Kazakhstan

WASHINGTON — President Trump will host leaders of five Central Asian countries at the White House on Thursday as he intensifies his hunt for rare earth metals needed for high-tech devices, including smartphones, electric vehicles and fighter jets.

Trump and the officials from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are holding an evening summit and dinner on the heels of Trump managing at least a temporary thaw with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on differences between the United States and China over the export of rare earth elements, a key point of friction in their trade negotiations.

Early last month, Beijing expanded export restrictions over vital rare earth elements and magnets before announcing, after Trump-Xi talks in South Korea last week, that China would delay its new restrictions by one year.

Washington is now looking for new ways to circumvent China on critical minerals. China accounts for nearly 70% of the world’s rare earth mining and controls roughly 90% of global rare earths processing.

Central Asia holds deep reserves of rare earth minerals and produces roughly half the world’s uranium, which is critical to nuclear power production. But the region badly needs investment to further develop the resources.

Central Asia’s critical mineral exports have long tilted toward China and Russia. Kazakhstan, for example, in 2023 sent $3.07 billion in critical minerals to China and $1.8 billion to Russia compared with $544 million to the U.S., according to country-level trade data compiled by the Observatory of Economic Complexity, an online data platform.

A bipartisan group of senators introduced legislation Wednesday to repeal Soviet-era trade restrictions that some lawmakers say are holding back American investment in the Central Asian nations, which became independent with the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

“Today, it’s not too late to deepen our cooperation and ensure that these countries can decide their own destinies, as a volatile Russia and an increasingly aggressive China pursue their own national interests around the globe at the cost to their neighbors,” said Republican Sen. Jim Risch of Idaho, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a sponsor of the legislation. “The United States offers Central Asian nations the real opportunity to work with a willing partner, while lifting up each others’ economies.”

The grouping of countries, referred to as the “C5+1,” has largely focused on regional security, particularly in light of the two-decade U.S. military presence and then withdrawal from neighboring Afghanistan, China’s treatment of ethnic Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and attempts by Russia to reassert power in the region.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio welcomed the Central Asian leaders at the State Department on Wednesday to mark the 10-year anniversary of the C5+1 and to plug the potential for expanding the countries economic ties to the U.S.

“We oftentimes spend so much time focused on crisis and problems – and they deserve attention – that sometimes we don’t spend enough time focused on exciting new opportunities,” Rubio said. “And that’s what exists here now: an exciting new opportunity in which the national interests of our respective countries are aligned.”

Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and the U.S. ambassador to India, Sergio Gor, who also serves as President Donald Trump’s special envoy to South and Central Asia, recently visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to prepare for the summit.

Administration officials say deepening the U.S. relationship with the countries is a priority, a point they have made clear to the Central Asian officials.

The president’s “commitment to this region is that you have a direct line to the White House, and that you will get the attention that this area very much deserves,” Gor told the Central Asian officials Wednesday.

In 2023, Democratic President Joe Biden met with the five leaders on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. That was the only other time that a sitting president has taken part in a C5+1 summit.

Madhani writes for the Associated Press. AP writer Matthew Lee contributed to this report.

As former striker Sam Vokes reminded, North Macedonia will still have a say in this group and will be eyeing their trip to Cardiff in November as a chance to nick second spot.

If the worst happens, Wales are all but sure of having the chance to qualify for the play-offs as one of the Nations League group winners.

In the likely event of two of Spain, Germany, Portugal, France and England finishing either first or second in their group, Wales would get their play-off place.

It is a handy safety net, but it does come with a warning.

The play-offs are seeded with the Nations League entrants being automatically placed into pot four. In other words, should Wales finish third, they would face one of the highest ranked runners-up in the semi-final.

Put simply, it means Bellamy’s side have every motivation going into their final three games.

And – as was suggested after full-time in Astana – all that matters from here on in is that they win.

After a final sense check of the schedule and plans, camp begins as players walk through the door at the Vale Hotel on the outskirts of Cardiff, where the FAW offices and training ground are also housed.

