Indonesias

Authorities warn locals and tourists to stay at least 6km away from the site of the volcano and to be ready for evacuation.

Authorities in Indonesia have raised the volcano emergency alert to its highest level after Mount Lewotobi Laki-Laki erupted, spewing volcanic ash an estimated 10km (6.2 miles) into the sky.

There were no immediate reports of casualties or damage on Wednesday, but authorities have warned residents and tourists on the eastern Indonesian island of Flores to keep away from the mountain and prepare for possible evacuation.

“The public should remain calm and follow the local government’s directions and not believe issues from unclear sources,” the country’s Centre for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation said in an alert notice.

The volcano erupted at 1:35am on Wednesday (Tuesday 18:35 GMT) for about nine minutes, Indonesia’s Geological Agency said in a statement, after also erupting two hours earlier.

Muhammad Wafid, head of the Geological Agency, said people should stay at least 6 to 7km (3.7 to 4.3 miles) from the site of the eruption, which saw volcanic materials shoot 10km (6.2 miles) into the sky above the mountain’s 1,584-metre-high (5,080ft) peak.

“People living near the volcano should be aware of the potential volcanic mudflow if heavy rain occurs,” Wafid said, adding that the column of ash from the eruption could “disrupt airport operations and flight paths if it spreads” further.

Authorities have suspended operations at the local Fransiskus Xaverius Seda Airport in the town of Maumere some 60km (37 miles) west of Lewotobi, the airport said on Instagram. The airport will remain closed until Thursday.

In July, the same volcano erupted, sending an 18km-high (11-mile) cloud of ash into the sky and forcing the cancellation of flights at the international airport on the resort island of Bali.

Ten people living in local villages were killed and thousands of houses damaged when the volcano erupted in November 2024, according to reports.

Indonesia, which has more than 120 active volcanoes, sits on the Pacific “Ring of Fire”, an area of intense seismic activity stretching from Japan through Southeast Asia and across the Pacific basin.

Indonesia has denied visas to Israel athletes ahead of the upcoming world championships in the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation.

Gymnastics’ governing body has given a muted reaction to Indonesia’s announcement that it would block Israeli athletes from competing at the upcoming world championships in Jakarta.

“The FIG takes note of the Indonesian government’s decision not to issue visas to the Israeli delegation registered for the 53rd FIG Artistic Gymnastics, which will be held in Jakarta from 19-25 October, and recognizes the challenges that the host country has faced in organizing this event,” it said in a short statement on Friday

The statement did not threaten to take the event away from Indonesia, as stipulated in FIG statutes for cases where the host refuses to issue visas.

“The FIG hopes that an environment will be created as soon as possible where athletes around the world can enjoy sports safely and with peace of mind,” it said.

Indonesia’s decision to deny visas to the Israeli athletes came after their planned participation had prompted intense opposition in the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, which has long been a staunch supporter of Palestinians.

Israel is among 86 countries registered to compete at the worlds, with a team highlighted by 2020 Olympic gold medallist and defending world champion Artem Dolgopyat in the men’s floor exercise.

Now its participation is in doubt, even though the Israeli Gymnastics Federation said in July that it had been assured by Indonesian officials that it would be welcome at the worlds. That would have gone against Indonesia’s longstanding policy of refusing to host Israeli sports delegations for major events.

On Thursday, Indonesia’s senior minister of law, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, made it clear the Israeli team will not be allowed into the country, despite Israel and Hamas having agreed to a ceasefire.

“We respect every decision taken by the government with various considerations,” Indonesian Olympic Committee president Raja Sapta Oktohari told a news conference in Jakarta on Friday.

Indonesian Gymnastics Federation chairwoman, Ita Yuliati, said that she has briefed FIG president Morinari Watanabe about the decision and claimed “the FIG has expressed support”.

The gymnastics spat is the latest example of how the global backlash against Israel over the humanitarian toll of the war in Gaza has spread into the arenas of sports and culture.

Indonesia was stripped of hosting rights for football’s Under-20 World Cup in 2023, only two months before the start of the tournament, amid political turmoil regarding Israel’s participation.

Instead of disciplining Indonesia, FIFA awarded the country hosting rights to a different youth World Cup later that year, which Israel had not qualified for.

Indonesian football was seen to benefit from its leader Erick Thohir’s close ties with FIFA president Gianni Infantino, who, like Thohir, is a member of the International Olympic Committee.

