Joaquin Guzman Lopez, one of four sons of the Sinaloa cartel’s ‘El Chapo’, changes his plea to guilty, court documents show.
Published On 29 Nov 202529 Nov 2025
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A son of notorious Mexican drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman will plead guilty next week in the United States to narcotics trafficking charges, according to federal court documents.
But federal documents released on Friday show that Guzman Lopez is to change his plea at a hearing set for Monday at the US District Court in Chicago.
Another of his three brothers, Ovidio Guzman, as part of a plea deal struck in exchange for a reduced sentence, pleaded guilty in July 2025 to conspiracy related to drug trafficking and two counts of participating in the activities of a criminal enterprise.
Ovidio Guzman also admitted that he and his brothers, known collectively as “Los Chapitos” (Little Chapos), had taken over their father’s operations within the cartel following his arrest in 2016.
Mexican broadcaster MVS Noticias said Guzman Lopez’s guilty plea could mean “a new chapter in the history of drug trafficking is about to be written”.
“This move has raised numerous questions about the possible ongoing negotiations between him and US authorities,” the news outlet said.
The ABC 7 Chicago news channel said federal prosecutors have said they will not now seek the death sentence for Guzman Lopez, and that there “is talk of a plea deal now in the works”.
He is due to appear in court in Chicago at 1:30pm (19:30 GMT) on Monday.
Two other “Chapitos” brothers, Ivan Archivaldo Guzman Salazar and Jesus Alfredo Guzman Salazar, have also been indicted on drug trafficking charges in the US but remain at large.
Their 68-year-old father, “El Chapo”, is serving a life sentence at a supermax federal prison in Colorado following his arrest and conviction in 2019.
Guzman Lopez was taken into custody last year when he arrived in Texas on board a small private plane, along with the cofounder of the Sinaloa cartel, Ismael “Mayo” Zambada.
Zambada claimed to have been misled about the destination and that he was abducted by Guzman Lopez to be handed over against his will to authorities in the US.
Following the arrest, clashes intensified between two factions of the Sinaloa cartel, headed, respectively, by the “Los Chapitos” brothers and Zambada. The infighting led to approximately 1,200 deaths in Mexico and about 1,400 disappearances, according to official figures.
Officials in the US accuse the Sinaloa cartel of trafficking fentanyl to the country, where the synthetic drug has caused tens of thousands of overdose deaths in recent years, straining relations with Mexico.
The cartel is also one of six Mexican drug-trafficking groups that US President Donald Trump has designated as global terrorist organisations.
Additional sanctions against the two fugitive “Los Chapitos” brothers were announced by Washington in June for fentanyl trafficking, and the reward for their capture was increased to $10m each.
Drug cartels in Mexico are recruiting children and forcing them to become professional killers. Rights groups warn hundreds of thousands of minors are at risk. Al Jazeera’s John Holman gained rare access to speak to child hitmen committing murder for money.
Political assassinations have long punctuated Mexico’s democratic trajectory, often surfacing at moments when institutional fragility becomes impossible to ignore. The murder of Uruapan’s mayor is therefore not an unprecedented shock but the latest manifestation of a recurring pattern in which local political authority collapses under the weight of criminal power. The country has witnessed similar moments in past electoral cycles, in rural municipalities, and along contested economic corridors. What is different today is the increasing regularity and visibility of these attacks, signalling not just isolated episodes of violence but a systemic erosion of governance. The killing of Carlos Manzo crystallises a truth that communities in Michoacán, Guerrero, Guanajuato, Sinaloa, Zacatecas and beyond have recognised for years: insecurity has metastasised into a political condition.
Michoacán has long been a barometer for national security. The state’s geography, agricultural wealth, and fragmented political networks have made it a battleground for groups competing for control. Yet the recent escalation in places like Uruapan signals a worrying transformation. Local reports of extortion, blockades, and increasingly public displays of force reflect criminal organisations behaving as de facto authorities. Entire communities have adapted to a logic of survival shaped by invisible borders, curfews, and negotiated coexistence with whoever wields power at any given moment. The assassination of public figures in such an environment is not simply a political act but a show of ownership over territory, demonstrating that the real lines of authority do not run through government offices but through armed structures with the capacity to enforce their will.
