Missile

The U.S. Army is calling for new potential options for replacing the venerable Stinger short-range heat-seeking surface-to-air missile. The service has already been funding work on two competing designs from Lockheed Martin and Raytheon under its Next-Generation Short-Range Interceptor (NGSRI) program since 2023. The Army is currently aiming to buy 11,000 NGSRI missiles, as well as 2,200 new man-portable launchers, starting in Fiscal Year 2028.

The Army put out a contracting notice regarding what it is calling the NGSRI Alternate Interceptor Demonstration (AID) yesterday. The service is looking to hold an industry day event regarding its plans for the AID at Redstone Arsenal in Alabama next month.

“The Army is seeking to identify additional potential sources to fulfill the NGSRI requirements,” the notice explains. “The Army plans to conduct a demonstration in the Spring 2027 timeframe. A successful demonstration by an offeror may lead to an award for missile procurement.”

“The current NGSRI program was initiated to meet the Department of the Army requirement for Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) surface to air missile systems to replace the legacy FIM-92 Stinger man-portable air defense system,” the notice adds. “The NGSRI is a high performance, soldier portable, fire and forget, surface to air missile system capable of defeating rotary wing, fixed wing, and Group 2/3 Unmanned Aircraft System threats.”

In U.S. military parlance, Group 2 covers drones with gross weights between 21 and 55 pounds, that can fly up to altitudes of 3,500 feet, and hit top speeds of up to 250 knots. Group 3, the next tier up, is a far broader category that encompasses uncrewed aerial systems weighing anywhere between 55 and 1,320 pounds, with operational ceilings between 3,500 and 18,000 feet, and with top speeds between 100 and 250 knots.

The Iranian-designed Shahed-136 one-way-attack drone is, by far, the best-known example of a Group 3 design, and one that encapsulates the importance of addressing threats in that particular category. Development of kamikaze drones in the Group 2 tier has also been surging globally, including in the United States. Both categories do also include drones configured for surveillance and reconnaissance and other missions.

It is also worth noting here that the Stinger has received upgrades in recent years to improve its effectiveness against drones. You can read more about that missile’s evolution since it was first introduced in the 1970s here.

Stinger missiles with proximity fuzes destroy UAVs

“The NGSRI missile is backwards compatible with the legacy Stinger missile platforms such as SGT STOUT and Marine Corps Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS),” yesterday’s contracting notice also stresses. This has been a key requirement since the program started.

Sgt. Stout is the name given to an air defense system in Army service today that is based on the 8×8 Stryker light armored vehicle. The Sgt. Stout has a turret that can be fitted with up to two four-round launchers for Stingers. Those launchers can also be swapped out for ones that can be loaded with a pair of millimeter-wave radar-guided AGM-114L Hellfire missiles. The turret also has a 30mm XM914 automatic cannon, which can fire proximity-fuzed airbursting rounds against drones and other aerial threats, and a 7.62x51mm M240B machine gun.

The four-round Stinger launchers used on the Sgt. Stout are the same ones found on the older Humvee-based Avenger air defense systems, which are in increasingly limited use in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Army Avengers were recently in the news after images emerged showing them protecting President Donald Trump at his golf course in Bedminster, New Jersey.

In its current form, the Marine Corps’ MADIS consists of two 4×4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) in different configurations. One is armed with Stinger missiles, as well as an XM914 cannon and M240 machine gun, all mounted on a single remote weapon station. The other has the same type of remote weapon station, but without Stingers, and also has added electronic warfare, electronic support measures, and sensor capabilities.

Stinger is still perhaps best known in its shoulder-fired form, also known as the Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) configuration, as seen in pictures earlier in this piece. The Army has already been pursuing new individual launchers, or Control Launch Assemblies (CLA), for use with existing Stingers, which could also be used with future NGSRI missiles. Lockheed Martin has publicly put forward a new CLA design as part of its NGSRI proposal, which is called QuadStar, as seen in the video below.

Whether or not the newly announced AID plans reflect any major issues with the existing NGSRI competition is unknown. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon have announced the successful passage of major milestones in work on their respective designs at separate points this year. Raytheon is also the current prime contractor for the Stinger.

Stinger is also in widespread service globally. Any replacement the U.S. military might adopt, especially one that is backwards compatible with existing launchers, could easily translate to interest from foreign armed forces. The ongoing war in Ukraine and other conflicts in recent years have contributed to a new surge in demand for MANPADS worldwide, including to help counter growing drone threats.

The U.S. military has been putting new emphasis on diversifying supplier bases and greater government control of intellectual property rights, especially for munitions, in recent years. This is a general focus area that has grown even more since President Trump’s second term began last year. Officials have been open about their desire to reduce reliance on traditional prime contractors and bring in more smaller and non-traditional firms, even for very high-profile weapon system programs. These efforts reflect a particular push to avoid so-called ‘vendor lock’ and promote greater competition, which can also offer benefits when it comes to cost and scaling production.

When it comes to NGSRI, as mentioned, the Army is looking to buy thousands of these missiles, as well as individual launchers, in the coming years. A new demonstration next year would also not preclude the service from ultimately ordering NGSRIs from either Lockheed Martin or Raytheon.

With plans to start production of the selected NGSRI design in Fiscal Year 2028, which starts on October 1 of next year, the Army will need to make a decision about how to proceed with NGSRI relatively soon.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

WASHINGTON — The U.S. military is experiencing a “beyond critical” shortage of advanced missile interceptors in Europe largely driven by President Trump’s war with Iran, a U.S. defense official in Europe and a NATO official told the Associated Press, raising concerns about vulnerabilities in NATO countries to a potential Russian attack.

The U.S. defense official said the most concerning shortfall involves Patriot missile interceptors, which can shoot down Russia’s high-speed ballistic missiles. The NATO official confirmed the low inventories of Patriots among American and NATO forces in Europe. Both spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive military matters.

In the event of a Russian ballistic missile assault on, for example, a military headquarters or power plant, NATO could be in a similar position to Patriot-starved Ukraine and be forced “to take punch after punch in the mouth,” the U.S. defense official said.

In Europe, the American military “definitely” does not have enough Patriots to stop any possible sustained ballistic missile attack and would have “very limited” capability to defend against a single ballistic missile strike or a stray Russian missile that goes off course, the U.S. official said.

It illustrates the cascading fallout from Trump’s decision to launch a war against Iran, a conflict that reaches the six-month mark on Friday. U.S. missile stocks in Europe have been moved to the Middle East, where U.S. and Gulf allies have fired off significant numbers of interceptors, including Patriots, to thwart Iran’s drones and missiles. Some of those attacks have killed and wounded American troops.

Though a Russian ballistic missile attack against NATO countries is not imminently expected, CIA Director John Ratcliffe went to Moscow this week to warn Russia not to attack, The Wall Street Journal reported. Trump played down the significance of the rare and secretive trip, saying it was “sort of semi-routine.”

European and NATO officials say Russia could be in a position to attack countries in the alliance by 2030. Patriot stockpiles are projected to rebound by then. In the meantime, Russia’s war in Ukraine could hinder its ability to carry out any missile attack on Europe as it would be a challenge for Moscow to fight an air war on two fronts.

U.S. Patriot transfers to Ukraine played a role in the drawdown, but the Iran war wasn’t expected

The Patriot missile shortage is most acutely felt in Ukraine, where officials are begging for more air defense support and where previous U.S. transfers also have drawn down some supply. Kyiv says only U.S.-made Patriots can stop Russia’s advanced ballistic missiles, which increasingly are getting through Ukrainian defenses, including as part of a barrage overnight into Thursday.

The U.S. supplied hundreds of Patriot missiles to Ukraine over the course of the 4 1/2-year-long conflict, but the Iran war was the tipping point for shrinking inventories, said Ed Arnold, senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a military think tank in London.

The supply to Ukraine was planned for and reasonably measured, he said, whereas stocks in the Middle East have been unexpectedly and quickly drained, exposing supply chain constraints.

The U.S. military in Europe also is grappling with critical shortages of the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, a medium-range ballistic missile designed to strike behind enemy lines, the two officials said. But the overall munitions picture in Europe is less dire than on air defenses alone because some European militaries have their own offensive missiles, such as the Taurus and Storm Shadow, which are both long-range air-launched bunker-busting missiles.

U.S. Army Col. Martin O’Donnell, a senior NATO military spokesperson, said it is “simply not the case” that the number of Patriot missiles in Europe is beyond critical.

NATO, he said, is able to “block punches” and has enough air defense munitions available to defend itself as well as to donate to Ukraine.

Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said in a statement Thursday that claims of U.S. munition shortages “are false.”

“We have everything required to strike at the time and place of the President’s choosing,” Parnell said. “Across multiple combatant commands, we have already executed successful operations while maintaining a deep, ready arsenal to defend our people and our interests.”

Europe has few alternatives while stocks are low

The dearth of Patriot interceptors in Europe would leave few alternatives for shooting down Russia’s more advanced ballistic missiles, which can be combined with swarms of inexpensive drones to overwhelm defenses, experts say.

Ukraine and some allies already use systems that can destroy slower-moving drones without expensive missiles. But ballistic missiles are a challenge because they dive steeply toward targets at more than five times the speed of sound, leaving little time to stop them.

The Patriot system tracks the missile, predicts its path and launches within minutes, all while carrying out complex calculations to ensure the interceptor finds its target. One Patriot battery can only cover a limited area: for example, a small military base but not a whole city.

One alternative could be France and Italy’s SAMP/T NG air defense system. France has promised to speed up the delivery of the system — the upgraded version of the current SAMP/T — to Ukraine, which the manufacturer says is better able to counter ballistics.

The new iteration, however, has not yet been battle tested and the current version of the SAMP/T has a smaller range than the Patriot.

While U.S. and European militaries have warships that can serve as mobile air defense, they may be too far from a target to protect it and could risk getting sunk.

Patriot stocks have plunged during the Iran war

Ukraine has received Patriots from American and European stockpiles since Russia’s 2022 invasion, with the U.S. providing about 600 of the interceptors during the Biden administration, said Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel who is now senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

But the greatest expenditure has been during the Iran conflict, which has used up 65% of U.S. Patriots, amounting to roughly 1,500 of the nation’s 2,330 interceptors, CSIS says. About 600 missiles, including those destined for Europe, should be made this year, with a production goal of 2,000 Patriot missiles a year set for 2030, Cancian said.

NATO says Europe’s first Patriot missile production facility is expected to open in Germany in September, with deliveries possibly beginning early next year. The first deliveries should go to countries that have already placed orders, including Germany, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain, the U.S. defense official said.

But for now, that means some countries, such as Germany, have bought expensive Patriot systems but are in the “ridiculous” position of not having any ammunition to fire from them, said Arnold of the London think tank.

Germany’s defense ministry said it does not comment on stockpiles.

Russia also has limitations

Moscow likely cannot carry out a sustained air assault on a NATO target while it launches almost nightly attacks on Ukraine, Arnold said.

Ukraine’s recent strikes into Russia also have exposed weaknesses in Russia’s air defenses, which could prompt Putin to think twice about provoking a retaliatory attack.

“The uncomfortable truth is possibly the best air defense that we have is Russian constraints,” Arnold said.

Burrows and Finley write for the Associated Press. Burrows reported from London. AP writer Konstantin Toropin contributed to this report.

The United Kingdom is clearing the way for Ukraine to locally assemble the Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missile, adding another layer to Kyiv’s rapidly expanding long-range strike arsenal. Storm Shadow/SCALP was first used by Ukrainian forces years ago and became the weapon of choice for standoff strikes against high value targets. Since then, stockpiles of these missiles have dwindled, but Ukraine’s own defense industry has made large leaps in producing increasingly advanced standoff weapons, which will apparently include a version of Storm Shadow/SCALP in the future.

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham arrived in Kyiv today for his first overseas trip since taking office, bringing with him a significant new commitment to Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. The U.K. government has authorized defense contractor MBDA to release classified information relating to British-made components incorporated into the SCALP long-range cruise missile. The move is intended to allow France and Ukraine to establish local assembly lines for the weapon inside Ukraine.

SCALP is the French designation for the air-launched missile known in British service as Storm Shadow. The two variants share substantial French and British technology and are produced by MBDA. According to the U.K. Ministry of Defense, Storm Shadow has a range in excess of 300 nautical miles, although in its export configuration it has an officially stated range of around half that.

