matters

Russians head to the polls from Friday to Sunday to elect members of the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, in the first parliamentary election to be held since the country launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The vote comes as Russians face a slowing economy as well as Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries and warehouses far from the front line.

United Russia, the governing party that backs President Vladimir Putin, is expected to keep its dominant position.

The authorities are presenting the election as a chance for voters to have their say. Critics argue that with no genuine opposition on the ballot, the result is largely settled in advance.

So why are the elections worth watching? Here is what you need to know:

How do Russia’s elections work?

Starting Friday and lasting through Sunday, Russians will elect members of the lower house, the State Duma.

They will also cast ballots in local elections.

Voters in 11 regions will elect their governors, and 39 regions will elect members of regional legislatures.

Voting is spread over three days to boost turnout among the 111 million eligible voters and includes areas Russia occupies in Ukraine. Electronic voting is allowed.

Half of the Duma’s 450 seats are filled by party lists and the other half are contested in single-ballot races.

What is United Russia?

Russia’s governing party, formed in 2001 from a merger of pro-Kremlin parties, has backed Putin and dominated the parliament ever since.

United Russia won more than two-thirds of the Duma’s seats in the 2021 election. It is again poised to dominate the body.

The party’s list is led by political heavyweights: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s top diplomat for 22 years, and Sergei Sobyanin, Moscow’s powerful mayor.

In an apparent bid to add fresh faces to what is widely seen as a party of bureaucrats, its third-highest-ranking official is war correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny, who was badly wounded by a Ukrainian drone.

Members of United Russia have pledged to back the war effort and Putin’s maximalist goals in what the Kremlin calls the “special military operation” in Ukraine.

Who else is running in Russia’s elections?

Alongside United Russia, other “systemic opposition” parties that vote in sync with the government on key issues are also expected to remain.

The liberal Yabloko Party, the only registered political party that opposes the war, was initially on the ballot, but the Supreme Court ordered it removed in August.

It cited, among other reasons, that the antiwar stance was akin to seeking the violation of Russia’s territorial integrity. Yabloko now runs only single-ballot races.

The Communist Party has been a leading force in the Federal Assembly since the 1990s, led for more than three decades by 82-year-old Gennady Zyuganov, a former Soviet official.

Throughout Putin’s rule of more than a quarter-century, the Communists have criticised some aspects of government policy but carefully avoided any criticism of him. They steadfastly support the war in Ukraine.

Alexander Bratersky, a political analyst and independent journalist, told Al Jazeera that the race for second place is worth watching.

If the Communist Party nab second, it would “suggest voters are angry about economic hardship and falling living standards”.

The Liberal Democratic Party, an ultranationalist force that has been a significant presence in the legislature since the early 1990s, will also likely retain some influence in the Duma.

Like the Communists, it staunchly supports the war and boasts of having multiple veterans as members.

Other smaller parties round out the ballot.

The party known as A Just Russia has been on Russia’s political scene for 20 years. A social-democratic party, it competes with the Communists for older and middle-aged voters nostalgic for the Soviet past, and it supports the war in Ukraine.

The New People Party was founded shortly before the last parliamentary election in 2021, seeking to position itself as a liberal voice representing younger voters and technocrats. It won just more than 5 percent of the vote, allowing it to form a small faction.

Bratersky described the party as “a liberal-leaning party backed by some Kremlin people who are more technocratic and more pro-peace”.

He said it appeals to the “middle-class audience”, and after the Kremlin banned Yabloko, it has been viewed as its substitute.

“So, if they come third with a good number of votes, this is a sign that those who are antiwar used them as their legal avatar,” he said.

Other parties seeking seats include Communists of Russia, a small rival of the main Communist Party; the Party of Pensioners; the Green Party; the Party of Direct Democracy; and the Motherland Party.

Why do the elections matter to the Kremlin?

While these elections may seem routine, the fact that they are the first since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is what makes them important, Bratersky told Al Jazeera.

He said that Putin has linked the elections to support for the war: Endorsing United Russia at its party congress in August, Putin said the party’s duty was “to do everything for victory” in the war in Ukraine.

“This shows that the Kremlin is a bit worried since the elections are the only legal way to show disrespect for the Kremlin,” Bratersky said. “Even Putin’s core fans hate United Russia as a corrupt force.”

How have past elections gone?

Since Putin first came to power in 2000, United Russia has won every Duma election, usually by a wide margin.