One by one squad members arrive, handing over a passport to be checked and receiving a room card.

The days of the likes of Chris Gunter and Aaron Ramsey sharing are over, with every player allocated single rooms which are mapped out and planned – though there is scope for players who are particularly close to be housed near one another.

Players have their own WhatsApp group, but another for information and key reminders rolls over from the previous international.

There is no room for sympathy, either, with dropped or injured players removed from that group to prevent sensitive information being leaked by accident.

It is safe to say that in the months after the 2022 World Cup, the words “Gareth Bale has left the group” rammed home the reality of his retirement.

Daily meetings with other departments – from media to medical – are held by Bellamy before breakfast, with each one laying out plans for the day and making sure everyone remains on the same page.

As training begins, an advanced party heads to Astana via Azerbaijan.

As well as a final check on facilities and security, meeting rooms at the hotel are decked in Wales team branding ready for the team’s arrival.

Among the early travellers is the team chef, who – after liaising with the performance team – has prepared and sent a menu to the hotel a month prior to arrival.

Menus are adapted if certain produce cannot be sourced or is out of season. Recipe cards are provided if local staff cannot quite get used to making staple foods like porridge at breakfast.

With players’ habits and even superstitions in mind, extensive options for food the day before a game and in the final hours before a match are provided – including those baked beans.

The Russian Federation resumes its invasion of Ukraine with little concern for the country’s sanctions, loss of soft power, and numerous military losses. Despite spending much of 2025 attempting to decouple Russia from China, the Kremlin has not reciprocated with goodwill to the Trump Administration. Instead, Moscow continues to stall negotiations to buy time to complete its military objectives.

Instead, Moscow can be brought under pressure for a negotiated settlement or full military withdrawal from Ukraine by limiting Russian influence as much as possible through its defense alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). A coalition that is thinly held together, CSTO has increasingly fractured in Moscow’s orbit, and the West has a chance to pressure the Russian government by isolating Russia from its own military alliance.

Ongoing Attempts to End the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Against the backdrop of Donald Trump assuming the presidency for the second time, the Administration has made a key goal to try to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine as quickly as possible. Originally trying to decouple Russia from China, the Administration attempted to bring the Kremlin to the negotiating table by voting against a United Nations resolution condemning the invasion, reducing weapons deliveries to Ukraine, and applying more pressure on Kyiv than Moscow.

Instead, Washington has found itself at a crossroads as the Kremlin has continued an aggressive posture, even when the U.S. government publicly ambushed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an attempt to bring Moscow to the table.

The Alaska Summit was intended to find a close solution to ending the war in Ukraine—potentially frozen lines akin to those on the Korean Peninsula, without guaranteed NATO membership for Kyiv. Still, Moscow’s demands included no Western troops providing peacekeeping, full sanctions lifting, and the entirety of the Donbas region, which Russian forces still do not control fully, including the remaining fortress cities under Ukrainian control.

Seeking options to finally bring Moscow to concrete talks, the U.S. and Western governments should utilize their global soft power by decoupling countries long considered Russian vassals and helping them grow more independent of Russia.

Russia is Losing Control of Its Former Sphere of Influence

During the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has suffered militarily and diplomatically. Countries that were initially hesitant to upset the Kremlin have begun to reassess their relations with Moscow, including some CSTO member states.

Formed in 2002, the CSTO comprises Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia as its member states. However, not all members of CSTO have been synchronized and on the same page.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have experienced numerous border clashes due to the Soviet Union’s reconfiguration of their perimeter. Belarus and Armenia are engrossed in a diplomatic conflict, and Kazakhstan has pushed back against Russia’s historical revisionism, moving closer to China. Furthermore, due to numerous inactions taken by Russia during the Second Karabakh War, Armenia has not only strained relations with the former but also limited their participation in CSTO.

