failed

Paralympic medallist Daphne Schrager insists she has “never cheated” after being given a two-year ban following an “unintentional” positive test for a banned substance.

Schrager, who won a silver medal at Paris 2024, tested positive for the banned substance Ligandrol, which selectively builds muscle and bone mass.

However, the ban has been backdated to start when she was initially suspended on 2 June 2025.

It will end on 1 June 2027, meaning Schrager could still compete at the 2028 Paralympic Games in Los Angeles. However, she has been left out of the England squad for the Commonwealth Games, currently taking place in Glasgow.

The substance was found after the 25-year-old completed an out-of-competition test last year.

UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) said Schrager argued that she had been exposed to environmental contamination with two possible scenarios.

She said she may have been contaminated at a gym that she had attended to receive a massage, or at a shared home address.

However, a UKAD tribunal found that while Schrager had not intentionally used a banned substance, she had not proved that it was an inadvertent environmental contamination.

In a lengthy statement on Instagram, external, Schrager said she had paid for hair and nail analysis as part of her attempts to prove her innocence – but because the exact source of contamination could not be proven, she had been banned.

“In June last year, I received news that turned my world upside down,” she said. “I had tested positive in an anti-doping test for a trace amount of Ligandrol, detected at 0.0006ng, resulting in my suspension from cycling since that time.

“I want to be very clear: I have never cheated, nor have I ever knowingly taken any banned substance. Facing the possibility of a four-year ban unless I could prove that the result was unintentional has been incredibly distressing.”

Schrager said the panel had confirmed she did not intentionally use or ingest Ligandrol, and she had proved that inadvertent environmental contamination from a minute trace of Ligandrol was to blame for the positive test.

She said the trace of Ligandrol would have provided her with no performance advantage. As a result, none of her results have been disqualified.

“In cases like mine, by the time an athlete is informed of their positive test, too much time has passed to identify the exact source of contamination with the certainty that the rules demand,” Schrager added. “That is not a failure of honesty or effort, it is simply too much of a burden to be met in every case.”

“This is one of the most difficult periods of my life. Losing my contract, my team and the structure that had long shaped my purpose and identity left me facing a level of uncertainty I had never known.”

Schrager, who has cerebral palsy, said the impact on her mental health has been “significant and at times overwhelming” – but vowed she would return to action in 2027.

She won Team GB’s first medal of the 2024 Paralympics with silver in the women’s C1-3 3000m individual pursuit.

She went on to win two gold medals at the Para-cycling Road World Cup in May 2025 in the C2 class – before being suspended a month later.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to penetrate Chinese society, particularly after the Arab Spring uprisings, stems from the Chinese Communist Party’s tight security grip, China’s policies of localizing religions, and the Chinese public’s rejection of transnational political ideologies. Despite the Brotherhood’s historical and organizational attempts to build ties with Muslim minorities in China, the rigid nature of the Chinese system and society has formed an impenetrable barrier to any infiltration. The fundamental contradiction between ideologies in China, such as Chinese communism as the ruling doctrine and political Islam as a totalitarian movement from which the Muslim Brotherhood emerged and China’s strict security policies aimed at integrating minorities, has led to the failure of these political ideological currents. Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to gain a foothold in China for several structural and political reasons. The most prominent of these is the strict nature of the Chinese communist system, which prohibits any political or religious activity outside the state’s control. This is compounded by the Sinicization policies that impose absolute loyalty to Chinese culture and the Communist Party. Furthermore, the internationalist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam clashes with Chinese nationalism. Additionally, there is a lack of popular support for such projects among Muslim minorities who follow religious traditions different from those in Arab and Islamic countries and around the world. Despite the existence of an Islamic religious group in China called Yihewani, whose name literally means brotherhood, it is a reformist movement within the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. It originated locally in China in the 20th century, specifically in the 1930s, but it is a completely independent, traditional Hanafi school of thought with no organizational or ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East.

