intelligence

A 31-year-old British man has been charged under the National Security Act over alleged contact with Russia’s military intelligence agency.

Joshua Cammidge, from Swindon, allegedly received instructions from an individual believed to be linked to the GRU Volunteer Corps, a group controlled by Russia’s military intelligence agency, the Crown Prosecution service said.

He has been charged with assisting a foreign intelligence service and preparatory conduct.

He is due to appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Thursday.

Cammidge was arrested at an address in Swindon on Friday by Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) London officers, supported by officers from Wiltshire Police.

He was taken to a London police station and searches were carried out at a different address in Swindon, the Metropolitan Police said.

He was further arrested and detained under the National Security Act on Saturday.

Chinese state-run shipping company COSCO has been using concealed systems on its vessels to gather signals intelligence around North American, European, and Asian coastlines for decades, it has been alleged. Similar claims have been made in the past, and overlap between nominally civilian enterprises in China and the country’s military and intelligence services is well established at this point.

Reuters first reported on the use of COSCO ships as discrete signals intelligence platforms earlier today, citing two unnamed officials within President Donald Trump’s administration.

“The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the U.S. assessment of the Chinese program, said COSCO has a decades-long intelligence-collection partnership with Beijing,” according to the report. “The arrangement allows China to collect communication signals from vessels ​and aircraft operating across Europe, North America and Asia, they said.”

It is worth noting here that China’s National Intelligence Law, enacted in 2017, includes a specific provision that requires all organizations and citizens within the country to support state intelligence work as required. It also obligates the state to protect entities that do so.

“The advanced equipment aboard the ships is intended to enable China ​to gather information about ‘military communications technologies and encryption developments,’ one of the officials said,” Reuters‘ story today added. “The officials did not detail the type of equipment COSCO ships were allegedly using, but said they were ‘sophisticated signals intelligence collection’ platforms, not routine communications hardware.”

Officials at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., unsurprisingly denied these assertions, according to that outlet.

Purpose-built signals intelligence suites can range widely in size and shape, as can their capabilities. They can be very small and basic or far more elaborate systems. Even the latter could be concealed as modern commercial ships, which already feature lots of antennas.

What might happen to intelligence collected by the ships is unknown. At the very least, systems onboard could record the data, which could then be batched out when safe to do so, either physically or via transmission. Basic passive signals suites can also run autonomously, or even be controlled from anywhere in the world if the ship is connected via satellite communications (SATCOM). High-bandwidth SATCOM is very common now on ships around the globe.

Personnel on the ship could also operate the systems, and even process receptions of interest. It might be possible to fit the ships with suitable datalinks to then transmit the collected data in near-real-time to other nodes, including ones back in China, for further analysis and exploitation.

Reuters‘ sources said scooping up data on “military communications technologies and encryption developments” was a priority for the commercial vessels turned spy ships. Signals intelligence can take many other forms, from emissions from radars to communications chatter. Depending on what is collected and how, specialists can use that information to glean details about how systems function, as well as insights into standard operating procedures and other details. This is especially true when multiple forms of intelligence are fused together. Generally speaking, signals intelligence is routinely used to help build out so-called ‘electronic orders of battle’ detailing the disposition and capabilities of an opponent’s forces, especially air defense and command and control networks. Fusing multiple forms

As mentioned, this is not the first time claims in this general vein have emerged, either. At least some evidence has been presented in the past, through open-source analysis. Reuters‘ sources directed that outlet to a report published last year by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College exploring exactly this topic in relation to China’s quasi-military maritime militia. The maritime militia is made up of ostensibly civilian fishing fleets, but has direct ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Coast Guard. It is routinely used to harass and intimidate foreign vessels in disputed waters, especially in the South China Sea.

“Undergirding these operations is a cadre of maritime militia intelligence specialists called ‘information personnel.’ Information personnel are organized into force contingents that support operational militia forces,” according to that report. “Most have day jobs in the fishing industry, but many hale [sic; hail] from other sectors, including marine shipping and even maritime law enforcement units.”

