geopolitical

The Patriarchate of Jerusalem is one of the most ancient thrones of Christianity. Its prestige lies in its uninterrupted custodianship of the Holy Land, yet its political weight has traditionally been limited compared to Constantinople, Alexandria, or Moscow. In recent years, however, Jerusalem has begun to act with growing assertiveness, repositioning itself on the global Orthodox chessboard. This is not an isolated gesture. It is a coherent strategy that combines ecclesiastical maneuvering with diplomatic calculation.

A measured distance from Constantinople

For centuries, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has exercised a primacy of honor that shaped Orthodox order. Its role became visible one more time after the Ukrainian autocephaly of 2018–2019, which triggered Moscow’s rupture with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and fragmented global Orthodoxy. In this fragile landscape, Jerusalem’s refusal to show customary respect to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, such as during Patriarch Theophilos’ visit to Constantinople while the Ecumenical Patriarch was absent, carried a strong symbolic charge.

In the Orthodox world, protocol is substance and responds to centuries-old traditions and rules. Jerusalem has chosen to highlight its autonomy, presenting itself less as a subordinate throne and more as an equal player that answers primarily to its own pastoral realities.

A visible embrace of Moscow

Parallel to this distancing, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem has cultivated visible proximity with Moscow. Encounters between Patriarch Theophilos and Patriarch Kirill in international forums are carefully staged. They showcase Jerusalem as one of the few Orthodox centers willing to stand with Moscow in public, at a time when the Russian Church is cut off from Constantinople after her own decision.

The significance is twofold. First, Jerusalem gains leverage by being seen with Moscow; it becomes indispensable to those who seek to keep channels open with the Russian Church. Second, it signals to Constantinople that Jerusalem has alternatives. In a polarized Orthodox world, Jerusalem positions itself as the third pole.

Exploiting the Orthodox divide

The fracture between Constantinople and Moscow is the defining fact of the present Orthodox landscape. Since the Ukrainian question, communion has been ruptured, and every inter-Orthodox initiative has become contested ground. Jerusalem has seized this moment. By maintaining relations with Moscow and refusing to follow Constantinople’s spiritual leadership, it elevates itself into a power broker.

The “Amman initiative,” launched by Patriarch Theophilos in 2020, was an early signal. Ostensibly a fraternal gathering, it was interpreted as an attempt to create a parallel framework of Orthodox coordination. The same logic continues today since the moment Jerusalem does not merely mediate, it seeks to shape the system in ways that enhance its own centrality.

Political dimensions and secular diplomacy

This ecclesiastical strategy intersects with secular diplomacy. Patriarch Theophilos’ meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Istanbul, without prior coordination with Athens or Constantinople, revealed how Jerusalem leverages regional power to reinforce its own profile. For Ankara, the encounter offered a stage to project international acceptance. For Jerusalem, it was an assertion of autonomy—the ability to engage heads of state directly, without reference to traditional Orthodox hierarchies.

Such moves demonstrate the Patriarchate’s dual logic. Ecclesiastical autonomy and political visibility. Yet they also risk entangling Jerusalem in agendas that exceed its spiritual mandate. When political authorities instrumentalize ecclesiastical actors, the cost is often borne by the broader unity of the Church.

At the heart of Jerusalem’s maneuvers lies a profound redefinition of legitimacy. The Patriarchate claims that its authority flows not from subordination to Constantinople but from its continuous guardianship of the Holy Land, its role as protector of Christian presence in the Middle East, and its ability to secure survival under adverse conditions. This narrative resonates with local communities and appeals to external partners who view Jerusalem less as a hierarchical institution and more as a political-religious actor with unique assets.

By presenting itself as sui generis, Jerusalem attempts to blur the lines of canonical order. It elevates historical custodianship over primacy of honor and pastoral necessity over hierarchical protocol. This reframing is powerful, but it destabilizes the traditional equilibrium of the Orthodox system.

Jerusalem’s strategy carries immediate benefits but long-term risks. Constantinople interprets distancing as defection. Moscow views cooperation as tactical, not loyal. Regional governments value the Patriarchate’s visibility but also use it for their own agendas. In the long run, Jerusalem risks being perceived less as a bridge and more as an opportunistic actor.

The Greek dimension

Greece remains a critical backdrop. Athens has aligned itself with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, supporting Ukrainian autocephaly and standing by the Fanar, defending its historical and canonical rights. However, Jerusalem invokes Greece whenever it needs legitimacy or support, especially to protect its institutions and heritage. This selective approach exposes Athens to the maneuvers of the Patriarchate without giving it substantial influence, as Greece is projected by Jerusalem as a guarantor but not as a decision-maker.

During the Sinai crisis, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem engaged Greece in a manner that combined dependence with instrumentalization. On the surface, Athens was acknowledged as a historical guarantor of the monastery’s continuity and as the institutional shield necessary for its protection. In practice, however, the Patriarchate pursued its course with minimal coordination and little transparency toward the Greek state. This dual approach created a paradox: Greece was projected internationally as an indispensable partner, yet it was excluded from substantive influence over the management of the crisis. By invoking Greek legitimacy when useful while retaining full control of decisions, the Jerusalem Patriarchate reinforced its own position but left Athens diplomatically exposed.

TOKYO — The leaders of China, North Korea and Russia stood shoulder to shoulder Wednesday as high-tech military hardware and thousands of marching soldiers filled the streets of Beijing.