On the other hand, China harbored apprehensions about the political Islam and Muslim Brotherhood model following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. Research centers and decision-making bodies in Beijing closely monitored the outcomes of these uprisings, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt and Tunisia. China viewed the Brotherhood’s ascent to power in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, followed by their subsequent failures and the descent of some into civil war, as evidence that political Islam harbors a project to destabilize nations. This understanding led Beijing to adopt a firm, principled stance rejecting this model of political Islam entirely in order to protect its own stable development model. Consequently, China adopted a policy of strategic alliance with Egypt under President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and other Arab nationalist regimes following the events of the June 30, 2013, revolution in Egypt and the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and its president, Mohamed Morsi. China strengthened its strategic and economic partnerships with current Arab governments, such as those in Egypt and the Gulf states. Here, China rejects interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Similarly, Arab states support the One China policy and its actions in Xinjiang. This high-level diplomatic coordination between China, Egypt, and other Arab states, following the Muslim Brotherhood’s failed rule, has led to a crackdown on any attempts to finance or subtly infiltrate the banned group through economic or educational channels within China.

Here, the Chinese state pursues a policy of institutional rejection of political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Chinese authorities classify any political activity with a religious basis as a direct threat to national security and territorial integrity. This has led to the banning and dismantling of any cells or attempts to establish branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, Muslim ethnic minorities in regions like Xinjiang (East Turkestan) face strict security and surveillance measures that prevent the formation of any opposing Islamic religious movements within China. Beijing also imposes the forced assimilation of Muslim minorities into Chinese culture and criminalizes any transnational organizational manifestations or affiliations.  With an emphasis on the dominance of communist ideology, the ruling Chinese Communist Party rejects any religious or political activity or movements that seek to assert identity above loyalty to the state and the party. This is coupled with strict Chinese security measures to combat foreign infiltration of religions, organizations, movements, and Islamic political currents within China, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Beijing maintains one of the world’s most stringent surveillance systems for monitoring religious and political activities. Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, Chinese security agencies raised their alert levels to ensure that the contagion of color revolutions or ideological movements did not spread within its borders. China considers any foreign organization, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a direct threat to national security and social stability. Therefore, any cells or committees attempting to engage with Chinese Muslims are banned and dismantled.

Political Islam movements have failed to penetrate Chinese society and bring about political or social changes as they have in other countries. This is due to several historical, political, cultural, and social factors imposed by the Chinese state. The most prominent of these factors are the tight security and political grip and the nature of the Chinese communist political system. China imposes a highly centralized system in which the state and the Communist Party completely control the public sphere and institutions. No independent political or ideological organization is permitted outside the umbrella of the Communist Party. Chinese authorities impose strict censorship and implement proactive security policies that prevent any political, religious, or opposition organizations or movements from existing or expanding. Furthermore, the primacy of nationalism over religion in China, where Chinese identity is primarily based on belonging to the nation and the nationality, represented by the culture of the majority Han Chinese population, makes loyalty to the state paramount. This renders the transnational ideologies adopted by political Islam movements unacceptable and severely restricted. Here, the government’s policies toward religions in China become clear. China pursues a policy of Sinicization of religions, meaning that the practice of any religious rituals must conform entirely to Chinese culture and socialism. The Chinese state follows policies of Sinicization on religions, with Chinese authorities implementing strict policies to subordinate religions to Chinese socialist culture and values. This has included systematic campaigns to prevent foreign or Middle Eastern influences on mosque style, clothing, and religious practices. China also adopts strict policies to contain any influence of political Islam and subjects religious bodies to state supervision. Beijing aims to Sinicize religions and requires their integration with the culture of the Han majority and the values ​​of the Communist Party, placing loyalty to the nation above all other affiliations.

This occurs while the Chinese state officially manages and oversees Islamic institutions, such as the Islamic Association of China, thus preventing the emergence of independent religious leaders or institutions that could adopt or disseminate the ideas of political Islam. Herein lies the role of cultural and historical diversity within China. Muslim minorities in China, such as the Hui ethnic group, have absorbed traditional Chinese culture and integrated it with their beliefs over centuries, making their communities well-integrated into the broader social fabric and resilient against external influences. Muslims have been historically integrated into China, and Islam has been part of the Chinese social fabric for over 13 centuries.  Muslim ethnic groups, such as the Hui, have successfully integrated into Chinese society and adapted to local culture. This integration has made political Islam alien to their environment due to China’s strict security measures. The Chinese government deals harshly with any religious or ethnic movements with a political character, particularly in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang region of northwest China, under the banner of combating extremism and terrorism. Security policies and measures have been implemented to restrict any religious activity outside the official control of the Chinese state. The state adopts a dual strategy: containing practices acceptable to official state institutions while categorically rejecting any separatist or political tendencies that Beijing considers a threat to the country’s unity and stability.

