Rear Admiral Abdullah bin Salem Al-Shehri will lead the multinational coalition’s naval defence to protect trade, energy routes.
Published On 6 Aug 20266 Aug 2026
Saudi Arabia has announced the appointment of a commander for a multinational maritime defence alliance to protect freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
The Saudi Ministry of Defence said in a statement on Thursday that Rear Admiral Abdullah bin Salem Al-Shehri has been appointed commander of the coalition a week after its establishment.
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Al-Shehri will oversee joint naval defence, coordinate with member states and other maritime coalitions, and carry out missions under the coalition’s charter, it added on X.
Bahrain, Bangladesh, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkiye and Yemen announced the formation of the coalition on July 30.
More countries are completing the procedures to join the coalition with some having already signed the joint declaration and others preparing to sign the declaration and charter before their formal accession as founding members, the Saudi statement said.
The ministry described the coalition as “an open international coalition that welcomes the accession of all countries that align with its goals and principles”, adding that it continues to receive new membership applications.
The coalition will hold a planning meeting August 12-13 to finalise its institutional framework and pave the way for more countries to join, according to the ministry.
The 14 countries that announced the formation of the Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition declared their intent to protect freedom of navigation and secure international trade routes and energy supply routes in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which form a strategic maritime corridor linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean.
This comes as the United States-Israel war on Iran has become focused on the Strait of Hormuz. The virtual closure of the route, through which about 20 percent of global oil and gas supplies transited before the conflict, is weighing heavily on the global economy.
“We have witnessed a significant increase in requests from commercial vessels seeking Aspides’ support for their safe transit through the High Threat Area (South Red Sea/Strait of Bab-al-Mandeb [BAM]/Gulf of Aden),” Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis, Commander of EUNAVFOR Aspides, told TWZ in an email. “In particular, the number of protection requests increased by 39% from February 2026 (the start of the US-Israel-Iran confrontation) until now.”
The Hellenic Frigate HS Psara, operating under EUNAVFOR Aspides, provided support to a merchant vessel (MV) crossing the Red Sea. (Aspides)
“The increasing number of protection requests clearly demonstrates that, in times of insecurity, the shipping industry views Aspides as a credible and reliable maritime security provider,” Gryparis added. “We are working daily to maintain and strengthen bonds with the shipping industry, as mutual understanding and effective collaboration are essential to maritime security and the preservation of Freedom of Navigation.”
As we were one of the first to report, Aspides was launched in February 2024 during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September. It was created to provide “a shield…to act in purely defensive mode to protect merchant vessels, and two non-executive tasks of ‘accompanying’ to deter with [its] presence and to strengthen maritime situational awareness,” a now former top EU official told reporters at the time.
Since its founding, the task force “has facilitated the safe passage of more than 2,240 merchant vessels and has provided close protection to more than 690 merchant vessels of different flags and interests,” the Aspides commander explained.
Merchant vessels transiting the Red Sea escorted by the Italian Frigate Bergamini. (Aspides)
Aspides did not provide assistance to vessels recently attacked by the Houthis because the task force was not asked, Gryparis told us.
“Those vessels were sailing within the territorial waters under the responsibility of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (KSA MRCC),” he stated. “Consequently, assistance was provided by the Saudi Arabian authorities. The vessels in question had not registered their transit with the Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean (MSCIO) and had not requested protection from EUNAVFOR Aspides.”
In addition to the blockade and strikes on Saudi assets, the Houthis are reportedly considering imposing a toll on Bab al-Mandeb Strait transits. Gryparis told us that such a move, which has yet to be enacted, would not alter Aspides’ goals.
“Such a development would not change the mandate or the mission of Operation Aspides,” the admiral proffered. “Our mission remains clear: to contribute to Freedom of Navigation, protect the lives of seafarers, support the secure flow of global trade by protecting merchant shipping, improve Maritime Situational Awareness, and contribute to regional stability.”
“Of course, any measure that could affect the free passage of commercial shipping has the potential to impact Freedom of Navigation and the confidence of the shipping industry,” he added. “How states or private shipping companies decide to address such a development would be a political and commercial decision for them.”