Two days earlier, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping huddled together, smiling broadly and clasping hands at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The gatherings in China this week could be read as a striking, maybe even defiant, message to the United States and its allies. At the very least, they offered yet more evidence of a burgeoning shift away from a U.S.-dominated, Western-led world order, as President Trump withdraws America from many of its historic roles and roils economic relationships with tariffs.

Trump himself indicated he was the leaders’ target in a message on social media to Xi: “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and (North Korean leader) Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against The United States of America.”

But China’s military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, and the earlier economic gathering, is also simply more of the self-interested, diplomatic jockeying that has marked regional power politics for decades.

Each of these leaders, in other words, is out for himself.

Xi needs cheap Russian energy and a stable border with North Korea, his nuclear-armed wildcard neighbor. Putin is hoping to escape Western sanctions and isolation over his war in Ukraine. Kim wants money, legitimacy and to one-up archrival South Korea. Modi is trying to manage his relationship with regional heavyweights Putin and Xi, at a moment when ties with Washington are troubled.

The events highlight China’s regional aspirations

China is beset with serious domestic problems — stark economic and gender inequalities, to name two — and a tense standoff with Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own. But Xi has tried to position China as a leader of countries that feel disadvantaged by the post-World War II order.

“This parade showcases the ascendancy of China propelled by Trump’s inept diplomacy and President Xi’s astute statecraft,” said Jeff Kingston, a professor of Asian studies at Temple University Japan. “The Washington consensus has unraveled, and Xi is rallying support for an alternative.”

Some analysts caution against reading too much into Russia-China-North Korea ties. China remains deeply wary of growing North Korean nuclear power, and has long sought to temper its support — even agreeing at times to international sanctions — to try to influence Pyongyang’s pursuit of weapons.

“Though the Russia-North Korea tie has resumed to a military alliance, China refuses to return to the year of 1950,” when Beijing sent soldiers to support North Korea’s invasion of the South and the USSR provided crucial military aid, said Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Relations of Nanjing University. “It is wrong to believe that China, Russia and North Korea are reinforcing bloc-building.”

Russia looks to China to help ease its isolation

For the Kremlin, Putin’s appearance in Beijing alongside major world leaders is another way to shrug off the isolation imposed by the West on Russia in the wake of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

It has allowed Putin to take to the world stage as a statesman, meeting a host of world leaders, including Modi, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. And Putin’s reception by Xi is a reminder that Russia still has major trading partners, despite Western sanctions that have cut off access to many markets.

At the same time, Russia does not want to anger Trump, who has been more receptive than his predecessor, particularly in hearing out Moscow’s terms for ending its war with Ukraine.

“I want to say that no one has been plotting anything; no one was weaving any conspiracies,” Putin’s foreign affairs adviser, Yuri Ushakov, said about Trump’s social media message. “None of the three leaders had even thought about such a thing.”

Kim Jong Un walks a diplomatic tightrope in Beijing

The North Korean leader’s trip to Beijing will deepen new ties with Russia while also focusing on the shaky relationship with his nation’s most crucial ally, and main economic lifeline, China.

Kim has sent thousands of troops and huge supplies of military equipment to help Russian forces to repel a Ukrainian incursion on their territory.

Without specifically mentioning the Ukraine war, Kim told Putin on Wednesday that “if there’s anything I can do for you and the people of Russia, if there is more that needs to be done, I will consider it as a brotherly obligation, an obligation that we surely need to bear.”

The Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank affiliated with South Korea’s spy agency, said in a report this week that Kim’s trip, his first appearance at a multilateral diplomatic event since taking power in 2011, is meant to strengthen ties with friendly countries ahead of any potential resumption of talks about its nuclear program with Trump. The two leaders’ nuclear diplomacy collapsed in 2019.

“Kim can also claim a diplomatic victory as North Korea has gone from unanimously sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council for its illegal nuclear and missile programs to being embraced by UNSC permanent members Russia and China,” said Leif-Eric Easley, professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.

India’s Modi is playing a nuanced game

Modi is on his first visit to China since relations between the two countries deteriorated after Chinese and Indian soldiers engaged in deadly border clashes in 2020.

But the tentative rapprochement has its limits. Praveen Donthi, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, said the Indian leader did not participate in Beijing’s military parade because the “distrust with China still exists.”

“India is carefully walking this tightrope between the West and the rest, especially when it comes to the U.S., Russia and China,” he said. “Because India does not believe in formal alliances, its approach has been to strengthen its relationship with the U.S., maintain it with Russia, and manage it with China.”

Even as he takes some steps toward China, the United States is also on Modi’s mind.

India and Washington were negotiating a free trade agreement when the Trump administration imposed 25% tariffs for New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil, bringing the combined tariffs to 50%.

Trade talks have since stalled and relations have significantly declined. Modi’s administration has vowed to not to yield to U.S. pressure and signaled it is willing to move closer to China and Russia.

But Donthi said India would still like to keep a window open for Washington.

“If Modi can shake hands with Xi five years after the India-China border clash, it could be far easier for him to shake hands with Trump and get back to strengthening ties, because they are natural allies,” he said.

Klug writes for the Associated Press. AP writers Kim Tong-hyung and Hyung-jin Kim in Seoul, South Korea; Ken Moritsugu in Beijing; Sheikh Saaliq in New Delhi; and Katie Marie Davies in Manchester, England, contributed to this report.

