a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries) to keep up with demand for submarines in this class. There is even more pressure on the program with the addition of plans to sell some of those boats to Australia as part of the trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense pact. The Navy is hoping to see the Virginia class production rate eventually rise to two per year, but is not expecting that to come until sometime in the 2030s.

If nothing else, the Navy has at least outlined more of a formal plan to supplant the Ohio class SSGNs with what it has now dubbed Virginia class SSGNs.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

President Donald Trump on Wednesday vowed to retaliate for Iran’s surprise attack on U.S. forces in Jordan launched Tuesday. His comments came a day after fighting in the region erupted anew after a several-day pause in U.S.-Iranian tit-for-tat actions. After the Iranian barrage, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia hit Iranian-backed militia groups in Iraq. That was in response for previous strikes from Iraq on U.S. and Saudi assets. Meanwhile, the Houthis are reportedly considering imposing a toll on Bab al-Mandeb Strait transits, adding to the region’s heightened tensions.

“We’re going to beat the fucking shit out of them,” Fox News reporter Troy Yingst says the president told him this morning, referring to Iran. “We’ll be hitting them hard. They’re going to get a beating.”

Yingst also said Trump told him that “U.S. forces had just minutes to shoot down these incoming Iranian ballistic missiles. The president says he has reviewed video of the shootdown, and it was U.S. forces conducting this operation to defend that area. He said it was real time; they were calling out coordinates and ensuring that none of this incoming Iranian fire got through.”

“In terms of possible talks with the Iranian regime, the president says ‘we’re going to let them keep talking,’” Yingst added. “…those talks are taking place as we speak behind the scenes.”

On Tuesday, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “launched multiple ballistic missiles from Iran in an attempted surprise attack on U.S. forces based in the Middle East,” U.S. Central Command stated on X. “All Iranian missiles were successfully intercepted. U.S. forces remain vigilant and at a high state of readiness.”

The attack began at 5:45 p.m. ET, according to CENTCOM.

The official Iranian Press TV media outlet released video it claims showed a missile attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base (MSAB) in Jordan. As we have pointed out in the past, the base has been frequently targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. Three U.S. Army soldiers were killed in an attack there on July 17.

Trump also addressed the combined U.S.-Saudi strike on Iraqi militias linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The action appears to marke the first publicly known instance of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia joining forces to carry out attacks in this conflict.

The president “says those strikes were coordinated with the Iraqi government,” Yingst explained. “He called these Iran-backed militias a cancer on the world, and says he is considering additional warnings against Iranian proxies and their link to the Iranian regime.”

Hours before Trump spoke with Yingst, Iraqi militia groups condemned the action.

Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN), an armed group in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), said those would be avenged, Al Jazeera reported. The PMF said at least 20 of its members were killed and 32 wounded in the U.S.-Saudi airstrikes, which took place across Iraq.

In a statement, HaN demanded the expulsion of U.S. forces from the country, saying their continued presence “has become an imminent threat to the country’s security and stability,” the outlet added. The group also called for an end to cooperation with Saudi Arabia and for the deployment of advanced air defense systems and threatened retaliatory attacks against U.S. and Saudi interests.

Prominent Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militia Al-Nujaba says it will not allow the U.S. and Saudi Arabia “to defile Iraqi soil without exacting a heavy price from them,” following joint U.S.-Saudi strikes on Iran-backed militias in Iraq overnight. https://t.co/r9euaiH60u

— Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران (@ariel_oseran) July 29, 2026

Meanwhile, influential Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr urged the IRGC and allied armed groups to stop launching attacks from Iraq.

“Since this holy land was not a launching point for bombing the Islamic Republic, then our brothers in the Revolutionary Guard must not bomb our independent and holy lands,” al-Sadr posted on X. “Likewise, the rogue militias must not give our brothers in the Gulf Arab states a pretext to target our holy land.”

“Everyone must embrace the spirit of brotherhood and peace and not be drawn into the schemes of the Zionist-American enemy to drag brothers into fighting and conflict,” the cleric added. “While I condemn the targeting of the holy Iraqi lands by all countries and parties, and I condemn the shameless actions of the militias to drag Iraq into a pointless war, I call upon the Iraqi government to establish security, enforce sovereignty, and work diligently for the safety of the Iraqi people and their holy sites, and not to be drawn into the abhorrent sectarian myths.”

CENTCOM on Tuesday said its forces, along with the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, “conducted precision strikes in Iraq, July 28, against Iran-aligned terrorists that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) directed to attack U.S. forces and Saudi energy infrastructure.”

“U.S. and Saudi fighter aircraft struck multiple terrorist logistics and weapons sites across eastern Iraq in a strong response to over 30 IRGC-directed aerial drone attacks in the last 72 hours. The unwarranted attacks against U.S. forces were not successful,” CENTCOM added. “From February through April 2026, there were more than 600 attempted attacks on U.S. citizens and facilities by Iran-aligned terrorist militias in Iraq. The IRGC and its terrorist proxies must cease these attacks to avoid further U.S. military response.”

A U.S. official told TWZ Tuesday night that the combined U.S.-Saudi attacks came after the Iranian barrage.

“To be clear, the IRGC-directed attacks at our forces and our Saudi partners since over the weekend came without any provocation,” the official added. “This is a clear message that we will not let those attempts go unanswered.”

U.S. troops are adding to the danger they face by posting cellphone videos of attacks online, CENTCOM commander Adm. Cooper warned, according to Reuters. The command is also considering having some personnel surrender their phones, the outlet added.

Cooper, in a previously unreported letter, “said Iran was benefiting from being able to see the success or failure of its strikes in near real-time by searching news reports or online posts by journalists referencing ‘reactions, photos, and footage from the cellphones of our troops,’” Reuters stated.

The CENTCOM commander appeared to reference the following video in his letter, Reuters suggested.

