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Jacob Ulibarri spent about six hours on New Year’s Day last year squashing hot spots where the Lachman fire had burned.

The rookie Los Angeles firefighter arrived sometime after 7 a.m., when the smoky areas were all over and easy to see. By the time the next crew swapped with his that afternoon, they were scarcer: “One every 30 minutes, roughly,” Ulibarri recalled.

At that point, Battalion Chief Martin Mullen, who was running the mop-up operation, had walked three laps around the perimeter of the fire. He recalled one hot spot he saw at about 10 a.m., which crews hit with water. Later in the afternoon, Mullen did his fourth and last loop and left the area for good.

He decided to leave the hoses out overnight, just in case.

Over the next two days, a series of communication failures and questionable decisions led crews to leave the area prematurely, with embers from the small Jan. 1 fire later reigniting into the devastating Palisades fire. A firefighter picking up hoses on Jan. 2 found crackling, red-hot coals in the dirt and warned colleagues that a more thorough mop-up was needed. Also that morning, a captain cautioned his chief that it was too soon to pick up the hoses. In yet another missed opportunity, crews apparently did not walk the entire perimeter of the burn scar after a caller reported smoke in the area on Jan. 3.

Because of the holiday, some were filling in for others outside of their normal assignments. Firefighters said they adhered to the LAFD’s strict chain of command and did not question higher-ups, while those in charge had fuzzy memories or shifted responsibility to others.

The revelations, contained in the sworn testimony of a dozen firefighters earlier this year as part of a lawsuit filed by Palisades fire victims, corroborate previous reporting by The Times and call into question the LAFD’s repeated claims that commanders left the fire “dead out.” More than a year later, with much of the Palisades still in ruins, LAFD leaders have refused to explain how or why the breakdowns occurred.

The LAFD employees mentioned in this story either could not be reached or declined to comment.

In a statement Monday, LAFD spokesperson Stephanie Bishop pointed to the alleged arsonist charged by federal prosecutors with deliberately setting the earlier fire. “The Lachman and Palisades Fire incidents would not be matters of discussion had this individual not allegedly initiated the original fire,” she said.

“It is important to allow the legal process to proceed without external influence or speculation. Offering running commentary on depositions outside of the courtroom risks compromising witness testimony, affecting the integrity of evidence review, and impacting ongoing judicial proceedings. We stand by the investigation conducted by the ATF,” Bishop added, referring to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

Around 6 a.m. on Jan. 2, 2025

At the end of his 24-hour overtime shift, Mullen handed the reins to Battalion Chief Mario Garcia, recommending that the incoming chief scope out the fire perimeter.

“I told him I left him hose lines in place overnight. You need to walk that and make sure there’s nothing going up on there,” said Mullen, whose regular job is managing the LAFD’s 106 fire stations and 30 or so other buildings.

Before Garcia set foot on the burn scar, he put word out to station captains about the plan for the morning: Pick up hoses.

At Fire Station 19 in Brentwood, Capt. Alexander Gonzalez got a text from the chief’s aide, directing him to bring a “plug buggy” — a pickup truck used to carry equipment — “to help pick up hose.”

The plan reached Capt. David Sander at Fire Station 23 in the Palisades and Capt. Michael McIndoe at Fire Station 69.

McIndoe had reservations.

He told the chief’s aide that he thought the hoses should stay out longer. He had seen the forecast that day — a National Weather Service alert had warned of weather conducive to wildfires — and handling any lingering hot spots would be easier with hoses in place. The aide told him to take it up with the chief.

So McIndoe shared his concerns with Garcia over the phone.

Garcia “said something along the lines of, ‘OK. Let me go check it out, and then I’ll get back to you,’” McIndoe testified.

But the orders for the morning never changed.

8:30 a.m. on Jan. 2, 2025

After a briefing at Fire Station 23, Scott Pike and his partner took their ambulance to a cul-de-sac near the burn area. They spotted some hose dangling over a retaining wall covered in ivy.

An engine crew threw a 20-foot ladder to get over the wall. Soon, Pike said, they got another call and left.

“We were kind of making jokes, like, ‘It’s on us,’’’ recalled Pike, a firefighter normally assigned to a station in Sunland.

