India Must Leverage Indian Ocean Security Mechanisms to Protect Its Strategic Interests
Authors: Rahul Mishra & Harshit Prajapati
The US-Israel conflict with Iran dragged almost every country into a phase of energy insecurity. While Iran’s neighboring countries are directly affected by the armed conflict, immediate regions too have not remained insulated from the ongoing conflict. For India, the conflict has demonstrated the implications of getting caught in the crossfire of a conflict in its vicinity. Two particular incidents—the US sinking of the Iranian warship IRIS Dena in the waters off the coast of Sri Lanka (just 40 nautical miles away) and the reported firing of two ballistic missiles towards the joint UK-US base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean—serve as a grim reminder about a conflict spiraling in India’s maritime backyard in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
For decades, the Indian Ocean region has remained largely peaceful, away from any direct impact of a conflict in a neighboring region or any major power conflict with a regional impact. The two above-mentioned incidents highlight the need for littoral states of the IOR to have a regional security mechanism to deal with any crisis in the region in a more cohesive and coordinated fashion. Being one of the major stakeholders in the region, it is incumbent upon India to foster meaningful and substantial cooperation with IOR littoral states through regional mechanisms such as the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). It would be a timely exercise to strive to move beyond non-traditional security cooperation mechanisms to protect the shared maritime space, especially during such conflicts.
The sinking of IRIS Dena in the IOR when it was returning to its home after participating in the International Fleet Review and multinational exercise MILAN, hosted by India, serves as a major strategic lesson to countries of the region. Since the International Fleet Reviews are an acknowledgement by the regional and global peers of the host country’s sovereignty and maritime supremacy in its neighborhood, the sinking of an Iranian warship does not augur well for India’s claim as a net security provider or preferred security partner in the IOR.
Additionally, Iran’s launch of two ballistic missiles, which failed to strike the designated target, towards the Diego Garcia base, reflects the risk of a distant war reaching India’s maritime backyard. The 2025 decolonization agreement between the UK and Mauritius enabled the transfer of the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia Island, to Mauritius; however, the UK retained access to the Diego Garcia military base for 99 years. Thus, in the event of a conflict, Diego Garcia, as the joint UK-US base, may become a target, thereby drawing the war into the Indian maritime backyard. With the escalating conflict with Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthi rebels, the possibility of repetition of such an incident cannot be ruled out.
During the Cold War, India and the IOR countries endeavored to halt the foreign military presence in the IOR, as illustrated by the UNGA Resolution 2832 of 1971, which sought to establish the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP). However, the regional countries failed to implement the declaration because of resistance from the major powers. In 2016, India attempted to revive implementation of the 1971 resolution but failed to garner significant attention from the IOR countries, putting aside any major power.
Rather than seeking IOZOP through restrictions on foreign military presence, India should strengthen its naval capabilities, especially its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Earlier, in 2018, India envisioned a 200-ship fleet by 2027; however, in 2026, the goal was revised to a 200-plus-ship fleet by 2035. Despite the induction of new platforms, this goal seems ambitious, as older platforms retire faster than new ones are inducted, especially given the constrained budget allocation to the Indian Navy.
A sizable portion of India’s submarine fleet is aging. The current force comprising Russian-origin Kilo-class submarines and German-origin Type 209 submarines has been in service for decades and is set to retire soon. Although the induction of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine Aridhaman in April 2026 and Arighaat in August 2024 strengthened India’s nuclear triad, the pace of induction of conventional submarines remains lagging. Project 75I, aimed at developing advanced diesel-electric submarines, was originally set in motion in 2007; however, its deal with the manufacturer—a German firm—has yet to be signed.
Earlier, it was planned that India would expand its fleet of long-range maritime reconnaissance Boeing P-8I aircraft from 12 to 28. But then the plan to expand the fleet to 28 P-8I aircraft was reduced to 20-22 due to constrained spending. Additionally, the Indian Navy only possesses 15 MQ-9B high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) drones.
Therefore, if India needs to entrench its position as a preferred security partner in the IOR and realize its vision of Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR)—upgraded to Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR) in 2025—in the IOR, then it needs to support its normative framework with military capabilities.
Given India’s lack of naval capabilities—across all three mediums (air, surface, and undersea)—to conduct persistent surveillance of the enormous IOR (spanning more than 70 million square kilometers), India should collaborate with littoral countries to conduct surveillance in the IOR through regional mechanisms such as the CSC and the IONS. Presently, cooperation in these forums is largely limited to countering non-traditional security threats, such as piracy, trafficking, maritime disasters, etc. Challenges such as differing threat perceptions, disparity in naval capabilities, and a lack of regional consciousness hinder meaningful and substantial cooperation.
However, if the littoral countries of the IOR seek to avoid getting caught in the crossfire of a distant conflict, such as the present one, they need to move beyond non-traditional security cooperation to develop a common understanding of how to protect the shared maritime space in the IOR, especially during such conflicts. India, being the most militarily equipped country in the IOR, should take the lead in forging the collaborative efforts to conduct persistent surveillance in the IOR, as maritime wars do not respect geographical boundaries.