“From our perspective, we will continue to implement our mandate within our means and capabilities, continuously assess the maritime security environment, provide protection to eligible merchant vessels in accordance with our mandate, and support the shipping industry through Maritime Situational Awareness and the timely dissemination of information and recommendations via the Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean (MSCIO),” Gryparis noted.
Today, the operation has reached 29 months since its launch.
EUNAVFOR ASPIDES has a totally defensive mandate, contributes to regional stability and prosperity by providing safety to fellow seafarers and protecting global common goods.@eu_eeaspic.twitter.com/gsb4CcEJZS
In a fiery speech, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi warned Saudi Arabia of an all-out escalation. He described his group’s actions as being in response to a Saudi “siege” on the Houthis in Yemen.
“The indicators show that the Saudi [side] is heading toward comprehensive escalation,” al-Houthi proclaimed. “We will seek God’s help against it — we will meet his comprehensive escalation with comprehensive escalation.”
“In this phase, regarding what the Saudi [side] has done, the outcome has been good since establishing the equation of (siege for siege) — in targeting Saudi oil tankers, in preventing their movement, turning back 16 ships, and also in shooting down the Saudi [-operated] aircraft that come to conduct reconnaissance and penetrate our airspace — armed drones,” the Houthi leader continued.
Leader of Yemen’s Ansarallah Abdul-Malik al-Houthi:
“Indicators show that the Saudis are heading toward full-scale escalation … We will meet Saudi’s full escalation with full escalation … The oppressor will learn [that] America won’t save him. Britain won’t save him. Israel,… pic.twitter.com/KKEeuEM489
“Recognizing the growing challenges facing global maritime security, and the resulting need to strengthen collective naval defense cooperation to protect freedom of navigation and international trade routes, and to secure global energy supply routes through the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden,” the Saudi Defense Ministry announced on Thursday. “The founding states affirm that the establishment of the Multinational Naval Defense Coalition represents a strategic step toward strengthening maritime security in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, consolidating defense cooperation among the member states, and supporting stability and prosperity — in a manner that contributes to complementing international efforts to protect international peace and security, in accordance with the provisions of international law.”
About 50 nations were asked to join and 14 so far have signed up. It is unclear at the moment how this will differ from Aspides.
وشهد الاجتماع مشاركة رؤساء الأركان وممثليهم من 43 دولة إلى جانب مندوبية الاتحاد الأوروبي لدى المملكة، من أصل 51 دولة ومنظمة مدعوة، بما يعكس الاهتمام الدولي بتعزيز التعاون الدفاعي البحري وتوحيد الجهود لحماية أمن الممرات البحرية. pic.twitter.com/la8vuyh7DF
Meanwhile, Iran claims it has completely shut down the Strait of Hormuz to vessels in the wake of recent U.S. attacks.
“Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) says that passage through the Strait of Hormuz is currently impossible because of the continued ‘aggressive actions’ of US military forces in the region, adding that applications for transit would only be processed once stability returns,” the official Iranian Press TV media outlet claimed. Iran, however, frequently makes statements that are outright fabrications or extremely exaggerated. TWZ cannot independently verify this claim.
Traffic through that strategic chokepoint had already been significantly reduced by Iran since the launch of Epic Fury.
In a post on X, U.S. Central Command pushed back on that claim, saying the Strait remains open to shipping.
“CLAIM: Once again, the Iranian government claims it has closed the Strait of Hormuz. This is FALSE,” the command stated. “FACT: The Strait of Hormuz remains open for commercial vessel transit. Iran does not control it. Thousands of ships have sailed through the international waterway over the past four months.”
🚫 CLAIM: Once again, the Iranian government claims it has closed the Strait of Hormuz. This is FALSE.
✅ FACT: The Strait of Hormuz remains open for commercial vessel transit. Iran does not control it. Thousands of ships have sailed through the international waterway over the… pic.twitter.com/sdDJ08MLHo
Regardless of the dueling claims, traffic through the Strait has slowed to a trickle, according to the Kpler global trade intelligence firm.
