Israel’s Defence Minister Israel Katz said an overnight strike killed Iran’s Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib. There has been no confirmation from Iran but Katz says Israel’s military is authorised to target senior Iranian officials without additional approval from the government.
Published On 18 Mar 202618 Mar 2026
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The international community has a structural problem in reading conflicts: it treats silence as neutrality, when in fact silence is a manufactured condition. When international monitors report the absence of civil protests or testimonies from conflict zones, they are not documenting consensus; they are documenting the success of propaganda operations. This article argues that conflicting parties are now actively exploiting the spiral of silence as a strategic weapon, and the international community’s failure to recognize this results in a structurally flawed diplomatic response even before analysis begins. This argument will be constructed in three layers: how the spiral is engineered, how Sudan proves it, and why the international interpretive framework must be updated immediately.
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1974), in her theory Spiral of Silence, describes how individuals suppress their minority opinions to avoid social isolation. This theory is built on the assumption of a free society, where silence is an organic social choice. In conflict zones, this assumption collapses completely. Silence is not chosen; it is engineered. Propaganda actors flood information channels with dominant narratives not to convince audiences that these narratives are true, but to signal which voices are safe and which are not. The result appears to be consensus. But it is not.
Social media has transformed this architecture of silence into something almost invisible. Platforms give users real-time visibility into how much public response a particular view receives. When opposing content is systematically silenced through algorithmic deprioritization and coordinated mass reporting campaigns, people conclude that speaking out is pointless, or worse, dangerous. Jowett and O’Donnell (2019) note that bandwagon propaganda does not require audiences to believe in the dominant narrative, only to believe that others already believe it. At that point, the spiral becomes self-sustaining: it no longer needs external enforcement because the target population has internalized it themselves.
The agenda-setting theory proposed by McCombs and Shaw (1972) adds another layer to this problem and makes it much more difficult to detect. The media and information channels do not merely reflect reality; they determine what is considered worthy of discussion from the outset. When warring parties dominate the information space, they not only shape international perceptions. They also determine which testimonies are considered safe for local residents to give and which silences are necessary for survival. This is not a side effect of conflict. It is a deliberate targeting of the information environment itself, and the international community has been consistently slow to recognize this as such.
Two technical mechanisms make all this work, and neither requires direct violence to be effective. First, bandwagon propaganda floods channels with coordinated content until dissent appears marginal and irrelevant. Second, fear appeals work without needing to be explicitly stated. In conflict environments, people have witnessed what happens to those who oppose the dominant narrative, so self-censorship becomes a rational choice, not a sign of weakness. The combination of the two is the most dangerous: the spiral no longer requires external enforcement because its targets are already silencing themselves. This is not the moral failure of individuals who choose to remain silent; it is a system designed to work exactly as intended.
The case of Sudan illustrates this most clearly. Both the SAF and the RSF launched coordinated information operations from the early days of the conflict. RSF channels spread a narrative of civilian protection, while the SAF network framed the war solely as a counter-terrorism operation. These two narratives, although contradictory, both served to narrow the space for independent civilian testimony. Civilians in Khartoum and Darfur faced an information environment that made disclosure a risk calculation rather than a right. The internet blackouts recorded at various periods of the conflict were not merely technical obstacles; they were a very clear signal of the price to be paid for speaking out.
Zeitzoff (2017) shows that users in environments close to conflict significantly alter their disclosure behavior under perceived surveillance, even without direct threats. In Sudan, the threat is anything but hypothetical. The diplomatic consequences are immediately apparent: the UN’s initial assessment of the Sudanese conflict has been repeatedly criticized by humanitarian organizations for underestimating civilian casualties and displacement figures. This is not a methodological failure. It is the intended result of a deliberate information architecture, a condition in which the most relevant data is already missing before the verification process even begins.
What makes this a diplomatic crisis, not merely an information crisis, is that the international response is built on what is reported. When open-source assessments treat civilian silence as a neutral baseline, they are not accessing the truth on the ground. They are accessing whatever has made it through the spiral. This pattern repeats itself in various conflicts because it consistently works in Syria, in Myanmar, and in Ethiopia. In each case, the international community finds itself working with records that have been curated by the parties most interested in concealing crimes.