The results have repeatedly been disputed.

In 2011, allegations of vote-rigging set off the largest street protests of Putin’s rule.

After the 2021 vote, independent monitors and statisticians said the party’s real support was far lower than the official count.

The authorities have rejected claims of widespread fraud. Opposition parties and critics of the war have increasingly been kept off the ballot.

The United States Supreme Court has rejected Donald Trump’s bid to restrict voting by mail ahead of the November midterm elections, in a setback to the US president’s efforts to change rules governing elections.

The ruling on Monday by the conservative supermajority court allows states to continue sending out mail ballots as they have done for years, dealing a blow to Trump’s plans to stop the ballots before the elections and halting possible last-minute legal actions as voting begins in some states.

Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on the security of mail-in voting, citing debunked claims of widespread election fraud associated with it. That is despite the president voting by mail himself, including during the 2024 election.

Mail ballots, in place for decades, have been found to increase voter turnout and currently account for a third of all votes cast in the US.

Here’s what we know about the legal challenge to overturn them:

What are mail-in votes?

Voting by post works by sending ballots to the homes of registered voters, who then mail them back before a deadline.

Eight states, several of them Democratic-leaning – California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and Washington – as well as the District of Columbia, allow all elections to be conducted entirely by mail.

Others only allow smaller elections to be conducted by mail.

Although there are cases of forgery or repeat voting, they are rare and amount to just four in 10 million mailed votes, according to the Brookings Institution.

What has Trump said about the mail-in votes?

Trump falsely blamed his 2020 presidential election loss on mail-in voting fraud. He and his supporters also opposed changes made during the COVID pandemic to expand mail-in voting.

During the 2020 Republican National Convention, Trump called mail-in voting changes “the greatest scam in the history of politics”.

His attempt to push the SAVE America Act, which calls for sweeping voting laws, has stalled in the US Senate. The bill, passed in the House of Representatives in February, faces opposition over concerns that millions of voters will be disenfranchised.

How did Trump target mail-in votes?

In March 2026, Trump signed an executive order directing the US Postal Service to take control of mail voting by designing new envelopes with special barcodes that would allow the federal government to ensure ballots are only from eligible voters.

For the midterms, that move would force all states to adopt a uniform envelope style in a short time.

The order also required states to provide the US Postal Service with a list of eligible voters ahead of elections. Several government departments, including Homeland Security and US Citizenship and Immigration Services, would also have the voters’ lists.

The postal agency was additionally empowered to deny mailed ballots if they did not comply with new standards or were not associated with registered voters on the states’ lists.

What happened to the order?

Democrats and activists challenged the order in several courts, resulting in a series of back-and-forth rulings between May and August.

US District Judge Indira Talwani imposed an injunction against the rule in June on the basis that it likely violated the US Constitution. Talwani also noted in her injunction that Trump’s executive order would be impossible to apply when the midterms were already so close.

But her ruling was overturned by the conservative-majority Supreme Court in late August in a temporary judgement.

The Supreme Court had not decided at the time whether Trump’s move was constitutionally legal. Rather, it only sided with the Trump administration on procedural grounds after the administration argued that Democrats sued too soon.

What does the latest judgement mean?

In the latest and final decision, the Supreme Court refused to lift Judge Talwani’s injunction.

In a brief written order that did not go into detail, the court noted that the administration was likely to fail in its push to restrict mail-in votes ahead of the midterms.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who was appointed by Trump, voted with the majority against the administration, though he indicated he could support the policy at a later stage. Two judges, Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Critics have long warned that restricting mail-in ballots could disenfranchise some voters who typically rely on this method.

It could also disrupt the delivery of mailed votes, as some states, including Alabama, North Carolina and Wisconsin, have begun sending in midterm ballots.

Spain’s Congress has approved a bill that would open a special route to Spanish citizenship for Sahrawis born in Western Sahara while the disputed territory was under Spanish occupation.

The bill passed by 168 votes to 31, with 145 abstentions. It must still go through the Senate before it can become law.

So what exactly would the measure do, and why is Morocco watching it closely?

What does the bill do?

The proposed law would allow people born in Western Sahara before September 29, 1977, to apply for Spanish nationality through a special procedure without having to meet the normal residency requirements. First-degree descendants would also be covered.

It would also shorten the duration of the residence requirement for eligible Sahrawis legally living in Spain. Instead of the usual 10 years, they would be able to apply after two years.