Beijing manages religious pluralism through the Islamic Association of China and views any ideologies that deviate from loyalty to the state with extreme caution. The relationship between the state and Islam in China is shaped by several pillars, including national diversity. China has 56 officially recognized ethnic, religious, and national groups, with the Han Chinese constituting the vast majority at approximately 92% of the population. Regarding Muslim ethnic groups, there are 10 Muslim-majority groups in China, such as the Hui and Uyghurs, with the total number of Muslims estimated in the tens of millions. China officially adopts a policy of Sinicization, whereby Chinese authorities lead campaigns to eliminate transnational religious expressions, prohibiting religious institutions from having ties with their counterparts abroad. Religious institutions are required to adhere to the Party’s leadership and integrate their doctrines with Chinese cultural traditions. The Chinese government pursues a policy of Sinicization of Islam. The Chinese state adopts a firm strategy based on integrating Islam and its culture into the Chinese national identity (in accordance with socialism with Chinese characteristics). As we mentioned, Muslim affairs are officially managed through the Islamic Association of China, which is under the control of the ruling Communist Party. This closure of the religious sphere has thwarted the Islamic internationalism ideology promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Middle Eastern countries, as China confines religious teaching and practice to purely local frameworks, preventing the introduction of the writings of Sayed Qutb or Hassan Al-Banna into Chinese territory.

Therefore, we conclude that attempts by political Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to infiltrate China or penetrate its Muslim communities have failed. Here we observe the cultural and ethnic differences between the Muslim minorities in China and the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Egypt and the Middle East. The main Muslim population in China is divided into two primary groups that fail to resonate with the Brotherhood’s ideology: the Hui ethnic group, a Chinese Muslim minority. The Hui are Chinese-speaking Muslims fully integrated culturally and socially into the fabric of the Chinese state. Their primary loyalty is to China, and therefore, the Arab political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood finds no echo among them. The second group is the Uyghur ethnic group. Uyghurs reside in the Xinjiang region (East Turkestan) in northwest China. Despite the presence of nationalist and religious tendencies, Beijing has imposed extremely strict security measures (including re-education camps and biometric surveillance, which are security systems within China that use an individual’s biological characteristics, such as fingerprints, facial features, and iris scans, to verify their identity), effectively isolating the region from any activism emanating from the Middle East, particularly from the Muslim Brotherhood.

The inability of a munitions plant in Mesquite, Texas, to build a key part set back the U.S. Army’s plans for ramping up production of 155mm shells to 100,000 rounds per month, according to a scathing new report by the War Department’s Office of Inspector General (DOWIG). Despite receiving close to $500 million from the U.S. Army funded through supplemental spending bills from Fiscal Years 2022 and 2023, General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GD-OTS), failed to make a single subcomponent needed to produce the badly needed shells as of last March.

“Without the 30,000 additional projectile metal parts anticipated from the Mesquite facility, the Army will be unable to reach its monthly capability goal of 100,000 155-mm artillery rounds,” the report concluded. “As of March 2026, the CPE A&E [Capability Program Executive Ammunition & Energetics] officials have not developed a plan to produce the additional rounds that are supposed to be produced at the Mesquite facility.”

At present, the Army is only producing 36,000 rounds per month, inspectors revealed.

Through modernization efforts and two new facilities, the Army expects to exceed the 100,000-round-per-month goal significantly by the end of next year. The initial goal was established by Congress in the wake of the U.S. providing millions of rounds to Ukraine.

Still, the report highlights the challenges U.S. arms makers face in trying to meet tighter timelines to produce more weapons. This all comes as the U.S. is increasingly concerned about stockpiles of a wide array of munitions after heavy usage in past and current conflicts and donations to partners like Ukraine, as well as foreign military sales. These are issues that we raised long before and during the current war with Iran, but they have become major headlines in the aftermath of the initial stages of that conflict.

The plant at the center of this new report is the Universal Artillery Projectile Line owned and operated by General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems. It opened in May 2024 to great fanfare and high hopes.

According to the IG report, more than three million 155mm shells were donated to Ukraine, more than 111,000 rounds were used over the past four years on training and testing, and nearly 218,000 rounds were sold to foreign customers. Combined, U.S. stocks were depleted by more than 3.6 million rounds since the start of the war in Ukraine.

The Mesquite plant was opened to help replenish the supply. However, according to DOWIG, it failed to live up to expectations.