“The latest maritime risk data points to growing divergence across the region’s two strategic chokepoints,” Kpler stated on X. “Strait of Hormuz crossings fell 77% day on day to just five vessels, with all transits concentrated through the Iranian Unilateral Scheme, suggesting reduced operational confidence and limited routing flexibility. At the same time, Bab el Mandeb remained active, recording 47 crossings despite ongoing sanctioned vessel movements, shadow fleet activity and a dark transit. With US and Iranian public positions still at odds, operators are closely monitoring traffic volumes, routing behaviour and any diplomatic developments that could reshape risk across regional shipping lanes in the days ahead.”
Hormuz traffic drops sharply
The latest maritime risk data points to growing divergence across the region’s two strategic chokepoints. Strait of Hormuz crossings fell 77% day on day to just five vessels, with all transits concentrated through the Iranian Unilateral Scheme,… pic.twitter.com/TQVeCmfOFN
Adding to concerns about energy exports, Egyptian officials yesterday confirmed that the port facility of Damietta was hit by a drone strike on Wednesday, the first public acknowledgment that the country has come under fire during this conflict. Cairo did not say who launched the attack, but Trump hinted it was the Iranians. The New York Times reported that two Iranians, who asked not to be named to discuss security matters, “said the explosion was a drone attack designed to show that global shipping and energy supplies could be more deeply disrupted if Iran chose to escalate. The individuals did not say whether Iran or an Iran-allied militia in the region had launched the attack, or from where.”
#NEW A drone struck a U.S.-owned gas storage tanker at Egypt’s Damietta Port.
It is not yet known if the drone was Iranian, although Trump indicated that it was, and that the U.S. will carry out retaliatory strikes against Iran soon.
While tensions on the waters are heating up, the pace of kinetic strikes on land targets seems to be slowing.
Kuwait reported its air defenses shot down several drones earlier on Friday.
“The sinful Iranian aggression targeted a number of vital and military facilities, where the hostile targets were dealt with and destroyed, resulting in material damage due to the fall of shrapnel, with no human casualties recorded, praise be to God,” the Kuwaiti Defense Ministry reported on X. “The armed forces affirm their continued execution of their missions and duties with high efficiency, within the framework of ongoing readiness and permanent preparedness, and taking all necessary measures to protect the sovereignty of the homeland, preserve its security and stability, in coordination with the competent authorities, in a manner that preserves the safety of citizens and residents.”
بيان رقم (81)
صرّح المتحدث الرسمي لوزارة الدفاع، العقيد الركن سعود عبدالعزيز العطوان،
بأن القوات المسلحة رصدت، منذ فجر اليوم، طائرات مسيّرة معادية داخل المجال الجوي الكويتي، وقد تم التعامل معها وتدميرها.
— KUWAIT ARMY – الجيش الكويتي (@KuwaitArmyGHQ) July 31, 2026
Tit-for-tat attacks between the U.S. and Iran have also slowed, with the last American strikes launched on July 29. However, during a cabinet meeting at Camp David, U.S. President Donald Trump indicated that more offensive action could be in the offing.
“We just want to win,” he stated. “We’ll be hitting them very hard. At some point, they will say we can’t take it anymore.”
Trump on Iran: We just want to win. We’ll be hitting them very hard. At some point, they will say we can’t take it anymore. pic.twitter.com/ahwAN1K4pC
That’s it for now. We’ll update this when there is more information to share.
UPDATE: 8:06 PM EDT –
The Houthis’ Sanaa-based Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) sent us a statement pushing back on claims that the Yemeni rebel group is seeking tolls on the BAM.
“The Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) has recently become aware of the circulation of a number of reports and claims across certain news websites and media platforms alleging that the Republic of Yemen [Houthis] intends to impose tolls for transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
The HOCC categorically denies the accuracy of these claims and confirms that it has neither taken nor considered any decision to impose fees for transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The HOCC further emphasizes that transit throughthe Bab al-Mandab Strait is free of charge.