Indonesia’s telecommunications sector is at a historic crossroads.  After a decade of consolidation, three groups — TelkomGroup (with Telkomsel), Indosat Ooredoo Hutchison (IOH) and XL Axiata/Smartfren (XL Smart) — now control about 95% of the market’s revenue .  This “healthy oligopoly” promises economies of scale and opens the door for infrastructure sharing, yet it also raises a sobering question: will these carriers become mere commodity providers squeezed by over‑the‑top (OTT) platforms, or will they emerge as strategic national enablers for Indonesia’s digital economy?

The Stagnation Trap: Core Problems and Risks

Low ARPU and Prepaid Dominance – Nearly 97% of Indonesian mobile subscribers are prepaid .  Customers churn easily, forcing operators into price wars.  As a result, the blended average revenue per user (ARPU) sits at only ~IDR 35,700 (US$2.38) and has been almost flat.

population was covered by 5G, mainly using refarmed 4G spectrum .  The for years.  Such thin margins, coupled with commoditization of connectivity, echo a global pattern where telco revenues grow slowly while capital expenditures continue to rise .

Limited 5G Spectrum and Slow Deployment – Indonesia’s 5G rollout remains selective and urban.  In 2024 only 26.3% of the country currently has 360 MHz of mid‑band spectrum assigned for mobile services, far below the ~2 GHz average required to capture 5G’s full economic impact.  Analysts note that refarming the 2.6 GHz and 700 MHz bands and releasing more mid‑band frequencies are urgent to prevent Indonesia from falling behind .

Spectrum Reform and Regulatory Bottlenecks – Twimbit’s 2023 update observes that spectrum scarcity has delayed 5G launches and forced operators to invest cautiously.  Government digital roadmaps push for 5G, but licensing remains fragmented and expensive.  Without transparent auction policies and neutral‑host models for shared infrastructure, the industry risks duplication and inefficiency.

Cybersecurity and Trust Deficit – High‑profile data breaches — including leaks affecting more than a billion SIM‑card activation records — spurred Indonesia’s Personal Data Protection law.  Implementing this law will require significant investment in cybersecurity.  EY research warns that two‑thirds of consumers want better explanations of how AI is used and 40% of telco employees feel unprepared to use AI responsibly.  Moreover, 57% of telecom executives worry about security attacks on physical assets, and Southeast Asian operators must balance innovation with strong compliance and trusted AI to counter rising cyber risks .

Talent and Skills Shortage – Telcos struggle to attract and retain digital talent.  EY’s Telco of Tomorrow survey shows that industry executives rank talent and culture as their top transformation inhibitors; poor collaboration and missing skills hinder innovation.  Competing with hyperscalers for AI and cloud expertise is an uphill battle, especially as Indonesia’s young engineers often migrate to global tech firms.

Financial Pressures and Capital Intensity – Globally, telco revenues are projected to grow at a compound annual rate of only 2.9% to 2028, while ARPU continues to decline.  Indonesia’s carriers therefore face a scenario where most cash is absorbed by capital expenditures, dividends and debt servicing , leaving little room for innovation.  Without new revenue streams, their role may stagnate.

Hidden Opportunities: Why Indonesia Still Holds Promise

Despite these headwinds, the country’s 280 million citizens and rapidly growing digital economy offer unique opportunities.  Indonesia’s GDP grew 5.3% in 2022 and its telecom revenue is expected to grow at 6.1% CAGR between 2023–27, outpacing global averages.  Operators and policymakers can tap several levers:

Infrastructure Sharing and Neutral Hosts – With three large players and tens of thousands of towers, sharing becomes logical.  Twimbit notes that Telkomsel, XL and Smartfren operate more than 165 000, 91 000 and 43 000 4G sites respectively.  Active sharing, fibre co‑build and neutral‑host models reduce duplication and free capital for new services.

Accelerated Spectrum Release – Refarming of the 2.6 GHz and 700 MHz bands and auctioning the 3.5 GHz mid‑band could enable Indonesia to meet the 2 GHz requirement.  Transparent, cost‑effective auctions will encourage investment and prevent a repeat of 5G’s initial delays.

Diversifying Beyond Connectivity – Telcos are shifting to non‑connectivity revenue streams.  Telkomsel created INDICO, focusing on education, health and gaming verticals, and saw its digital business revenue grow 17.4% year‑on‑year .  Enterprise services are a priority: carriers now offer IoT, cloud computing and managed services to businesses.  This pivot from consumer to B2B mirrors global advice that AI, fixed connectivity and vertical solutions are the ingredients for growth.

Trusted AI and Data Sovereignty – Indonesia can leverage its telcos as sovereign enablers rather than mere “techco”  By investing in secure sovereign clouds, digital identity and data‑classification systems, carriers can provide AI‑powered services while ensuring national data stays onshore.  EY’s insights stress that as AI becomes pervasive, building trust and clear privacy policies is essential.  Indonesia’s new data protection law compels operators to bolster cyber defenses, turning compliance into a competitive advantage.

