Gamble

President Prabowo Subianto’s government said on February 10 that Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 troops to a proposed multinational Gaza stabilisation force under Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace (BoP). The troop proposal forms part of Jakarta’s broader decision to participate in the BoP framework, an initiative conceived and driven by Trump. Together, these steps signal a significant shift in Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy posture. At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, Jakarta appears to be committing itself to a project shaped around a single, deeply polarising political figure. The decision raises a fundamental question: is Indonesia advancing its national interests and diplomatic credibility, or allowing its foreign policy direction to be shaped by an external agenda?

Geopolitics is not a theatre for symbolic proximity to power but a disciplined calculation of national interest and sovereign credibility. Indonesia’s decision to engage with the BoP appears less like a carefully calibrated strategic choice and more like a reactive impulse that risks weakening the philosophical foundations of its diplomacy, built over decades. Indonesia’s international influence has historically rested on strategic equidistance rather than personal alignment with controversial leaders.

There is a growing sense that Jakarta risks acting out of geopolitical urgency. Yet the initiative Indonesia has chosen to support is led by a figure known for transactional diplomacy and disregard for international consensus. The implications extend well beyond Middle East peace initiatives. What is at stake is Indonesia’s reputation as an independent stabilising actor in global diplomacy.

If Indonesia proceeds with troop deployment under the BoP framework, the risks become even more acute. Gaza is not a conventional peacekeeping theatre. It is one of the most volatile and politically contested conflict environments in the world, where humanitarian imperatives and hard security objectives frequently collide. Deploying thousands of troops into such an arena without an inclusive multilateral mandate risks drawing Indonesia into a conflict environment where neutrality would be difficult to sustain.

The erosion of the ‘Free and Active’ doctrine

The most serious concern is the gradual erosion of Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy doctrine, the intellectual backbone of its diplomacy since the Djuanda Declaration and the Bandung Conference. Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a mediator rather than a follower of personalised diplomatic agendas.

By participating in an institution closely identified with Donald Trump, Jakarta risks legitimising unilateral approaches that often conflict with established international norms. “Free” diplomacy implies independence, and “active” diplomacy implies engagement driven by national priorities rather than external pressure.

Indonesia also risks being reduced to a symbolic endorsement of a United States-centred foreign policy outlook. If Jakarta drifts too far into this orbit, its leverage with other major actors, including China, Russia and ASEAN partners, could weaken. Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia has depended on its credibility as a neutral stabilising force. That credibility may erode if it is seen as participating in great-power security agendas.

Indonesia’s respected record in United Nations peacekeeping has historically rested on internationally recognised neutrality under UN command structures. Participation in a BoP framework, which sits outside established multilateral systems, risks shifting Indonesia from neutral arbiter to participant in a political security architecture shaped beyond globally recognised peacekeeping norms.

More troubling is the precedent this sets. If foreign policy principles become negotiable in exchange for economic or strategic promises, Indonesia risks undermining the coherence of its diplomatic identity. Its constitutional commitment to promoting global peace and social justice depends on preserving policy independence.

The Palestine paradox

Indonesia’s participation in the BoP also creates a visible moral and constitutional tension. The Indonesian constitution explicitly rejects all forms of colonialism and emphasises international justice. Participation in an initiative led by the architect of policies historically skewed in Israel’s favour creates a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.

Trump’s record in the region remains controversial. His decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem altered decades of diplomatic consensus and drew widespread criticism across the Muslim world. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and a consistent supporter of Palestinian statehood, association with this framework carries significant political sensitivity.

If the Board of Peace advances regional normalisation without firm guarantees of Palestinian sovereignty, Indonesia risks being linked to a process widely perceived as externally imposed. This would conflict with domestic public sentiment and weaken Indonesia’s moral leadership in forums such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations.

The troop deployment dimension deepens these concerns. The Gaza conflict landscape extends beyond Israeli and Palestinian actors to include broader regional power networks, including the so-called “Axis of Resistance”. Indonesian forces could be perceived by militant groups as extensions of Western-backed security arrangements, increasing the risk that peacekeeping troops become operational targets.

Strategic and economic trade-offs

Deploying 8,000 personnel overseas is not a marginal decision. For Indonesia, it represents a full brigade likely composed of some of its most capable units. At a time of rising tensions in the North Natuna Sea and intensifying Indo-Pacific competition, diverting elite forces to the Middle East risks diluting focus on core national defence priorities and stretching military readiness across distant theatres.

