intelligence

Artificial Intelligence in the Interregnum: Technology and the Reconfiguration of Meaning

There are moments in history when civilizations continue to advance materially while progressively losing confidence in the values  and structures that once gave direction and coherence to collective life. Institutions continue to function, markets continue to expand, and technological progress accelerates uninterruptedly, yet beneath this movement emerges a quieter uncertainty.

As Simone Weil observed, “to be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized

need of the human soul.”[1] Yet contemporary societies often struggle to sustain those forms of

belonging and shared meaning that once anchored human communities. The crisis is

therefore not simply political or economic. It concerns meaning itself.

Artificial intelligence has appeared precisely within such a historical juncture. Most contemporary discussions approach AI primarily as a technological revolution, or as an element of economic and geopolitical competition between great powers. Governments now frame it as a strategic race, corporations present it as the next engine of productivity, and Silicon Valley often speaks of AI in the language of inevitability and destiny, recalling Aldous Huxley’s fear that technological progress might ultimately weaken rather than deepen human civilization.[2]

 But such interpretations may ignore something deeper still. AI may be less the cause of a civilizational transformation than one of its clearest symptoms. It reflects a broader historical transition in which inherited moral and symbolic frameworks are dissolving faster than new forms of collective meaning can emerge.

Slouching Towards Bethlehem[3]

This condition closely resembles what Antonio Gramsci described as an interregnum: a period in which the old world is dying while the new world struggles to be born. [4] Such periods produce not only political instability, but also moral exhaustion, the erosion of shared narratives, and declining confidence in beliefs once considered self-evident. Civilizations have passed through similar moments before.

The enduring fascination of Edward Gibbon’s monumental The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire lies not merely in its account of imperial decline, but in its portrayal of the slow weakening of the moral and symbolic foundations that once sustained an entire civilization.[5] Rome did not collapse overnight. Its institutions remained impressive long after few still believed in the civilization they were meant to serve. Administrative power survived even as collective meaning and aspirations deteriorated.

That pattern feels strangely familiar.

Never before have technological capacities appeared so extensive while social distrust, political fragmentation, and loneliness have become so pervasive. Hyperconnectivity was supposed to bring societies closer together. In many cases, it has done the reverse.

AI in the Anthropocene

AI emerges from within this historical condition . It appears perfectly suited to societies organized around abstraction, speed, quantification, and technological mediation. In this sense, AI is profoundly historical. It results from a long civilizational development in which rationalization, efficiency, and technical calculation have come to replace older moral, religious, and symbolic frameworks as primary sources of legitimacy and meaning. What distinguishes AI from previous technologies is that it extends these same principles into domains traditionally considered irreducibly human. Activities once understood as distinctly human, such as reasoning, creativity, interpretation, and even emotional interaction, are now becoming technologically mediated.

The deeper unease therefore concerns anthropology as much as technology. What remains distinctively human when machines become capable of imitating reasoning, generating art, and mediating human relationships?

Such moments of civilizational disorientation are not entirely unprecedented.

The Renaissance confronted a similar rupture. Medieval Europe had long possessed a relatively coherent worldview capable of organizing religion, politics, morality, and human identity within a common order. By the late fifteenth century, however, this equilibrium was beginning to fracture under the pressure of new scientific discoveries, religious wars, and the weakening of older political and spiritual authorities. Thinkers such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola sought, in radically different ways, to redefine humanity’s place within a rapidly changing world.[6] Pico celebrated human beings as creatures capable of shaping themselves through freedom and intellect, while Machiavelli recognized more soberly that periods of transition dissolve inherited certainties and force societies to confront instability and power directly.

Both understood that historical transformation is ultimately existential before being institutional. Our own transition may prove even more radical because technology no longer transforms only economic or political life, but cognition itself.

AI now mediates everyday experience itself: how people search for information, communicate, work, and make sense of the world around them.

Algorithms no longer merely distribute information. They shape attention, influence perception, and affect how individuals relate emotionally to public life and to one another. Under such conditions, the distinction between human judgment and technological mediation becomes far less clear.

