geopolitical

The Patriarchate of Jerusalem is one of the most ancient thrones of Christianity. Its prestige lies in its uninterrupted custodianship of the Holy Land, yet its political weight has traditionally been limited compared to Constantinople, Alexandria, or Moscow. In recent years, however, Jerusalem has begun to act with growing assertiveness, repositioning itself on the global Orthodox chessboard. This is not an isolated gesture. It is a coherent strategy that combines ecclesiastical maneuvering with diplomatic calculation.

A measured distance from Constantinople

For centuries, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has exercised a primacy of honor that shaped Orthodox order. Its role became visible one more time after the Ukrainian autocephaly of 2018–2019, which triggered Moscow’s rupture with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and fragmented global Orthodoxy. In this fragile landscape, Jerusalem’s refusal to show customary respect to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, such as during Patriarch Theophilos’ visit to Constantinople while the Ecumenical Patriarch was absent, carried a strong symbolic charge.

In the Orthodox world, protocol is substance and responds to centuries-old traditions and rules. Jerusalem has chosen to highlight its autonomy, presenting itself less as a subordinate throne and more as an equal player that answers primarily to its own pastoral realities.

A visible embrace of Moscow

Parallel to this distancing, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem has cultivated visible proximity with Moscow. Encounters between Patriarch Theophilos and Patriarch Kirill in international forums are carefully staged. They showcase Jerusalem as one of the few Orthodox centers willing to stand with Moscow in public, at a time when the Russian Church is cut off from Constantinople after her own decision.

The significance is twofold. First, Jerusalem gains leverage by being seen with Moscow; it becomes indispensable to those who seek to keep channels open with the Russian Church. Second, it signals to Constantinople that Jerusalem has alternatives. In a polarized Orthodox world, Jerusalem positions itself as the third pole.

Exploiting the Orthodox divide

The fracture between Constantinople and Moscow is the defining fact of the present Orthodox landscape. Since the Ukrainian question, communion has been ruptured, and every inter-Orthodox initiative has become contested ground. Jerusalem has seized this moment. By maintaining relations with Moscow and refusing to follow Constantinople’s spiritual leadership, it elevates itself into a power broker.

The “Amman initiative,” launched by Patriarch Theophilos in 2020, was an early signal. Ostensibly a fraternal gathering, it was interpreted as an attempt to create a parallel framework of Orthodox coordination. The same logic continues today since the moment Jerusalem does not merely mediate, it seeks to shape the system in ways that enhance its own centrality.

Political dimensions and secular diplomacy

This ecclesiastical strategy intersects with secular diplomacy. Patriarch Theophilos’ meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Istanbul, without prior coordination with Athens or Constantinople, revealed how Jerusalem leverages regional power to reinforce its own profile. For Ankara, the encounter offered a stage to project international acceptance. For Jerusalem, it was an assertion of autonomy—the ability to engage heads of state directly, without reference to traditional Orthodox hierarchies.

Such moves demonstrate the Patriarchate’s dual logic. Ecclesiastical autonomy and political visibility. Yet they also risk entangling Jerusalem in agendas that exceed its spiritual mandate. When political authorities instrumentalize ecclesiastical actors, the cost is often borne by the broader unity of the Church.

At the heart of Jerusalem’s maneuvers lies a profound redefinition of legitimacy. The Patriarchate claims that its authority flows not from subordination to Constantinople but from its continuous guardianship of the Holy Land, its role as protector of Christian presence in the Middle East, and its ability to secure survival under adverse conditions. This narrative resonates with local communities and appeals to external partners who view Jerusalem less as a hierarchical institution and more as a political-religious actor with unique assets.

By presenting itself as sui generis, Jerusalem attempts to blur the lines of canonical order. It elevates historical custodianship over primacy of honor and pastoral necessity over hierarchical protocol. This reframing is powerful, but it destabilizes the traditional equilibrium of the Orthodox system.

Jerusalem’s strategy carries immediate benefits but long-term risks. Constantinople interprets distancing as defection. Moscow views cooperation as tactical, not loyal. Regional governments value the Patriarchate’s visibility but also use it for their own agendas. In the long run, Jerusalem risks being perceived less as a bridge and more as an opportunistic actor.