Outside of the CSTO, Russia has also suffered military setbacks and lost influence in certain parts of Africa and the Middle East. Russian mercenaries are taking heavy casualties in the Sahel with their junta allies in Mali and Sudan on the back foot against jihadists, Tuareg separatists, and the Sudanese army, respectively.

Against the backdrop of the collapse of the Ba’athist Syrian military, Russia would lose its strategically important naval base in Tartus and its only military stronghold in the Middle East. Without Syria, not only is Russia’s Mediterranean fleet limited in maritime maneuvers, but also the shadow fleet of tankers will not have a key base to dock and export fuel to continue the Kremlin’s war effort.

How to Bring CSTO Nations into the Fold

Russia’s costly and miscalculated invasion and prolonged occupation have only isolated the country into a de facto vassal status of China. With waning Russian influence, the West can use rapprochement policies towards CSTO countries to decouple them from the Kremlin’s orbit.

In Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have developed closer relations with China and Turkey; however, pivotal Western policies, such as the United States’ promotion of sovereignty without Russian interference in 2023, have also played an integral role in enhancing relations in the region. President Trump could continue advancing this Biden Administration policy that further sidesteps Russia while ongoing trade negotiations continue.

In the South Caucasus, the economic corridor submitted between Azerbaijan and Armenia as part of a planned peace agreement has excluded Russia from the finalized documents. The Trump Administration scored a key diplomatic victory after years of the U.S. government’s rapprochement with Armenia following the 2020 war.

France has played a key role in American relations in the South Caucasus, as Paris is at the forefront of limiting Russian influence in the region, as Moscow has done the same towards French soft power in Africa. With Armenia’s government showing signs of wanting to transform into a full Western democracy with potential European Union membership, the U.S. should, in the future, promote Yerevan towards non-NATO ally status.

Regarding Belarus, its armed forces have shot down more Russian drones than NATO during the ongoing invasion. Alexander Lukashenko, the longtime leader of Belarus, arguably sticks close to Russia after decades of isolation from Europe due to his authoritarian policies.

Nevertheless, the West could initiate a slow and gradual process of rapprochement with Belarus—neither lifting sanctions, but offering Lukashenko amnesty and potential exile in a comfortable villa if the Belarusian autocrat promotes democratic norms and gradually drifts away from Russia.

Utilizing soft power, not just through sanctions, is a policy the West can use going forward to apply pressure on Russia. With Moscow’s drifting soft power in several regions while relations with CSTO continue to drift, the United States and Europe have an opportunity for rapprochement to isolate the Kremlin further and bring the Russian government to get serious in negotiations for their invasion of Ukraine, finally.

The nuclear danger today is greater than at any time since the Cold War. The world faces the prospect of a renewed arms race, this time unconstrained by the agreements that for decades kept catastrophe at bay. It is estimated that there are now 12,241 nuclear warheads worldwide. Arms control is unravelling before our eyes: Inspections under the New START treaty, the last remaining arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, remain suspended, and with its expiration in February 2026, there is no successor in sight. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is gone, the Treaty on Open Skies has been abandoned, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has still not entered into force. At the same time, the world’s geopolitical landscape is more volatile than ever.

Deep down, everyone knows nuclear weapons are a danger. We know their destructive power: Instant annihilation, radiation sickness, cancers, poisoned land, and generations of suffering. Yet the international community increasingly accepts the idea that nuclear weapons make countries safe. It is true that, at the level of geopolitics, they can provide a shield of deterrence. But on a global scale, they are a sword of Damocles hanging over all of humanity. The longer we pretend they guarantee security, the greater the danger that one day deterrence will fail. This danger is becoming even more disturbing with the growing reliance on artificial intelligence in military technologies.

I know this danger all too well, not in theory, but in my body and in my country’s history. I was born without arms, a legacy of nuclear testing carried out by the Soviet Union in my homeland of Kazakhstan. From 1949 to 1989, more than 450 nuclear tests were conducted at the Semipalatinsk test site. More than a million people were directly exposed to radiation, and the consequences are still felt today in the third and fourth generations: Cancers, birth defects, environmental destruction, and intergenerational trauma. My own life is a testimony to the human price paid for so-called “national security”. I became an artist, painting with my mouth and feet, and an activist so my country’s tragedy will not be repeated anywhere else.