The financial dimension is equally significant. Sustaining thousands of troops in a devastated and heavily militarised enclave would require extensive logistical infrastructure. Even when operations receive international support, hidden costs often revert to national budgets. At a moment when Indonesia’s domestic economy requires stimulus and its defence sector seeks modernisation, allocating substantial resources to an expeditionary mission with uncertain strategic returns warrants serious parliamentary scrutiny.

Diplomatic engagement must deliver tangible dividends to the public, not impose new burdens on an already stretched state budget. Without clearly defined security or economic benefits, troop deployment risks appear as an expensive geopolitical gamble. Indonesia could find itself dependent on security arrangements shaped by shifting US domestic political priorities, creating commitments that may prove unreliable over time.

The absence of robust public debate surrounding this decision is equally concerning. Large-scale overseas military commitments require democratic oversight. Without transparency, foreign policy risks becoming an elite-driven exercise detached from national consensus.

Reputational risk and strategic myopia

Indonesia’s close association with an initiative so strongly linked to Donald Trump introduces long-term reputational risk. US politics remains deeply polarised. If future administrations distance themselves from Trump-era initiatives, Indonesia could face diplomatic exposure through no necessity of its own.

Foreign policy frameworks built around highly personalised leadership often prove unstable. Indonesia’s diplomatic partnerships have traditionally been grounded in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and ASEAN, which provide durability precisely because they are not tied to individual leaders.

If the Board of Peace becomes politically contested or evolves into a coercive security instrument, Indonesia may struggle to disengage without reputational damage. Participation, therefore, concentrates diplomatic risk rather than diversifying it.

In a rapidly multipolar world, Indonesia does not require shortcuts to global influence. Its credibility has historically been built on independence, balance and principled diplomacy. The central question is whether Indonesia will preserve that tradition or compromise it in pursuit of geopolitical visibility and proximity to power. Indonesia deserves a far more independent role than that.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

SACRAMENTO — David Crane is a gifted investment banker who shared his expertise with government until he was dumped from a state board that invests teacher retirement funds.

Lawmakers bounced him from the board, one of the biggest players on Wall Street, after he repeatedly questioned whether state pension funds could earn enough to keep paying retirement benefits to teachers and other politically powerful employees.

Democratic legislators, who receive millions in campaign donations from teachers unions and other government labor groups, said it wasn’t Crane’s job to meddle in investment forecasts. California’s numbers are in line with those of other states, they note, and its pension investments have beat projections over the last 20 years.

But Crane, a close friend of Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, represents a cadre of market gurus who see investment profits flattening. They worry that state pension systems are heading down the same path as corporate retirement plans that hit trouble after failing to meet rosy earnings projections.

Several government pension plans are already deep in the red. Standard & Poor’s reported in February that 13 states are likely to have less than 75% of the cash needed for promised benefits.

In Crane’s corner are such financial heavyweights as investor Warren Buffett; John C. Bogle, founder of investment giant Vanguard Group Inc.; and William Bernstein, author of “The Four Pillars of Investing.”

The stakes are huge — especially for California, which has more than $350 billion in retirement funds covering teachers and other public employees. Falling short of the nearly 8% return that state money managers project for those funds could create deficits of tens of billions of dollars.

Taxpayers would have to ante up; retirees’ benefits are locked in by contract. Elected officials could be forced to raise taxes, cut services or borrow money. California’s teacher retirement fund already has a projected $20-billion shortfall.

“It is a very real problem,” Bogle said. “The financial consequences are staggering.”

A decade of returns at the rate Buffett has set for retirement plans at his companies — 6.4% — would leave California short more than $90 billion. That is more than the entire state budget for health and human services this year, and several times what the state is spending on its university system.

The Legislature has spurned such restrained forecasts.

Lawmakers in June rejected Crane’s appointment to the teacher retirement board by Schwarzenegger, after he had served almost a year. State Senate leader Don Perata (D-Oakland) said the job of trustees is “only to protect members’ benefits” — not to worry about the long-term effects of the benefits on the state budget.

Crane, who helped build a San Francisco investment firm that has arranged $250 billion in financings, said at his confirmation hearing: “Bless them if they can make it” to 8%. “I would assume a lower number. And I think there is a lot of evidence to back up my view.”

Bogle said he thinks California officials “are dreaming.”