He grabbed his brush jacket, helmet and gloves and climbed over. He decided to hike to the end of the hose line — he was feeling good and thought he’d get a workout in.

Pike followed the main line — called the trunk line — which had hoses branching off in other directions. About 100 feet in, he saw where grass had burned. He navigated through culverts and climbed a steep hill of about 300 feet before hitting a hiking trail.

When he got to the end of the line, at about 8:45 a.m., he noticed a handful of smoky areas in heavier brush, and a hand line that wasn’t cut properly.

One ash pit was so hot he didn’t want to touch it, even with gloves. So he kicked it with his boot, exposing red-hot coals. He heard crackling and smelled smoke. He looked around, and there were no other firefighters.

We shouldn’t be picking up hoses, he thought to himself. Instead, we should be filling the hoses with water to do a more thorough mop-up.

He pinched the hose, directing any residual water to the ash pit. It steamed and crackled. He felt defeated when he only got a couple of gallons out, which wasn’t enough.

He slowed down, in case the pickup plan were to change because of his observations, and was relieved when more crews began hiking over.

“Hey, guys, are you seeing what I’m seeing?” Pike told a couple of firefighters. He was working an overtime shift away from his usual fire station, so he didn’t know them. “Like, maybe we should be charging these lines instead of picking them up.”

Since they were already there, he figured, some extra mop-up could save them work down the line if the fire were to reignite.

The firefighters shrugged him off and seemed eager to finish the assignment.

“They were like, ‘Yeah, I see what you’re saying,’ And then it was like, ‘We’ll tell one of the skippers. We’ll tell one of the captains.’ But, like, in the meantime, people were just very much like, just get the hose picked up,” Pike testified.

Shortly after, he saw a captain and raised the same concerns.

“That’s how I approached him, is like, ‘Hey, Cap … We have hot spots in general. We have some ash pits,’” Pike said. “That’s an alert to double-check the whole area and maybe we need to switch our tactics.”

Pike testified that it was not his job “to overstep and tell him what to do. He earned that rank.”

The captain suggested possibly bringing hand tools or a backpack filled with water up the hill to extinguish any hot spots.

Pike went back to picking up the hose while awaiting new orders, which never came.

The LAFD has declined to say whether the captain has been identified. Pike believed the captain was from Engine 69, which would have been McIndoe. But McIndoe told The Times he did not speak with Pike that day.

McIndoe said he also came across a smoldering ash pit during the couple of hours he was on the hill.

He retrieved a backpack with water from his engine, sprayed into the ground with a couple of gallons of water and dug up the dirt with his hand tool until he was satisfied it was cool.

At one point, he saw Garcia, the battalion chief, and brought up their earlier conversation.

“I just went up to him, and I said, ‘Hey, I hope you don’t think I’m just trying to get out of work,’” McIndoe said. “And he said, ‘No, that’s — that’s fine.’ Something along those lines, and that that’s all I can really recall.”

He said he was trying to tell Garcia that he believed “that the hose should stay up a little bit longer.”

By the time Gonzalez, who was backfilling that day at the Brentwood station, got to the scene, the operation was well underway, with half the hose already down the hillside.

“When I got there, it was just, it’s like a big daisy chain of hands pulling hose off and getting it down to the street. And rolling it, hosing it off and loading it into the plug buggy,” he testified.

He did not see smoldering that day. He testified that he went about 200 to 300 feet up, to where piles of hose were being dropped. “The next person brings it back down and that was it,” he said.

Some firefighters on hose pickup duty that day have not been deposed in the lawsuit. Aside from McIndoe and Pike, the four other firefighters who testified that they were at the burn scar on Jan. 2 said they did not see smoldering.

Garcia testified that at the burn scar, no one raised any concerns with him about the hose pickup. Nor did he see any need to leave the hoses at the site.

At 1:35 p.m. on Jan. 2, Garcia texted two higher-ups: “All hose and equipment has been picked up.”

Around 4:30 p.m., Garcia walked the area again with his aide to see if they had left any equipment behind. He saw no issues.

“We both walked the whole area,” Garcia said. “We went separate directions, but covered the whole area, and there was nothing that would bring any concern.”