Bridging the Digital Divide – Indonesia’s archipelagic geography means connectivity gaps persist.  The government’s Palapa Ring fibre backbone connects remote islands, but 5G coverage remains low.  Satellite‑enabled non‑terrestrial networks, community internet for rural areas, and targeted subsidies can help ensure that digital inclusion accompanies growth.

A Path Forward: Policy and Industry Recommendations

For Indonesia to avoid stagnation and instead become a digital powerhouse of the Global South, stakeholders must act in concert:

Enact Pro‑Growth Regulation – Regulators should adopt an orchestrator role, promoting shared infrastructure and neutral‑host models, streamlining spectrum auctions and fostering healthy collaboration.  Transparent policies can align private investment with national goals.

Prioritize Mid‑Band Spectrum – Release at least 200–300 MHz of the 3.5 GHz band and integrate it with the 700 MHz auction .  Reserve prices should be conservative to encourage robust 5G rollout.

Invest in Talent and Innovation – Government, academia and industry must co‑create programs to develop AI, cybersecurity and cloud skills.  Public‑private partnerships can sponsor scholarships and nurture a local digital workforce.

Leverage AI Responsibly – Telcos should harness generative AI to reduce costs, personalize services and improve network efficiency, while adhering to strict privacy standards .  Clear communication about AI use can rebuild customer trust.

Expand Non‑Connectivity Services – Operators need to emulate digital leaders by offering integrated fintech, healthtech, education and entertainment services.  Building “digital ecosystems” will differentiate them from commoditized connectivity and create new revenue streams.

Conclusion

Indonesia’s telco sector stands between two futures.  One path leads to commoditization and slow decline, as global OTT giants capture the value created by local networks.  The other path requires bold policies, shared infrastructure, spectrum reform and investment in AI and talent.  By choosing the latter, Indonesia’s operators can become sovereign digital enablers — powering not just connectivity but the nation’s broader ambitions for health, education, industry and sovereignty.  The moment for decisive action is now.

 Tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration on Southeast Asian nations—effective August 7, 2025—are likely to have a significant impact on the economies of the region. The second-quarter growth figures of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam would have brought some relief for all these countries. For long, ASEAN countries have benefited immensely from globalization and reasonable global geopolitical stability—especially stable ties between China and the US—and in recent years even from the China+1 policy of several companies—especially western ones—which sought to reduce their dependence upon China.

In the current economic and geopolitical situation, however, the ASEAN region faces multiple challenges due to the global turbulence, and countries in the region are devising tools to deal with the economic uncertainty.

Apart from diversifying economic relations, countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam are all focusing heavily on domestic spending. While Vietnam is focusing on infrastructure, Indonesia, under the leadership of Prabowo Subianto, is focusing heavily on welfare schemes, which include an ambitious free nutritious meal program, setting up of rural cooperatives, free health check-ups, and the construction of three million homes. During his first state of the nation address, the Indonesian president said:

‘Our goal of independence is to be free from poverty, free from hunger, and free from suffering.’

For 2026, Indonesia is likely to raise public spending to $233.92 billion. The free meal program will receive $20.7 billion. Prabowo’s ambitious plan to develop 80,000 rural cooperatives is also likely to incur massive public expenditures.

Focus on welfare and the impact of infrastructure projects in Indonesia.

In the case of Indonesia, the spending on welfare schemes has also resulted in lesser allocation towards Nusantara—the new administrative capital proposed by Prabowo’s predecessor, Joko Widodo, referred to as Jokowi. The reason for setting up a new capital was infrastructural and logistical problems in the current Indonesian capital—Jakarta. Nusantara, located in the East Kalimantan region of Indonesia, was chosen due to its geographical location and the fact that it may help in addressing disparities between the eastern and western parts of the country. While Jokowi had committed over $5 billion for the development of Nusantara, between 2022 and 2024, his successor has committed a little more than half the amount for the period between 2025 and 2029.

Unlike Jokowi, who focused heavily on the infrastructure sector, Prabowo Subianto is focused more on welfare. This is a major departure in terms of economic policy. Lesser focus on Nusantara could have several implications. First, according to many observers, it could send the wrong message to investors. Second, it may have domestic political ramifications. The Nusantara project was a brainchild of Jokowi, and it remains to be seen how the former president views the slowing down of the project.

In conclusion, ASEAN countries are being forced to explore new economic approaches and focus more on spending. As mentioned earlier, some ASEAN countries like Vietnam are focusing heavily on infrastructure, while Indonesia is expanding welfare programs. While focusing on the same is important, it remains to be seen what approach the current dispensation adopts vis-à-vis the Nusantara project, which is very important in terms of messaging to investors. It also remains to be seen whether the slowing down of the project will have any impact on Indonesia’s domestic politics.