“The direct, unavoidable cost of this open-source intelligence could be measured ​in the lives of American service members and civilian residents in targeted Gulf countries,” Cooper wrote in his July 28 letter, a copy of which was obtained by Reuters.

He ​called on troops to “redouble our focus on operational security,” without prescribing specific steps in the memo,” the news organization further noted.

“Admiral Cooper’s top priority is the well-being and protection of over 50,000 American service members operating in the Middle East,” CENTCOM spokesman Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins told TWZ in response to our questions about the letter. “His guidance to troops about operational security reinforces this priority.”

Cooper’s letter follows moves by U.S. satellite companies like Vantor and Planet Labs to delay posting imagery from the region out of similar concerns about operational security.

Cooper’s memo underscores the mounting tensions between real-time news reporting on the war, often aided ⁠by satellite imagery and first-person accounts, and the desire by the U.S. military to restrict any information that could aid Iran as it tries to kill and wound U.S.… https://t.co/0OBN2o1rtg

— Phil Stewart (@phildstewart) July 29, 2026

Amid the renewed U.S.-Iran hostilities, the Houthi rebels of Yemen are considering imposing fees on ships transiting the Red Sea, according to Reuters. The move follows the group’s imposition of a blockade on Saudi ships and its firing on Saudi vessels. It mirrors a similar effort Iran is trying to impose on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

“The Houthis were looking into imposing fees on most traffic through the narrow Bab el-Mandeb [BAM] gateway,” Reuters noted, citing sources. The narrow waterway, between Yemen and Djibouti, links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. “No timeframe was given ​at this stage for implementation,” the sources added.

The Houthis’ media office did not respond to a request for comment.

July 29 (Reuters) – Yemen’s Houthi group is considering imposing fees on commercial ships sailing through the southern Red Sea, a week after declaring a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, regional sources with knowledge of the matter told Reuters.

— Tala Ramadan (@TalaRamadan) July 29, 2026

As we have frequently detailed, Houthi actions in the BAM threaten to add far greater pressure on oil exports from the Middle East, already drastically affected by the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the resumption of the U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. The Yemeni rebel group has already expanded its target set, hitting oil terminals and infrastructure Saudi Arabia is using to pump supplies to tankers in the Red Sea. The kingdom has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to the hostilities in the Persian Gulf. Even with the BAM closed, oil exports could still head to the West, via the Suez Canal. But if the infrastructure used to convey these energy products is put out of action, the consequences could be even more severe, with far less or even no energy supplies from Saudi Arabia moving out of the Red Sea. The closing of the BAM, and the possible imposition of tolls, also raises the specter of the U.S. having to get as involved as it did during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September, which could pull resources away from Iranian-focused operations.

Despite the increased risks, transits through both straits are trending upward, according to the Kpler risk management firm.

“Daily monitoring shows stronger transit volumes across the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, with 12 and 41 confirmed crossings respectively on 28 July,” Kpler noted on X. “Yet higher traffic should not be mistaken for lower risk. Hormuz routing remains concentrated outside traditional traffic separation patterns, while Bab el-Mandeb continues to present elevated operational and compliance challenges through dark transits, sanctioned vessels and shadow fleet movements.”

“With 62 confirmed maritime security incidents recorded by the IMO as of 27 July and geopolitical tensions still unresolved, vessel behavior remains a more meaningful indicator than crossing volumes alone,” Kpler added. “For operators and markets alike, transparency, routing choices and emerging disruptions remain the key signals to watch over the coming days.”

Traffic rises, risks persist

Daily monitoring shows stronger transit volumes across the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, with 12 and 41 confirmed crossings respectively on 28 July. Yet higher traffic should not be mistaken for lower risk. Hormuz routing remains concentrated… pic.twitter.com/fwUxZyUaf8

— Kpler (@Kpler) July 29, 2026

In the wake of new fighting in the region and threat of Houthi tolls on the BAM, oil prices are once again trending upward. The per barrel price of Brent Crude has risen to nearly $90, according to OilPrice.com. It had fallen to just over $83 per barrel yesterday when the pause in hostilities was still holding.

As we have previously noted, the U.S. and Iran had stopped firing at each other late last week, leading to a pause after 13 straight days of continuous tit-for-tat operations. U.S. President Donald Trump hadn’t ordered a U.S. strike on Iranian territory since last Thursday. This was ostensibly to give another round of diplomacy a chance. However, lingering concerns over the supply of munitions, especially air defense interceptors, reportedly played a role in Trump’s thinking.

The U.S. has burned through hundreds of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot interceptors since a shaky ceasefire went into effect on April 8, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) latest assessment. CSIS was updating a previous analysis of munitions expenditures during Epic Fury that you can read more about here.

According to CSIS, the U.S. had about 2,300 Patriot interceptors in its inventories before Epic Fury, 1,030 by the time the ceasefire was agreed to and between 759 and 827 as of July 27.

As for THAADs, there were 452 interceptors in the U.S. inventory before Epic Fury, between 232 and 262 on the date of the ceasefire and between 234 and 278 as of July 27.

The report authors noted that “[e]stimated inventories today account for additional interceptor use and new deliveries since the April 8 ceasefire. THAAD deliveries during the ceasefire outpaced estimated use over the same period, resulting in higher inventories today than in April. Patriot calculations include the latest MSE variant and PAC-3s. Several hundred PAC-2s, not represented in the chart, are estimated to remain in the U.S. inventory.”

New estimates of American Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD anti-ballistic missile interceptor stockpiles in American inventory from CSIS.

Roughly a third of pre-war Patriot interceptors are estimated to remain. pic.twitter.com/fa986PkBQM

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) July 29, 2026

The lack of sufficient magazine depth is an issue that TWZ has raised frequently for years, and especially in regard to America’s air and missile defenses, in particular. In fact, we laid out in detail these exact concerns and how they would be a major issue in war with Iran just prior to the conflict starting in a feature you can read in full here.

Given Trump’s threat against Iran today, those concerns may be set aside out of a need to respond to the ballistic missile attack. The coming hours should give us a better picture of how all this will develop.