11:51 a.m. on Jan. 3, 2025

Shortly before noon, someone called the LAFD about a grass fire in the burn area.

Engineer Edward Rincon, who had been on Engine 23 retrieving hoses the day before, pulled up to the same cul-de-sac. Once again, his crew threw the 20-foot ladder over the retaining wall. As on the previous day, he never entered the burn scar. He stayed with the engine while the captain and two firefighters went to scope out the area. He set the volume high on his radio to hear if they needed anything.

On the other side of the wall, Capt. Cesar Garcia walked for what he said was more than a couple of football fields, while the two firefighters went to different peaks to look around for smoke or fire.

“Everything is completely burned. I don’t smell anything. I don’t see any smoke. I don’t see any fire,” he testified.

He canceled another engine that was assigned to the call.

Firefighter Michael Contreras said he also didn’t see smoke. He said he could not see the entirety of the burn scar from his vantage point. He also said he did not suggest to his captain, Cesar Garcia, that they walk the whole perimeter.

“Is there a reason you did not?” a plaintiffs’ attorney asked.

“Again, would not be my lane to tell him that, you know,” he said.

Battalion Chief Mario Garcia was on duty again that day. Like Rincon, he stayed with his vehicle. Cesar Garcia said the chief pulled up a live feed on an iPad from two cameras on the mountain, which showed no smoke or fire.

An incident report shows they spent about 34 minutes on the call.

On the morning of Jan. 7, LAFD records show, a captain on duty in the Palisades called Fire Station 23 and told colleagues: The Lachman fire had started up again.

Early in Michael McIndoe’s shift on Jan. 2, 2025, his crew got their marching orders: Pick up hoses left overnight at the scene of the Lachman fire.

McIndoe, a captain at Fire Station 69 in Pacific Palisades, didn’t think the plan was a good idea, he said in sworn testimony obtained by The Times. He had read the National Weather Service’s forecast for the day — temperatures were expected to be warmer — and handling any lingering hot spots would be easier with hoses in place.

While he was still at the station, he said, he relayed his concerns by phone to Battalion Chief Mario Garcia, who was in charge of the operation.

Garcia “said something along the lines of, ‘OK. Let me go check it out, and then I’ll get back to you,’ ” McIndoe testified last month.

Despite the warning, Garcia’s orders never changed, and McIndoe spent a couple hours or so that morning rolling up hose lines.

At one point, McIndoe said, he came across a smoldering ash pit. He retrieved a backpack with water from his engine, sprayed into the ground with a couple gallons of water and dug up the dirt with his hand tool until he was satisfied it was cool.

Days later, amid high winds, embers from the Lachman fire ignited into the Palisades fire, which killed 12 people and destroyed thousands of homes.

McIndoe was one of a dozen Los Angeles firefighters deposed in January in a lawsuit filed by Palisades fire victims against the city and the state. Transcripts and videos of the testimony were released Thursday and Friday, backing up earlier reporting by The Times that crews were ordered to pack up their hoses despite signs that the Lachman fire was not completely out.

One firefighter, Scott Pike, testified that he informed a captain of hot spots and ash pits in the area but that he never received orders to take care of the hazards.

Garcia testified that no one informed him of any concerns about picking up the hoses and that he believed the decision was made before his shift.

The testimony raises questions about why LAFD officials did not address concerns expressed to them about weather conditions and potentially dangerous hot spots that could flare up into another fire. With Pike and McIndoe saying they were following directions from above, and Garcia and the battalion chief from the prior shift appearing to pass the buck to others, it is unclear who made the decision to leave the Lachman fire.

LAFD spokesperson Stephanie Bishop declined to answer the question of who decided to pull the hoses, citing an ongoing investigation. She also would not answer whether officials had identified the captain whom Pike spoke with or determined what the captain did with his concerns.

Pike said he did not know the captain’s name but believed the captain was from Engine 69.

McIndoe testified that he was the captain on Engine 69 that day. In an email Saturday, McIndoe said he was not authorized to speak with the media but wanted to correct the record: “I did not speak to, nor do I recall seeing, Firefighter Pike the day that we picked up hose at the Lachman fire.”

Garcia did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Pike did not respond to a request for comment.