What Kazakhstan went through is the reason why, since independence, my country has been a leading proponent of nuclear disarmament. We inherited the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal and chose to give it up voluntarily. We shut down the Semipalatinsk test site permanently. We established the International Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, creating a global backstop against nuclear fuel crises. And today, Kazakhstan is preparing to build its first nuclear power plant. This is an important distinction: Our country is not against nuclear energy, which can be harnessed peacefully to meet the growing demand for electricity and reduce carbon emissions. But nuclear weapons are a different matter entirely. They do not light homes; they only destroy them. That is why it was Kazakhstan’s initiative at the United Nations that led to the proclamation of August 29, the date on which the Semipalatinsk test site was officially closed, as the International Day against Nuclear Tests.

Kazakhstan has done its part. But this fight is bigger than us. The world needs much wider support if we are to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons. I acknowledge that the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons may feel distant today. But there are concrete steps the international community can take right now to reduce the danger, if only the will can be found.

First, we must address the madness of keeping thousands of warheads on hair-trigger alert. About 2,100 nuclear weapons remain on short-notice alert, with leaders given only minutes to decide whether to unleash them. In such a compressed timeframe, the risk of false alarms, technical glitches, or even AI-driven misjudgments grows intolerably high. De-alerting these weapons is the most obvious near-term risk-reduction step. Human survival should not rest on a rushed decision made in mere moments.

Second, nuclear-armed states must publicly reaffirm their moratorium on nuclear testing, regardless of treaty politics. If they cannot yet ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, they should at least pledge never to test again. That is the bare minimum owed to the victims of past testing, from Semey to the Pacific and beyond.

Third, we must reaffirm the humanitarian principle that nuclear weapons are inhumane by their very nature. That is the moral heart of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Even if governments cannot yet sign or ratify it, they can embrace its spirit, recognising that no state, no people, can ever respond adequately to the detonation of a nuclear device in a populated area.

Fourth, the world must prevent new frontiers of nuclear danger. We must reaffirm the ban on nuclear weapons in orbit, ensuring that outer space remains free of these doomsday devices. And all states should commit that decisions on nuclear use will never be delegated to artificial intelligence.

Finally, we must fight the greatest danger of all: Forgetting. Each August 29, we should not only mark the International Day against Nuclear Tests but also commit to education and remembrance. Every schoolchild should know what happened at Semey, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, at Bikini Atoll. Only when the world remembers our suffering will it choose never to repeat it.

The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons is not naive, and it is not impossible. Kazakhstan showed what is possible when it closed the Semipalatinsk test site and renounced its nuclear arsenal. If a nation that endured hundreds of nuclear tests could choose a nuclear-weapon-free path, others can too. The question is whether humanity has the courage to do it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

United States President Donald Trump has unveiled steep tariffs on more than a dozen countries as he ratchets up his pressure campaign aimed at winning concessions on trade.

Trump’s latest trade threats on Monday put 14 countries, including key US allies Japan and South Korea, on notice that they will face tariffs of 25 to 40 percent from August 1 unless they take more US exports and boost manufacturing in the US.

In nearly identical letters to the countries’ leaders, Trump said the US had “decided to move forward” with their relationship, but “only with more balanced, and fair, TRADE”.

Trump warned that any retaliatory taxes would be met with even higher tariffs, but left the door open to relief from the measures for countries that ease trade barriers.

“If you wish to open your heretofore closed Trading Markets to the United States, eliminate your tariff, and Non Tariff, Policies and Trade Barriers, we will, perhaps consider an adjustment to this letter,” Trump said in the letters, using capital letters to emphasise particular words.

“These Tariffs may be modified, upward or downward, depending on our relationship with your Country.”