The solution is not more monitoring infrastructure. What is needed is a different interpretative framework. Silence must be treated as a data point that requires explanation, not as a default condition that requires nothing. When there are no reports from conflict zones, it does not mean that nothing is happening; rather, it means that the conditions for speaking out have been destroyed first. Protected witness pathways, verification networks from the diaspora, and analysis of anomalies in information flows are all useful, but only after a fundamental recognition that the problem is not a lack of information, but rather that engineered silence is constantly misinterpreted as the absence of anything worth investigating.
The Spiral of Silence was originally a theory about how even free societies can slowly and unconsciously silence themselves. In the hands of modern propaganda architects, the theory has been repurposed as a method to ensure that the most credible witnesses to crimes never speak out and that their silence is interpreted by the international community as proof that there are no crimes to investigate. The arguments in this article, from the mechanisms of spiral engineering to the role of social media to the case of Sudan, all point to the same conclusion: as long as silence is interpreted as absence, the international community is not conducting independent analysis. They are confirming the narrative of those most interested in concealing the truth. The loudest voices are not the most honest; they are simply the ones allowed to speak.
March 6 (UPI) — Russia is helping Iran by giving it intelligence on American troops, ships and aircraft during the U.S. and Israeli assault on the Middle Eastern nation.
The intelligence Iran has received on potential U.S. targets in the region — naval vessels, military bases and the locations of other American assets — has largely been provided using Russia’s massive space-based surveillance apparatus, CNN reported.
It remains unclear exactly what or how much Russia has helped Iran with but The Washington Post, which was the first to report that one of the United States’ longest-running adversaries is assisting the Iranian regime, reported that one its sources said the assistance “does seem like it’s a pretty comprehensive effort.”
Additionally, sources told NBC News that the intelligence could potentially be used to help Iran locate American assets in the region, though there has been no indication that Russia has actually helped direct Iranian attacks against U.S. interests there.
One source that was briefed on the intelligence reported by all three news organizations told CNN that despite Russia’s appearance that it is staying out of the widening conflict in the Middle East, it “still likes Iran very much.”
Dara Massicot, expert on the Russian military at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told The Post that Iran’s “very precise hits on early warning radars or over-the-horizon radars” indicated they were methodically targeting U.S. assets in an effort to undermine American command and control.
When asked by reporters on Friday, President Donald Trump replied that the U.S. is doing “very well” in its plans against Iran and said it was “a stupid question … to be asking at this time.”
“Somebody said, how would you score it from zero to 10?,” NBC News reported Trump said. “I’d give it a 12 to a 15. Their army is gone. … Their navy is gone. Their communications are gone. Their leaders are gone. Two sets of their leaders are gone. They’re down to their third set. Their air force is wiped out entirely. Think of it.”
U.S. intelligence also reportedly suggests that China is considering getting involved in the conflict, with financial assistance, spare parts and missile components potentially being on the table as it worries about access to Iranian oil that it heavily relies on.
March 6 (UPI) — Counter-terrorism police in London arrested four Iranian men early Friday on suspicion of conducting surveillance for Iranian intelligence of individuals and locations linked to the Jewish community in the capital.
The suspects, one Iranian and three dual British-Iranian nationals aged between 22 and 55, were detained shortly after 1 a.m. local time in raids on addresses in north London and Watford, just north of the city, under the National Security Act, Metropolitan Police said in a news release.
Searches of at least three addresses in the north London borough of Barnet were still underway, said the Met.
Six other suspects, all males aged between 20 and 49, were arrested at one of the locations raided in London on suspicion of assisting an offender and assaulting police.
“Today’s arrests are part of a long-running investigation and part of our ongoing work to disrupt malign activity where we suspect it,” said Commander Helen Flanagan, Head of Counter Terrorism Policing for London.
“We understand the public may be concerned, in particular the Jewish community, and as always, I would ask them to remain vigilant and if they see or hear anything that concerns them, then to contact us,” she added.
