Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
Just over three years ago, the U.S. Air Force moved to cancel the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) hypersonic missile. ARRW had been in line to be the U.S. military’s first operational hypersonic weapon. Now, the program has not only reemerged from purgatory, with missiles being ordered for operational use, but a new variant is on the horizon. The “Increment 2” ARRW is set to feature an all-new seeker, which would give it a moving target engagement capability. A version of the AGM-183 able to strike enemy ships at sea could be especially relevant in a future high-end fight against China in the Pacific.
The U.S. Air Force is asking for just over $296 million to support work on the new ARRW variant in its 2027 Fiscal Year budget request. This money would fund “the design, test, and evaluation of Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) Increment 2 with terminal seeker and data link capability and other cost reduction production initiatives into ARRW,” according to official budget documents.
The Air Force’s budget documents also indicate that prior work has already been done that “integrated Air Force and DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] enabled system technologies into a prototype that demonstrated the viability of this concept to be fielded as a long range prompt strike capability.”
A live AGM-183A ARRW missile seen under the wing of a B-52 bomber at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam ahead of a test in 2024. USAF
Furthermore, the “ARRW [program] designed, developed, manufactured, and tested, [sic] a number of prototype vehicles to inform decisions concerning ARRW acquisition, production, and leave behind capability,” the budget documents add. “ARRW Inc.2 adds enhanced capability.”
“FY27 [Fiscal Year 2027] plans to begin [ARRW] INC 2 technology efforts such as but not limited to integrating pre-planned product improvements, design, trade studies, hardware upgrades, facilitization, affordability initiatives, and testing,” the documents also note.
To take a step back quickly, ARRW is known as a boost-glide vehicle-type hypersonic weapon. Designs of this type use a rocket booster to get an unpowered glide vehicle to an optimal speed and altitude. The glide vehicle then detaches from the rest of the weapon and proceeds to its target along a relatively shallow flight path within the Earth’s atmosphere. The vehicle is also designed to maneuver along the way, sometimes erratically. The combination of speed, flight trajectory, and maneuverability creates particular challenges for opponents when it comes to spotting and tracking incoming glide-vehicles, let alone attempting to intercept them or otherwise reacting to the threat. It is this ability to pierce enemy air defenses and very rapidly strike very high-value targets that makes hypersonic weapons so attractive.
A rendering depicting an ARRW hypersonic missile’s nose cone breaking away to reveal the unpowered boost-glide vehicle inside. Lockheed Martin A rendering depicting an ARRW hypersonic missile’s nose cone breaking away to reveal the unpowered boost-glide vehicle inside. Lockheed Martin
“The Air Force will employ units equipped with ARRW to provide an offensive, high-speed strike capability to destroy high-value, time-sensitive, land-based targets in anti-access/area-denial environments,” according to a report from the Pentagon’s Office of the Director of Test and Evaluation that was released in March. “Launched from bomber aircraft, ARRW provides standoff capability to prosecute targets in a timely fashion.”
To date, the Air Force has disclosed plans to integrate ARRW onto its B-52 and B-1 bombers, but other aircraft could potentially carry these weapons, or variants thereof, in the future.
A B-1 bomber seen carrying an ARRW missile, or a relevant test article, on an external pylon during a flight test. USAF capture
ARRW, in its current guise, is also understood to only be capable of engaging static targets. Adding a terminal seeker would open up the ability to hit targets on the move, including ones at sea. The budget documents do not provide any further details about what kind of seeker the Air Force is looking to add to the Increment 2 variant. Imaging infrared sensors, radars, or passive signal homing seekers – or some combination thereof – could be potential operations.
The extreme heat and physical stress that hypersonic weapons experience in flight, as well as the shape of the glide vehicle, would make integration of any seeker system of these more complex. It is worth noting that ARRW’s prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, is already developing an anti-ship-optimized version of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) short-range ballistic missile for the U.S. Army. A key element of the new PrSM variant is the addition of a multi-mode seeker system to enable engagement of moving targets. It is possible that some of that technology could be applicable now to work on the new iteration of the AGM-183.
A rendering of the anti-ship-optimized version of the PrSM short-range ballistic missile. Lockheed Martin
A data link would also allow targeting updates to be sent to Increment 2 ARRWs in flight, helping to get it first to a general area where the enemy is, or at least believed to be, before its seeker takes over. That system would also need to be able to communicate under hypersonic flight conditions. Given the AGM-183A’s range, off-board platforms would be required for initial target detection and tracking. The weapon’s ability to close that distance very quickly does limit the time available for the target to try to leave the area.
The Air Force did demonstrate exactly the kinds of networks that would be required to close this extremely long-range kill chain in a simulated ARRW strike during Exercise Northern Edge 2021. The designated target was 600 nautical miles from the launch platform, a B-52 bomber. In that instance, no weapon was actually released.
Multiple ARRW flight tests have been conducted since then, including the launch of an AGM-183A with a live warhead from a B-52 flying from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam in 2024. As TWZ noted at the time, the Guam test sent clear signals to China. The Air Force has made no secret of how important it views the development and fielding of hypersonic weapons as part of larger preparations for a potential future high-end fight against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Pacific. This is further underscored by the fact that the mention of the “terminal seeker and data link capability” for Increment 2 of ARRW is actually contained in the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) section of the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget request.
A rare look at an ARRW shortly after launch, from a test in 2021. USAF A low-quality image of an ARRW after launch during a previous live-fire flight test. USAF
In the context of a major conflict in the Pacific, there would also be a very high demand for prompt, long-range anti-ship capability. The ability to conduct those strikes even in the face of dense anti-air defenses would be even more attractive for engaging very high-value vessels, such as China’s growing fleets of aircraft carriers or big deck amphibious assault ships. The PLA Navy’s (PLAN) combat fleets, overall, continue to grow in scale and scope at a prodigious rate, as well. This, in turn, has put additional emphasis on the development and fielding of new and improved anti-ship capabilities that can be air-launched, as well as employed from the maritime and ground domains, across the U.S. military in recent years. Increment 2 ARRWs could also offer another means to strike mobile, high-value targets on land, such as ballistic missile transporter-erector-launchers.
China’s aircraft carriers Shandong, at left, and Liaoning, at right, sail together, along with various escorts, as elements of their air wings fly overhead, in 2024. Chinese state media
To reiterate, a plan now to develop an Increment 2 version of ARRW is also just an important step forward for the program as a whole. As mentioned, the Air Force had previously moved to cancel work on the AGM-183 in 2023. The announcement followed a number of failed flight tests of what had been expected to be the first operational hypersonic weapon anywhere within the U.S. military. The explicit intent at the time was to shift resources to the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) effort. HACM is an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile that functions in a completely different way from ARRW.
A graphic offering a very general comparison of the typical flight trajectories of hypersonic boost-glide vehicle weapons and air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles, as well as aeroballistic (or quasi-ballistic) missiles and traditional ballistic missiles. GAO
In the years that followed, there were steady signs that the Air Force’s position on ARRW was changing and that it had not actually been axed in the end. Last year, it became clear that the service had rebooted the program when it requested funds to purchase missiles for operational use in its Fiscal Year 2026 proposed budget. The Air Force ultimately received $362.15 million for the procurement of ARRWs in the current fiscal year, and is now seeking a little over $452 million to continue doing so in Fiscal Year 2027. How many of the weapons the Air Force has ordered to date, and how many more it plans to buy in the coming years, is currently deemed to be Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the general public.
Depending on how ARRW and HACM programs progress, the former could still be the first hypersonic weapon to enter operational U.S. Air Force service, with an Increment 2 version able to hit targets on the move following close behind.
Photographer Jonathan Tweedy took pictures of several U.S. Navy test jets departing Eglin Air Force Base in Florida on May 13. This included an F/A-18F Super Hornet from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 31 (VX-31) carrying the AIM-260 on the fuselage station outboard of its right engine intake. The jet also has a modified FPU-13/A drop tank with an infrared search and track (ISRT) sensor on its centerline station, as well as flight data pods on its wingtips. The Aviationistwas the first to publish Tweedy’s pictures of the VX-31 jet with the JATM.
A full look at the F/A-18F from VX-31 carrying the AIM-260. Jonathan Tweedy/ @flightline_visuals
Eglin is routinely used as a staging point for U.S. military aerial weapons testing, as well as other aviation research and development and test and evaluation work. The base is situated right next to extensive over-water ranges over the Gulf of Mexico, off the coast of the Florida panhandle.
When it comes to the AIM-260, Tweedy’s picture confirms the design is very minimalist, at least externally, with only four fins at the tail. Unlike the AIM-120, it has no mid-body control surfaces, or even strakes running along the sides. The JATM’s overall configuration reflects optimization for maximum speed and range.
A close-up look at the AIM-260. Jonathan Tweedy/ @flightline_visualsA stock picture of an AIM-120 missile. USAF
The JATM in this case looks to have a live high-explosive warhead, as indicated by a yellow band at the front end of the body. There are also two black bands toward the rear, which could point to the location of the missile’s rocket motor.
The nose cone has a distinct light gray color compared to the rest of the predominantly white body. There are square markings at various points at the rear of the body, which are often seen on aerial munitions and aircraft during testing to help with visual tracking, as well.
Overall, the AIM-260 seen in Tweedy’s pictures looks entirely in line with what had previously been depicted in official renderings of the JATM, both in terms of its design and markings.