“The DoW increased its capability and capacity to produce 155-mm artillery ammunition but did not reach the 2025 National Defense Industrialization Strategy Implementation Plan goal of 100,000 rounds per month by October 2025,” the DOWIG report pointed out.

As of March 2026, “the Army had increased its monthly production from 14,000 to 36,000 rounds because of expansion and modernization efforts at both the projectile metal parts and the load, assemble, and pack facilities,” the IG report noted. “However, at a contractor-owned, contractor-operated facility in Mesquite, Texas, the contractor has been unable to produce any projectile metal parts that meet contract specifications.”

According to an Army news release about the plant opening, it was built to “feature high-volume production capabilities for large-caliber metal parts and is equipped with long-stroke, high-tonnage forging capabilities.”

“The facility’s 155mm metal parts production lines also meet Army modernization goals by incorporating high levels of automation, modern manufacturing practices, and digital-data-capture ability. It will offer the flexibility to produce a variety of metal parts ranging from 60mm to 155mm, with minimal changeover requirements,” the Army added.

The Army “planned for the Mesquite Texas facility to produce 30,000 rounds per month,” the report added. “With only three facilities producing the required projectile metal parts, the DoW will reach only 71,000 rounds per month, or 71 percent of its monthly production capacity goal for 155-mm artillery rounds.”

We’ve reached out to General Dynamics and the Army for comment and will update this story should the company respond.

The main issue inspectors found was that the plant adapted equipment used to make parts for M107 155mm shells to produce parts for M795 155‑mm shells. The latter is an upgraded version of the munition that is slightly heavier and longer, and has an extended range.

As a result of this adaptation, several factors came into play, according to DOWIG. Army officials knew that the concept of trying to produce the more advanced 155mm shells using equipment not designed for that was risky. However, officials felt that would pay off because that machinery was already available. In addition, the report stated that the existing Scranton plant’s past work with GD-OTS on ammunition production was a factor in deciding to take a chance on what turned out to be a flawed assumption.

The report states, in part:

• According to the Army’s CPE A&E, “ACC issued the contract and CPE A&E accepted the risk associated with the contractor’s plan to purchase and adapt M107 metal part production equipment to produce a newer variant of the 155-mm projectile metal parts at different specifications.”
• “According to CPE A&E officials, the Mesquite facility was a high-risk, high-reward opportunity, and CPE A&E is realizing some of that risk now because the facility has been unable to produce acceptable rounds.”
• “CPE A&E accepted the contractor’s proposal to acquire and adapt unique production equipment and an unproven production process because equipment was already available. According to the CPE A&E official, obtaining and adapting the available production line equipment was expected to be faster than obtaining new M795 production line equipment.”

• “The contractor has been working since the original contract task order was issued in November 2022 to produce the contracted 155-mm projectile metal parts. However, according to CPE A&E officials, acquiring the equipment and adapting it to produce M795 155-mm projectile metal parts resulted in significant challenges.” The report redacted specific examples.
• “In addition, according to CPE A&E officials, CPE A&E recommended the contractor for the Mesquite facility because the contractor has 20 years of experience producing 155-mm projectile metal parts at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant.”
• “Scranton Army Ammunition Plant officials stated that despite the contractor’s years of experience, the Scranton facility encountered separate ongoing problems with the contractor in terms of responsiveness, equipment maintenance, and timeliness.”
• “Those officials expressed concern to the evaluation team that ACC did not open the contract for the Mesquite facility to competition from other contractors.”
• “In addition, according to ACC officials, the contract for the Mesquite facility was issued as a task order under the property management contract for the Scranton Ammunition facility and not as a separate contract.”

The Army did not dispute that the Mesquite factory was not producing the needed parts.

“The Capability Program Executive Ammunition & Energetics will correct issues identified in this report, and develop and implement a corrective action plan,” CPE A&E responded.

The “United States Army concurs with the report as written,” the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology stated.

Army Contracting Command (ACC), however, took issue with how the relationship between the Scranton and Mesquite plants was characterized. In its response, ACC stated that no one reached out to them to question GD-OTS’s plan and that it had received sign off from higher authorities to execute the contract without Congressional approval. Moreover, ACC added that it did not need to open up competition for the new plant.