Furthermore, the services provided by the HOCC — including the Safe Transit Service for vessels — are, as is well known, entirely free of charge. The Safe Transit Service is a voluntary and cost-free service offered by the HOCC to vessels/companies (falling outside the scope of the declared ban) that wish to confirm the safe transit of their vessels through the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea. All vessels outside the scope of the declared ban may transit safely. Additionally, for added assurance, such vessels may submit a Safe Transit Request by email to the following address: clearances@hocc.gov.ye at any time, and a response will be provided within a few hours.
Accordingly, the HOCC categorically confirms that any individual or entity requesting the payment of money in exchange for transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait does not represent the Republic of Yemen or HOCC in any capacity whatsoever. The HOCC urges shipping companies not to make any payments or provide any information to unauthorized individuals or entities.
The HOCC warns against any unauthorized use of its name or logo, or any false claim of representation, for the purpose of collecting fees or other payments in connection with transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait. It further calls upon anyone who is asked to pay such fees to refrain from making any payment, document the incident whenever it is safe and practicable to do so, and report the matter via the email address: compliance@hocc.go.ye, attaching all available details and supporting evidence that may assist in verifying the incident and taking the necessary action.
The HOCC calls upon all media outlets and news websites to adhere to professional standards, exercise due diligence and accuracy when reporting news and information, and refrain from publishing or circulating any information concerning transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait before verifying it through the HOCC’s official channels.“
Taipei, Taiwan – China’s coastguard and civilian fleet are expanding their presence in the waters east of Taiwan, raising fears that Beijing may be rehearsing a containment strategy that would cut off the self-ruled island from outside trade and assistance.
Through June and July, China’s Maritime Safety Administration and coastguard staged multiple patrols and “special maritime law enforcement operations”, according to official government announcements.
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While China regularly patrols the Taiwan Strait – the waterway with an average width of about 180km (112 miles) separating coastal China from the main island of Taiwan – this marks the first time the patrols have moved east of Taiwan in such quick succession, according to analysts.
K Tristan Tang, a nonresident fellow at the United States-based National Bureau of Asian Research, said the shift carries both strategic and symbolic weight for Taiwan.
“Beijing is signalling that it wants to extend its claimed administrative jurisdiction to Taiwan’s eastern waters, effectively surrounding Taiwan rather than only eroding Taiwan’s space in the strait,” Tang told Al Jazeera.
“Law enforcement operations” have included patrolling the area and requesting information from commercial vessels about their origin and destination, according to Taipei.
The shift east has also occurred amid a greater uptick in Chinese maritime activity around Taiwan and its outlying islands. Taiwan reported 55 sightings of Chinese coastguard and research vessel activity in June, up from 30 sightings in May.
These sightings included Chinese activity near the uninhabited Taiwan-controlled Dongsha Islands, also known as the Pratas Islands, in the South China Sea.
Beijing has said the operations are a response to talks between Japan and the Philippines to set their maritime boundaries, which infringe on “territorial sovereignty as well as its maritime rights and interests”, according to Chinese state media.
Some of the waters around southern Japan and the northern Philippines overlap with Taiwan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles (370km) from its coastline.
On July 4, China’s coastguard announced that law enforcement activities to the east of Taiwan would continue to “firmly safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests”.
China claims Taiwan as a province – which means it also views Taiwan’s EEZ as under its jurisdiction. It also claims large swaths of the nearby South China Sea and East China Sea, some of which are disputed by Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has previously told reporters that its activities near Taiwan are “legitimate actions to exercise China’s jurisdiction, safeguard regional stability and uphold order at sea in accordance with the law”.
The Chinese embassy in Washington, DC did not immediately respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment.
‘Grey zone’ tactics
Ray Powell, founder and director of Sea Light, a maritime transparency project based at Stanford University, said he views the uptick in patrols as part of China’s “boa constrictor strategy that intends to squeeze Taiwan one coil at a time”.
China has pledged to annex Taiwan by peace or by force, and it employs a variety of pressure tactics, from cutting off access to international spaces such as the World Health Organization, drone and fighter jet incursions, to alleged cyberattacks, according to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau.