That day, McIndoe testified, he saw Garcia on the hill picking up hoses and brought up their earlier conversation.

“I just went up to him, and I said, ‘Hey, I hope you don’t think I’m just trying to get out of work,’ ” McIndoe said. “And he said, no, that’s — that’s fine. Something along those lines, and that that’s all I can really recall.”

He said he was trying to clarify with Garcia that he believed “that the hose should stay up a little bit longer.”

Garcia testified that when he got to the burn scar, no one raised any concerns about the hose pickup, nor did he see any need to leave the equipment at the site.

He said he thought the decision to pick up the hoses was made before his shift — though he was “not 100 percent sure” — and that it was a “collaborative decision, based off all the information that was received.”

By the time he got up to the burn area, Garcia testified, half the hose had already been picked up. He walked the perimeter to ensure there was a line cut around it and that it was cold, and did not see any smoke or any sign that the fire was not fully extinguished.

“Came across several members,” he said. “Nobody mentioned anything about there being any concerns of any sort.”

Battalion Chief Martin Mullen, who was on duty before Garcia, testified that he walked the perimeter four times and left the hose lines in place overnight as a precaution, keeping two assistant chiefs, Vinny Alvarado and Joseph Everett, in the loop. Mullen said they informed another top chief, Phillip Fligiel.

The hoses could be hooked up again quickly “if something were to happen,” Mullen testified.

Mullen testified that he also notified Garcia: “I told him I left him hose lines in place overnight, you need to walk that and make sure there’s nothing going on up there.”

Mullen, who said he was not involved in deciding when to pick up the hoses, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

In an email Sunday, Everett said: “I was not present or assigned to that incident. As a result I made no command decisions nor do I have information as to anyones testimony.”

Text messages obtained by The Times through a public records request in December show that Fligiel, Alvarado and Everett were making plans to remove the equipment on Jan. 1. The Lachman fire, which federal prosecutors believe was deliberately set, flared up shortly after midnight on Jan. 1, 2025. A few hours later, at 4:46 a.m., the LAFD announced that it was fully contained at eight acres.

“I imagine it might take all day to get that hose off the hill,” Fligiel said in a group chat early the morning of Jan. 1. “Make sure that plan is coordinated.”

At 1:35 p.m. on Jan. 2, Garcia texted Fligiel and Everett: “All hose and equipment has been picked up.”

Earlier that day, Pike was making troubling observations that led him to think that the entire area needed to be re-investigated. He saw about five smoky areas and ash pits, including one he remembered vividly that was too hot to touch with his gloved hand.

“So I just kicked it with my boot to kind of expose it, and there was, like red hot, like, coals,” he testified. “And I even heard crackling.”

Pike, a 23-year LAFD veteran based at a station in Sunland, was working an overtime shift at Fire Station 23, the LAFD’s second outpost in the Palisades, that day. He relayed his observations to a captain and two firefighters.

“That’s how I approached him, is like, ‘Hey, Cap … We have hot spots in general. We have some ash pits,’ ” Pike testified about his conversation with the captain. “That’s an alert to double-check the whole area and maybe we need to switch our tactics.”

Pike testified that it was not his job “to overstep and tell him what to do. He earned that rank.”

The captain, he said, suggested possibly bringing hand tools or a backpack filled with water up the hill to extinguish any hot spots. Pike went back to picking up the hose while awaiting new orders, which never came.

Pike testified that he felt his colleagues — the captain and two firefighters — blew him off.

“It kind of sits heavy with me that nobody listened to me,” he said.

In his deposition, McIndoe did not recall details about other conversations he had that day.

He was asked by a plaintiffs’ attorney: “Any dialogue with anyone else that you haven’t told me about concerning any of the work that was being done up there at the Lachman fire site, in terms of checking for smokers? Making sure that you got all the hose? Anything like that?”

McIndoe responded: “I don’t recall specific conversations. I think I may have had a conversation with one or two of the other captains that were on scene before we left.”

McIndoe testified that he told that captain — whom he said was from Fire Station 37 — that he thought it would be a good idea to leave the hose out because the warm weather could preheat the ground and bring up smokers, “and it would be nice to have the hose lines in place to address those.”

The Times reported in October that crews were ordered to leave the Lachman fire, even though the ground was still smoldering and rocks were hot to the touch.