The ACC response says:

• “It is unclear what parties or organization are being referred to by ‘SCAAP officials,’ so it cannot confirm the accuracy of this information, however, ACC-RI would like to clarify that at no point did anyone question or raise concerns to ACC in terms of the acquisition strategy to award this effort to the contractor under the existing Scranton facility effort. Further, ACC-RI did document the contract file with a Determination of Contractor Responsibility in accordance with FAR 9.104 prior to award of these task orders.”
• “ACC-RI received concurrence and approval on the acquisition strategy to execute these efforts on a sole source basis under W52P1J-19-D-0075 from the requiring activity, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army-Procurement, and the Office of General Counsel, with notification provided to Congress prior to execution.”
• “ACC-RI would like to clarify that while some might refer to W52P1J-19-D-0075 as the ‘Property Management contract for the Scranton Ammunition facility,’ the scope of the contract states that it covers operation, maintenance, and modernization; includes Production Based Support projects; and doesn’t require active operation at Scranton.” 
• “The contract states that ‘The Property Management of SCAAP can be accomplished either through active operation of the Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated facility or layaway maintenance’ and allows the contractor to operate the contract at a privately-owned facility. As such, ACC-RI already determined it in scope to execute the Universal Artillery Projectile Line requirement as separate task orders under W52P1J-19-D-0075 and documented such in-scope determinations in memorandums within the contract file.”

Problems with the plant were emerging even before the DOWIG released its report.

In February, Brent Ingraham, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, complained to lawmakers about the inability of the plant to produce needed parts.

“First, let me start by saying I’m not happy with where we are at Mesquite either, right?” he testified. “So I’m in the same boat you are.” 

The Army was considering scrapping GD-OTS’s contract to manage the production lines in Mesquite, but Ingraham said the service ultimately did not go through with it, according to Breaking Defense. The Army is still in negotiations with the company, he said at the time.

“I anticipate you will see an investment from the company themselves, from the industry partner themselves, to ensure they can continue to build out that facility that would make rounds that would primarily be supported by the [foreign military sales],” Ingraham said. “But we are currently in negotiation [on] what that looks like, both from a line perspective, a quantity perspective, and hopefully we’ll have that wrapped up soon.”

A month ago, General Dynamics announced it would “invest $200 million of its own money and unwind a partnership with Turkish defense contractor Repkon in a bid to finally start producing 155mm artillery shells at a Texas plant that’s been beset by delays,” Bloomberg News reported, citing people familiar with the matter.

The factory “has joined a long list of US defense programs that have failed to meet the lofty goals set out for them,” the publication added.

Munitions manufacturing equipment provided by Repkon “had failed to meet required standards and will be replaced by hardware and management from Deterrence Defense, a privately-held company based in Fremont, Calif.,” Bloomberg added. “General Dynamics and the US Army ‘have reached an agreement on a path forward, which includes additional investment,’ the company said in a statement without disclosing the amount.”

As we noted earlier in this piece, despite the problems at the Mesquite plant, the Army projects that it will turn things around by next year.

“According to Army officials, the Army did not reach its goal for increased capability and capacity to load, assemble, and pack 155-mm artillery ammunition,” investigators found. “However, through the modernization of the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant and the addition of two new facilities in Kansas and Arkansas, the Army is on track to increase its capability and capacity to load, assemble, and pack 140,000 155-mm artillery rounds per month by December 2027. This exceeds the NDIS Implementation Plan goal by 40,000 rounds per month.”

Still, that’s more than a year away and, as we noted earlier in this story, about 14 months later than the Army was expecting to receive these shells. Whether it can meet these revised goals remains to be seen.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Istanbul, Turkiye – At around 19:30 GMT on July 15, 2016, a faction of the Turkish military launched a coordinated attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s democratically elected government.

But within hours, the attempted takeover involving tanks and fighter jets had been quashed. Thousands of people poured onto the streets of major cities, joining loyalist members of the army and the police, and much of the chain of command, in defeating the putschists.

The failed coup attempt 10 years ago was not only the bloodiest in Turkiye’s modern history – some 250 were killed and more than 2,200 wounded – but also a watershed moment that fundamentally changed relations between civil and military authorities in the country.

“The failure of July 15 had three pillars,” said retired Colonel Unal Atabay.

“The resistance of the people, the officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers inside the Turkish Armed Forces who resisted the coup, and the institutional reflex of the armed forces themselves.”

Military intervention cast a long shadow over Turkish politics for decades.

The armed forces overthrew governments in 1960 and 1980; intervened through a memorandum in 1971; and forced another elected government from office in what became known as the “post-modern coup” of 1997.