Israel is rewriting the rules of the game in the Middle East, not through diplomacy, peace treaties, or multilateral negotiations, but by deploying advanced military tools such as drones, guided missiles, cyberattacks, and cross-border intelligence operations. This aggressive approach, often justified under the banner of “self-defense,” goes beyond defense in practice and has resulted in a violent reconfiguration of the region’s political geography. While the United States should strategically focus on containing China, competing in technology, and maintaining dominance in the Asia-Pacific, Israeli policies have dragged Washington into a quagmire of costly and unending conflicts in the Middle East. This situation has not only undermined regional stability but has also jeopardized America’s global standing. Furthermore, this fragmented and chaotic Middle East demands greater energy and resources from the U.S., offering an opportunity for other actors to exploit this disorder to expand their influence.

Israel and the Violent Redesign of Middle Eastern Geography

Over the past decade, Israel has significantly altered its approach to perceived security threats. Rather than relying on diplomatic tools or classical deterrence, it has embraced a strategy that can best be described as a violent redesign of the Middle East’s geography. This strategy includes a combination of targeted assassinations, precision bombings, sophisticated cyberattacks, and deep intelligence operations inside neighboring countries. While the stated objective is to neutralize threats from actors like Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, resistance groups in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Palestinian resistance movements, the actual result has gone far beyond defense, raising fundamental questions about the territorial sovereignty of other nations in the region. 

    Israel’s repeated strikes on targets in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, and most recently inside Iran, have not only violated national sovereignty but rendered traditional red lines—defined by international treaties—virtually meaningless. These actions send a clear message to the region: in the new Middle East order, borders are no longer defined through diplomatic agreements but by military power and the flight paths of drones and missiles. What we are witnessing today in the Middle East surpasses traditional conflicts or conventional warfare. Israel is creating a new missile-based order in which the rules of engagement are dictated not by negotiations or international treaties, but by military and technological superiority. In this new order, drones and guided missiles have become tools for rewriting the region’s political and military boundaries. Although this strategy is ostensibly designed to secure Israel, it has in practice contributed to the growing instability across the region.

    The message of this new order to regional actors is unmistakably clear: deterrence is no longer achieved through diplomacy or conventional state armies. In the absence of coordinated responses from regional governments, non-state resistance groups have emerged as the only effective counterforce to these aggressions. Groups like the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza—despite their ideological and political differences—share one common goal: resisting Israel’s military and intelligence dominance. This decentralized, networked resistance has posed an unprecedented challenge to Israel. Unlike traditional wars fought in defined battlefields with clear enemies, these confrontations lack both fixed timelines and geographic clarity. Even Israel’s most advanced defense systems, such as the Iron Dome, face limitations in confronting these diffuse and asymmetric threats.

A Geopolitical Challenge for Washington

The strategic and political alignment between the United States and Israel has elevated this from a regional crisis to a global challenge for Washington. At a time when the U.S. should be allocating its resources to compete with China, secure maritime routes in the Asia-Pacific, protect Taiwan, and drive technological innovation, it is now forced to spend a significant share of its time, resources, and international credibility managing the fallout of Israeli policies. America’s unwavering support for Israel, from advanced arms sales to diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council and intelligence cooperation, has made it an active partner in this new missile order. Every Israeli strike on Iranian, Lebanese, Syrian, or Iraqi territory, directly or indirectly, implicates the United States. Israel’s recent attacks on Iran, Syria, Yemen, and deep inside Iraq have compelled Washington to again bolster its military presence in the region. The more America is drawn into managing Middle Eastern crises, the less it can concentrate on global rivalries, especially with China.

    This dynamic is particularly costly at a time when the U.S. is attempting to rebuild its image among countries of the Global South. Across the Islamic world—from North Africa to Central Asia—Israeli actions are viewed not as defensive, but as acts of aggression and occupation. Since the U.S. stands fully behind Israel, this animosity is directly projected onto Washington. Even America’s traditional allies in the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are now distancing themselves from U.S. favoritism and moving toward engagement with other powers like China and Russia.

    One of the most consequential outcomes of this new missile order is the shift in regional discourse. Whereas peace and negotiation were once regarded as primary means of conflict resolution, power now defines the regional order. Through its actions, Israel has demonstrated that the rules of engagement are no longer based on international agreements or even traditional diplomatic norms but on military and technological capability. This shift has not only militarized the region further but also placed the United States in a difficult position. While Washington tries to present itself as a mediator for peace and a guardian of global stability, its unconditional support for Israel has severely tarnished that image.

    Some analysts in Washington may still argue that Israel is America’s first line of defense in the Middle East. However, that view—rooted in Cold War logic—no longer aligns with the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. If this “defense” leads to expanded conflict zones, intensified regional hostilities, and a stronger axis of resistance, it can no longer be considered a strategic asset. Israel has become a liability that holds American geopolitics hostage. The costs of this situation are multifaceted: military costs to sustain a regional presence; political costs from losing credibility in international institutions; missed opportunities in competing with China; and the growing influence of other powers in the security vacuum of the Middle East.
    The fundamental question for American policymakers is this: is the United States prepared to sacrifice its 21st-century geopolitical future for unconditional loyalty to a single ally? However strategically important Israel may be, it cannot alone justify America’s deviation from its global priorities. It is time for Washington to redefine its support for Israel—not based on historical habit or domestic pressures, but grounded in long-term national interest. This redefinition could include pressuring Israel to return to diplomacy, scale back aggressive actions, and strengthen regional cooperation. Without such a shift, Israel’s new missile order will not only further destabilize the Middle East but also place the United States on a trajectory where the costs far outweigh the benefits.