What is unfolding today is not an isolated deterioration but a worsening trend that has become more explicit during the last two federal administrations. The promise that security would be reimagined through social policy and a rejection of past militarised models never materialised into real control of territory or a coherent strategy for dismantling criminal governance. While the language changed, the underlying problem deepened. The country saw more regions where the state operates only partially or symbolically, where elections proceeded under intimidation, and where local authorities lacked the means or autonomy to resist the pressures around them. The result is an increasingly fragmented political geography in which criminal groups influence candidate selection, determine which campaigns can operate, and regulate economic flows at the community level.
Under Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the narrative of moral regeneration through social investment was presented as a long-term answer to entrenched violence. Yet the gap between discourse and reality widened every year. Homicides remained persistently high, disappearances continued to haunt families, and entire municipalities came under the shadow of armed groups. The federal government’s insistence that security indicators were improving often clashed with the everyday experience of citizens navigating threats, extortion, and territorial disputes. Even as official statistics were reinterpreted to show progress, the lived reality in regions such as Michoacán, Guerrero, Zacatecas, and Guanajuato suggested that criminal organisations had consolidated their presence more deeply than before.
It is against this backdrop that Claudia Sheinbaum assumed the presidency, carrying forward a security model that was already failing. Her early months in office reveal how far the government still is from containing the expanding insecurity. Despite official claims of reduced violence, these figures jar with how people actually experience their lives. A majority of citizens continue to feel unsafe, and communities in high-risk states report no perceptible change. Her reliance on social prevention ignores how firmly criminal networks have embedded themselves in local political and economic systems. In several regions, armed groups continue to operate openly, even during federal visits, reinforcing the perception that national security strategy is more rhetorical than practical. The dissonance between optimistic messaging and deteriorating public trust reveals a government that has yet to confront the structural nature of the problem. In doing so, it risks turning its security agenda into little more than political theatre rather than a meaningful plan to reassert state authority.
Federal responses, while immediate and visible, reveal a deep structural weakness. Large-scale deployments, announcements of multi-sector investment packages and public proclamations of institutional coordination have become the standard repertoire of crisis management. These interventions create the appearance of control but rarely alter the conditions that allow criminal groups to flourish. The persistent challenges of corruption, politicised policing, fragmented prosecutorial capacity and limited municipal autonomy remain largely unresolved. Without addressing these deficits, security operations risk becoming cyclical performances rather than durable solutions.
National security trends further complicate the picture. Although certain aggregate indicators suggest stabilisation or marginal declines, the broader trajectory reflects a shift towards diversified criminal governance. Extortion, territorial control, interference in municipal administration and the permeation of legitimate industries reflect forms of violence that escape simple statistical capture. Thus, a focus on homicide figures alone obscures the structural deterioration of Mexico’s security landscape. The issue is not merely how many people are killed or disappeared, but how violence shapes political participation, economic activity and civic behaviour.
The deterioration of security in Mexico is inseparable from the erosion of its democratic foundations. Criminal groups no longer just threaten individuals — they infiltrate political processes, influence elections, and shape economic life. Municipalities under their sway become more than battlegrounds; they become laboratories of parallel governance. Political pluralism suffers when competition is skewed by coercion; the meaningful choice of leaders erodes when citizens know that certain voices are too dangerous to raise. Freedom of expression, too, is undermined. Journalists, activists, and community leaders operate in climates where challenging criminal-political alliances can entail serious risks. Self-censorship becomes a survival strategy, and public debate narrows under the weight of unspoken fear. When participation becomes dangerous, political representation becomes illusory.
This is not how democratic life is supposed to function. Institutions — from city halls to courts — ought to guarantee protection, justice, and participation. Yet in many places, the real source of power lies outside constitutional structures, in the hands of groups that command both arms and economic influence. This isn’t a temporary crisis; it is a systemic breakdown: when violence is structural, the response must be institutional.
Civil society responses illustrate both the potential and the limits of civic resistance. The mobilisation of Generation Z represents an important shift: a young, digitally connected cohort demanding accountability, transparency and meaningful security reform. These demonstrations are grounded in lived experience. For many young people, insecurity is not an abstract policy concern but an organising principle of daily life. Their protests reflect a rejection of narratives that normalise violence, minimise institutional failure or reduce insecurity to political rhetoric. Yet their activism also highlights a worrying reality: younger generations increasingly turn to extra-institutional forms of political expression because formal channels appear unresponsive.
