Geopolitics

Middle Eastern crises seldom stay localized. They frequently go well beyond the battlefield in terms of politics, strategy, and psychology. Officials in Beijing, Moscow, Taipei, and Kyiv will be keeping a tight eye on events surrounding Iran today, in addition to those in Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv. Power perceptions are shaped by situations like this, and in international politics, perception can be almost as important as actual power.

The current state of affairs presents an unsettling question for China and Russia. A large-scale military operation against a prominent regional actor will unavoidably send signals about the balance of power in the international system if it continues without significant opposition from other big states. The Middle East is not where those signals will end. They will visit other geopolitical hotspots, like Taiwan and Ukraine, where credibility is crucial to deterrence.

Iran has progressively evolved into more than simply another diplomatic friend in Beijing’s eyes. It now plays a part in China’s larger Eurasian economic and strategic strategy. Beijing has been building energy and transportation networks that connect western China to the Arabian Sea through projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Chinese planners considering long-term energy security have taken note of the geographical proximity of the Pakistani port of Gwadar to Iran’s Jask Oil Terminal.

Beijing has long sought variety, which these lines provide. Chinese strategists have been concerned about dependence on maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca for decades. The energy lifelines of the second-largest economy in the world could be threatened by any interruption there. Iran fits into China’s attempt to lessen that vulnerability because of its location and resources. Trade in energy has already strengthened ties between the two nations. Iran has quietly emerged as a major supplier of cheap crude to China in spite of U.S. sanctions. Both nations are able to avoid some aspects of the Western financial architecture since many of those transactions go through China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System and are settled in renminbi.

However, the partnership has grown beyond oil. Beijing and Tehran signed a long-term strategic agreement in 2021 with the goal of working together on infrastructure, energy, and technology for decades. Later, China backed Iran’s admission to groups like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Then came a diplomatic surprise: Beijing assisted in mediating the reestablishment of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, a development that surprised many Western observers.

Taken together, these actions indicated a significant development. China was starting to portray itself not only as a regional economic force but also as a diplomatic player with the ability to influence its political environment.

That ambition makes the current moment particularly sensitive for Beijing. Governments in the Middle East and a large portion of the Global South frequently evaluate great powers based on their actions during times of crisis rather than their words during times of peace. Some capitals may discreetly reevaluate how reliable such support would be in an actual security crisis if China seems unwilling to protect the strategic environment surrounding its alliances.

The ramifications go well beyond Iran. Chinese officials have made it clear time and time again that they would not support Taiwan’s formal independence efforts and will not allow outside meddling in the Taiwan Strait. The legitimacy of those warnings is just as important to deterrence as military prowess. Some Washington policymakers may assume that China is unlikely to take more aggressive action in other areas if Beijing’s response to significant geopolitical shocks involving its partners primarily consists of diplomatic criticism.

Russia faces a different—but no less consequential—set of calculations. Moscow has positioned itself as a major Middle Eastern political mediator for the majority of the last ten years through its military engagement in Syria. Russian soldiers established a key base on the Mediterranean coast and assisted in stabilizing Bashar al-Assad’s regime starting in 2015. From such a vantage point, Moscow participated in almost all meaningful discussions regarding the future of the area.

However, that impact has been diminished. The political landscape has drastically changed as a result of the fall of the Syrian government and the growing power of actors supported by the West in Damascus. In addition to losing a strategic ally, Russia has also lost a significant portion of the regional clout it developed over the course of almost 10 years of diplomatic and military engagement.

In that context, Iran now occupies a far more important place in Moscow’s strategic thinking than it once did. Defense and energy cooperation are two areas where the two nations’ relationship has grown. Iranian drones have contributed to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, establishing a clear connection between the conflict in Eastern Europe and events in the Middle East. The message would reverberate much beyond the immediate battlefield if Iran were to sustain a significant military defeat at the hands of a concerted operation by the United States and Israel. While opposing major powers stayed mostly on the sidelines, observers from all around the world would see that Washington still had the capability to change regional dynamics.

These impressions build up in geopolitics. Credibility develops gradually, frequently over years, but it can deteriorate rapidly. Some governments may start to doubt the geopolitical benefit of aligning with Moscow if Russia seems incapable—or unwilling—to react when a close ally is under severe strain. However, competing nations might feel more confident to test Russian interests in other disputed areas, such as the Black Sea or Ukraine. However, Moscow’s choices are far from straightforward. In order to lessen the impact of Western sanctions, Russia has been fostering stronger commercial connections with a number of Gulf governments in recent years. Openly supporting Iran might make those relations more difficult. But staying completely silent runs the danger of conveying a contrary message: that when tensions rise, Russian alliances provide little strategic defense.

It seems unlikely that either China or Russia will move quickly to engage in direct combat. There would be significant risks of escalation. However, great-power competition seldom relies solely on choices made on the battlefield. There are plenty of other ways to be influential. Both nations have permanent seats in the UN Security Council. They can guarantee that any military action is politically disputed on the international scene by imposing debates, contesting legal justifications, and introducing resolutions, even symbolic ones. Beyond the Security Council, diplomacy is also important. Sovereignty and non-intervention have long been valued in nations like South Africa, Brazil, and India. Even if it doesn’t instantly change the situation on the ground, coordinated pressure from a larger group of states could influence how the issue is portrayed worldwide.

Another option is economic levers. The energy markets continue to be extremely vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. Major exporters continue to have the power to affect supply and pricing decisions by working with producers in organizations like OPEC+. Even little changes can serve as a reminder to the globe that regional conflicts have far-reaching economic repercussions. Great powers are also capable of sending quieter signals. Regional balances are not changing in isolation, as seen by intelligence collaboration, defensive technology transfers, and conspicuous naval deployments in nearby waterways. These actions convey that other important actors are keeping a close eye on them even while they avoid open confrontation.

Ultimately, this moment’s significance goes well beyond Iran. Expectations about how power functions in the international system are gradually shaped by incidents such as these. The precedent starts to take hold if armed action consistently reshapes regional orders without significant opposition from opposing nations. That precedent unavoidably affects Taiwan’s future for China. For Russia, it relates to both the larger security balance throughout Europe and the continuing conflict in Ukraine. Credibility is crucial in both situations.

Moments like this become inevitable tests if Beijing and Moscow want to maintain an international system where power is more widely spread. It is not always necessary to escalate conflict in order to respond. It often involves proving that significant changes in regional power will not happen completely unchallenged through diplomacy, economic pressure, and strategic signaling. There is meaning in silence as well. In places far from the Persian Gulf, how Tehran interprets that silence now could influence strategic decisions tomorrow.