“It is more likely than not that PRC [People’s Republic of China] vessels operating overseas have already begun embarking information personnel to serve intelligence collection and reporting functions. In the case of China’s fishing fleet, serving this foreign intelligence collection function could be as simple as adding a new duty to the ‘information personnel’ that already embark aboard some distant-water fishing vessels,” that report added. “Aside from their primary responsibilities of tallying and reporting production numbers, serving as experts on international and national fisheries regulations that affect their work, and handling interactions with foreign officials while at sea and in port, they might also be tasked with collecting and reporting military and political intelligence while operating overseas.”

“Similar processes may already be in place in the commercial shipping industry,” it continued. “For instance, Guangxi province’s Beihai city has built up its ranks of maritime intelligence specialists by recruiting from among marine shipping personnel.”

No explicit mention is made in the report about signals intelligence gathering.

In the past year or so, there have been multiple reports that Russia is also using its so-called ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tanker ships in a secondary role as intelligence-gathering platforms. The primary job of those vessels is to help the Kremlin evade sanctions.

There is other tangential evidence that also lends credence to today’s report from Reuters. As mentioned, in the midst of still mysterious drone swarms that harassed U.S. Navy ships off the coast of southern California back in 2019, U.S. authorities at least explored the possibility that a Hong Kong-flagged bulk carrier, the M/V Bass Strait, might have been a launch point. It remains unknown, at least publicly, whether the Bass Strait or another nearby ship might have been the source of the harassment, or if it came from somewhere else, potentially further away. TWZ was the first to report on this detail as part of a deeper investigation into these incidents, which came amid a spike in news about claimed sightings of what are now commonly referred to as unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP). We have been saying for years now that, while some UAP sightings do remain unexplained, many more are likely to have been drones (as well as balloons), which foreign governments could be using for intelligence gathering and other malign purposes.

It’s also worth noting here that intelligence collection from international waters and airspace is a practice that nation state armed forces and intelligence agencies globally, including those in the United States, engage in regularly with varying degrees of openness. Leveraging nominally civilian ships, as well as aircraft, for these purposes is hardly new.

Despite the official denials to the Reuters piece today, it would be hard to imagine Chinese authorities not making use of commercial ships for this purpose, if possible, given that major deepwater ports worldwide are often dual-purpose civilian/military facilities. Radar sites and other critical facilities are often positioned along or near coastlines. Cargo ships and tankers often pass by major exercises and under major military operating airspace, where they could scoop up critical data.

With commercial ships already plying their routes, this would also just offer the Chinese government ways to readily bolster maritime intelligence-gathering capacity at low cost and low risk. China’s commercial fleets dwarf any other on Earth, making their presence commonplace and providing many opportunities to hide these operations.

Shipyard in Snow

A 2021 report published through the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s (NGA) Tearline Project also highlighted the possibility of Chinese-owned facilities at ports around the world being used for intelligence gathering or even for launching non-kinetic attacks, including electronic warfare jamming. It specifically noted how COSCO’s facility in Belgium’s Port of Zeebrugge is “in close proximity to a Belgian Naval Base and thus could fulfill additional militarized requirements.”

Concerns about land owned by Chinese companies and nationals being used to collect intelligence or for other purposes have become an increasingly hot topic of discussion in the United States in recent years.

Reuters‘ piece does not say what, if any, steps U.S. authorities have taken or may be planning to take now to monitor for or take more active countermeasures against Chinese-flagged ships being used for intelligence gathering, despite this being said to be a decades-old practice. The report does note that “the Pentagon put COSCO on its list of companies linked to China’s military in January 2025, a designation that carries serious reputational costs for companies ​as well as U.S. government procurement ​bans, but does not entail ⁠formal sanctions.”

Though no hard evidence has yet been provided, Chinese authorities using cargo ships as additional discreet signals intelligence-gathering assets is very plausible, and would certainly seem to be an issue that should be taken seriously, if it is not already being addressed.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Chinese media and intelligence are closely following the exodus of the American Central Intelligence Agency CIA personnel, particularly the months-long wait for new retirees to receive their financial entitlements. The agency is facing what it describes as an unprecedented number of retirements as the Trump administration seeks to reduce its workforce. Chinese media and intelligence perspectives on this unprecedented exodus of CIA officers align with their own. The delayed payments are a key focus, with both China and the US focusing on exploiting these developments to highlight institutional weaknesses within the American administration and the declining effectiveness of espionage against Beijing. Beijing is using the CIA exodus and delayed retirement payments to cast doubt on the efficiency of American institutions, targeting disaffected and dismissed intelligence operatives to gather information. This is achieved by promoting the idea of ​​the US administration’s collapse and attracting these affected security professionals to bolster Chinese counterintelligence capabilities.  Here, Beijing is exploiting the widespread layoffs and dismissals within the CIA and other US federal agencies, turning the affected employees into valuable assets to bolster Chinese counterintelligence capabilities. The Chinese strategy focuses on transforming these dismissed experts from defenders of US national security into offensive tools that expose Washington’s vulnerabilities.