A previously released rendering of the AIM-260. USNAnother rendering released in the past depicting an F-22 Raptor firing a JATM. USAF via Gen. Mark Kelly
The Navy is developing the AIM-260 in cooperation with the Air Force. In the past, officials have explicitly cited the growing reach of Chinese air-to-air missiles, and the PL-15 in particular, as key drivers behind the JATM program. China continues to develop and field more capable air-to-air missiles, as you can learn more about this past TWZ feature. A boost in maximum range is therefore known to be a central requirement for the AIM-260, which is reportedly designed to hit targets out to at least 120 miles, if not further.
Another known requirement for the AIM-260 is to have a form factor that is roughly the same as the AIM-120, making it easier to integrate on existing aircraft. Details about the JATM otherwise remain limited. As TWZ has previously written:
“An advanced rocket motor with highly loaded propellant has long been seen as a likely route to give the AIM-260A significantly greater range, as well as speed, over the AIM-120 without making the new missile larger. A core known requirement for the JATM is that it has to have the same general form factor as the AMRAAM, in large part to ensure that it can fit inside the internal bays on stealth fighters like the F-22 and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In addition to crewed aircraft, AIM-260As are expected to arm future stealthy drones like the ones under development under the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program.”
…
“The AIM-260A’s rocket motor is also likely to be a dual-pulse design that retains energy across the flight envelope to further extend range and help dramatically with endgame maneuverability. Thrust vectoring capability would also be a requisite to give the missile sufficient agility in the absence of additional control surfaces.”
…
“An active electronically scanned array radar (AESA) seeker is likely. Multi-mode seeker capability, potentially with imaging infrared and passive radiofrequency (RF) guidance capabilities, could be extremely valuable in the face of an ever-expanding countermeasure ecosystem, although we have no idea if this is a feature now or not. It’s also possible it could be introduced in later variants. Advanced networking capabilities would be a key feature, allowing the missile to get additional targeting information from an array of third party sources. This is especially imported for engaging targets beyond the reach of the launch platform’s own sensors and it can allow the aircraft firing the missile, especially a stealthy one, to avoid having to switch on its radar and increase its vulnerability to detection as a result. Multiple networked JATMs might even be able to prosecute engagements cooperatively.”
Another view of the F/A-18F with the AIM-260. Jonathan Tweedy/ @flightline_visuals
Overall, the JATM program, which traces back to at least 2019, remains largely classified. As noted, flight testing of AIM-260 has been underway for some time and has already included multiple live-fire shots. There has also been movement in recent years to get the missile into production and fielded operationally.
Navy Super Hornets, along with U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors, are expected to be the first types to fly operationally armed with AIM-260s. The missiles will surely be integrated onto a host of other aircraft, including the Air Force’s future F-47 and whatever design the Navy might choose to become its sixth-generation F/A-XX fighter.
What the projected timeline might be for the AIM-260 entering operational service now is unclear. When the program first emerged publicly in 2019, the goal was for the missiles to be fielded in 2022. There were reports late last year that JATM had suffered a new three-month delay due to funding issues, based on a fact sheet distributed by some members of the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services. However, the committee subsequently said that the information was incorrect.
Jonathan Tweedy/ @flightline_visuals
As an aside, the Navy announced back in 2024 that it had begun limited fielding of another, different very-long-range air-to-air missile, the AIM-174B, which is derived from the surface-launched Standard Missile-6. The AIM-260 is expected to be complementary to the AIM-174B, as you can read more about here and check out our video below.
How The Navy’s New Very Long-Range AIM-174 Will Pierce China’s Anti-Access Bubble
The first public sighting of an AIM-260 this week certainly points to new progress toward finally fielding this new air-to-air missile.
Special thanks again to Jonathan Tweedy for sharing the pictures of the AIM-260 on the VX-31 Super Hornet with us.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy strongly condemned Russia after a missile strike on a residential apartment building in Kyiv killed at least 24 people, including three children.
The attack occurred during one of the heaviest aerial bombardments on the Ukrainian capital this year and further intensified international concern over the continuing war between Russia and Ukraine. Rescue operations continued for more than a full day before emergency workers completed searches through the destroyed structure in Kyiv’s Darnytskyi district.
The strike formed part of a broader wave of Russian drone and missile attacks across Ukraine that officials say targeted multiple regions over consecutive days.
Zelenskiy Visits the Site of the Attack
Zelenskiy visited the destroyed apartment building on Friday, laying red roses at the site and meeting rescue workers who had spent more than twenty eight hours searching for survivors beneath the rubble.
In remarks shared through social media, the Ukrainian president praised emergency responders for their continuous efforts and accused Russia of deliberately destroying civilian lives.
According to Zelenskiy, the missile strike effectively destroyed an entire section of the residential building. Ukrainian officials stated that initial analysis suggested the attack involved a recently manufactured Russian Kh 101 cruise missile.
The Ukrainian leader once again appealed to international allies for stronger air defence support and increased pressure on Moscow.
Heavy Civilian Casualties
Kyiv authorities declared Friday a day of mourning in memory of the victims. Flags across the capital were lowered to half mast, and public entertainment events were cancelled or postponed.
The Interior Ministry reported that rescue teams removed approximately 3,000 cubic meters of rubble during the operation. Hundreds of emergency personnel participated in the search efforts.
Officials confirmed that 24 bodies were recovered from the site, while approximately 30 people were rescued alive. Nearly 50 individuals were injured, and hundreds required psychological support following the attack.
The deaths of children among the victims further intensified public grief and anger across Ukraine.
Russia Intensifies Air Campaign
Ukrainian authorities stated that Russia launched more than 1,500 drones along with dozens of missiles during attacks carried out over two consecutive days this week.
The strikes extended beyond Kyiv and affected western regions of Ukraine located far from active frontline combat zones. Officials reported that six people were killed during attacks in western Ukraine on Wednesday.
The scale of the aerial assault highlights Russia’s continuing ability to conduct large coordinated attacks despite prolonged international sanctions and battlefield losses.
Moscow did not immediately comment specifically on the apartment building strike. Russia consistently denies deliberately targeting civilians, although residential buildings, hospitals, schools, and energy infrastructure have repeatedly been damaged throughout the conflict.
Ukraine Also Conducts Cross Border Attacks
The conflict has increasingly involved reciprocal long range attacks by both sides.
Russian regional officials stated that Ukrainian drone strikes killed four people, including a child, in the Russian city of Ryazan. Authorities reported damage to apartment buildings and an industrial facility during the incident.
Ukraine has expanded drone operations against targets inside Russia over the course of the war, aiming to disrupt military infrastructure, industrial production, and logistical operations linked to Moscow’s military campaign.
These developments reflect the increasingly transnational nature of the conflict, with civilian populations on both sides facing growing security risks.
The Continuing Humanitarian Crisis
The attack on Kyiv underscores the severe humanitarian consequences of the war, which began with Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Millions of Ukrainians have been displaced since the start of the conflict, while repeated strikes on civilian infrastructure have damaged homes, hospitals, schools, transportation systems, and energy networks across the country.
International organizations and human rights groups have repeatedly raised concerns about civilian casualties and the destruction of non military targets during the war.
At the same time, the prolonged conflict has placed enormous economic and psychological pressure on Ukrainian society as cities continue to face the threat of missile and drone attacks.
Analysis
The deadly strike on Kyiv demonstrates how the war between Russia and Ukraine continues to evolve into a prolonged campaign involving large scale aerial warfare and attacks far beyond frontline battle zones.
For Ukraine, the attack reinforces the urgent need for stronger air defence systems capable of intercepting missiles and drones before they reach urban areas. Zelenskiy’s renewed appeals to allies reflect growing concerns that Ukraine’s defensive capabilities remain under intense strain as Russia increases the scale and frequency of aerial assaults.
For Russia, sustained missile and drone attacks appear aimed at weakening Ukrainian morale, exhausting defence systems, and increasing pressure on the government through continued civilian disruption.
However, such attacks also carry significant international consequences. Civilian casualties, especially involving children and residential buildings, strengthen global criticism of Moscow and may encourage additional military and financial support for Ukraine from Western allies.
The conflict additionally illustrates the changing character of modern warfare, where advanced missiles, drones, and long range strikes allow both sides to target infrastructure and urban centers far from traditional battlefields.
Despite ongoing diplomatic discussions in various international forums, there remains little indication of a near term political settlement. Instead, the war increasingly appears locked in a prolonged phase of escalation, attrition, and humanitarian suffering.
The strike on Kyiv therefore stands not only as a tragic individual event but also as a broader symbol of the continuing devastation caused by one of the most consequential conflicts in modern Europe.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday, the admiral in charge of U.S. military operations in the Middle East pushed back against claims that Iran still possesses a large number of missiles and launchers. He spoke as the White House said U.S. President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping discussed the ongoing Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz and hours after Iran seized another ship.
Iran can “no longer threaten regional partners, or the United States, in ways that they were able to do before, across every domain,” the commander of U.S. Central Command, Admiral Brad Cooper, explained.
On Wednesday, The New York Times reported that the “Trump administration’s public portrayal of a shattered Iranian military is sharply at odds with what U.S. intelligence agencies are telling policymakers behind closed doors.”
The newspaper cited “classified assessments from early this month that show Iran has regained access to most of its missile sites, launchers and underground facilities.”
“Most alarming to some senior officials is evidence that Iran has restored operational access to 30 of the 33 missile sites it maintains along the Strait of Hormuz, which could threaten American warships and oil tankers transiting the narrow waterway,” the Times added. “Iran still fields about 70 percent of its mobile launchers across the country and has retained roughly 70 percent of its prewar missile stockpile, according to the assessments. That stockpile encompasses both ballistic missiles, which can target other nations in the region, and a smaller supply of cruise missiles, which can be used against shorter-range targets on land or at sea.”