Although civilian rule returned after each intervention, the military remained one of Turkiye’s most influential institutions, seeing itself as the guardian of the republic’s founding principles.

Yet that was not how the republic’s founders had envisioned civil-military relations. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu, both commanders during the War of Independence of the early 1920s, entered politics only after leaving military service.

“If the military had remained involved in politics, it would most likely have been exploited by various groups in the uncertain and weak conditions of those early years of the republic. They made the most accurate diagnosis and said that the military should stay out of politics.

Political scientist Ali Carkoglu said separation between military command and civilian politics was regarded as one of the republic’s founding principles, calling it “the most accurate diagnosis”.

Over time, however, the armed forces increasingly came to see themselves as guardians of the state, repeatedly invoking that role to justify intervention in politics.

But 10 years since the latest attempt, few experts believe Turkiye faces another conventional coup.

“You never say never,” said Howard Eissenstat, a Turkiye specialist at St Lawrence University in New York. “But to bet on a military coup in Turkiye is to lose money.”

While the military’s political role appears to have receded, the broader consequences of the post-coup transformation remain the subject of debate.

Reducing the military’s influence over politics had already become a central objective of the governing Justice and Development Party, or AK Party, after it came to power in 2002.

Following years of tension with the military establishment, the government steadily expanded civilian oversight – and the failed coup accelerated that process dramatically.

Ankara accused the network of United States-based Muslim scholar Fethullah Gulen, designated by the Turkish government as the Fethullah Terrorist Organisation (FETO), of orchestrating the coup attempt. Tens of thousands of soldiers, judges, police officers, teachers and civil servants were dismissed or arrested. Military academies were replaced by the National Defence University, command structures were overhauled, and civilian oversight of the armed forces expanded.

Atabay said these changes have fundamentally reshaped the relationship between the military, the state and society.

He added the military has strengthened its internal oversight after the coup to prevent another organised infiltration, noting that both the armed forces and wider society are now more alert to attempts to penetrate state institutions.

“External centres of power may always make such attempts,” he said. “The important thing is to detect them early, expose them and build a system that prevents them from infiltrating the state.”

For Carkoglu, however, the military cannot be examined in isolation from the broader health of Turkiye’s democratic institutions.

He said bringing the armed forces firmly under civilian authority was essential. But civilian supremacy alone, he argued, does not necessarily amount to democratic consolidation.

“It is certainly a success that civilian authority has established greater control over the military,” he said. “But if that comes at the expense of democracy, then it is, at the very least, an unfortunate outcome for Turkish politics.”

Carkoglu noted that institutions derive legitimacy not simply from who controls them, but from whether citizens trust them.

“The healthy development of trust in institutions requires competitive politics and the possibility of free expression,” he said. “Otherwise, institutions themselves begin to lose credibility.”

That debate has become increasingly prominent in recent years.

The arrests of several opposition mayors – including Istanbul mayor and presidential candidate for the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Ekrem Imamoglu, together with investigations into other opposition politicians, have fuelled criticism from political parties and rights groups, who argue judicial processes are increasingly being used against rivals.

The government rejects those accusations, saying the investigations are conducted independently and are based solely on evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

The debate has unfolded during a period of remarkable political continuity. Since coming to power in 2002, the AK Party has won every parliamentary election, most recently in 2023, when the governing People’s Alliance retained its parliamentary majority.

Rights groups, meanwhile, focus on a different legacy of the coup.

Human Rights Watch says emergency powers introduced after the 2016 coup attempt gradually evolved into broader restrictions on civil liberties. It argues the crackdown extended well beyond those responsible for the attempted overthrow, leaving many dismissed public employees unable to rebuild their professional lives even after acquittal.

The government says the measures were necessary to dismantle clandestine networks inside the state and prevent Turkiye from facing a similar threat again.

Ten years on, that effort continues. On Monday, two days before the anniversary, Turkish authorities launched coordinated operations across all 81 provinces targeting nearly 1,000 suspects over alleged links to FETO.

For the government, it was another reminder that the events of July 2016 remain an active national security issue rather than a closed chapter in the country’s history.

The order comes three years after a jury found out Trump has sexually abused and defamed the writer.

A federal judge has ruled that writer E Jean Carroll can collect the more than $5.8m that US President Donald Trump was ordered to pay after a jury found he sexually abused and defamed her, clearing the way for the money to be released after the US Supreme Court declined to hear his appeal.

