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Manchester United caretaker manager: Michael Carrick and Ole Gunnar Solskjaer are front runners

Michael Carrick and Ole Gunnar Solskjaer have emerged as the frontrunners to become Manchester United’s caretaker manager until the end of the season.

The former players, who have both previously managed United, are set for face-to-face talks with the club’s leadership.

It is not out of the question the pair could also work together because Carrick was a significant part of Solskjaer’s coaching team when he replaced Jose Mourinho at Old Trafford in 2018.

Darren Fletcher, United’s current Under-18s coach, who has also been spoken to about the job, will continue as interim manager until a caretaker is appointed. The former midfielder takes charge of his first match on Wednesday, when United visit Burnley (20:15 GMT) in the Premier League.

Ruud van Nistelrooy, the ex-United striker, is also believed to be a contender.

Amorim was sacked on Monday after a turbulent 14 months in charge.

United plan on naming a permanent successor for Amorim in the summer.

One player has told BBC Sport they felt it was possible the role could be shared by more than one of the contenders, or that Fletcher could even stay in the job until the end of the season if the next two matches are positive.

Solskjaer initially took charge in a similar fashion when United sacked Mourinho in 2018, and he subsequently became the full-time manager for three years before he was sacked in November 2021.

Carrick then had a three-game stint as temporary boss after Solskjaer’s dismissal before he left the club in December 2021.

The former England midfielder has been out of work since he was sacked by Championship club Middlesbrough last June after after two-and-a-half years in charge.

Solskjaer was sacked by Turkish club Besiktas in August.

Crystal Palace manager Oliver Glasner and former Brighton boss Roberto de Zerbi – now at Marseille – are understood to be early contenders for the full-time job.

Glasner, who won the FA Cup with the Eagles last season, was asked about the link during his news conference on Tuesday.

He said: “I am Crystal Palace manager and it makes no sense for you to ask me any more questions about it.”

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Understanding Honduras’ Post-Election Crisis

Honduras’ presidential election occurred on November 30, but nearly three weeks later, there is still no clear winner. The elections have faced issues with the vote counting process, allegations of fraud, and U. S. involvement. Conservative candidate Nasry Asfura of the National Party leads center-right candidate Salvador Nasralla of the Liberal Party by about 43,000 […]

The post Understanding Honduras’ Post-Election Crisis appeared first on Modern Diplomacy.

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Turtle Island Liberation Front quartet charged for California NYE bomb plot | News

Pro-Palestine, antigovernment, anti-colonial group accused of targeting immigration agents and companies in ‘massive and horrific terror plot’.

Federal authorities in the United States have arrested four members of an antigoverment left-wing group over an alleged bomb plot targeting immigration agents and companies, among others, in California, officials have said.

Announcing the arrests on Monday, US Attorney General Pam Bondi said the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had disrupted “a massive and horrific terror plot” being prepared by the Turtle Island Liberation Front.

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“The Turtle Island Liberation Front – a far-left, pro-Palestine, anti-government, and anti-capitalist group – was preparing to conduct a series of bombings against multiple targets in California beginning on New Year’s Eve,” Bondi said in a statement.

She was careful to note that among the group’s planned targets were Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents and their vehicles.

Audrey Illeene Carroll, 30; Zachary Aaron Page, 32; Dante Gaffield, 24; and Tina Lai, 41, have been charged with conspiracy and possession of an unregistered destructive device. Officials said additional charges are expected.

Desert meeting

The suspects, who are all from the Los Angeles area, were arrested on Friday in the Mojave Desert as they were working on the plot, First Assistant US Attorney Bill Essayli told a news conference.

Officials showed reporters’ surveillance footage of the suspects in the desert moving a large black object to a table. The group was arrested before they had the opportunity to build a functional bomb, the officials said.

Essayli said Carroll had created a detailed plan to bomb at least five locations. The plot included the targeting of two “Amazon-type” logistics centres operated by US companies in the Los Angeles area on New Year’s Eve.

Backpacks filled with IEDs that were to be detonated simultaneously at midnight were to be left at the locations. The group believed the explosions would be less likely to be noticed due to fireworks detonated during the celebrations.

Two of the suspects had discussed plans for attacks targeting ICE agents and vehicles with pipe bombs early next year, according to the complaint.