In a text message reviewed by The Times, a firefighter who was at the scene wrote that Garcia had been told it was a “bad idea” to leave because of the visible signs of smoking terrain, which crews feared could start a new fire if left unprotected.

“And the rest is history,” the firefighter wrote.

Los Angeles Fire Department Chief Jaime Moore has taken over an agency under intense scrutiny — and he’s getting paid handsomely to do it.

Moore, who was appointed by Mayor Karen Bass in October, will earn $473,600 a year, the City Council decided Tuesday — $18,000 more than his predecessor, Kristin Crowley, made when she was ousted by Bass in February 2025 for her handling of the Palisades fire.

The LAFD and the mayor continue to face intense scrutiny over their handling of the Palisades fire, which killed 12 people and destroyed thousands of homes in January of last year, as well as the watering down of the LAFD after-action report on the fire.

When Crowley started as fire chief in 2022, her annual salary was $367,100.

Soon after that, the city amended its salary ranges for department heads to keep up with inflation, said Matt Szabo, the city’s top budget analyst.

Crowley, the city’s first female and first LGBTQ fire chief, received annual merit raises, according to Szabo.

On Monday, Crowley filed a whistleblower lawsuit claiming that Bass “orchestrated a campaign of retaliation” to protect her own political future and paper over her failures during the Palisades fire.

The LAFD did not immediately comment on Moore’s salary, which was recommended by the mayor and the City Council’s Executive Employee Relations Committee before going to the full council on Tuesday.

“Investing in strong and experienced leadership fortifies public safety for residents,” said a spokesperson for council President Marqueece Harris-Dawson, who chairs the employee relations committee.

Moore’s salary is fairly comparable to that of other city and county public safety leaders.

The chief of the Los Angeles County Fire Department, Anthony Marrone, made $475,000 in base pay in 2024, according to county data.

Los Angeles Police Chief Jim McDonnell was sworn in at a $450,000 salary in 2024 — less than the $507,500 the Board of Police Commissioners had initially recommended. McDonnell’s salary as of Tuesday was still about $450,000.

McDonnell’s salary was a significant jump over the initial pay of his predecessor, Michel Moore, who earned $350,000 when he first assumed the position in 2018.

The LAFD has about 3,200 uniformed fire personnel, while the LAPD has about 8,700 sworn officers.

Both McDonnell and the new fire chief make far less than Janisse Quiñones, general manager of the Department of Water and Power, who was sworn in at $750,000 a year. Salaries for DWP executives must remain competitive with those of utility company execs to retain top talent, according to the city’s Office of Public Accountability, which recommended Quiñones’ salary.

She makes much more than Marty Adams, the previous department head, who earned about $447,000 a year when he departed.

Moore, a 30-year LAFD veteran, has spent his first months as chief dealing with persistent questions about the department’s management of the Palisades fire.

A week after the fire, a Times investigation found that top LAFD officials did not fully staff up and pre-deploy all available engines and firefighters to the Palisades and other high-risk areas, despite a forecast of dangerously high winds.

Bass cited the failure to keep firefighters on duty for a second shift as one reason she dismissed Crowley.

The new chief has swerved between candid reflection over the department’s failures during the Palisades fire and lashing out at the media over what he has called a “smear” campaign against firefighters who bravely worked to put out the catastrophic blaze.

Moore appeared to be referencing a Times report that a battalion chief ordered crews to roll up their hoses and leave the area of the Jan. 1 Lachman fire, even though firefighters had complained that the ground was still smoldering and rocks remained hot to the touch. Days later, the Lachman fire reignited into the Palisades fire.

Moore has also tried to walk a fine line on the LAFD’s after-action report, which was meant to spell out mistakes and suggest measures to avoid repeating them.

The author of the report, Battalion Chief Kenneth Cook, declined to endorse the final version because of changes that altered his findings and made the report, in his words, “highly unprofessional and inconsistent with our established standards.”

The most significant change to the report involved downplaying LAFD officials’ pre-deployment mistakes.

Moore has admitted that the report was watered down to “soften language and reduce explicit criticism of department leadership,” while saying he would not look into who directed the watering down. But Moore has also said that he will not allow similar edits to future after-action reports.