The viral claim that ASEAN warned Indonesia of possible disintegration by 2030 due to endemic corruption was swiftly debunked. No such statement appeared in the May 2025 ASEAN Summit documents nor in the World Bank’s official publications. However, its widespread circulation exposes a deeper unease—one rooted in the undeniable truth that corruption remains a corrosive force, weakening Indonesia’s economic foundations, threatening public trust, and undermining regional integrity.

This episode is more than a fact-checking exercise. It underscores a sobering reality: while Indonesia remains Southeast Asia’s largest democracy, its governance architecture is visibly strained. From chronic procurement fraud to weakened anti-graft institutions, the Indonesian state has yet to tame the entrenched networks of clientelism and political patronage that siphon national wealth and public trust alike.

The 46th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur instead highlighted ‘Inclusivity and Sustainability’ as its 2045 vision—aspirations that cannot be realised unless the region tackles systemic governance failures. And nowhere is this more urgent than in Indonesia, where economic leakage, institutional decay, and digital disinformation form a toxic triangle.

Recent research paints a stark picture. Corruption is estimated to drain Indonesia of 2–3% of its GDP annually, amounting to tens of billions in lost services, distorted investments, and inflated procurement budgets. Inflation eased to 1.6% by year-end 2024 (2.3% average) and remained within the 2.5 ± 1% target corridor in 2025—testimony to tight policy coordination between Bank Indonesia and the government. Transparency International ranked Indonesia 37 out of 100 in its 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index—lagging behind ASEAN peers such as Vietnam and Malaysia. The World Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator placed Indonesia at –0.49, well below the global average.

The local impact is even more severe. Field studies show that in provinces where corruption exceeds certain thresholds, economic growth slows dramatically. Procurement funds vanish. Schools and hospitals are underbuilt or shoddily provided. Meanwhile, decentralisation reforms, intended to empower local government, have instead multiplied the number of hands skimming public budgets.

What does this mean geopolitically?

First, Indonesia’s capacity to lead the region as ASEAN’s de facto heavyweight is compromised by domestic governance weaknesses. Political capture by economic elites stifles reform. Recurrent scandals—some reaching into defence procurement and public infrastructure—fuel public cynicism and blunt Jakarta’s credibility when promoting regional norms of transparency and the rule of law.

Second, ASEAN’s credibility suffers. For all the talk of a rules-based order, corruption undermines the region’s soft power. If democratic erosion and institutional decline persist in member states, ASEAN risks becoming a hollow vessel for lofty declarations. The disinformation surrounding Indonesia’s supposed 2030 ‘collapse’ may be false, but its virality hints at waning confidence in ASEAN’s integrity.

Third, the digital ecosystem accelerates distrust. The viral ‘ASEAN warning’ narrative spread rapidly across Southeast Asian platforms. While easily disproven by reading the summit communiqué, few do. This reveals the new battleground: disinformation thrives when formal institutions lose moral authority. Where trust erodes, conspiracies take root.

What’s needed is not another ASEAN statement, but tangible action on governance resilience. Three avenues stand out.

ASEAN must initiate a Regional Integrity Compact—a binding, independently monitored governance framework that benchmarks anti-corruption reforms across member states. Inspired by the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Network, this compact should integrate real-time procurement tracking, sectoral red-flag indicators, and transparency scorecards linked to UNCAC compliance. A designated unit within the ASEAN Secretariat, working alongside neutral data partners, must publish annual reports accessible to civil society, investors, and member parliaments alike. Only through enforceable metrics—not rhetorical declarations—can ASEAN restore credibility in its governance ambitions.

Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN hinges on the restoration of independent prosecutorial authority. The rollback of the Corruption Eradication Commission’s (KPK) powers since 2019 has severely compromised public trust. This must be reversed through emergency legislative amendment to reinstate its wiretapping capacity, shield it from executive interference, and ensure prosecutorial continuity. Pilot programs should be deployed for independent project audits in high-risk sectors like infrastructure and defence, backed by civic oversight dashboards. No ASEAN leadership claim can be sustained if Indonesia cannot clean its own house.

Australia and Japan—both leading ASEAN dialogue partners—must anchor a new Strategic Governance Partnership for the Indo-Pacific. This initiative should target forensic accounting training, secure whistleblower systems, and regional ombuds institutional support, particularly in fragile democracies. By aligning with the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, such a partnership would counteract opaque foreign investment and safeguard institutional resilience. As Beijing’s economic influence grows, a values-based governance bulwark is not merely ideal—it is indispensable.