The Valdai Discussion Club, in partnership with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), will hold the 3rd Russian-African conference titled “Realpolitik in a Divided World: Rethinking Russia-South Africa Ties in a Global and African Context” in late July 2025. The primary goal of the conference is to form and expand communities of African and Russian experts interested in cooperation, the confidential discussion of the most pressing international issues, and the preparation of recommendations for practical foreign policy work.

It is no coincidence that South Africa has been chosen as the venue for the Valdai’s conference. In 2025, South Africa chairs the G20 summit. In preparation for the upcoming late July conference, Steven Gruzd, Head of the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme and the Africa-Russia Project at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), offers an insight into the current Russia-South Africa relations, the United States trade issues with Africa, and Africa’s future prospects in this rapidly changing world. Here are the interview excerpts:

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) will host the 3rd Russian-African conference of the Valdai Discussion Club in South Africa. Within the context of the shifting geopolitics, what would you say, in terms of current Russia-South Africa relations, its status and prospects, as one of the themes for discussion?

Steven Gruzd: SAIIA looks forward to co-hosting the Third Russian-African Conference of the Valdai Discussion Club later in July 2025. We believe that it is important to interact and engage with a variety of actors in a balanced and nuanced way. We do not believe that academic boycotts are constructive.

The event is being held against the backdrop of rapidly shifting global geopolitics and the erosion of the “rules-based international order,” as nationalism is reasserted and conflicts endure in the Great Lakes in East-Central Africa and in the Middle East.

South Africa has maintained good relations with Russia throughout the last decade, although trade remains at a relatively low level and there is much scope to improve it. Diplomatically, relations are warm and constructive, and have been enhanced by regular interaction between the two countries in both BRICS and the G20. South Africa has tried to play a mediating role in Russia’s war with Ukraine, but here it has been one voice among many and does not have much concrete to show for these efforts, as the war rages on. Nevertheless, it remains a key driver of the African Peace Initiative. At the UN, most of South Africa’s votes on the Russia-Ukraine war have been abstentions, in line with its declared non-aligned stance.

To what degree are the few points raised above influencing or reshaping Russian-African relations? Do you also think Russia is rivaling and competing with its own BRICS members, for instance, China and India, across the continent?

SG: Russia-Africa relations have been steadily growing, as the two well-attended Russia-Africa Summits in 2019 and 2023 attest to. As Russia has faced sanctions and been shunned by the West, it has sought new markets and to strengthen ties with the Global South, including in Africa. Russia supported the membership of Egypt and Ethiopia to become full BRICS members at the 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg. The 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, was successful and added Algeria, Nigeria, and Uganda as “partner countries.” This was an important occasion for Russia to show that it was not internationally isolated and could still rely on many countries as friends.

The operations of the Wagner Group, especially in the Sahel, have been gradually subsumed under the Africa Corps of the Russian Ministry of Defence.

Russia has been strengthening bilateral relations with many African countries and is looking to provide peaceful-use nuclear technology to about 20 African countries. It is heavily involved in the building of a nuclear energy plant in Dabaa, Egypt.

Russia’s BRICS partners—China and India, but also the UAE and Saudi Arabia—are active on the African continent, but at this stage it seems that all are able to achieve their strategic objectives in Africa without coming into conflict with one another.

Do you view South Africa’s G20 presidency as a unique factor for fighting neo-colonialism and Western hegemony and for addressing thorny trade issues with the United States?

SG: South Africa’s G20 presidency is important. It remains the only African member state of the G20, although the African Union has joined as a full member since 2023. This is the first time that the G20 is hosted in Africa. As the president, South Africa has the ability to influence the G20’s agenda. It is the fourth developing country in a row to host the G20—after Indonesia (2022), India (2023), and Brazil (2024). It has continued several of the initiatives of these Global South states in its focus. South Africa’s priorities include strengthening disaster resilience and response, ensuring debt sustainability for low-income countries, mobilizing finance for a just energy transition, and harnessing critical minerals for inclusive growth and sustainable development. The aim is for a more equitable, sustainable, and resilient global economy.

So far, the US has not sent its top leaders to preparatory meetings in South Africa, and there is doubt whether US President Donald Trump will attend the G20 Summit in November. This threatened to damage South Africa’s leadership, but the other G20 members have rallied to support South Africa.

I do not think that the G20 is the venue to “fight neo-colonialism, Western hegemony, and trade issues with the United States,” or at least not in using that language. I think BRICS may be a more appropriate platform to air these issues. South Africa will nevertheless push the concerns of the Global South this year.

Can South Africa’s presidency change perceptions of the G20’s role in global politics and its invaluable contributions to Africa’s development?

SG: I believe South Africa is doing well in its G20 stewardship so far and will hopefully host a successful summit, which has become especially challenging in the current geopolitical environment. If Trump does not attend, it will be damaging to the G20, particularly because the US is the host for 2026. South Africa’s relations with the US have deteriorated, including over Trump’s views on the treatment of white farmers, the expulsion of Ambassador Ebrahim Rasool from Washington, and threatened high tariffs, among many other issues.