Officials said the suspects were an offshoot of a group dubbed the Turtle Island Liberation Front, which says it is for the “liberation of all colonised peoples”.

The group, which has a small social media following, describes itself on Facebook as a political organisation advocating for the “Liberation of occupied Turtle Island and liberation of all colonized peoples across the world”.

The term “Turtle Island” is used by some Indigenous peoples to describe North America in a way that reflects its existence outside the colonial boundaries put in place by the US and Canada. It comes from Indigenous creation stories where the continent was formed on the back of a giant turtle.

Activists affiliated with the group have previously organised campaigns against detentions and deportations by ICE, as well as anti-colonial issues.

Los Angeles Police Chief Jim McDonnell said while federal and local officials disagree on the Trump administration’s immigration raids, they still come together to protect residents.

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Eurovision 2026: Identity, Norms, and Digital Activism in Europe’s Cultural Diplomacy

The Eurovision likes to sell itself as a glittering exercise in European unity, colorful, loud, proudly diverse, and (officially) above politics. Yet anyone who has watched the contest with both eyes open knows that “apolitical” has always been more of a brand promise than a lived reality. In late 2025, that gap widened into a full-blown crisis, as a number of broadcasters reported across outlets that Spain, Ireland, Slovenia, the Netherlands, and Iceland signaled they would not take part in Eurovision 2026 after the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) decided not to exclude Israel amid the ongoing war in Gaza, Palestine.

This episode is not simply “politics invading culture.” It reflects a shift in how legitimacy is demanded and contested in Europe’s cultural diplomacy, particularly when public broadcasters operate under constant online scrutiny. A constructivist lens helps explain why withdrawal can become socially “appropriate” not only because of interests, but because identities, norms, and public expectations set the boundaries of acceptable action.

Eurovision’s political DNA

Eurovision was launched in 1956 as a post-war cultural bridge. Its origin story is important: a shared stage was meant to build familiarity, and familiarity was meant to soften rivalry. That heritage still shapes the contest’s self-image. But Eurovision has long functioned as a stage where politics appears in coded ways through voting patterns, representation debates, and symbolic messaging.

In 2026, the argument is no longer coded. The EBU’s insistence that Eurovision must remain apolitical is being tested by publics who increasingly expect cultural institutions to reflect basic humanitarian values. This tension has been building for years, but the Palestine crisis and the EBU’s decisions have turned it into a legitimacy problem, not merely a public relations headache.

Why withdrawal became “appropriate”

Constructivism in international relations focuses on how identities and norms shape behavior. States and national institutions do not act only from material interests; they also act from what is socially acceptable, what fits their self-image, and the expectations of their audiences.

Three dynamics stand out.

Identity signalling, domestically and externally

For several withdrawing countries, participation carried an identity cost. Public broadcasters—especially those that see themselves as guardians of civic values—operate within national narratives about solidarity, rights, and moral responsibility. Remaining in the contest while public debate framed Israel’s participation as incompatible with humanitarian concerns risked looking like complicity or indifference. Withdrawal, by contrast, functioned as a signal: this is who we are, and this is the line we will not cross.

Importantly, this signalling was not addressed only to external audiences. It was also addressed inward towards domestic publics, artists, and civil society networks. In many European societies, those constituencies are no longer passive consumers of cultural events; they are active participants in the reputational economy surrounding public institutions.

Norm cascades and moral momentum

Once a few broadcasters moved towards withdrawal, the decision quickly gained social momentum. This is what Finnemore and Sikkink described as a “norm cascade”: when a norm shifts from being optional to being expected, and the reputational cost of non-compliance rises. In practical terms, it can start to feel safer to leave than to stay—because staying invites condemnation, while leaving can be framed as moral coherence.

This is also why the dispute escalated so quickly. A single broadcaster withdrawing is a story. Multiple broadcasters withdrawing is a pattern, and patterns trigger moral comparisons. The question changes from “Why did they leave?” to “Why are you still staying?”

The ‘apolitical’ norm is under strain because it looks selective.

The apolitical claim does not collapse simply because people become more emotional. It collapses when it appears inconsistent. Critics repeatedly pointed to Russia’s exclusion in 2022 after the invasion of Ukraine and asked why a different standard was being applied now. The EBU, for its part, has emphasized the contest’s non-political ethos and introduced new rules aimed at insulating Eurovision from government influence.