Indonesia is not Sri Lanka. It retains a pluralist system, growing GDP, and an active civil society. But the Sri Lankan collapse remains a cautionary tale: corruption-fueled inequality, elite impunity, and opaque debt deals led to mass revolt and institutional failure. The same fault lines—if left unaddressed—exist in Indonesia.

Moreover, as Southeast Asia navigates a more contested Indo-Pacific, governance is no longer a domestic issue; it is strategic. Poor governance undermines resilience, emboldens foreign interference, and weakens regional cohesion. To dismiss the viral ‘disintegration’ claim as mere misinformation is to miss the signal in the noise.

ASEAN’s 2045 vision will be built not in summits but in procurement offices, audit bureaus, and independent courts. Indonesia’s leadership depends not only on its economy or geography, but on its willingness to confront the rot within. The disinformation storm is a symptom. The cure is integrity.

Rescue effort under way after boat carrying 18 people capsizes in bad weather off the Mentawai Islands.

Rescuers in Indonesia are searching for 11 people who went missing after a boat capsized in bad weather off the Mentawai Islands in West Sumatra province, according to a local search and rescue agency.

Dozens of rescuers and two boats were at the site of the disaster on Tuesday, and seven of the 18 people on board the boat have been rescued, the agency said in a statement.

The vessel capsized at about 11am on Monday (04:00 GMT) as it sailed around the Mentawai Islands.

It had departed Sikakap, a small town in the Mentawai Islands, and was heading to another small town, Tuapejat. Of 18 people on board, 10 were local government officials.

“Our focus is on combing the area around the estimated accident site to find all victims,” said Rudi, the head of the Mentawai search and rescue agency.

He did not give a cause for the boat capsizing, but marine accidents are a regular occurrence in the Southeast Asian archipelago of approximately 17,000 islands, in part due to lax safety standards or bad weather.

On July 3, a ferry carrying 65 people sank off the popular resort island of Bali, killing at least 18 people.

In March, a boat carrying 16 people capsized in rough waters off Bali, killing an Australian woman and injuring at least one other person.

In 2018, more than 150 people drowned when a ferry sank in one of the world’s deepest volcanic lakes on Sumatra island.

BREAKINGBREAKING,

National Search and Rescue Agency says rescuers searching for 43 people after vessel sank off resort island.

Rescuers are searching for 43 people missing in rough seas overnight after a ferry carrying 65 people sank near Indonesia’s resort island of Bali.

The KMP Tunu Pratama Jaya sank almost half an hour after leaving East Java’s Ketapang port late Wednesday, the National Search and Rescue Agency said in a statement.

It was bound for Bali’s Gilimanuk port, a 50-kilometre (30-mile) trip.

The ferry carried 53 passengers, 12 crew members and 22 vehicles, including 14 trucks, it said.

Two bodies have been recovered and 20 were rescued, many of them unconscious after drifting in choppy waters for hours, said Banyuwangi police chief, Rama Samtama Putra.

Nine boats, including two tug boats and two inflatable boats, have been searching for the missing people since Wednesday night, battling waves up to two metres (6.5ft) high in the overnight darkness.

Ferry tragedies are common in Indonesia, an archipelago of more than 17,000 islands, where ferries are often used as transport and safety regulations can lapse.

More to follow…

In April 2025, a familiar tension resurfaced on the global trade stage. The United States, through its 2025 National Trade Estimate (NTE) report, criticized Indonesia’s national QR payment system, QRIS (Quick Response Code Indonesian Standard), and its domestic payment network GPN for allegedly restricting access to foreign firms like Visa and Mastercard. This came at a politically sensitive moment: just as the U.S. announced a 32% reciprocal tariff on Indonesian goods—a move temporarily suspended by the Trump administration for 90 days starting April 9, 2025 (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2025).

At the center of this trade dispute is a quiet yet transformative success story: Indonesia’s regulator-led push to unify, simplify, and democratize digital payments. While the U.S. frames QRIS as protectionist, many in the Global South see it differently. They see it as sovereignty in code form—a model where innovation doesn’t only emerge from Silicon Valley, but from sovereign policy designed with inclusion, affordability, and national interoperability at its core.

QRIS, launched in 2019 by Bank Indonesia, now boasts over 50 million users and 32 million merchants—92% of whom are MSMEs. Its impact is visible not only in transaction volumes but in the radical reshaping of Indonesia’s informal economy. Through a single interoperable QR standard, QRIS reduced barriers for small vendors, brought millions into the financial system, and enabled digital literacy at scale (Bank Indonesia, 2025; QRIS Interactive, 2025). Features like QRIS TUNTAS and QRIS Antarnegara extend its utility to ATM-like services and cross-border payments with neighboring ASEAN countries (“Riset Sukses QRIS Indonesia”, 2025).