WaPo last week: “Iran retains about 75 percent of its prewar inventories of mobile launchers and about 70 percent of its prewar stockpiles of missiles” https://t.co/FpAhZQKPlG
Cooper took issue with those figures when asked about them.
“I think it’s appropriate in this forum not to discuss specific intelligence assessments,” he responded. “What I would say, from my perspective, is the numbers that I’ve seen in open source are not accurate. I think what also is not taken into consideration, it’s more than just the numbers. It’s the command and control that’s been shattered. It’s a significant degradation and capability, and it’s the lack of any ability to then produce any missiles…on the back end.”
Cooper was further pressed on Iran’s ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz because it still has missiles and fast boats and other assets.
“In each of those cases, their capabilities have been significantly degraded,” the admiral posited. “If I just use my own professional experience and 100 transits through the Strait of Hormuz, you would typically see 20 to 40 fast boats, and lately we’ve seen two or three. So the degradation means it’s been significant, but some residual capability does exist with respect to the threat that remains.”
.@CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper: “[Iran’s] capability has been significantly degraded. If I just use my own professional experience, in 100 transits through the Strait of Hormuz, you would typically see 20-40 fast-boats; lately, we’ve seen two or three.” @centcomcdrpic.twitter.com/8pWaMFpKQ9
— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) May 14, 2026
Though Cooper downplayed Iran’s current capabilities, he said Tehran posed significant new threats with its modern drones.
“The days of $35,000 drones that we saw in the last couple of years, particularly in the fight against the Houthis in Yemen, those days are behind us,” Cooper proffered. “Today we face an increased threat from drones that are highly sophisticated. They’re jet-powered. They have high-end sensors. They have electronic warfare…signals intelligence. So those days of using high value defenses to shoot down cheap targets are behind us.”
“Quite the contrary, what we have been doing lately is using our own low-cost one way attack drones, [to attack] Iran, making them use higher and more expensive weapons. So I can confidently tell you, we have flipped the cost curve in many ways. Always work to be done, but I like where we are in this regard.”
CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper says the U.S. has “flipped the cost curve” in drone warfare against Iran.
“The days of using high-value defenses to shoot down cheap targets are behind us.” pic.twitter.com/7iK4JKpL9N
The LUCAS drones are “an additional capability that we’ve now employed against an adversary very effectively,” Cooper commented. He declined to provide further details.
“Vis a vis Iran, I think I would just like to keep that in the classified setting,” he noted.
LUCAS kamikaze drones. (CENTCOM)
Cooper provided additional statistics about Epic Fury to the committee.
“We destroyed or buried much of Iran’s ballistic missiles, launcher vehicles, and long-range attack drones with more than 450 strikes on ballistic missile storage and systems and roughly 800 strikes on Iran’s drone-launching units and storage. In the air domain, Iran’s air and air defense forces are functionally and operationally irrelevant.”
“Before OEF, the Iranian Air Force flew between 30 and 100 sorties each day. Today that number is zero. We destroyed or rendered non-mission-capable Iran’s fixed-wing airfields, hangars, fuel storage, and munitions stockpiles, and we knocked out 82 percent of its air defense missile systems along with the radar and command architecture that tied them together.”
“At sea, we destroyed 161 vessels in total across 16 classes of warships, effectively crippling the regime’s ability to operate.”
Admiral Cooper: “At sea, we destroyed 161 vessels in total across 16 classes of warships, effectively crippling the regime’s ability to operate. We eliminated more than 90 percent of Iran’s once-massive inventory of over 8,000 naval mines, with more… pic.twitter.com/VmBwR8KIlM
“We eliminated more than 90 percent of Iran’s once-massive inventory of over 8,000 naval mines, with more than 700 airstrikes on Iranian naval mine targets. In sum, Iran’s navy can no longer claim to be a maritime power, and it cannot project into the Gulf of Oman or the Indian Ocean. Iran retains nuisance capability – harassment, low-end drone and rocket attacks, and residual proxy support – but it no longer possesses the means to threaten major regional operations or to deter U.S. freedom of action in the air or maritime domains.”
“The second-order effects of OEF are significant. More than 2,000 strikes against Iran’s command-and-control structures created leadership vacuums, paralysis, and internal confusion.”
“We have seen reporting of desertions, personnel shortages, and signs of regime desperation in their attempts to compel discipline through arrest and execution. Most importantly for the region’s future: Iran will be highly challenged to proliferate advanced weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, or the Iraqi militia groups. The supply chain from Tehran to the proxies has been broken.”
While Iran has clearly been battered by attacks from the U.S. and Israel, recent events show it can still inflict damage on its neighbors and shipping. As we previously reported, Tehran has repeatedly struck the United Arab Emirates (UAE) before and after the April 7 ceasefire. In previous coverage, we have pointed out how Iran has also attacked U.S. warships and commercial vessels they were helping guide through the Strait of Hormuz during the short-lived Project Freedom operation.
Hours before Cooper testified, “the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy seized the Honduras-flagged fishery research vessel Hui Chuan,” a maritime security official told us. “The Company Security Officer (CSO) reported that the vessel was taken by Iranian personnel while at anchor approximately 38nm northeast of Fujairah, UAE, at 05:45 UTC.”
The Hui Chuan was operating as a “floating armory” storing weapons for Chinese security firms who protect ships at sea from attack by pirates, the official told us. The ship is now “bound for Iranian territorial waters,” the UK’s Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) organization said.
The Honduras-flagged fishing research vessel Hui Chuan (IMO: 8316895), anchored off the UAE’s east coast, is believed to have been seized by the IRGC Navy.
The ship is reportedly operated by the Chinese private security company Sinoguards as a floating armory. pic.twitter.com/VlHpmkqFYw
During an interview with NBC News, Rubio was asked what Trump asked Xi when it comes to Iran.
“He didn’t ask him for anything,” the secretary noted. “We’re not asking for China’s help. We don’t need their help… Our position is very clear: Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon.”
NBC: “What exactly did President Trump ask President Xi for when it comes to Iran?”@SecRubio: “He didn’t ask him for anything. We’re not asking for China’s help. We don’t need their help… Our position is very clear: Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon.” pic.twitter.com/Hn7f3aqiUp
— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) May 14, 2026
In a post on his social media platform responding to Xi’s remarks that the U.S. is essentially a declining power, Trump responded that the Chinese leader was referring to America under Biden and that things are much better now.
More interesting, however, is a hint Trump dropped about the future with Iran.
Among the accomplishments he claimed on Truth Social was “the military decimation of Iran (to be continued!).”
The House voted for a third time against acting as a check on President Trump’s military powers in Iran, even as a growing number of Republicans express concern about the prolonged conflict, CBS News reported.
Thursday’s vote on a Democratic resolution to rein in Trump’s authority was 212-212, falling just short of a majority. Originally introduced on March 4, the measure as written would have directed the president to remove U.S. forces from hostilities within 30 days of the start of the war, which began on Feb. 28.
The U.S. House voted 212-212 on a War Powers Resolution to restrict military action against Iran. The measure failed, needing a majority to pass. pic.twitter.com/NcRDvUIFyA
In a readout of the meeting in Beijing between Trump and Xi, the White House noted that the topic of the Strait of Hormuz came up in discussions between the two leaders.
“The two sides agreed that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to support the free flow of energy,” the White House posted on X. “President Xi also made clear China’s opposition to militarization of the Strait and any effort to charge a toll for its use, and he expressed interest in purchasing more American oil to reduce China’s reliance on the Strait in the future.”
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who was among those accompanying Trump, highlighted Xi’s opposition to allowing Iran to impose tolls on ships transiting the Strait.
“President Trump raised the issue of Iran with China and it was important,” said Rubio. “The Chinese side said they are not in favor of militarizing the Strait of Hormuz and are not in favor of a tolling system, and that’s our position.”
SECRETARY RUBIO: President Trump raised the issue of Iran with China and it was important.
The Chinese side said they are not in favor of militarizing the Strait of Hormuz and are not in favor of a tolling system, and that’s our position. pic.twitter.com/9JYpbvztd8
However, there was no mention of Iran or the Strait of Hormuz.
While that doesn’t mean these issues weren’t discussed, readouts are messaging and this reflected the emphasis Beijing places on the paused war and its aftermath.
“The two heads of state exchanged views on major international and regional issues, including the situation in the Middle East, the Ukraine crisis, and the Korean Peninsula,” was about as close as the statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry came to addressing Iran.
Despite the Trump administration’s stance that China opposes allowing Iran to impose tolls on shipping, Beijing is paying for transits, the Guardian claims.
Tehran “says it has reached a deal with China that has already allowed a large number of oil tankers bound for China to go through the strait of Hormuz since Wednesday night, and this has been made possible by China agreeing to limited charging, undercutting US opposition to such moves,” the outlet reported. “The development suggests China has accepted Iran’s assertion that the shipping rules in the strait have changed, with reports suggesting the cost will be in the region of $1 per barrel.”
We cannot independently verify that and have reached out to the White House for details.
🇮🇷 🇨🇳 Iranian media reported on Thursday that naval forces had allowed a group of Chinese ships to pass through the strategic Strait of Hormuz since the night before. Iran has largely blocked shipping through the strait since the outbreak of war with the US and Israel ➡️… pic.twitter.com/PVjGJ0TY7t
Trump pushed back on claims that China is working to arm Iran.
“We discussed it,” he told Fox News host Sean Hannity. “I mean, when you say ‘support,’ they’re not fighting a war with us or anything. He said he’s not gonna give military equipment. That’s a big statement. He said that strongly. But at the same time he said they buy a lot of their oil there, and they’d like to keep doing that.”