The weapon is an air-launched, conventionally armed cruise missile designed for precision attacks against fixed targets well beyond the immediate battlefield. Its primary targets include command facilities, hardened infrastructure, and other high-value installations.

Storm Shadow/SCALP

The announcement removes a major technology-transfer barrier surrounding British-origin components in the Franco-British weapon, allowing the French-Ukrainian production project to move forward.

Ukraine is already heavily dependent on Western deliveries for some of its most capable long-range weapons, while European stocks of Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles have been depleted by years of procurement limitations and transfers to Kyiv.

Local production could eventually give Ukraine a new source of these weapons closer to the battlefield and reduce its dependence on foreign stockpiles.

At the same time, the Storm Shadow/SCALP project is only one part of a much broader Ukrainian effort to build a sustainable deep-strike capability.

Ukraine has spent the past several years rapidly expanding its domestic long-range strike industry, with long-range one-way attack drones currently forming the largest and most mature component of that arsenal. Ukrainian forces are now capable of launching large numbers of domestically produced strike drones against targets hundreds and, in some cases, more than a thousand kilometers from Ukraine. Relatively inexpensive one-way attack drones can be launched in mass and used to overwhelm air defenses, attack energy and industrial infrastructure, and impose a sustained cost on targets deep inside Russia.

Alongside those relatively inexpensive systems, Kyiv is pushing ahead with domestically developed cruise missiles intended to provide a substantially heavier payload and more sophisticated guidance and penetration capability. The most prominent example is the FP-5 Flamingo, developed by Ukrainian defense company Fire Point, while other indigenous cruise-missile programs are also progressing.

Video showing the launch of an FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile:

Випробувальний пуск ракети “Фламінго”

Ukraine is also moving into the ballistic-missile arena. Domestic ballistic-missile programs have progressed toward testing and deployment, with Ukrainian officials and industry working toward serial production of systems intended to extend the country’s ability to strike targets deep inside Russia. With their high speed and steep terminal trajectories, ballistic missiles provide a substantially different challenge to Russian air defenses.

Western-supplied systems such as Storm Shadow/SCALP and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missile have meanwhile provided Ukraine with critical combat experience and an immediate deep-strike capability while its domestic missile industry matures.

Rather than simply replacing missiles consumed in previous campaigns, the planned Ukrainian production of Storm Shadow/SCALP is particularly significant because it could eventually give Kyiv another sophisticated cruise-missile type within an arsenal that is becoming increasingly indigenous.

A domestic assembly capability could provide Kyiv with greater control over production rates, sustainment, and replenishment while reducing the logistical burden associated with obtaining complete weapons from foreign stockpiles. Potentially, Ukraine might also have the option to adapt the missile according to its own requirements. This could include changes to the guidance system or warhead, and perhaps even adaptation for launch from the ground.

The limited availability of the Su-24M/MR Fencer swing-wing combat jets that currently launch Ukraine’s Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles are currently a limiting factor and there is no realistic means of replacing them. It was expected that Mirage 2000 fighters transferred to Ukraine by France would be modified to launch SCALP, but this has so far not been confirmed. Should Ukraine receive the French-made Rafales that it plans to, then SCALP compatibility would be provided from the outset.

Maybe even more importantly, it would allow these weapons to be used however Ukraine wants, without geographical and target type restrictions that are currently dictated by whoever donates them. It could also result in critical technology transfer, including about low observable cruise missile design, that Ukraine can gestate and deploy into other programs. Finally, it’s possible this could even be a future export for the country, especially if it can produce a variant that is adaptable and economical.

It is unclear when locally built Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles will join Ukraine’s strike arsenal. However, establishing an industrial production line for a sophisticated cruise missile is a major undertaking, particularly inside a country that remains under sustained Russian missile and drone attacks.

As noted in the opening of this article, the United Kingdom supplied Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine beginning in 2023, giving Kyiv a long-range precision-strike capability that was previously unavailable from most of its Western partners. Soon after, France committed to sending SCALP missiles, and Italy, another Storm Shadow operator, has similarly supplied the missiles to Ukraine.

The air-launched version of Castelion’s Blackbeard hypersonic strike missile for the U.S. Navy has now at least been test-loaded onto an F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Castelion and the Navy are pushing to have the lower-cost Blackbeard ready for a limited early entry into operational service no later than August 2028.

Attendees at the Tailhook Association’s annual convention this past weekend were shown a picture of a pair of Blackbeard test articles under the right wing of a Super Hornet. The image was shown alongside another one offering a general side profile view of the missile, seen at the top of this story, which was first released publicly last week.

Blackbeard, which the Navy is acquiring under its Multi-mission Affordable Capacity Effector (MACE) program, was included in the same briefing at Tailhook where the new AIM-424 Malice Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile (LRAAM) was revealed. The slide on MACE was shown very briefly in passing in a video of the recording of a new episode of The Mover and Gonky Show podcast, which was posted online on Tuesday.

TWZ has reached out to the Navy about obtaining the full image and for more information.

Where or when the picture of the Blackbeards loaded on the Super Hornet was taken is unknown. In March, Axios reported that the missile would “fly aboard an F/A-18 in the near future,” without directly naming a source. In a press release the following month regarding a $105 million contract award from the Navy, Castelion said that funding would go in part to “completing the hardware and software integration of Blackbeard onto the F/A-18E/F airframe.”

Whether or not any actual flight tests have been conducted is also unclear. Another slide in the Navy briefing at Tailhook included a bullet point reading “Project Alpha – Hypersonic missile shot in 2026,” but does not explicitly say whether or not that milestone has already been reached. The MACE slide makes clear that the program is directly intertwined with Project Alpha, if they are not just different names for the same effort.

Beyond the confirmation of this important new step in testing, the picture of the Blackbeards on the Super Hornet’s wing offers a new look at the front of the missile, showing what look to be apertures on one side of the design’s wedge-shaped nose. The apparent apertures are also seen pointed up, but many air-launched munitions do flip down after release.

How exactly Blackbeard is guided remains unknown, but a downward-angled aperture at the nose end for a seeker system would make sense for this weapon, which the Navy is pursuing primarily as a new way to target enemy ships. In particular, a wide array of existing anti-ship and land attack missiles, as well as certain anti-air types, have variously shaped apertures in their noses for imaging infrared seekers. Imaging infrared has the benefit of being immune to radio frequency electronic warfare jamming. In addition, it is a passive capability that does not send out signals that can give an opponent advance notice of an incoming attack. Blackbeard’s full guidance package very likely also includes some means of navigating to a target area first, and it could have multiple modes of operation.

The apertures could also be present in this case for testing or other purposes, though this seems far less likely.

We previously discussed the other visible aspect of the design after last week’s release of the side profile picture, writing:

“A profile photo at the company’s headquarters reveals a weapon with a ballistic missile-like booster, on top of which is mounted what could be an unpowered hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). A booster brings an HGV to the desired velocity and altitude before releasing it toward its target. The concept is in contrast to air-breathing cruise missiles capable of traveling at hypersonic speeds. Hypersonic speed is generally defined as anything above Mach 5, which larger ballistic missiles also reach in the course of their flights. More precise performance figures for Blackbeard are lacking, but Castelion has previously hinted it could hit targets out to just under 500 miles. Alternatively, the second stage may also have its own motor, allowing it to continue accelerating or sustain high-speed flight. A similar arrangement has been suggested as the propulsion system for the Russian Zircon missile.”

“Both stages of the weapon have cruciform fins, while the upper one features a prominent ‘chine’ line along the length of its body, and a slightly beaklike nose. The trolley on which the weapon is mounted provides some idea of its overall size. The blue stripes seen on each stage normally signify that a munition is an inert, non-explosive round utilized for training or tracking purposes. This would indicate a real (unarmed) missile rather than a dummy or mockup.”

As noted, Castelion and the Navy are hoping to see the air-launched Blackbeard reach an early operational capability (EOC) within the next two years. Castelion’s press release in April said EOC was being targeted for 2027, a timeline that had been previously reported. Just yesterday, the company put out a press release announcing a new nearly $90 million contract from the Navy specifically to help push the weapon closer to that milestone, as well as perform other activities. The release did not explicitly mention a new EOC schedule, but did say the contract covered work through August 2028, by which point the hope is that at least 50 missiles will have been delivered.   

Castelion previously released the video below to highlight continued work on Blackbeard, including in an air-launched form for integration on the Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornets.

Blackbeard is coming 🏴‍☠️

The U.S. Army is also separately funding development of a surface-launched version of Blackbeard. In May, the Pentagon outlined plans for the acquisition of 12,000 Blackbeard missiles over the next three years, but it is unclear whether this covers surface- or air-launched versions, or a mix of both. At that time, the Pentagon also announced a framework for purchases of 10,000 lower-cost surface-launched cruise missiles in that same timeframe.

As underscored by those planned orders, Blackbeard is being developed with an eye toward lower cost and relative ease of production, as well as exportability to U.S. allies and partners. Historically, hypersonic missiles have been viewed as expensive, low-density assets offering a more limited ‘silver bullet’ capability against high-value targets. Depending on the price point that Castelion can achieve with Blackbeard, it could help change this calculus. Expanding sales beyond America’s armed forces could help further spread cost burdens and drive down unit prices through economies of scale.

Reduced production costs and timetables are areas of great interest today to the U.S. military when it comes to munitions, in general. Global conflicts in recent years, including recent fighting with Iran, other crises in the Middle East, and the war in Ukraine, have underscored the importance of having adequate stockpiles of key munitions and being able to rapidly replenish them. They have also exposed the United States’ increasingly worrisome lack of capacity in both areas at present.

For the Navy, from an operational perspective, Blackbeard is seen as a particularly important addition to the arsenal available to the service’s carrier air wings. The missile will offer Navy Super Hornets, and potential other aircraft, a boost in the range at which they can hold targets at risk, as well as the ability to cover those longer distances faster. Castelion’s design will also give the service a new stand-off strike weapon that is far more survivable and more capable, especially against time-sensitive targets. The missile’s speed will lessen the need for persistent kill chains, as well.

Greater standoff reach is already becoming more and more valuable, if not vital, as carriers and their air wings are being pushed further and further away from target areas by expanding and evolving adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubbles. Similar considerations are pushing the Army and other services toward greater standoff strike capabilities.

If the development schedule for Blackbeard holds, the Navy will see the arrival of its first operational air-launched hypersonic weapon in the next two years. We now know that work on this weapon has already reached another important milestone, with testing on the Super Hornet now underway.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

India has taken a major step towards opening one of its most sensitive areas of defence production to private companies.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approved the transfer of technologies developed by the state-run Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for all conventional missile systems to Indian industry for domestic production, the country’s Ministry of Defence said on Tuesday.

The move marks a significant shift for the sector dominated by government-run firms and research laboratories. Private companies will be able to compete for the technology and production rights, subject to technical qualifications, certifications and other regulatory requirements, the ministry said.

The Narendra Modi-led government says the aim is to move missiles from development into mass production faster, increase domestic manufacturing and reduce India’s dependence on imports.

So, does India’s private defence industry have the capacity to manufacture sophisticated missile systems at the scale and reliability the military needs, is the country moving towards developing its own military-industrial complex, and are there security risks involved?

What did the government announce?

India’s Defence Ministry said Singh had approved the transfer of DRDO-developed technology for all conventional missile systems to Indian defence companies for production inside the country.

“The objective is to enhance domestic manufacturing capabilities, strengthen the defence industrial base, and create opportunities for the participation of Indian MSMEs (micro, small and medium-sized enterprises) and other technology partners in the supply chain,” the ministry said in a statement.

The measure would enable the “successful transition of missile system development to industrial production” and create opportunities for MSMEs and other technology partners, the ministry added.

“DRDO remains committed to working closely with Indian industry to facilitate the transfer and absorption of advanced defence technologies and to further strengthen the country’s indigenous defence capabilities.”

The announcement spans a wide range of missiles, said Aditya Ramanathan, a research fellow with the Bengaluru-based Takshashila Institution.

“It will include surface-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles, anti-radiation missiles, antitank systems, and so on. It will also include more heavy-duty hardware like land-attack cruise missiles,” he told Al Jazeera.

Why is India doing this?