The arrests come as the latest development in a long history of covert activity by the Iranian regime on British soil, mostly targeting dissidents, exiled Iranian news organizations providing independent coverage to people inside Iran and the Iranian diaspora, and groups opposing the regime.
“Iran is the biggest state sponsor of terrorism globally and sadly, that is in effect in our own society as well,” British Deputy Prime Minister David Lammy told ITV television on Friday morning.
“Our intelligence services and counter-terrorism police have thwarted lots of action over the last few years,” he added.
On Saturday, in his announcement that Britain was joining the U.S-Israeli offensive against Iran in a “defensive” role, Prime Minister Keir Starmer condemned Iranian aggression against Britain’s Middle East allies, saying the United Kingdom had long been a target.
“Even in the United Kingdom, the Iranian regime poses a direct threat to dissidents and to the Jewish community. Over the last year alone, they have backed more than 20 potentially lethal attacks on U.K. soil.”
In May, three Iranian men were charged over allegedly conducting surveillance and reconnaissance of U.K.-based journalists working for the Iran International news outlet to enable “serious violence” to be committed against them.
Mostafa Sepahvand, 39, Farhad Javadi Manesh, 44, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 55, of London, are accused of “engaging in conduct likely to assist a foreign intelligence service” under the National Security Act.
A plea hearing is scheduled for Sept. 26 and a provisional trial date set for Oct. 5.
Iran International, a Persian-language satellite TV channel and multilingual digital news operation established in 2017, puts out highly critical coverage of the Iranian government which has banned it as a terrorist organization.
British media and U.S. academics have previously reported links between Iran International and backers at the most senior level in Saudi Arabia, which Iran International denies.
The men were arrested on Friday on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence service.
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Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, speaks at an event hosted by the Washington chapter of the Korean American Union Society at the Washington Korean Community Center in Alexandria. File. Photo by Asia Today
Feb. 26 (Asia Today) — North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau operates as a “complex threat entity” that merges military operations, cybercrime and terrorism under a single command structure reporting directly to leader Kim Jong Un, according to a new report from a Washington-based human rights organization.
The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea released the report Sunday, titled Reconnaissance General Bureau: The Kim Regime’s Precious Treasured Sword. It offers one of the most detailed public examinations to date of the agency’s structure, financing and global reach.
The report was authored by Robert Collins, a former U.S. Army strategist with extensive Korea-related experience, including serving as chief of strategy at the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command – the joint military structure that oversees the defense of South Korea.
Collins argues that the RGB defies easy comparison to conventional intelligence agencies. Unlike South Korea’s National Intelligence Service or the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which operate within defined mandates, the RGB consolidates military reconnaissance, special operations, cyberwarfare, espionage, psychological operations and operations targeting South Korea under one centralized chain of command.
The bureau reports to North Korea’s State Affairs Commission and ultimately to Kim Jong Un, who the report says treats it as a core instrument of regime survival. Kim has personally referred to its cyber units as a “precious treasured sword,” according to the report.
Seven Bureaus, One Command
Established in February 2009 through the merger of several intelligence and operations units, the RGB currently operates through six main bureaus and a seventh logistics unit.
The first bureau oversees agent training and infiltration missions. The second conducts military reconnaissance along the Demilitarized Zone and coastal areas. The third manages overseas intelligence and alleged international operations. The fourth handles inter-Korean dialogue and related policy support. The fifth directs cyber operations, including hacking and communications interception. The sixth provides technical support and electronic warfare capabilities, while the seventh handles rear services and logistics.
Taken together, the report assesses that the RGB maintains operational capacity across land, sea, air and cyberspace – a multi-domain reach that few comparable organizations possess.
Cyber Operations as a Revenue Engine
A substantial portion of the report is devoted to North Korea’s cyber activities, which Collins describes as both strategically and financially central to the regime.
The report estimates that North Korea maintains approximately 5,900 cyber personnel and identifies hacking groups Lazarus, Andariel and Bluenoroff as operating under the RGB’s organizational umbrella. These groups have been linked by U.S. and international authorities to some of the most significant state-sponsored cyberattacks in recent years.