The most prominent trends in official and semi-official Chinese commentary and analysis regarding the dismissal of CIA personnel can be summarized as follows: (Chinese mockery of the China-defeat strategy and the backfiring on the strategist). This is the same point made by Chinese media reports, such as the official Xinhua News Agency, which indicated that the Trump administration had previously announced that its restructuring and hiring freeze aimed to focus on China-defeating and the trade war. However, the actual result was the dismissal of skilled and experienced personnel within the CIA. This exposes the structural failures of the US, and Chinese media highlighted the crisis as evidence of administrative chaos within the United States. The pressure to downsize the federal government has paralyzed the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). This has left Washington unable to even pay the pensions of its retired spies on time.  Here, Chinese intelligence, military, political, strategic, and media circles seized upon this crisis to promote the idea of ​​eroding American national security and the golden opportunity it presented for counterintelligence. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies seized upon internal American warnings that leaving thousands of former intelligence officers without income for months made them easy targets for infiltration. Beijing interpreted this as a tacit admission of the fragility of institutional loyalty within the American system in the face of financial pressures. Beijing viewed it as evidence of American administrative disarray and a prime example of the brain drain of accumulated expertise. Chinese analyses, assessments, and evaluations focused on the fact that the deferred resignation and contract buyouts programs have prompted senior analysts and field officers within the CIA (those with extensive networks and deep knowledge of Asian affairs) to abruptly leave the service, creating an intelligence gap that will be difficult to fill in the near future.  From the Chinese perspective, this exposes the American narrative of transparency and efficiency and reinforces the idea of ​​the political manipulation of intelligence. Therefore, China is exploiting this unprecedented crisis within the CIA to bolster its ongoing narrative that US intelligence agencies have become tools in partisan political conflicts within Washington. Beijing views the mass exodus as a reflection of the professional officers’ lack of confidence in the administration’s political direction. Beijing is using this as part of a counter-propaganda strategy, with Chinese media outlets employing these facts to send messages to the international community, developing countries, and the Global South, suggesting that the United States, which seeks to impose its global security hegemony, is suffering from severe internal divisions that prevent it from managing its fundamental sovereign affairs efficiently and professionally.

Regarding the Chinese political and media exploitation of the CIA staff exodus crisis, the Chinese media machine promotes these crises as evidence of the collapse and disarray of the US federal administration model. It exploits the inability of US institutions to meet their financial obligations (to portray Washington as incapable of protecting even its most sensitive agencies). Therefore, Chinese intelligence, analytical, and strategic circles employ propaganda to highlight the fragility of job security and social stability within US decision-making circles. Furthermore, China strategically and intelligence-wise exploits this internal US crisis. Chinese intelligence agencies monitor these vulnerabilities to target former employees or those facing termination. Beijing offers inducements or clandestine channels of communication through consulting and research fronts to ensnare individuals who are psychologically and financially distressed. China also exploits the frustration resulting from delayed pensions or forced layoffs to facilitate infiltration, counter-recruitment, and the acquisition of sensitive secrets.

