What the Johannesburg G20 Revealed About China and India’s Competing Roles
The Real G20 Story
The G20 in Johannesburg underscored a trend that has been developing for several years: China is steadily consolidating its leadership within the Global South, while India’s efforts, though visible, remain constrained by structural limitations. In the recent summit in South Africa, New Delhi sought to position itself as the “voice of the Global South,” but Beijing’s development-first messaging and institutional depth resonated more clearly with African and Asian delegations. The summit demonstrated that China’s influence, through embedded networks stemming from the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS, and the AIIB, shapes discussions even in Xi Jinping’s absence. Africa’s calls for representation and development financing further align with China’s existing agenda, increasing the visibility of its long-standing South–South partnerships.
What emerged from the summit was a shift in how multilateralism is being practiced. Institutions once shaped by Western leadership are now being reinterpreted by developing economies, with China playing a central role in defining priorities in areas such as climate financing, infrastructure connectivity, and debt restructuring. For countries across Africa and Asia, consistent engagement matters more than ideological alignment, and China has already earned this trust, as demonstrated over the past two decades. For India and other middle powers seeking to expand their footprint in Africa, the challenge is not only to build comparable financial tools, policy coherence, and a long-term presence but also, first, to earn the trust of partners and, if need be, to act as a reliable leader.
China’s Message to the Global South
African governments have repeatedly stressed the need for partnerships that deliver measurable development outcomes, with China’s development-first message at the G20 aligned with the stated priorities of many African and Asian governments.
In his keynote speech, Premier Li Qiang articulated China’s vision for global governance. Li used the Summit to advance a coherent, development-oriented agenda to position China as the leading partner of the Global South. He called for comprehensive reforms of the IMF and World Bank, urging greater voting rights for developing countries and more concessional financing mechanisms. He demanded more substantial debt restructuring that avoids what many African states view as the punitive processes of Western-dominated institutions.
Li also stressed that equitable climate transitions must prioritize development. He outlined expanded cooperation on renewables, pushing China’s already massive exports of solar panels to Africa, which have risen by over 60 percent in the last year, as evidence of Beijing’s capacity to deliver climate solutions without imposing political conditions. His announcements about digital economy cooperation, artificial intelligence governance, and the creation of a new Institute of Global Development showed China positioning itself not merely as a financier but as an intellectual and institutional architect of a new global economic order rooted in South-South knowledge production.
With China’s growing institutional network from its role in BRICS to SCO, China’s efforts for multilateralism are overt and transparent, positioning it as a stable and consistent partner for the Global South.
India’s Claims: Strong Rhetoric but Weaker Structures
In Johannesburg, India urged the G20 to give the Global South a more meaningful seat at the table. New Delhi pushed for institutional reforms that grant developing countries a stronger voice in global governance. India highlighted the need for equity in international trade, fair access to critical minerals, and transparent supply chains, arguing that global economic rules must reflect the realities and aspirations of emerging economies rather than those of advanced Western powers. At the same time, India presented a concrete tech-development agenda as its vision for the future of growth: promoting digital public infrastructure, safe and inclusive artificial intelligence, and skills development as foundational to the 21st-century Global South. In his remarks, Modi called for a “global compact” on AI, one that ensures human-centricity, transparency, accountability, and accessibility, not just profit-driven deployment. He also proposed the G20–Africa Skills Multiplier Initiative, aimed at training a million instructors in Africa over the next decade to build capacity through cooperation rather than charity.
Yet much of this agenda remains difficult to scale without strong financial and institutional frameworks. India’s domestic priorities, limited development financing tools, and multi-aligned foreign policy mean that its leadership role, though aspirational and increasingly visible, is still evolving. At this stage, China’s longer track record of delivery gives it clearer strategic weight within the Global South.
The G20 Gap Between China and India
Although India is increasingly discussed as a strategic counterweight to China, the disparity in institutional, financial, and commitment capacity remains significant. China can give established financing means, supply-chain linkages, and development corridors to Africa. Beijing’s proposals on climate finance and development sequencing align closely with the material needs of many Global South economies, giving its message a degree of credibility built on experience rather than intent alone. On the contrary, India’s contributions remain narrative-oriented and focused on diplomatic positioning.
Why This Matters for Asia and the Global South
This divergence carries two implications. First, for observers who draw parallels between India and China, the gap in capability and delivery is unmistakable: India offers compelling narratives, while China has been undertaking the structural initiatives that shape long-term influence. Second, for the Global South, China has effectively set the pace for development governance and emerged as a consistent convener, a role India aspires to but has yet to match in capacity or reach.
With the United States engaging selectively in global institutions, leadership within the G20 is tilting toward Asia, a watershed moment in the geopolitical landscape of today. But within Asia, China’s development financing and institutional networks provide it with structural leverage, while India’s ambitions may strengthen over time but will require a more explicit strategic focus. But with India supported in part by its partnership with Washington, the G20 might become a stage of rivalry between the two Asian powers, with the US conveniently observing from afar. The reality is that the G20 is entering an increasingly post-Western phase, but the next summit in the United States, with its support for India, which has historically served as a counterweight to China, will test how durable this shift truly is. Whether this moment becomes a defining moment for multilateralism and China’s leadership in Africa or just a temporary recalibration will depend on the consistency and competition among Asian leaders and Washington’s willingness to re-engage.