And while grid physics remains the starting point, the innovations shaping the 2030 landscape extend far beyond conductors and transmission lines. The energy transition of the early 2020s was framed as a moral and political imperative. But from 2026 onward, the debate shifts decisively. The center of gravity moves from ideological declarations to hard technical realities, material constraints, and industrial competitiveness. The path to 2030 is no longer about announcing targets; it is about solving the physical, economic, and infrastructural parameters that will determine whether decarbonization can advance without destabilizing grids or bankrupting entire sectors.

EU deserves a clear reminder. LNG corridors from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean are helpful, but they cannot resolve Europe’s energy challenges. They remain complementary measures. They do not correct the structural difficulties created over decades. A persistent green ideological rigidity limited the role of firm capacity. Domestic hydrocarbon production was phased out. Permitting essential infrastructure slowed significantly. These choices had predictable effects. They overlooked grid physics, materials, storage, reliability, and industrial policy. They weakened the system Europe now relies on. Three forces now shape the landscape. Grids must remain stable under very high RES penetration. Critical materials, from copper and aluminum to gallium, are becoming scarce and expensive. Existing fossil infrastructure must be used strategically to avoid premature asset stranding. Innovation is adjusting to these realities. New conductors, new storage solutions, new fuels, and updated regulatory frameworks are emerging because the previous assumptions no longer hold.

Materials and Conductors: The Silent Revolution in Grid Reinforcement

The rapid expansion of data centers and large RES clusters has exposed the limits of traditional copper‑based infrastructure. Prices, weight, and installation requirements make the full network reconstruction prohibitive. Aluminum, meanwhile, cannot handle the required current densities. This is where copper‑clad aluminum (CCA) becomes critical: it offers higher conductivity than aluminum, lower cost and weight than copper, and reduced thermal load in dense electrical environments. By 2030, CCA will be widely deployed in data centers, EV fast‑charging networks, and medium‑voltage grids across Europe and North America. Instead of rebuilding entire networks, operators turn to targeted CCA upgrades to ease congestion and unlock dormant capacity. Yet another constraint emerges: transformer shortages and slow permitting, now as acute as the bottlenecks facing RES deployment.

Hydrogen and Methane Pyrolysis: The End of the Universal Green Solution

The myth of the early transition collapses in the 2020s. Hydrogen is no longer viewed as a universal green solution. Life‑cycle analyses show that green hydrogen is only as clean as the electricity feeding the electrolyzers, while methane leakage undermines the value of blue hydrogen. This opens the door to methane pyrolysis, which produces hydrogen and solid carbon with lower emissions, provided methane leakage is tightly controlled. Yet its economic viability depends on stable, low‑cost methane supply. The shift from blue to pyrolytic hydrogen changes the chemical approach, and the geopolitics. Pyrolysis does not free Europe from geopolitical exposure because the continent still depends on external methane suppliers, such the US, Qatar, Algeria, East Med producers, and African exporters. Europe’s pursuit of low‑carbon hydrogen therefore intersects with the strategic interests of actors whose priorities do not always align with EU climate policy.

Hard Carbon and Sodium‑Ion Batteries: The New Geopolitics of Storage

As hydrogen is reconsidered, another development is quietly reshaping the storage landscape. Research from 2024–2025 shows significant advances in sodium‑ion batteries (SIBs). They use hard‑carbon anodes and improved electrolytes that extend performance, safety, and lifespan. Their cost structure is attractive, and their reliance on abundant materials makes them resilient to supply‑chain shocks. They remain short‑duration technologies, typically up to 10 hours, but they offer a robust alternative for stationary applications where energy density is less critical. Lithium keeps its lead in mobility and high‑power applications, yet it gradually loses its monopoly in grid storage.

The absence of lithium, cobalt, and nickel drastically reduces dependence on unstable or concentrated supply chains. Sodium, abundant and low‑cost, makes SIBs ideal for stationary applications. By 2030, SIBs will be deployed across industrial sites, distribution grids, substations, and hybrid long‑duration systems, often combined with hydrogen or thermal storage. China leads production, while Europe attempts to build its own supply chain to reduce import dependence. Sodium‑ion technology is emerging as a strategic counterweight to China’s dominance in lithium refining and cathode materials. By shifting to sodium, a resource with no geopolitical constraints, Europe and India seek to dilute China’s leverage over global battery supply chains. Storage is no longer just a technical field; it is a geopolitical chessboard.

Long Duration Storage Beyond Lithium

Lithium batteries remain essential for short‑duration storage, but the 2030 system increasingly depends on Long Duration Energy Storage (LDES). The cause is simple: high RES penetration creates multi‑day and multi‑week imbalances that no battery chemistry can economically cover. Hydrogen becomes the backbone of these long‑duration needs, not because of efficiency, but because it provides security of supply and seasonal flexibility. In shipping, e‑methanol emerges as the most practical ambient‑temperature hydrogen carrier, balancing energy density, safety, and infrastructure readiness.

The LDES ecosystem expands rapidly. Iron‑air and zinc‑air systems offer multi‑day discharge at low cost. Flow batteries provide long cycle life and deep‑discharge flexibility. Thermal storage and mechanical systems add further diversity. Together, these technologies form a portfolio that complements lithium and sodium‑ion, each serving a different segment of the duration curve.

Hydrogen‑Ready Infrastructure and the Management of Stranded Assets

This shift toward hydrogen‑compatible combined‑cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) is not ideological but economic. It allows investors to continue amortizing fossil infrastructure while gradually reducing emissions. Technical challenges such as, flame speed (much higher than natural gas), NOₓ formation, and material stress, are significant. By 2030 many such units will operate with 20–30% hydrogen blends. They will not eliminate emissions but provide a transition bridge and prevent massive asset write‑offs while stabilizing the grids during low‑RES periods. In fact, dispatchable capacity is becoming a strategic asset in a world where energy security is increasingly weaponized. From Russia’s pipeline leverage to Middle Eastern LNG politics, the vulnerabilities are unmistakable. In this environment, hydrogen‑ready CCGTs are not merely engineering choices; they function as geopolitical insurance policies.

SMRs and the Return of Firm Power

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) will move from concept to implementation in the late 2030s. Their value lies not only in nuclear physics but in industrial standardization, factory manufacturing, harmonized licensing, and integration into industrial heat networks. By 2030, the first SMRs will operate as firm‑power anchors for mining regions, isolated grids such as data centers, and large industrial sites. In a world of tightening supply chains and rising geopolitical competition, their role becomes both technological and strategic.

