lessons

The NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU Battlegroups have demonstrated that placing multinational forces on standby does not automatically make them immediately operational. German-Dutch military integration, in contrast, has generated a different outcome since cooperation was internalized within permanent command structures, units, training, and capability planning before a crisis occurred.

Such a comparison is becoming increasingly relevant to Northeast Asia. A Taiwan contingency could absorb American military assets at the very moment when North Korea embarks upon a serious provocation towards South Korea. Continued US commitments in Europe and the Middle East could further complicate the allocation of finite resources.

Why Standby Forces Encountered Problems

The NRF was established after the 2002 Prague Summit as a rapidly deployable multinational joint force of roughly 25,000 troops. Yet the NRF was heavily dependent on the member countries assigning their respective forces to particular rotations, while these governments had the final say over whether the forces could ultimately be employed. During the Afghanistan and Iraq wars—when operational demand was high—each government had strong disincentives in introducing scarce high-readiness units and specialized enablers to NRF rotational deployment.

This created a gap between designated readiness and actual availability. Strategic transportation, logistics, specialized support units, and communication capacity could still be subject to competing national demands. Eventually, in 2024, NATO replaced the NRF with the NATO Force Model, which emphasized a substantially larger pool of high-readiness forces that is closely aligned with specific defense plans.

Meanwhile, the EU Battlegroup was faced with an even clearer problem. Although the multinational battlegroups had been maintained on rotational standby since 2007, they had never been deployed. While acknowledging that the battlegroups enhanced interoperability and military transformation, the European Parliament attributed the shortcoming largely to insufficient political will, difficulties in decision-making, implementation problems, and the financing arrangements.

What Germany and the Netherlands Did Differently

German-Dutch cooperation developed according to a different institutional logic. Although the 1st German-Netherlands Corps was created in Münster in 1995, the integration later expanded deep into both militaries’ force structures. The Dutch 11th Airmobile Brigade was incorporated into the German Division Schnelle Kräfte (DSK) in 2014, while the Dutch 43rd Mechanized Brigade was integrated into Germany’s 1st Panzer Division in 2016, and the Dutch 13th Light Armoured Brigade joined Germany’s 10th Panzer Division in 2023.

The relationship was extended below the brigade level. Germany’s Panzerbataillon 414 is operated under the Dutch 43rd Mechanized Brigade, and Dutch personnel operate Germany’s Leopard 2A6MA2 tanks while serving within the battalion. Moreover, German officers serve in Dutch command headquarters and vice versa, turning multinational command into a routine organizational reality instead of a stopgap measure that is only activated during major exercises.

Needless to say, such an arrangement does not eliminate national sovereignty. Both Germany and the Netherlands preserve the political prerogative over whether and where their forces are deployed. Meanwhile, the benefits of integration would become observable once a crisis necessitates the deployment. Staff are already well-versed in each other’s procedures, and units have repeatedly conducted joint exercises, while command and logistics relations do not need to be newly constructed during mobilization.

The distinctions were visibly observable during training. For example, approximately 7,000 German and Dutch personnel participated in the 2026 Fighter Lion—the largest military exercise conducted by the Netherlands in two decades—ten years after the Dutch 43rd Mechanized Brigade was integrated into Germany’s 1st Panzer Division. These types of exercises strengthen existing command relations rather than creating temporary interoperability for a single event.

What Japan and South Korea Can Apply

It is quite obvious that Japan and South Korea cannot replicate the German-Dutch model. Neither country has a formal mutual defense pact nor a NATO-style integrated command structure. Therefore, the directly applicable lessons are more limited. Nonetheless, selected operational relationships can and should be institutionalized before multiple simultaneous contingencies make such coordination necessary.

The practical first step could be a standing bilateral adjustment mechanism that links Japan’s Joint Operations Command (JJOC) with relevant South Korean joint headquarters. Instead of exercising command authority, the mechanism could maintain procedures for intelligence exchange, deconfliction in the air and at sea, movement of US reinforcements, logistics coordination, and the use of Japanese facilities that support a Korean contingency. This would be especially crucial when Japan has to assist US operations related to Taiwan while installations across Japan—including Yokota, Yokosuka, Sasebo, Iwakuni, and other United Nations Command (UNC)-Rear facilities—play a pivotal role in US reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula in accordance with Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5055.

Under this mechanism, small-scale functional cells could concentrate on specific missions. Missile warning would be the most obvious starting point since the United States, Japan, and South Korea have conducted North Korean missile-warning data-sharing since December 2023. Additional cells could treat maritime domain awareness (MDA), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), cyber defense, transportation, medical evacuation, and logistics.