India has traditionally relied heavily on state-owned defence companies to turn weapons developed by DRDO into large-scale production. Bharat Dynamics, one such state-owned company, has long held a monopoly in missile production.

Tuesday’s announcement is a “big change” because it ends that monopoly, said Ramanathan.

“Private companies have been making missile components for years, but what this decision does is allow them to move up the value chain and become prime integrators for these systems,” he said.

While India largely relies on domestically made missiles, it also imports missiles — especially from Russia and Israel, two key weapons suppliers to the country.

But under Modi, India has attempted to both encourage self-reliance in defence — a concept that the government calls Atmanirbhar Bharat or self-reliant India — and prod foreign defence majors to manufacture in India.

At a time when geopolitical allegiances are changing fast, and India faces uncertainties on both major borders — with rivals Pakistan and China — the country under Modi has more than doubled its defence budget, from $38bn in 2014 to $86bn in the current financial year.

The brief four-day conflict with nuclear-armed rival and neighbour Pakistan last year has injected fresh urgency into India’s defence preparedness plans. This year’s defence budget is 16 percent higher than the previous year’s.

Other geopolitical events have forced the government’s hand too, suggested Ramanathan.

“I don’t think this move would have happened as soon as it did if not for the experience of recent wars. Indian decision-makers have been looking at Ukraine, they’ve been looking at the US war with Iran, and of course they’ve been imbibing the lessons of operations from last year,” he said.

“One reason you’re going to need large stockpiles is that, as we’ve seen recently, you’re going to burn through your inventory pretty quickly. The other reason is that your adversary could also degrade your stockpiles using their own precision-strike systems.”

China, he said, was a major factor in India’s calculations.

“India believes that to deter China, which is its most capable adversary, it will need to demonstrate that it can both inflict and absorb really punishing attrition over weeks of gruelling warfare,” Ramanathan said.

To that end, India is also creating a tri-services conventional missile force. “To be a viable and effective force, it’s going to require serious magazine depth, and this cannot be achieved without the active involvement of the private sector,” he added.

What is India’s defence industry already manufacturing?

In June, India announced that it was preparing to spend more than $2bn on military drones from domestic manufacturers, reflecting the rapid expansion of the country’s private defence industry.

More than 600 companies were involved in India’s drone industry, including major groups such as Adani, Larsen & Toubro, and Tata Advanced Systems, as well as startups.

In July, India also approved the purchase of a range of military equipment for its defence forces worth $5.46bn, including missiles, electronic warfare systems and Kamikaze drones.

India is also pushing to rapidly modernise its navy with an eye on Beijing’s growing influence in key Indian Ocean shipping lanes. In December, New Delhi announced plans to procure at least 75 ships and submarines, with most expected to be constructed domestically.

At the same time, India is trying to diversify the foreign sources of its weapons. Over the past decade, New Delhi has worked to move away from its longstanding reliance on Russia for military hardware, expanding defence ties with countries such as the United States, France and — increasingly — Israel.

Does the private sector have the capacity to build missiles?

Private arms manufacturers in India have been increasing spending on bolstering military production in the past few years.

Major conglomerates have invested heavily in ammunition, drones, aerospace and military electronics. Of late, they have started to invest in facilities that aim to manufacture missiles.

Adani Defence & Aerospace, owned by business tycoon Gautam Adani, a close associate of Indian Prime Minister Modi, announced plans in 2024 to invest more than 30 billion rupees ($315m) in ammunition and missile manufacturing facilities in Uttar Pradesh.

The facilities would include capabilities for handling explosives used in missiles and precision munitions.

But commitments and intent don’t build missiles.

“Ultimately, I think the success or failure of this move will depend on how the Indian government places orders,” Ramanathan said. “Making missiles is an incredibly complex and costly affair, and companies are going to have to invest a lot in infrastructure, technology and people. These sorts of investments will only pay off if the government places large enough orders to justify them and also, hopefully, leave these companies with some profits that they can pour back into research and development.”

What missiles does India have?

India has a range of cruise and ballistic missiles, several of which are also capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

In May, on the anniversary of the 2025 war with Pakistan, India successfully test-fired the Agni-V, its most advanced nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach a distance of 5,500km (3,418 miles) — a range that covers all of China, the Middle East and even parts of Europe.

Its other ballistic missiles have ranges from as little as the Prithvi-1 (150km or 93 miles) to the Agni-IV (4,000km or 2,485 miles), again covering everything from border skirmishes with Pakistan to India’s extended neighbourhood.

It also has powerful cruise missiles, like the BrahMos, co-developed with Russia, which has a range of up to 500km (311 miles), and was used in last year’s war with Pakistan.

Is India also exporting missiles and other weapons?

India has dramatically ramped up its military exports in recent years, from just $72m in 2014-15 — when Modi came to power — to $4bn in 2025-2016.

Paras Defence, one of India’s fast-growing defence manufacturers, said this month it expects its exports to more than double in the 2026–27 financial year, up to $14m, driven partly by increased demand linked to conflicts in the Middle East.

Indian arms makers have also been involved in joint ventures with companies abroad. Adani Defence, in partnership with Elbit Systems – Israel’s largest weapons manufacturer – produces the large Hermes 900 armed drone systems.

A 2024 investigation by Al Jazeera exposed how India was exporting rocket parts and ammunition to Israel, even as the Modi government was publicly calling for diplomacy to end the war on Gaza.

In June 2026, Amnesty International said in a report that India’s weapons exports to Israel made it complicit in the genocide in Gaza.

But it isn’t just Israel that has sought and received weapons from Indian manufacturers. Nor is it just bullets and weapons parts that India is exporting today — complete missiles are in demand, too.

In 2022, the Philippines bought three batteries of the BrahMos missiles from India. Since then, Vietnam and Indonesia have signed deals with India for the purchase of these missiles. And India has submitted a proposal to the United Arab Emirates offering to supply the Gulf country these missiles, too.

Is the latest move a step towards building a military-industrial complex?

That appears to be the intention.

While Tuesday’s announcement marks the first time that India’s state-run research and manufacturing facilities will transfer missile technology to the private sector, the government earlier this year shortlisted private firms to manufacture the country’s next-generation fighter jets.

Tata Advanced Systems, a subsidiary of Tata Sons, and Bharat Forge are among companies to be shortlisted, and are emerging as major makers of artillery systems, ammunition and aerospace systems. India has its homegrown jets, but imports the most cutting-edge planes in its arsenal, including the Rafale fighters from France. The Indian Air Force also relies heavily on Soviet-era jets.

Still, while India “wants to build a wider defence industrial base”, said Ramanathan, “it is very far from developing the sort of military-industrial complex that [former US President Dwight] Eisenhower worried about. Power in India still resides overwhelmingly with the government.”

What about India’s military imports?

Despite the surge in domestic manufacturing and exports of specific weapons systems and parts, India on the whole remains a major military importer.

India was the world’s second-largest importer of weapons between 2021 and 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Russia was its biggest source, accounting for 40 percent of India’s imported weapons.

Are there risks in transferring sensitive technology to the private sector?

As the US and Israel bombed Iran in March this year, a group of Iranian hackers claimed it broke into the servers of major US defence manufacturer Lockheed Martin, stealing blueprints of components used in the F-35 fighter jets.

The alleged data breach exposed the risks of private companies — which often have lower security standards and oversight than top-secret government laboratories — holding sensitive information.

But Ramanathan pointed out that in India’s case, “the companies that are most likely to get the missile contracts are all old hands”.

“They’ve been involved in the defence sector in some capacity for decades, and they have experience in dealing with confidentiality and secrecy,” he said.

The Indian government, on its part, also “doesn’t want the technology or its missile secrets to go to its adversaries, and it also wants to abide by its commitments to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which gives India several advantages,” he said, referring to one of the world’s major export-control regimes.

“So India has good reasons, in its own self-interest, to ensure that missile technology doesn’t leak.”

The U.S. Navy made a major splash this weekend when it revealed the existence of the AIM-424 Malice Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile (LRAAM), which is already deep in development. At the same time, the service also highlighted plans for a new Compact Air-to-Air Missile (CAAM) optimized for shorter-range engagements and internal carriage on stealthy fighters like the F-35 and future drones as part of its larger future missile vision. Readers can first get caught up on what is known about the long-range AIM-424 in our initial reporting on that missile here.

As described so far, the core goals for CAAM sound virtually identical to what the service has outlined previously in relation to a “Compact Variant” of the AIM-9X Sidewinder (AIM-9X CV), which TWZ was first to report on. A missile in this general category would offer a boost in magazine depth that could be especially valuable for more localized defense of carriers and other high-value assets against large waves of missiles and drones.

The “Compact Air-to-Air Missile (CAAM) effort is a future inner boundary weapon. Requirements are being evaluated and assessed by N98 [the Air Warfare Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations] at this time,” a Navy official told TWZ when asked for more information. “The Navy does not plan to provide routine updates beyond approved public releases because of operational security and program sensitivity.”

Mention of CAAM was included in the same briefing where the AIM-424 was first unveiled at the Tailhook Association’s annual convention this weekend. A central focus of the CAAM is on “increasing internal carriage capacity for inner boundary weapon,” according to that presentation.

For the Navy, at present, “internal carriage” is a consideration most applicable to the service’s F-35Cs and, by extension, other variants of the Joint Strike Fighter. Internal weapons bays will also be a feature on whatever design the Navy may ultimately select as its future sixth-generation carrier-based combat jet, currently referred to as F/A-XX. Future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) type drones or other uncrewed aircraft the service might acquire in the future could also have internal bays. We will come back to this later on.

The description of CAAM as an “inner boundary weapon” points to a focus on shorter-range engagements, where there could also be less total time to react overall.

In terms of what the Navy’s core requirements for the CAAM might be beyond internal carriage, details are limited. A rendering included in the presentation at Tailhook this weekend shows a relatively generic-looking design with fins only at the tail and a yellow band around the front of the body indicating the presence of a high-explosive warhead.

However, earlier this year, the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD), part of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), did put out a contracting notice regarding rocket motor developments to support CAAM and other developments.

NAWCWD “intends to procure on a Full and Open competition basis to develop and demonstrate technology that results in greatly enhanced kinematic capability for the next generation of tactical missiles,” the notice explained. “To support this technological development efforts, NAWCWD is interested in maturing high total impulse loaded and energy tailorable solid propulsion systems for transition into compact weapon systems, including a Compact Air-to-Air Missile (CAAM).”

“Requirements will include tasking and products needed to provide a Concept Design with build-to-print data package, identify critical technology gaps, conduct critical component and rocket motor experiments, conduct a Design for Manufacturing & Assembly study to identify features required to meet manufacturing and cost goals, and provide a plan to mature the CAAM HLG Concept Design to a maturity state ready to enter a Department of Defense (DOD) Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) program,” the notice added.

“HLG” here stands for “Highly Loaded Grain.” This, in turn, refers to solid-fuel rocket motors designed to maximize output per volume. This is an area of missile technology where the Navy has already been heavily investing for years with a broad eye toward increasing the range and improving the performance of future missiles. Furthermore, a missile with an HLG rocket could offer substantially increased capability over a similarly-sized design with a non-HLG motor. This, in turn, offers particular advantages when designing missiles for carriage in internal bays with rigid dimensions.

“The Next-Generation Highly Loaded Grain project team has matured the technology and seeded the development of future mission-modular propulsion systems that can increase weapon ranges by up to 1.5x while maintaining inner boundaries for short-range and time-critical missions,” according to one fact sheet detailing notable achievements by NAVAIR’s Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCAD) in 2023. Note here also the explicit mention of ‘inner boundary’ design considerations.

As mentioned earlier, the Navy has previously used virtually identical language to describe the planned AIM-9X CV, which is also a joint program with the U.S. Air Force.

“The AIM-9X CV repackages the SIP IV technology into a compact airframe optimized for internal carriage on advanced aircraft with improved kinematic performance,” according to the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget request, released earlier this year. “The program will deliver increased capability to the warfighter with greater standoff range, increased aircraft weapon station capacity, and maintains inner boundary performance.”

How exactly the CAAM and the AIM-9X CV programs may be related is unknown, but they clearly have the same general goals if they are not different names for the same development effort. From what was shown this weekend, CAAM is a distinctly different-looking missile from the AIM-9X, and plans for a compact Sidewinder variant or derivative could also be a stepping stone to a new design intended to fill the same general role.