UPDATE: 1:16 PM EDT –

Two vessels were struck by drones in the Egyptian port of Damietta, according to the Ambrey maritime security firm.

One of the ships was a U.S.-owned and operated, Marshall Islands-flagged liquefied natural gas (LNG) floating storage facility and the other was a Greek-owned and operated, Bermuda-flagged LNG tanker, Ambrey stated.

“Reportedly, the incident occurred during LNG discharge operations, with the strike causing a fire on board” the floating LNG storage facility, Ambrey said in an alert. “Ambrey was aware that a second vessel reportedly experienced a fire in connection with the incident. AIS data indicated that the vessel was subsequently towed by two tugs to a position 2.9 NM northeast of the port, accompanied by a fire-fighting vessel.”

The security firm added that it “was aware that the crew had been evacuated and that the fire had subsequently been brought under control. At the time of writing, no party had claimed responsibility. No casualties, damage to port infrastructure or pollution had been reported in connection with the incident.”

After being struck by a drone and experiencing a fire, the Greek-owned and operated Bermuda-flagged LNG tanker “departed and anchored in a position approximately 10.2 NM northwest of the port,” Ambrey noted. 

A maritime security specialist told us that the U.S.-owned and operated, Marshall Islands-flagged floating gas storage facility was the Energos Winter while the other ship was the Gaslog Salem.

Fire involving two LNG vessels disrupts Damietta terminal

A fire involving the Energos Winter floating storage and regasification unit and the LNG carrier GasLog Salem has disrupted activity at Egypt’s Damietta LNG terminal. Following the incident, both vessels were moved… pic.twitter.com/3weeuJ4YvS

— MarineTraffic (@MarineTraffic) July 29, 2026

TWZ cannot confirm claims about the drone attacks, however, NASA FIRMS shows two thermal anomalies within the port limits near the vessels’ berths.

Video emerging from the scene shows what is purported to be smoke wafting from the Energos Winter after the attack.

A drone struck the U.S.-owned floating gas storage tanker Energos Winter while it was unloading cargo at Egypt’s Damietta Port, sparking a fire that spread to a second vessel, GasLog Salem. The crews were evacuated, the fire was brought under control, and no injuries were… pic.twitter.com/JwyNSywv8t

— Moshe Schwartz (@YWNReporter) July 29, 2026

UPDATE: 4:38 PM EDT-

Asked during a press conference whether Iran was behind the drone attack on Egyptian port, Trump said “it’s a little more of the same, but it’s going to be straightening out, it’s going to be straightening out. But in the meantime, we are going to be hitting them very hard, because it is our turn to hit ’em. They know it’s coming, they are asking us not to do it.”

“We’re going to hit them very hard.”

President Trump warns adversaries that the U.S. is prepared to respond forcefully following a drone attack on an LNG tanker off the coast of Egypt.

Trump signaled that retaliation is imminent despite requests from adversaries to hold back.… pic.twitter.com/SMOUuj5qGT

— Fox News (@FoxNews) July 29, 2026

UPDATE: 8:33 PM EDT –

As promised by Trump, the U.S. is hitting Iran tonight.

“U.S. forces began launching strikes against Iran at 8 p.m. ET today,” CENTCOM announced on X. “The strikes are a powerful response to yesterday’s attempted Iranian attacks on U.S. forces based in the Middle East.”

U.S. forces began launching strikes against Iran at 8 p.m. ET today. The strikes are a powerful response to yesterday’s attempted Iranian attacks on U.S. forces based in the Middle East.

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 30, 2026

UPDATE: 10:37 PM EDT –

In a post on X, CENTCOM announced that at 10 PM ET, its “forces successfully completed a heavy wave of strikes against Iran in response to yesterday’s attempted missile attacks on U.S. forces.”

“CENTCOM assets struck dozens of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets in Iran, including military command centers, missile and drone facilities, coastal surveillance and defense sites, and maritime capabilities,” the command stated. “The strikes aimed to further diminish threats posed by Iran and its proxies to American forces, commercial shipping, and neighboring Gulf countries.”

CENTCOM says it struck dozens of targets in a “heavy wave” of airstrikes on Iran overnight in response to yesterday’s Iranian missile attacks on U.S. forces.

Newly released strike footage: pic.twitter.com/47V0nlAKFu

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) July 30, 2026

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has fired a Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile from one of its warships for the first time, marking a significant development in Tokyo’s efforts to field a long-range conventional strike capability at sea. The launch, conducted by the Kongō class Aegis destroyer Chōkai in the Pacific Ocean with support from the U.S. Navy, is the result of years of work to integrate the U.S.-made cruise missile into Japan’s surface fleet and significantly expands the country’s standoff attack options.

Japan becomes the third country outside the United States to fire a Tomahawk from a surface combatant, with Australia and the Netherlands having previously done so. The other operator of the missile, the United Kingdom, has only fired Tomahawks from submarines.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense announced that Chōkai, which has been deployed to the United States since late last year for modifications and crew training, carried out the live-fire event on July 29 Japan Standard Time (July 28 Pacific Daylight Time). According to the ministry, the test confirmed not only the ship’s ability to launch the missile but also the proficiency of its crew in operating the weapon, clearing another major hurdle toward operational service.

The firing represents the culmination of a process that began in October 2025, when Chōkai arrived in the United States. In March, Japan announced that the destroyer had successfully completed the structural upgrades, software integration, and crew instruction required to employ the Tomahawk, making it the first Japanese warship capable of launching the missile. At the time, officials said a live-fire demonstration would follow before the capability entered operational service.

“This live-fire test demonstrates steady progress in the Tomahawk project, and the Ministry of Defense will continue to work towards the early establishment of stand-off defense capabilities,” the ministry said in a statement.

Chōkai is expected to return to Japan around September 2026.