Speaking to reporters later on Monday, Trump said the August 1 deadline was “firm” but not “100 percent firm”.

“If they call up and they say we’d like to do something a different way, we’re going to be open to that,” he said.

Trump’s steepest tariffs would apply to Laos and Myanmar, which are both facing duties of 40 percent. Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Kazakhstan and Tunisia would be subject to the lowest rate of 25 percent.

Cambodia and Thailand are facing a 36 percent tariff rate, Serbia and Bangladesh a 35 percent rate, and South Africa and Bosnia and Herzegovina a 30 percent rate. Indonesia would be subject to a 32 percent rate.

All 14 countries, many of which have highly export-reliant economies, had previously been subject to a baseline tariff of 10 percent.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba called the tariff on his country “truly regrettable”, but said the Japanese side would continue negotiations towards a mutually beneficial agreement.

South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said in a statement that it would step up negotiations ahead of the August 1 deadline to “reach a mutually beneficial negotiation result so as to swiftly address uncertainties stemming from tariffs”.

Malaysia’s Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry said the Southeast Asian country would continue engagement with the US “towards a balanced, mutually beneficial, and comprehensive trade agreement.”

Lawrence Loh, the director of the Centre for Governance and Sustainability at the National University of Singapore Business School, said Asian countries are limited in their ability to present a united front in the face of Trump’s threats due to their varying trade profiles and geopolitical interests.

“It is not possible for these countries, even for a formal pact like ASEAN, to act in a coordinated manner. It’s likely to be to each country on its own,” Loh told Al Jazeera, referring to the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

“That’s the trump card for Trump.”

Loh said countries in the region will feel pressure to make concessions to Trump to avoid damage to their economies.

“On balance for Asian countries, not giving concessions will turn out more harmful than playing along with the US,” he said.

“Especially for the smaller countries with less bargaining power, retaliation is out of the question.”

The US stock market dipped sharply on Trump’s latest tariff threats, with the benchmark S&P 500 falling 0.8 percent and the tech-heavy Nasdaq Composite dropping 0.9 percent.

But Asia’s major stock markets shrugged off the uncertainty, with Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index up about 0.8 percent, South Korea’s KOSPI up about 1.4 percent, and Japan’s Nikkei 225 up about 0.2 percent as of 05:00 GMT.

While the Trump administration has ramped up pressure on its trade partners to reach deals to avoid higher tariffs, only three countries so far – China, Vietnam and the United Kingdom – have announced agreements to de-escalate trade tensions.

US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent earlier on Monday teased the announcement of “several” agreements within the next 48 hours.

Bessent did not elaborate on which countries would be involved in the deals or what the agreements might entail.

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told a media briefing that Trump would send more letters this week and that the administration was “close” to announcing deals with other countries.

Calvin Cheng, the director of the economics and trade programme at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, said that while US partners will be eager to negotiate relief from the tariffs, many governments may be resigned to higher taxes on their exports going forward.

“In my view, many will likely be under greater pressure to deploy every available institutional and political lever to address legitimate US trade concerns, particularly around tightening rules of origin and legitimate IP [intellectual property] concerns,” Cheng told Al Jazeera.

“However, there could also be a cognisance that current tariff lines are more durable than expected, so measures could shift towards targeted accommodation, while preparing domestic exporters and industries for a future of trade where a significant proportion of this tariff barrier is likely to remain.”

“My personal view is that the bulk of the current tariff rate is stickier than perhaps initially assumed,” Cheng added.

“Future concessions could be within single-digit percentage points off the average rate.”

Eduardo Araral, an associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, expressed a similar view.

“Unless Tokyo, Seoul and key ASEAN capitals can bundle tariff relief with credible paths on autos, agriculture, digital trade and – in some cases – security alignment before 1 August, the higher rates will likely stick, adding another layer of uncertainty to an already litigated and politically fraught tariff regime,” Araral told Al Jazeera.