Bass has repeatedly denied that she was involved in any effort to water down the report. But two sources with knowledge of Bass’ office have said that Bass wanted key findings about the LAFD’s actions removed or softened.

Bass has called The Times’ reporting “dangerous and irresponsible.”

Former Los Angeles Fire Chief Kristin Crowley is suing the city, claiming in a whistleblower lawsuit that Mayor Karen Bass “orchestrated a campaign of retaliation” to protect her own political future and paper over her failures during the most destructive fire in city history.

In the lawsuit, filed Monday in L.A. County Superior Court, Crowley and her attorneys allege Bass sought to shift blame for the way the city handled last year’s catastrophic Palisades fire to Crowley amid mounting criticism of the mayor’s decision to attend a ceremony in Ghana on Jan. 7, the day the fire erupted. Bass, the suit alleges, left L.A. despite knowing of the potential severe winds and fire danger.

“She sought to avoid accountability by shifting blame and lying — including falsely claiming that she was not aware of the nationally anticipated weather event, falsely claiming that the LAFD’s budget was not cut, and falsely claiming that LAFD’s resources would have supported an additional 1,000 firefighters to fight the blaze — claims contradicted by public records and Bass’ own prior statements,” the lawsuit alleges. “These false statements were not mistakes but part of a deliberate strategy to divert scrutiny from Bass’ decisions and to avoid accountability.”

The Palisades fire took off the morning of Jan. 7, 2025 amid fierce Santa Ana winds, killing 12 people and destroying thousands of homes amounting to billions of dollars in damage. While authorities allege a Florida man started the fire, saying it was actually a rekindling of a Jan. 1 fire, decisions by both LAFD brass and the mayor before, during and after Jan. 7 have come under scrutiny.

According to records obtained by The Times, shortly before releasing an after-action review report on the Palisades fire, the Los Angeles Fire Department issued a confidential memo detailing plans to protect Bass and others from “reputational harm.” The 13-page document is on LAFD letterhead and includes email addresses for department officials, representatives of Bass’ office, and public relations consultants hired to help shape messaging about the fire.

But as questions about the fire response swirled, instead of getting in lockstep with Bass, Crowley revealed to the public that “budget cuts had weakened the department’s readiness and jeopardized public and firefighter safety” and said her repeated warnings were ignored, the lawsuit says. It alleges Bass retaliated by ousting her as fire chief on Feb. 21, 2025.

Since the fire, the city has faced criticism for an inadequate deployment of firefighters, a chaotic evacuation of Pacific Palisades and a lack of water caused in part by a local reservoir being left empty for repairs. In December, The Times revealed that the city’s after-action report had been altered to deflect criticism of LAFD’s failure to predeploy engines and crews to the Palisades, among other shortcomings.

Crowley’s lawyers claim Bass’ view of her performance shifted with political opinion — starting with initial praise before reversing course and criticizing Crowley as the mayor came under fire for being out of the country during the blaze.

The mayor’s office did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

When Crowley was ousted, the mayor said it was because Crowley failed to inform her about the dangerous conditions that day or to predeploy hundreds of firefighters just in case. She also said Crowley rebuffed a request to prepare a report on the fires — a critical part of ongoing investigations into the cause of the fire and the city’s response.

But Crowley’s lawyers, Genie Harrison and Mia Munro, allege their client “repeatedly warned of the LAFD’s worsening resource and staffing crisis” prior to the fire and warned that aging infrastructure, surging emergency calls and shrinking staff left the city at risk.

“An analysis of the 90th percentile of all incidents indicates that the overall response time of LAFD resources has increased from 6:51 (minutes) in 2018 to 7:53 in 2022. This dramatic increase is nearly double the time by national standards for first-arriving units,” the lawsuit says.

Three days after the fire, Crowley told a local TV news station that her department was “screaming to be properly funded,” which prompted Bass to summon Crowley to her office, according to the lawsuit.

“I don’t know why you had to do that; normally we are on the same page, and I don’t know why you had to say stuff to the media,” Bass told Crowley, according to the lawsuit. Bass allegedly told Crowley she wasn’t firing her then because “right now I can’t do that.”

