Geopolitics

Artificial intelligence is increasingly being treated not simply as a technology sector but as a strategic capability tied to economic power, national security and geopolitical competition. Recent warnings from leading AI researchers and executives that increasingly autonomous systems could pose extreme risks have intensified debate over whether development should be slowed.

Yet the same warnings could make a slowdown less likely. If advanced AI can provide major military, economic and technological advantages, governments may view continued development as a strategic necessity. The result could be a paradox in which growing concerns about the dangers of AI encourage countries to accelerate the race to control it.

The United States and China are at the center of this competition. Both governments have strong incentives to maintain their technological advantage, while companies are investing enormous sums in data centers, chips and computing infrastructure.

The scale of investment shows why reversing course would be difficult. Goldman Sachs estimates that cumulative global AI spending through the end of the decade could reach as much as 5% of global GDP. At the same time, financial markets are increasingly sensitive to whether the extraordinary investment in AI infrastructure will ultimately generate sufficient economic returns.

Why it matters

The central question is no longer simply whether AI development should be regulated. It is whether governments can realistically agree to meaningful limits while competing for technological dominance.

A country that slows development unilaterally risks allowing competitors to move ahead. That creates a classic security dilemma: measures intended to reduce risk can themselves create strategic vulnerability.

The problem is particularly significant because AI has applications far beyond commercial technology. Advanced systems could affect cybersecurity, intelligence, military planning, financial markets, biotechnology and critical infrastructure.

That makes AI different from many previous technology debates. Governments may be willing to regulate individual applications, but they are less likely to accept restrictions that could permanently reduce their strategic advantage.

The investment dilemma

The AI boom has already become deeply connected to wider economic growth.

Companies are spending heavily on computing capacity and data centers, while investors have placed enormous valuations on firms expected to benefit from AI adoption. A significant slowdown could therefore have consequences far beyond technology companies.

Morgan Stanley has estimated that almost $200 billion in U.S. data center projects were cancelled or delayed amid political resistance to new infrastructure. The bank has also argued that capital expenditure linked to AI could account for roughly one third of U.S. GDP growth over the current period.

This creates another obstacle to restraint. AI investment is no longer only a corporate decision. It has become connected to employment, infrastructure, financial markets and national economic growth.

The longer the investment cycle continues, the more difficult it becomes for governments and companies to voluntarily step away from it.

Washington and Beijing

The geopolitical dimension makes a coordinated slowdown even harder.

U.S. policymakers increasingly view technological leadership in AI as an element of national power. China, meanwhile, sees AI development as part of its broader effort to reduce dependence on Western technology and strengthen its own economic and strategic capabilities.

That means Washington and Beijing have incentives to monitor each other’s progress rather than simply establish limits.

The political rhetoric surrounding AI increasingly reflects this competition. Trump has portrayed opposition to AI infrastructure as benefiting China, while Chinese state media has described warnings about AI as part of a broader geopolitical strategy against Beijing.

The result is a familiar strategic dilemma: if either side believes the other may continue developing advanced AI, neither has much incentive to slow down first.

Can international rules work?

Meaningful AI restrictions would ultimately require international cooperation.

Individual countries can establish domestic safety standards, require companies to conduct risk assessments or impose restrictions on specific applications. But those measures cannot fully address the geopolitical problem if competitors outside those jurisdictions remain free to develop more powerful systems.

The nuclear comparison illustrates the difficulty. The first nuclear weapon was developed in 1945, but the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty did not emerge until 1968. Even after the treaty, nuclear proliferation continued beyond the five states formally recognized as nuclear-weapon states.

AI could present an even more complicated challenge because it is not confined to a small number of military facilities. Its development involves thousands of companies, researchers, data centers and computing systems spread across multiple countries.

Economic security could become the new arms race

The most important shift may be that AI competition does not need to resemble a conventional military arms race to produce similar strategic pressures.

Advanced AI could generate advantages in productivity, financial markets, scientific research, cybersecurity and military technology. Falling behind could therefore be perceived as an economic and national security threat even without the development of an explicit weapon.

This could produce what might be described as mutually assured economic dependence. Countries may recognize the dangers of uncontrolled AI while simultaneously believing that abandoning the technology would be even more dangerous.

That dynamic makes voluntary restraint increasingly difficult.

Implications and analysis

The growing warnings about AI may therefore have an unintended geopolitical consequence: they could accelerate the race they are intended to constrain.

If governments become convinced that highly capable AI could fundamentally alter national power, they are unlikely to leave its development to private companies or accept restrictions that allow competitors to gain an advantage. Instead, the technology could become more closely integrated with national security policy.

That could eventually mean greater government involvement in AI companies, computing infrastructure, semiconductor supply chains and access to advanced models.

The biggest danger is therefore not simply that AI becomes too powerful to control technologically. It may become too strategically important for governments to willingly slow down.

For meaningful safeguards to emerge, major powers would need to treat AI safety as a shared security interest rather than another arena of geopolitical competition. Without that shift, every warning about the potential consequences of advanced AI could strengthen the argument for moving faster.

The paradox is clear: the more dangerous AI becomes, the more governments may feel they need to control it. And the more they compete to control it, the harder it becomes to slow the race.

With information from Reuters.