United States President Donald Trump is set to impose 25 percent tariffs on two key US allies, Japan and South Korea, beginning on August 1 as the administration’s self-imposed deadline for trade agreements of July 9 nears without a deal in place.

On Monday, the Trump administration said this in the first of 12 letters to key US trade partners regarding the new levies they face.

In near-identically worded letters to the Japanese and South Korean leaders, the US president said the trade relationship was “unfortunately, far from Reciprocal”.

Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has said that he “won’t easily compromise” in trade talks with the Trump administration.

The US imports nearly twice as much from Japan as it exports to the country, according to US Census Bureau data.

Currently, both Japan and South Korea have a 10 percent levy in place, the same as almost all US trading partners. But Trump said he was ready to lower the new levels if the two countries changed their trade policies.

“We will, perhaps, consider an adjustment to this letter,” he said in letters to the two Asian countries’ leaders that he posted on his Truth Social platform. “If for any reason you decide to raise your Tariffs, then, whatever the number you choose to raise them by, will be added onto the 25% that we charge.”

Trump also announced the US will impose 25 percent tariffs each on Malaysia and Kazakhstan, 30 percent on South Africa and 40 percent each on Laos and Myanmar.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said earlier on Monday that he expected several trade announcements to be made in the next 48 hours, adding that his inbox was full of last-ditch offers from countries to clinch a tariff deal by the deadline. Bessent did not say which countries could get deals and what they might contain.

In April, the White House said it would have 90 trade and tariff deals established within 90 days. That did not happen, and since that time, the administration has solidified two agreements — one with Vietnam, and the other with the United Kingdom.

“There will be additional letters in the coming days,” White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said, adding that “we are close” on some deals. She said Trump would sign an executive order on Monday formally delaying the July 9 deadline to August 1.

BRICS tensions 

Trump also put members of the developing nations’ BRICS group in his sights as its leaders met in Brazil, threatening an additional 10 percent tariff on any BRICS countries aligning themselves with “anti-American” policies.

The new 10 percent tariff will be imposed on individual countries if they take anti-American policy actions, a source familiar with the matter told Reuters news agency.

The BRICS group comprises Brazil, Russia, India and China and South Africa along with recent joiners Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Trump’s comments hit the South African rand, affecting its value in Monday trading.

Russia said BRICS was “a group of countries that share common approaches and a common world view on how to cooperate, based on their own interests”.

“And this cooperation within BRICS has never been and will never be directed against any third countries,” said Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

European Union at the table

The European Union will not be receiving a letter setting out higher tariffs, EU sources familiar with the matter told Reuters on Monday.

The EU still aims to reach a trade deal by July 9 after European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Trump had a “good exchange”, a commission spokesperson said.

It was not clear, however, whether there had been a meaningful breakthrough in talks to stave off tariff hikes on the largest trading partner of the US.

Adding to the pressure, Trump threatened to impose a 17 percent tariff on EU food and agriculture exports, it emerged last week.

The EU has been torn over whether to push for a quick and light trade deal or back its own economic clout in trying to negotiate a better outcome. It had already dropped hopes for a comprehensive trade agreement before the July deadline.

“We want to reach a deal with the US. We want to avoid tariffs,” the spokesperson said at a daily briefing.

Without a preliminary agreement, broad US tariffs on most imports would rise from their current 10 percent to the rates set out by Trump on April 2. In the EU’s case, that would be 20 percent.

Von der Leyen also held talks with the leaders of Germany, France and Italy at the weekend, Germany said. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has repeatedly stressed the need for a quick deal to protect industries vulnerable to tariffs ranging from cars to pharmaceuticals.

Germany said the parties should allow themselves “another 24 or 48 hours to come to a decision”. And the country’s auto company Mercedes-Benz said on Monday its second-quarter unit sales of cars and vans had fallen 9 percent, blaming tariffs.

Markets respond

US markets have tumbled on Trump’s tariff announcements.