U.S. defense contractors have been publicly showing concepts for compact air-to-air missiles for years now. This includes Raytheon’s Peregrine, unveiled in 2019, which was said to be roughly half the size of an AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) while still offering comparable range. The company said it also had equivalent maneuverability to current-generation Sidewinders. Raytheon is the prime contractor for the AIM-120 and the AIM-9, as well as the newly unveiled AIM-424.

In the late 2010s, Boeing also put forward a concept for a multi-stage Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile (LRAAM), which had a design that raised the possibility of whether the first stage could be used as a more compact, stand-alone weapon. In 2022, Boeing notably received funding for further development of that missile under a contract from the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to “investigate advanced missile sub-system components to support the Compact Air-to-Air Missile [CAAM] and Extended Range Air-to-Air Missile Systems [ERAAM].”

During the 2010s, Lockheed Martin promoted a compact anti-air missile design called Cuda, with a focus on internal carriage, as well. However, Cuda had largely disappeared from the company’s marketing materials by the end of the decade.

Regardless, the use case for such a CAAM-type missile is clear-cut, especially for the Navy and its carrier air wings. In particular, the service is facing a threat ecosystem that is rapidly evolving in scale and scope, including multiple different classes of anti-ship missiles (ballistic, cruise, hypersonic) and long-range one-way attack drones. There is a very real prospect of large-volume and complex attacks made up of very different tiers of weapons incoming from multiple vectors simultaneously, creating a greater risk that both long- and short-range defenses will be overwhelmed. TWZ previously explored this reality in depth in discussing how the long-range AIM-174B, an air-launched version of the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) that was officially unveiled in 2024, fits into the service’s larger plans.

How The Navy’s New Very Long-Range AIM-174 Will Pierce China’s Anti-Access Bubble

Added localized defensive capability and capacity could also be relevant for aerial force packages pressing their way to a target in hostile territory, where similarly growing aerial threats could materialize suddenly and in close proximity. Depending on its capabilities, CAAM might even be able to provide a new layer of defensive capability against incoming anti-air missiles, including for larger aircraft. So, giving individual aircraft more total engagement opportunities will only become more valuable, if not vital, as time goes on.

As noted, stealth platforms with limited internal bay space face particular constraints in this regard. For years, more magazine depth via smaller missiles has been seen as a key avenue for improving payload limitations for platforms like the F-35 and F-22 when operating in their most low-observable (stealthy) configuration. In many scenarios, these aircraft can get closer to their targets without detection, offering different options for the employment of what could be shorter-range weapons. A compact air-to-air missile design that still offers comparable performance to larger existing designs, through the use of a high-load-grain rocket motor and other features, would be even more of a boon. Having something that is capable of short-to-intermediate-range engagements, but that can be loaded in greater numbers internally would expand tactical flexibility, amplify lethality, and increase utility of the aircraft as they can down more targets on a single sortie in certain scenarios.

The continued growth of drone threats, especially those posed by long-range one-way attack types, has added another dimension to this equation. Limited magazine depth limits the ability to rapidly retask stealthy platforms to respond to often unpredictable high-volume drone attacks. Furthermore, the anti-air version of the 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) laser-guided rocket, the U.S. military’s current go-to lower-cost air-to-air weapon against drones, cannot be fired at all from the internal bays on the F-35 or the F-22. CAAM can offer the ability to address these threats better than aircraft like the F-35 and F-22 can today.

A weapon like CAAM would also be especially relevant for future collaborative combat aircraft, which have extreme constraints on payload capacity, internal and external, as well as total takeoff weight. For CCA-type uncrewed aircraft, keeping the airframe size as small as possible to meet requirements is also essential for meeting affordability and producibility targets. Arming these platforms with an AIM-120-sized missile might not necessarily be required, or even be ideal, especially when operating along the leading edge of the air-to-air battle, closer to threats. In those scenarios, having the option of carrying even twice as many missiles per sortie, internally (if available) or externally, even if they have shorter reach, could be hugely beneficial.

There could easily be interest in a CAAM-like missile from other branches of the U.S. military, if it is not already a joint service effort. The Air Force is already known to be involved in the AIM-9X CV effort. The service has publicly pursued new compact and lower-cost air-to-air missile concepts over the years under various different project names. This includes its own CAAM effort, through which Boeing previously received funding.

What is clear now is that the Navy is pushing to maximize the anti-air capabilities of its aircraft at both the shorter- and longer-range ends of the engagement spectrum.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Aug. 24 (UPI) — On his first visit to Ukraine as British Prime Minister Andy Burnham promised Monday to share Anglo-French long-range cruise missile technology with Kyiv in its fight with Russia, saying Britain would stand with Ukraine until there was “a just and lasting peace.”

Burnham said European defense contractor MBDA would be authorized to declassify blueprints for the parts of the Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles that are made by Britain to help Ukraine build its own version of the weapon that Britain has for the past three years been giving to Kyiv.

The Storm Shadow enables Ukrainian forces to hit targets 150 miles inside Russia.

Burnham said Britain would join forces with France to build production plants in Ukraine following a similar pledge of help by President Emmanuel Macron, who also told Zelensky at the weekend that France would supply Kyiv with more anti-missile interceptors in the wake of a series of deadly ballistic missile strikes.

“On Ukraine’s 35th anniversary of independence, the Ukrainian people should be in no doubt: the U.K. is behind you today and for as long as it takes. I am proud of the contribution our country has made to Ukraine and I want the Ukrainian people to hear it directly from me that our support will not waver. After all, Ukraine’s security is our security,” Burnham said in a statement issued Sunday night.

“The friendship between our two countries will long outlast Russia’s illegal war. In both the fight and in the rebuilding to come, we will stand with Ukraine and deliver opportunities for people across both our countries. Russia should be in no doubt of our resolve. We will not back down until there is a just and lasting peace,” said Burnham.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov likened the missile plan to pouring gasoline on relations with Russia and warned Britain over “participating in this war” on Ukraine’s side, saying that the Russian military was actively collecting data to uncover and destroy any missile production sites.

“Britain is methodically and regularly adding fuel to the fire and methodically and regularly plotting to prevent any progress in the peace process,” said Peskov.

Burnham’s high-profile, public backing for Zelensky came as he faces challenges both from nightly Russian ballistic missile strikes and to his authority, amid calls for elections which have been suspended for more than four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.

As well joining Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for Independence Day celebrations in Kyiv, Burnham was also scheduled to chair a meeting of the U.K.-France-led Coalition of the Willing for talks on providing more help to Ukraine.

Established in 2025, the focus of the 34 country plus Ukraine partnership is to provide security guarantees in the event a cease-fire agreement is reached, including providing a multinational force to support and monitor it from day 1, though not necessarily in the format of a traditional peace-keeping force.

The stand by Burnham, coincided with a similar pledge from from Brussels, backed up by a multi-billion dollar package of fresh European Union military aid.

“On Ukraine’s Independence Day, we show our unfaltering support. Today, we approved $7.1 billion for the air and missile defense systems, missiles, ammunition and radars that Ukraine urgently needs. Europe stands with you today, tomorrow, and for as long as it takes,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a post on X.

The package is in addition to $18.7 billion already approved by the 27-country bloc, $9.7 billion of which has already been provided to Kyiv.

Big news has broken out of the Tailhook Association’s convention in Reno, Nevada this weekend. The Navy has disclosed the existence of an all-new very long-range air-to-air missile, the AIM-424 “Malice.” An image released by the Navy taken last April shows a Super Hornet from Navy Air Test And Evaluation Squadron 23 (VX-23) loaded with four of the weapons. Another image shows the missile installed in an F-35C’s weapons bay.

The news of the new missile was first reported by our friends Brian Everstine and Steve Trimble over at Aviation Week.

The AIM-424 Long Range Air-to-Air Missile (LRAAM), which is already deep in testing, is meant to arm F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, F-35C Joint Strike Fighters and the upcoming F/A-XX next-generation naval fighter. The missile is clearly larger and significantly farther-reaching than the long-serving AIM-120 AMRAAM and the new AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile, which shares the AIM-120’s general mold-line. It isn’t known where Malice slots in next to the very far-reaching AIM-174B “Gunslinger,” which was adapted from the Navy’s surface-launched SM-6. According to Aviation Week, the missile is a two-stage design, which should result in extreme range and very high-speed.

The Pentagon has been interested in multi-stage air-to-air missiles for years and is now floating the goal of developing extreme-range air-to-air weapons that can reach out to the 1,000-mile mark in the years to come. This number is seen as critical to surviving future enemy anti-access capabilities of equal reach and to take advantage of very long-distance kill chains that will dominate future combat.

In addition, closing the air-to-air missile gap, specifically with China, and attempting to leap significantly in front of the PLA’s capabilities in this regard, has become a top priority for the Pentagon. A multitude of classified programs to develop new and more capable air-to-air missiles have been well underway and now we are seeing yet another example of this work in the form of Malice. One of these secretive programs, the Long-Range Engagement Weapon (LREW,), date back at least a decade, which also point to the development of multi-stage air-to-air weapons.

While we don’t know for certain the manufacturer that built this weapon or if this is its only configuration,

It also isn’t clear if this new weapon has other secondary modes, such as anti-ballistic missile and/or air-to-surface capabilities, nor what types of flying targets it is intended to destroy. For instance, is it capable of hitting maneuverable fighters at extreme distances as well as lumbering force multiplying support aircraft? Again, we don’t know at this time.

We will be doing additional analysis reporting on this weapon soon, stay tuned.

Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com

UPDATE:

We now have a specifications page from the Navy. The highlights include a weight of 1500 pounds (roughly three times that of an AIM-120), and a range in excess of 250NM. Keep in mind that these figures may be intentionally skewed for counter-intelligence purposes, as is often the case, in particular the range figure. Regardless, this weapon possibly sits in between the AIM-260 and the AIM-174B Gunslinger in terms of range, and closer to the latter. We also know the missile is built by Raytheon.

The product page reads:

The Department of Navy is developing the Air Intercept Missile (AIM)-424 Long Range Air to Air Missile (LRAAM), a next-generation missile intended to strengthen fleet defense and maintain a decisive air domain overmatch against advanced threats. Also known as Malice, LRAAM directly supports the Department’s contribution to integrated deterrence by increasing range, lethality, and combat effectiveness for Marine and Naval aviation forces that are defending our fleets, our interests, and our homeland.

LRAAM sustains the Department’s first look, first shot, first kill advantage by providing our aviators greater reach, greater survivability, and greater tactical flexibility in the air-to-air fight. Built for 4^th, 5^th, and 6^th generation platforms, LRAAM is designed for the air wing of today and the future.

Specifications

Primary Function: Air-to-Air Missile

Contractor: Raytheon

Propulsion: Solid-propellant rocket motor

Length: 13.5 feet (4.11 meters)

Diameter: 13.5 inches (0.34 meters)

Wingspan: 26.2 inches (0.67 meters)

Weight: 1500 pounds (680.4 kg)

Range: In excess of 250 nm (463 km)

Warhead: Blast fragmentation

*Author’s note, similarities of the design to a Boeing concept was removed due to the manufacturer being disclosed by the Navy

Iran denies launching missiles at the UAE, suggesting the incident was a ‘false flag operation’.

The United Arab Emirates has imposed an indefinite trade embargo on Iran after accusing Iranian forces of firing two ballistic missiles at the country, an allegation Tehran denies.

In a statement early on Wednesday, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the decision was made in “light of escalations that undermine peace and security in the region”.

“All trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice,” it added.

The statement came after the UAE’s Ministry of Defence said its air defences detected two ballistic missiles launched from Iran, with one falling outside the country’s territorial waters and the other landing within them.

In a follow-up statement, the ministry said the missiles had been “targeting maritime traffic” and promised to “resolutely confront any attempt to undermine the security of the nation or maritime navigation in the region”.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the accusation as “baseless”, with spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei suggesting it was a “false flag operation” amid the war launched by the United States and Israel against his country.

Baghaei warned the claim “contradicts the principle of good neighbourliness” and urged regional parties to steer clear of what he called unfounded claims against Tehran, and argued that any honest assessment of the situation must also weigh the “malicious actions” of the US and Israel.