HANNITY: Did you discuss China’s support for Iran with Xi?
TRUMP: We discussed it. Uhhhh. I mean, when you say ‘support,’ they’re not fighting a war with us or anything. He said he’s not gonna give military equipment. That’s a big statement. But at the same time he said they buy… pic.twitter.com/Lq677uoCfG
Trump’s claim that China told him it won’t give weapons to Iran followed The New York Times report that Beijing was working to ship arms to Tehran.
“Chinese companies have been discussing arms sales with Iran, plotting to send the weapons through other countries to mask the origins of the military aid,” the publication stated, citing U.S. officials.
The United States “has gathered intelligence that Chinese companies and Iranian officials have discussed the arms transfers,” the newspaper added. “It is not clear how many, if any, arms have been shipped or to what degree Chinese officials have approved the sales.”
Officials briefed on the intelligence “have reached different conclusions on whether the arms have already been sent to the third countries,” according to the Times. “But no Chinese weapons appear to have been used on the battlefield against U.S. or Israeli forces since they began their war against Iran in late February.”
“The United Arab Emirates denies reports circulating regarding an alleged visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the UAE or receiving any Israeli military delegations in the country,” the UAE Foreign Affairs Ministry posted on X Wednesday afternoon EDT. “The UAE reaffirms that its relations with Israel are public and conducted within the framework of the well-known and officially declared Abraham Accords, and are not based on non-transparent or unofficial arrangements. Accordingly, any claims regarding unannounced visits or undisclosed arrangements are entirely unfounded unless officially announced by the relevant authorities in the UAE.”
The ministry added that the “UAE calls on media outlets to exercise accuracy and professionalism, and to refrain from circulating unverified information or promoting misleading political narratives.”
UAE Denies Reports Regarding Visit by Israeli Prime Minister or Receiving Any Israeli Military Delegation pic.twitter.com/TRX9y5ZoVN
Hours before the UAE announcement, Netanyahu’s office claimed the Israeli leader did travel to the Gulf Arab nation, confirming a CBS News report about the visit.
“In the midst of Operation ‘Roar of the Lion,’ Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a secret visit to the United Arab Emirates and met with the President of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed,” the office posted on X. “This visit led to a historic breakthrough in relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates.”
לשכת ראש הממשלה מאשרת כעת:
בעיצומו של מבצע ״שאגת הארי״, ראש הממשלה בנימין נתניהו ביקר בחשאי באיחוד האמירויות ונפגש עם נשיא איחוד האמירויות, השייח׳ מוחמד בן זאיד.
ביקור זה הביא לפריצת דרך היסטורית ביחסים בין ישראל לאיחוד האמירויות.
Israel’s N12 News chief political correspondent Amit Segal noted a “few striking details regarding the news of Netanyahu’s visit to the UAE.”
“A covert flight reportedly took place while Israeli airspace was fully shut—without leaks or detection,” he noted on X. “Sources suggest a deal was reached on an Iron Dome shipment” and “UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan has publicly hosted Israeli leaders like Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid—but not Benjamin Netanyahu. Until now, their contacts stayed behind closed doors.”
Bennet and Lapid visited the UAE in 2021, as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister respectively.
A few striking details regarding the new of Netanyahu’s visit to the UAE:
1. A covert flight reportedly took place while Israeli airspace was fully shut—without leaks or detection.
2. Sources suggest a deal was reached on an Iron Dome shipment.
The announcement from Netanyahu’s office followed media reports on Tuesday about the visit to the UAE of two other high-level Israeli officials.
The Wall Street Journal reported that Mossad chief David Barnea visited the UAE at least twice during Operation Roaring Lion to coordinate war efforts. Barnea reportedly flew to the UAE in March and April. In addition, Israeli media reported that Shin Bet chief David Zini also visited the UAE to coordinate security efforts.
Certainly not surprising given the Abraham Accords and the more recent Iron Dome battery and miltary deployment to UAE by Israel. But 2 back to back visits by a Mossad chief amid a war speaks volumes. Important read by @AnatPeled1 & @summer_said in @WSJ.https://t.co/i9BmyHNZ3p
— Behnam Ben Taleblu بهنام بن طالب لو (@therealBehnamBT) May 13, 2026
The back and forth over the potentially unprecedented wartime visit by three top Israeli officials to the UAE comes a day after U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee publicly confirmed that Israel sent the UAE an unspecified number of Iron Dome air defense batteries and troops to operate them. News of the deployment was first reported by Axios last month. Such an acknowledgement of direct Israeli military aid to an Arab nation is unusual in its own right.
🚨 WATCH: US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee officially confirms: Israel sent the United Arab Emirates an Iron Dome system and a team to operate it. This happened because there are exceptional relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, based on the Abraham Accords. pic.twitter.com/BgCkESt4Yl
TWZ cannot independently verify any of the travel claims. However, Israel has historically been viewed as an enemy by the Arab world and direct cooperation in the form of a visit by its head of state could be considered controversial to say the least. At the same time, things have changed dramatically in the region over the last decade or so, with Arab countries warming to relations with Israel. This has been spurred by the major economic development the region has seen as well as, at least to a degree, a common foe — Iran.
Perhaps the UAE is trying to appeal to a domestic audience or, as Israel’s I24 News senior Middle East correspondent Ariel Oseran suggested on X, UAE is trying to distance itself from Netanyahu and his coalition, not Israel writ large. Maybe Netanyahu, for his own reasons, is trying to claim a level of relationship that doesn’t exist, however that seems unlikely.
We may never find out for sure.
It is highly unlikely that Israel’s PMO would issue a fake statement regarding Netanyahu visiting the UAE at such a sensitive time.
What is more likely is that Abu Dhabi is trying to publicly distance itself from Netanyahu on a personal level, a sentiment that I have personally… https://t.co/8laUSjOAc7
— Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران (@ariel_oseran) May 13, 2026
The Senate on Wednesday blocked the seventh Democratic attempt to prevent Trump from waging war on Iran. However, it was by the slimmest margin yet, indicating a growing unease in the legislature about the now-paused conflict.
The vote failed by a 49-50 margin, with all Democrats but John Fetterman of Pennsylvania supporting the measure. For the first time, Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska joined fellow Republican Senators Susan Collins of Maine and Rand Paul of Kentucky in breaking with Trump and voting with Democrats.
This was the first vote on the War Powers Resolution since Trump bypassed the 60-day deadline to seek congressional authorization for Operation Epic Fury last month. You can read more about that effort in our story about it here.
U.S. President Donald Trump announces he has selected the path forward for his Golden Dome missile defense system in May 2025 in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C. A report by a nonpartisan office said Tuesday said the system could cost $1.2 trillion, far more than Trump said during this announcement. File Photo by Chris Kleponis/UPI | License Photo
May 12 (UPI) — A nonpartisan office said Tuesday that President Donald Trump‘s proposed Golden Dome missile defense system could cost $1.2 trillion over two decades – far more than the $175 billion he said it would cost last year.
The Congressional Budget Office said in a report that this analysis isn’t based on final blueprints, as full details of the system’s architecture haven’t been announced, Time reported. It said this estimate shows the price of “one illustrative approach rather than an estimate of a full Administration proposal.”
The CBO said that acquisition costs for the system would alone cost more than $1 trillion, and of that, about 70 percent of the cost would be for the interceptor layer, orbital weapons meant to destroy missiles after they’re launched, The Hill reported. This would include about 7,800 satellites.
Gen. Mike Guetlein, the Pentagon official in charge of the project, said in March that it would cost about $185 billion. The CBO report said that this difference in estimated price may mean that the “objective architecture is more limited” for the project than the system accounted for by the CBO, The Hill reported.
Congressional Republicans have earmarked $25 billion for the project in the 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act. The Pentagon has asked for $17 billion more in a reconciliation bill this year.
The Trump administration’s fiscal 2027 budget request, which includes $750 billion earmarked for the Golden Dome system, says the system “keeps Americans safe, while using innovative program management and acquisition approaches to prudently employ taxpayer dollars,” The Hill reported. Trump has said he wants the system operational by the end of his term.
The CBO said the system it used in its estimate could counter a limited attack but would be overwhelmed by a large-scale one, Time reported. Israel’s similar air-defense system, often called the Iron Dome, has intercepted missiles from Iran and other localized groups but is meant for a smaller area and shorter-range threats, as opposed to the United States’ need to defend a much larger area from long-range attacks, it said.
Sen. Jeff Merkley, D-Ore., requested the CBO report. He said Tuesday that the report shows the Golden Dome project “is nothing more than a massive giveaway to defense contractors paid for entirely by working Americans” that will “do little to advance American national security.”
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
For the first time, the U.S. Air Force has publicly released imagery showing a B-1B Lancer bomber carrying an AGM-183 Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon hypersonic missile, or ARRW. The development comes with the B-1B now officially slated to serve for another decade, while it has been earmarked as a hypersonic weapons test platform. For its part, the ARRW, at one point expected to be the U.S. military’s first operational hypersonic weapon, is also back from purgatory, after continued questions about its future. The Air Force now wants to develop an improved version, as well as a separate air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM).
A brief clip showing a B-1B flying with an ARRW carried on an external hardpoint was released on Edwards Air Force Base’s Instagram page recently. The emergence of the video was first brought to our attention by The Aviationist.
It is unclear when the test-flight footage was taken, and it is not directly referenced in the video, which is otherwise dedicated to the work of maintainers on different aircraft platforms at Edwards.