The erosion of freedom is not only visible in the public sphere but in private life. Decisions that should be routine — attending a festival, organising a community meeting, even taking certain roads — have become political acts shaped by calculations of risk. This gradual internalisation of fear constitutes a subtle but profound form of democratic regression. When citizens adapt their behaviour to avoid harm, the space for free expression, open debate and community participation contracts. Democracy loses not through abrupt authoritarian shifts but through the slow, everyday retreat of civic life.
Addressing this crisis requires an institutional response that moves beyond episodic militarisation. Prosecutorial structures must be capable of pursuing cases that reveal networks rather than producing symbolic arrests. Municipal police forces must be professionalised, insulated from political interference and equipped with oversight mechanisms. Transparency must also be central in any reform. Citizens need access to clear, verifiable information about investigations, budget allocations, and the performance of security institutions. Without this, trust will remain a casualty of rhetorical solutions. Economic regulation must prevent criminal control of supply chains, especially in high-value sectors. Without reform of these foundational elements, any security strategy will be short-lived and vulnerable to the next surge in criminal activity.
At the national level, political leadership must recognise that security, democracy and economic development are interdependent. Reducing violence without strengthening democratic institutions will merely shift the form that insecurity takes. Conversely, institutional reforms that ignore security realities will remain aspirational. The state must rebuild public trust not through proclamations but through transparent evidence of institutional effectiveness.
International cooperation can play a supporting role, particularly in intelligence and financial tracing, but it cannot substitute for domestic institution-building. Sovereignty requires the capacity to govern effectively; reliance on external actors to fill institutional gaps risks reinforcing perceptions of state weakness.
Mexico stands at a juncture where insecurity threatens more than physical safety. It challenges the very conditions that make democratic life possible. The murder of Uruapan’s mayor is therefore not simply another entry in a long record of violence but a sign of cumulative democratic decay. If unchecked, this trajectory will entrench parallel systems of governance in which criminal groups continue to expand their authority while formal institutions recede.
The country’s future depends on rejecting this drift. A more honest political narrative is needed — one that acknowledges institutional failure, confronts criminal power directly and recognises that democracy cannot coexist indefinitely with pervasive fear. The question is whether political leaders will choose the difficult path of structural reform or continue to rely on reactive measures that mask, rather than resolve, the crisis.
Mexico cannot allow political assassination to become an unremarkable feature of its democratic life. Public institutions must assert their authority not through spectacle but through competence. Reversing the current trajectory will require political courage, institutional reconstruction and a renewed commitment to pluralism and freedom. The alternative is stark: a political landscape where democracy is reduced to procedures while real power is negotiated through violence, and where the politics of fear become the politics of the state.
Nov. 5 (UPI) — Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said she has filed a complaint against the man seen in video groping her on a Mexico City street.
“If I don’t report it — besides the fact that it is a crime — then what position are all Mexican women left in?” she asked during a Wednesday press conference.
“If this can happen to the president, what can happen to all the young women in our country?”
Video of the Tuesday incident circulating online shows Sheinbaum speaking to people on a crowded Mexico City street. As she turns to speak with people to her right, a man comes up from behind her left side, puts his arm around her right shoulder and appears to lean in to try to kiss the president on the cheek.
As another man, whom Sheinbaum identified as Juan Jose of her staff, approaches, the suspect’s left hand is seen sliding up the president’s side and appears to grope her before Jose intervenes and moves him away.
Sheinbaum told reporters Wednesday that the man has been arrested.
“I had to go to the Mexico City Attorney General’s Office because it’s a local offense. I filed the complaint, and it turns out this same person later went on to harass other women on the street,” she said.
“First of all, this is something that should never happen in our country. I’m not saying this as the president, but as a woman, and on behalf of all Mexican women: it should not happen.”
She explained they decided to walk from the National Palace to the Ministry of Public Education on Tuesday because the drive would have taken 20 minutes, when by foot it would only take them a quarter of the time.
Many people greeted them en route without problems, until “this totally drunk person approached,” she said.
“That’s when I experienced this incident of harassment. At that moment, I was actually talking with other people, so I didn’t realize right away what was happening,” she said, adding it was only after watching the video that she realized she had been accosted.
“I decided to file a complaint because this is something I experienced as a woman, and it’s something women across our country experience. I’ve lived through this before, back when I wasn’t president, when I was a student, when I was young,” she said.
“Our personal space — no one has the right to violate it,” she continued. “No one. No one should violate our personal space. No man has the right to do so. The only way that’s acceptable is with a woman’s consent.”
The type of harassment the president was the victim of is not a crime in all states, she said, adding that she has called for a review to see where it is a criminal offense.