Chinese intelligence, such as the Ministry of State Security (MSS), operates through specific and deliberate mechanisms. The MSS, which oversees Chinese intelligence operations, exploits vulnerabilities such as fractured loyalty, financial weakness, and psychological and material incentives. Beijing focuses on federal officers and probationary personnel who have been laid off from the CIA and harbor resentment, bitterness, and a desire for revenge against their former superiors. Chinese intelligence, analytical, and strategic circles then work to support these individuals to fill the financial gap. The sudden loss of a job for a security officer with high financial obligations creates fertile ground for recruitment, as China offers substantial and enticing financial incentives to secure their loyalty. Chinese intelligence circles are also actively employing digital recruitment through front companies. These are sham consulting firms. Beijing is establishing networks of consulting companies, think tanks, and fake recruitment agencies that appear Western and 100% legitimate to target talent on LinkedIn. Through these platforms, Chinese intelligence officers target former CIA employees who are seeking employment on well-known job search platforms like LinkedIn. They use disguised accounts, sometimes employing artificial intelligence, to apply for jobs. Then begins the process of gradually extracting information. The relationship starts with requests for ordinary, non-classified (publicly available) research in exchange for lucrative financial rewards to build trust. The employee is then gradually drawn into providing sensitive information and moving to encrypted communication platforms.

Here, Chinese intelligence agencies work to feed their counterintelligence efforts with tactical information. When China succeeds in recruiting a compromised American security operative, it doesn’t just seek international secrets but focuses on acquiring high-quality information that serves its counterintelligence apparatus. The most prominent of these is uncovering the methods of operation of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Understanding American recruitment mechanisms, how spies are planted, and methods of vetting and infiltration. Identifying profiles and characteristics (profiles) to understand the psychological and behavioral traits the CIA seeks in informants, which helps China detect potential spies within its own territory or within the People’s Liberation Army early on. This also involves uncovering technical and cyber vulnerabilities by identifying the encryption tools and systems used by US agencies, thus giving Chinese counterintelligence the ability to fortify its networks and penetrate counterespionage operations.  Exploiting the absence of exit briefings, Western and American intelligence reports have revealed that some federal employees who were hastily discharged did not undergo standard exit briefings. This procedural gap left employees without direct warnings or clear reporting mechanisms should they be approached by hostile entities. Beijing exploited this as a golden opportunity to operate with minimal oversight. In response to this risk, US security agencies, such as the FBI and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center NCSC), issued heightened security alerts and shut down and blocked dozens of fake websites belonging to Chinese recruitment networks targeting discharged CIA employees.

Reporting from Washington — Five years ago, U.S. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.) was visiting a thinly guarded U.S. special operations base in a remote part of Afghanistan near the border with Pakistan. One of his hosts took him up to the roof, where he peered through binoculars at militants loading 122-millimeter rockets.

Those rockets soon will be raining down on this base, the officer told the congressman.

“What are you going to do about it?” Rogers asked with a note of concern, according to someone who was present.

“I can’t do anything about it,” the officer replied. “They are on the wrong side of the Durand Line” — the Pakistan side of the century-old British-decreed border between the two countries. Pakistan was off-limits.

Rogers and an aide were hustled onto a helicopter and flown out. The Afghan base indeed was rocketed. Rogers, whose resume includes a stint as an Army officer and another as an FBI investigator, returned to Washington determined to find out, as part of his role on the House Intelligence Committee, why the U.S. wasn’t doing more to strike Taliban militants in Pakistan.

The responses he received frustrated him, those close to Rogers say, and led him to mount a campaign to press the George W. Bush administration to do more. In a story known only to a small group of participants, Rogers played a role in convincing President Bush to issue a July 2008 order that dramatically expanded the scope of Predator drone strikes against militants in Pakistan, according to two former Bush administration officials close to the matter and two members of the House Intelligence Committee who were involved. The officials declined to be named speaking about secret deliberations.

Rogers’ unpublicized efforts as an advocate for that covert program, which has been expanded dramatically by President Obama, helped convince House Republican leader John Boehner last week to name Rogers incoming chairman of the intelligence committee.

“Mike went out and found out the ground truth on this stuff,” said U.S. Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R.-Mich.), who is retiring as the ranking Republican on the committee.

These days, unmanned U.S. Predator drones are raining Hellfire missiles on militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas at a rate of twice a week. But for much of his two terms, Bush used the drones sparingly. The State Department and some in the CIA opposed expanding the targeted killing program over fears it would destabilize the fragile Pakistani government, former U.S. officials said.

Military officials also argued that troops on the border already had authorization to call in airstrikes in Pakistan under “hot pursuit” doctrine.

But that wasn’t happening in practice, Rogers found, and front-line soldiers and spies were furious.