Judge Lewis A Kaplan ruled on Wednesday that Carroll can be paid the original $5m award granted to her by the jury, along with interest that has accrued since the verdict in 2023. Carroll’s lawyers had asked for the funds to be released after the Supreme Court refused on June 29 to hear Trump’s appeal.

“This is the end of the line,” Carroll’s lawyer Roberta Kaplan wrote in a court filing, adding, “It is time for him to pay Carroll.”

Less than an hour after the judge issued the order, Trump appealed it.

“The American People stand with President Trump as they demand an immediate end to all of the Witch Hunts, including the Democrat-funded travesty of the Carroll Hoaxes,” a spokesperson for Trump’s lawyers said in a statement.

Carroll first accused Trump in 2019, writing in a memoir that he had sexually assaulted her in a dressing room at the Bergdorf Goodman department store in Manhattan in 1996. Trump denied the allegation, saying he had never met Carroll, accusing her of lying to sell books and for political reasons, and calling the claim a “hoax.”

Carroll sued him for defamation over those comments later that year, accusing him of damaging her reputation by suggesting she had lied for personal gain. She filed a second lawsuit in 2022, accusing Trump of battery/sexual abuse and defamation over another denial he posted on Truth Social in 2022, again calling the allegation a hoax.

In 2023, a jury found Trump liable for sexually abusing Carroll and for defaming her through his 2022 statements. It did not determine that Trump was liable for rape.

A second jury awarded her $83.3m in 2024 for the defamatory statements Trump made in 2019 when he was president, after she first went public with the allegation.

Trump has continued to fight both verdicts.

After the Supreme Court declined to hear his appeal, He called the lawsuit “a Fake Case” and pledged to continue fighting what he described as a “Weaponisation and Lawfare Case.”

On Wednesday, Trump’s lawyers filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision not to hear the appeal. They argued that Trump would suffer “irreparable harm” if the money is paid out, because Carroll has said she intends to donate it, which would make it difficult to recover the funds if the verdict is later overturned.

Trump is also still appealing the $83.3m judgment, arguing his 2019 comments were made while he was president and are therefore protected by presidential immunity. The Department of Justice has also launched a criminal investigation into Carroll over whether she committed perjury during her testimony.

FIRST REVIEW CONFESSIONS II

★★★★★

AS one of the most talked-about, celebrated and frequently derided pop stars of all time, returning with her first album in seven years is a high-stakes move for Madonna.

The Queen of Pop has never left it so long between albums in her 43-year career. And she has taken an even bigger risk by recording a ­follow-up to her much-lauded 2005 dance-pop opus, Confessions On A Dancefloor.

But rather than playing it safe, ­Confessions II sees her doing just that — confessing.

She addresses everything from how she failed her eldest daughter Lourdes to her regrets over her relationship with her late brother, Christopher Ciccone.

And also, surprisingly, how her first husband, Sean Penn, 65, made her feel during their short-lived marriage.

The most venom-tongued track is titled Bizarre, in which she squarely attacks the Hollywood A-lister, who she was married to from 1985 to 1989.

She references the 1968 Shelby GT500 convertible she gave him as a wedding gift and his conviction for reckless driving in 1987.

And she also lays into how Penn was “threatened” by her and claims he resented her while they were together.

Madge sings: “Love is the strangest thing. Just when you think you’ve finally let go, it comes back to you.

“Movie star, deep blue eyes. In Hollywood, we’re a perfect prize.

“He drove way too fast, Shelby Cobra wasn’t meant to last.”

Earlier the lyrics had turned to anger, as she sings: “Roll out the carpet for us, but you don’t share it.

“All ’cause you’re threatened by me, you won’t admit it.

“The little things that you do don’t make me want you. Who knew love could be so bizarre?”

And in a later verse, she adds: “I know I left you behind and you resent me.

“A thousand reasons why you could never have me.

“The thought of being with you is so indecent. I guess you’ll never know my dirty little secret.”

Penn isn’t the only subject of her scorn, with Betrayal appearing to be about her stepmum Joan, who died in 2024 while the album was being made. Madonna did not attend her funeral.

The singer was five years old when she lost her mum — who she was named after — to breast cancer. Three years later, in 1966, her dad Silvio married Joan, who worked briefly for the family as a housekeeper.

In the opening verse of Betrayal, Mad­onna sings: “This is a story of betrayal. You couldn’t see your fall from grace.