The exchange of officers should accompany the aforementioned measures. Japanese officers could participate in South Korean command posts, while South Korean officers could join Japanese operational staff who deal with naval operations, air defense, logistics, or reinforcement coordination. The goal is to get familiar with each country’s procedures, communications, command relations, and other miscellaneous constraints before wartime pressure markedly shortens the timeframe for decision-making.

Exercise Scarcity Rather Than Ideal Conditions

The most notable changes should be related to exercise design. Trilateral exercises should not be premised on the assumption that the full inventory of United States support capabilities will always be available. A more pessimistic scenario would begin with a Taiwan scenario that is already consuming a substantial amount of US assets—including its ISR capacity, strategic transportation, and precision-guided munitions—when North Korea embarks upon a serious horizontal or vertical military escalation on the Korean Peninsula.

In this particular situation, elaborated by the Atlantic Council report, South Korean military planners should determine which missions could be conducted independently and which can be addressed bilaterally. South Korea may assume greater responsibility for ISR, missile defense, logistics, and conventional firepower on the Korean Peninsula—yet this would be affected by the tempo of wartime operational control (OPCON) transition—while Japan could take on additional maritime surveillance, ASW, sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, base defense, and logistics. The primary aim is not to divide the Taiwan and Korean Peninsula theaters between Seoul and Tokyo but to identify how both countries could most effectively conduct missions that complement US military operations across the two regions.

Logistics should be placed at the center of these exercises. A dual contingency could impose on the Japanese government the need to support both US operations on Taiwan and USFJ reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula, which inevitably involves Japanese ports and airfields. It could cause competition for fuel, maintenance, transportation, ammunition depots, runways, and port capacity. Thus, Tokyo and Seoul should develop procedures concerning reciprocal servicing, immediate repair, medical support, transportation, and selected supplies before the bottleneck transmogrifies into wartime problems.

Functional Integration Without a Bilateral Alliance

The German-Dutch case illustrates that political authority is not necessarily the same thing as operational preparedness. A government can maintain full authority over whether its forces enter conflicts and can also prepare in advance to cooperate effectively if that decision is made. These distinctions are highly relevant to Japan and South Korea since they enable a considerable level of operational preparedness without a formal defense pact. For instance, South Korea could discuss target allocations for North Korean TELs with its Japanese counterparts in order to effectively use the finite weapons available to Japan’s enemy base strike capability and South Korea’s Kill Chain and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR).

Naturally, the primary objective should be functional integration in fields where both governments already have overlapping interests. A large set of measures—spanning from ISR coordination to cyber defense—can be institutionalized without creating either an integrated force or an Asian version of NATO.

Both the NRF and EU Battlegroups revealed the limits of formations that remained dependent on political and operational arrangements being assembled only when crises occur. German-Dutch cooperation worked better since many of those arrangements already existed.

Given the historical baggage that Japan and South Korea carry, it would undoubtedly be a Herculean task for them to take novel steps. Nonetheless, the emerging regional security environment is rapidly narrowing down the available options.

After appearing last year on a contentious political panel discussion in Washington, D.C., Jessica Tarlov, co-host of the the popular Fox News show “The Five,” was approached by a transgender woman from Alabama.

Tarlov had said that Democratic candidates in tough races might have to concede that transgender collegiate swimmer Lia Thomas should not be competing against women assigned female at birth. But the matter never came up. Instead, the Alabama woman thanked Tarlov for making the case for Democrats against four conservatives on “The Five,” the most watched program in cable news and a favorite of family members who no longer speak to her.

“If more people talked like you, I might get my family back,” the woman said. “I’m just happy my parents can hear someone like you.”

Tarlov describes the encounter in her new book “I Disagree: Winning Arguments Without Losing Friends,” out Sept. 15. The part how-to book and part personal memoir is aimed at helping readers navigate the harsh political divisiveness in the culture. Her role on “The Five” has made her an advocate of going into not-so-friendly territory to debate issues rather than staying in comfort zones where views are unchallenged.

“I’m trying to show that a Democratic voice like mine can exist there, without an apology,” she writes of her Fox News position. “And that a person with strong liberal beliefs can bring that same perspective to a host of outlets and places.”

During a recent conversation at Fox News headquarters in Manhattan, Tarlov said the kind words of the fan from Alabama align with what she’s heard from children and grandchildren of the network’s loyal viewers. They are grateful their Fox News-loving families are exposed to a voice from outside the conservative media ecosystem.

Fox News co-host Jessica Tarlov is the author of “I Disagree.”

(Penguin Random House)

Tarlov, 42, has been a sturdy liberal counterweight at “The Five,” which averages 3.5 million viewers daily, according to Nielsen. She comes to the panel’s table highly prepared with data-based talking points, forcing her often intractable co-hosts to engage and listen. She often does it while deflecting the mocking remarks of rambunctious colleagues Jesse Watters and Greg Gutfeld, who try to throw off her arguments.