As of 3:30pm in New York (19:30 GMT), the S&P 500 fell by 1 percent, marking the biggest drop in three weeks. The tech-heavy Nasdaq Composite Index was down by a little more than 1 percent, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average also fell by more than a full percentage point.

US-listed shares of Japanese automotive companies fell, with Toyota Motor Corp down 4.1 percent in mid-afternoon trading and Honda Motor off by 3.8 percent. Meanwhile, the US dollar surged against both the Japanese yen and the South Korean won.

Chinese President Xi Jinping reached Kazakhstan on Monday to attend the second China–Central Asia Summit, a high-stakes diplomatic gathering aimed at deepening Beijing’s economic and strategic ties with the region.

The summit, which will be held on Tuesday in the Kazakh capital Astana, comes at a time when China is intensifying its outreach to Central Asian countries amid shifting global power alignments — and mounting tensions in neighbouring Iran, which is roiled in an escalating conflict with Israel.

The summit will bring together the heads of state from all five Central Asian nations — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — along with Xi.

The Astana summit also carries symbolic weight: it is the first time that the five Central Asian nations are holding a summit in the region with the leader of another country.

So, what is the importance of the China-Central Asia Summit? And is China battling both the United States and Russia for influence in the region?

What’s on Xi’s agenda in Astana?

On Monday, Xi was greeted by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and other senior officials at the airport in Astana. The Astana summit follows the inaugural May 2023 China–Central Asia Summit, which was held in Xi’an, the capital city of China’s Shaanxi province.

Xi is expected to be in Astana from June 16 to 18 and is scheduled to hold bilateral meetings with Kazakhstan’s leaders on Monday before the summit on June 17.

At the summit, he is expected to deliver a keynote speech and “exchange views on the achievements of the China-Central Asia mechanism, mutually beneficial cooperation under the framework, and international and regional hotspot issues,” said a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson.

The office of Kazakhstan’s president noted that both countries are “set to further strengthen bilateral ties” and Xi will also chair “high-level talks with President [Tokayev] focused on deepening the comprehensive strategic partnership”.

Tokayev, who has been in office since 2019, is a fluent Mandarin speaker and previously served as a diplomat in China.

Zhao Long, a senior research fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), told Al Jazeera that Central Asian countries see their partnership with China as a deep, multifaceted cooperation grounded in shared strategic and pragmatic interests.

“The alignment with China helps Central Asian states enhance their regional stability, pursue economic modernisation, and diversify their diplomatic portfolios,” said Zhao. Where Central Asia has abundant energy resources, he said, China offers vast markets, advanced technology, and infrastructure expertise.

Last Friday, Lin Jian, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, told a news briefing that establishing “the China-Central Asia mechanism was a unanimous decision among China and the five Central Asian countries, which dovetails with the region’s common desire to maintain stability and pursue high-quality development”.

Since China first formalised and chaired the China-Central Asia Summit in May 2023, Lin said, “China’s relations with Central Asian countries have entered a new era … injecting fresh impetus into regional development and delivering tangibly for the peoples of all six countries.”

“We believe through this summit, China and five Central Asian countries will further consolidate the foundation of mutual trust,” Lin added.

“During the summit, President Xi will also meet with these leaders and lay out the top-level plan for China’s relations with [the] five Central Asian countries,” said the spokesperson.

SIIS’s Zhao said Xi’s attendance at the second summit sends a clear message: “China places high strategic importance on Central Asia.”

What’s ‘C5+1’ – and is China racing the US for influence?

Experts are dubbing the China-Central Asia Summit as a C5+1 framework, because of the five regional nations involved.

The United States first initiated the concept of such a summit with all five Central Asian nations in 2015, under then-US President Barack Obama. But at the time, the conclave was held at the level of foreign ministers. Then-US Secretary of State John Kerry led the first meeting in September 2015 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

In January 2022, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a virtual summit with the five Central Asian state heads, and then in June 2025, he invited them for a follow-up conclave in India.