Before Crowley was ousted, the city’s top financial analyst pushed back on her budget-cutting narrative, saying that spending on the Fire Department actually went up during that budget year — in large part because of a package of firefighter raises. Those increases added an estimated $53 million to the department’s budget.

Regardless, the day after Crowley and Bass met in her office, the lawsuit alleges, retired LAFD Chief Deputy Ronnie Villanueva began working at the Emergency Operations Center, donning a mayor’s office badge. On Feb. 3, 2025, more than two weeks before Crowley was removed from her position, Villanueva wrote a report to the Board of Fire Commissioners identifying himself as the interim fire chief — a position he held until the appointment of Fire Chief Jaime Moore last fall.

The lawsuit alleges that Bass and others in her administration defamed Crowley, retaliated against her in violation of California’s labor code and violated Crowley’s 1st Amendment rights. Crowley is seeking unspecified damages.

Bass repeatedly has denied she was involved in any effort to water down the after-action report, which was meant to spell out mistakes in the Palisades fire response and suggest measures to avoid repeating them. But two sources with knowledge of Bass’ office said that after receiving an early draft of the report, the mayor told Villanueva it could expose the city to legal liabilities.

Bass wanted key findings about the LAFD’s actions removed or softened before the report was made public, the sources told The Times this month. The mayor has said The Times’ story based on the sources’ accounts was “completely fabricated.”

Crowley and her lawyers allege the LAFD “did not have sufficient operating emergency vehicles to safely and effectively pre-deploy 1,000 (or anywhere near 1,000) additional firefighters on January 7.” The department did not have the money or personnel “to repair and maintain emergency fire engines, fire trucks, and ambulances,” the suit alleges.

“This case is about accountability,” said Harrison, Crowley’s attorney. “Public servants should not face punishment or be silenced for telling the truth about public or firefighter safety and on matters of public importance.”

Times staff writers Alene Tcheckmedyian, David Zahniser and Paul Pringle contributed to this report. Pringle is a former Times staff writer.

Shortly before releasing an after-action report on the Palisades fire, the Los Angeles Fire Department issued a confidential memo detailing plans to protect Mayor Karen Bass and others from “reputational harm” in connection with the city’s handling of the catastrophic blaze, records obtained by The Times show.

“It’s our goal to prepare and protect Mayor Bass, the City, and the LAFD from reputational harm associated with the upcoming public release of its AARR, through a comprehensive strategy that includes risk assessment, proactive and reactive communications, and crisis response,” the memo states, referring to the acronym for the LAFD’s report.

The 13-page document is on LAFD letterhead and includes email addresses for department officials, representatives of Bass’ office and public relations consultants hired to help shape messaging about the fire, although it is not known to whom it was eventually distributed. The Times obtained the memo, titled “LAFD AARR: Strategic Response Plan,” from the LAFD through the California Public Records Act.

Labeled “for internal use only,” the memo, which is unsigned, aims to shape news media coverage of the report’s findings, including through efforts to “minimize tough Q&A” by asking to hold closed-door briefings with the Fire Commission and City Council. The memo is undated but notes that “This plan has been updated with the latest timeline as of 10/7.” The after-action report was released to the public on Oct. 8.

The Times disclosed in December that the report had been altered to deflect criticism of the LAFD’s failure to pre-deploy engines and crews to the Palisades ahead of the Jan. 7, 2025 fire, among other shortcomings in the city’s preparations for and response to the deadly disaster.

Mayor Karen Bass joins L.A. City Council and community safety leaders at City Hall in downtown Los Angeles on February 17, 2026.

(Christina House/Los Angeles Times)

Bass has repeatedly denied that she was involved in any effort to water down the report, which was meant to spell out mistakes and suggest measures to avoid repeating them after a fire that killed 12 people and destroyed thousands of homes. But two sources with knowledge of Bass’ office have said that after receiving an early draft of the report, the mayor told then-Interim Fire Chief Ronnie Villanueva that it could expose the city to legal liabilities.

Bass wanted key findings about the LAFD’s actions removed or softened before the report was made public, the sources told The Times early this month. The mayor has said that The Times’ story based on the sources’ accounts was “completely fabricated.”