World War Two continues to shape relations between Russia, China, Taiwan and Japan, with competing interpretations of the conflict increasingly intersecting with present day geopolitical tensions.

The issue resurfaced last week when Russian diplomats in Taiwan screened a film about Japanese militarism and World War Two. The screening raised concerns in Taiwan that Moscow was helping Beijing promote a narrative of a rising Japanese military threat while also creating divisions between Taipei, Tokyo and their Western partners.

The disagreement reflects fundamentally different interpretations of who fought Japan, who ultimately defeated Japanese forces in East Asia and which governments have the right to claim that legacy.

What’s Happening

Russia’s presentation of Japan’s wartime history comes against the backdrop of its own unresolved dispute with Tokyo over territory captured at the end of World War Two.

Soviet forces entered the war in East Asia only during its final weeks, when the Red Army moved into Japanese occupied northeastern China. Soviet forces withdrew from most of the region in 1946 and transferred many captured Japanese weapons to Mao Zedong’s communist forces.

The Soviet Union quickly recognized Mao’s government after the People’s Republic of China was established in October 1949 following the communist victory over Chiang Kai shek’s Republic of China.

Soviet forces also seized four islands off Japan’s Hokkaido at the end of the war. Russia calls them part of the Kurils, while Japan refers to them as the Northern Territories. Moscow continues to control the islands.

Russia and Japan have never signed a formal World War Two peace treaty, with the territorial dispute remaining a major obstacle.

China’s View of World War Two

Beijing presents the history of the war as a central part of China’s national narrative.

The Chinese government says China sacrificed 35 million people during its struggle against Japan, which Beijing dates back to Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria.

China officially refers to the conflict as the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and describes World War Two as the World Anti Fascist War.

Beijing argues that China and the Soviet Union were the mainstays of resistance against Japan and Germany, while Chinese communist guerrilla forces formed the backbone of the resistance inside China.

This interpretation gives the wartime struggle an important role in China’s broader political narrative and its portrayal of Japan’s contemporary military posture.

Taiwan’s View

Taiwan strongly disputes Beijing’s interpretation.

Taiwan’s government argues that the People’s Republic of China cannot claim credit for a war fought before the PRC was established in 1949.

During World War Two, the Republic of China under Chiang Kai shek was China’s government, while Taiwan itself was under Japanese colonial rule. Republican forces carried out much of the fighting against Japan.

The Chinese civil war was temporarily suspended during the conflict as Chiang’s forces and Mao’s communists formed an uneasy alliance against Japan.

Taiwan also points to the formal Japanese surrender at the end of the war. The Republic of China, represented by Chiang’s government, signed the surrender alongside the other Allied powers, including the Soviet Union.

From Taipei’s perspective, Mao’s communist forces used the war to strengthen themselves and subsequently benefited from the civil war that resumed after Japan’s defeat.

Why It Matters

The competing historical narratives are not simply disagreements about the past. They influence how the governments involved portray present day security threats and diplomatic relationships.

For China, Japan’s wartime history remains an important element of its criticism of Japanese military development. For Taiwan, however, Beijing’s use of that history is also connected to its claim over Taiwan and its attempt to define the historical legitimacy of the Chinese state.

Russia’s involvement adds another layer because Moscow has its own unresolved territorial dispute with Japan stemming directly from the final stages of World War Two.

The screening of a film about Japanese militarism in Taiwan therefore carries significance beyond historical commemoration. Taipei sees the issue through the lens of its current relations with Japan and the West, while Russia and China share interests in challenging what they portray as a resurgence of Japanese military power.

Key Stakeholders

Russia retains control of the disputed islands off Hokkaido and has never concluded a formal World War Two peace treaty with Japan.

China presents itself as a central force in the wartime resistance against Japan and emphasizes the enormous Chinese sacrifice during the conflict.

Taiwan argues that the Republic of China, rather than the People’s Republic of China, represented China during World War Two and carried out much of the fighting against Japan.

Japan remains directly affected by the competing historical narratives, particularly because of its territorial dispute with Russia and its increasingly important relationship with Taiwan.

What’s Next

The dispute over World War Two history is likely to remain intertwined with current tensions in East Asia.

For Taiwan, the concern is that Russia and China could use wartime history to portray Japan as an emerging military threat and undermine Taipei’s growing ties with Tokyo and other Western partners.

For Japan, historical disputes remain connected to its relationships with both Russia and China.

For Russia and China, emphasizing their wartime resistance against Japan provides a historical framework through which they can criticize what they see as a revival of Japanese military power.

Analysis

The significance of the dispute lies in how history is being used as a tool of contemporary geopolitics. The same war produces fundamentally different political narratives depending on which government is telling the story.

Beijing emphasizes China’s enormous wartime sacrifice and the role of communist forces. Taipei emphasizes the Republic of China’s role as the government that fought Japan and signed the Japanese surrender. Moscow emphasizes the Soviet Union’s final campaign against Japan and retains territory captured during that period.

These competing narratives matter because they provide historical legitimacy for present day political positions. As Japan strengthens its security relationships with Taiwan and Western partners, wartime memory can be used to frame those developments not simply as responses to current security concerns, but as part of a longer historical confrontation.

The dispute therefore shows how the legacy of World War Two remains an active element of East Asian power politics rather than simply a question of historical interpretation.

With information from Reuters.