Drawing on international assessments, the report alleges that North Korean-linked hackers stole approximately $1.7 billion in cryptocurrency in 2022 alone – funds it says are funneled into the country’s nuclear and missile programs, helping Pyongyang sustain its weapons development despite sweeping international sanctions.
The report also raises concern about reported cooperation between North Korean operatives and foreign cybercriminal networks, suggesting the bureau’s reach may extend further into the global criminal ecosystem than previously documented.
Human Rights in the Crosshairs
The report draws an explicit connection between the RGB’s security operations and human rights, an angle that sets it apart from purely strategic assessments of the bureau.
It argues that cyber intrusions, surveillance and information disruption campaigns may violate international covenants protecting privacy and freedom of expression. It further contends that revenue generated through cybercrime – redirected to weapons programs rather than civilian welfare – could breach obligations under international agreements on economic and social rights.
The report also revisits a series of past incidents attributed to North Korean operatives, including armed infiltrations, bombings and assassinations, characterizing them as violations of the right to life and other fundamental protections under international law.
A Threat Beyond the Peninsula
In its conclusion, the report warns that the RGB can no longer be viewed solely as a regional security concern. The integration of its cyber capabilities with emerging technologies – including drones and advanced reconnaissance systems – could significantly complicate the security environment in coming years, the report said.
The committee said the study is intended as a reference for policymakers, researchers and security specialists seeking to understand the bureau’s expanding operational scope.
No response from the North Korean government was immediately available. Pyongyang does not typically comment on reports issued by foreign organizations.
— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.
Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260226010007781
In a recent move, China’s top general and a longtime confidant of President Xi Jinping, Zhang Youxia, and Joint Staff chief Liu Zhenli were removed from the Central Military Commission (CMC). An editorial published in Liberation Army Daily described both men as “seriously betraying the trust and expectations” of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the CMC.
Beyond corruption allegations, Zhang was reportedly accused of leaking core technical data on China’s nuclear weapons programme to the United States. In the aftermath, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a Mandarin language recruitment video targeting disaffected Chinese soldiers. Titled “The Reason for Stepping Forward To Save the Future,” portrays a disillusioned midlevel officer choosing to contact American intelligence. The outreach appears aimed at deepening internal doubts and positioning itself as an alternative confidant for officers who may feel exposed. However, this is not the first time the agency has sought to infiltrate the country.
Intelligence rivalry stretches back to the late 1940s, when the CIA tried to monitor the Soviet nuclear programme by placing listening devices within China and along its Soviet border. Surveillance also extended to the Xinjiang region, tracking uranium, gold, petroleum, and Soviet aid to the CPC during its war with the US backed Guomindang for regional control. Despite these efforts, the intelligence gathered remained minimal at best, from October 1950 to July 1953 the agency also failed to achieve its primary objective of diverting significant resources away from China’s military campaign in Korea.
As Cold War rivalries hardened, the CIA launched Operation Circus in the late 1950s to support Tibetan rebels against the CPC. The CIA supplied guerrilla groups, including the most active Chushi Gangdruk group, with arms and ammunition and trained fighters at Camp Hale. Allen Dulles, then CIA deputy director, saw the effort as an opportunity to destabilize the CPC and counter Communist influence across Asia. The group continued its operations from Nepal until 1974, when funding ended after US-China rapprochement.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the CIA cooperated with Chinese intelligence under Project Chestnut, establishing listening posts in the northwest to monitor Soviet communications. In 1989, as the Tiananmen Square protests rocked the CPC, the CIA provided communications equipment, including fax machines and typewriters to protestors. It also assisted in the escape of protest leaders with the help of sympathizers in Hong Kong under Operation Yellow Bird. Relations deteriorated in 2001, when an aircraft built in the US for General Secretary Jiang Zemin was found to contain at least 27 listening devices, including one embedded in the headboard of a bed, operable via satellite.
However, these gains proved fragile as major setbacks soon followed, with reports that between 2010 and 2012 Chinese authorities dismantled a large CIA network. In total, between 18 and 20 sources were killed or imprisoned, according to two former senior American officials. One asset was reportedly shot in front of colleagues in the courtyard of a government building as a warning to others suspected of working with the CIA.