Meanwhile, in 2023, Xi hosted the leaders in Xi’an. Four months later, then-US President Joe Biden hosted the C5 state heads on the sidelines of the UNGA in New York. It was the first time a US president met with Central Asian heads of state under this framework.

But current US President Donald Trump’s tariff policies could upset that outreach from Washington. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have all been tariffed at 10 percent.

Trump initially imposed an even higher 27 percent tariff on imports from Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy, though as with all other countries, the US president has paused these rates, limiting tariffs to a flat 10 percent for now.

China has cited these tariff rates to project itself as a more reliable partner to Central Asia than the US. At the meeting with the foreign ministers of the region in April, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi criticised unilateralism, trade protectionism, and “the trend of anti-globalisation [that] has severely impacted the free trade system”.

The US, Wang said, was “undermining the rule-based multilateral trading system, and destabilising the global economy”.

Why does Central Asia matter to China?

The region, rich in uranium, oil, and rare earth metals, has become increasingly important to China as a key corridor for trade with Europe. Subsequently, China has increased its engagement with Central Asian countries.

Xi, who has curtailed his foreign visits since the COVID-19 pandemic, is visiting Kazakhstan for the third time since 2020. He visited in 2022, and then again in 2024.

Central Asia is also a critical part of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — a network of highways, railroads and ports connecting Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America — as a gateway to Europe.

Experts expect the BRI to figure prominently at the summit in Astana on Tuesday, with additional emphasis on collaboration in energy and sustainable development.

A planned $8bn railway connecting China’s Xinjiang region to Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan is likely to be on the agenda, the SIIS’s Zhao said. Construction on the project is scheduled to begin in July. Expected to be completed by 2030, the railway route will provide China with more direct access to Central Asia and reduce the three countries’ reliance on Russia’s transport infrastructure.

Additionally, Zhao said, the summit may feature agreements on reducing tariffs, streamlining customs procedures, and lowering non-tariff barriers to boost bilateral trade volumes.

How much does Central Asia depend on China?

A lot.

China is today the top trading partner of each of the five Central Asian republics.

• Kazakhstan imported goods worth $18.7bn from China and exported goods worth $15bn in 2023 — making up 30 percent of its total imports and 16 percent of exports.
• Tajikistan imported goods worth $3.68bn from China and exported goods worth $250m in 2023 — making up 56 percent of its total imports and 16 percent of exports.
• Kyrgyzstan imported goods worth $3.68bn and exported goods worth $887m in 2023 from China — constituting 29 percent of its total imports and 26 percent of exports.
• Uzbekistan imported goods worth $12.7bn and exported goods worth $1.82bn in 2023 from the world’s second-largest economy — representing 32 percent of its total imports and 6 percent of exports.
• Turkmenistan imported goods worth $957m and exported goods worth $9.63bn in 2023 from China — or 20 percent of its total imports and 62 percent of exports.

China is also ramping up its investments in the region. It has committed to an estimated $26bn in investments in Kazakhstan, for instance.

Is China replacing Russia in Central Asia?

It’s complicated.

Formerly parts of the Soviet Union, the five Central Asian republics have long belonged in Russia’s strategic sphere of influence. Millions of people from the five republics live and work in Russia, and since 2023, Moscow has become a supplier of natural gas to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which have faced energy shortages — even though Central Asia was historically a supplier of energy to Russia.

But though Russia remains a major economic force in the region, China has overtaken it as the largest trading partner of Central Asian republics over the past three years — a period that has coincided with Russia’s war on Ukraine. Some of that increased trade, in fact, is believed to be the outcome of China using Central Asia as a conduit for exports to Russia of goods that face Western sanctions.

Still, there are ways in which Russia remains the region’s preeminent outside ally. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — three of the region’s five nations — are part of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) — along with Russia, Armenia and Belarus. Like NATO, this bloc offers collective security guarantees to members. In effect, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have the cover of Russia’s protection if they are attacked by another nation — something that China does not offer.