The summit will hopefully showcase South Africa and change perceptions about failed or failing African states. South Africa remains a key player in Africa, contributing to the continent’s development through peace efforts, trade, and political interactions.

But I also think South Africa should be and has been modest in its expectations of what the G20 can do during any one-year presidency. The G20 remains one of the few forums where Russia and the West still sit around the same table, and it has been challenging to reach consensus.

South-South cooperation is frequently resonating, as is the United States skipping the G20, Trump, and the new world architecture featuring in bilateral and multilateral discussions. Can African leaders change attitudes and face geopolitical development realities? Can Africa remain non-aligned? What then can we expect as future prospects, especially for Africa?

SG: There is no doubt that South-South cooperation is happening and being talked about more and more, and it is set to continue. The global environment is subject to profound geopolitical tensions, not least due to Trump’s “America First” policies, including high trade tariffs. The entire world of development assistance or foreign aid is likewise undergoing far-reaching changes. Trump has destroyed the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), putting at risk or shutting down countless development projects in Africa. European countries—for a long time generous donors to Africa—are diverting billions of euros in development funding to defense and dealing with migration-related issues.

African countries will be under continual pressure to “pick a side” in what some have called the “New Cold War,” and for the most part they will continue to assert their non-aligned stances. How long they can continue on this path is unclear. And many say they are non-aligned but continue to lean closer to either the West or China and Russia in reality. African leaders are having to adjust to a rapidly changing and uncertain world, the contours of which are not entirely clear at this point. African leaders have been forced to deal with a world with less aid. Hopefully this will encourage African states to be more self-reliant, curb corruption, and pursue their national interests.

ASEAN nations have been closely observing the trajectory of US-China relations and have expressed their apprehensions vis-à-vis the uncertainty arising out of Trump tariffs. Leaders of Singapore and Malaysia have been particularly vocal in expressing their apprehensions.

While speaking at the opening of the 46th ASEAN Summit held at Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian PM, Anwar Ibrahim, referred to the imposition of tariffs by US President Donald Trump. Said the Malaysian PM:

‘Indeed, a transition in the geopolitical order is underway, and the global trading system is under further strain with the recent imposition of US unilateral tariffs,’

How ASEAN countries have benefited from the China+1 strategy

Here it would be pertinent to point out that ASEAN nations have also benefitted from the China+1 strategy of Western companies. Through this strategy, Western companies have been keen to reduce their dependence upon China and have been shifting to several ASEAN countries. Companies have moved from China not just to Vietnam but to other ASEAN nations like Indonesia and Malaysia as well.

Impact of China-US thaw on ASEAN

While many would have thought that ASEAN countries would heave a sigh of relief after the China-US agreement signed in Geneva, via which the US reduced tariffs against China from 145 percent to 30 percent. There has been a mixed reaction to the same, given the possibility of companies redrawing their China+1 plans.

Malaysia’s interest in BRICS+

Another important impact of Trump’s policies has been ASEAN countries seeking entry into multilateral organizations. Indonesia entered BRICS as a member in January 2025.

Malaysia, which entered BRICS as a partner country in October 2024, has also applied for full membership. Two other ASEAN countries, Vietnam and Thailand, also entered BRICS.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan, while commenting on the ASEAN nation’s interest in joining BRICS:

‘Malaysia’s desire to join BRICS represents its effort to uphold policies and identity as an independent and neutral country, striking a balance with great powers and opening up new business and investment opportunities,’

Malaysia shares close economic ties with China as well as the US and the EU. Malaysia’s bilateral trade with China in 2024 exceeded $200 billion ($212.04 billion). The ASEAN nation’s trade with the US was estimated at $80.2 billion in 2024.

The Malaysian PM, Anwar Ibrahim, had earlier proposed an ‘Asian Monetary Fund’ as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In recent years, Malaysia has been pushing for “de-dollarization,” or trade in non-dollar currencies, with several countries.

Anwar Ibrahim’s Russia visit and discussion of BRICS+

Apart from several other bilateral issues, the role of Malaysia in BRICS+ was also discussed during the recent meeting between Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the former’s Russia visit. The Malaysian PM thanked Putin for his role in facilitating Malaysia’s entry into BRICS+. The Russian president, on his part, welcomed the entry of Malaysia and other ASEAN nations as partner countries into BRICS+ during Russia’s chairmanship of BRICS+ in 2024.

During the meeting of Australian PM Anthony Albanese and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto during the former’s Indonesia visit, one of the issues that was discussed was Indonesia’s entry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and OECD. The CPTPP—earlier the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—was initially conceived by former US President Barack Obama. During US President Donald Trump’s earlier presidency, the US had pulled out of TPP. While the organization did face a setback after the US exit from the CPTPP — members like Japan and Australia, which are wary of China’s growing clout in the Indo-Pacific, have been playing a key role in giving a push to economic linkages. Two other ASEAN countries—Malaysia and Vietnam—are already members of the CPTPP.

The Indonesian president thanked Australia for its support for Indonesian into the CPTPP.

The Australian PM, while commenting on his support for Indonesia’s entry into CPTPP:

‘I assure you, Mr. President, of Australia’s support for your joining the OECD as well as your accession to the CPTPP.’

The Australian PM also reiterated Indonesia’s strategic importance in the context of the Indo-Pacific.