Known as “grey zone” tactics, these manoeuvres are designed to strain Taiwan’s limited resources and damage morale in order to convince its 23 million people that annexation is inevitable, according to Taiwanese officials.
Security analysts like Powell have warned that “law enforcement” activities could quickly escalate into a blockade or quarantine. Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to this type of pressure as an island that imports nearly all its energy supplies.
“One day we could look back at this and say this was in some ways the start of the quarantine,” he told Al Jazeera.
“Today it’s radio challenges; what is the next stage after that? When do we start to see them stop and inspect ships or reroute them? It’s not a very big step to start squeezing Taiwan on things it needs, like LNG,” Powell said.
China has already signalled that a blockade could be on the table in the future. Since 2022, Beijing has regularly staged large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, including a simulated blockade of the island during its last round of exercises in December.
While coastguard activity is more low-profile than a naval patrol, Chauluen Lin, an expert in asymmetric warfare at Taipei’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told Al Jazeera the fleet could be considered a “second navy”.
China’s coastguard is not a civilian police force, as it falls under the jurisdiction of the Central Military Commission as a division of the People’s Armed Police.
An aerial view of the outlying Atoll National Park of the Dongsha Islands, also known as the Pratas Islands, 236km (147 miles) southwest of the southern Taiwanese port of Kaohsiung, Taiwan, on September 15, 2010 [Peter Enav/AP Photo]
China’s coastguard patrols have been unusual enough to elicit a rare joint response from the United Kingdom, Germany and France, who said in late June that the “actions threaten regional stability and the freedom of navigation and safety of international shipping”.
“We reiterate our opposition to any unilateral change to the status quo, particularly by threat or use of force or coercion,” the statement said.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said last week that Washington disagrees with the expanded patrols and that they undermine regional stability.
A distracted US
William Yang, the Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Northeast Asia, told Al Jazeera that Beijing may be taking advantage of a US distracted by the war in Iran and a president who appears ambivalent towards Taiwan.
Although the US does not recognise Taiwan as a country, it has pledged to help the island defend itself. Much of this assistance has come in the form of weapons sales, training and intelligence sharing.
US President Donald Trump also cast doubt on these commitments when he said US weapons sales could be a “negotiating chip” with China following a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in May.
“The external environment has fundamentally changed in the Indo-Pacific region, at least from their perspective, with Washington very focused and tangled up in the Middle East,” Yang said.
“At the same time, the US has no bandwidth to really look at or respond to such an expansion of Chinese maritime operations in these sensitive waters,” he added.
July 20 (UPI) — The Philippine military accused China of beating and injuring a Philippine Navy sailor with a wooden baton in the latest seaborne confrontation between the two nations over a submerged reef in the disputed South China Sea.
The incident occurred Monday morning near the BRP Sierra Madre, a derelict warship the Philippines intentionally grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal, a reef both countries lay claim to and which the Philippines calls Ayungin Shoal and China, Ren’ai Jiao.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines said in a statement that a China Coast Guard rigid-hull inflatable boat with eight people on board unlawfully approached the BRP Sierra Madre and took pictures and video of it.
While two AFP rubber boats drove it away, China Coast Guard personnel on the boat struck a Philippine Navy sailor on his head with a wooden baton. The man suffered a deep gash on his scalp, according to a picture shared online by Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Jay Tarriela.
Video of the incident posted online by Tarriela shows some China Coast Guard members aboard a larger boat swinging long sticks down upon members of the Philippine Navy in a smaller rubber boat.
“Striking an unarmed sailor on the head with a baton — inside our own exclusive economic zone — is not law enforcement. It is unlawful aggression, plain and simple,” Tarriela said in a statement.
If there is any party here that provokes and escalates tension, it is only the unruly and barbaric China Coast Guard personnel who clearly do not understand UNCLOS.
China has rejected the accusation, accusing the Philippines of instigating the incident.
“The Philippine personnel first launched malicious attacks on Chinese law enforcement officers using oars, long poles and other tools,” the China Coast Guard said in a statement published online by China’s Embassy in Manila.