The B-1B over a test range, with the ARRW installed. U.S. Air Force screencap
The B-1B was originally designed to carry external stores on up to eight external hardpoints. The Air Force had also developed special pylons that would have allowed the bombers to carry two nuclear-tipped AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) on each one. Following the end of the Cold War, the B-1Bs lost their nuclear mission and, as a result, the external pylons fell into disuse, at least as far as weapons are concerned.
B-1B with cruise missile mounting racks attached to external hardpoints during testing back in the 1980s. U.S. Air Force
However, as long ago as 2020, the Air Force detailed plans to add the ARRW to the B-1B, after the service highlighted work to expand the bomber’s ability to carry hypersonic weapons and other new stores, both internally and externally.
“My goal would be to bring on at least a squadron’s worth of airplanes modified with external pylons on the B-1, to carry the ARRW [Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon],” Gen. Timothy Ray, then head of Air Force Global Strike Command, told Air Force Magazine. He added that the service had contemplated several options for integrating the missile onto the bombers, “but we believe the easiest, fastest, and probably most effective in the short term will be to go with the external pylons.”
In the meantime, we have seen examples of the ARRW carried under the wing of the B-52H bomber during multiple test sorties, and a live version also notably appeared on a Stratofortress during a training event at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam.
A live AGM-183A ARRW under the wing of a B-52 bomber at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam ahead of a test over the Western Pacific in 2024. U.S. Air Force
The Fiscal Year 2026 budget request confirmed that the Air Force plans to use the B-1B as a testbed for the Load Adaptable Modular (LAM) pylon, intended for hypersonic weapons and other outsize loads. The B-1B can accommodate six of these pylons, each capable of carrying two 2,000-pound-class weapons or a single 5,000-pound-plus-class weapon. The ARRW would fall into the latter category.
Boeing concept art showing a B-1B fitted with LAM pylons carrying air-breathing hypersonic missiles. Boeing
The budget documents noted: “The Hypersonic Integration Program successfully demonstrated the B-1’s ability to execute a captive carry of a 5,000-pound-class store and the release of a proven weapon shape from a Load Adaptable Modular (LAM) pylon.” This suggests that the video we are now seeing could have been taken during this demonstration, but it might also refer to external load tests involving the Air Force’s new bunker-buster bomb, the 5,000-pound class GBU-72/B.
A model of the LAM pylon, which Atlantic Models in Miami built for Boeing, loaded with two mock-up hypersonic cruise missiles. Atlantic Models
In the same position as seen in the ARRW video, the LAM has also been used for external carriage tests of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). More routinely, this same position mounts an external pylon that accommodates a Sniper targeting pod. The same location has previously been used in external carriage tests of the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) cruise missile, too.
A B-1B Lancer assigned to the 419th Flight Test Squadron conducts flight tests with a JDAM on the Load Adaptable Modular pylon in early 2024. Air Force photo by Richard GonzalesA 419th Flight Test Squadron B-1B carrying an inert AGM-158 JASSM during a demonstration flight. U.S. Air ForceA close-up look at a Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod on a B-1B. U.S. Air Force
As for ARRW, it carries an unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicle as its warhead. A rocket booster accelerates and lifts the vehicle to the required speed and altitude, after which it separates and glides through the atmosphere on a relatively shallow path toward its target. The weapon’s high speed and unpredictable flight path make it difficult for opponents to intercept and engage it, and give very little response time.
B52 ARRW Hypersonic evaluation test at Edwards Air Force Base 12 JUN 2019
Meanwhile, in its Fiscal Year 2027 budget request, the Air Force seeks funds for the development of what it calls ARRW Increment 2, as well as to kick-start a new air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) program. The service wants almost $350 million to fund these two efforts. ARRW Increment 2 involves adding undisclosed enhanced capabilities onto the baseline weapon, while the ALBM effort would seek to field a new air-launched, long-range strike capability to complement the ARRW and HACM.
The US Air Force plans to kick off Air Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) Increment 2 development and stand up a new Air Launched Ballistic Missile (ALBM) program in Fiscal Year 2027. The service has set aside nearly $350 Million combined for these two efforts. ARRW Inc 2… pic.twitter.com/pe0SKPlrDO
In its Fiscal Year 2027 budget documents, the Air Force further notes:
“We are doubling production rates for our two developmental hypersonic weapons, the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) and the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), with a planned investment of $1.8 billion across the FYDP to accelerate delivery of these critical strike capabilities into the hands of the warfighter.”
The documents don’t give any details on how many ARRWs they want to order.
Mockups of the Chinese JL-1 ALBM on parade in Beijing on September 3, 2025. Central Military Commission of China
Despite previous plans to retire the B-1B by 2030, the bomber’s ability to carry outsize loads, in particular, has helped ensure that it’s now expected to remain in service until at least 2037.
Fiscal Year 2027 budget documents indicate that the Air Force plans to spend $342 million on modernizing its 44 remaining B-1Bs from 2027 to 2031. “This request provides the necessary funding to modernize the platform, ensuring its lethality and relevance through 2037,” the budget said.
With a capacity to carry more conventional weapons than any other aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory, we will surely see the B-1B carrying additional external weapons and larger numbers of them, as it continues its service career.
1 of 2 | Bruce Bechtol speaks at the International Council on Korean Studies (ICKS) annual conference titled “Challenges of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance 2026” at the Hudson Institute in Washington on Wednesday. Photo by Asia Today
May 1 (Asia Today) — North Korea has transferred missile technology to Iran over more than 40 years, evolving from early Scud missile supplies to capabilities approaching intercontinental ballistic missiles, while also helping build factories, underground facilities and naval systems, according to U.S. experts.
Bruce Bechtol made the assessment at the annual International Council on Korean Studies conference titled “Challenges of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance 2026,” co-hosted in Washington by the Hudson Institute and the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.
Bechtol, co-author of the book Rogue Allies: Iran and North Korea’s Strategic Partnership, said Iran began acquiring Scud missiles in the early 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War. Initially supplied in limited numbers by Libya, Iran later established contact with North Korea and imported roughly 100 Scud missiles, which it used to strike Iraqi cities during what became known as the “War of the Cities.”
He said Iran subsequently ordered an additional 200 to 250 Scud-C missiles and, with North Korean assistance, produced and upgraded them domestically. This led to the development of Iran’s current short-range ballistic missile, the Qiam, which has an estimated range of about 800 kilometers.
Bechtol added that Iran attended North Korea’s Nodong missile test in 1993, along with a Pakistani delegation, and later signed a contract to acquire about 150 Nodong missiles. North Korean engineers helped build production facilities near Isfahan, where Iran manufactured the missiles under the name Shahab-3.
He said North Korean specialists further modified these systems, leading to the development of the Emad missile, with a range of about 1,750 kilometers, and the Ghadr missile, with a range of about 1,900 kilometers. Both systems have been used repeatedly and are capable of reaching targets across Israel.
Bechtol also said North Korea sold 19 Musudan missiles – based on the Soviet-era submarine-launched ballistic missile R-27 – to Iran after obtaining the technology from Russian scientists following the collapse of the Soviet Union. He noted that Iran modified the missile for land-based launch, which introduced structural instability and limited its success rate to about 50%.
Based on the Musudan platform, Iran developed the Khorramshahr missile, which can carry a warhead approximately four times heavier than the original design and has an estimated range of 2,000 kilometers. The Israeli military has estimated its penetration rate at about 8%.
Bechtol cited media reports that North Korea transferred 80-ton-class rocket boosters – equivalent to first-stage propulsion systems for intercontinental ballistic missiles – to Iran even during negotiations over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. He noted that the United States imposed sanctions on both countries in 2016 and 2019 in response.
He said a 2021 report by a United Nations panel of experts also detailed such transfers and assessed that technologies similar to those used in North Korea’s Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-15 missiles had been shared with Iran.
Bechtol further claimed that ballistic missiles fired by Iran toward the U.S.-U.K. base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean in March – from a distance of about 4,000 kilometers – were based on North Korean technology.
Beyond missiles, North Korea has supported Iran and its allied groups by providing military hardware and infrastructure. Bechtol said Pyongyang sold 14 Yono-class submarines – the same type used in the 2010 sinking of South Korea’s Cheonan warship – and helped build production facilities for them. North Korea also supplied 46 fast infiltration boats and assisted in constructing related manufacturing sites.
He said North Korean engineers were involved in building underground nuclear-related facilities in Natanz and Isfahan, which he described as difficult to destroy without the use of U.S. B-2 bombers.
Bechtol also pointed to evidence that North Korean weapons were used by Hamas during its October 2023 attack on Israel, including 122 mm rockets, anti-tank weapons, Type 73 machine guns and Type 58 rifles marked in Korean.
Separately, an Israeli research center reported that North Korean arms exporter Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation helped build two tunnels in Lebanon for Hezbollah, measuring about 25 miles (40 kilometers) and 45 miles (72 kilometers), at a cost of about $13 million.
Bechtol said North Korea has also generated significant revenue through military cooperation. Citing research from the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, he estimated that Pyongyang earned about $20 billion over roughly 15 months from transactions with Russia since late 2023 – close to its annual gross domestic product of about $26 billion.
Andrew Scobell said cooperation among China, Russia, Iran and North Korea – sometimes referred to as “CRINK” – is not a formal multilateral alliance but rather a collection of bilateral relationships.
Scobell added that North Korea appears to have exercised restraint in supplying weapons to Iran following U.S. and Israeli strikes earlier this year, citing intelligence assessments reported by international media.