Today, QRIS is accepted not only across Indonesia but also in partner countries including Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Brunei Darussalam, Japan, and South Korea. These regional agreements strengthen QRIS as a payment bridge across Asia, facilitating tourism, trade, and local currency settlements.

In contrast to the U.S. critique, QRIS represents a strategic choice to design for dignity rather than dependence. The lesson here is not anti-global—it is about asserting a model of digital governance where financial infrastructure, when governed wisely, can serve local resilience while remaining open to fair, mutually beneficial cooperation.

In fact, the Indonesian government has consistently expressed openness to global firms—including Visa and Mastercard—being part of the QRIS ecosystem. This reflects a collaborative model that embraces interoperability and innovation, as long as it aligns with the public interest and meets the nation’s inclusive development goals. The QRIS story shows that sovereignty and openness can coexist, and that digital payment systems can be built on principles of both equity and cooperation.

For the Global South, Indonesia’s QRIS success offers five strategic lessons:

1. Lead with Policy, Not Platforms: Innovation doesn’t have to be outsourced. Sovereign institutions can shape markets when they prioritize public interest over private monopolies.
2. Standardize Early to Scale Fast: Mandating one interoperable code simplified adoption, removed friction, and prevented early-stage fragmentation.
3. Subsidize the Small: By waiving merchant fees for low-value transactions, QRIS made itself indispensable to micro-enterprises.
4. Adaptation Is Innovation: QRIS kept evolving, integrating ATM functions, enabling cross-border payments, and responding to real-world behaviors.
5. Sovereignty Is Not Isolation: Building domestic rails doesn’t mean closing doors. It means entering global trade with stronger footing.
6. Data Inclusion Enables Policy Precision: By digitizing informal transactions, QRIS generates more accurate data flows across sectors. This improves transparency, tracks real-time economic activity—especially in the informal sector—and strengthens the foundation for evidence-based policymaking.

This trajectory stands in marked contrast to two other Global South giants: India and China.

In India, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), launched by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), created a real-time payment system that integrates bank accounts across providers. Its success stems from similar government-led standardization, free or minimal transaction fees, and integration into flagship digital initiatives. UPI has become central to India’s financial inclusion drive, particularly among underbanked rural populations (IJFMR, 2025; NPCI, 2025).

Meanwhile in China, QR payment adoption exploded via a different route: commercial super-apps. Alipay and WeChat Pay dominated over 93% of the market by 2019, offering frictionless experiences integrated into social media and e-commerce platforms. However, their dominance led to walled gardens, until government intervention in 2017 required all non-bank QR transactions to be cleared through a centralized clearinghouse known as Wanglian (REI Journal, 2025; Toucanus Blog, 2025).

This comparison reveals not just different models, but different philosophies:

• Indonesia and India: regulator-first, interoperability by design, competition fostered between diverse providers.
• China: market-first, innovation by dominance, regulation applied retroactively to rein in systemic risk.

As financial digitalization accelerates worldwide, the choice is no longer between Silicon Valley or state control. The new frontier lies in hybrid governance models rooted in public interest, where local needs shape global partnerships. QRIS is not perfect, but it proves a crucial point: the Global South can chart its own fintech path—inclusive, interoperable, and sovereign—while still welcoming collaboration.

The key is to ensure that such collaborations are not extractive, but mutual. Interoperability with foreign systems can and should be pursued, as long as it doesn’t compromise local resilience or digital sovereignty. Rather than rejecting international cooperation, Indonesia’s QRIS shows how it can be done on equal terms—answering local priorities first.

For many nations in the Global South, digital public infrastructure like QRIS offers not just a financial tool, but a social mission. It is directly aligned with ESG and SDG narratives—advancing financial inclusion, reducing poverty, and promoting economic equity at the last mile. As such, future cooperation—whether with international firms or multilateral agencies—must serve this broader vision: technology as a lever for dignity, not dependency.

And sometimes, that path starts with a simple square of black-and-white code.

Waste has been a critical problem in Indonesia. Reportedly, 40.16% of the 33.7 million tons of waste generated in 2024 was unmanaged. This statistic has forced the country to renew its 100% waste management target from 2025 to 2029. Besides, 48% of Indonesian households burn their waste despite the legal prohibition of such activity, causing air pollution and respiratory diseases. Amidst the shortcomings in Indonesia’s waste management system, the contribution of its informal waste pickers is inevitable.