Supporters describe the measure as a way of addressing what they see as a historical injustice.

Spain was the colonial power in Western Sahara until it ended its administration of the territory in 1976. The territory has remained disputed ever since, with Morocco considering it part of its sovereignty, while the separatist Polisario Front seeks independence.

Why does Morocco care?

The law would not change the territorial status of Western Sahara. It would not recognise an independent Sahrawi state, nor would Spanish citizenship give its holders sovereignty over the territory.

The concern in Rabat is instead about the relationship the law could create between Spain and people with direct links to Western Sahara.

Reuters has reported that between 70,000 and 110,000 people could eventually qualify, although estimates vary. Anyone who obtains Spanish nationality would also become a European Union citizen and acquire the rights that come with that status.

Potential beneficiaries could include eligible Sahrawis living in Western Sahara as well as members of the Sahrawi refugee population around Tindouf in Algeria, where the Polisario Front is based.

For Morocco, that could mean a larger community of Spanish and EU citizens with personal or family ties to an issue at the centre of its relationship with Madrid.

Why is the timing important?

The bill comes after a significant change in Spain’s policy towards Western Sahara.

In 2022, Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s government backed Morocco’s autonomy proposal for the territory, describing it as the most serious, realistic and credible basis for resolving the dispute.

That decision helped repair relations between Madrid and Rabat after a major diplomatic crisis. Since then, the two countries have strengthened cooperation on migration, security, trade and other areas.

The new citizenship measure does not formally change Spain’s support for the autonomy proposal. Madrid can argue that supporting autonomy as a political solution is one matter, while dealing with the consequences of its former colonial rule is another.

But the two issues are difficult to separate completely from Morocco’s perspective because both concern Western Sahara.

What is the debate inside Spain?

The bill has also divided Spain’s political parties.

The governing Socialist Party and its allies in Sumar supported it. The conservative People’s Party abstained, while Vox voted against it.

The disagreement has centred partly on how Spain should address the legacy of its former rule in Western Sahara and on the legal route proposed for granting nationality.

The debate is important to the Moroccan side because it shows that the measure is not simply a technical change to Spanish nationality law. It has also become part of a discussion inside Spain about its colonial past and its relationship with Western Sahara.

Moroccan and international media have also focused on the measure. While Moroccan media have highlighted its potential implications for Spain’s policy towards Western Sahara and its relations with Rabat, Reuters has reported that the move could further strain relations between Spain and Morocco.

Does the bill recognise the Polisario?

No. The proposed nationality route does not recognise the Polisario Front or an independent Sahrawi state.

Nor does acquiring Spanish citizenship indicate support for the Polisario. Nationality is a legal status, and Sahrawis hold different political positions.

The connection to the Polisario is nevertheless relevant because many Sahrawi refugees live around Tindouf, where the Polisario has its headquarters and administers the refugee camps.

If eligible people from those communities acquire Spanish nationality, they would become Spanish and EU citizens while retaining their existing personal and political identities.

Why is Spain referring to its colonial past?

Spain was the colonial power in Western Sahara until it ended its administration of the territory in 1976.

Supporters of the bill argue that people born in the territory during Spanish rule were left in a difficult legal position after Spain withdrew. They therefore present the measure as a way of addressing what they consider a historical wrong.

Spain has used historical ties in nationality policy before.

In 2015, it introduced a procedure allowing Sephardic Jews who could establish their Sephardic origin and a special connection with Spain to apply for Spanish nationality. The measure was linked to the expulsion of Jews from Spain beginning in 1492.

That precedent is relevant to the Moroccan debate because Spain has previously used historical ties to establish a special route to nationality.

And what about Ceuta and Melilla?

This is where the issue becomes particularly sensitive for Morocco.

Morocco considers Ceuta and Melilla an integral part of its territory and sovereignty. The two cities are located on Morocco’s northern coast in North Africa and are under Spanish administration.

Spain rejects Morocco’s claim and considers the cities Spanish territory. Successive Spanish governments have maintained that their sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla is not negotiable.

The Moroccan argument here could be about how historical ties are treated.

If Spain can draw on its historical and colonial relationship with Western Sahara to create a special nationality route for Sahrawis, and has previously used historical ties with Sephardic Jews, whose connection to Spain dates back more than five centuries, Morocco could ask why its own historical and geographical relationship with Ceuta and Melilla should be considered irrelevant when it makes its claim to sovereignty over the two cities.