The Price of Nostalgia

One striking feature of the contemporary digital environment is the degree to which individuals now participate voluntarily in their own data extraction. Recent Instagram trends such as the viral “What Were You Like in the ’90s?” challenge encourage users and celebrities alike to upload curated archives of personal photographs spanning decades of their lives. Presented as nostalgia and entertainment, these trends also generate immense quantities of highly valuable visual and behavioural data: faces across time, emotional reactions, aesthetic preferences, social interactions, and patterns of self-presentation. Whether or not such material is directly incorporated into future AI systems, the broader objective remains significant. Human memory, identity, and even nostalgia itself increasingly becomes raw material for computational analysis and commercial platforms.

Reactions to AI therefore oscillate easily between fascination and anxiety. Beneath both lies a deeper uncertainty about whether modern societies still possess a coherent understanding of what human beings are for, beyond economic productivity and consumption.

Friedrich Nietzsche anticipated aspects of this crisis more than a century ago. His declaration that “God is dead” did not merely constitute a theological provocation but signalled the emergence of a civilization in which traditional moral structures would lose authority long before new ones could replace them.[7] Nietzsche feared not nihilism alone, but the possibility that societies might become incapable of generating new forms of transcendence once older ones had collapsed. We saw how his worldview provided an intellectual base for Fascism.

I Read, therefore I Am

In increasingly mediated environments, the act of sustained reading itself begins to take on a countercultural character. To read is, in some sense, to resist. We have access to more information than any previous generation, yet physical books can still provide a sense of orientation. The books people return to, annotate, or simply keep close over time often reveal something enduring about the way they think and who they are.

The central issue, therefore, is not simply whether artificial intelligence will become more powerful. The deeper question is whether societies organized around AI can still sustain stable forms of responsibility and belonging strong enough to preserve coherent collective life. This is ultimately a political and civilizational problem before it is a purely technical one.

Much contemporary discourse still assumes that technological advancement naturally produces historical progress. History offers little evidence for such confidence.

Civilizations do not endure simply because they innovate technologically. They endure because they preserve, or reinvent, systems of meaning capable of holding societies together over time.

The Roman Empire mastered engineering yet gradually lost the moral cohesion that had once sustained it. Renaissance Europe produced extraordinary creativity precisely because it confronted existential instability directly rather than attempting to ignore it.

Contemporary Western societies appear caught between immense technological sophistication and growing uncertainty about their own civilizational narrative.

AI therefore represents more than innovation. It reflects a transformation in how human beings understand themselves, authority, knowledge, and reality itself. The danger is not simply that machines become too powerful. It is that societies now outsource judgment, imagination, and responsibility while slowly losing the cultural and moral resources required to govern these technologies wisely. Yet periods of interregnum are not necessarily periods of decline alone. They are also moments in which civilizations redefine themselves.

AI For Good ?

Historical transitions create possibilities as well as dangers. The Renaissance emerged from the crisis of medieval Europe. Modern democracy emerged from the upheavals of industrial society. Today’s uncertainty may likewise force Western societies to confront questions long obscured by economic growth and technological optimism:

What constitutes a good society? What forms of belonging remain possible in a hyper-mediated world? What aspects of human life should never be reduced to data, prediction, or optimization?

AI cannot answer these questions. But its emergence makes avoiding them increasingly difficult.


[1] Simone Weil, The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind (1949/1952).

[2] See Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (1932) and his later essays such as Brave New World Revisited (1958), where he warns that technological efficiency and social conditioning could erode authentic human experience.

[3] The phrase alludes to the final lines of W.B. Yeats’ poem “The Second Coming” (1919): “And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, / Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?”

[4] Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (written 1929–1935, published posthumously). The “interregnum” concept appears in Notebook 3: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”

[5] Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (6 volumes, 1776–1789). Gibbon famously attributed part of the decline to the rise of Christianity and the erosion of civic virtue.

[6] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486) — often called the “Manifesto of the Renaissance”; Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532) and Discourses on Livy.

[7] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882, §125 – “The Madman”) and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The full phrase is usually rendered “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.”

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Tulsi Gabbard resigns as Trump’s top US intelligence official | Donald Trump News

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Tulsi Gabbard has resigned as US Director of National Intelligence, citing her husband’s cancer diagnosis. Her departure comes after months of tensions inside President Trump’s administration over foreign policy and intelligence matters, including over the decision to strike Iran.

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Tulsi Gabbard resigns as intelligence chief after husband’s cancer diagnosis

May 22 (UPI) — Tulsi Gabbard resigned as director of national intelligence Friday to support her husband, who has been diagnosed with a rare form of bone cancer.

