Koreas

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un presided over a major exhibition of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) on Thursday. A mockup of an apparent new large stealth drone was displayed prominently alongside an increasingly diverse collection of reconnaissance drones, armed UAVs, loitering munitions, and small attack drones. While there is no evidence that North Korea is capable of getting a stealthy flying-wing drone flying, let alone operating as a operationally relevant low-observable platform, there are no doubts that the country has an increasingly impressive uncrewed aircraft arsenal, with the smaller, lower-end types being of greatest importance.

As for the “stealth drone,” photographs released by North Korean state media show a mockup of a tailless flying-wing design. In terms of appearance, there are clear parallels with advanced uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) developed by the United States, China, and Russia.

However, huge questions remain as to what degree the mockup is part of a realistic program. We have no details of the program’s development status and planned capabilities. It is highly questionable if Pyongyang is able to produce a functional prototype. Even if it can get it into the air, there is no evidence that it possesses the capabilities to master meaningful stealth technologies, let alone the command-and-control functions and other elements needed for it to operate in a tactically relevant manner.

The exhibition, titled Unmanned Aeronautical Technology Development-2026, was held on Thursday, with images published by the ruling Workers’ Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun today. Kim called for the country to achieve “absolute superiority” in drone technology and announced unspecified measures to accelerate the development of uncrewed aviation systems and military artificial intelligence.

An Ambitious New Flying-Wing Design

The mockup of the new aircraft was positioned prominently in the exhibition hall, suggesting that Pyongyang considers it at least indicative of its broader ambitions.

Based on the available photographs, Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, interviewed by NK News, estimated the wingspan at roughly 56 to 66 feet and its height at around 10 to 11.5 feet. Standout features include a dorsal air intake, a relatively large center fuselage section integrated into the flying wing, and retractable tricycle landing gear.

In terms of general arrangement, there are similarities to Northrop Grumman’s X-47B, the U.S. Navy’s experimental carrier-based UCAV. There are also visual similarities with China’s GJ-11 Sharp Sword and Russia’s S-70 Okhotnik, two other large flying-wing UCAV designs.

At this point, North Korea has not provided any technical information about the aircraft’s propulsion system, payload, intended mission, or flight performance.

Critically, while the external shape is consistent with a stealthy UCAV, a flying-wing configuration on its own is only one part of a far more complex puzzle in achieving a genuinely low radar signature. Other factors include the engine inlet and exhaust arrangements, radar-absorbing materials, surface treatments, manufacturing tolerances, and the alignment of individual edges and surfaces, low probability of intercept communications and much more.

The Iranian RQ-170 Precedent

Overall, there are many good reasons to be extremely cautious about North Korea’s apparent ambitions in this area.

Iran is another country that has displayed a drone that resembles an advanced Western stealth platform, without actually reproducing its capabilities. It has, however, gotten a UCAV-lookalike into the air.

After recovering a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel reconnaissance drone that came down inside Iranian territory in 2011, Tehran announced that it had successfully reverse-engineered the aircraft. In 2014, Iranian authorities displayed what they presented as a domestically produced copy of the American drone, claiming that it would soon undertake a test flight.

Outside observers questioned whether the displayed aircraft was anything more than a non-functional replica, noting apparent shortcomings in its construction and the use of components inconsistent with a sophisticated operational aircraft.

Iran subsequently presented a family of aircraft derived from the RQ-170 concept, including the Shahed-171 Simorgh and the smaller Shahed-191. Iran has demonstrated flying examples of these designs, but they fall far short of replicating the RQ-170’s actual low-observable qualities, let alone its sensors and avionics.

In the case of Pyongyang, however, the possibility of Russian assistance is at least worth considering.

North Korea’s burgeoning military relationship with Moscow, including the deployment of North Korean troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, could provide a chance for the exchange of technical knowledge and operational experience from Moscow. Russia has developed and flown the S-70 Okhotnik UCAV, exposing it to some operational trials in Ukraine, and could have passed related information on to Pyongyang.

In particular, North Korea would welcome Russian assistance in developing and manufacturing propulsion, flight control, sensor, and materials technologies.