Indonesia’s important role on the global stage

Indonesia has robust ties with both China and the US and seeks to use multilateral platforms for further enhancing its clout, as several middle powers have done in recent years. Indonesia has sought to present itself as an important voice of the Global South and as an important link between the G7 and G20.

ASEAN-China-GCC

On the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit, the first ASEAN-China-GCC Summit was held for the first time. The Malaysian PM dubbed this as extraordinary. Anwar Ibrahim also said:

‘I am confident that ASEAN, the GCC, and China can draw upon our unique attributes and shape a future that is more connected, more resilient, and more prosperous.’

Conclusion

In conclusion, the interest of countries like Malaysia and Indonesia in entering multilateral organizations is driven by the changing geopolitical situation in ASEAN and beyond. These nations need to be deft and nimble and can not afford to have a zero-sum approach towards the same. The recent ASEAN Summit is a strong illustration of how ASEAN member states are seeking to diversify their relationships by seeking entry into important multilateral blocs. Apart from this, one point that is evident from the recent ASEAN summit was that ASEAN as a grouping is also seeking to strengthen ties with groups like the GCC.

Indonesia, as the world’s largest archipelagic state, holds a highly strategic geographic position, located between two continents and two oceans. This location makes Indonesia a crucial maritime hub in the Indo-Pacific region. In the era of Prabowo Subianto’s administration that began in 2024, Indonesia’s foreign policy has garnered significant attention, given the increasingly complex and multipolar global dynamics. This article aims to analyze how Indonesia, under Prabowo’s leadership, positions itself between its regional commitment to ASEAN and engagement with new global power alignments such as the Indo-Pacific.

1. Indonesia’s Geopolitical Context in the New Global Era
The current global order is undergoing a significant transformation. Tensions between the United States and China are one of the primary drivers of this shift. Amid global geopolitical polarization, the Indo-Pacific region has received heightened attention from various global actors. Indonesia, as a major democracy in Southeast Asia and a G20 member, holds a unique position.

In this context, Indonesia is expected to play a more active role in maintaining regional stability. The Prabowo administration faces significant challenges in upholding the principles of a free and active foreign policy while also safeguarding national interests closely tied to economic, defense, and domestic stability. Therefore, Indonesia’s geopolitical strategy today is shaped not only by bilateral relations but also by its ability to engage in multilateral frameworks and international forums.

2. Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN during the Prabowo Era
ASEAN remains a central pillar of Indonesia’s foreign policy. As a founding and leading member of ASEAN, Indonesia bears both a moral and political responsibility to maintain the cohesion of this regional organization. In the Prabowo era, Indonesia’s approach to ASEAN appears pragmatic yet still committed to regional collective values.

The Prabowo administration has demonstrated its commitment to ASEAN by participating in high-level meetings and voicing regional concerns, such as the peaceful resolution of the Myanmar crisis and the development of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. However, with increasing external pressures from powers like the United States and China influencing ASEAN dynamics, Indonesia must enhance its regional diplomatic capacity to keep ASEAN relevant and unified.

Another challenge within ASEAN is the growing divergence of interests among member states. Prabowo faces the task of maintaining Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN without appearing dominant. A collective diplomatic approach and strengthened intra-ASEAN cooperation, especially in defense and food security, are key to preserving regional solidarity.

3. Emerging Global Powers and the Challenge of Neutrality
With the growing influence of emerging global powers such as China, Russia, and India, as well as the rise of cooperation blocs like BRICS, Indonesia faces a foreign policy dilemma. On one hand, Indonesia maintains strong economic ties with China, particularly in infrastructure and trade. On the other hand, Indonesia also maintains robust relations with Western countries, including the United States and the European Union, especially on issues of democracy, human rights, and regional security.

Prabowo, with his military background and experience in defense, is expected to balance these global relationships effectively. One of Prabowo’s strengths lies in his ability to establish strategic communication with various international actors. Indonesia’s active neutrality must be manifested through flexible diplomacy that is not merely symbolic but also substantive in safeguarding national interests.

Amid competition among major powers, Indonesia can play the role of a mediator or ‘bridge builder’ that facilitates dialogue and cooperation across blocs. This capability would strengthen Indonesia’s position as a respected middle power on the global stage.

4. Indonesia’s Strategic Opportunities
Indonesia has numerous strategic opportunities to seize in the new global era. As a maritime nation, Indonesia possesses vast potential in maritime security, international trade, and global logistics. The Prabowo administration must strengthen maritime infrastructure, enhance naval military capacity, and develop strategic port areas as part of its foreign policy agenda.

Initiatives such as the “Global Maritime Fulcrum” can be revived with a more pragmatic and realistic approach, focusing on improving regional connectivity and engaging in economic forums like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Additionally, Indonesia has the opportunity to expand its economic diplomacy. The Prabowo administration can synergize foreign policy with trade policy to attract foreign investment and expand export markets. In the defense sector, Indonesia can also strengthen cooperation with strategic partners for military technology development and increased domestic production capacity.