For decades, Japan’s Aegis destroyers have been optimized almost exclusively for fleet air defense and ballistic missile defense missions. Integrating the Tomahawk fundamentally changes this by giving the ships the ability to strike fixed targets hundreds of miles inland, and potentially other ships at sea over great distances, extending the reach of the JMSDF far beyond traditional maritime operations.

The Tomahawk acquisition forms part of Japan’s broader effort to build what Tokyo describes as “standoff defense capabilities” in response to an increasingly challenging regional security environment. Under Japan’s revised National Security Strategy, the country has embraced a limited counterstrike capability intended to hold hostile missile launchers, command nodes, and other military targets at risk if Japan comes under attack. Officials have repeatedly stressed that these weapons remain consistent with Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented security policy and are intended to strengthen deterrence rather than enable offensive military operations.

Japan is purchasing up to 400 Tomahawk missiles from the United States, including both Block IV and newer Block V variants, at a cost of around $1 billion. The Block IV Tomahawk can hit targets nearly 1,000 miles away with a 1,000-pound unitary warhead. It is capable of rerouting mid-flight and can loiter over an area to hit targets as they emerge, featuring an imaging infrared seeker capability. The Block V variant is an improved version with survivability upgrades that can be used to also hit moving targets, especially in the long-range anti-ship missile role.

Tomahawk is seen as a bridge capability while indigenous long-range weapons — including Upgraded Type 12 anti-ship missiles and other domestically developed standoff systems — enter service. Tomahawk deliveries have already begun, and additional Aegis destroyers are expected to receive the modifications needed to employ the weapon over the coming years.

Japan’s four Kongō class destroyers already feature the Mk 41 vertical launching system (VLS) and an Aegis combat system closely aligned with U.S. Navy architecture, requiring modifications rather than wholesale redesign to operate Tomahawk. Future installations are expected across the remainder of Japan’s Aegis destroyer fleet, including the two Atago and two Maya class ships.

Tokyo has already allocated funds of close to $700 million for the appropriate modifications to four more Aegis destroyers: Kirishima, Haguro, Myoko, and Atago.

Japan’s future Tomahawk fleet is likely to extend beyond its existing destroyers.

The country is constructing two massive Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs), due to enter service in fiscal years 2027 and 2028, respectively. Although the ships are being designed around the ballistic missile defense, or BMD, mission, Defense Ministry officials say that a Tomahawk capability will be added later.

A pair of previously unseen missiles slung beneath the wings of a Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) Mitsubishi F-2 fighter underscores the progress Tokyo is making on expanding its long-range strike arsenal, to which the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile was recently added. While the weapon has not been officially identified, its size, configuration, and timing strongly suggest it could be the air-launched version of Japan’s new Type 25 Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile (25SSM).

Photographer @bibabibabibary on X was one of many to capture the new missiles during what was apparently the first test flight from Gifu Air Base today. The aircraft carrying them was the two-seat F-2B serial 68-8101, one of the F-2 prototypes now operated by the JASDF’s Air Development and Test Wing (ADTW). The first F-2A prototype, 68-8101, served as a ‘chase plane’ for the sortie.

Carried on the inboard wing pylons, the missiles are notably large — bigger than the familiar ASM-2 or even the newer, ramjet-powered ASM-3 anti-ship missiles already associated with the F-2 fleet. The new, gray-painted weapons have a long, fairly slender fuselage, folding wings in the upper part of the body, and four cruciform tailfins. The boxier cross-section has ‘chines’ reminiscent of those on other low-observable missiles. Its stealth features should enhance its survivability and lethality against increasingly capable naval integrated air defense systems. An underslung engine intake, with a protective cap, is located below the rear part of the body. There is no obvious optical window, suggesting that the missile relies on GPS/INS navigation and a radar seeker for the terminal phase.

Overall, the weapon has the look of a subsonic, radar-evading cruise missile optimized for long-endurance flight rather than high-speed dash performance.

どうやらスタンドオフ防衛能力向上のための12式地対艦誘導弾空発型のようですね。
初めて吊るし飛んだと思いますが凄くでっかくて太いです…。
後席Pさん👍

2026.07.30
岐阜基地 RJNG
F-2B 101 pic.twitter.com/eP4E443OOI

— ボボ・AKEBOVO (@AKEBOVO) July 30, 2026

Significantly, the new missile has a lot of similarities with what we have seen of the Upgraded Type 12/Type 25 family of weapons, suggesting that this is an air-launched derivative.

The Upgraded Type 12/Type 25 is a heavily upgraded evolution of Japan’s legacy Type 12 anti-ship missile, with its range reportedly increased to around 1,000 kilometers (around 620 miles).

Once in service, it will substantially increase Japan’s maritime-strike reach. The original Type 12 used by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) has a range of 200 kilometers (124 miles), while the JASDF’s ASM-2 can strike targets at 180 kilometers (112 miles).

While the original Type 12 was conceived as a coastal defense weapon to attack enemy shipping, the new missile family is a multirole strike system capable of engaging maritime as well as land targets, including enemy missile launch sites and other fixed infrastructure, hundreds of miles from the home islands, as part of Japan’s evolving ‘counterstrike’ posture.

Japan’s pursuit of increasingly capable standoff weapons is being driven largely by the deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific, particularly China’s rapid military expansion and growing arsenal of long-range precision missiles. The People’s Liberation Army fields extensive anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) networks designed to keep U.S. and allied forces at arm’s length, while China’s navy continues its rapid expansion. At the same time, North Korea’s advancing ballistic missile and nuclear programs have reinforced Tokyo’s view that it needs the ability not only to defend its territory, but also to hold hostile missile launchers, command nodes, and naval forces at risk before they can strike.

At the end of March of this year, the JGSDF announced the deployment of the Upgraded Type 12, and, at the same time, officially redesignated it as the Type 25 Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile (25SSM) — the “25” reflects fiscal year 2025, when the coastal defense weapon was formally inducted to service.