Gabbard said in a resignation letter, which she posted on X, that after her husband Abraham Williams’ recent diagnosis she will “step away from public service to be by his side and fully support him through this battle.”

The principal deputy director of national intelligence, Aaron Lukas, will take over as acting DNI after Gabbard departs June 30, President Donald Trump said in a post on Truth Social.

“I am deeply grateful for the trust you placed in me and for the opportunity to lead the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for the last year and a half,” Gabbard said in her letter.

Gabbard, who told Trump that she is resigning during a meeting in the Oval Office on Friday, was a controversial nominee for the position.

Nearly all Republicans voted to confirm her on a party-line vote, but former Senate Republican leader Sen. Mitch McConnell voted against her because she had “failed to demonstrate” that she was ready for the position.

Before she was named DNI, Gabbard served in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Hawaii House of Representatives dating to 2002.

The decision to resign, Gabbard said, is the balance of her husband’s dedication to her career, dating to her time in the military, and that she “cannot in good conscience ask him to face this fight alone while I continue in this demanding and time-consuming position.”

In his post, Trump said that Gabbard “has done an incredible job, and we will miss her.”

“She, rightfully, wants to be with [Abraham], bringing him back to good health as they currently fight a tough battle together,” Trump said. “I have no doubt he will soon be better than ever.”

Kevin Warsh takes the oath of office as he is sworn-in as the new chairman of the Federal Reserve by Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas in the East Room of the White House on Friday. Photo by Yuri Gripas/UPI | License Photo

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Tulsi Gabbard resigns as Trump’s top US intelligence official | News

Tulsi Gabbard ⁠is resigning ⁠from her job as United States President Donald Trump’s director of national ⁠intelligence, according to her ⁠resignation letter posted on her X account.

In her resignation letter, Gabbard told Trump she was “deeply ⁠grateful for the trust ⁠you placed in me and for the opportunity to lead the Office ⁠of the Director of National Intelligence for ⁠the last year ⁠and a half”.

She cited her husband’s recent diagnosis with ‌a rare form of bone cancer as the reason for her resignation.

More to come…

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Tulsi Gabbard resigns as director of national intelligence, citing her husband’s health

Tulsi Gabbard resigned as President Trump’s director of national intelligence on Friday, saying she needed to step away as her husband battles cancer. She is the fourth Cabinet official to depart during Trump’s second term.

“Unfortunately, I must submit my resignation, effective June 30, 2026,” Gabbard wrote in her resignation letter, which she posted on X. “My husband, Abraham, has recently been diagnosed with an extremely rare form of bone cancer.”

There had been rumblings that Gabbard would split with Trump after the president’s decision to strike Iran, which caused some division within his administration. Joe Kent, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, announced his resignation in March, saying he “cannot in good conscience” back the war.

Gabbard, a veteran and former Democratic congresswoman from Hawaii, built her political name on her opposition to foreign wars. This put her in an awkward position when the U.S. joined Israel in launching attacks on Iran on Feb. 28.

During a congressional hearing in March, her measured comments were notable for their careful non-endorsement of Trump’s decision to strike Iran. She repeatedly dodged questions about whether the White House had been warned of potential fallout from the conflict, including Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Gabbard said in written remarks to the Senate Intelligence Committee that there had been no effort by Iran to rebuild its nuclear capability after U.S. attacks last year “obliterated” its nuclear program. That statement contradicted Trump, who has repeatedly asserted that the war was necessary to head off an imminent threat from the Islamic Republic.

This created several awkward exchanges with lawmakers who asked Gabbard for her opinion on the threat posed by Iran as the nation’s top intelligence official. She repeatedly said it was Trump’s decision to strike, not hers.

“It is not the intelligence community’s responsibility to determine what is and is not an imminent threat,” she said.

Gabbard’s departure follows Trump having ousted Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem in late March, in the midst of mounting criticism over her leadership of the department — including the handling of the administration’s immigration crackdown and disaster response.

The second Cabinet member to leave was Attorney General Pam Bondi, in response to growing frustration over the Justice Department’s handling of files related to Jeffrey Epstein. And Labor Secretary Lori Chavez-DeRemer resigned in April, after being the target of various misconduct investigations.

A surprising choice for the job

A veteran but without any intelligence experience, Gabbard was a surprising choice to head the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which oversees the nation’s 18 intelligence agencies. She ran for president in 2020 on a progressive platform and her opposition to U.S. involvement in foreign military conflicts.