Representatives of Bass’ office and the LAFD did not immediately comment this week on the 13-page “strategic response plan” memo.

The disclosure about the effort to protect the mayor’s reputation comes after other records revealed that she was leading damage control efforts around both the after-action report and an announcement by federal prosecutors that the Palisades fire was caused by a rekindling of a smaller blaze.

The LAFD was facing scrutiny over why it failed to put out the earlier blaze.

“Any additional interviews with the Fire Chief would likely depend on the Mayor’s guidance,” LAFD spokesperson Capt. Erik Scott wrote in an Oct. 9 email to a Bass aide, Villanueva and others. “Regarding a press conference, I would be cautious as it could invite a high volume of challenging questions, and this would also be contingent on the Mayor’s direction.”

Before releasing the after-action report, the LAFD formed an internal crisis management team and brought in the public relations consultants, Beverly Hills-based Lede Co., to help shape its messaging about the fire. In the 13-page strategy memo, Lede, whose fee was covered by the nonprofit Los Angeles Fire Department Foundation, is tasked with helping to manage and monitor news media coverage of the report.

The latest set of documents obtained by The Times includes a “Tough Q&A” with proposed answers to questions that news reporters might ask Bass and Villanueva. The questions for Bass centered around the budget and former Fire Chief Kristin Crowley’s claims that budget restrictions hampered the department’s ability to fight the Palisades fire, with the proposed answers emphasizing that the budget was not cut.

Ronnie Villanueva speaks during his appointment as interim LAFD Chief on Feb. 21, 2025.

(Drew A. Kelley / Long Beach Press-Telegram via Getty Images)

Villanueva’s proposed answers focused on the “unstoppable” nature of the fire and improvements LAFD has since made to ensure adequate staffing on red flag days.

Other internal emails reviewed by The Times show that Bass met with Villanueva about the after-action report in mid-July.

The mayor’s role in altering the after-action report and managing its release has become an issue in her reelection campaign. Bass previously said through a spokesperson that her office merely encouraged the LAFD to fact-check references in the report about city finances and the forecast of high winds leading up to Jan. 7. The mayor later told The Times that the report was “technical,” saying, “I’m not a firefighter.”

The changes that ended up in the final report were significant, with some Palisades residents and former LAFD chiefs saying they amounted to a cover-up.

A week after the fire, The Times exposed LAFD officials’ decisions not to fully staff up and pre-deploy all available engines and firefighters to the Palisades and other high-risk areas before the dangerous winds hit. Bass later removed Crowley, citing the failure to keep firefighters on duty for a second shift.

An initial draft of the after-action report said the pre-deployment decisions “did not align” with policy, but the final version said the number of companies pre-deployed “went above and beyond the standard LAFD pre-deployment matrix.”

Fire fighters work to extinguish flames during the Eaton fire on Wednesday, Jan. 8, 2025 in Altadena, CA.

(Jason Armond/Los Angeles Times)

The author of the report, Battalion Chief Kenneth Cook, declined to endorse the final version because of changes that altered his findings and made the report, in his words, “highly unprofessional and inconsistent with our established standards.”

Even with the deletions and changes, the report delivered a harsh critique of the LAFD’s performance during the Palisades fire, pointing to a disorganized response, failures in communication and chiefs who didn’t understand their roles. The report found that top commanders lacked a fundamental knowledge of wildland firefighting tactics, including “basic suppression techniques.”

Fire Chief Jaime Moore, an LAFD veteran whom Bass named as chief in November, has said he is focused on the future and not interested in assigning blame for changes to the report. But he said he will not allow similar edits to future after-action reports.

The after-action report included just a brief reference to the Lachman fire, a small Jan. 1, 2025, blaze that rekindled six days later into the Palisades fire.

The Times found that a battalion chief ordered firefighters to roll up their hoses and leave the Lachman burn area the day after the fire was supposedly extinguished, despite complaints by crew members that the ground still was smoldering.

After the Times report, Bass directed Moore to commission an independent investigation into the LAFD’s handling of the Lachman fire.

LAFD officials have said that most of the 42 recommendations in the after-action report have been implemented, including mandatory staffing protocols on red flag days and training on wind-driven fires, tactical operations and evacuations.

Pringle is a former Times staff writer.