CBAM and the New Era of Tariff Diplomacy

As the transition moves from engineering constraints to system‑wide restructuring, the pressures are no longer purely technical. Materials, grids, storage, and firm capacity define what is physically possible and the global environment in which these technologies operate is increasingly shaped by trade policy, industrial strategy, and geopolitical competition. This is where the next layer of the transition emerges: the regulatory and commercial instruments. They determine who captures value, who bears cost, and how global supply chains realign. Among these instruments, none is more consequential than the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. This mechanism does not offer technical solutions, it turns decarbonization from a voluntary commitment to a tool of trade. Exporters of steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizers, and electricity must prove low carbon intensity or pay tariffs that erase their competitiveness. For the European Union, CBAM is expected to accelerate investment in low‑carbon processes, often supported by IPCEI programs. Yet the counter‑argument gains weight: CBAM relies on ideological rather than technocratic CO₂ accounting. It ignores life‑cycle emissions, methane leakage outside the EU, the energy intensity of European grids, and emissions embedded in imports. Instead of reducing global emissions, it risks creating carbon leakage under another name.

CBAM sits at the intersection of great‑power competition and the emerging fracture lines of the global economy. For the United States, it is both challenge and opportunity. First, a challenge because European border carbon pricing can collide with U.S. industrial and trade interests. Secondly, an opportunity because, together with the Inflation Reduction Act, it can support a transatlantic low‑carbon industrial block capable of setting de facto global standards. Whether Washington and Brussels coordinate or drift into regulatory rivalry will shape investment flows for decades.

For China, CBAM is more than a tariff, it signals that the EU is prepared to weaponize market access in the name of climate policy. Beijing reads it alongside export controls on critical technologies and restrictions on Chinese clean tech in Europe. In response, China accelerates its own standards, consolidates its dominance in batteries, solar and critical materials, and secures long‑term offtake agreements with countries that feel penalized by European rules. CBAM thus reinforces Beijing’s narrative of Western “green protectionism” aimed at containing China’s industrial rise.

The BRICS expansion adds another layer. Many BRICS and “BRICS‑plus” countries, from India and Brazil to Gulf and African states, view CBAM as a unilateral imposition of European norms on their development paths. As they deepen South‑South cooperation, build alternative financial mechanisms, and explore their own carbon accounting systems, CBAM risks catalyzing parallel regulatory ecosystems: one centered on the EU, another around a looser BRICS‑led bloc rejecting externally imposed climate conditionality.

For much of the Global South, CBAM reinforces a long‑standing grievance: that advanced economies, having built their prosperity on cheap fossil energy, now deploy climate policy in ways that restrict others’ industrial development. Many fear it will confine them to raw‑material roles while eroding the competitiveness of their energy‑intensive sectors. This perception fuels diplomatic pushback, draws some countries closer to China or BRICS frameworks, and complicates Europe’s attempt to position itself as a partner in a “just transition. In this sense, CBAM is more than a tool of market protection or climate ambition. It is a lever that can either place Europe at the center of a rules‑based low‑carbon trade system or accelerate the fragmentation of the global economy into competing regulatory and geopolitical blocks.

Conclusion

The energy transition is not a single technological narrative. Some innovations concern grid physics, conductivity, stability, and thermal management; others shape the energy mix, storage, and industrial architecture of the coming decade. The energy system of 2030 will not be shaped by slogans but by physics, materials, and economics. The question is whether Europe will adapt in time, or whether reality will violently adjust its ambitions.

In a recent move, China’s top general and a longtime confidant of President Xi Jinping, Zhang Youxia, and Joint Staff chief Liu Zhenli were removed from the Central Military Commission (CMC). An editorial published in Liberation Army Daily described both men as “seriously betraying the trust and expectations” of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the CMC.

Beyond corruption allegations, Zhang was reportedly accused of leaking core technical data on China’s nuclear weapons programme to the United States. In the aftermath, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a Mandarin language recruitment video targeting disaffected Chinese soldiers. Titled “The Reason for Stepping Forward To Save the Future,” portrays a disillusioned midlevel officer choosing to contact American intelligence. The outreach appears aimed at deepening internal doubts and positioning itself as an alternative confidant for officers who may feel exposed. However, this is not the first time the agency has sought to infiltrate the country.

A History of Intelligence Operations and Resets

Intelligence rivalry stretches back to the late 1940s, when the CIA tried to monitor the Soviet nuclear programme by placing listening devices within China and along its Soviet border. Surveillance also extended to the Xinjiang region, tracking uranium, gold, petroleum, and Soviet aid to the CPC during its war with the US backed Guomindang for regional control. Despite these efforts, the intelligence gathered remained minimal at best, from October 1950 to July 1953 the agency also failed to achieve its primary objective of diverting significant resources away from China’s military campaign in Korea.

As Cold War rivalries hardened, the CIA launched Operation Circus in the late 1950s to support Tibetan rebels against the CPC. The CIA supplied guerrilla groups, including the most active Chushi Gangdruk group, with arms and ammunition and trained fighters at Camp Hale. Allen Dulles, then CIA deputy director, saw the effort as an opportunity to destabilize the CPC and counter Communist influence across Asia. The group continued its operations from Nepal until 1974, when funding ended after US-China rapprochement.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the CIA cooperated with Chinese intelligence under Project Chestnut, establishing listening posts in the northwest to monitor Soviet communications. In 1989, as the Tiananmen Square protests rocked the CPC, the CIA provided communications equipment, including fax machines and typewriters to protestors. It also assisted in the escape of protest leaders with the help of sympathizers in Hong Kong under Operation Yellow Bird. Relations deteriorated in 2001, when an aircraft built in the US for General Secretary Jiang Zemin was found to contain at least 27 listening devices, including one embedded in the headboard of a bed, operable via satellite.

However, these gains proved fragile as major setbacks soon followed, with reports that between 2010 and 2012 Chinese authorities dismantled a large CIA network. In total, between 18 and 20 sources were killed or imprisoned, according to two former senior American officials. One asset was reportedly shot in front of colleagues in the courtyard of a government building as a warning to others suspected of working with the CIA.

Espionage in the Xi Jinping Era

Estimates in 2024 suggested the Ministry of State Security (MSS) employed as many as 800,000 personnel, compared with roughly 480,000 at the height of the KGB. After taking power in 2012, Xi further consolidated control over its security apparatus, chairing a high level national security task force.

His approach also followed revelations that an American informant network had infiltrated the MSS. An executive assistant to MSS Vice Minister Lu Zhongwei was discovered in 2012 to have passed sensitive information to the CIA. The ministry was also influenced by former security chief Zhou Yongkang, who was charged with abuse of power and intentionally leaking state secrets in 2014. He was subsequently expelled from the politburo in one of the most consequential purges in the country’s history.

In light of these developments, Xi’s “comprehensive state security concept,” promulgated in 2014, linked internal and external threats and underscored the dangers of destabilization through foreign subversion and infiltration. He also enacted the 2014 Counter Espionage Law, revised in 2023 to broaden espionage definitions, coinciding with detentions of foreign firm employees and tighter data controls.