The informal sector collects around 1 million tons of plastic waste, which mostly ends up at recycling facilities. In Jakarta alone, informal waste pickers have estimatedly reduced the waste volume by 30%, not only reducing the recycling costs for municipalities but also helping to extend the lifespan of dumps and sanitary landfills. As waste accounts for roughly 10% of Indonesia’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2021, the informal waste pickers’ work in diverting recyclables also contributes to combating climate change.

The Overlooked Workforce

Despite their central role in waste management, the well-being of informal waste pickers is far from ideal. Its precarious nature remains a major issue. Waste pickers in Bekasi and Depok earn only about one-third of the government’s minimum wage in both locations. In the Bantar Gebang landfill in Bekasi, the income per person not only fell below the legal minimum wage but was also lower than that of occupations in both the formal and informal sectors.

The informal waste pickers also work in horrible conditions. They often directly make contact with medical waste and other sharp waste. Leachate that contaminated the groundwater was also one of the most dangerous environmental problems at the site. Furthermore, many informal waste pickers do not have access to free health services, forcing them to rely on paid services or ignore their health problems.

To add insult to injury, the work of informal waste collection remains highly stigmatized due to its association with waste. Informal waste pickers in Surabaya cope with their low social status by changing clothes before they go home and emphasizing that waste-picking is at least a halal job, unlike stealing or other immoral occupations. Consequently, the combination of their precarious working conditions, low income, and social stigma often heightens their risk of psychological health issues, including depression.

Despite their roles in creating more livable cities, the regulation that includes informal waste pickers is nearly nonexistent. From the first law regulating waste management (Law No. 18/2008) to Presidential Regulation on National Waste Management Policy and Strategy (No. 83/2018) and Ministerial Regulation on Waste Reduction Roadmap by Producers (No. 75/2019), none of them explicitly recognize informal waste pickers. The regulations leave them outside of the system.

The poor condition of Indonesian informal waste pickers also stems from the intergenerational poverty cycle. These workers are trapped in debt and poverty due to the lack of access to employment, education, sanitation, water, healthcare, welfare schemes, and housing. Their low income as waste pickers and the lack of government protection prevent them from breaking the cycle.

The lack of institutional support, like cooperatives and unions, also hinders Indonesian informal waste pickers from leveraging their well-being. Albeit organizations like Pemulung Berdaya Cooperative and Indonesian Scavengers Association exist, they have not yet represented the majority of Indonesian informal waste pickers, especially in urban cities outside of Jakarta and its satellite areas.

Making the Invisible, Indispensable

Indonesia’s informal waste pickers might be invisible in policy, but they are surely indispensable in practice. Thus, the government needs to recognize these “invisible heroes” by acknowledging them as essential workers. Consider how Brazil’s national waste policy puts informal waste pickers as valuable actors in the waste management system. The law mandates the catadores (Brazilian informal waste pickers) to share responsibility in reducing the volume of solid waste.

Take the case of Belo Horizonte, a large city in Brazil, which developed an integrated system of solid waste management, including the catadores, into a formalized relationship with the wider recycling ecosystem. This might be one of the reasons why informal waste pickers in Belo Horizonte have a higher perceived social status compared to those in Surabaya, according to a study by Colombijn and Morbidini.

Integrating the informal waste pickers into the system may increase recycling rates while reducing child labor and providing benefits such as healthcare, education, and social recognition. The city of Accra, Ghana, formalized partnerships with informal waste pickers by providing them with access to finance, equipment, health insurance, and motorcycle licenses.

Just as crucial is creating and supporting cooperatives to give economic agency to informal waste pickers. Learning from the Solid Waste Collection and Handling (SWaCH) Cooperative in India, the presence of institutional support not only provides gloves, masks, footwear, jackets, carts, and implements for its members. Beyond this, cooperatives act as intermediaries and leverage the bargaining power of informal waste pickers. In Pune, every registered waste picker has the right to health insurance, thanks to the advocacy work of the cooperative.

The same inclusive principle must also extend to Indonesia’s Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) system. Despite the formal regulation through the Ministerial Regulation (No. 75/2019), informal waste pickers are once again overlooked. Excluding informal waste pickers from the EPR system is neither practical nor just, according to the Consumer Goods Forum’s Coalition of Action on Plastic Waste. Instead, EPR financing may target waste pickers’ cooperatives or other inclusive initiatives. The Producer Responsibility Organization can provide technical support to improve informal waste pickers’ rights and working conditions. Most importantly, the informal waste pickers themselves must be included in the discussion of EPR policy formulation.