US naval blockade

Tuesday’s attack came a day after a 60-day window for US-Iranian peace talks expired without a breakthrough in the more than five-month-old conflict.

In the war’s first six weeks, Iran targeted the UAE with retaliatory strikes more than any other Gulf country, launching more than 530 ballistic missiles, dozens of cruise missiles and over 2,200 drones at what it described as US assets. Tuesday’s strike is the first targeting the UAE since May, and comes days after Abu Dhabi accused Tehran of attacking two of its state-owned ADNOC (Abu Dhabi National Oil Company) vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran has not claimed responsibility for the ADNOC attacks.

The trade embargo comes as the US maintains a naval blockade on Iranian ports, with President Trump signalling a pivot towards economic pressure, rather than military pressure, to compel Tehran into accepting US demands.

Mark Kimmitt, a retired US general and former assistant secretary of state, told Al Jazeera the UAE’s trade embargo could hit Iran harder than anything Washington has imposed, with Dubai having quietly become Iran’s most important trading partner, edging out both China and Turkiye to supply roughly a third of everything Iran imports each year.

The UAE had suspended direct cargo shipping between the two countries in early March, just days after the war began, and resumed trade only in late June via Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port.

“I don’t think that you can overstate or understate the importance of the trade, both financial and goods trade, between Dubai and Iran,” Kimmitt said.

That reliance runs deeper than goods on ships, given Dubai’s standing as a global financial hub, which Kimmitt said has long given Iran a discreet way to move money around international sanctions, cutting off a route Tehran has long relied on for years. “In many ways, the embargo being put on by the UAE is even more significant than the embargo being put on by the United States,” he said.

The former general said he doesn’t expect other Gulf states to follow suit immediately, predicting a “wait-and-see” approach even if Iranian attacks continue.

But he said the UAE’s move is significant enough that Tehran could interpret it as bordering on an act of war, likening it to the near-total embargo the US imposed on Japan after World War II.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has plans for a new radar to succeed the AN/TPY-2. The AN/TPY-2 is most commonly associated with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system, but it can also be used as a stand-alone sensor in a larger integrated air defense network. MDA’s main desire now is to find a more mobile radar system to make them less susceptible to enemy missile and drone attacks. Iran’s successful targeting of largely static missile defense radars this year, including the reported destruction of at least one AN/TPY-2, has been a wake-up call to just how vulnerable these prized assets have become already. TWZ explored this reality and its implications in a detailed feature earlier this year.

MDA put out a call yesterday for “innovative prototype concepts” for what it is currently calling the Forward-Based Mode (FBM) Radar Next. This notably came just ahead of the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, that opened today and at which TWZ is in attendance.

The contracting notice stresses that the agency is currently in the pre-solication phase of this effort, but that it does have plans to eventually pursue these prototypes through an Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreement. OTA is a mechanism typically used to support rapid prototyping and other research and development work outside of a typical and often drawn-out contracting process. In its budget request for the 2027 Fiscal Year, which was released earlier this year, MDA also explicitly asked for funding for a pair of “next generation radar prototypes to prove out and mature emerging technologies for the future FBM Radar fleet.”

For some additional context, MDA uses the term FBM here to refer to a radar used to detect threats, traditionally ballistic missiles, after launch. Deployable radars like the AN/TPY-2 employed in this role are typically emplaced at semi-permanent sites. The U.S. military also has higher-end static strategic radar sites around the globe, along with space-based assets, to help provide additional layers of early warning detection.

FBM is one of two typical modes of operation for the X-band AN/TPY-2. The other is a terminal mode where the radar is used to cue interceptors to incoming threats. As mentioned, AN/TPY-2 is most commonly used in the terminal mode as part of the THAAD system, but it also has a demonstrated ability to feed data to Patriot surface-to-air missile systems.

At the time of writing, the U.S. military is publicly known to have two AN/TPY-2s deployed in the FBM mode in Japan, as well as three more at sites in Israel, Qatar, and Turkey. Additional AN/TPY-2 are also currently forward-deployed elsewhere globally as a component of the THAAD system.

AN/TYP-2s, as well as the generators needed to power them, are trailer-mounted and technically road mobile. However, they are not designed to be very rapidly relocated from one site to another. This brings us back to the FBM Radar Next.

“As adversarial missile capabilities become increasingly sophisticated, the need for agile, survivable, and highly precise forward-based sensors has never been greater. Current static or semi-mobile radars are vulnerable to counterattacks and lack the rapid relocation capabilities necessary for modern distributed operations,” the pre-solication notice explains. “FBM Radar Next will close this gap by providing a system that can be quickly transported, set up, and operated in austere forward locations while maintaining interoperability with existing Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) networks.”

In terms of transportability and deployability requirements, “the system must be capable of rapid deployment and transport via C-17 military airlift and tactical ground vehicles,” the notice says. “The radar must demonstrate rapid setup and teardown times (e.g., operational within specified hours of arrival, and tear down within minutes to maximize survivability).”

The next-generation radar must also be capable of “high-sensitivity detection, persistent tracking, and precise discrimination of advanced threats in high-clutter and contested electromagnetic environments,” the notice continues. MDA also wants “engineered physical, thermal, and electromagnetic signatures to
ensure platform survivability in contested environments.”

Furthermore, “the design must support remote operations, command and control integration, and automated system health monitoring,” the notice adds. Minimizing the onsite operator footprint is critical to improving personnel safety and increasing overall tactical flexibility.”

MDA wants the FBM Radar Next to be able to slot into more “versatile deployment architectures, with the capability to operate either as a highly integrated single aperture or as multiple distributed arrays to optimize geographical coverage, sensitivity, survivability, or electronic protection.” In line with this demand, there are additional requirements for a modular design with open architecture systems, as well as seamless integration with the existing Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) architecture.

The MDA video below highlights the general capabilities of the C2BMC architecture in the context of a notional engagement of a hypersonic threat utilizing the still-in-development Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI).

GPI Scenario Animation

A highly networked and distributed concept of operations could open the door to more novel radar configurations, including ones involving larger groups of smaller types, to succeed the AN/TPY-2. Smaller individual radars could also have reduced signatures, be easier to conceal, and be more readily relocatable, all helping to reduce vulnerability. This could also make the entire system more resilient in the event that nodes are lost or otherwise rendered inoperable for any reason.

There could be benefits in terms of unit cost and scalability of production from such an approach, too. Prime contractor Raytheon is understood to have only produced 16 AN/TPY-2s to date, in total, for all customers, not just the U.S. military. The unit cost of a single one of those radars is generally pegged at around $250 to $300 million, and these are long-lead-time items that take years to deliver.

“The system design must prioritize manufacturing ease, design-for-manufacturing-and-assembly (DFMA) principles, and cost-efficiency. It is critical that the prototype demonstrates a viable pathway to rapid, high-volume production at an affordable unit cost,” MDA’s FBM Radar Next notice makes clear. “This ensures the capability to quickly scale production and cost-effectively replace radar units in highly active forward-deployed environments.”

Regardless of the approach MDA ultimately decides to pursue, the threat ecosystem that is driving the FBM Radar Next plans is real now, and is not just limited to enemy missile attacks. Weaponized drones, especially long-range one-way attack types, present real dangers to high-value targets. This fact had already been driven firmly into the public consciousness by the ongoing war in Ukraine. It has now been further demonstrated by Iran’s aforementioned targeting of prized air and missile defense radars around the Middle East during fighting earlier this year. The ramifications of all of this go well beyond these particular conflict zones, too.

As we wrote back in March after Iran’s very deliberate targeting of U.S. and allied radars became clear:

“Strategic air and missile architectures, in general, exist in a world now where the threats they face are not limited to very-long-range standoff capabilities possessed only by peer or near-peer adversaries.“

“It used to be, generally, that you had to fire a ballistic missile or high-end cruise missile in an attempt to strike one of these systems. Now, long-range one-way-attack drones, as well as increasingly capable cruise and ballistic missiles, continue to proliferate steadily, including to smaller nation-state armed forces and even non-state actors. An attack could even come from a small drone with a C4 charge launched from a fishing trawler 10 miles away from one of these critical radar installations. The threat of these kinds of near-field attacks has largely been overlooked for years, even as the low-end drone threat has exploded and ‘democratized’ precision-guided weaponry, as they did not fit the established aerial threat matrix and the countermeasures used to repel those threats.”

…

“The scale and scope of Iran’s retaliatory attacks so far, while clearly threatening, pale in comparison to what one would expect to see in a major high-end fight between the United States and China in the Pacific. The overall ramifications would also be more severe.“

“Beyond the more immediate impacts of losing this kind of strategic radar coverage, there are far larger implications. In some cases, these radars are designed to provide critical early warning and verification of incoming nuclear strikes, or other large-scale attacks by a major adversary, targeting a nation’s home soil. They are critical parts of the nuclear deterrent. As such, losing these sensors can have major downstream impacts on strategic decision-making cycles based on concerns about what suddenly is not being seen. Fewer radars also means fewer ways to double-check that a track is not a false positive in a scenario where the total available decision-making time could be seriously truncated, to begin with. These are concerns TWZ explicitly highlighted after Ukraine’s attack on the Armavir Radar Station in Russia in 2024.”

During a panel discussion at the SMD Symposium today, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Richard Zellmann, Deputy Commander of U.S Space Command, further underscored the reality of the current threat ecosystem, including one-way attack drones layered in with traditional missile barrages. The general also highlighted the impact of more readily available space-enabled targeting and navigation capabilities.

“We see, I think, the low end on Epic Fury [the official nickname for U.S. operations against Iran earlier this year]. Sure, the missiles are more high-end, but we’ve seen our adversary employ a number of one-way attack systems that are coupled with these ballistic missile volleys,” Zellman explained. “We are really at this point in the history of warfare because of the democratization of space. Space isn’t a sanctuary. It’s no longer just the playground of nations with a lot of money.”

“The commercialization of space has created what many call essentially a transparent battlefield. And because I can see everything all the time with commercial ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; in this case primarily satellite imagery], it’s given our adversaries capabilities that they haven’t had in the past,” he continued. “That ISR, if you couple it with a platform that has access to GPS or some other PNT [Position, Navigation, and Timing] system, and then you add in another layer of over-the-horizon comms, like say from an Iridium or a Starlink [satellite communications terminal], and you have a pretty lethal asymmetric weapon system that our adversaries can get a hold of.”

Munitions that use GPS, or a similar form of navigation, alone for guidance are only employable against static targets. This, in turn, only drives home even more the importance of the transportability and deployability requirements that are at the heart of the FBM Radar Next plan.

It’s also important to note that, like AN/TPY-2 now, FBM Radar Next will still be just one part of a larger air and missile defense architecture. In our analysis earlier this year, we noted that Iranian attacks on radars in the Middle East had reinforced arguments for new layered defenses to protect those and other prized assets and for migrating more early warning and missile tracking capabilities into space. There is still a question of how much of that functionality will be shared and eventually ported over into orbital sensing capabilities. As Lt. Gen. Zellmann pointed out today, threats to space-based capabilities continue to grow, and that domain can no longer be considered a sanctuary, either. Having a layered, redundant, and flexible mix of terrestrial and orbital sensing for ballistic missile tracking will remain highly important for the foreseeable future.

What exactly a successor to the AN/TPY-2 looks like in the end remains to be seen. What is clear now is that very real missile and drone threats have prompted a major rethinking on the part of MDA about how future missile defense radars will need to be employed to ensure they can survive going forward.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The U.S. Army is on the hunt for a new lower-cost strike missile capable of hitting targets more than 621 miles (1,000 kilometers) away. The Affordable High Speed Strike (AHSS) missile could be more of a traditional ballistic missile-like weapon or feature an air-breathing propulsion system. AHSSs could be fired from new uncrewed launcher vehicles that the Army is pursuing separately, as well as certain existing crewed types like the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). The service sees these future weapons as offering a particularly important new way to strike enemy air bases, air defense nodes, missile launchers, and other high-value targets within a particular theater of operations.

AHSS was among the many programs the Army’s Combat Capabilities Development Command’s Aviation & Missile Center (DEVCOM AvMC) highlighted at its booth at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama. TWZ was in attendance at this conference, which wrapped up yesterday. Aviation Week was first to report on AHSS from this event.