Opponents of Crane, a Democrat, called him the operative of an administration eager to undermine the political power of public employee unions. Schwarzenegger, a Republican, campaigned last year to eliminate pensions for all new government workers and replace them with 401(k)-style accounts. The unions fought him, and he dropped the issue.

Many labor leaders and pension officials characterize as bogus the alerts being raised about the funds’ soundness.

“This is another way that folks who would like to see these benefits go away can undermine the plans,” said Pat Macht, spokeswoman for the California Public Employee Retirement System.

Macht notes that state pension investments have yielded returns averaging 9.2% over the last decade. That includes the 12 months that ended June 30, when profits on state investments exceeded 12%.

Stanford University professor William F. Sharpe, who won a Nobel Prize in economics, helped California develop its forecasts. And the state’s assumptions are in line with the predictions of economist Roger Ibbotson, whose predictions over the last 30 years have been uncannily accurate.

But author Bernstein, who is also a portfolio manager for wealthy individuals, is troubled that those who question the state’s numbers are brushed aside as partisans.

“This is not a right- or left-wing issue,” said Bernstein, a Democrat. “This is an issue of whether or not you can add.”

Bernstein notes that as the outlook for domestic stocks dims, California and other states are moving more of their money into risky places, such as high-tech start-ups, real estate and hedge funds. Returns on such investments are erratic, he said, and could easily fall short of standard stock market index funds over time.

Meanwhile, as corporate America has scaled back retirement benefits in recent years, California has headed in the opposite direction, enhancing benefits through legislation and contract negotiations with public employee unions. The result is the most generous public pensions of any state.

Under former Gov. Gray Davis, who received millions in campaign donations from unions, retirement packages for state workers were sweetened.

Davis signed legislation that based the pensions for many California workers on the highest annual income they earn while government employees; other states use an average of the top three years of earnings.

In addition, the age at which some employees could begin collecting was dropped to 50, and annual retirement payments were increased substantially.

When Schwarzenegger ousted Davis in the 2003 recall election, he made changing the pension system a centerpiece of his agenda, highlighting what he characterized as runaway costs.

Yet the 18 labor contracts negotiated by his administration have left in place most of the benefits the governor said the state can’t afford; the few concessions that union officials traded for pay increases did little to lower future retirement costs.

Long-serving state employees in California “can receive more annual income in retirement than when they worked,” according to a legislative report released last year.

The report said that when Social Security payments are factored in, “It takes just 20 to 30 years of work (that is, less than a full career) to have retirement income … equal to working pay.”

A typical 55-year-old government employee who earns $60,000 and has worked for the state for 20 years is entitled to $25,000 a year, plus Social Security and lifelong healthcare benefits. In most other large states, the pension for the same employee, if eligible at 55, would be less than $15,000 a year — thousands less in some states — plus health benefits.

Defenders say the state is well positioned to cover these costs.

“Reasonable people disagree about what the markets can do long-term,” said John Meier, a managing partner at Strategic Investment Solutions, a San Francisco firm that helps the state make projections.

Forecasts are made through a collaboration of actuaries, economists and investment experts from state government and private firms. They gauge the historical returns of various investment types, the outlook for growth in those places and the assumptions being used by other institutional investors.

“Our organization and a lot of other organizations believe that

Arizona and Virginia project an 8% return. Colorado and Pennsylvania anticipate 8.5%.

That’s all fine, said Zvi Bodie, a professor at Boston University School of Management, but there are no guarantees — and there’s the rub. Some experts are predicting a period of long-term market instability, he notes, and the state can’t afford to be off by a percentage point or two.

“Every study we have of stock market behavior says one thing we know for sure is: We don’t know for sure,” he said. “It is risky. There is no free lunch here.”

Bodie says the pressure for state number-crunchers to project strong earnings indefinitely is intense.

Optimistic projections free lawmakers from having to pull billions of dollars out of other state programs to increase the taxpayer contribution to the pension funds.

Meanwhile, officials at the California State Teachers Retirement System announced at a recent meeting that they are poised to raise investment in such risky areas as high-tech start-ups by roughly 67%.

“If they lose money, someone is going to have to bear that risk,” said Olivia S. Mitchell, executive director of the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School’s Pension Research Council. “Politicians today have promised benefits without explaining what will happen down the road if the system runs short.”

Times staff writer Dan Morain contributed to this report.