Citing her military experience, she argued that U.S. wars in the Middle East had destabilized the region, made the U.S. less safe and cost thousands of American lives. Gabbard later dropped out of the race and endorsed the ultimate winner, President Joe Biden.

Two years later she left the Democratic Party to become an independent, saying her old party was dominated by an “elitist cabal of warmongers” and “woke” ideologues. She subsequently campaigned for several high-profile Republicans and became a contributor to Fox News.

She later endorsed Trump, who also was a strong critic of past U.S. wars in the Middle East and campaigned on a pledge to avoid unnecessary wars and nation-building overseas.

Iran caused early tensions

But friction with the president started soon after he began his second term and tapped Gabbard to lead ODNI, which was set up after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to improve coordination between the nation’s intelligence agencies.

Shortly after taking on the job, Gabbard testified before lawmakers that there was no intelligence suggesting Iran was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. After Trump launched attacks on Iranian nuclear sites in June he said Gabbard was wrong and that he didn’t care what she said.

She appeared to be back in Trump’s good graces when she took a lead role in Trump’s effort to relitigate his 2020 election loss to Biden, whom Gabbard had endorsed. She appeared at an FBI search of election offices in Fulton County, Georgia, even though her office was created to focus on foreign espionage, not state elections.

Earlier this week, however, she testified to lawmakers during an annual threats hearing that last year’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites had “obliterated” their nuclear program and that there had been no subsequent effort to rebuild.

The statement seemed to complicate Trump’s repeated assertions that Iran posed an imminent threat and created several awkward exchanges with lawmakers who asked Gabbard for her opinion on Iran’s threat as the nation’s top intelligence official. She repeatedly said that it was Trump’s decision to strike, not hers.

“It is not the intelligence community’s responsibility to determine what is and is not an imminent threat,” she said at one of this week’s hearings.

Gabbard wrought big changes in one year

Gabbard vowed to eliminate what she said was the politicization of intelligence by government insiders. But she quickly used her office to support some of Trump’s most partisan of arguments — that he won the 2020 election.

She also worked to undermine the results of earlier investigations into Trump’s ties to Russia.

In her year on the job, Gabbard oversaw a sharp reduction in the intelligence workforce, as well as the creation of a new task force that she charged with considering big changes to the intelligence service.

Earlier this year an intelligence sector whistleblower filed a complaint that Gabbard was withholding intelligence for political reasons, a complaint that prompted calls from Democrats for Gabbard’s resignation.

Gabbard, 44, was born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa, raised in Hawaii and spent a year of her childhood in the Philippines. She was first elected as a 21-year-old to Hawaii’s House of Representatives but had to leave after one term when her National Guard unit deployed to Iraq.

As the first Hindu member of the House, Gabbard was sworn into office with her hand on the Bhagavad Gita, the Hindu devotional work. She was also the first American Samoan elected to Congress.

During her four House terms she became known for speaking out against her party’s leadership. Her early support for Sen. Bernie Sanders ’ 2016 Democratic presidential primary run made her a popular figure in progressive politics nationally.

Kinnard, Weissert and Klepper write for the Associated Press.

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Japan to launch prime minister-led National Intelligence Bureau

Prime Minister of Japan Sanae Takaichi speaks during a joint press statement with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese (not pictured) at Parliament in Canberra, Australia, 04 May 2026. Prime Minister of Japan Sanae Takaichi is on a three-day visit to Australia. Photo by LUKAS COCH / EPA

May 7 (Asia Today) — Japan plans to launch a new National Intelligence Bureau as early as July to centralize intelligence gathering and analysis under the prime minister’s office, a move expected to affect trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan.

The new organization will upgrade the existing Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office into a roughly 700-member agency, with plans to gradually expand staffing by recruiting specialized intelligence personnel and private-sector experts.

According to the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Japanese government has finalized plans to establish the National Intelligence Bureau this summer with an initial workforce similar in size to the current intelligence office.

Legislation creating the National Intelligence Council, which will serve as the legal basis for the new bureau, was submitted to parliament on March 13 and passed the lower house in April. Deliberations in the upper house are scheduled to begin Thursday.