Former U.N. sanctions panel expert William Newcomb said North Korea’s proliferation activities have contributed significantly to instability in the Middle East and called for a comprehensive assessment of their global economic impact, suggesting the cost could exceed $1 trillion.
Scobell also noted that North Korea’s strategic value to Russia could decline significantly if the war in Ukraine ends, indicating that the current level of cooperation is closely tied to ongoing conflict dynamics.
“We’re exploring theater ballistic missile defense. So we’re doing some studies, we’re running some simulations, to see if that’s a requirement for the service in the future,” Marine Lt. Col. Robert Barclay said during a panel discussion yesterday at the annual Modern Day Marine exposition, at which TWZ has been in attendance.
US Marine Corps Lt. Col. Robert Barclay seen speaking at the annual Modern Day Marine exposition on April 28, 2026. USMC
Barclay is currently the Marine Air Command and Control Systems (MACCS) Integration Branch Head within the Aviation Combat Element Division of the service’s Combat Development and Integration office. His portfolio includes service-wide air and missile defense requirements.
“We know our old sensor used to be able to do it, but it wasn’t really a requirement,” Barclay added. “What we need to determine is, is [defending against] a theater ballistic [missile] like an SRBM [short-range ballistic missile] or MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile], a requirement for the Marine Corps to do? I would argue that it probably is.”
“At the end of the day, I don’t think the Army’s going to have enough capacity with us where we’re operating to actually adjudicate on that threat,” he continued. “So, I think we need to take a hard look at that, and that’s what our intent [is] to do over the next year.”
To take a step back quickly, the Marine Corps’ main general-purpose ground-based anti-air weapon today is the Stinger short-range heat-seeking surface-to-air missile. The service currently fields Stinger in a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) configuration using shoulder-fired launchers, as well as integrated on the Humvee-based Avenger air defense vehicles. Stinger offers a point defense capability against fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, drones, and certain types of cruise missiles.
A Marine fires a Stinger missile from a man-portable launcher during training. USMC
The Marines also hope to reach initial operational capability this year with a new Medium-Range Intercept Capability (MRIC), which is a service-specific variation of the Israeli Iron Dome system. MRIC uses a U.S.-made version of Iron Dome’s Tamir interceptor, called SkyHunter, and a trailer-based road-mobile launcher. Each launcher can accommodate up to 20 interceptors, which come preloaded in individual canisters, at a time. The system uses offboard sensors to spot and track targets and cue missiles to intercept them. The Corps’ existing AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radars (G/ATOR) have been presented as the primary sensor for MRIC.
A Marine Corps MRIC launcher on display loaded with a row of five launch canisters for SkyHunter interceptors. USMC/Cpl. Michael Bartman
“The primary target set for MRIC is cruise missiles and your higher-end Group 5-type of [anti-]air application, as well as rotary wing, fixed-wing type of aspects,” Marine Col. Andrew Konicki, the service’s Program Manager for Ground Based Air Defense and another panelist at Modern Day Marine yesterday, explained. MRIC “can go after Group 3, because it’s probably a mismatch in terms of ammunition versus what it’s going after. So it’s primarily focused on that growing threat, or that higher-end threat, so to speak, as part of that integrated air missile defense application and layer defense piece.”
Groups 3 and 5 here refer to different categories of uncrewed aerial systems. The U.S. military defines Group 5 as consisting of drones with maximum weights greater than 1,320 pounds, and that can fly above 18,000 feet. The MQ-9 Reaper is a commonly used example of a Group 5 uncrewed aircraft. Drones that fall under Group 3 have maximum weights anywhere between 56 and 1,320 pounds, can operate at altitudes between 3,500 and 18,000 feet, and reach top speeds of up to 250 knots. Group 3 is very broad, but notably includes Iran’s now-infamous Shahed 136 long-range kamikaze drone, and the growing number of variants and derivatives thereof.
Lt. Col. Robert Barclay’s mention of an unspecified previous Marine ballistic missile defense capability seems most likely to be a reference to the HAWK medium-range surface-to-air missile system. The service retired HAWK in the 1990s, but versions of the system remain in use elsewhere worldwide, including in Ukraine. HAWK has used an evolving mixture of radars for target acquisition and engagement since the system was first introduced in the 1950s, as you can read more about here. Improved HAWK interceptors have also been developed, including variants explicitly intended to offer a rudimentary anti-ballistic missile capability.
The video below shows HAWK systems in service in Ukraine.
Американський ЗРК HAWK (Яструб) захищає небо України!
Barclay did not elaborate on what level of ballistic missile defense capability the Marine Corps might look to pursue in the future. In the past year or so, there have been reports of Israel using Iron Dome against incoming Iranian ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. However, the system’s effectiveness against ballistic missiles of any kind, which it was never designed to intercept, and whether the Marines might be able to employ MRIC in this role, is unclear.
Today, the main tool for providing ground-based theater ballistic missile defense across all of America’s armed forces is the Army’s Patriot surface-to-air missile systems. The Army also operates the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which offers a higher-end ballistic missile defense capability over Patriot. Both Patriot and THAAD are only capable of intercepting incoming ballistic threats during their final terminal phase.
The latest conflict with Iran has reignited discussions about the Army’s worryingly limited capacity to meet operational needs for ballistic missile defense, as well as protection against other aerial threats. Between February and April, Iranian forces launched repeated missile and drone attacks on key bases across the Middle East. They were successful in many instances in targeting high-value military assets, including aircraft parked on the ground and air and missile defense radars.
📸 Al Jazeera shows heavily damaged AN/FPS-132 early warning radar at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, a key U.S. ballistic-missile detection system.
The AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is a $1.1 billion U.S.-built missile-warning system that detects… pic.twitter.com/RcmvQff2Is
The conflict with Iran also put a new spotlight on concerns about the depth of American stockpiles of air and missile defense interceptors, and the ability to replenish them quickly. Pressure on Patriot and THAAD units would be even more pronounced in a high-end fight, such as one across the broad expanses of the Pacific against China.
The ballistic missile threat ecosystem is also not static. This is underscored by Iran’s recent use of ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads, which are also designed to release their payloads at very high altitudes, as a way to consistently get around Israeli terminal defenses. TWZ previously explored the very serious broader implications of this in a feature you can find here.
One of the ballistic missiles launched by Iran at central Israel a short while ago carried a cluster bomb warhead, footage shows. pic.twitter.com/kaIdFcyKuj
— Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian (@manniefabian) March 24, 2026
“The purpose of the test-fire is to verify the characteristics and power of cluster bomb warhead and fragmentation mine warhead applied to the tactical ballistic missile.” pic.twitter.com/cem3NwYpAC
“I would argue that the adversary is not just going to throw drones at you. We’re going to have other threats in the future,” Lt. Col. Barclay stressed during yesterday’s panel, which was focused primarily on ongoing efforts to counter uncrewed aerial threats. “You’re going to see probably TBM [theater ballistic missiles], ballistic missiles, coming at you as well in a variety of other types of threats.”
With all this in mind, a new, organic theater ballistic missile capability may now be on the horizon for the U.S. Marine Corps.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
The U.S. Navy says it is still aiming to see the AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range (AARGM-ER) enter operational service this year. This is despite the announcement of a planned “strategic pause” in purchases of the missiles in the 2027 Fiscal Year. AARGM-ER is set to give Navy carrier air wings a critical boost in their ability to neutralize ever-more capable hostile integrated defense networks.
AARGM-ER has been in the works since the late 2010s. Northrop Grumman is the current prime contractor, through its previous acquisition of Orbital ATK. The Navy has ordered dozens of the missiles already. Hence, it was very surprising when the service’s latest proposed budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year, rolled out in full last week, included no request for funding to buy more AGM-88Gs due to the aforementioned pause. All of this, coupled with previous delays and technical issues encountered in testing, had prompted new questions about the future of the program.
An AARGM-ER seen under the wing of an F/A-18 Super Hornet during a test. USN
“U.S. procurements for the AARGM-ER program are planned to resume once the system has successfully completed all necessary testing and software updates. Our immediate priority is ensuring the weapon passes these rigorous testing milestones to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in September 2026,” a Navy spokesperson told TWZ. “After validating the software and testing, the plan would be to ramp up production to clear a backlog of over 150 missiles, with U.S. procurements officially restarting in FY28 [Fiscal year 2028]. In the interim, FY27 production will be allocated to Foreign Military Sales to fulfill our commitments to five signed international cases.”
The spokesperson did not name the foreign customers in question. However, Italy is a full partner in the development of the AGM-88G. The U.S. government has also previously approved sales of the missiles to Australia, Finland, and the Netherlands. Norway has publicly announced its intention to purchase AARGM-ERs, as well. The U.S. Air Force is also set to acquire these missiles. We will come back to this later on.
The AGM-88 family, also known as the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), traces its roots back to the 1970s. The AARGM-ER is a major redesign of the preceding AARGM variant, also designated the AGM-88E. The AGM-88G features a completely redesigned body optimized for high speed and range, as well as a new, more powerful rocket motor and control actuation system.
A graphic the Navy has previously released offering a general breakdown of the components of the AGM-88G AARGM-ER, including what it carries over from the preceding AGM-88E AARGM. USNAn earlier generation AGM-88 missile seen under the wing of a Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet. USN
Inside, the AGM-88G reuses the guidance and control systems from the AGM-88E. By extension, this means the AGM-88G retains the same multi-mode guidance capability of its predecessor, which includes a GPS-assisted inertial navigation system and a millimeter-wave radar seeker. The AARGM-ER’s primary target set is hostile emitters, especially air defense radars, but the guidance package is designed to allow it to find its mark even if they shut down and stop sending out signals to home in on. The AGM-88E also has a more general, secondary ability to strike targets on land or at sea, including by just being directed to hit a specified set of coordinates.