However, there is so far no proof of technology transfer from Russia. Even if it were to be provided, it is far from clear that this would suffice to get a true UCAV into the air anytime soon, although an Iran-style knockoff with far reduced capabilities cannot be ruled out entirely. It’s also worth noting that Russia’s own UCAV program has been anything but a smooth and rapid advancement to an operational state.

Overall, the new flying-wing concept does not represent a realistic technological undertaking — at least for now. Very few countries have managed to develop and fly drones in this class, and fewer still have been able to field them operationally.

North Korea’s Drone Development Effort

The flying-wing aircraft was only one part of a much larger display. More than 30 types of UAVs reportedly appeared at the exhibition, reflecting North Korea’s efforts to diversify its uncrewed aviation capabilities.

Some of these designs had been seen before, including the Saetbyol-4 and Saetbyol-9. These were first displayed in 2023 and are, in terms of appearance, clones of the U.S. RQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-9 Reaper, respectively.

Imagery released of the Saetbyol-9 showed it carrying — and firing — several types of air-to-ground weapons. These include a Hellfire-like laser-guided missile, along with smaller rockets and other possible guided munitions.

Other exhibits included loitering munitions resembling Israel’s Harop and Russia’s Lancet, as well as smaller drones with configurations similar to the U.S.-made Switchblade family.

Hundreds of small quadcopter drones were also displayed on storage racks. Some appeared to carry cylindrical containers associated with fiber-optic control systems, a technology that has become increasingly prominent in the Russia-Ukraine war. Unlike conventional radio-controlled drones, fiber-optic systems are largely immune to conventional radio-frequency jamming of their control links. These drones would be a major feature in a cross-DMZ conflict.

North Korean interest in artificial intelligence was another recurring theme. Kim called for the development of increasingly intelligent uncrewed weapons, although there is no indication of how advanced the country’s existing autonomous navigation, target recognition, or engagement systems actually are.

The exhibition was accompanied by live-fire demonstrations involving UAVs, cruise missiles, and multiple rocket launchers. North Korean state media claimed that missiles launched from drones and other systems struck an island target “with 100 percent accuracy.”

From Ambition To Operational Capabilities

North Korea’s rapidly expanding interest in drones should also be seen against the shortcomings of its aging crewed combat aviation fleet. Relatively inexpensive UAVs offer opportunities for reconnaissance and attacks against military infrastructure without exposing pilots to enemy air defenses. At the same time, Pyongyang has failed to introduce new crewed combat aircraft to modernize its air force, the capabilities of which are thoroughly outmatched by those of South Korea.

The war in Ukraine (as well as lessons from conflicts in the Middle East) also provides Pyongyang with an opportunity to study the use of drones on a large scale. North Korean troops deployed to Russia will have gained first-hand experience of drone warfare, including the integration of reconnaissance UAVs, FPV attack drones, and electronic warfare systems.

That experience could help accelerate the development of North Korea’s own uncrewed platforms, particularly relatively simple systems that can be produced in large quantities.

An attack drone in the Shahed/Geran class, for example, could be produced relatively easily in very large numbers (and that is likely already happening to some degree) and could saturate South Korean air defenses, which are generally tailored to address more conventional threats. North Korea doesn’t need the long range that the Shahed/Geran typically provides, since many of its primary targets are much closer. The shorter distances involved could permit a greater proportion of a drone’s weight to be allocated to its warhead, depending on the design. Alternatively, a drone with the roughly 1,000-mile reach of the Shahed/Geran could fly a very complex route to reach targets in the South, including approaching via the coast. At the very least, expanding North Korean efforts in this area could tilt the balance of power on the peninsula, providing Seoul with a major interdiction problem and forcing the development of new countermeasures, such as directed-energy weapons and cheap interceptors.

The possibility of Russian assistance via its own Geran development effort is likely bringing enhanced technologies within reach of North Korea. Indeed, that kind of expertise is already being gained by tens of thousands of North Korean workers who have been sent to Russia as additional labor for its drone-production efforts.