The new bureau will operate under the prime minister’s office and support the National Intelligence Council, chaired by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

The restructuring marks a major shift from the current system, in which the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office is largely staffed by officials dispatched from agencies such as the National Police Agency and the Foreign Ministry.

Beginning next year, Japan plans to recruit its own career-track intelligence officers through the national civil service examination system.

The government also intends to expand midcareer hiring from the private sector to secure experts with foreign language skills, cybersecurity expertise and advanced internet technologies.

Officials are additionally considering hiring engineers capable of using artificial intelligence to process large volumes of intelligence data more efficiently.

The new agency is expected to oversee intelligence exchanges with foreign services, analysis of overseas developments and responses to disinformation and misinformation on social media platforms.

Japan’s opposition parties have raised concerns about the expansion of surveillance powers and the political neutrality of the organization.

Critics argue the legislation does not clearly define the operational scope of intelligence activities and could lead to infringements on privacy rights and freedom of thought.

Some lawmakers have also warned the new system could pave the way for future legislation on anti-spying measures or the establishment of a full-fledged foreign intelligence service.

For South Korea, the reorganization means Japan’s intelligence-sharing channel within trilateral security cooperation with Washington could become more centralized and influential.

Key security issues already shared among the three countries include North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, Chinese military activities in the East and South China seas, Russian military movements in the Far East, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

Analysts said Japan’s strengthened intelligence structure could accelerate the speed of Japanese threat assessments and crisis responses during regional emergencies.

At the same time, South Korea is expected to closely monitor how Japan integrates the new agency into trilateral intelligence-sharing frameworks and whether the reform strengthens Japan’s independent security decision-making role.

The launch of the National Intelligence Bureau could improve coordination on North Korean missile threats while also marking a broader expansion of Japan’s security and intelligence capabilities.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260507010001415

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How Putin’s Coup-Proofing Measures Have Undermined Russia’s War Effort in Ukraine

Authoritarian leaders like President Vladimir Putin are faced with a dilemma: they require their military forces to competently conduct campaigns against external enemies, but these same capabilities make them more capable of successfully initiating coups to remove the incumbent leader.  Putin, like other leaders of his ilk, is forced to balance policies which promote competence in the armed forces with measures that ensure regime survival.  The latter are referred to as ‘coup-proofing’ measures, the implementation of which, to some extent explain the underperformance of the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

Counterbalancing and Parallel Forces

The coup-proofing measure of most consequence to Russia’s military performance in Ukraine is ‘counterbalancing’.  This involves the introduction of new security forces to counterbalance the military and each other.  A splintered security sector filled with various armed groups are in competition with each other for funding, recruits, and supplies, as well as the ruling autocrat’s attention, which is ultimately vital for attaining the aforementioned resources. 

Counterbalancing confers three advantages.  Firstly, it promotes loyalty by encouraging competition and distrust between militarized factions who must demonstrate allegiance to the leader to secure resources.  Secondly, it deters coups because the officers and senior figures distrust their counterparts in other organizations; and thirdly, it prevents the likelihood of a coup succeeding as it is more difficult for military and security forces operating under disparate chains of command to coordinate and cooperate effectively.

To quote, a 2017 paper appearing in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, ‘If coups are akin to coordination games, counterbalancing can be understood as an effort to add additional players to the game – actors who lack the incentive to move in concert with the others.’

Counterbalancing is rarely used in isolation and may be combined with other coup-proofing measures.  For example, authoritarian leaders frequently favour loyalty over meritocracy when selecting staff for senior military and security positions.

Mercenaries as Parallel Forces

Several parallel armed groups exist outside of the Russian military’s chain of command.  The most high-profile example is the use of mercenaries from Wagner Group, formerly led by Yevgeny Prigozhin until his demise in August 2023.  Wagner Group employs an estimated 50,000 soldiers, 40,000 of which are believed to be released prison convicts.  For Putin, the introduction of mercenaries to the war in Ukraine conferred several benefits including a degree of plausible deniability, less domestic blowback from casualties, and an alternative source of manpower which was especially valuable prior to the partial mobilization in September 2022.

From a coup-proofing perspective, the introduction of a private military company (PMC) with overlapping responsibilities to the regular military promoted greater competition between senior leaders.  This rivalry was exacerbated by the contest for vital resources like ammunition, supplies and personnel. 