AARGM-ER is also sized to allow for internal carriage on F-35A and C variants. There are plans to eventually integrate it for external carriage on all three F-35 variants, as well as legacy F/A-18C/D Hornets, as well.
A picture showing a fit check to demonstrate the ability of the AARGM-ER test article to fit inside F-35A/C internal bays. Orbital ATK www.twz.com
As noted, the development of the AARGM-ER has had to contend with technical issues and delays over the years. Originally, the goal was to reach IOC on F/A-18E/F and EA-18G in Fiscal Year 2023.
“The AARGM-ER experienced significant delays as a result of rocket motor, structural, and software problems discovered during testing,” the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said in a report published in June 2025. “Contracting officials noted that the program worked with the prime contractor to investigate the root causes of the identified deficiencies and implement corrective actions, including changes in the production process.”
“The program is still experiencing production delays as well. Since our last assessment, program officials stated that testing issues, supply chain challenges, and construction delays for a new production facility slowed completion of the first two production contracts by 1 year,” GAO’s report added. “We have found that starting production before demonstrating a system will work as intended – which the Navy did – increases the risk of discovering deficiencies that require costly, time-intensive rework.”
“In FY25 [Fiscal Year 2025], the [AARGM-ER] program attempted three IT [integrated test] weapon employment tests using F/A-18F aircraft against a threat-representative integrated air defense land target at the China Lake Range in California,” according to a separate report from the Pentagon’s Office of the Director of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), released in March of this year. “AARGM-ER successfully completed one of the three weapon events but exhibited performance discrepancies during the other two, to include one event during which range safety terminated the weapon after release. No further weapons employment testing was accomplished in FY25 pending implementation of updates required to address the problems that were identified.”
DOT&E warned in that report that the IOC schedule for AGM-88G could slip further to the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2027, which starts on October 1 of this year.
A US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet fires an AGM-88G AARGM-ER over the Point Mugu Sea Range during a test. Northrop Grumman
Earlier this year, the Navy somewhat urgently put out a contracting notice saying it was exploring options for a new long-range anti-radiation missile. The stated requirements for this Advanced Emission Suppression Missile (AESM) were very much in line with how the AARGM-ER has been discussed in the past, with one notable exception: a new demand for the ability to engage targets in the air, as well as on the surface. You can read more about why that is significant here. With the Navy confirming that it is still pushing ahead on AARGM-ER, it remains unclear how exactly the service sees ASEM fitting into its broader plans. There does not appear to be any explicit mention of ASEM in the Navy’s latest budget request.
As noted, the U.S. Air Force is also in line to acquire AGM-88Gs. An AARGM-ER subvariant with “improved warhead/fuze” is set to serve as a bridge to the Stand-in Attack Weapon (SiAW), as well. Reportedly now designated the AGM-88J, SiAW is a derivative of the AARGM-ER being developed to provide a broader high-speed strike capability. The Air Force expects to primarily employ SiAW against time-sensitive and/or high-value assets on the ground, especially ballistic and cruise missile launchers, air and missile defense nodes, electronic warfare systems, and even anti-satellite weapons.
A SiAW test article. Northrop Grumman
Despite the Navy’s “strategic pause” with AARGM-ER, the Air Force is asking for more funds to purchase additional SiAWs in Fiscal Year 2027. The Air Force has said in the past that it has been targeting 2026 for reaching IOC with SiAW on the F-35A. SiAW flight testing to date, at least that has been disclosed, has involved carriage by F-16 fighters, and it is possible the missile could be integrated operationally onto that aircraft and others, as well. As an aside, Northrop Grumman has also been pitching a ground-launched member of the AARGM-ER/SiAW family, called the Advanced Reactive Strike Missile (AReS).
A SiAW test article is released from an F-16 fighter during a test. USAF
As mentioned, the Navy has made clear that procurement of AARGM-ERs for foreign customers through the FMS program is also continuing.
Time will tell whether or not the Navy can meet its IOC target for AARGM-ER by September, or the timeline slips into the next fiscal year. Still, the service looks to remain committed to the program, at least for the time being, regardless of its intent to put a year-long pause on buying more AGM-88G.
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
Ukraine has released more details of Russia’s S-71K Kovyor — translated as Carpet — an air-launched missile that Kyiv says has been used in combat since late last year. The continued development of weapons in this class highlights the fact that Russia is looking for alternatives to its more established — and more costly — legacy air-launched cruise missiles, with current production levels struggling to meet wartime needs.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) today publicly released new information on the S-71K, including an interactive 3D model. The GUR had previously released details of companies involved in the manufacture of Russia’s Su-57 Felon fighter, and notes that the new missile was specifically developed for this platform.
GUR
“The new missile was first deployed by the enemy late last year and appears to represent the United Aircraft Corporation’s (UAC) initial venture into missile manufacturing,” the GUR says.
The GUR adds that the warhead of the S-71K utilizes a 551-pound OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb. This bomb, which was developed in the Cold War as a free-fall air-launched weapon, is integrated into the structure of the S-71K, which otherwise features a low-observable airframe.
OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb repurposed as the missile warhead. GUR
The S-71K’s airframe is made from “a multi-layer fiberglass material with additional reinforcement,” with other internal elements made of aluminum alloys. The airframe has a low-observable shape, with a trapezoidal cross section, chined nose, pop-out swept wings, and an inverted V-tail. Available imagery of the wreckage reveals details of the top-mounted conformal engine intake, feeding a pentagon-shaped intake duct. There are, however, no signs of any low-observable coatings, such as radar-absorbent material, likely to keep costs down.
The S-71K engine air intake. GUR
The GUR also provides information on various electronic components, of which it says “the vast majority” are of foreign origin, including items manufactured in China, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States. As the GUR says, “Continued access to foreign technologies and components allows the aggressor state to develop new weapons and scale their use in the war against Ukraine.”
This makes it one of many Russian weapons relying on foreign parts. For instance, a Russian Shahed-136 strike drone obtained by the GUR contained numerous components from the U.S. as well as parts from Iran, Taiwan, and other nations. Previously, we noted that the GUR found multiple foreign components in a Russian S-70 Okhotnik-B (Hunter-B) flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV) downed in a case of friendly fire.
The S-71K is powered by a compact R500 turbojet engine, also produced by UAC, and features what the GUR describes as “an inertial navigation system based on simple sensors.”
The R500 turbojet engine. GUR
With three separate internal fuel tanks, Ukraine assesses that the S-71K has an operational range of up to 186 miles. Earlier reports suggest that the missile flies at a speed of Mach 0.6 and at altitudes of up to 27,000 feet.
One of the bladder-type fuel tanks inside the missile. GUR
In 2024, it was reported that Sukhoi had received approval from the Russian Defense Ministry to begin producing the S-71, after it underwent “significant design changes” based on lessons from the Ukraine conflict.
Two views of the S-71 as seen in the original patent, with wings folded and deployed. via X
These changes apparently included increasing the range and reducing the radar cross-section to improve survivability against air defenses.
A rear view of the S-71K under the wing of a Su-57. via X
The GUR has not said what platform or platforms are understood to have employed the S-71K in the war in Ukraine. As mentioned, the S-71K is known to have been developed with the Su-57 in mind and has at least been tested on this aircraft, with captive-carry trials in April 2024 at the Russian flight research center in Zhukovsky. There is no reason that it couldn’t also be carried by other Russian tactical jets; this would be necessary for large-volume employment, if significant production numbers are actually realized.
It is also expected that Russia will explore the integration of the S-71K with its S-70 Okhotnik UCAV.
S-70 Okhotnik-B (Hunter-B) flying wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV). Russian Ministry of Defense screenshot/via X
Interestingly, there have also been reports that the S-71K may be complemented by a more advanced weapon, known as the S-71M Monokhrom. While described as a kamikaze drone, this is essentially an air-to-ground missile expected to have a “human-in-the-loop” capability, to allow dynamic targeting, including against moving targets, via a controller on the ground. In this way, it differs from the S-71K, which apparently features a fairly basic inertial guidance system, likely backed up by satellite navigation. The S-71M is also said to feature electro-optical sensors for day and night operations, and multiple warhead options, including high-explosive and shaped charges.
While the S-71K is externally carried by launch aircraft, the S-71M can reportedly also be accommodated in the weapons bay of a Su-57 or S-70 UCAV. So far, we have not seen S-71s with folding tailfins, which would be required for internal carriage.
A graphic showing the external carriage of two S-71Ks under the wing of a Su-57. via X
Earlier this year, unconfirmed reports from Russia suggested that the S-71M Monokhrom may have been used in an attack on a Ukrainian HIMARS launcher in the Chernihiv region, although the Russian military stressed that the target was destroyed by a Geran loitering munition. Images released of S-71M test rounds indicate a missile design that is notably less stealthy than the latest S-71K, but the M-version may also have been refined in the meantime.
An S-71M test article under the wing of a Su-57. via X
In March of this year, the GUR revealed details of another new Russian air-launched cruise missile, the Izdeliye 30, which you can read more about here.
The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has published an interactive 3D model, the main assemblies, and components of the enemy’s new cruise missile “izdeliye-30,” as well as data on 20 enterprises involved in its production cooperation chain.
— Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (@DI_Ukraine) March 2, 2026
This missile also has folding wings, but offers a much longer range of at least 930 miles. It is similarly powered by a compact turbojet engine but does not have a stealthy airframe.