“Interruptions are an indication that you’re winning,” said Tarlov, evoking the pithy chapter summaries in “I Disagree.”

Tarlov games out numerous scenarios with recommendations on how to deploy statistics and when to lighten up. She also explains the necessity of allowing the other side to blow off steam as she did when “The Five” co-hosts became emotional and overwrought over the shooting of right wing activist Charlie Kirk.

Tarlov believes the key to the success of “The Five” is the camaraderie the panel has off-camera. While the co-hosts will battle it out on set over President Trump’s policies or the excesses of the socialist wing of the Democratic Party, they are supportive of each other once the show is over (three of them are represented by the same CAA agent).

“We don’t talk politics outside of work,” Tarlov said.

Tarlov has been an accepted part of the Fox News family, recently signing a three-year contract despite Trump’s suggestion that “The Five” would be better off without her.

But it has taken time for Tarlov to gain credibility among like-minded pundits and thought leaders on the political left. Most are dismissive of the network as its most popular hosts are unwavering Trump loyalists. Tarlov also resists being in lockstep with every Democratic position and trend. (She voted for Andrew Cuomo over New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani, citing the former governor’s experience.)

“Even in the last year I’ve been at big liberal gatherings, very clearly hosts on other big podcasts or show were not interested in talking to me,” said Tarlov, who has had many conversations that start with the question “Why are you on that network?”

But with younger news consumers getting their news and information through social media platforms, Fox News clips of Tarlov scoring points for the Democrats are gaining attention. Tarlov said she has felt more welcome in left-leaning circles since the 2024 presidential campaign when the digital accounts of Joe Biden and then Kamala Harris put her commentary in heavy rotation. (Scott Galloway, the author and social critic, partnered with Tarlov on a podcast, “Raging Moderates,” after seeing her come up repeatedly in his feeds and then meeting her on the set of “Real Time With Bill Maher”).

Tarlov didn’t start out seeking a career as a TV personality, although her family background likely helped her understand media and communication. Her parents were attorneys who met while working on the Warner Bros. lot in New York, and raised their two daughters in the hip lower Manhattan neighborhood of Tribeca.

Her father, Mark Tarlov, was a onetime speechwriter for Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger who went on to produce two of John Waters’ films and direct projects of his own. Tarlov and her sister Molly, an actor who co-starred in the MTV sitcom “Awkward,” traveled the world with their father to shooting locations. (Tarlov pays tribute to her father, who died in 2021 of 9/11-related cancer, by wearing his nerd-chic Oliver Peoples eyeglass frames made of buffalo horn).

A graduate of Bryn Mawr College and the London School of Economics, Tarlov worked as a strategist on the London mayoral campaign of Boris Johnson. She talked Democratic pollster Doug Schoen into giving her a job. Schoen hired her and brought her to the attention of Fox News, which started using her as a guest on Sean Hannity’s program in 2016.

The ability to effectively volley with conservatives led Democratic Party leaders to approach Tarlov about running for Congress in the district representing Staten Island. (She has no desire to seek political office.)

Tarlov was named co-host on “The Five” in 2022. She and husband Brian McKenna, who works in finance, welcomed their first daughter in 2021, the other in 2024. She remains awed that the show’s viewers — most of whom don’t agree with her politics — have acknowledged her personal milestones with warm greetings and homemade gifts.

She is aware that she’s had a rarefied career. But in “I Disagree,” she goes beyond her impressive resume to reveal her insecurities — unusual in the ego driven TV news business — and tells readers how she’s tried to resolve them.

“I have a good amount of shyness to me,” she said. “I have a lot of imposter syndrome. I’m constantly in wonder that I ended up getting to do this and that hopefully, am the right person to do it.”

Long self-conscious about her raspy voice, which Trump once described as “grating and irritating,” she shares how a 2016 meeting with former Chief Executive Roger Ailes made her relax about it. He told her viewer criticisms were more aimed at her positions, at not how she sounded. “No matter what room the television is in, you want to make sure the person listening in the next room knows you’re on it,” he told her. “Don’t try to smooth your voice out. They may hate what you stand for and what you’re saying, but you want them to know it’s you on TV.”

Tarlov met with Ailes just months before he was ousted over sexual harassment allegations. While Tarlov was grateful for his advice, her book praises current Fox News Chief Executive Suzanne Scott for creating a workplace culture that is much more hospitable to women. Scott promoted Tarlov to co-host right before she was due to give birth to her first child.

“The knowledge that I’m supported allows me to take big swings and not be intimidated,” Tarlov writes. She knows that’s not the situation for all women; in her signature style, she presents the data and the narrative to back it up.