And once again, it’s these one-way attack munitions and smaller drones that can be mass-produced and rapidly iterated upon that pose a real threat to South Korea. It is likely that North Korea will continue to ramp-up its investment in these systems, building them in very large tranches in order to create an asymmetric advantage — one that has proven challenging to counter in real conflicts around the globe. At the same time, they will also continue to build high-tech-looking clones of far more advanced systems which will have little tactical or strategic impact but work well for propaganda purposes.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarone.com

North Korea says it has test-fired two types of submarine-launched strategic cruise missiles off its east coast, in what appears to be the first time its bizarre Hero Kim Kun Ok submarine has been seen at sea in a publicized manner. If the vessel truly was the launch platform, the tests would mark its first confirmed weapons trials and a potential step toward operational service. Unveiled with considerable fanfare in 2023, the Hero Kim Kun Ok has been billed by Pyongyang as a centerpiece of its future nuclear-armed navy, but its operational status and actual capabilities have remained unclear.

The launches took place Wednesday, October 14, with state media Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reporting the activity earlier today. North Korea said the tests were intended to assess the readiness of its underwater combat systems, improve the Navy’s ability to execute strategic missions, and demonstrate the reliability of its deterrent. Along with imagery of the cruise missiles, KCNA released one photo of the Hero Kim Kun Ok underway, which you can see at the top of this story.

KCNA did not otherwise identify the submarine involved or disclose the missiles’ ranges, flight paths, or performance. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it had detected and tracked the launches from before firing through the cruise and terminal phases. A JCS spokesperson said one missile type was launched from a vertical launch system and another from a torpedo tube. This would match the imagery we are seeing, it would also match the Hero Kim Kun Ok’s unique capabilities. The South Korean military assessed that the launches came from a submarine but did not initially identify the vessel publicly.

There remains a possibility that the 3,000-ton-class Hero Kim Kun Ok was not actually involved in launching the missiles. North Korea has long used underwater platforms for test missile launches and has paired these with images of an actual submarine for propaganda purposes. However, the JCS confirming they came from a submarine would lend additional credence to the possibility Hero Kim Kun Ok did indeed launch the missiles. If this is the case, it would indicate that North Korea has begun validating weapons systems aboard the submarine ahead of deployment. At the very least, we can confirm that the Hero Kim Kun Ok is now sailing, although South Korean and U.S. intelligence would be acutely aware of its movements and it could have been in at-sea testing for years now, we just don’t know.

North Korea unveiled the submarine in September 2023, describing it as its first “tactical nuclear attack submarine” and one of the Navy’s core offensive platforms. At the launching ceremony, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was quoted as saying that arming the Navy with nuclear weapons “brooks no further delay.”

Nevertheless, many questions remain about the submarine’s design and operational prospects. Overall, it remains a heavily modified derivative of a Cold War-era Romeo class diesel-electric submarine — nearly an antique by today’s standards — rather than a purpose-built guided missile submarine. Previous imagery shows 10 missile launch tubes concealed in the prominent ‘turtle back’ aft of the sail, in addition to torpedo tubes, although the precise configuration, usable capacity, and operational status of those systems remain uncertain.

The absence of publicly reported weapons tests from the vessel over the following years raised questions about its development. Analyst Shin Jong-woo of South Korea’s Defense and Security Forum told Reuters that the latest launches suggested combat-system testing for operational deployment was underway. He also suggested that North Korea may have resolved technical problems and could also test a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) before the vessel enters service. North Korea has previously presented SLBMs of increasing size, but has lacked a suitable submarine to launch them from.

Missile launches while the submarine is submerged represent a more demanding and operationally relevant capability than firing from the surface.

At the same time, a missile launch of any kind demonstrates only part of the capability required for a submarine like this to be effective at all. An operational submarine must also be able to deploy reliably, remain sufficiently difficult to detect, maintain its weapons, and execute missions under realistic conditions.

A vertical launch system (VLS) can provide dedicated capacity for certain missile types — potentially much larger ones — and may enable faster launches or larger salvos than a configuration relying exclusively on torpedo tubes. Torpedo tubes offer an alternative launch method, but with different constraints on weapon dimensions, handling, and firing procedures.