Various components in the Izdeliye 30 appear to have been reused from existing weapons, reducing cost and complexity and speeding development.
Based on its range, the Izdeliye is likely intended as a cheaper, simpler alternative to the air-launched cruise missiles otherwise used by Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers, namely the Kh-101 and Kh-555 (the Kh-55 carries a nuclear warhead).
Meanwhile, the S-71K appears to be tailored for tactical crewed and uncrewed aircraft, while its more limited range is partly compensated for by the fact that it has low-observable features (and is intended for launch from low-observable platforms).
The S-71K should also offer a cheaper alternative to the Kh-69, a weapon widely associated with the Su-57, although it can also be launched by ‘legacy’ Russian tactical aircraft. You can read about this air-to-surface missile here.
1/ TASS reports that KTRV will display (a mock-up of) its Kh-69 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) at the upcoming “Army-2022” forum.
Specifications: – Max range (km): 290 – Cruise speed (km/h): 700 – 1,000 – Warhead (kg): 300 – 310 (depending on configuration) pic.twitter.com/UD38MsNNpG
While it remains to be seen exactly how the S-71 series will be used in an operational context, it’s clear that Russia has a need for cheaper, easier-to-produce air-launched missiles for its combat aircraft fleet.
A Su-57 undergoes trials with a pair of S-71K missiles. via X
At minimum, the deployment of the S-71 poses an additional challenge for Ukraine’s already strained air defense forces, especially given the continued scarcity of Western-supplied ground-based air defense systems.
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A new, longer-range version of the Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile (RAACM) has been unveiled by CoAspire at the Sea-Air-Space 2026 exposition near Washington, D.C. The development comes just days after the U.S. Air Force launched market research for its Family of Affordable Mass Missiles — Beyond Adversary’s Reach (FAMM-BAR), reflecting the service’s interest in low-cost, long-range strike weapons, specifically for anti-surface warfare.
Jamie Hunter of TWZ spoke about the RAACM-ER (RAACM pronounced ‘rack-em;’ ER for Extended Range) with Doug Denneny, founder, CEO, and owner at CoAspire.
A frontal view of the RAACM-ER. Jamie Hunter
First off, it’s worth looking at the original RAACM, a modular, low-cost cruise missile that leverages 3D printing to bring down cost and enable rapid production ramp-up.
“When we designed the original RAACM, we knew that it was going to be the size of a GBU-38,” Denneny said, referring to the 500-pound version of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which is 92.6 inches long and has a wingspan of 14 inches.
An official video promoting the original RAACM:
RAACM Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile
“When you go to that size, there are great reasons to do it, but it doesn’t go as far as a larger variant could do,” Denneny continued. “We really wanted to take everything we learned and now have an extended-range version. And what’s beautiful about the additive manufacturing that we use is that we can really optimize fuel tank volume, which means this can go very far.”
According to the manufacturer, the RAACM-ER has a range greater than 1,000 nautical miles.
This is especially remarkable considering the relatively compact size of the weapon. Indeed, when it comes to anti-ship missiles, the only weapon in the U.S. inventory that comes close is the BGM-109 Block V Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST). This can be launched from destroyers, submarines, and the U.S. Army’s Typhon system. Like the RAACM-ER, it is subsonic, but a single round costs $3.64 million, according to the Navy. While the RAACM-ER clearly has a degree of low observability, it is not to the same degree as on the MST.
A full battery set of four Typhon launchers, as well as the trailer-based command post. U.S. Army
Like RAACM, the extended-range model is designed for launch from aircraft, as well as from the ground and from naval vessels. For surface-launched applications, the RAACM-ER adds an additional rocket booster behind its turbojet, meaning it can be propelled out of its launch canister.
Despite the nomenclature, the RAACM-ER is a new design, rather than a modification of the RAACM.
Denneny explained: “Our engineers came to us and said, ‘Hey, if we’re going to make a bigger one, should we make it look just the same?’ I mentioned earlier that RAACM was made that shape just to ease integration. We’re an engineering company, so we said, ‘Let’s optimize fuel volume, let’s optimize survivability features, let’s optimize physics so that this thing can go as far as possible and take the sensors needed. That’s why it’s in this slightly different shape.”
The RAACM-ER is somewhat reminiscent of the AGM-158 Joint Air-To-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), in terms of appearance and capabilities, but Denneny is keen to avoid direct comparisons.
Stealthy AGM-158 JASSMs loaded onto an F-15E. U.S. Air Force/Photo by Airman 1st Class Susan Roberts Stealthy AGM-158 JASSMs loaded onto an F-15E. JASSM uses an imaging infrared seeker — seen in the hexagon-shaped window on the missile’s nose — to match the target in its databank and fine-tune its terminal attack run. (Photo by Airman 1st Class Susan Roberts)
“Physics is physics,” he added. “When people look at shapes, they look similar, but just like an Airbus looks like a Boeing, but what they have different inside is really what matters, and that’s how we differ in many ways.”
In terms of sensors, the RAACM-ER is currently fitted with a GPS navigation system, suitable for air, ground, and surface launch.
“Both our RAACM and our RAACM-ER also have a long-wave infrared sensor in the nose,” Denneny continued, “so we have the opportunity to search and find targets as well.”
Unlike the JASSM and similar cruise missiles, however, the RAACM-ER, like the RAACM before it, is optimized for low cost.
For Denneny, “the most important thing is affordable mass. [This] means keeping the cost down, so that the nation and our allies can purchase these at scale. That’s number one. Number two is to use as many commercial off-the-shelf parts, so that we’re we are not locked into a single supplier for anything. The final thing is to have something that can survive enemy countermeasures, and also hit the target, whether it’s stationary or moving. Those are the main requirements.”
Jamie Hunter
When it comes to price point, CoAspire has optimized mass rather than the highest-end capabilities. This is a reflection not only of the sheer number of targets that the U.S. military and its allies would face in a potential conflict with China, but also the fact that a considerable proportion of missiles won’t make it to their targets anyway. Still, as recent conflicts have shown, the ability of lower-end drones, especially, to overwhelm adversary air defenses when fielded in large numbers is significant. After all, quantity has a quality all of its own.
Denneny confirmed that CoAspire plans to test-fly the RAACM-ER “very soon.”
The original RAACM has already undergone flight trials aboard a contractor-operated A-4. CoAspire is now under contract to the U.S. government for RAACM, and the weapon is in production at the company’s plant in Manassas, Virginia.
In the past, we’ve learned that both the Air Force and the Navy have funded work on the RAACM project. It has also been reported that CoAspire is one of two companies producing Extended Range Attack Missiles (ERAM) for Ukraine — this may well involve the RAACM or a related weapon.
Two candidate weapon prototypes competing for the US Air Force’s Extended-Range Attack Munition program 👇. Both Coaspire and Zone 5 Technologies were awarded contracts late last year in support of the #ERAM program. Both are expected to enter testing this year. https://t.co/9cGBuB9z3spic.twitter.com/gc3ZDtX54m
As for the RAACM-ER, this was unveiled only a week after the Air Force launched market research for its Family of Affordable Mass Missiles — Beyond Adversary’s Reach (FAMM-BAR).
“The potential procurement objective is to produce an inventory for the [U.S.] Government and Foreign Military Sales. The expectation is that the annual production orders will range from 1,000 to 2,000 units per year for five years (procurement numbers will vary by year),” the Air Force says in the request for information.
The FAMM-BAR program lists five desired attributes for the potential weapon: a range of at least 1,000 nautical miles, a speed of at least 0.7 Mach, the option of palletized delivery from a cargo aircraft, the ability to receive midcourse navigation updates, and the manufacturing capacity to produce more than 1,000 rounds annually. The main target set for the weapon is “slow-moving maritime” vessels.
A video showing a demonstration of the Rapid Dragon air-launched palletized munitions concept, using surrogate weapons delivered from the cargo holds of a C-17A and an EC-130J:
Rapid Dragon Flight Test
This requirement reflects the growing focus on anti-surface warfare as the U.S. military plans for a high-end conflict in the Pacific, especially against China. The U.S. military is increasingly investing in a diverse mix of anti-ship capabilities, part of a broader strategic shift driven by China’s growing maritime power. At the same time, real-world operations have exposed how rapidly missile stockpiles can be depleted, intensifying concerns that sustaining the massive volumes of anti-ship fires required in a China conflict will demand significant expansion of U.S. production capacity and inventories.
At the same time, the RAACM-ER would be useful for striking static land targets during an Indo-Pacific war, too. With such a considerable range, the weapon will also be better able to deal with increasingly far-reaching air defenses, something that the Pentagon is increasingly concerned about, including the likelihood of enemy missiles that can target its aircraft at ranges as great as 1,000 miles.
It should be noted that there are already other FAMM programs underway, namely the FAMM-Palletized and FAMM-Lugged cruise missiles for the Air Force. However, these require ranges of 250-500 nautical miles.
At this point, the low-cost, long-range strike weapon field is becoming increasingly crowded. Other contenders include designs from Anduril, General Atomics, and Zone 5 Technologies. From the last of these companies, the Rusty Dagger recently underwent release tests from an Air Force F-16 as part of the FAMM-L effort.
A U.S. Air Force F-16 takes off carrying a Rusty Dagger, from Zone 5 Technologies, as part of the Family of Affordable Mass Munition — Lugged tests. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Thomas M. Barley
Global Technical Systems is also pitching a cruise missile with a range of 1,200 nautical miles and an anti-ship warhead.
However, with the original RAACM already in production, and proven in flight tests, the new RAACM-ER looks well-positioned to go far — figuratively and literally — in the FAMM-BAR program.