The Greek dimension

Greece remains a critical backdrop. Athens has aligned itself with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, supporting Ukrainian autocephaly and standing by the Fanar, defending its historical and canonical rights. However, Jerusalem invokes Greece whenever it needs legitimacy or support, especially to protect its institutions and heritage. This selective approach exposes Athens to the maneuvers of the Patriarchate without giving it substantial influence, as Greece is projected by Jerusalem as a guarantor but not as a decision-maker.

During the Sinai crisis, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem engaged Greece in a manner that combined dependence with instrumentalization. On the surface, Athens was acknowledged as a historical guarantor of the monastery’s continuity and as the institutional shield necessary for its protection. In practice, however, the Patriarchate pursued its course with minimal coordination and little transparency toward the Greek state. This dual approach created a paradox: Greece was projected internationally as an indispensable partner, yet it was excluded from substantive influence over the management of the crisis. By invoking Greek legitimacy when useful while retaining full control of decisions, the Jerusalem Patriarchate reinforced its own position but left Athens diplomatically exposed.

TOKYO — The leaders of China, North Korea and Russia stood shoulder to shoulder Wednesday as high-tech military hardware and thousands of marching soldiers filled the streets of Beijing.

Two days earlier, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping huddled together, smiling broadly and clasping hands at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The gatherings in China this week could be read as a striking, maybe even defiant, message to the United States and its allies. At the very least, they offered yet more evidence of a burgeoning shift away from a U.S.-dominated, Western-led world order, as President Trump withdraws America from many of its historic roles and roils economic relationships with tariffs.

Trump himself indicated he was the leaders’ target in a message on social media to Xi: “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and (North Korean leader) Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against The United States of America.”

But China’s military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, and the earlier economic gathering, is also simply more of the self-interested, diplomatic jockeying that has marked regional power politics for decades.

Each of these leaders, in other words, is out for himself.

Xi needs cheap Russian energy and a stable border with North Korea, his nuclear-armed wildcard neighbor. Putin is hoping to escape Western sanctions and isolation over his war in Ukraine. Kim wants money, legitimacy and to one-up archrival South Korea. Modi is trying to manage his relationship with regional heavyweights Putin and Xi, at a moment when ties with Washington are troubled.

The events highlight China’s regional aspirations

China is beset with serious domestic problems — stark economic and gender inequalities, to name two — and a tense standoff with Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own. But Xi has tried to position China as a leader of countries that feel disadvantaged by the post-World War II order.

“This parade showcases the ascendancy of China propelled by Trump’s inept diplomacy and President Xi’s astute statecraft,” said Jeff Kingston, a professor of Asian studies at Temple University Japan. “The Washington consensus has unraveled, and Xi is rallying support for an alternative.”

Some analysts caution against reading too much into Russia-China-North Korea ties. China remains deeply wary of growing North Korean nuclear power, and has long sought to temper its support — even agreeing at times to international sanctions — to try to influence Pyongyang’s pursuit of weapons.

“Though the Russia-North Korea tie has resumed to a military alliance, China refuses to return to the year of 1950,” when Beijing sent soldiers to support North Korea’s invasion of the South and the USSR provided crucial military aid, said Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Relations of Nanjing University. “It is wrong to believe that China, Russia and North Korea are reinforcing bloc-building.”

Russia looks to China to help ease its isolation

For the Kremlin, Putin’s appearance in Beijing alongside major world leaders is another way to shrug off the isolation imposed by the West on Russia in the wake of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

It has allowed Putin to take to the world stage as a statesman, meeting a host of world leaders, including Modi, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. And Putin’s reception by Xi is a reminder that Russia still has major trading partners, despite Western sanctions that have cut off access to many markets.

At the same time, Russia does not want to anger Trump, who has been more receptive than his predecessor, particularly in hearing out Moscow’s terms for ending its war with Ukraine.

“I want to say that no one has been plotting anything; no one was weaving any conspiracies,” Putin’s foreign affairs adviser, Yuri Ushakov, said about Trump’s social media message. “None of the three leaders had even thought about such a thing.”