For eight centuries, Muslim dynasties, including the Almoravids and Almohads, ruled parts of the Iberian Peninsula.

Morocco’s potential argument is therefore narrower: if historical ties can help establish present-day legal rights, then history and geography can also form part of the case it makes about two cities located on the North African coast.

What would the law change for Morocco?

In territorial terms, very little.

The citizenship measure would not change who controls Western Sahara, determine the territory’s final status or alter the United Nations-led political process. Nor does it, in itself, change Spain’s official position in support of Morocco’s autonomy proposal.

Its significance lies mainly in the relationship between Spain and Morocco. The measure brings Spain’s colonial history in Western Sahara into a broader domestic political debate, raising questions about how that history should be addressed and what its growing political significance could mean for the delicate relationship between Madrid and Rabat.

DUBAI: Renewed fighting along Yemen’s Red Sea coast has put the strategic Bab Al-Mandab Strait back in focus, raising concerns over a key maritime route linking Europe and Asia.

The strait is a narrow passage between Yemen and the Horn of Africa that connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean.

For ships travelling between Asia and Europe, it forms part of the route linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, making it one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

Why is it so important?

Bab Al-Mandab is the southern gateway to the Red Sea. Ships travelling through the Suez Canal between Europe and Asia generally pass through the Red Sea and then Bab Al-Mandab before entering the Gulf of Aden.

The route has ships carrying oil, fuel and other commercial goods.

Oil flows through the strait fell sharply after Houthi attacks on shipping began disrupting Red Sea traffic.

The US Energy Information Administration said oil trade through Bab Al-Mandab averaged about 4 million barrels per day in the first eight months of 2024, compared with 8.7 million barrels per day in 2023.

Why does the latest fighting matter?

Yemen’s western coastline runs alongside the strait, making control of nearby territory strategically important.

The port city of Mokha lies north of Bab Al-Mandab, while Dhubab is close to its entrance. Any expansion of Houthi control along this stretch of coast could increase the group’s ability to threaten or monitor shipping through the waterway.

Reuters reported on Thursday that Houthi forces were moving toward Mokha and Dhubab as they sought greater control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Yemeni government military sources said this could give the Houthis significant leverage over Bab Al-Mandab.

The reports have not been independently verified, and they do not mean the Houthis control the strait. But any further Houthi advance toward the coast could increase the risk to commercial shipping.

The Houthis have previously targeted commercial vessels in and around the Red Sea, forcing many ships to avoid the route.

What happens if shipping is disrupted?

Ships can avoid Bab Al-Mandab and the Red Sea by sailing around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa.

But that can add thousands of kilometers to some journeys, increasing sailing times, fuel consumption, insurance costs and freight rates.

The consequences can therefore extend well beyond Yemen, affecting the movement and cost of energy, manufactured goods and other products travelling between Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

Sanaa, Yemen – The United Nations-recognised Yemeni government and the Houthi group have been using warplanes, missiles, drones and other weapons as they engage in intense fighting on multiple fronts in the country’s north, west and central regions.

At least 194 people have been killed and 880 others wounded in the past two weeks of fighting in parts of Taiz, the western coast, al-Jawf, Marib and Dhalea, according to aid agencies.

Iran-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), have intensified attacks on the coastal district of al-Makha (Mocha) located on the western coast, among others, to gain a foothold in the Red Sea – a vital shipping lane.

On the other hand, government forces have been battling to expand in Taiz and boost their control of Marib, an oil-producing region in the north.

Fighting has also been raging in the al-Jawf governorate bordering Saudi Arabia and Dhalea, which connects the Houthi-controlled north to the country’s south under the internationally recognised government.

Experts say gains or losses on any of these strategically important fronts could have significant consequences for either side.

Taiz and western coast fronts

“The hills and mountainous areas of Taiz and the western coast are key targets for the Houthis, who have repeatedly attempted to advance there,” Yazeed al-Jeddawy, the research manager at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, said.

“The Houthis are trying to seize commanding terrains, cut supply routes between the coastal Mocha district and Taiz, and prevent government troops on the western coast from linking up with the Taiz Military Axis,” said al-Jeddawy.

In Taiz and along the western coast, al-Jeddawy says, the immediate contest is over the heights and roads connecting Taiz to al-Makha.

Situated roughly 60km (37 miles) from the Bab al-Mandeb strait, al-Makha enjoys a highly strategic position on the Red Sea. For a month now, the Houthis have launched missile and drone attacks on the city, causing massive damage to its port facilities and killing and injuring several civilians.