They are also launching a campaign to encourage women to be respected “in every sense” and to promote that harassment is a crime.
TheSan Antonio class amphibious transport dock ship USS Fort Lauderdale has left Mayport, Florida, and is returning to the Caribbean to rejoin the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a U.S. official confirmed to The War Zone Monday morning. The vessel left on Sunday and is now south of Miami in the Straits of Florida, according to an online ship tracker. It will provide additional air and troop support once it arrives on station. San Antonio class ships can launch and land two CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters or two MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft or up to four AH-1Z, UH-1Y or MH-60 helicopters at once. In addition, they can carry Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft or other landing craft and boats in their well deck, and can transport up to 800 Marines.
The San Antonio class amphibious transport dock USS Fort Lauderdale (LPD 28) is on its way back to the Caribbean to rejoin the ongoing enhanced counter-narcotics mission. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Savannah L. Hardesty) Petty Officer 2nd Class Savannah Hardesty
The Fort Lauderdale is set to rejoin a flotilla of at least eight other surface warships plus a nuclear-powered fast attack submarine arrayed for an enhanced counter-narcotics mission also aimed, at least partially, at Venezuelan dictator Nicholas Maduro. The Henry J. Kaiser class fleet replenishment oiler USNS Kanawha is in the region as well, the Navy official told us. In addition, the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford and one of its escort ships, the Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer USS Bainbridge, are currently in the western Mediterranean Sea, heading toward the Caribbean, a U.S. Navy official told The War Zone. It could take as long as another week for those ships to arrive in the Caribbean, the official added.
🔎🇺🇸Final Alignment: CSG 12 Appears almost Ready for Southcom Pivot
The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) remains visually unescorted in the Central Mediterranean (Nov 1). This could be a calculated tactical decision to facilitate the nearby replenishment of a key escort.
The MV Ocean Trader – a roll-on/roll-off cargo ship modified to carry special operators and their gear – has also appeared in several places around the Caribbean in recent weeks. Navy officials and U.S. Special Operations Command have declined to comment on this vessel. The ship, which TWZ first reported on back in 2016, has been something of a ghost since entering service, popping up in hot spots around the globe.
There is also an increasing buildup on the land. Reuters noted that the U.S. is continuing to make improvements at the former Roosevelt Roads Navy base for use by combat and cargo aircraft. Since August, the facility has been used as a central logistics hub, with frequent landings by airlifters and by aircraft from the 22nd MEU as well. The new additions include Mobile Aircraft Arresting Systems for stopping incoming fast jets. As we have reported in the past, Marine Corps F-35B stealth fighters are already operating from there and the MAAS can help support I fighters during emergencies. The incoming USS Gerald R. Ford’s air wing, for instance, could use the base as a divert location.
The military has also set up 20 tents at the installation.
📍José Aponte de la Torre Airport, #UnitedStates (🇺🇸)
Recent @Reuters photos from José Aponte de la Torre Airport viewing the ongoing C-17A Globemaster III logistics operations unloading cargo at the former Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Ceiba, Puerto Rico. pic.twitter.com/mgpPjJxwOu
Satellite images show construction of an ammunition storage facility at the airport at Rafael Hernandez Airport, the second-busiest civilian airport in Puerto Rico.
Reuters also found significant changes at Rafael Hernandez Airport. The US military has moved in communications gear and a mobile air traffic control tower. Satellite images show construction of an ammunition storage facility at the airport -Reuters pic.twitter.com/L3lRCwr3kU
Beyond Puerto Rico, the U.S. has set up a new radar system at an airport in St. Croix.
A AN/TPS-75, which acts as the primary land-based tactical air defense radar for the U.S. Air Force, seen deployed late last month at Henry E. Rohlsen Airport on the Island of St. Croix in the U.S. Virgin Islands, just to the southeast of Puerto Rico and roughly 450 miles to the… pic.twitter.com/eaC3vEybgU
Despite the buildup, the Trump administration’s goal remains unclear. In an interview on Sunday with CBS News’ 60 Minutes, President Donald Trump offered a mixed message about his plans for Venezuela.
Asked if the U.S. was going to war with the South American nation, Trump answered, “I doubt it. I don’t think so. But they’ve been treating us very badly, not only on drugs – they’ve dumped hundreds of thousands of people into our country that we didn’t want, people from prisons – they emptied their prisons into our country.”
Later in the interview, the president was asked if “Maduro’s days as president are numbered.”