The forward four tubes are larger than the rear six on the submarine’s ‘turtle back.’ This would allow the boat to carry multiple types of missiles, possibly including a mix of short-range and longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

Testing both systems would be consistent with an effort to validate multiple elements of the submarine’s weapons architecture.

North Korea has pursued submarine-launched missiles for years. In March 2023, it reported a submarine-launched cruise missile test from the older 8.24 Yongung submarine. In January 2024, Pyongyang said it had fired Pulhwasal-3-31 strategic cruise missiles from that same vessel. The earlier sub is in the 2,000-ton-class and is understood to have only one or two vertical launch tubes.

North Korea’s description of the weapons as “strategic” cruise missiles should also be treated cautiously. North Korea’s long-range cruise missile program is well established and a nuclear payload is a major part of its ambitions, but how mature or reliable a nuclear warhead is for this application at this time isn’t clear. Regardless, ground, surface, and now subsurface-launched cruise missiles are a key part of North Korea’s broader deterrent architecture.

According to reports, Wednesday’s activity was the first publicly reported underwater North Korean missile-testing event since the January 2024 launch.

Compared to the 8.24 Yongung submarine, the Hero Kim Kun Ok has a larger hull and additional vertical launch tubes, but it still uses very dated diesel-electric propulsion, which presents hugely different endurance, acoustic, and operating constraints compared with nuclear propulsion or even modern diesel-electric submarine capabilities.

As to the expectation that Pyongyang may test an SLBM from the submarine before deployment, this would be a likely milestone toward North Korea fielding a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.

North Korea is also pursuing a separate nuclear-powered submarine project, unveiled as under construction in March 2025. Its completion and operational timeline remain uncertain. Nuclear propulsion is a much bigger challenge, but if perfected, such a boat would be of considerably greater value, especially as a second-strike capability.

The latest submarine tests come amid a broader series of North Korean weapons demonstrations, including reported hypersonic missile tests on September 20 and October 3, as well as tactical ballistic missile launches earlier in October.

The sequence is consistent with Pyongyang’s effort to diversify its delivery systems and complicate military planning for South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

The activity also carries a diplomatic message. North Korea has repeatedly insisted that it will not abandon its nuclear weapons while the United States maintains what Pyongyang calls a hostile policy. It has also rejected the suggestion that adjustments to U.S.-South Korean military exercises would be sufficient to change the underlying relationship.

The tests also follow North Korea’s rejection of an apparent diplomatic opening from U.S. President Donald Trump after Washington sought to reduce tensions surrounding a U.S.-South Korean military exercise.

A submarine able to launch missiles from less predictable locations complicates defensive planning for South Korea and the United States. The challenge extends beyond intercepting missiles after launch to detecting and tracking the submarine before it reaches a potential firing position. Even a partially capable vessel places additional demands on potential adversaries.

Were things to ‘go hot’ on the Korean Peninsula, any submarine capable of carrying strategic weapons would be at the top of the targeting list for Pyongyang’s adversaries. A submarine based on the archaic Romeo class design would be fairly easy to track from the time it leaves its berth. This is especially the case bearing in mind the sophisticated nature of South Korea’s anti-submarine capabilities.

Future submarines will become increasingly more challenging, however. That problem could intensify if future North Korean boats make more use of Russian assistance in developing their capabilities. Submarine technology is supposedly part of the payment to Pyongyang for its help in the war in Ukraine. This could become a much larger problem, even if Moscow were to provide North Korea with advanced Kilo class boats, for example.

For now, provided that the Hero Kim Kun Ok launched the missiles, which seems most likely, this would indicate that North Korea is advancing weapons integration aboard a submarine intended to expand its offensive naval capabilities. The fact that the Hero Kim Kun Ok is now at sea also signals progress toward deployment.

Whatever the ultimate operational effectiveness of the Hero Kim Kun Ok and its emerging missile armament, Pyongyang continues to demonstrate incremental improvements to its submarine forces.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com