The Japan Ministry of Defense also says it plans to deploy ship- and air-launched variants of the 25SSM on Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyers and JASDF fighters in fiscal year 2027.

With that in mind, it would make sense that the weapons seen on the F-2 today are the air-launched variants of the 25SSM. We cannot be certain of that, however, and the official designation of such a missile is also unknown (ASM-4 has been suggested).

At this point, we don’t know the status of the new air-launched missile. However, Japan is currently testing a variety of new missiles.

The F-2 is also being used to test an improved version of the ASM-3 high-speed anti-ship missile, the ASM-3 Kai.

Japan is meanwhile working on the New Surface-to-Ship Missile. Earlier this year, an official video was released showing a flight test of the missile in which it executed a series of manoeuvres, including barrel rolls, intended to defeat defenses in the terminal phase of the attack. The New Surface-to-Ship Missile is powered by an efficient turbofan engine and is expected to have a greater range than the Upgraded Type 12. It is similarly intended for launch from ground, maritime, and air platforms. You can read more about it here.

The demonstration of the New SSM’s barrel roll capability can be seen in the video starting at around 0:49 in the runtime.

P-31-1_島嶼防衛用新対艦誘導弾の要素技術の研究

As we reported earlier today, the JMSDF recently fired a U.S.-made Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile from one of its warships for the first time, the Aegis destroyer Chōkai, marking another significant expansion of the country’s standoff attack options.

In terms of air-launched weapons, Tokyo has procured the stealthy Joint Strike Missile (JSM) to arm its F-35As, giving them a combined standoff anti-ship and land-attack capability, and the longer-range JASSM has also been cleared for sale to Japan.

An air-launched Type 25 would fit well into Japan’s broader shift toward long-range ‘counterstrike’ capabilities, and add another string to the bow of the F-2. Alongside ground-launched Type 25 missiles, new hypersonic weapons, and Tomahawks, Tokyo is assembling a layered standoff strike arsenal designed to hold hostile ships and land targets at risk from far greater distances than ever before.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The U.S. Navy has shared details about its vision for a new family of modular surface-to-air missiles that is expected to include a version that will arm future variants of the Virginia class submarine. This would be an all-new capability for the service, at least as far as we know. All of the members of the Naval Modular Missile (NMM) are set to be based around a common Terminal Stage Interceptor (TSI), creating a range of capabilities in very different form factors. This, in turn, opens a door to new options for larger and/or mixed loadouts in vertical launch systems on surface warships and submarines.

New information about the Navy’s NMM concept is contained in a draft request for solutions contracting notice recently posted online, which Aviation Week was first to report on. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) hosted an NMM Industry Day event earlier this year to get feedback from prospective vendors. The NMM effort traces its roots back to at least 2021, but the Navy has only released limited details about its plans for these new missiles in the past.

“The United States Navy (USN) is seeking a new, modular interceptor to serve as the basis for the Naval Modular Missile (NMM) program, a next-generation initiative designed to revolutionize surface naval capabilities through multi-mission utility, enhanced capacity, and a modular open architecture,” according to the recent draft request for solutions notice. “The NMM TSI is a modular, highly capable multi-mission interceptor that leverages state-of-the-art technology to provide effectiveness across the entire mission space.”

“The TSI is ten inches in diameter and consists of five modules,” which are “the Seeker Assembly Module (SAM), Lethality Module (LM), Command Module (CM), Terminal-Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM), and Control Actuation Module (CAM),” the notice adds. “This TSI will be integrated with multiple booster stacks and canisters to achieve a robust family of multi-mission and multi-platform variants.”

To start with, the contracting document describes the desired TSI as “highly agile” and “multi-mission capable,” but does not lay out any hard performance or capability requirements.

When it comes to the TSI’s seeker, there are certainly multiple options for prosecuting an aerial intercept, including active radars, imaging infrared sensors, and passive radiofrequency (RF) capabilities. Though we do not know yet what the Navy’s requirements here might be, a multi-mode seeker system could also be extremely valuable as the countermeasure ecosystem continues to expand.

An interceptor with a high degree of agility would also be required for any NMM variants intended to address high-supersonic and/or hypersonic targets, especially ones with their own ability to maneuver significantly during mid-course and/or terminal phases of flight. The Navy has made clear in the past that addressing the threats posed by ever more advanced supersonic and hypersonic anti-ship missiles, including air-breathing types, as well as ballistic and hypersonic designs, is a top priority. This has only been underscored by lessons learned from recent conflicts in and around the Middle East, as well as observations from the war in Ukraine. Those threats are only expected to be magnified in any future high-end fight against an adversary like China or Russia. Both of those countries have been investing heavily in the development and fielding of new high-speed anti-ship missile capabilities.

All this being said, the TSI element is perhaps the least interesting part of the overall NMM concept the Navy has now outlined. The service envisions at least four distinct NMM “All-Up-Rounds,” or AURs, topped with the common interceptor. As described now, the missiles are very different in form and function.

There is a Long-Range (LR) version that “brings multi-mission, hypersonic capability to the Mk 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS),
leveraging existing USN investments in a 21” rocket motor and fully integrating with future Long-Range Fires kill chains,” according to the recent notice. A single LR NMM will be able to fit inside a Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cell.

A 21-inch rocket motor is a key component of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA anti-ballistic missile interceptors in Navy inventory today. A similarly sized rocket motor is also a central feature of the still-in-development supersized Block IB version of the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6). Existing variants of the SM-6 are multi-purpose missiles that can be employed as anti-interceptors, including against certain hypersonic threats, as well as surface targets. The rendering the Navy has shown now of the LR version of the NMM is very much in line with the overall designs of the SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6 Block IB.

In addition, the Navy wants slimmer extended and medium-range NMMs that can be dual- and quad-packed into a single Mk 41 VLS cell, respectively. These are called the DP-ER and QP-MR versions. It’s worth noting here that the service uses similar extended and medium-range terminology today to describe different variants of the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2). Those missiles are primarily employed as surface-to-air interceptors, but have a limited secondary surface-to-surface capability, as well. However, SM-2s can only be loaded singly in Mk 41 VLS cells. The Navy is now in the process of integrating the Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptor into the Mk 41, offering another alternative to SM-2, but those missiles will also be loaded one per cell, at least initially.