Rogers cut through a bureaucratic fog by confronting senior policymakers with anecdotes from his trips to CIA and special operations bases along the Afghan-Pakistan border, said a former senior U.S. intelligence official who played a key role in the debate.

Rogers also pressed the issue with senior U.S. diplomats and CIA officials in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and he worked back channels with junior CIA officers who shared his agenda but found themselves stymied by their cautious bosses, current and former U.S. officials said.

“I would say he played a unique role,” said the former official, who was involved in crafting the new policy. “There was no one who took this on like he did.”

Boehner spokesman Michael Steel would not discuss drone strikes in Pakistan, which are officially denied by the U.S. government. Rogers got the chairmanship, Steel said, in part because he “has traveled extensively to the real down-and-dirty areas, the front lines in our war on terrorism. And that’s gotten him a lot of respect from the intelligence community and a real hands-on feel for the challenges we face.”

Rogers declined to comment on the classified drone program. But he said his trips to remote corners of the U.S. war effort were grounded in basic investigative techniques he learned in the FBI: Go ask the people who actually know.

“Proper congressional oversight is a lot like the work of the FBI,” he said. “Especially in a business that is designed to be clandestine, you have to be a little more tenacious to get the whole story. You have to go to where things are happening.”

Rogers, 47, who is remarried with two teenagers, is an anti-abortion, down-the-line conservative from a solid Republican district in southern Michigan. As intelligence committee chairman, he can be expected to challenge the Obama administration aggressively over what he views as a law enforcement approach to terrorism. For example, he ripped the decision by federal authorities to read Miranda warnings to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian accused of trying to blow up a plane over Detroit last Christmas Day with a bomb sewn into his underwear. The priority should have been intelligence gathering, Rogers said, especially given the other evidence against Abdulmutallab.

Rogers also has blasted Obama’s decision to restrict CIA questioning of detainees to the strictures of the U.S. Army Field Manual, which he argues are more restrictive than the rules governing FBI agents when questioning criminal suspects.

And he made news when he said the death penalty should apply to Bradley Manning, accused of being the source of classified U.S. documents posted by WikiLeaks.

But Rogers has a knack for disagreeing without being disagreeable, a trait that has engendered warm feelings among at least some Democrats. CIA Director Leon Panetta, for example, said in a statement that Rogers “is one of Congress’ foremost experts on intelligence and the fight against terrorism,” and that “I have come to know him and respect his insights.”

Kansas Rep. Todd Tiahrt, a Republican who traveled with Rogers while he served on the intelligence committee, said Rogers is well-liked “because he’s very personable. He’s tough as nails, but he can do it with a way that’s not offensive.”

Rogers poked and prodded behind the scenes — and finally made a personal appeal to Bush — to force the U.S. military to better secure unguarded Iraq weapons and ammunition storage sites after the 2003 invasion, sites that were fodder for the burgeoning insurgency.

A 1985 graduate of Adrian College in Michigan, Rogers served three years in the Army and then joined the FBI, where he worked until he ran and won a state Senate seat in 1994. He served as Michigan Senate majority Leader from 1999 to 2000 and was elected to Congress that fall.

On the walls of his Capitol Hill office, Rogers displays a tomahawk made of metal from a Soviet tank given to him by Afghans, and a long knife given to him by Pakistanis.

There is also a framed Chicago newspaper front page about the biggest chapter of his FBI career. Rogers built the case that mushroomed into a massive public corruption prosecution in Cicero, Ill., just outside Chicago. The town that once hosted Al Capone’s gang was still, in the late 1980s, infiltrated by the mob. Betty Loren-Maltese, the town president, was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2002 after she and six others were convicted of stealing $12 million from the town.

It started with a telephone tip about a missing woman, Rogers said, which led him to set up surveillance on a Cicero strip club that fronted for a brothel. The place was under the protection of corrupt Cicero police officers, Rogers soon realized.

“I thought it was a few bad cops,” he said. It turned out to be a well-orchestrated conspiracy.

His biggest break came when he went to the hospital to see a woman who had been stabbed in the club, he said. She had previously refused to talk. But on this day, a mobster had just turned down her request to pay her medical expenses.

“She was upset,” Rogers said. “She asked, ‘Well, would you pay for my hospital bill?’ I said, ‘Yeah, sure,’ Then I said to myself, ‘Oh, my God, I hope the Bureau will pay for this.’ ”

Rogers showed her pictures, and she identified mob figures and police who frequented the club.