“AHSS is an entirely new missile,” a DEVCOM spokesperson said, according to Aviation Week. At the same time, the Army is also clearly in the very early stages of defining what it wants from this new weapon beyond general affordability and reach.

A graphic on display at DEVCOM’s booth at the SMD symposium showed renderings of two distinctly different notional missiles under the AHSS heading, as seen at the top of this story and below. One has a traditional ballistic missile-type design with a cruciform fin arrangement at the tail end. The other notional missile has a more novel design with an air-breathing propulsion system feeding from an intake in the nose. In broad terms, the intake has a style commonly associated with high-speed jet engines such as ramjets and scramjets. It also has a completely different tail configuration, as well as what appears to be a long, slender stabilizing strake visible along the right side of the body.

Aviation Week‘s story also highlights the Army’s current separate development of an entire new family of Common Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher (CAML) vehicles. However, the current AHSS concept also includes “an option to be launched from a crewed HIMARS,” the DEVCOM spokesperson said, according to that outlet.

HIMARS, which uses a 6×6 tactical truck as its base, fires munitions via standardized ammunition ‘pods.’ As such, it seems likely that any other launcher that makes use of these same pods, such as the tracked M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), would also be able to fire the future AHSS missile.

“This project directly supports Precision Fires capabilities by developing, maturing, and demonstrating affordable high speed strike missile technologies for responsive, mobile, deployable, survivable, and sustainable Army conventional theater strike weapons,” the Army said about AHSS in its 2027 Fiscal year budget proposal, which was released earlier this year. The program will “provide hardware and software technologies demonstrated, including affordable advanced propulsion, complementary warhead, guidance, navigation and control technologies, and integration onto Army mobile launch platforms.”

“The Army needs affordable, responsive high speed strike capability to attack theater level targets, provide offensive counter-air capability, and be launched from Army mobile, deployable, and survivable platforms,” the Army budget documents add.

The specific mention of the offensive counter-air (OCA) mission set is interesting as it is far more commonly associated with air assets. However, it is simply defined as “offensive operations to destroy or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, and as close to their source as possible,” according to the January 2020 edition of the U.S. military’s official Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Long-range surface-to-surface missiles are very applicable for pursuing these objectives, something we will come back to later on.

It is also worth noting that DEVCOM’s graphic at the SMD Symposium used the exact same air-breathing missile render to represent the planned Increment 4 version of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). The baseline version of PrSM, or Increment 1, is a traditional short-range ballistic missile with ability to hit targets at least around 310 miles (500 kilometers) away, if not further. The Army’s current stated plan for Increment 4 is to acquire a new variant or derivative of PrSM with a range of at least 621 miles/1,000 kilometers. For further context, the Increment 2 PrSM, which is in active development now, is an anti-ship-focused variant with a new seeker system, allowing it to engage moving targets. The Increment 3 plan is centered on new unspecified “enhanced” payloads, which could include swarms of loitering munitions.

The Army has also talked in the past about an Increment 5 variation of PrSM with even greater range. This would put it in the same general category, at least in terms of reach, as AHSS. As noted, DEVCOM has stressed that AHSS is distinct from other existing efforts.

Furthermore, AHSS and PrSM are just two parts of a larger array of new longer-range strike capabilities the Army is working to acquire. The service has already fielded a small number of Typhon systems, which are currently capable of firing Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) multi-purpose missiles. Tomahawks can hit targets roughly 1,000 miles away. The Army is now pushing to field the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also known as Dark Eagle, as well. Last year, new details emerged that put the maximum range of this weapon at around 2,175 miles.

On top of this, defense startup Castelion is developing a ground-launched version of its Blackbeard missile for the Army. Blackbeard is a lower-cost design said to be capable of traveling at hypersonic speeds. The exact maximum range of this missile is unclear, but the Army has said in the past that it is targeting “80% of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) Increment 4 capability.”

A key underlying factor in all of this was the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019. Under the INF, the United States and Russia were both prohibited from developing and fielding nuclear or conventionally-armed ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with maximum ranges between 310 and 3,420 miles (500 and 5,500 kilometers). The AHSS section in the Army’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request specifically mentions that such developments are now “unconstrained by previous treaties.”

Depending on what kind of capability is ultimately pursued under AHSS, as well as PrSM Increment 5, the Army could be on track to field its first new medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) since the INF went into force in 1988. MRBMs are categorized as ballistic missiles with maximum ranges between 620 and 1,860 miles (1,000 and 3,000 kilometers). Members of Congress have notably been openly supportive of the Army acquiring exactly this kind of long-range capability in the past.

Pairing this capability with new and improved crewed and uncrewed launchers could offer more flexibility for employing these weapons, while also helping to reduce vulnerability to enemy attacks. TWZ has highlighted now on several occasions how uncrewed mobile launch systems would offer even greater advantages for future expeditionary and distributed operations. Uncrewed platforms could be pushed further forward without necessarily exposing human operators to greater risks. This would also allow a smaller force of human personnel to operate a larger number of total launchers, in general.

The broader value of Army ground-based long-range strike capabilities has been demonstrated this year in the course of operations against Iran. PrSM, as well as older Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles, have been so heavily employed against Iranian targets that there are now serious concerns about the adequacy of the remaining stockpiles of those weapons. There are reports that stocks of PrSMs, which the Army only received in quantity in 2023 and that made their combat debut in strikes on Iran, have run especially low.

The U.S. needs to change the way it tracks and defends against future missile threats, the deputy commander of U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) said on Tuesday. The need to do so comes as changes in missile technology are moving faster than the current defeat system can keep up with.

“Historically, if you start from the high end here, missile defense and missile warning were operating on separate and distinct stovepipe networks,” Lt. Gen. Rick Zellman said during a panel at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium (SMD) in Huntsville, Alabama, attended by TWZ. “Missile warning, of course, was going to detect a launch and let people know something’s coming inbound and see a duck and cover and whatnot, and missile defenders were looking to get a little bit more fidelity in their track and be able to shoot down an incoming missile,” he continued. “But today we don’t really have any ballistic missiles. Everything is maneuvering. Everything is complex, and so we can’t provide warning without providing a lot more observations on these missiles.”

As a result of the evolution in missile technology, “the lexicon that we’re starting to see is missile tracking, right?” the general proffered. “And so missile warning and missile defense are really coming together in that realm. Missile warning was a space legacy mission area, and of course missile defense is missile defense. And you can see how these things are coming together. So really, the distinction between missile warning is almost obsolete at this point.”

The U.S. military has space-based early warning sensors that are integrated into its existing sensing, and has been for decades. But these warn of launches, they generally don’t track a weapon throughout its flight cycle. For some years now, work has been underway to substantially expand on space-based missile defense capabilities, to include the start of the fielding of new satellite constellations to help track ballistic missiles, as well as hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and other threats, during the mid-course portion of their flights. This is on top of a major push to move other kinds of terrestrial sensing to orbital layers, some of which could potentially have a secondary missile defense role.

To achieve the objective of fusing missile warning and tracking functions together, “we have to leverage a couple of really good partners,” Zellman stated, pointing to two in particular. One is the Space Development Agency (SDA), tasked with quickly delivering needed space-based capabilities to the U.S. military. The other is the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), charged with developing, deploying, and sustaining layered and integrated missile defense capabilities.

The SDA, noted the general, “is developing a number of missile-tracking satellites as part of their tranches that they’re launching.” The MDA, meanwhile, has “a long history of integrating battle management,” Zellman discussed.

“So those two together are really helping Space Command take separate disparate stovepipe information and bring it together,” he stated.

“It also has to talk about decision speed, and this really is going to require us to look at more than man-in-the-loop [MITL], and maybe a man on the loop [MOTL] situation,” he noted. MITL is when a human is fully engaged in assessing and controlling the operation compared to MOTL, which usually relies on more heavily automated systems where the human approves critical decisions, usually based on distilled data presented by the system. AI is becoming a large part of making that possible in an increasingly successful way.

The reason to make this change, Zellman explained, is that “we have to make these decisions faster, and that data flow has to be able to enable our layered defenses – whether that’s coming from a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense], or a Patriot, or directed energy, or SM-3, or space-based interceptors in the future – all that is going to be dependent on our decision speed.”

“At the heart of all this for the United States Space Command is one of our unified command plan responsibilities, and that is as a global sensor manager,” the general said. 

“We don’t use sensors dedicated to a single mission,” he explained. “They may have originally been conceived to do space domain awareness or missile warning, or in some cases, missile defense, but we try to take the goodness of all those sensors and use them for all three of those mission areas.”

Under SPACECOM, “we take those sensors and we dynamically task them and prioritize accordingly, so we can support multiple commands around the globe. And that really, once again, gets to the theme about defending at home and abroad is being able to support these multiple commands simultaneously.”

The command’s “modern systems, whether it’s a long-range discrimination radar or some of our systems that have been around a little bit longer – like an upgraded early warning radar – they’re all inherently multi-mission,” Zellman put forth. “A single radar can see an object in space and give me space domain awareness information, and a little bit later it can see a missile launch and provide warning, and then hopefully down the road a bit more… provide essentially a track so that we can shoot an interceptor at it and kill it.”

“All these three things can be done in the same duty cycle with that same system, and so we have to be able to dynamically task these systems to ensure that whichever is the priority mission at that time is the one that is being serviced,” the general cautioned. “Historically, space domain awareness information went to space operators, and I would argue missile warning information probably went to both space operators and the missile defense community. But today, that information has to all be put in one data location, and we pull the information we need for the mission we have at hand.”

Long Range Discrimination Radar Capabilities

“We recognize that what we do in space at Space Command is really fundamental to what the missile defense community has to do for missile defense,” Zellman vocalized. “So that really talks about the high end. Let’s talk about the low end.”

Lt. Gen. John Rafferty, commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and Joint Task Force-Gold “mentioned some of this today,” Zellman noted, referring to an earlier SMD panel. “We see, I think, the low end on Epic Fury. Sure, the missiles are more high end, but we’ve seen our adversary employ a number of one-way attack systems that are coupled with these ballistic missile volleys, and we are really at this point in the history of warfare because of the democratization of space.”

“Space isn’t a sanctuary,” the general shared. “It’s no longer just the playground of nations with a lot of money. The commercialization of space has created what many call essentially a transparent battlefield. And because I can see everything all the time with commercial ISR, it’s given our adversaries capabilities that they haven’t had in the past.” 

“That ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance], if you couple it with a platform that has access to GPS or some other PNT [position, navigation and timing] system, and then you add in another layer of over-the-horizon comms, like say from an Iridium or a Starlink, and you have a pretty lethal asymmetric weapon system that our adversaries can get a hold of.”

Regardless of how much integration and automation occurs, it’s still a people business in Zellman’s eyes.

“So whether it’s a combination volley of attack drones or hypersonic glide vehicles, the mission at SPACECOM remains the same, and that’s to synchronize global missile defense and space domain awareness using a common set of information,” Zellman said. “But that synchronization doesn’t just happen in a vacuum; it happens with the joint warfighters that are standing on watch.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

SEOUL, Aug. 11 (UPI) — North Korea fired a ballistic missile toward the East Sea on Wednesday, the militaries of Seoul and Tokyo said, its second such launch in less than a week as the United States and South Korea gear up to kick off their major summertime joint military drill.

The missile was fired from the Wonsan area on North Korea’s east coast at around 6 a.m., South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a text message to reporters.

“The detected North Korean missile flew over 700 kilometers (435 miles), and South Korea and the U.S. are currently conducting a detailed analysis regarding its exact specifications,” the JCS said.

The military did not specify the type of missile involved, although the distance the projectile traveled falls within the range of short-range ballistic missiles.

South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities tracked and shared information on the launch from its initial stage, while Seoul also exchanged information related to the ballistic missile with Japan, the military added.

“Under a robust South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture, the military is closely monitoring North Korea’s various movements and maintaining the capability and readiness to overwhelmingly respond to any provocation,” the JCS said.

Japan’s Defense Ministry also detected the launch, saying the missile flew about 429 miles, reached a maximum altitude of roughly 56 miles and fell outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi condemned the launch at a press briefing, saying the North’s weapons tests “threaten the peace and security of our country, the region, and the international community.”

Koizumi said the launch violated relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and noted that Japan had lodged a strong protest with North Korea through diplomatic channels at its embassy in Beijing.