The feud between Wagner’s late leader with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov was especially bitter.  Prigozhin frequently levelled scathing criticism at the two men, and other senior military officers for their handling of the war, accusing them of stealing the credit for Wagner’s battlefield successes in Ukraine, and even attempting to sabotage the PMC’s efforts by withholding vital ammunition. 

For a time, this suited Putin.  Prigozhin was careful to avoid directly criticizing the Russian president himself which helped to deflect any blame Putin might receive from the public onto his generals.  Moreover, Prigozhin’s actions appeared to fit a preestablished pattern in Russian politics whereby senior figures jostle against each other to secure the president’s favour. 

There are several Russian PMCs in addition to Wagner Group.  Konstantin Pikalov, once thought to be Prigozhin’s right hand man and the head of Wagner operations in Africa, heads his own mercenary group called ‘Convoy’, which were founded in occupied Crimea in Autumn 2022.  Another group is ‘Redut’, which was likely formed to provide security for Russian-owned facilities in Syria, but it believed to have been one of the first PMCs to provide personnel during the invasion of Ukraine in February last year.

The Russian energy giant Gazprom also has mercenaries in the guise of ‘private security organizations’, which energy companies were permitted to create after a new law was passed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in February 2023.  It is unclear whether the various groups associated with Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Neft will exclusively guard the company’s energy facilities or whether they will take on active combat roles in Ukraine.

Other Parallel Forces

Mercenaries are not the only parallel forces at play.  In 2016, Putin formed the Rosgvardiya (National Guard) under the leadership of Viktor Zolotov, the president’s former bodyguard.  The formation of the Rosgvariya entailed the reorganization of preexisting internal security forces into a new agency which directly reports to Putin.  Ostensibly, the Rosgvardiya’s responsibilities largely concern public order, policing, and counterterrorism, but the 300,000 to 400,000 strong force certainly acts as a deterrent to would-be coup-plotters.  The Rosgvardiya has also reportedly seen action in Ukraine.

Similar examples of counterbalancing can be seen in the intelligence sphere.  Three of the country’s most important intelligence services, the GRU, the SVR, and the FSB, each have their own elite special forces contingents.  Competition and mutual distrust between the three is rife due to a high degree of overlapping tasks and low degree of cooperation.  The FSB have attracted a particularly high degree of rancour from the GRU and SVR because of its increasingly proactive role conducting operations beyond its domestic remit.  Additionally, counterintelligence officers from the FSB are embedded directly within the armed forces to monitor signs of dissent. 

Finally, there are parallel forces provided by the Russian republics.  Just two days after the invasion of Ukraine, Ramzan Kadyrov, the Kremlin-appointed leader of Chechnya, confirmed that the 141st Special Motorized Regiment – better known as the Kadyrovites – were operating in the country.  The Kadyrovites are essentially a paramilitary organization loyal to Kadyrov, functioning as his private army. 

Like Prigozhin, Kadyrov has been highly critical of the Russian military leadership but avoided levelling such critiques at Putin.  By emphasizing the effectiveness of Chechen fighters over regular Russian forces, Kadyrov may have been hoping to make himself appear more indispensable to Putin.

How Coup-Proofing Degrades Military Effectiveness

The introduction of several players incentivized to hold each other in mutual suspicion is not conducive to an effective and unified war effort, as events in Ukraine have demonstrated.  As explained by James M. Powell, coup-proofing ‘undermines the fighting capacity of a military by creating coordination challenges in the field.’  Unity of command is necessary for a coup to be effective, but it is just as necessary for conducting a war.  The absence of unified command has thus jeopardized the entire Russian war effort.

The lack of a unified command structure was evident in the early stages of the war.  In the first months following the invasion, Western and Ukrainian intelligence agencies and analysts were unable to identify a single overall commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine.  Instead, it was believed that separate formations were drawn from each of Russia’s four military districts and placed under the command of senior officers from each district, with Putin taking on an oversized role, sometimes reportedly giving orders to field formations.  Last April, Army General Aleksandr Dvornikov was finally named as overall commander but there have been at least three reshuffles at the top since then.

Wagner’s increasing share of frontline duties further undermined unity of command, with Prigozhin and his mercenaries not subject to the authority of the regular armed forces.  Tensions between Prigozhin and the miliary leadership culminated in Wager Group’s mutiny in June.  A civil war or coup seemed momentarily possible in Russia until a deal was brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.  Prigozhin was later killed in a plane crash in August removing him from the chessboard altogether, but his insubordination was a clear sign that Putin had miscalculated and allowed the rivalries simmering between the members of his inner circle to burn too hot.