Recently, the group has also attempted to extend its ground operations towards al-Makha city.

“The Houthis seem intent on tightening their hold around [al-Makha] and moving closer to the Dhubab–Bab al-Mandeb area. A substantial advance would strengthen their position near the southern entrance to the Red Sea and give them greater leverage over international shipping,” he added.

Fuad Mussed, a Yemeni political analyst and author, told Al Jazeera that the strategic importance of the western coast and Taiz fronts stems from their proximity to Bab al-Mandeb, a chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

“The Houthis seek to move closer to this vital waterway to threaten maritime traffic. Such a move aims to keep the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb under the influence of Iran and use them as leverage against regional and international powers. This is a strategy Tehran has been pursuing for years,” Mussed said.

Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a global oil chokepoint, to use it as leverage in the war against the United States. It has also warned that its allies could shut shipping via Bab al-Mandeb. Iran also attacked Saudi Arabia’s pipeline used to export oil from the Red Sea.

In July, the Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi vessels transiting through the Red Sea – an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.

Marib and al-Jawf fronts

Over the past few weeks, pro-government forces have attacked Houthi-held territories in Marib and al-Jawf, facing further retaliation from the Houthis.

Saddam al-Huraibi, a Yemeni political commentator, said the Marib front is fateful for both sides.

“Marib is a government stronghold in north Yemen. So, a Houthi expansion in Marib would threaten government presence and weaken its leverage in the north. That is why pro-government troops are ready to fight tooth and nail on this front line,” al-Huraibi told Al Jazeera.

For the Houthis, the takeover of Marib will deepen the group’s authority and step towards controlling the oil and gas infrastructure. The Iran-backed group captured vast swaths of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, but Marib has remained in government hands since.

“Dominating Marib’s oil and gas resources has been a Houthi goal for over a decade. Without facing a crushing defeat in Marib, they would keep fighting to achieve that goal,” al-Huraibi said.

Adjacent to Marib, al-Jawf is also a hub of tense fighting between the Houthis and government forces. A government gain there would lay the groundwork for further advances, while a strong Houthi defence could undermine government forces’ morale and prompt them to retreat.

“Government-aligned forces have lately focused much of their offensive effort on al-Jawf. Government gains in al-Jawf would ease the threat to Marib while requiring the Houthis to defend a much broader area,” al-Huraibi said.

Al-Jeddawy said government gains could open routes towards the north – Saada, Amran or Houthi positions north of Marib.

The Houthis have carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia, including energy facilities in the country’s south. They have also accused Saudi Arabia of launching multiple attacks in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces in support of government forces.

The Dhalea front

Fighting on the Dhalea front, a strategic gateway between Houthi-held territory and the southern governorates, has intensified in recent weeks.

Fighting there did not fully stop during the relative calm, which began in April 2022 following the UN-brokered ceasefire.

A Houthi advance there could open a route for their fighters to reach other southern territories. On the other hand, a Houthi setback would encourage government forces to push towards Ibb, controlled by the group.

“[Houthi] advances in Dhalea could expose the southern hinterland, while [government advances] could threaten Houthi positions and supply routes towards Ibb, al-Bayda and, farther north, Sanaa,” al-Jeddawy noted.

With the escalating fighting, the Houthis face pressure on several fronts, but the group has been readying for a range of scenarios, Khaled Ghorab, a pro-Houthi general, said.

“The [Houthi] Yemeni armed forces were never caught off guard by the prospect of escalation; rather, they worked to build and develop their own military capabilities based on tactical combat plans designed to counter a comprehensive, sustained attack launched simultaneously from land, sea and air,” he said.

Ghorab noted that this state of readiness enables the Houthi forces to carry out a direct response to sources of the threat – whether deep within enemy territory or at sea – targeting military bases or aircraft carriers as far as the Horn of Africa.

While the warring parties compete to seize strategic positions on several front lines, the latest escalation is also closely related to the wider regional confrontation.

“Iran has an interest in keeping Yemen and the Red Sea active as sources of leverage, while parts of the government camp believe the Houthis are under growing strain and that this is an opportunity to weaken them,” al-Jeddawy, the Sanaa-based researcher, said.

“The escalation still reflects domestic military and political aims, but its timing and direction cannot be separated from the regional war,” he told Al Jazeera.