“The Chinese side, acting in full compliance with laws and regulations, employed measures such as verbal warnings, evasive maneuvering and proportionate countermeasures to stabilize the situation on site, while exercising the utmost rationality and restraint.”
At roughly 105 nautical miles west of Palawan, the Second Thomas Shoal is well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. The Philippines beached its Sierra Madre warship on the disputed submerged reef in 1999, which it has manned since in an effort to protect its maritime claims.
However, China lays claim to the Second Thomas Shoal and much of the South China Sea via its Nine-Dash-Line map, which has been rejected by several nations, including the United States. The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration also rejected China’s sweeping maritime claims in a landmark 2016 ruling in a case brought by Manila. Beijing rejects the ruling.
Following the incident, the China Coast Guard said in a statement that it would continue to “carry out rights protection and law enforcement activities” and “firmly safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”
The U.S. State Department late Monday issued a statement in support of the Philippines, condemning “China’s dangerous and aggressive actions against Philippine navy personnel.”
State Department spokesperson Thomas Pigott said the United States calls on China to “immediately cease its destabilizing conduct.”
“China’s troubling pattern of provocation against lawful Philippine maritime operations undermines regional peace and stability and directly contradicts China’s repeated commitments to resolve disputes peacefully,” he said.
“We stand with our ally, the Philippines, and commend the professionalism and restraint shown by the Philippine navy personnel in this incident.”
Pigott added that the United States reaffirms the 2016 tribunal ruling as final and legally binding on both China and the Philippines.
Customers inspect various wind chimes during the opening day of the Furin-Ichi wind chimes market at the Kawasaki Daishi Heikenji Temple in Kawasaki, Kanagawa-Prefecture in Japan, on July 17, 2026. Photo by Keizo Mori/UPI | License Photo
Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels have announced a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia after the two sides traded fire last week for the first time in years. Observers have described the announcement as a “significant military move” that threatens global trade.
On July 14 the crews of the Mombasa and the Al Bahiyah found out. Two UAE-flagged tankers were hit by Iranian cruise missiles in the southern lane, inside Omani territorial waters, according to the Emirati defense ministry. An Indian sailor was killed and eight others were hurt, six Indians and two Ukrainians, and India summoned Iran’s deputy ambassador the same day. The Revolutionary Guard said the ships had run dark and ignored repeated warnings on a mined route. They had been following the other government’s instructions.
This is what a diplomatic technique looks like when it fails in public.
The technique has a name, and for fifty years the profession has been proud of it. Constructive ambiguity, Henry Kissinger’s phrase, is the art of writing a sentence that lets two enemies sign the same page while believing opposite things. Resolution 242 called for Israeli withdrawal from “territories” occupied in 1967, and the missing definite article has been argued over for fifty-nine years. The Good Friday Agreement left the sovereignty question deliberately unfinished. Ambiguity is not a drafting failure. It is often the only reason a war stops on the day it stops.
The Islamabad Memorandum, signed on June 17 by Donald Trump and Masoud Pezeshkian and brokered by Pakistan, used the same tool. Read Paragraph 5 and you can watch it happen. Iran undertakes to use “best efforts” for the safe passage of commercial vessels “with no charge, for 60 days only,” and to open a dialogue with Oman on the strait’s future administration “in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states. ” Tehran reads that as recognition that Iran determines safe passage and will price it when the clock runs out. Washington and the Gulf states read best efforts as an obligation to facilitate passage and nothing more. Fourteen points. One waterway. Two meanings, both sincere.
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Here is what the drafters missed, and it is the reason the strikes came back and the market is repricing this week. Constructive ambiguity works on questions that can sit still. A border can stay contested for six decades because a border does nothing in the meantime. Sovereignty over Northern Ireland is not exercised on Tuesday at 4 p.m. by a specific person who has to make a call.
A strait is not like that. Before the war, roughly 130 vessels crossed Hormuz every day. That is one ship approaching the disputed sentence about every eleven minutes, each one requiring somebody to physically wave it through or turn it back. Paragraph 5 does not get to be undecided. It gets decided, hundreds of times a day, by a coastal battery commander at Bandar Abbas and a watch officer on a destroyer, neither of whom has the luxury of interpretation.