Beyond Prigozhin’s dramatic rebellion, Coup-proofing has created other unintended consequences which have hindered Russia’s military efforts.  An overemphasis on loyalty at the expense of competence coupled with fierce competition between the security and defence services have created incentive structures that have undermined honesty and integrity, inter-service cooperation, and professionalism. 

These trends were identified by analysts as being particularly pervasive in the Russian intelligence community even before the invasion of Ukraine.  For example, a 2021 Congressional Research Service report noted that ‘Agencies compete with each other for greater responsibilities, budgets, and political influence, often at the expense of other agencies.’  As Mark Galeotti puts it, ‘The competition for presidential approval is especially strong and has led to a perverse competition to tell the boss what they think he wants to hear, not what he needs to hear.’  This culture likely incentivised the Russian intelligence community to provide briefings to Putin prior to the invasion that confirmed his preconceptions that Ukraine would offer little resistance.

It is equally questionable if the most competent officers have been granted the responsibility to lead Russia’s war on Ukraine.  Sergei Surovikin, a veteran of several conflicts and broadly considered to be capable officer by most military analysts, was made the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine in October 2022.  However, Surovikin was replaced in January the following year by Valery Gerasimov, despite the latter having already attracted much of the blame for implementing a faulty strategy in his role as the Chief of the General Staff.  In August, Surovikin was then stripped of his role as the commander of the Russian aerospace forces due to suspicions that he was linked to the Wagner rebellion. 

Other officers have met similar fates.  On July 12, Major General Ivan Popov, who led the 58th Combined Arms Army stationed in Ukraine’s southern Zaporizhzhya region, disclosed that he had been relieved of his command after he made complaints to Gerasimov regarding the lack of troop rotations.  He also highlighted issues his soldiers were having with counterbattery radar and artillery reconnaissance.  Popov’s dismissal indicates that senior military personnel are seemingly unable to report the facts on the ground to their superiors without facing charges of disloyalty or disciplinary action.  Such a culture, especially within the Russian military’s highly hierarchal command structure will make it increasingly difficult for commanders to make informed decisions based on accurate information.

Thus far, Putin’s coup-proofing strategy has succeeded in fragmenting the Russian security elite sufficiently to secure his hold on power, despite Prigozhin’s short-lived insubordination.  However, these same measures which have enabled Putin to safeguard his rule have seriously undermined Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.  The constituent parts of Russia’s defence and security apparatuses fail to act as a whole and there is ample evidence that senior leaders have been promoted on the basis of perceived loyalty over competence.  A culture of competition and distrust has hindered cooperation, coordination, and honesty, which has led to poor decision-making, the results of which have played out on the battlefields of Ukraine since February last year.

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South Korea minister denies U.S. intelligence sharing dispute

South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks to reporters at the Seoul Government Complex on April 20. Photo by Asia Today

April 20 (Asia Today) — South Korea’s unification minister on Monday rejected reports of a rift with the United States over intelligence sharing on North Korea, warning against speculation that could harm bilateral relations.

Chung Dong-young said he was concerned about claims suggesting a crisis in ties between Seoul and Washington following reports that the United States had limited the sharing of satellite intelligence after his recent remarks.

“I explained policy to underscore the seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear issue, and it is deeply regrettable that this is being framed as a leak of classified information,” Chung told reporters at the Seoul Government Complex.

He said his comments referencing a suspected nuclear facility in Kusong, North Pyongan Province, were based on publicly available information and had been mentioned previously during his confirmation hearing in July.

Chung questioned the timing of the controversy, noting that the same reference had been made months earlier without issue.

He added that since taking office, he has not received any classified intelligence reports related to North Korea’s nuclear facilities from domestic or foreign agencies.

South Korea’s Unification Ministry also said the remarks were based on previously published material, including reports by the Institute for Science and International Security, the RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Chung dismissed suggestions that internal divisions within South Korea over alliance policy were behind the issue, saying he did not believe such factors were at play.

In a separate social media post, he also criticized what he described as politically motivated speculation, calling claims of an intelligence leak “groundless.”

The comments come amid heightened scrutiny over information sharing between South Korea and the United States on North Korea’s nuclear program.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260421010006305

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