Conclusion
The Prabowo Subianto administration faces considerable challenges in navigating an increasingly complex global geopolitical map. Amid ongoing shifts in global power dynamics, Indonesia must maintain a balance between its involvement in emerging global power structures and its commitment to ASEAN. Flexible, strategic, and interest-based diplomacy is essential to the success of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

As the largest democracy in Southeast Asia and an emerging economy, Indonesia holds significant potential to play a more prominent role in the global order. Prabowo must ensure that every foreign policy decision aligns with the nation’s long-term interests, preserves regional stability, and enhances Indonesia’s position as a strategic actor in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

President Donald Trump’s embrace of Syria’s new leadership, driven by Saudi lobbying, marks a major realignment in regional power dynamics. Al Jazeera’s Hashem Ahelbarra was in Riyadh, reporting on this historic shift in Middle East geopolitics.

In an era where technological paradigms shift with geopolitical winds, where design thinking must account for cultural diplomacy, and where engineering solutions intersect with national security concerns, India faces an epistemic crisis in higher education. The disciplinary silos that have long characterized our academic institutions—compartmentalizing knowledge into business, technology, design, and social sciences—have become intellectual anachronisms. This essay argues not merely for incremental curriculum reform but for a fundamental reconceptualization of knowledge production and transmission across disciplines, with particular emphasis on geopolitical literacy as an intellectual cornerstone for students of all academic backgrounds.

The Epistemological Divide: Empirical Evidence

The data regarding interdisciplinary education in India reveals a stark reality that demands urgent intellectual attention:

• Among India’s premier technological institutions, only 4.3% offer substantive coursework in international relations or geopolitical analysis (IIT Council Report, 2024).
• Within design schools, a mere 2.7% incorporate geopolitical considerations into their curriculum despite the growing importance of cultural diplomacy in global aesthetics (Design Education Review, 2023).
• Computer science programs show particular deficiency, with 91% offering no coursework on the geopolitics of technology, despite India’s positioning in the global digital economy (National Association of Software Companies, 2024).
• Engineering students receive, on average, less than 3.5 credit hours of humanities education throughout their entire degree program (All India Council for Technical Education, 2024).

When juxtaposed against global benchmarks—where leading institutions mandate cross-disciplinary exposure—this disciplinary isolation represents not merely a pedagogical oversight but an intellectual impoverishment with profound implications for India’s future.

The segregation of knowledge into discrete disciplines reflects a Cartesian reductionism increasingly at odds with contemporary epistemology. The complex problems facing modern societies—from climate adaptation to artificial intelligence governance—exist in what philosopher Horst Rittel termed the realm of “wicked problems,” resistant to solutions derived from any single knowledge domain.

Consider these intellectual frameworks that demand cross-disciplinary integration:

1. Systems Theory Perspective: Complex adaptive systems that characterize global affairs cannot be understood through linear causal models typical of siloed education. As philosopher Edgar Morin argues, understanding complexity requires transcending disciplinary boundaries.
2. Epistemic Justice: The privileging of certain knowledge forms (technical, financial) over others (geopolitical, cultural) represents what philosopher Miranda Fricker identifies as “hermeneutical injustice”—denying students conceptual resources needed to interpret their reality.
3. Constructivist Learning Theory: Knowledge constructed through interdisciplinary engagement leads to cognitive frameworks better suited to navigating complexity, as educational theorist Jean Piaget established.
4. Critical Realism Philosophy: The stratified nature of reality (physical, biological, social, geopolitical) means that reduction to any single analytical level produces incomplete understanding—a perspective advanced by philosopher Roy Bhaskar.

NEP 2020: Potential and Contradictions

India’s National Education Policy 2020 ostensibly embraces interdisciplinary education, calling for “holistic and multidisciplinary education” as a foundational principle. Yet a critical analysis reveals significant contradictions between rhetoric and implementation mechanisms:

The policy states, “There will be no hard separations between arts and sciences, between curricular and extracurricular activities, or between vocational and academic streams.”

However, structural implementations reveal persistent disciplinary segregation:

• Credit allocation systems still predominantly favor disciplinary depth over breadth.
• Faculty evaluation metrics continue to reward specialization over integration.
• Administrative structures maintain departmental silos instead of problem-focused organization.
• Funding mechanisms disproportionately support traditional disciplinary research.

What emerges is a form of what sociologist Pierre Bourdieu would term “symbolic violence”—the appearance of change while reproducing existing knowledge hierarchies. True interdisciplinary education requires not merely allowing elective courses but fundamentally restructuring the epistemological foundations of higher education.

Geopolitics as Foundational Knowledge

The argument for geopolitical literacy extends beyond traditional international relations frameworks. Geopolitics offers essential intellectual scaffolding for understanding the context in which all disciplines operate:

For Design Students

Design does not occur in a geopolitical vacuum. Consider:

• The emergence of “strategic design” as a field addressing complex social problems requires understanding of geopolitical forces.
• Cultural diplomacy increasingly employs design as soft power—87% of nations have invested in design-forward cultural initiatives (UNESCO Cultural Indicators Report, 2023).
• Supply chain aesthetics are shaped by geopolitical realities—the movement of materials, labor, and production reflects power dynamics that designers must navigate.
• Design futures work must account for geopolitical scenarios—42% of failed design innovations demonstrated ignorance of geopolitical constraints (Design Management Institute, 2024).

For Technology Students

The bifurcation of global technology ecosystems along geopolitical lines demands attention:

• Semiconductor supply chains have become explicitly geopolitical, with India’s positioning requiring strategic understanding—the $10 billion India Semiconductor Mission operates in a geopolitical context students must comprehend.
• Data sovereignty regulations reflect geopolitical tensions—76% of new technology regulations in India’s key export markets derive from geopolitical considerations (MEITY Analysis, 2023).
• AI ethics frameworks diverge along geopolitical lines, with 63% of major differences attributable to geopolitical positioning rather than technical considerations (AI Ethics Global Review, 2024).
• Technology standards-setting processes have become battlegrounds for national influence—participation requires diplomatic as well as technical expertise.