The stakes are clear: promoting a better waste management system is not merely about the technology and infrastructure, but also justice and inclusion. Considering the environmental and economic benefits they have contributed to society at large, informal waste pickers should not remain the “invisible heroes.” They have kept our cities clean; they too have the right to a better living standard and recognition.

Indonesia, as the world’s largest archipelagic state, holds a highly strategic geographic position, located between two continents and two oceans. This location makes Indonesia a crucial maritime hub in the Indo-Pacific region. In the era of Prabowo Subianto’s administration that began in 2024, Indonesia’s foreign policy has garnered significant attention, given the increasingly complex and multipolar global dynamics. This article aims to analyze how Indonesia, under Prabowo’s leadership, positions itself between its regional commitment to ASEAN and engagement with new global power alignments such as the Indo-Pacific.

1. Indonesia’s Geopolitical Context in the New Global Era
The current global order is undergoing a significant transformation. Tensions between the United States and China are one of the primary drivers of this shift. Amid global geopolitical polarization, the Indo-Pacific region has received heightened attention from various global actors. Indonesia, as a major democracy in Southeast Asia and a G20 member, holds a unique position.

In this context, Indonesia is expected to play a more active role in maintaining regional stability. The Prabowo administration faces significant challenges in upholding the principles of a free and active foreign policy while also safeguarding national interests closely tied to economic, defense, and domestic stability. Therefore, Indonesia’s geopolitical strategy today is shaped not only by bilateral relations but also by its ability to engage in multilateral frameworks and international forums.

2. Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN during the Prabowo Era
ASEAN remains a central pillar of Indonesia’s foreign policy. As a founding and leading member of ASEAN, Indonesia bears both a moral and political responsibility to maintain the cohesion of this regional organization. In the Prabowo era, Indonesia’s approach to ASEAN appears pragmatic yet still committed to regional collective values.

The Prabowo administration has demonstrated its commitment to ASEAN by participating in high-level meetings and voicing regional concerns, such as the peaceful resolution of the Myanmar crisis and the development of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. However, with increasing external pressures from powers like the United States and China influencing ASEAN dynamics, Indonesia must enhance its regional diplomatic capacity to keep ASEAN relevant and unified.

Another challenge within ASEAN is the growing divergence of interests among member states. Prabowo faces the task of maintaining Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN without appearing dominant. A collective diplomatic approach and strengthened intra-ASEAN cooperation, especially in defense and food security, are key to preserving regional solidarity.

3. Emerging Global Powers and the Challenge of Neutrality
With the growing influence of emerging global powers such as China, Russia, and India, as well as the rise of cooperation blocs like BRICS, Indonesia faces a foreign policy dilemma. On one hand, Indonesia maintains strong economic ties with China, particularly in infrastructure and trade. On the other hand, Indonesia also maintains robust relations with Western countries, including the United States and the European Union, especially on issues of democracy, human rights, and regional security.

Prabowo, with his military background and experience in defense, is expected to balance these global relationships effectively. One of Prabowo’s strengths lies in his ability to establish strategic communication with various international actors. Indonesia’s active neutrality must be manifested through flexible diplomacy that is not merely symbolic but also substantive in safeguarding national interests.

Amid competition among major powers, Indonesia can play the role of a mediator or ‘bridge builder’ that facilitates dialogue and cooperation across blocs. This capability would strengthen Indonesia’s position as a respected middle power on the global stage.

4. Indonesia’s Strategic Opportunities
Indonesia has numerous strategic opportunities to seize in the new global era. As a maritime nation, Indonesia possesses vast potential in maritime security, international trade, and global logistics. The Prabowo administration must strengthen maritime infrastructure, enhance naval military capacity, and develop strategic port areas as part of its foreign policy agenda.

Initiatives such as the “Global Maritime Fulcrum” can be revived with a more pragmatic and realistic approach, focusing on improving regional connectivity and engaging in economic forums like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Additionally, Indonesia has the opportunity to expand its economic diplomacy. The Prabowo administration can synergize foreign policy with trade policy to attract foreign investment and expand export markets. In the defense sector, Indonesia can also strengthen cooperation with strategic partners for military technology development and increased domestic production capacity.

Conclusion
The Prabowo Subianto administration faces considerable challenges in navigating an increasingly complex global geopolitical map. Amid ongoing shifts in global power dynamics, Indonesia must maintain a balance between its involvement in emerging global power structures and its commitment to ASEAN. Flexible, strategic, and interest-based diplomacy is essential to the success of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

As the largest democracy in Southeast Asia and an emerging economy, Indonesia holds significant potential to play a more prominent role in the global order. Prabowo must ensure that every foreign policy decision aligns with the nation’s long-term interests, preserves regional stability, and enhances Indonesia’s position as a strategic actor in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.