Kim Jong Un walks a diplomatic tightrope in Beijing

The North Korean leader’s trip to Beijing will deepen new ties with Russia while also focusing on the shaky relationship with his nation’s most crucial ally, and main economic lifeline, China.

Kim has sent thousands of troops and huge supplies of military equipment to help Russian forces to repel a Ukrainian incursion on their territory.

Without specifically mentioning the Ukraine war, Kim told Putin on Wednesday that “if there’s anything I can do for you and the people of Russia, if there is more that needs to be done, I will consider it as a brotherly obligation, an obligation that we surely need to bear.”

The Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank affiliated with South Korea’s spy agency, said in a report this week that Kim’s trip, his first appearance at a multilateral diplomatic event since taking power in 2011, is meant to strengthen ties with friendly countries ahead of any potential resumption of talks about its nuclear program with Trump. The two leaders’ nuclear diplomacy collapsed in 2019.

“Kim can also claim a diplomatic victory as North Korea has gone from unanimously sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council for its illegal nuclear and missile programs to being embraced by UNSC permanent members Russia and China,” said Leif-Eric Easley, professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.

India’s Modi is playing a nuanced game

Modi is on his first visit to China since relations between the two countries deteriorated after Chinese and Indian soldiers engaged in deadly border clashes in 2020.

But the tentative rapprochement has its limits. Praveen Donthi, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, said the Indian leader did not participate in Beijing’s military parade because the “distrust with China still exists.”

“India is carefully walking this tightrope between the West and the rest, especially when it comes to the U.S., Russia and China,” he said. “Because India does not believe in formal alliances, its approach has been to strengthen its relationship with the U.S., maintain it with Russia, and manage it with China.”

Even as he takes some steps toward China, the United States is also on Modi’s mind.

India and Washington were negotiating a free trade agreement when the Trump administration imposed 25% tariffs for New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil, bringing the combined tariffs to 50%.

Trade talks have since stalled and relations have significantly declined. Modi’s administration has vowed to not to yield to U.S. pressure and signaled it is willing to move closer to China and Russia.

But Donthi said India would still like to keep a window open for Washington.

“If Modi can shake hands with Xi five years after the India-China border clash, it could be far easier for him to shake hands with Trump and get back to strengthening ties, because they are natural allies,” he said.

Klug writes for the Associated Press. AP writers Kim Tong-hyung and Hyung-jin Kim in Seoul, South Korea; Ken Moritsugu in Beijing; Sheikh Saaliq in New Delhi; and Katie Marie Davies in Manchester, England, contributed to this report.

Israel is rewriting the rules of the game in the Middle East, not through diplomacy, peace treaties, or multilateral negotiations, but by deploying advanced military tools such as drones, guided missiles, cyberattacks, and cross-border intelligence operations. This aggressive approach, often justified under the banner of “self-defense,” goes beyond defense in practice and has resulted in a violent reconfiguration of the region’s political geography. While the United States should strategically focus on containing China, competing in technology, and maintaining dominance in the Asia-Pacific, Israeli policies have dragged Washington into a quagmire of costly and unending conflicts in the Middle East. This situation has not only undermined regional stability but has also jeopardized America’s global standing. Furthermore, this fragmented and chaotic Middle East demands greater energy and resources from the U.S., offering an opportunity for other actors to exploit this disorder to expand their influence.

Israel and the Violent Redesign of Middle Eastern Geography

Over the past decade, Israel has significantly altered its approach to perceived security threats. Rather than relying on diplomatic tools or classical deterrence, it has embraced a strategy that can best be described as a violent redesign of the Middle East’s geography. This strategy includes a combination of targeted assassinations, precision bombings, sophisticated cyberattacks, and deep intelligence operations inside neighboring countries. While the stated objective is to neutralize threats from actors like Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, resistance groups in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Palestinian resistance movements, the actual result has gone far beyond defense, raising fundamental questions about the territorial sovereignty of other nations in the region. 