The last and most notable version of the NMM that the Navy has outlined now is an extended-range version intended to be launched from future subvariants of the Virginia class nuclear-powered attack submarine equipped with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). The VPM consists of four large vertical launch tubes and is set to be integrated first on Block V Virginia class boats. The so-called ER-S member of the NMM family would be loaded into those tubes via a seven-cell Multiple All-Up-Round Canister (MAC) adapter, first used on Ohio class guided missile systems.

The Navy does not currently have an operational submarine-launched surface-to-air capability at all, at least that we know about. This is something that has been explored by navies globally to varying degrees for decades, as you can read about more in this past TWZ feature. We will come back to this later on.

The NMM concept presents clear potential benefits operationally. The Navy’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request indicates the service is aiming to eventually supplant all of its existing Standard missiles with NMM types. The new modular missile family could conceivably replace other munitions. With a new common TSI interceptor, even shorter-range NMM versions could offer expanded capability against an array of aerial threats in different envelopes. The Navy’s description of the LR type, at least, as a multi-mission weapon, also points to new capability against surface targets.

It’s also important to point out that the Navy says the LR and ER-S versions will be capable themselves of traveling at hypersonic speeds, helping to close any kill chain faster, even at extended ranges. This would be especially important for engaging incoming hypersonic threats, something the Navy can only currently do with versions of SM-6, to at least some degree. Depending on the full scope of capabilities the Navy has planned for NMM, this could open the door to new options for strikes on time-sensitive or otherwise fleeting surface targets.

The DP-ER and QP-MR versions would bring valuable additional magazine depth. Currently, the lower-end Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) is the only surface-to-air interceptor in Navy inventory that can be multi-packed into VLS cells on its surface ships. Greater magazine depth means more engagement opportunities before having to reload, a process that currently requires Navy warships to leave their stations and head to a friendly port. During those transits, they may also be more vulnerable due to limited remaining ordnance. Especially in the face of growing threats to established port facilities, the Navy is also pursuing new at-sea reloading capabilities to create additional operational flexibility and reduce vulnerability. These issues have also been highlighted by recent U.S. operations in and around the Middle East.

ESSM Blk 2 GTV 1 Firing

The NMM plan would present benefits logistically and when it comes to production, too. Multiple contractors could be brought on to produce TSIs and the different rocket motors, creating opportunities for competition and cost savings, as a result. It could also help with ramping up production at scale. The recent NMM contracting notice says the Navy could leverage multiple vendors just to produce the modular components of the TSIs, and that the service is aiming for a production rate of 1,000 interceptors per year within five years of a contract award.

These are all considerations that are top of mind for the U.S. military at present when it comes to anti-air interceptors, as well as other munitions. Higher-end surface-to-air missiles have historically been very long-lead-time items with the delivery timelines measured in months, if not years. This has already created serious issues for sustaining stockpiles that have been exacerbated by a succession of crises in the Middle East, as well as the need to support allies and partners, especially Ukraine.

Overall, NMM “will provide the US Navy, Joint Force, Allies and Partners with advanced defensive and offensive capability to out-pace the threat. As the effective range, capability and capacity of adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems have increased, the US Navy and Joint and Allied forces are at increased risk,” the Navy’s budget documents explain. “Additionally, adversary capacity and expected large raid engagement tactics will demand US and Allied forces increase their platforms’ defensive capacity (depth of magazine) or be forced to resupply frequently in the midst of combat operations. The adversary’s increased capacity comes with increased capability in the form of highly-maneuverable, complex threats that will stress the current U.S. weapon systems capabilities.”

Then there is the additional matter of the submarine-launched capability. As stressed from the start, the explicit inclusion of the ER-S version in the NMM plan is especially significant since this is not something the Navy is known to have access to at all right now. TWZ has previously explored in detail the potential benefits, as well as drawbacks, of arming submarines with anti-air interceptors.

Historically, the most immediate use case for a submarine-launched anti-air missile capability has been localized defense against anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, as seen in the video below. The threat of a submarine shooting back could have a deterrent effect, too. Still, a submarine could have to get close to the surface and otherwise expose its position to prosecute such an engagement. A submarine launching anti-air interceptors is not automatically guaranteed to achieve a kill, either. This all raises a question of the value proposition compared to simply trying to evade detection and escape pursuers. There are rules of engagement and other questions to be answered, as well, as you can read more about here.

DCNS A3SM submarine launched MICA surface to air missile

However, the extended-range nature of the ER-S NMM variant raises the possibility of a different concept of operations involving a deep integrated and fully networked kill web, which is an area the Navy has already been investing in heavily. In this context, submarines might offer broader additional anti-air engagement capacity as part of a larger defensive posture around carrier strike groups, other surface action groups, and even potentially friendly assets on island outposts or along other coastlines, although this is unlikely to be the primary use of this capability set.

Submarines offer inherent survivability benefits and can operate discreetly across broad areas for extended periods of time. This, in turn, could create additional challenges for opponents who would have to account for the potential of additional surface-to-air capabilities to be hiding underneath the waves. Similarly, ER-S-armed submarines could be used proactively to take out enemy aircraft in areas far forward of any other friendly forces, and without opponents knowing they are there to begin with. This could be an especially valuable tool for targeting airborne early warning and control planes and other prized strategic force multiplying platforms. Targeting data could come from many sources, including future air moving target indicator space sensing layers, but also from warships equipped with the Aegis combat system or aircraft, including future sixth-generation F/A-XX fighters operating beyond the reach of their weapons capabilities. Acting as forward remote ‘shooter’ nodes, submarines would be very unpredictable and dangerous counter-air assets. Ukraine, for instance, has leveraged remote forward ‘shooter’ concepts in a similar manner, albeit on land, to great success.