Under his leadership, another major initiative allowed the MSS to establish direct public contact in 2015 through a hotline and website urging citizens to report threats to national security. In 2017, MSS offered rewards of up to 500,000 RMB for reporting suspected threats. In the same year, counterintelligence services also launched a broad awareness campaign through websites, animations, and television dramas promoting this “special work,” often targeting journalists, academics, and Chinese American and Taiwanese businesspeople.

Chinese courts have also imposed severe punishments in such cases. In April 2025, a former employee of a military research institute was sentenced to life imprisonment for selling secret documents to foreign intelligence agencies. The ruling followed the sentencing of a former engineer to death in March on similar charges.

China also deploys operatives abroad to curb criticism and preserve regime stability. Overseas police stations reportedly directed by provincial MSS offices combine administrative services with intelligence functions. One established in New York by the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau drew headlines in 2023. In fact, the earliest cyber incidents targeting UK government systems in the early 2000s originated not from Russia but from China, and were aimed at gathering information on overseas dissident communities, including Tibetan and Uighur groups.

New Intelligence Order Enters a Decisive Era

As China’s influence grew in the 2000s, Western policymakers were focused on the war on terror and interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, political leaders often preferred that intelligence chiefs avoid publicly naming China. Businesses faced mounting pressure to prioritize access to its vast market, while remaining reluctant to acknowledge that their proprietary information was being targeted.

In 2021, the FBI reported opening a new Chinese espionage case roughly every 12 hours, most involving cyber disruption. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of Justice, and other US bodies repeatedly identified MSS affiliated actors in advisories and indictments. Analysts assess MSS linked groups have surpassed PLA associated actors in both the sophistication and scope of their hacking campaigns. In 2024, authorities announced that Salt Typhoon had breached major US telecommunications companies in one of the most damaging publicly reported cyber campaigns. The National Security Agency (NSA) also noted that China’s reliance on indigenous technology makes its networks harder to track.

Former CIA director William J. Burns, under the Biden administration described these intelligence shortcomings as a “pacing challenge.” The administration created a China Mission Centre and a technology intelligence centre to address it. An executive order was also issued in 2024, prohibiting funding for Chinese semiconductors, microelectronics, quantum computing, and certain AI applications in sectors that are considered capable of enhancing military capabilities.

When the Trump administration returned in 2025, it triggered significant disruptions across the US government. In early May 2025, plans were announced to cut 1,200  positions at CIA and 2,000 at the NSA, with similar reductions reportedly planned for other intelligence bodies as well. Such cuts were expected to disrupt operations and deter long term asset relationships. The “Signalgate scandal” further revealed that senior national security officials had shared classified information in an unsecured Signal group chat. These avoidable lapses posed a serious threat to operational security and heightened the risks faced by intelligence assets worldwide.

As China pursues its vision of a unipolar world while escalating espionage and global security threats, international attention on its actions has intensified. Trump’s planned visit to China in April 2026 will be closely watched to assess whether the recruitment videos are part of a broader strategy targeting Xi’s establishment or merely a pressure tactic.

Introduction

The Arctic has long been known as “high North, low tension”, as its frozen waters and permafrost landscape offered no incentives to the states. However, due to global warming, it is changing. The rate of warming in the Arctic region is four times faster than the globe, resulting in massive ice loss. This anthropogenic anomaly has made the Arctic a region of geopolitical significance.

The Strategic Importance

The strategic importance of any region primarily depends on two factors: The first is Geographical position; which not only emboldens its importance as a trade passage but also defines its fruitfulness as a strategic location in both peace and war. The second; its Resources which offer economic benefits to the states, which can be translated into military might. The Arctic, indeed, has manifested both qualities. Its seas are becoming navigable as the ice recedes. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest passage (NWP) provide the countries in the high latitudes lucrative trade opportunities. Similarly, the geo-economic weight of the Arctic is augmented by its huge reserves of petroleum and minerals. It holds almost 13% (90 billion barrels) of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered gas resources. Moreover, the Arctic has a large amount of mineral resources. For example, Greenland; which comprises almost 15% of the Arctic region and its second largest contiguous landmass, is estimated to possess large deposits of Rare Earths, Copper, Zinc, Iron ore, Gold, Nickel and Uranium. Therefore, the big powers have set eye on the Arctic, including the US; Russia and China, with ambitions to dominate which may be termed as The Arctic Great Game.

Strategic location of the Arctic

“Whoever holds Alaska will hold the world”, General Billy Mitchell was not wrong when he uttered this phrase in 1935. Indeed, during the Cold War, the possession of Alaska for the US, its only in the Arctic, proved fruitful. American early warning satellites and missile defenses were installed in Alaska to detect Soviet infiltration. The Cold War is over now, but the competition over the Arctic has reinvigorated. The US, under Trump administration, is ambitious to dominate

the Western Hemisphere. The Arctic, especially Greenland, can be defined as the head of the Western Hemisphere. The geographical position of the Greenland is indeed enviable. East of it runs the widest gap between the Arctic and the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, America holds the Island in esteem for its strategic location. The 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the US military and commercial access to the Arctic, especially Greenland. It already operates the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in Greenland, in addition to its Alaskan military bases in the Arctic.

Russia, an important stakeholder in the region, enjoys one of the longest coastlines and largest territories in the Arctic. Russian activities in the Arctic are not novice. In the late 18^th century, Russian emperor Peter the Great launched the ‘Great Northern Expedition’ which aimed to search for a northern sea route that could connect the Pacific and Europe. The quest for a such a sea route seems promising now as the Arctic waters become traversable. In 2020, Russia unveiled its Arctic policy till 2035. Among others, it emphasized the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as ‘a national transport communication of the Russian Federation that is competitive on the world market’. However, after Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin adopted a staunch outlook. In Feb 2023, Putin decreed to amend the country’s Arctic policy. The amended document mentioned the prioritization of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. For this purpose, Russia has endeavored to transform NSR into a global trade and energy route. Russia currently operates the largest Icebreaker fleet and thanks to this technology, the transit of trade vessels is expected to increase through the NSR.

Routes through the Arctic Ocean. Source: Author’s creation

However, any unilateral Russian action in the Arctic Ocean would not land off the attention of the other Arctic states. While Russia is ambitious to hew the Arctic Ocean as a “Russian Lake”, the other Arctic countries too deem the Arctic as their ‘number one priority’. The Nordic countries consider the Arctic as a security concern, they also see Russia as a threat in the region while emphasizing sustainable development in the region. Therefore, the strategic competition in the Arctic will, inevitably, shape the European security dynamics.