For Other Non-Social Science Fields

• Agriculture students: 71% of agricultural market disruptions in the past decade stemmed from geopolitical events rather than climate or technology factors.
• Medical students: Global health security increasingly operates as a function of geopolitical relationships—pandemic response coordination shows an 84% correlation with geopolitical alliance structures.
• Architecture students: Urban resilience planning now incorporates geopolitical risk assessment in 67% of major global architectural firms.

Reimagining Interdisciplinary Education

Meaningful interdisciplinary education must transcend the tokenism of isolated courses to embrace what philosopher Hannah Arendt termed “praxis”—reflective action informed by theoretical understanding. This requires

Structural Reforms

1. Epistemic Integration: Core courses should integrate knowledge across disciplines rather than merely adding electives—for example, “Geopolitics of Design” rather than “Design” plus “Geopolitics.”
2. Faculty Development: Create joint appointments across departments and invest in faculty capacity to teach across disciplinary boundaries.
3. Assessment Revolution: Move beyond discipline-specific metrics to evaluate students’ ability to synthesize knowledge across domains.
4. Institutional Architecture: Reorganize academic units around problems rather than disciplines—establishing centers for “Technology Governance” rather than separate computer science and political science departments.

Pedagogical Innovations

1. Wicked Problem Studios: Project-based learning focused on complex challenges requiring multiple knowledge domains
2. Simulation-Based Learning: Complex geopolitical simulations where students from different disciplines must collaborate to address scenarios
3. Embedded Fieldwork: Place students in contexts where disciplinary knowledge must be applied within geopolitical complexities.
4. Collaborative Research: Structure research initiatives requiring teams spanning disciplines.

The resistance to interdisciplinary education reflects not merely administrative convenience but deeper intellectual commitments to particular forms of knowledge production. As sociologist Thomas Kuhn demonstrated, paradigm shifts in knowledge structures face resistance from established practitioners. This resistance takes several forms:

1. Epistemic Hierarchy: The implicit ranking of knowledge types that privileges technical over contextual understanding
2. Disciplinary Identity: Faculty self-conception rooted in disciplinary expertise rather than problem-solving capacity
3. Measurement Fetishism: Overreliance on discipline-specific metrics that cannot capture interdisciplinary competence
4. Resource Competition: Zero-sum thinking about curriculum space and faculty resources

Beyond Employability

While much discourse around education reform focuses on employability, the argument for interdisciplinary geopolitical education runs deeper. At stake is what philosopher Martha Nussbaum identifies as the “capability for critical thinking”—the intellectual capacity to comprehend and engage with complex realities.

The segregation of knowledge domains impoverishes not merely professional competence but civic capacity. In a democracy increasingly facing complex, interconnected challenges, citizens require integrated understanding. This represents what political philosopher Michael Sandel terms “civic education”—preparation not merely for economic contribution but for meaningful participation in collective self-governance.

Empirical Evidence of Interdisciplinary Impact

The case for interdisciplinary education is not merely philosophical but empirically grounded:

• Teams comprising members with diverse disciplinary backgrounds demonstrate 43% higher problem-solving efficacy for complex challenges (Harvard Interdisciplinary Research Initiative, 2023).
• Organizations led by individuals with interdisciplinary education show 37% greater adaptive capacity during geopolitical disruptions (McKinsey Global Institute, 2024).
• Patents filed by teams with interdisciplinary composition show 28% higher citation impact and 41% greater commercial application (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2024).
• National innovation systems with higher rates of interdisciplinary collaboration demonstrate 23% faster response to complex crises (OECD Innovation Policy Review, 2023).

Beyond NEP 2020: A Radical Reimagining

While NEP 2020 provides rhetorical support for interdisciplinary education, implementation requires more fundamental reconceptualization. True interdisciplinary education demands:

1. Philosophical Reconciliation: Acknowledging that the fragmentation of knowledge is itself a historical construct rather than an epistemological necessity
2. Structural Transformation: Moving beyond departmental structures to problem-focused organization
3. Pedagogical Revolution: Replacing linear curriculum models with networked knowledge structures
4. Assessment Reconception: Developing evaluation frameworks that value synthesis and integration
5. Faculty Transformation: Recruiting and developing scholars capable of transcending disciplinary boundaries

The Intellectual Imperative

The argument for interdisciplinary geopolitical education transcends instrumental concerns about career preparation. What is at stake is nothing less than our capacity to comprehend and address the defining challenges of our era.

For India’s position in the global knowledge economy—and more fundamentally, for its democratic vitality—the integration of geopolitical understanding across disciplines represents not a curricular luxury but an intellectual necessity. The continued segregation of knowledge domains reflects not merely administrative convenience but an impoverished conception of education itself.

As philosopher John Dewey argued, education must prepare students not merely for the world as it exists but for creating the world that could be. In an era of profound geopolitical transformation, this preparation requires not the reinforcement of intellectual silos but their transcendence. The question is not whether design students, technology students, and others should be “allowed” to learn international relations—it is whether we can afford the intellectual impoverishment that results from preventing them from doing so.