“That’s what really started the Cicero case,” Rogers said.

Rogers had a similar break in his effort to convince Boehner and other House leaders to press the Bush administration to expand drone strikes, according to some who were there.

One day in 2008, Rogers, Hoekstra and Boehner attended a meeting in the Capitol with a group of CIA officials. Some of the senior CIA officials expressed opposition to expanding drone strikes, say two of them who were there, and some argued that Rogers was overstating the targeting capabilities.

A junior CIA officer spoke up and acknowledged that there were targeting “packages” against militants in Pakistan that were viable but had not been used.

“The front-row guys, they didn’t have a clue what to say,” one meeting attendee said.

Not long afterward, then-CIA Director Michael Hayden briefed Bush on a series of more aggressive covert options in Pakistan, including drone strikes that went after Taliban networks, in addition to high-value al Qaeda targets.

ken.dilanian@latimes.com

The government of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz approved a landmark bill to expand the powers of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Domestic Intelligence Service (BfV) by 2027. This expansion grants them offensive and operational tools, including cyber counter-sabotage and espionage, with funding of €1.51 billion. This move has sparked significant concern among Chinese and Russian intelligence agencies regarding the radical shift in German security doctrine, stemming from the geopolitical context and the fears of Germany’s adversaries, China and Russia, regarding the ongoing hybrid warfare. The German initiative was driven by the escalating pace of gray and hybrid warfare, the most recent example being the discovery of a booby-trapped drone at Leipzig’s strategic airport. Consequently, intelligence, strategic, and security circles in Beijing and Moscow are closely monitoring this historic intelligence revolution approved by Chancellor Merz’s government on August 12, 2026.  This draft law (exceeding 700 pages) represents the most significant shift in Germany’s security doctrine since the end of World War II in 1945. From the perspective of Chinese and Russian intelligence, this shift constitutes a security revolution that ends the strict constraints imposed on Germany since World War II, transforming German intelligence agencies from mere information-gathering tools into entities capable of launching offensive and counter-sabotage operations. For these reasons, this internal German intelligence transformation is being closely monitored and analyzed in depth within intelligence and military circles in Beijing and Moscow, given its strategic dimensions and its connection to Berlin’s attempt to break free from American dependence. This move, analyzed by Chinese and Russian intelligence and military circles, is seen as a targeting of Russia and China. Although Berlin attempts to frame counterintelligence as a general effort, German officials, such as Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, have explicitly stated that the goal is to deter Russian and Chinese sabotage operations and enable German intelligence to inflict pain on adversaries and operate on equal footing with allies like the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), rather than relying on them entirely. The German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) is expected to formally pass the bill after the summer recess, allowing these offensive powers to become fully operational in Germany by early 2027.

Military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Russian circles alike are analyzing all the operational and political dimensions of this strategic decision in Germany, focusing on understanding the German desire to shift from a defensive doctrine to an offensive operational approach and to adopt a cyber sabotage strategy and a counter-terrorism measure called “Hack-Back.” For the first time, the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BfV) are granted legal authority to penetrate the information systems of adversaries and attackers and modify or delete data to prevent large-scale cyberattacks and dismantle the infrastructure of hackers. This includes German approval for field sabotage operations in situations of German defense tension, whereby the BND is permitted to carry out active sabotage operations abroad, such as disabling servers and replacing military or vital technology components with damaged ones to prevent attacks, such as in drone factories and chemical laboratories of hostile states. This has been interpreted by Chinese and Russian circles as a German crushing of the principle of separation between German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies.   According to Chinese and Russian analyses, the new German law is also generating considerable legal controversy within Germany itself, as it narrows the historical distance between intelligence agencies (those concerned only with collecting information) and the police agencies (those concerned with implementation).