The strategic importance of GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a body of open water between the three countries, is still relevant. During the Cold War, it provided the Soviet vessels an outlet into the North Atlantic Ocean which conferred optimal range to strike NATO targets. However, in late 2019, Russian submarines surged through the gap into the North Atlantic in what was a large-scale military exercise to which NATO forces counteracted with air missions to gather reconnaissance. Therefore, the Arctic is of strategic significance. It acts as a vanguard for the defenses of the Americas and Europe.

The most interesting case offered in the Arctic security is that of China, which lacks any geographical connection to the region. For Beijing, the Arctic begets new opportunities. China has already declared itself a “Near-Arctic State”  in its Arctic Policy 2018 and seeks to participate in the development of the Arctic shipping routes. China’s growing interest in the Arctic shipping routes can be interpreted as its efforts to diversify its trade routes. Compare the two routes which link China to the Western European markets: First is from the Chinese ports through the East and South China Sea, into the Indian Ocean, then crossing the Suez and reaching Mediterranean, squeezing through Gibraltar strait and reaching destinations. China’s apparition, utilizing this route, is evident in what has been translated as the “Malacca dilemma”. The second runs northerly from the Chinese ports and then cruising along the Arctic reaches Northern and Western Europe. The first is long, time-consuming and precarious in case of conflict given complex maritime features of the region. The second not only cost saving but also relatively more secure and safe. Therefore, the prospects for China to make the Arctic a “Polar Silk Road” are rewarding.

Future Power Politics in the Arctic. Source: Author’s creation

The Race to Secure the Arctic Resources

President Trump, during his first term, had tried to buy Greenland. However, his efforts were reinvigorated after his re-election in late 2024. During his second term, he has repeatedly threatened to occupy Greenland by using military force, the island defined by him as a matter of national security. The strategic importance of the Greenland is evident. Trump’s interest in the Greenland can be defined by two reasons. First to oust China and Russia from the region who have been increasing their influence in the region, as he perceives. Secondly, Trump wants to secure the resources of the Greenland for the US. Greenland, as said earlier, is rich in rare-earth minerals, which have their application in military industries, medical equipment, oil refining and green energy. Currently, China is the largest exporter of the rare earths. US deems ramping up its rare earth’s resources crucial for countering the Chinese monopoly over them. Last year, a global supply chains crisis loomed following China’s restrictions on the exports of the critical minerals. Moreover, to meet the threat imposed by climate change, the real progenitor of the shift in Arctic security, the transition to renewable and smart energy sources demands sufficient mineral resources including the rare earths. These are used in wind turbines and electric vehicles.

Russia extracts a huge amount of its energy and mineral resources from the Arctic. It produces rare earths, nickel and cobalt from its Arctic territory. Russian Arctic also holds almost 37.5 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, 75% of Russia’s gas reserves. As the permafrost thaws and the sea ice melts in the Arctic, Russia will expand its efforts to secure the resources in the region. Therefore, the Kremlin keenly observes changing environmental and political dynamics in the Arctic.

Lastly, the ‘Near-Arctic State’ has also augmented its footholds in the Arctic. China has invested in economic sectors in the Arctic. It is yet to be unveiled whether China’s ambitions in the Arctic are solely for peaceful economic purposes or rather they embody a strategic objective. So far, China has remained innocuous, focusing on economic ties with the Arctic states which benefit all.

Conclusion

The Arctic is going to witness a tense geostrategic competition. Climate Change has transformed this previously unnoticed region into a new stage of strategic competition. Arctic routes and resources invite regional as well as extra-regional powers to vie for dominance in the high north. Therefore, states have shifted their focus to the Arctic. The political and strategic facts imply that in the future the master of the Arctic will decide the matters of the world.

The 10th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was held on November 3 in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. The main theme of this year’s summit was ‘Turk Time’. The organization, which has set goals such as the long-term Vision of the Turkic World 2040 and the short-term Strategic Roadmap of the OTS 2022-2026, has added a new vision with ‘Turk Time’. So, is the Turk Age possible in the 21st century? Could Turks become an effective political center in the new era? Is Turk Time just a slogan? Or is it based on reality?

Turmoil in the Current Global System gave birth to the Organization of Turkic States

The 2008 economic crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the weakening of United States (US) hegemony that emerged with its military withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq left great chaos and a vacuum in international order.[1] Especially with the COVID-19 pandemic and the US debt ceiling crisis, the US hegemony tool, dollar hegemony, has suffered a major shake-up and has become controversial.[2] This vacuum and chaotic environment triggered an effort to build a new alternative order for countries that were uncomfortable with the existing international order, and to gain a position in the new order to be established. As the rise of Asian economies continued in the global economy, organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS accelerated the construction of an alternative multipolar order. The world was divided into two camps: defenders of the old unipolar world order and proponents of the new multipolar world order. The weakening of US hegemony and global chaos paved the way for the OTS. The transformation of the organization in 2021 coincided with the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Turkey, in particular, plays a decisive role in the OTS. In recent years, Turkey has experienced sharp ruptures in its relations with the US, EU, and NATO. The weakening of Turkey’s relations with the West is a reflection of the decline of US hegemony in the global order. At the same time, Turkey’s increasing cooperation and friendship with Russia and China played a positive role in the establishment of the OTS. The organization should be seen as an attempt to become part of a multipolar world order. For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statement that the world is bigger than five is an expression of the need to build a just multipolar world order. As the Turkic states increase cooperation, trade, and prosperity among themselves, they serve regional peace and the establishment of a just order. With the OTS, Turkey aims to increase prosperity in the region, improve infrastructure, maintain a common culture, and increase its defense and counter-terrorism cooperation capabilities. Turkey’s objectives in the OTS in Central Asia are an effort to take part in a multipolar world that will strengthen peace and prosperity. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan aims to continue the Turk Time with Turkey and for the Turkic world to become the world’s rising power.[3] Turkey wants to be a subject, not an object, in the multipolar order. In sum, Turkey is trying to play a stronger role in the new international system to be established by establishing good relations with the advocates of the multipolar world order.

Organization Strengthens by Institutionalizing

After the transformation of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States into the OTS with the Istanbul summit in 2021, the organization entered the process of building a stronger institutional infrastructure. Analyzing the outcomes of the Astana Summit, efforts to complete the institutionalization of the organization stand out. This year, the organization continued to increase institutionalization in areas such as the Civil Protection Mechanism, the Turkic Judicial Training Network, the Union of Notaries of the Turkic World, the Turkic Investment Fund, and the Organization of Trade Unions of Turkic States. The final declaration expresses satisfaction with the activities carried out within the framework of the organization in one year.[4] For example, the Alliance of Turkic News Agencies (ATNA) was established after the summit between Turkey’s news agency Anadolu Agency (AA), Azerbaijan State News Agency (AZERTAC), Kyrgyz National News Agency (Kabar), Uzbekistan National News Agency (UzA), and Kazakhstan’s news agency Qazcontent. After the establishment of ATNA, Binali Yıldırım, Chairman of the OTS Council of Elders, said: “We aim to bring the truth to the people in the fastest way and to prevent colonialist countries from covering the events. Serdar Karagöz, who was elected president of ATNA, emphasized the importance of combating disinformation.[5] In short, in the field of media, OTS has placed establishment of a media network that will challenge the media of the unipolar world and represent the oppressed at its center. During the next few years, it is possible to predict that the organization will institutionalize in various fields.