The memorandum deferred two questions to a second phase. One of them, Iran’s nuclear program, can wait, because centrifuges do not require a daily ruling. The other cannot wait an afternoon. The drafters treated them as the same kind of problem, and only one of them is shooting. JD Vance, who runs the American side of the file, conceded the point on a podcast Wednesday without appearing to notice he had made it: the nuclear negotiations he leads have stalled over the strait.
Everything since follows from that. Six consecutive nights of American strikes. A naval blockade of Iranian ports has been back in force since Wednesday, with a Curacao-flagged tanker disabled by Hellfire missiles fired into its smokestack near Kharg Island. Iran’s ambassador filed a letter at the U.N. listing 42 American violations of a text Trump declared dead on July 8 and Tehran stopped complying with on the 13th, which tells you the memorandum has become useless as a truce and indispensable as a claim. Both capitals still cite Paragraph 5. Neither will be governed by it. They are both telling the truth about a sentence that says two things.
Trump’s week makes more sense in this light than in any other. On Monday he declared the United States “guardian” of the strait and announced a 20% charge on cargo passing through it. By Tuesday the fee was gone, swapped for promises of Gulf investment, after the International Maritime Organization said there is no legal basis for mandatory tolls simply to transit a strait and shipowners refused to play. On Thursday, IRNA reported that Tehran is preparing environmental compensation fees on transiting ships. Both governments have now tried to invoice the same water in the same week, and neither can collect. That is not a strategy, and it is not a neoconservative plot. That is what happens when the document you signed does not contain the authority you thought you had bought.
He said on Tuesday that next week come the bridges. The bridges came Friday. American strikes hit six of them around Bandar Khamir and a railway junction outside Bandar Abbas, cutting Iran’s main port off from the roads inland, and collapsed the control tower at Chabahar. Iran’s health ministry counts 38 dead and more than 400 wounded since the strikes resumed. Even Trump’s own deadlines are now being decided faster than he sets them.
The market is the only participant being paid to read Paragraph 5 honestly, and its verdict is arriving. Brent touched $86 on Tuesday, a one-month high, and held above $85 through a week in which the peace was formally alive. Traffic tells it better than price. Eleven ships crossed on the day Iran declared the strait closed. Seven crossed on Wednesday. Three crossed Thursday, the fewest since May, against 130 a day before the war. One ship every eleven minutes has become one ship every eight hours.
Rory Johnston of Commodity Context makes the harder point, and it deserves more attention than it has received. The stock cushion that absorbed the spring’s supply shock has been drawn down, which means the next shock will not be padded the way the last one was. The price is not high because the war is bad. It is high because the peace is unreadable.
Americans are paying in a currency the ceasefire never touched. Thirteen of the fourteen U.S. service members killed in this war died in March, before any truce existed. What has climbed through every pause is the wounded count, now 414, most of them with traumatic brain injuries. Truces here have reliably stopped the funerals and never stopped the concussions.
The mediators still working the phones in Islamabad, Doha, and Cairo do not need a grand bargain by August 16, when the memorandum’s sixty-day clock runs out and Iran has promised to start charging. They need something duller and much harder. They need to convert one sentence into a procedure: who physically waves the ship through, on whose radio frequency, under whose flag, and with what recourse when someone gets it wrong. Not sovereignty over the strait. Traffic control of it. The nuclear file can keep. The lane cannot.
Iran released an American detainee on Wednesday, which some in Washington read as a hand reaching for a rail. Nobody has set a date for the conversation that would matter. If none is set, the war will not restart in August. It will simply stop pretending to have paused, and a ship’s master off Oman will keep making a sovereign decision on behalf of two governments that refuse to make it for him.
Constructive ambiguity is a loan against the future. Most disputes let you pay it back slowly. Hormuz charges interest by the hour.
From Spain to Cabo Verde, the EIB is building a blueprint for global maritime decarbonization.