Hawaii-based U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said it detected the launch and was consulting with regional allies and partners.

“Based on current assessments, this event does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel or territory, or to our allies,” the command said in a statement.

The launch came days before the United States and South Korea are set to begin their annual summertime joint military drills. The 11-day Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise kicks off Monday and will focus on preparing for evolving threats from North Korea, military officials said earlier this week.

North Korea routinely denounces the allies’ joint exercises as rehearsals for an invasion and frequently responds with weapons tests. On Thursday, Pyongyang fired a short-range ballistic missile toward the East Sea.

The allies stressed that the joint exercise is defensive in nature.

“We’re up here today announcing Ulchi Freedom Shield to the entire world before it even starts,” U.S. Forces spokesman Col. Ryan Donald said at a press briefing Monday. “UFS is not a pretext, it’s not a provocation. It’s a transparent, longstanding defensive training event.”

Gen. Michael Guetlein, the top U.S. military officer in charge of the Golden Dome missile defense shield, says he is confident that the initiative will be able to deliver the desired capabilities within its current stated budget of $185 billion. Operational elements of the huge new architecture are currently scheduled to start coming online in mid-2028. This is despite independent estimates that the required ‘system of systems’ could cost exponentially more to develop, field, and maintain. At the same time, Guetlein has now warned that work on Golden Dome could abruptly end, at least for a time, regardless of its total price tag, if a huge budgetary hurdle is not overcome.

Guetlein, whose current title is Director of Golden Dome and is presently assigned to the U.S. Space Force, shared new details about the initiative during a talk today at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, at which TWZ is in attendance.

“What is the bill to the nation? How much national treasure are we asking the American public to commit to the defense of the homeland?” Guetlein said in his introductory remarks. “I’m on record, and I’m still up here saying the exact same number: $185 billion. We started at 175 billion dollars, and we added 10 more billion [dollars] worth of accelerating space capabilities that we thought the nation needed, that were not part of our original architecture.”

“That is a lot of money. It’s one of the biggest systems that we’ve ever put together as a nation. We [have] got to keep it affordable,” Guetlein continued. “There’s two other cost estimates out there that are exceptionally larger, but I’m going to tell you those cost estimates are not estimating what we are building.”

The general did not specify what cost estimates he was referring to, but the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has put out two top-level figures since the initiative was first unveiled in 2025. CBO’s first estimate in May 2025 said the complete architecture could cost up to $542 billion to develop, deploy, and then operate over a period spanning two decades. The office put out a second estimate in May of this year that said the full price tag might actually be nearly $1.2 trillion over the same 20-year timespan. At that time, CBO also explicitly said its analysis had been hampered by a lack of publicly available information about exactly what the so-called “objective architecture” for Golden Dome actually entails.

There are other independent estimates of Golden Dome’s full cost that are even higher than CBO’s May 2026 projection.

“We’re building something completely differently, and that architecture is coming together, and is being proven every single day,” Guetlein stressed today. “We have radars on contract. We have launchers on contract. We have space-based interceptors on contract. Hypersonic ballistic tracking system on contract. Space data network is on contract. Our construction contracts have been let [sic], and we are moving out with haste to get after what the President [Donald Trump] asked us to do in the summer of 2028.”

Space-based interceptors are notably vital to the Golden Dome plan as it has been described publicly to date. They are also central to CBO’s $1.2 trillion cost estimate, which projected that it would be necessary to have 7,800 of them in orbit at any one time for the architecture to work as intended.

The Northrop Grumman video below includes a computer-generated clip depicting a space-based interceptor engaging a target outside the Earth’s atmosphere, starting at 0:13 in the runtime.

Northrop Grumman Third Quarter 2025 Highlights

“We have our first operational site. We are digging dirt around the homeland, getting ready for the capabilities that the President asked us to deliver in the summer of 2028,” Guetlein also said, but did not elaborate on where that work was being done or its exact purpose.

“We’ve had two tests. We can’t talk about those tests, but those tests were phenomenally successful, and they demonstrated that the capabilities that we are putting together, both command and control, our sensor network, and our effectors, are going to be effective against the threats as they are currently designed,” the Golden Dome director added.

“We had committed to the President last year that we would do a major test every single year. So in January this year, I gave a challenge to the Missile Defense Agency of what test I needed to happen in the summer of 2026, and we executed that test,” Guetlein did note later on in the talk. “It was the most complex test with the most threats in the air in the history of WSMR [the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico]. MDA pulled that off and executed that test in six months, and met every single test objective that I gave them.”

“So the MDA team, plus the WSMR team, plus SMDC [the U.S. Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command], plus PAE Fires [the Army’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Fires], plus Fort Bliss [in Texas], plus a whole host of other agencies, all came together in less than six months, starting from scratch, and delivered what I will argue is the most complex integrated missile defense test that we have pulled off as a nation,” he continued. “But that test is a fraction of what we got to do to deliver what they’ve asked us to do in [20]28. So the test in [20]27 will be even more complex.”

Despite all of this apparent progress and significant authority to keep pushing ahead, Guetlein warned today that Golden Dome is facing a potentially insurmountable budget impasse. This has to do with how the initiative has been paid for so far, with core funding coming from outside normal defense spending streams via a process called reconciliation.

“When the President submitted his President’s Budget over to the Hill for FY27 [Fiscal Year 2027], I was not in the top line. I’m in what they call mandatory funding, which is another reconciliation-type funding bill,” Guetlein explained. So, yes, we have a CR [continuing resolution], and we’re not going to shut down the federal government, but a CR doesn’t help me under Golden Dome because I don’t have a top line to fall back to to get that percentage of the continuing resolution.”

Continuing resolutions are short-term spending bills Congress passes to keep the government running in the absence of the approval of a full annual budget.

The defense budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year that the Trump administration submitted earlier this year was already historically large, in part because of expected reconciliation funding. The $1.5 trillion “topline” was broken down into a base budget of $1.1 trillion and then “$350 billion in additional mandatory resources through reconciliation.”

“So we’ve got to figure out, as a nation, a different way of funding Golden Dome, at least for [20]27. Right now, that’s under reconciliation,” Guetlein added. “I will tell you that if they don’t figure it out, there is no Golden Dome because there is no funding.”

Guetlein said today that $22.5 billion has been appropriated for Golden Dome so far, and that 95 percent of that money is already committed to specific work.

“I do believe, as a nation, we’re going to figure this out just because the sense of urgency is so great, but it is a challenging budget environment,” he continued.

As an aside, the Senate, which is currently controlled by President Trump’s Republican Party, just passed its version of the new continuing resolution last week. It notably omitted certain defense spending provisions the White House had sought, including $1 billion for work on the Trump class battleship program, another top priority for the administration. That bill still needs to be reconciled with a separate temporary spending bill making its way through the Republican-controlled House of Representatives before it can be sent to President Trump’s desk to be signed into law (or vetoed).

On top of all this, there has been some bipartisan pushback to further use of the reconciliation process and related mechanisms to boost defense spending outside of the U.S. military’s base budget.

“I think it’s safe to conclude there will not be another reconciliation bill,” Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell, a Republican, said during a hearing on the U.S. Air Force’s proposed 2027 Fiscal Year budget back in June.

It is also worth noting here that a significant delay in additional funding could have a cascading impact on Golden Dome and its aggressive schedule. The Pentagon could also seek to redirect funds from other parts of its budget, but this could then have similar effects on other efforts. Guetlein did tell reporters after his talk at the SMD Symposium that the Pentagon is looking at contingency options to keep Golden Dome running in the absence of direct funding, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“Several of the space capabilities that we are investing in are also being invested in by the Space Force,” he said, per Air & Space Forces Magazine‘s report. “So, if Golden Dome is not able to continue to invest in those type of capabilities, then the Space Force could decide at that time to continue the investments.”

“Because we have diversified execution of a lot of these capabilities, and a lot of these capabilities are already requested by combatant commands, there are some alternatives that we can pursue. We have not made any decisions on any pathway,” he also noted.

Still, this all comes a the U.S. military is currently in the midst of a host of other major modernization programs, many of which are also deemed critical to national security. This is especially true of costly and expansive programs now underway to update all three legs of America’s nuclear deterrent triad, as well as the command and control architectures that underpin them.

Based on Guetlein’s comments today, Golden Dome now looks to be approaching its first major watershed moment, with this budgetary dilemma set to have significant impacts on how the initiative continues to progress.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Pyongyang conducts second weapons test in less than a week as Seoul, Washington gear up for annual military exercises.

North Korea has launched a ballistic missile towards the Sea of Japan, according to Seoul and Tokyo, marking the second such test from Pyongyang in less than a week.

The launch on Wednesday came as South Korea and the United States announced plans to hold their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield military drills starting on August 17.

“Our military detected at around 6:00 am [21:00 GMT Tuesday] a ballistic missile launched by North Korea from the Wonsan area towards the East Sea,” South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a message to reporters, referring to a body of water also known as the Sea of Japan.

South Korea’s military said the missile flew more than 700km (435 miles).

It said it has boosted its surveillance posture and that it was closely exchanging information on the launch with Washington and Tokyo.

Japan’s Defence Ministry said on social media that the suspected ballistic missile had “already fallen”, without providing further details.

“North Korea has never simply let a South Korea-US joint military exercise pass without a response,” Lim Eul-chul, a North Korea expert at Kyungnam University, told the AFP news agency.

“This is a message that Pyongyang is closely watching the upcoming drills and could stage a provocation if it deems one necessary.”

US-South Korea drills

The Ulchi Freedom Shield training is to start on Monday and run for 11 days. Its scale will be similar to previous years, with 18,000 South Korean soldiers taking part, according to South Korea’s military.

North Korea has in previous years denounced the exercises as a rehearsal for invasion, and responded to the drills with weapons tests and harsh rhetoric. Seoul and Washington, however, have repeatedly said their training is defensive in nature.

On August 6, South Korea, the US and Japan detected the launch of a short-range ballistic missile from North Korea in what was Pyongyang’s first ballistic weapons testing activity since late June.

North Korea did not confirm the reported launch.

Pyongyang has ratcheted up its criticism of Tokyo’s defence policy, issuing statements at least seven times since July.

On Tuesday, North Korean state media condemned Japan’s latest defence white paper as a “re-invasion-minded” document, saying it “groundlessly described” Pyongyang as ⁠the greatest strategic challenge to “justify its reckless arms buildup”.

North Korea has also been accused of playing a more active role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Tuesday that Moscow had used a North Korean ballistic missile during an attack that killed seven workers at a Ukrainian steel plant in the southeastern city of Zaporizhzhia.

South Korea plans to upgrade a key Army battle tank and an anti-ship missile program for the Navy in an effort to boost military capabilities against evolving enemy threats, the arms agency said Tuesday.

It will launch a 3.43 trillion-won (US$2.43 billion) project to upgrade the K2 main battle tank to be equipped with an active protection system (APS) to intercept anti-tank missiles and drones, a drone and improvised explosive device (IED) jammer and a remote-controlled weapons station (RCWS), the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said.

The APS system is dubbed a smart shield system that uses radar to automatically spot incoming enemy missiles or drones and attack them.

The drone and IED jammer blocks enemy radio signals and the RCWS enables the crew to safely aim and fire from inside the armored vehicle.

The K2 upgrade program will run from 2028 through 2046, with the new tanks expected to enter into service in 2033, DAPA said.

The agency will launch another upgrade project for the new Haeseong-II long-range anti-ship missile, aiming to double its strike range, backed by a more powerful turbofan engine.

With a budget of around 1.63 trillion won, the military aims to complete the development by 2033 and start mass production in 2034.

The upgraded Haeseong-II missiles are expected to be mounted on South Korea’s next-generation KDDX destroyer, a source familiar with the matter said. The government recently signed a formal contract with Hanwha to build its lead ship.

The upgrade plans were approved during DAPA’s key decision-making meeting on Tuesday.

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For most golfers, the biggest hazards are ponds and sand traps. President Donald Trump, the target of frequent attempts on his life, including while golfing, has bigger threats to worry about, especially from Iran. Which is why images and videos have emerged showing U.S. Army Humvee-based Avenger system short-range air defense systems (SHORAD) in the background when Trump hits the links.