The organization Aims to Strengthen Trade

There are two important cooperation areas between the member states of the OTS. The first is the development of cooperation in the energy field. Turkic states are rich in valuable minerals such as energy, natural gas, oil, and uranium. Therefore, the member states of the organization tend to deepen their cooperation in the field of energy. The second meeting of the OTS Working Group on Energy Cooperation of the Ministers Responsible for Energy of the OTS was held on September 28, 2022, in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The parties adopted the OTS Energy Cooperation Program and the related action plan for 2023-2027, which includes the exchange of information and ideas on legislation and national programs in the energy sector, renewable and alternative energy sources, fossil fuel energy, nuclear energy, energy efficiency, dissemination of new technologies, capacity-building programs, and enhancing cooperation in the international arena. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized the importance of making efforts to make the Middle Corridor even more attractive for investment and to transport trans-Caspian resources, particularly Turkmen gas, to Turkey and Europe. Strategic energy infrastructure projects such as the Organization, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, Southern Gas Corridor, Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP), and Trans Adriatic Pipeline Project (TAP) contribute to the prosperity of Turkic states and European and global energy security. [6]

The second is to take steps to strengthen trade along the Silk Road belt. The member states of the OTS had a trade volume of $ 700 billion. However, only $ 18 billions of this trade volume is carried out among the member states themselves. This situation is the main driving factor in the establishment of the organization. Because Turkey and the member states are determined to develop trade among themselves. The member states of the organization focus on removing or facilitating trade barriers among themselves. Eliminating trade barriers and providing infrastructure investments on roads. In this respect, there is no other way but to work in harmony with the Belt and Road Initiative of the OTS. The implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the 2023-2027 OTS Transport Connectivity Program adopted at the Astana summit is expected to significantly increase the transit potential of the Middle Corridor and make Caspian transits smoother.

The establishment of the Turkish Investment Fund was on the agenda at the Istanbul Summit. During the two-year period of the organization, sub-commissions carried out infrastructure work to establish the Turkish Investment Fund. On March 16, 2023, the Agreement on the Establishment of the Turkish Investment Fund was signed at the Extraordinary Summit of the OTS held in Ankara. Before the Astana summit, Turkey voted the proposal for the establishment of the Turkish Investment Fund as a law in its parliament: “The capital participation commitment of the Republic of Turkey to the Turkish Investment Fund and the payments to be made within the framework of this commitment cannot exceed the equivalent of USD 100,000,000.[7] The President is authorized to increase the amount up to five times.  Thus, the OTS has gained an institutional structure to finance its investments among itself. All of these developments are efforts to increase the economic trade volume of the organization and strengthen economic cooperation.

Russia, Iran, and China should be part of the OTS

The fate of Turkic states depends on the revival of the Silk Road and the Belt and Road Initiative. Historically, trade flowing from China to Europe via the Silk Road played an important role in enriching Turks and building powerful states. Today, China, the world’s second-largest economy, has regained its historical position. The revival of the historical Silk Road plays an important role in the revival of the Turkic world. There must be an air of unity in Eurasia in order for the OTS to succeed. In this respect, the accession of Iran, Russia, and China, which have Turkic-speaking peoples, to the OTS will add significant strength to the organization. There is already such an expectation in the OTS. Chairman of the Council of Elders of the OTS Binali Yıldırım stated that China and Russia are natural members of the OTS.[8]

The sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of Russia’s operation in Ukraine have highlighted the strategic importance of the Middle Corridor.[9] Moreover, although 96 percent of the trade from China to Europe is by sea, the US continues to blockade the South China Sea. Currently, the Middle Corridor is the safest port for trade flow. The most important goal of the OTS is to make the Middle Corridor more active. “We should also pay special attention to the development of transport networks between our countries. With this understanding, we continue our efforts to activate the Caspian Trans-Caspian East-West Middle Corridor. We should strengthen our cooperation in removing obstacles to transportation and trade, enriching transportation networks, facilitating border crossings, and visa procedures”.[10]

Conclusion

The world is on the brink of a global rupture, and OTS is an organization that emerged on the brink of this global rupture. Shortly after the Republic of Turkey celebrated its 100^th anniversary on October 29, the OTS organized a summit with the theme of ‘Turk Time’, which reflects the expectation of Turks to become a global actor for the 200^th year. To achieve this goal, the Organization of Turkic States must unite in Eurasia. In this respect, it is vital for the OTS to strengthen its cooperation with China, Iran, and Russia. These states are the leading powers of Asia and home to Turkic-speaking peoples. Economically, the Middle Corridor is vital for the OTS. Trade between China and Europe passes through Central Asia via railroads, which indicates the revival of the historic Silk Road. Controlling the Silk Road, the OTS can regain its historical role, gain a geopolitical advantage, and become an important figure in world politics. Turks have always had their own special goals, called the ‘Red Apple’. The Ottoman Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror set the conquest of Istanbul and the establishment of a new Roman Empire as the Red Apple. In the 16-18^th centuries, the Ottoman Sultans identified the conquest of Vienna and Rome as the Red Apple. In the 20^th century, Turkist ideologues had the Red Apple of establishing a Turan State. In the 21^st century, it is clear that the Turks’ Red Apple is the greatest ideal to be a center in the multipolar world order under the slogan of ‘Turk Time’.

The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of Shanghai University.