Tied in with offboard sensor networks, submarines loaded with ER-S missiles might be able to conduct more general anti-missile defense missions, as well. For instance, a submarine would offer a new and different way to position such a capability closer to enemy territory, and potentially without their knowledge, from where boost-phase intercepts might be attempted. Missiles, especially larger ballistic types, are particularly vulnerable in the boost phase after launch. However, taking advantage of that has historically been complicated by the fact that the launch points are generally expected to be in more heavily defended areas.

If ER-S can also be employed as a hypersonic surface-to-air missile, it would give submarines armed with them additional operational flexibility. A VPM-equipped Virginia class submarine could also carry ER-Ss as just one part of a mixed ordnance load. VPM tubes are designed to accommodate a variety of munitions, including Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles and Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) hypersonic missiles.

In the missile defense context, the submarine with mid-course ballistic missile and/or hypersonic missile interceptors onboard could provide a more forward launch point for midcourse interception of these weapons. This would provide another layer of defense, especially in anti-access combat scenarios, allowing for the traditional missile defense layer, farther to the rear, to deal with whatever breaks through.

This all sounds great, but there is one problem with actually using this kind of capability in a sustained operational context. Firing off a larger interceptor from a submarine gives off a huge signature — infrared, radar, and acoustic. This is exactly what submarines operating forward try to avoid at nearly all costs. So how exactly this would be mitigated is unclear at this time. Clearly, there is a risk-reward calculus to all operations, but having a hugely valuable asset loaded with sensitive technologies and lives give away its position deep in enemy territory to shoot down a plane or missile would be a choice that would have to be made very carefully. The submarine could have a long way to run to safer territory if its presence were detected.

If nothing else, ER-S would create a submarine-based anti-air capability, and its very presence would impact adversary anti-submarine warfare playbooks. When it comes to chasing down U.S. submarines from the air, the hunted could now shoot back.

The Navy does still appear to be relatively early on in the process of outlining the NMM concept, let alone moving down a path that could lead to an operational capability. The requirements for NMM, including the submarine-launched capability, could well evolve further down the line, or even be truncated to focus first on a lower-risk spiral. As it stands now, the Navy is asking for $311 million to support NMM development in Fiscal Year 2027, which it says is a “new start” effort.

“The Department [of the Navy] is implementing diverse procurement strategies to enable rapid acquisition,” the service’s budget documents also note. “These will include the use of Other Transaction Authorities, ‘Marketplace’ acquisition platforms, and alternative concepts to increase supply and suppliers in addition to traditional FAR-based procurement strategies.”

Still, the NMM plan that the Navy has outlined now shows that it is pursuing a significant leap in anti-air capability that will be employed across its fleets, including on certain Virginia class submarines.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Warsaw asserts missile recently made, illustrating Russia’s nightly barrage against Ukraine is draining arsenal.

Poland has summoned the Russian ambassador in protest over a missile incursion into one of its eastern regions.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced on Friday that the ambassador had been summoned after Warsaw confirmed that the projectile, which landed in the village of Tarnawa Kolonia in the Lublin region on Thursday, was a Russian Kh-101 missile. No casualties or injuries have been reported.

An investigation into the incident suggested that Russia’s weapon stockpiles may be running low as it continues to launch nightly barrages of drones and missiles at Ukraine while its more than four-year war drags on.

“The ambassador was informed of our unequivocal condemnation of hostile actions directed against the security of a sovereign state and its citizens,” Maciej Wewior, spokesman for Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told journalists.

“We emphasised that any escalation at the border of the European Union and the North Atlantic alliance [NATO] is unacceptable,” he added, underlining that the root of the incident was “the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation”.

The incident marked the latest in a series of incursions on NATO’s eastern flank. Drones and missiles intruding on the territory and airspace of Poland, Romania and the Baltic states have fuelled fears that the war in Ukraine may spill over the alliance’s borders.

NATO and European leaders have been swift to support Poland and condemn Russia for the missile.

Depleted stockpiles

Poland has identified the missile as part of an attack that killed at least eight civilians in Ukraine and injured more than 50.

Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz reported that Warsaw had established that the missile was produced near Moscow in the second quarter of this year.

“This means that Russia is using newly produced missiles to strike Ukraine,” he wrote on social media. “It confirms reports that Russian wartime stockpiles have been depleted.”

An expert from Ukraine who arrived at the scene “did not have the slightest doubt” about the origins or model of the missile, Marcin Kozak, spokesman for the prosecutor’s office in Lublin, said.

“I will point out that this type of missile is used exclusively by Russian strategic aviation,” Wewior noted.

Evidence has emerged indicating that China’s YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile is now also being fielded aboard the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) Type 052D class destroyers. These warships are far more numerous than the Type 055 ‘super destroyers,’ from which the missile was previously seen being fired, as we reported at the time. The new development suggests that the PLAN intends to distribute the weapon across a much broader portion of its surface fleet rather than reserving it exclusively for its largest combatants.

A new video apparently originating from the PLAN shows the launch of a YJ-20 from the cold-launch vertical launch system (VLS) on the foredeck of an unidentified Type 052D destroyer, known in the West as the Luyang III class. After being ejected from the launcher, the missile’s solid rocket motor ignites before it accelerates rapidly away. No target engagement is shown.

Typically, the Type 052D’s VLS would be loaded with variants of the HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile, YJ-18 subsonic anti-ship cruise missile, CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile, and CY-5 anti-submarine missile.

The 7,500-ton Type 052D has 64 VLS cells, 32 forward and 32 aft. It’s unclear whether each of these is able to accommodate the big YJ-20 missile.

This compares to the Type 055’s 112-cell VLS system, which makes it the PLAN’s premier surface strike platform. However, only 10 of these ships are currently in operational service, with additional vessels still under construction. By contrast, approximately 35 Type 052D destroyers have entered PLAN service, with production continuing.