Here, the Chinese intelligence reading of the German reform can be understood as the end of historical restrictions imposed on Berlin, as Beijing views the move as a reversal of the strict restrictions imposed since the end of World War II and Berlin’s shift from purely information gathering to carrying out covert operations and penetrating adversaries’ networks.  In addition to what this represents for Beijing and Moscow in terms of reducing dependence on Washington, Chinese intelligence is monitoring Germany’s attempt to build independent self-reliance capabilities to reduce intelligence dependence on the United States and its allies amid mutual strategic suspicions. Intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Beijing also view with caution the (militarization of German digital space). Here, the Chinese analysis considers that allowing the disruption of infrastructure and the modification and deletion of data places German agencies in the ranks of major countries with active offensive doctrines, given the reliance of German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies on the pattern of practical and technical dimensions of reform and hybrid capabilities in reforming their security and intelligence agencies, through directly confronting drones, disrupting spy servers, or tampering with components of a weapon under production without resorting to human physical violence, with the expansion of the use of artificial intelligence technologies, through expanding the use of facial recognition technologies and reducing data protection restrictions to store and analyze information for longer periods. However, at the same time, German circles are facing parliamentary challenges, given that the draft law is undergoing legislative proceedings in both houses of the German parliament (the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) amidst local human rights objections warning of the erosion of personal freedoms and the principle of separating intelligence from the police.

Here, the Russian intelligence perspective (Moscow) on the German intelligence draft law comes to the fore. Russian intelligence agencies (SVR, GRU, and FSB) view this move as a direct response to their operations and interpret it within the context of an acknowledgment of hybrid warfare. Moscow believes that Germany is now officially treating Russia as an enemy in a state of undeclared war.  The increase in the budget of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency (BND) by 26%, reaching €1.51 billion, is seen as an indication of a long-term security buildup against Russia. Moscow also viewed this as a move to neutralize cognitive denial, especially given accusations from German domestic and foreign intelligence agencies that Russia is exploiting German bureaucratic sluggishness and strict data privacy measures to carry out cyberattacks and sabotage operations. Therefore, the Russian interpretation of this German decision can be seen as a direct response from Berlin to Moscow, aimed at closing this digital and security gap between the two sides. It can be interpreted as a German intelligence strategy of reciprocity, or, according to the Russian analysis, as an attempt by Germany to encircle disinformation networks by granting German intelligence the ability to take down Russian propaganda and disinformation servers, which pose a direct threat to Russia’s soft power tools aimed at destabilizing Germany.

On the other hand, Chinese intelligence circles, primarily the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which acts as the Chinese intelligence service, analyze German law from the perspective of technological and geopolitical conflict, targeting industrial and academic espionage by China. Here, the Chinese analysis focuses on the expansion of the powers of the German domestic intelligence agency (BfV) and the use of artificial intelligence. This analysis primarily aims to track Chinese soft networks that focus on stealing advanced German technology and conducting economic espionage in order to protect German infrastructure and communications. Beijing believes that the new German laws, which compel German telecommunications companies and digital platforms to hand over data to German intelligence, are primarily intended to isolate Chinese technology and impose complete German sovereign control over cyber data in the face of China. The most sensitive aspect of Russian and Chinese analyses lies in their dual interpretation of Germany’s desire to break free from the Five Eyes framework. They see it as either an intelligence network for exchanging signals intelligence, comprising the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, whose decisions are guided by Washington, or as a new dilemma facing Germany in building self-reliant capabilities and ending its dependence on the United States. This latter scenario serves the interests of China and Russia, promoting multipolarity and a multipolar international world and ending the one-way street of Washington.   The German Chancellery has publicly stated that reliance on allies (specifically the US) has been a one-way street, where Germany receives information without the ability to exchange it or protect itself independently. From a Chinese and Russian intelligence perspective, this represents a new German policy of hedging against Trump’s unpredictability. Moscow and Beijing believe that the primary motivation behind the conservative Merz government’s actions is strategic skepticism regarding the reliability of the United States, particularly with Donald Trump in the White House, and Berlin’s fear of the politicization or severing of US intelligence flows. This reinforces the Chinese-Russian view that this is a technologically impossible German attempt to break free from US control and dictates.

Accordingly, assessments in Beijing and Moscow agree that Germany—despite its ambition—will not be able to completely break free from intelligence dependence on America anytime soon. The United States controls the global cloud infrastructure, internet cables, and critical cyber technologies, making German intelligence independence a costly ambition that will take years to materialize technologically. However, it does give Berlin at least greater parity in dealing with partners, which China and Russia are trying to maximize.