[1] Francis Fukuyama, Francis Fukuyama on the end of American hegemony, 8 November 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2021/11/08/francis-fukuyama-on-the-end-of-american-hegemony

[2] CFR, The Future of Dollar Hegemony, 22 August 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/future-dollar-hegemony

[3] Türkiye Yüzyılı’nda ‘Türk Devri’ başlıyor, 3 November 2023, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/turkiye-yuzyilinda-turk-devri-basliyor-809286.html

[4] Organization of Turkic States, “Declaration of the Tenth Summit of the Organization of the Turkic States”, 3 November 2023, https://www.turkicstates.org/assets/pdf/haberler/astana-declaration-3113-215.pdf

[5] AA, “Türk Haber Ajansları Birliğinin ilk genel kurulu yapıldı”, 6 November 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/kurumsal-haberler/turk-haber-ajanslari-birliginin-ilk-genel-kurulu-yapildi/3045736#

[6] Türkiye İletişim Başkanlığı, 21. Yüzyılın Parlayan Yıldızı: Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı, İstanbul, Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı Yayınları: 2023

[7] Resmî Gazete, Türk Yatırım Fonu Kuruluş Anlaşmasının Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun, 11November 2023, https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2023/11/20231111-1.htm

[8] Sputnik, Aksakallılar Konseyi Başkanı Yıldırım: Rusya ve Çin Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı’nın doğal üyesidir, https://tr.sputniknews.com/20211126/aksakallilar-konseyi-baskani-yildirim-rusya-ve-cin-turk-devletleri-teskilatinin-dogal-uyesidir-1051186836.html

[9] Zeynep Çetinkaya, & Zeynep Canlı, “Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı Türkiye’den geçen ‘Orta Koridorun önemini daha da artırdı.” AA, 2022, 1 Mart 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/rusya-ukrayna-savasi-turkiyeden-gecen- orta-koridorun-onemini-daha-da-artirdi/2519232.

[10] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, “Türk dünyasının barışı, refahı ve güvenliği yönünde adımlar atmayı sürdüreceğiz”, 3 November 2023, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/150055/-turk-dunyasinin-barisi-refahi-ve-guvenligi-yonunde-adimlar-atmayi-surdurecegiz-

The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, six frigates, three light warships, and approximately thirty fighter jets and support aircraft have entered the Middle East by order of Donald Trump who, by repeatedly touting the slogan “I have ended six/seven/eight wars,” has considered (and continues to consider) himself deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize. What objective do all these tensions that the U.S. administration has generated in the region actually pursue? The weakening of Iran, or the overthrow of the incumbent government? Whatever his and his administration’s aim may be, it appears that—within the cost–benefit calculations of his trader’s mindset—he has yet to arrive at a definitive conclusion as to what kind of blow, and at what scale, could deliver the desired outcome. His recent military posturing around Iran and his increasingly threatening rhetoric against the Islamic Republic have placed him in a no-win situation whose end few can predict.

Why a no-win situation for Trump?

First Strike Doubt: Trump and the constellation of officials currently in the White House—who, notably, are far from unified or aligned on how to approach Iran—have reached no certainty regarding the effectiveness of a first strike against Iran or the likelihood of achieving their desired results. It is evident to all that the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither Venezuela, nor Libya, nor Syria, nor Afghanistan, nor Iraq, nor anything akin to the historical cases in which the United States has intervened militarily in the name of democracy verbally and in pursuit of its own interests operationally. This very reality has, thus far, prevented Trump from issuing the order to “open fire” on Iran up to now.

On the other side, there is no sign of the flexibility or concession sought by the United States in the behavior or rhetoric of Iranian officials—a fact acknowledged by American officials themselves. This indicates that pressure, intimidation, and threats have thus far yielded no results. The reason is clear: the Islamic Republic views any potential confrontation as an existential war and is unwilling to grant any concessions. Trump, however—who seeks to manufacture achievements out of even the smallest events and whose penchant for exaggeration is among his defining traits—perceives such circumstances as detrimental to his personal prestige and standing.

Iran’s Resilience: The experience of the Israeli attack and the hybrid war launched against Iran in June 2025, with direct assistance from the United States and indirect support from so many others, demonstrated that the instability they sought within the governing structure of the Islamic Republic and even the internal social fragmentation and rifts that had been cultivated for years through various media tools did not materialize. Despite the blows inflicted on Iran, none of the long-term strategic objectives of the United States and Israel were achieved. Likewise, the unrest and riots of January 8 and 9, despite the violence and damage they caused to the public and the state, were ultimately brought under control and culminated in a multi-million-person rally on January 12 condemning the unrest and supporting the central government of the Islamic Republic.

High costs and Persian Gulf Worries: Operationalizing a military threat would impose heavy costs on the United States and its allies. The Islamic Republic has explicitly declared that any military action against its territory, at any scale, would be regarded as all-out war, and that, consequently, the entire region—as well as U.S. interests wherever they may be—would fall within range of Iran’s retaliatory strikes. This serious warning has also prompted Persian Gulf states to mobilize their capacities to dissuade Trump from attacking Iran. The strikes on U.S. bases at Ayn al-Asad and Al-Udeid entrenched the perception that the Islamic Republic does not shy away from responding to foreign aggression, even if large segments of the world regard the attacking state as a “superpower.”

Global Energy Risks: The ignition of war in the Persian Gulf would amount to a grave threat to global energy supply routes. Roughly 30 percent of the world’s crude oil and 20 percent of liquefied natural gas are supplied by Persian Gulf countries, and 20–25 percent of global crude oil transits the Strait of Hormuz. Any aggressive action by the United States would jeopardize the security of one-fifth of the world’s fuel and profoundly affect the global economy.

Although the U.S. National Security Strategy does not place the Middle East among America’s top strategic priorities, the same document states that: “We (the United States) want to prevent an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass while avoiding the forever wars”, which shows Persian Gulf oil is still of high importance for Washington.

Tilting Power Balance: In addition, heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf would endanger China’s economic interests, and any large-scale military confrontation would likely lead to a more pronounced military-security presence by Russia and China in the Gulf—tilting the balance in favor of America’s rivals.

And finally?

The embers beneath the region’s ashes today could be ignited by the slightest breeze, engulfing a vast area. Israel, while likely the first target of Iran’s retaliatory response in the event of a U.S. attack, is nevertheless eager to initiate confrontation based on the calculation that a war waged with the full might of the United States could ultimately erode the very existence of the Islamic Republic or weaken it to the point of capitulation. In this context, it is not far-fetched to suggest that the disclosure of new documents and details concerning Trump’s links to the notorious Epstein case and his mysterious island may have been driven by the Mossad, as such revelations could compel the U.S. president to undertake an irrational action to divert attention elsewhere.

Today, Trump is acting more than ever in contradiction to his own professed principles—from trampling on his signature MAGA slogan and morphing it into MIGA (Make Israel Great Again), to undermining his administration’s efforts to reduce unnecessary international expenditures; from his paradoxical pride in having ended “eight wars” to the strategy of off-shore balancing the Middle East. Should a war of this magnitude and consequence erupt, no country involved—whether through direct action or geographic proximity—would be spared its consequences. Regarding these circumstances, it appears that the only desirable scenario for Trump, the region, and the world at large is the opening of a genuine dialogue, free from the shadow of threats, intimidation, and American bullying.