Estimates in 2024 suggested the Ministry of State Security (MSS) employed as many as 800,000 personnel, compared with roughly 480,000 at the height of the KGB. After taking power in 2012, Xi further consolidated control over its security apparatus, chairing a high level national security task force.
His approach also followed revelations that an American informant network had infiltrated the MSS. An executive assistant to MSS Vice Minister Lu Zhongwei was discovered in 2012 to have passed sensitive information to the CIA. The ministry was also influenced by former security chief Zhou Yongkang, who was charged with abuse of power and intentionally leaking state secrets in 2014. He was subsequently expelled from the politburo in one of the most consequential purges in the country’s history.
In light of these developments, Xi’s “comprehensive state security concept,” promulgated in 2014, linked internal and external threats and underscored the dangers of destabilization through foreign subversion and infiltration. He also enacted the 2014 Counter Espionage Law, revised in 2023 to broaden espionage definitions, coinciding with detentions of foreign firm employees and tighter data controls.
Under his leadership, another major initiative allowed the MSS to establish direct public contact in 2015 through a hotline and website urging citizens to report threats to national security. In 2017, MSS offered rewards of up to 500,000 RMB for reporting suspected threats. In the same year, counterintelligence services also launched a broad awareness campaign through websites, animations, and television dramas promoting this “special work,” often targeting journalists, academics, and Chinese American and Taiwanese businesspeople.
Chinese courts have also imposed severe punishments in such cases. In April 2025, a former employee of a military research institute was sentenced to life imprisonment for selling secret documents to foreign intelligence agencies. The ruling followed the sentencing of a former engineer to death in March on similar charges.
China also deploys operatives abroad to curb criticism and preserve regime stability. Overseas police stations reportedly directed by provincial MSS offices combine administrative services with intelligence functions. One established in New York by the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau drew headlines in 2023. In fact, the earliest cyber incidents targeting UK government systems in the early 2000s originated not from Russia but from China, and were aimed at gathering information on overseas dissident communities, including Tibetan and Uighur groups.
As China’s influence grew in the 2000s, Western policymakers were focused on the war on terror and interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, political leaders often preferred that intelligence chiefs avoid publicly naming China. Businesses faced mounting pressure to prioritize access to its vast market, while remaining reluctant to acknowledge that their proprietary information was being targeted.
In 2021, the FBI reported opening a new Chinese espionage case roughly every 12 hours, most involving cyber disruption. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of Justice, and other US bodies repeatedly identified MSS affiliated actors in advisories and indictments. Analysts assess MSS linked groups have surpassed PLA associated actors in both the sophistication and scope of their hacking campaigns. In 2024, authorities announced that Salt Typhoon had breached major US telecommunications companies in one of the most damaging publicly reported cyber campaigns. The National Security Agency (NSA) also noted that China’s reliance on indigenous technology makes its networks harder to track.
Former CIA director William J. Burns, under the Biden administration described these intelligence shortcomings as a “pacing challenge.” The administration created a China Mission Centre and a technology intelligence centre to address it. An executive order was also issued in 2024, prohibiting funding for Chinese semiconductors, microelectronics, quantum computing, and certain AI applications in sectors that are considered capable of enhancing military capabilities.
When the Trump administration returned in 2025, it triggered significant disruptions across the US government. In early May 2025, plans were announced to cut 1,200 positions at CIA and 2,000 at the NSA, with similar reductions reportedly planned for other intelligence bodies as well. Such cuts were expected to disrupt operations and deter long term asset relationships. The “Signalgate scandal” further revealed that senior national security officials had shared classified information in an unsecured Signal group chat. These avoidable lapses posed a serious threat to operational security and heightened the risks faced by intelligence assets worldwide.
As China pursues its vision of a unipolar world while escalating espionage and global security threats, international attention on its actions has intensified. Trump’s planned visit to China in April 2026 will be closely watched to assess whether the recruitment videos are part of a broader strategy targeting Xi’s establishment or merely a pressure tactic.