“I would say ‘yeah. I think so, yeah,” Trump responded. The American leader, however, declined to offer any details about what that meant.
“I’m not gonna tell you what I’m gonna do with Venezuela, if I was gonna do it or if I wasn’t going to do it,” he explained when queried about whether he will order land attacks in Venezuela.
As for why the Ford carrier strike group is heading toward the Caribbean, Trump explained, “it’s gotta be somewhere. It’s a big one.”
Moscow “resolutely condemns the use of excessive military force” by the U.S. in the Caribbean,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said, adding that Russia fully supports the Venezuelan government in its efforts to safeguard national sovereignty and maintain the region as a “zone of peace.”
Amid the growing tensions, Russian aircraft have landed in Venezuela. potentially with military supplies, Defense News reported last week.
A russian Il-76 landed in Venezuela following Maduro’s appeal to the russian Federation for military assistance, – Defense News.
These aircraft were previously used to transport weapons, military equipment, and even russian mercenaries. pic.twitter.com/M6cC7Srwz8
Meanwhile, as Trump maintains a level of strategic ambiguity about his objectives toward Maduro, the U.S “has begun detailed planning for a new mission to send American troops and intelligence officers into Mexico to target drug cartels,” NBC News reported Monday morning. That possibility and how it could happen were subjects we examined in great detail back in February, which you can read about here.
While no deployments are imminent, training for such a mission is already underway, the network added.
“The U.S. troops, many of whom would be from Joint Special Operations Command, would operate under the authority of the U.S. intelligence community, known as Title 50 status,” NBC posited, citing two anonymous U.S. officials. ”They said officers from the CIA also would participate.”
These operations would have U.S. troops in Mexico “mainly use drone strikes to hit drug labs and cartel members and leaders,” the report continued. “Some of the drones that special forces would use require operators to be on the ground to use them effectively and safely, the officials said.”
As we have previously wrote, such an operation would be precedent-setting. While U.S. troops like Green Berets from the 7th Special Forces Group routinely work with Mexican forces, training them to hit cartels and serving as observers on raids, there has yet to be a known U.S. military kinetic action inside Mexico.
The most famous example of a covert strike using U.S. troops under Title 50 authority was the 2011 Navy SEAL attack on al-Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden, but what NBC is describing is a much more sustained operation with increased risks, a former White House official under the first Trump administration told us.
“This seems like more of a campaign,” Javed Ali, who worked in the National Security Council’s (NSC) counterterrorism unit during the first Trump administration, explained. “What the administration is trying to achieve under Title 50 is ostensibly to use military force, but covertly. But in this day of social media, it is harder to not have that revealed. They lose the element of surprise.”
Ali raised an additional concern. Would the cartels, who already have operatives in the United States, strike back if they were attacked in Mexico?
“The enemy gets a vote,” Ali suggested. “Would the cartels be so bold to actually conduct attacks inside the United States is an open question. If a cartel lab gets blown up or cartel leaders are killed in drone strikes, how would they respond? Inside the government, I would have to think they are looking at all those contingencies.”
Still, even with these risks, it seems clear the Trump is willing to go further than his predecessors in hopes of significantly reducing the flow of narcotics into the United States. Public support for such actions will likely be dictated by losses of American troops — if any — in the process, should such operations move forward. It’s also not clear where the Mexican government stands on this issue at this time.
It is unknown exactly what the Trump administration will do when it comes to countering cartels and taking on Maduro. However, while U.S. strikes against the Venezuelan cartels have been limited to attacks on alleged drug-smuggling boats, the possibility exists that America could soon find itself conducting kinetic strikes on two fronts in its own backyard.
Update: 5:03 PM Eastern –
The Navy provided us with some context about why the Fort Lauderdale was in Mayport.
“The USS Fort Lauderdale (LPD 28) returned to Naval Station Mayport from Oct. 24 to Nov. 2, 2025, for a mid-deployment voyage repair (MDVR) and maintenance period. NS Mayport’s facilities offered the most expedient option with the best infrastructure, maintenance, repair, and logistical support for the maintenance period.
A Mid-Deployment voyage repair (MDVR) is a period, roughly halfway through a ship’s deployment, where necessary and preventative maintenance and repairs are made. This MDVR allowed Fort Lauderdale to conduct vital maintenance to the ship with the support of in-port services.
In-port maintenance and logistical support enable the ship to correct and maintain materiel readiness, warfighter readiness, and sustainability.”