Almost fifty years after the revolution in 1979 that changed the political landscape of Iran, Iran is at the crossroads of its history, which is defined by economic pressures, social pressure, and the changing geopolitical environment. The Islamic Republic was constructed as a combination of revolutionary ideology, anti-Western response, and promise of social justice. In the present day, although the ideological framework is still maintained, the sustainability of that framework is being strained increasingly by the structural economic pressures of the day, generational shifts, and changing regional hegemony.

On the economic front, Iran is continually constrained by global sanctions and inefficiency in its structure. Withdrawal by the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the reimposition of massive sanctions in 2018 have cut off much of the oil exports of Iranian oil, banking, and foreign investment flows. The country works well under its economic potential despite the fact that Tehran has been able to sustain limited oil sales, especially through discounted sales to China and through surrogate routes. The inflation rate has been above 40 percent during the recent years, the Iranian rial is falling drastically, and unemployment among the youth is also a burning issue. It is the middle and lower classes that are directly impacted by these economic pressures and that pose a legitimacy challenge that cannot be solved only through rhetorical means of revolution.

The internal landscape is a manifestation of long-term frustration. Frequent demonstrations regarding fuel prices, the state of the economy, and social liberation indicate the growing disparity between state discourses of resistance and the realities that the citizens encounter. The newer generation born after the revolution has lost any connection with the revolutionary memory of 1979 and perceives governance less as ideologically symbolic and more based on economic performance and individual opportunity. The policy employed by the state has been based on the repressed handling of dissent, which consists of the limitation of the mobilization of protests and the prevention of the collapse of the system. Although this is a way of maintaining short-term stability, it does not deal with structural issues like brain drain, capital flight, falling purchasing power, and diminished faith in long-term economic potential.

The main political quandary is consequently a legitimacy transformation quandary. In the past, the Islamic Republic gained legitimacy through revolutionary mobilization, religious control, and confrontation with the external hostilities, especially the United States and Israel. Nevertheless, the contemporary politics demands more and more performance-based legitimacy—providing economic growth, stability, and material changes in the quality of life. The conflict between ideological stability and realistic adjustment is the characteristic of the contemporary crossroads of Iran.

Iran is geopolitically a country that exists in the complex web of pressures. The United States is still the main external agent, which affects the Tehran strategic calculations. The policy of Washington is alternating between the engagement of diplomacy and coercion, yet the ultimate goal is the same as it is: avoiding the possibility of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons competence and reducing its impact in the region. In Tehran, it will need negotiations that will help soften sanctions and stabilize the economy, but any deal will not collapse under the perception of submission over matters of sovereignty, ballistic missile potential, and relations with the region.

Meanwhile, the nuclear and missile programs in Iran are considered to be existential threats to Israel. The shadow struggle that has been there for a long time, including cyber attacks, precision attacks, espionage, and proxy wars, has heightened strategic mistrust. The intensity of this rivalry is shown by the fact that Israel has been carrying out its operations within Iran and against Iran-related targets in Syria. Any intensification would attract Gulf states and disrupt world energy supply, especially through the Strait of Hormuz, which is a choke point in the oil markets of the world. Even minor confrontations will have a global economic impact, as Iran is strategically placed in the important maritime paths.

The regional policy of Iran has focused on the establishment of strategic depth by alliance and coalition with non-state actors and supportive governments within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. This system becomes a deterrence and leverage factor, making it difficult to engage in a direct military strike on the territory of Iran. Geostrategically, this doctrine of forward defense has enhanced the bargaining power of Iran. But it is likewise causing tension with the other Arab countries and creating the impression of destabilization in the region. The recent diplomatic thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which was facilitated by China, shows that both sides noticed that continued confrontation is expensive in terms of both economics and strategy.

Iran is geographically at one of the most strategic points of Eurasia. It connects the Persian Gulf with Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South Asia. The International North-South Transport Corridor is one of the major trade routes that can make Iran a major transit route between India and Russia and Europe. This geo-economic location, in theory, has colossal prospects of being rolled into new multipolar trade systems. Sanctions and political isolation in reality prevent full access to the global markets. The latter can be said to be strategic convergence, as Iran was brought closer to Russia, especially after the war in Ukraine, as a result of Western pressure. But such convergence also subjects Tehran to secondary sanctions and makes it less flexible in its East-West balancing.

Iran—Concerns about the nuclear problem continue to be the major pivot of the external affairs. Tehran maintains that its nuclear program is nonviolent and has indicated that it is free for verification. But the Western governments require more guarantees and wider negotiations, which can feature missile capabilities and regional operations. It is possible that a strictly limited nuclear deal will minimize the risks of immediate proliferation and alleviate the economic pressure, which might make the Iranian internal situation more stable. Nonetheless, such a deal may not help solve any underlying rivalries between the region but could simply freeze the situation unless there are larger regional de-escalation mechanisms. On the other hand, the inability to find any solution will lead to the further worsening of the economy and the possible military clash.

In a more geo-strategically global understanding, the balance of power between the Middle East and the rest of the world will be influenced by the course of Iran. In case Tehran manages to negotiate the lifting of sanctions and turns in the direction of economic integration with the Gulf states, it will be able to shift from the resistance-focused model to the development-oriented state step by step. This would strengthen the stability of the region, safeguard the energy security, and minimize the motivation to intervene. It would also make the regional rivalry be based more on economic rivalry rather than military rivalry, especially in terms of infrastructure rivalry, trade corridor rivalry, and energy market rivalry.

Nevertheless, should the negotiations fail and the confrontation escalate, Iran might apply the asymmetric deterrence further, increasing the range of its missiles and extending proxy bases. That way would strengthen the preemptive stance of Israel and increase the presence of the US military in the Gulf. The escalation would disorient shipping routes, exert more volatility on oil prices, and disintegrate the security infrastructure in the region. To the surrounding Arab nations, which require diversifying and changing their economies, new warfare would destroy investment conditions and long-term strategies.

On the domestic front, economic resilience is what will sustain the strategic position of Iran. The political principle of endurance can only be stretched so far as inflation undermines the wages and the depreciation of currency undermines savings. This needs structural changes: enhancing transparency, welcoming foreign investment, and a non-hydrocarbon economy, and empowering the business sector. Foreign policy victories cannot entirely offset its dissatisfaction at home without economic change.

After all, the crossroads of Iran is not only ideological but also structural. The state has to strike a compromise between sovereignty and economic need, deterrence and diplomacy, and ideological identity and practical governance. Its strategic location means that its decisions will have a far-reaching impact, not only across its frontiers, but also on the energy markets of the world, the great-power politics, and the new security order of the Middle East. The future of Iran becoming a development-oriented regional power with full membership in multipolar networks or being a sanction-bound resistance state under continuous pressure will not only dictate the internal stability of the country but also the geopolitical orientation of a long-time conflict-ridden and strategically divided region.