But in the public sphere, the argument is not purely procedural. It is moral and comparative: if Eurovision can act decisively in one case, why not in another?

Constructivism predicts that institutions struggle when the norms they rely on no longer align with the moral intuitions of their audiences. That is exactly what this crisis reveals.

Digital activism as a legitimacy engine

If this controversy had happened twenty years ago, it would likely have moved more slowly, mediated by newspapers and official statements. Today it unfolds in a real-time digital public sphere where narratives travel quickly across borders and reputational costs escalate fast. Online mobilization—through petitions, artist statements, and hashtag campaigns—helped turn Eurovision into a symbolic battleground, pressuring broadcasters to respond to highly visible moral claims.

Two effects matter most. First, digital dynamics accelerate moral consolidation, which means once “selective neutrality” becomes a dominant frame, hesitation itself is read as a political stance. Second, institutions face continuous visibility. Decisions are no longer a single event but an ongoing justification process, renewed by viral moments and high-profile protest actions linked to Israel’s inclusion.

For cultural diplomacy, this shifts the logic of soft power from image-making towards moral credibility under public scrutiny.

Withdrawal as cultural diplomacy

Withdrawal from Eurovision is, in a strict sense, symbolic. But symbolism is precisely what cultural diplomacy trades in. The act of leaving, particularly when done by public broadcasters, served three strategic functions.

First, moral signalling, which meansbroadcasters and states communicated alignment with humanitarian values and a refusal to normalize perceived injustice.

The second one is reputation management.  In a digital environment, silence can be more costly than action. Withdrawal can reduce domestic backlash and preserve trust in public institutions.

Last, this is ethical positioning as soft power.  The logic of soft power is shifting from colorful branding to ethical coherence. A state may gain credibility not by appearing “fun,” but by appearing consistent with its professed values.

These functions help explain why the controversy is bigger than Eurovision. What is being tested is the idea that cultural platforms can remain insulated from global crises. Many audiences no longer accept that separation.

The EBU’s dilemma: rules, legitimacy, and consistency

The EBU now sits at the center of competing demands. On one side is the institutional need for predictability: rules that keep Eurovision from becoming an arena for state-to-state confrontation. On the other side is the public demand for moral consistency: rules that do not appear selective or politically convenient.

The EBU’s recent approach of avoiding an immediate exclusion decision while adjusting rules—may be defensible from a governance perspective.

Yet governance solutions do not automatically restore legitimacy, because legitimacy is also emotional and relational. It depends on whether audiences believe the institution is acting in good faith and applying standards fairly.

This is where cultural diplomacy meets a hard truth: neutrality is not simply declared; it is earned. And in the digital age, it is re-earned continuously.

What this means for Europe’s cultural diplomacy

Three implications stand out.

First, moral expectation is becoming structural.  European publics increasingly demand moral coherence not only from governments but from cultural institutions as well. Cultural diplomacy is being asked to carry ethical weight.

Second, “European values” are being operationalized. They are no longer abstract slogans. They are used as benchmarks to judge institutions and to accuse them of hypocrisy when they fall short.

Third, public opinion has become a strategic force, not background noise.  Digital mobilization can shape state behavior indirectly by pressuring broadcasters, artists, and institutions that sit at the heart of national identity.

Policy takeaways

If the EBU seeks to protect Eurovision’s legitimacy without turning it into a geopolitical tribunal, three steps would help. First, it should clarify participation principles by defining what “neutrality” means operationally and what thresholds trigger institutional action. Second, it should build a credible consistency mechanism, as audiences will continue comparing cases and demanding transparent reasoning. Third, the EBU should treat the digital sphere as part of governance: proactive engagement and rapid clarification now shape institutional survival as much as formal rule-making.

Conclusion

Eurovision 2026 is not simply a cultural controversy with political noise attached. It is a case study in how identity, norms, and digital activism are reshaping Europe’s cultural diplomacy. Constructivism helps explain why withdrawal became not only possible but, for some, necessary: it aligned state-linked institutions with the moral expectations of their publics.

Eurovision was built to bridge Europe after war. Ironically, its newest crisis shows that unity today is conditional: audiences increasingly expect cultural institutions to be transparent, consistent, and ethically credible, especially when global suffering is impossible to ignore.

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