The latest such imagery was from Sunday, when Trump was attending the final round of the LIV Golf Bedminster tournament at his New Jersey golf course.

One photo shows Trump wielding a wedge with an Avenger behind concertina wire in the background. There is another photo of an Avenger, but it is unclear it is the same one. There are certainly other protection platforms we don’t see, especially electronic warfare systems.

The White House on Monday confirmed the authenticity of the photos to us.

The following video shows the Avenger and an AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel air defense radar in the background.

As if to highlight the concerns, while Trump was at Bedminster on Sunday, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) F-16 Fighting Falcons intercepted two general aviation aircraft that violated the Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) airspace over the area.

“All general aviation aircraft were safely escorted out of the area by NORAD aircraft,” the command stated on X.

On Aug. 1, the White House shared a video of Trump talking with soldiers at Bedminster. In the background was an Avenger.

“I’m not worried about missiles and drones,” the president joked.

“We got it covered,” a colonel responded with a smile, pointing his right thumb over his shoulder to the Humvee-mounted SHORAD system.

The Avengers, which fire Stinger heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, are a fast-reacting point defense asset, and do make some sense for protecting a golfing president. They have been upgraded to deal with drones and there is also a known rooftop Avenger missile turret near the White House for air defense purposes, which was installed not long after 9/11.

When deployed to assist the Secret Service in protecting POTUS, the Avenger systems are operated by the 263rd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, NORAD told us. A spokesperson declined to provide further details about how often the Avengers are used this way.

Drone technology, including first-person view types and those equipped with fiber optics, is rapidly proliferating around the world and Iran has been both a user and distributor of these weapons.

Trump, as we noted earlier in this story, has already been the subject of several assassination attempts and threats. A number of these threats involve golf. The most recent incident came earlier this month. 

“Authorities arrested a suspect who was allegedly photographing and recording security preparations ahead of a scheduled fundraising dinner at the Trump National Golf Club in Rancho Palos Verdes, California,” Fox News reported. “The suspect, Jeanine John Taele, 38, was found carrying a 16-round magazine loaded with ammunition, while investigators recovered an additional pistol and a fake ‘security protection agent’ badge from his truck.”

Prior to that, there was an attempt against Trump on Sept. 15, 2024, at the Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Florida. 

As Trump golfed, a Secret Service agent conducting a perimeter security sweep saw the partially obscured face of a man in the brush along the fence line near the sixth hole, according to a Justice Department media release at the time. 

“The agent observed the barrel of a rifle aimed directly at him,” the release stated. “As the agent began backing away, he saw the rifle barrel move, and the agent fired” at the man, later identified as Ryan Wesley Routh, 58, of Hawaii. Routh survived and is currently in prison awaiting trial.

A few months earlier, on July 13, 2024, at a campaign event in Butler, Pennsylvania, a man fired a shot at Trump, then the Republican presidential nominee. Thomas Matthew Crooks, 20, of Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, was later killed, and a bloodied Trump was whisked away. 

Prior to those attempts, Iran made a golf-related threat against Trump.

An image highly suggestive of a drone targeting the then-former President Trump on a golf course in a “vengeance” strike in retaliation for the death of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani was posted on Twitter by an account for Iran’s then-Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The U.S. military killed Soleimani in a drone strike in Iraq in January 2020, which had already prompted public threats from Iranian officials, including against Trump specifically.

Twitter suspended the @khamenei_site account around 15 hours after the post when the image first appeared on Jan. 21, 2020.

Khamenei himself was killed Feb. 28 during the opening night of Operation Epic Fury.

There has been extreme concern for Trump’s safety following the launch of that operation, with an Iranian revenge hit on the president being more plausible now than ever. This has triggered major changes in safety protocols, some of which have made headline news.

The Avenger isn’t the only specialized vehicle used to protect Trump while he golfs. As we previously reported, during a golf outing with his son Eric at his course in Scotland last year, Trump was trailed by an armored Polaris Ranger X utility task vehicle (UTV) designed to provide ballistic protection. The vehicle, dubbed Golf Force One by the press, was “part of the Presidential fleet of specialty vehicles,” a White House spokesperson told The War Zone at the time. The White House provided no further details. Trump was in Scotland to host a meeting with former British Prime Minister Keir Starmer at his resort, where security was beefed up.

So the next time you are having a tough time on the course, just remember this. At least you probably don’t need a Stinger-launching weapons system to ensure you make it safely to the clubhouse.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

China’s test of a nuclear-capable missile into the Pacific has exposed the growing divisions among Pacific island nations over the increasing militarisation of a region they have sought to preserve as an “Ocean of Peace”.

The July launch, China’s first known ballistic-missile test into the Pacific since September 2024, took place just hours after Fiji and Australia signed a major defence treaty, marking Fiji’s first formal alliance. The timing highlighted the increasingly complex security environment in a region where China, the United States and their allies are competing for influence.

More than a month after the test, Pacific Islands foreign ministers were unable to agree on a collective statement condemning Beijing’s missile launch, despite individual leaders expressing concern about the growing military presence in the region.

Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko described the test as “totally inappropriate”, while stressing that China remained a close friend and ally of Papua New Guinea. He said Beijing had provided advance notice of the launch but had not given details about where the missile would land.

China defended the test, saying it had been conducted safely and urging countries not to over-interpret the launch.

Growing Military Activity in the Pacific

The missile test came after a year of increasingly visible military activity across the Pacific, a region that has become a major arena of strategic competition between the United States and China.

Chinese naval deployments and live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea have coincided with U.S.-allied military exercises around Guam and Hawaii. Warship visits and expanding security partnerships have also increased across the region.

The United States retains a substantial military presence in the Pacific, including in Hawaii, Guam and the Marshall Islands.

For Pacific island governments, the growing military presence creates an increasingly difficult choice. Security partnerships can provide valuable capabilities for surveillance, disaster response, policing and training, but they can also increase the possibility that Pacific territory and waters become incorporated into wider strategic competition.

Tuvalu permanent foreign secretary Pasuna Tuaga expressed concern about the broader militarisation of the region, including security arrangements such as the AUKUS partnership between Australia, Britain and the United States.

Pacific Nations United in Principle but Divided in Practice

Pacific leaders endorsed the Ocean of Peace Declaration in September 2025, committing themselves to protecting the region and strengthening international peace and security.

The initiative reflected a long-standing desire among Pacific states to ensure that their security agenda is not dictated by larger external powers.

The defence agreement between Australia and Fiji, known as the Ocean of Peace Alliance, emerged from this broader regional framework.

But the growing number of security partnerships has created an inherent contradiction. Pacific governments want greater security capabilities while simultaneously opposing the militarisation of their region.

Australia and other partners argue that defence cooperation can strengthen regional resilience. Critics, however, fear that expanding bilateral arrangements could eventually leave Pacific nations with less influence over how their territory, waters and infrastructure are used.

Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Rick Houenipwela said the regional agenda must remain “conceived by the Pacific, shaped by the Pacific and only by the Pacific.”

Yet the failure to produce a unified response to China’s missile test demonstrated just how difficult that principle is to implement.

China Divides Regional Consensus

The disagreement over the missile test reflects the different political and economic interests of Pacific island nations.

Kiribati and Nauru, which have deepened their relations with Beijing after switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan, did not support the wording of the proposed statement, according to an official familiar with the discussions.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters blamed foreign influence for the failure to reach consensus, although he did not identify a particular country.

The disagreement demonstrates that Pacific nations do not share a uniform approach toward China.

Some governments see Beijing as an important economic and diplomatic partner, while others are increasingly concerned about its military activities and the strategic implications of its expanding regional presence.

At the same time, many Pacific governments remain wary of becoming closely aligned with either China or the Western powers.

The Security Dilemma Facing the Pacific

The central problem for Pacific nations is the tension between security and strategic autonomy.

Countries require surveillance capabilities, military training, disaster-response mechanisms and other security resources. Defence partnerships can provide those capabilities.

But greater reliance on external powers can also make it more difficult for Pacific governments to maintain an independent regional agenda.

Fiji Foreign Minister Sakiasi Ditoka acknowledged this tension, saying countries wanted to be free from “war-making paraphernalia” while also recognising that some security capabilities helped keep them safe.

Fiji’s participation for the first time in U.S.-led RIMPAC military exercises further illustrates this balancing act.

The country is simultaneously promoting the idea of an Ocean of Peace while becoming more involved in established regional security structures.

Analysis: The Pacific Is Becoming a Strategic Battleground

The significance of China’s missile test goes beyond the launch itself. It has exposed the growing gap between the Pacific’s aspiration to remain an “Ocean of Peace” and the strategic realities surrounding it.

The region is increasingly being shaped by competing security partnerships, military exercises and the expanding strategic presence of major powers. China is becoming more active militarily, while the United States, Australia and their partners are strengthening their own defence relationships.

For Pacific island states, the challenge is therefore not simply whether to oppose China’s military activities. It is how to respond to them without allowing the Pacific’s security agenda to become dominated by great-power rivalry.

The failure to agree on a common statement is particularly significant because regional unity is one of the Pacific’s strongest tools for maintaining its diplomatic autonomy. When governments cannot agree on how to respond to a major security development, external powers gain greater room to shape the regional agenda.

At the same time, completely rejecting security partnerships would leave many Pacific states without capabilities they consider increasingly necessary. The result is a difficult balancing act: accepting enough external security assistance to address genuine threats while preventing those partnerships from transforming the region into a military theatre.

China’s missile test therefore exposes a deeper strategic dilemma. The more Pacific states seek security through external alliances, the greater the risk that the region becomes militarised; yet the more they reject those partnerships, the harder it may become to respond to an increasingly competitive security environment.

The upcoming Pacific Islands Forum leaders’ meeting in Palau is likely to bring these questions back to the centre of regional diplomacy. The key issue will be whether Pacific nations can establish a collective security approach that protects their interests without allowing the strategic competition between China and Western powers to define the future of the region.

With information from Reuters.

Iran-backed Houthis have resumed attacks on Yemen’s al-Makha port in the Red Sea, striking Saudi weapons depots with missiles and drones. Yemen’s military says at least seven people were killed.

The latest Houthi attacks come less than 24 hours after an earlier barrage struck al-Makha (Mocha) and its commercial port.

Yemen’s Houthis have launched a new wave of missile and drone attacks on the Red Sea port city of al-Makha (Mocha), extending an assault on government-held areas along Yemen’s western coast and killing at least 11 people.

The latest attacks came on Sunday evening, less than 24 hours after an earlier barrage struck al-Makha and its commercial port. Yemeni government forces said air defences intercepted six drones during the renewed assault, while two ballistic missiles fell into the sea without hitting their targets.

Footage broadcast by the Houthi-affiliated Al Masirah TV showed several ballistic missiles and drones being launched. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said the operation targeted Saudi troop concentrations and weapon depots in the area, according to the Reuters news agency.

At least 11 killed

Earlier on Sunday, Attacks on al-Makha killed at least 11 people, including eight military personnel and three civilians, and wounded 32 others, according to the latest toll cited by the AFP news agency.

The strikes also caused extensive damage at al-Makha’s port. Government authorities said buildings and commercial facilities were hit, while The Associated Press reported damage to port infrastructure, commercial goods and food supplies.

Government forces also said they intercepted and destroyed an unmanned explosive boat approaching the commercial port.

During the renewed attacks later on Sunday, the National Resistance Forces, which are aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognised government, urged residents of al-Makha to remain indoors, accusing the Houthis of carrying out indiscriminate shelling.

Houthis say Saudi military buildup prompted attack

The Houthis said the operation involved a large number of ballistic missiles and drones and was launched in response to an alleged continued Saudi military buildup, including the reinforcement of allied forces with weapons and equipment along Yemen’s western coast and in Taiz province.

Houthi political council member Hizam al-Assad separately claimed that continuing explosions, fires and columns of smoke from the port were caused by large quantities of weapons and military equipment stored there.

Attacks extend to al-Khokha

The escalation was not limited to al-Makha, but also targeted the al-Khokha district, south of the coastal city of Hodeidah.

Al-Jumhuriya television, which is affiliated with the National Resistance Forces led by Presidential Leadership Council member Tareq Saleh, said the government-appointed governor of Hodeidah, al-Hassan Taher, survived an assassination attempt on Sunday after a Houthi ballistic missile struck his residence in the district.