    Israel’s repeated strikes on targets in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, and most recently inside Iran, have not only violated national sovereignty but rendered traditional red lines—defined by international treaties—virtually meaningless. These actions send a clear message to the region: in the new Middle East order, borders are no longer defined through diplomatic agreements but by military power and the flight paths of drones and missiles. What we are witnessing today in the Middle East surpasses traditional conflicts or conventional warfare. Israel is creating a new missile-based order in which the rules of engagement are dictated not by negotiations or international treaties, but by military and technological superiority. In this new order, drones and guided missiles have become tools for rewriting the region’s political and military boundaries. Although this strategy is ostensibly designed to secure Israel, it has in practice contributed to the growing instability across the region.

    The message of this new order to regional actors is unmistakably clear: deterrence is no longer achieved through diplomacy or conventional state armies. In the absence of coordinated responses from regional governments, non-state resistance groups have emerged as the only effective counterforce to these aggressions. Groups like the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza—despite their ideological and political differences—share one common goal: resisting Israel’s military and intelligence dominance. This decentralized, networked resistance has posed an unprecedented challenge to Israel. Unlike traditional wars fought in defined battlefields with clear enemies, these confrontations lack both fixed timelines and geographic clarity. Even Israel’s most advanced defense systems, such as the Iron Dome, face limitations in confronting these diffuse and asymmetric threats.

A Geopolitical Challenge for Washington

The strategic and political alignment between the United States and Israel has elevated this from a regional crisis to a global challenge for Washington. At a time when the U.S. should be allocating its resources to compete with China, secure maritime routes in the Asia-Pacific, protect Taiwan, and drive technological innovation, it is now forced to spend a significant share of its time, resources, and international credibility managing the fallout of Israeli policies. America’s unwavering support for Israel, from advanced arms sales to diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council and intelligence cooperation, has made it an active partner in this new missile order. Every Israeli strike on Iranian, Lebanese, Syrian, or Iraqi territory, directly or indirectly, implicates the United States. Israel’s recent attacks on Iran, Syria, Yemen, and deep inside Iraq have compelled Washington to again bolster its military presence in the region. The more America is drawn into managing Middle Eastern crises, the less it can concentrate on global rivalries, especially with China.

    This dynamic is particularly costly at a time when the U.S. is attempting to rebuild its image among countries of the Global South. Across the Islamic world—from North Africa to Central Asia—Israeli actions are viewed not as defensive, but as acts of aggression and occupation. Since the U.S. stands fully behind Israel, this animosity is directly projected onto Washington. Even America’s traditional allies in the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are now distancing themselves from U.S. favoritism and moving toward engagement with other powers like China and Russia.

    One of the most consequential outcomes of this new missile order is the shift in regional discourse. Whereas peace and negotiation were once regarded as primary means of conflict resolution, power now defines the regional order. Through its actions, Israel has demonstrated that the rules of engagement are no longer based on international agreements or even traditional diplomatic norms but on military and technological capability. This shift has not only militarized the region further but also placed the United States in a difficult position. While Washington tries to present itself as a mediator for peace and a guardian of global stability, its unconditional support for Israel has severely tarnished that image.

    Some analysts in Washington may still argue that Israel is America’s first line of defense in the Middle East. However, that view—rooted in Cold War logic—no longer aligns with the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. If this “defense” leads to expanded conflict zones, intensified regional hostilities, and a stronger axis of resistance, it can no longer be considered a strategic asset. Israel has become a liability that holds American geopolitics hostage. The costs of this situation are multifaceted: military costs to sustain a regional presence; political costs from losing credibility in international institutions; missed opportunities in competing with China; and the growing influence of other powers in the security vacuum of the Middle East.
    The fundamental question for American policymakers is this: is the United States prepared to sacrifice its 21st-century geopolitical future for unconditional loyalty to a single ally? However strategically important Israel may be, it cannot alone justify America’s deviation from its global priorities. It is time for Washington to redefine its support for Israel—not based on historical habit or domestic pressures, but grounded in long-term national interest. This redefinition could include pressuring Israel to return to diplomacy, scale back aggressive actions, and strengthen regional cooperation. Without such a shift, Israel’s new missile order will not only further destabilize the Middle East but also place the United States on a trajectory where the costs far outweigh the benefits.