Putting the YJ-20 on the Type 052Ds would significantly expand the number of Chinese warships capable of launching hypersonic anti-ship strikes, further strengthening Beijing’s growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) posture across the western Pacific. On the other hand, it remains possible — although less likely — that the launch depicted is some kind of trial or experimental effort that might not lead to large-scale fielding on these hulls.

The new video follows the release of official Chinese military footage showing what the PLAN described as a “finalization test” of the YJ-20 launched from the Type 055 destroyer Wuxi, late last year. That video appeared to confirm the missile’s integration with China’s largest surface combatant, a warship design that you can read more about here.

That test from the Wuxi provided the first official acknowledgement of the ship-launched YJ-20. The missile itself had previously been unveiled publicly during China’s military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan in World War II, although speculation surrounding the weapon stretches back several years before that.

A missile first observed during what appeared to be a Type 055 launch in 2022 was widely referred to as the YJ-21. Subsequent official Chinese designations now strongly suggest that weapon was actually the YJ-20, or an earlier developmental version of it.

The YJ-20 is understood to be a hypersonic anti-ship weapon employing either an aero-ballistic flight profile or potentially a boost-glide vehicle: different Chinese sources have described both concepts at various times. In either case, the missile is optimized for extremely high terminal speed combined with unpredictable maneuvering designed to defeat modern naval air defenses.

Unlike a traditional ballistic missile that follows a predictable parabolic arc, an aero-ballistic missile can execute quasi-ballistic maneuvers — including skip-glide or ‘porpoising’ trajectories — as it descends toward its target. These abrupt changes in altitude and direction make interception significantly more challenging.

Chinese state media have also described the missile as employing a conical boost-glide vehicle, which would use a rocket booster to accelerate to high altitude before gliding toward its target while conducting sustained maneuvering throughout the terminal phase.

Although many details remain murky, it is generally considered that the missile achieves speeds well above Mach 6 during cruise and may approach Mach 9 during its terminal attack. Estimated range is generally assessed at more than 620 miles.

Guidance is believed to combine satellite navigation and mid-course updates before transitioning to an active radar and/or infrared seeker during the final approach.

Weapons with these characteristics are particularly well suited to engaging high-value naval targets including aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, cruisers, and other major surface combatants. The missile likely also possesses a secondary land-attack capability against fixed targets.

With their combination of extreme speed and maneuverability, hypersonic weapons can dramatically compress an opponent’s decision-making timeline while reducing opportunities for interception, making them especially valuable against time-sensitive targets. They also require very high-end interceptors, if they can be intercepted at all.

The apparent expansion of the missile to the Type 052D is arguably an even more significant milestone than the Type 055 test itself.

For China, fielding the YJ-20 aboard both the Type 055 and the much more numerous Type 052D dramatically increases the number of PLAN hulls capable of conducting long-range hypersonic anti-ship attacks. Such a move represents another step in expanding the reach of its layered A2/AD strategy. Rather than concentrating hypersonic capability in a small number of flagship destroyers, the PLAN appears to be distributing it across a much larger force capable of operating throughout the First Island Chain and increasingly beyond it.

Clearly, a larger force of PLAN destroyers armed with hypersonic anti-ship missiles would complicate U.S. and allied naval operations across the western Pacific by increasing the number of launch platforms capable of threatening high-value warships from long stand-off ranges.

At the same time, it is unclear if the YJ-20 has formally entered full operational service. However, official test footage, public appearances during military parades, and, above all, launches from two separate destroyer classes all point toward the missile transitioning from a developmental program to a broader capability.

The development underscores two major issues for the U.S. military as it gears up to face the prospect of a potential conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. On the one hand, the PLAN is growing at an alarming rate, and Chinese shipyards are churning out increasingly capable warship designs, not to mention submarines and other naval weapons.

The latest annual Pentagon report to Congress on China’s military, released at the end of 2025, stated that “China has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal and continued to advance the development of conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies during the past year.”

With that in mind, the case study of the YJ-20 further underscores the fact that China is investing heavily in the development of hypersonic missiles and is now apparently scaling that capability across a larger proportion of its surface fleet, something that will have a significant effect on the regional naval balance.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Returning from the US, Zelenskyy says Ukrainians’ safety depends on allies’ willingness to provide anti-missile defences.

Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko says some non-residential sites in the city caught fire as Russia struck the Ukrainian capital with ballistic missiles.

Multiple explosions were heard in the city at 1:18am on Thursday (22:18 GMT Wednesday), according to Kyiv Independent reporters on the ground. Klitschko instructed people to seek shelter.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had warned on Wednesday that a massive Russian attack on Ukraine was likely and the safety of Ukrainians depended on the willingness of allies to provide anti-missile defences.

He was returning from the United States, where he said President Donald Trump had agreed to give Ukraine licences to make Patriot missiles.

Zelenskyy also repeated his request to Ukraine’s allies to supply Kyiv with the missiles its air defence system lacks in an X post.

In early July, Trump had expressed his intention to allow Ukraine to make the surface-to-air missiles at a time when Russia had stepped up its ballistic missile strikes.

Only US Patriot systems are capable of shooting down Russian missiles, but Ukraine is short of PAC-3 interceptor missiles.

This shortage has worsened since the war on Iran launched by the US and Israel in February.

In Washington, DC, Zelenskyy held what he called a “good meeting” with Trump, as he underscored Russian President Vladimir Putin’s loss of initiative on the war front due to heavy losses.

Zelenskyy spent just over an hour with Trump at the White House, in talks that came as Kyiv and Moscow intensified long-range strikes, as US-led diplomatic efforts to end the war stalled.

After the meeting, Trump posted photos to social media with a note that said: “Many things were discussed. The meeting went very well!”

Relations between Zelenskyy and Trump have warmed since the start of the US president’s second term, with Trump suggesting earlier this month that Ukrainian strikes inside Russia “could help” end the war.