When the European Investment Bank (EIB) signed off on an €80 million loan to Bilbao’s Port Authority in late 2024, most observers logged it as routine. It was anything but.
The facility bundled three priorities that now define the bank’s maritime strategy: capacity expansion, grid electrification, and renewable energy generation on port land. Over the past 18 months, operating through its core European window and EIB Global, the bank has deployed or committed well over €400 million in maritime financing, for the most active period of EIB maritime engagement in a generation.
The Bilbao loan and a subsequent package for Málaga form the European spine of the push. Bilbao’s €80 million facility finances breakwater expansion, the landside electricity grid, and renewable generation, positioning the port on the Atlantic Corridor of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) as a lower-carbon alternative to road freight. Málaga’s €50 million loan, signed in spring 2025, follows the same template on the Mediterranean Corridor: a new multi-purpose terminal, full shore-power electrification for docked vessels, and upgraded border and passenger facilities.
Regulatory Revolution
Both foreground onshore power supply (OPS)—enabling ships to cut auxiliary engines at berth—in anticipation of FuelEU Maritime, the EU regulation that mandates OPS at designated EU ports as of 2030.
Assembled in layers over the past two years, the program combines €114 million in EIB loans with a €34 million EU investment grant for a total €148 million concessional package under the Global Gateway, the EU’s strategy to invest in sustainable infrastructure. The undertaking spans three of the four maritime hubs across the Cape Verde archipelago: Mindelo’s Porto Grande (new breakwater, expanded container and fisheries infrastructure), Palmeira on Sal (larger-vessel reception, improved fish-landing facilities), and Santo Antão’s Porto Novo (inter-island connectivity upgrades).
Solar energy systems across multiple ports aim to cut diesel dependency. The centerpiece of the project is the rehabilitation of CABNAVE, Cape Verde’s sole naval repair yard. The EIB intends to develop it into a regional maritime center of excellence: a goal with geopolitical resonance, given China’s longstanding interest in the facility.SUBHED
The series of deals comes fully into focus as an accompaniment to the regulatory revolution unfolding in parallel in the EU. FuelEU Maritime, in force since the beginning of last year, mandates progressive greenhouse-gas intensity cuts for ships above 5,000 gross tonnes calling at EU ports: 2% against a 2020 baseline now, rising to 6% by 2030 and 80% by 2050. Simultaneously, the EU Emissions Trading System covers shipping; companies must surrender allowances for 40% of verified emissions from 2024, 70% from 2025, and 100% from 2026.
This double pressure—a fuel-intensity standard alongside a carbon price—is the commercial incentive structure the EIB’s port electrification investments are designed to capitalize on. The bank is de-risking regulatory transitions for port authorities that might otherwise be delayed while awaiting final implementing rules. Additionally, bundling electrification, renewables, and capacity expansion into single loan instruments is more sophisticated than the EIB’s earlier methods of generating port loans, which were piecemeal and perceived as non-strategic.
€100 Billion Funding Gap
But the EIB is not the only major backer of the energy transition, nor could it be.
Last year, the European Investment Fund approved infrastructure fund investments explicitly targeting shipping-sector decarbonization, signaling a move beyond pure debt into equity and quasi-equity instruments that aim to crowd in pension funds and insurers at a scale individual EIB loans cannot reach. The European Commission has estimated that the full maritime energy transition will require around €100 billion by 2035; the EIF’s fund route is considered the most plausible mechanism for mobilizing capital at that magnitude.
Yet gaps remain. The portfolio is still weighted heavily toward port-side infrastructure rather than the fleet itself; direct EIB financing for vessel retrofits and alternative-fuel newbuilds has yet to materialize at scale. OPS deployment across all TEN-T ports by 2030 is a larger task than two Spanish loans can address. And the geopolitical role the bank has assumed in Cape Verde raises questions about mandate and institutional capacity that extend beyond the mid-Atlantic.
The EIB’s maritime schemes of the past 18 months are not isolated transactions; they are the outline of a strategy. Whether the bank receives the resources and political backing to match the scale of the transition it’s trying to finance is an open question.