“So take the hammer, hit the nail. You’ll never take my mother’s place.”

And later in the track, she adds: “You betrayed me, you enslaved me.”

But Madonna, 67, shows her softer side on The Test, which sees her and Lourdes, 29 — the eldest of her six kids — open up about their at-times difficult relationship.

On how her daughter was thrust into the limelight because of her own fame, Madonna sings: “Little star, I tried to put you on a pedestal, you didn’t ask for all the flashing lights.

“I didn’t think of how we could disturb, or how it hurt. I wish I knew the pain I caused.”

She continues: “Sometimes I think you wish I’d go away, but the shadow stays, and it’s OK to be yourself.”

Madge also appears to touch on her 2023 brush with death, when she was found unresponsive at her New York apartment and placed into a coma after suffering from an infection that led to sepsis.

Lourdes, 29, who Madonna had with fitness trainer Carlos Leon, was among those that rallied around her in hospital.

Madonna sings: “You made me whole when I was broken, too. I hope and pray I can do the same for you.”

Paying tribute to her mum, Lourdes sings: “You are my reason to be, what I want or look like, what I wear, all the clothes on my back, and what I attract.

“I trace the line of what you have sewn. Keep my own design. Make it a landscape. Make it alive.”

Elsewhere on the album Madonna makes peace with Christopher, who she was accused of “dropping” as her creative director in the early-2000s, and who later wrote a book titled Life With My Sister Madonna.

The once-close pair never fully repaired their relationship and he died of cancer at the age of 63, in October 2024 although she says he now visits her in her dreams.

On the song Fragile, she sings: “We shared a name, a home. We shared a fragile bond, now you’re gone.

“We laughed, we cried, we held each other’s hands. We had each other’s eyes and they belonged

“This is the time I hate the most, the words inside my heart

“I know you’re fragile ’cause you’ve been hurt, been let down.”

At the end of the track, she adds: “Late last night I was fast asleep, you came to me in a dream.

“You said don’t forget about me, don’t forget to be happy.

“So I hope you found a higher ground.”

The 16-track album clocks in at almost 64 minutes, and is a metaphor for a night out, starting with the heavy, pulsating beats of a club.

Then the final five songs represent the evening winding down, with Madonna spilling out her deepest feelings with the bravery and vulnerability that comes from a night of loud, messy partying.

When she reaches the last track L.E.S. Girl — about her life pre-fame on the Lower East Side of New York — you can hear traffic beeping, signalling she is finally on her way home as the morning rush hour starts.

It’s a neat arc for the ambitious album, which she once again made with English producer and songwriter Stuart Price, who she teamed up with on the first Confessions album.

But this record is much darker, heavier and grown-up.

And as well as being symbolic of a single night out, Madonna uses it to represent key parts of her life and the moments that have made her.

The most brilliantly bombastic highlight comes in Danceteria — named after the New York nightclub where she found her friends in the industry and where DJs played her music for the first time.

It’s a feel-good number with a Vogue-style rap and namechecks for everyone from her pal Debi Mazar to artist Jean-Michel Basquiat and even The B-52s.

Another highlight comes with Love Sensation, which appears to be a tribute to her boyfriend, Akeem Morris, 30.

She started dating the former football player in 2024, two years after ending a three-year romance with dancer Ahlamalik Williams, 31, and they now live together in London.

Madonna sings: “When I feel alone I always want to bring you near ’cause you bring a smile right here. You chase away my darkest hours.”

And in the chorus she continues: “Baby, come and get with me, there’s something that I gotta do.

“Baby, when you’re here with me, there’s nothing that we cannot do.”

So far in her career Madonna has sold 450million albums, and counting.

And with this project, she proves there is still plenty of passion, ambition and talent.

Undoubtedly it is her most cohesive and accomplished album since the original Confessions, 21 years ago.

And long may the Queen of Pop ­continue to reign.

LOVE, BETRAYAL AND ECSTASY ON SWEET 16

I Feel So Free: The opening track, released in April, is a throbbing song with breathy vocals and a sample of the 1989 Lil Louis acid house track French Kiss, complete with orgasm. It’s a statement of what’s to come as she says: “On the dancefloor, I feel so free.”

Good For The Soul: Heavy-sounding verses make way for a buoyant and optimistic pop chorus, all about how important letting your hair down is. It was written on her first session for the record.

One Step Away: Madonna dives headfirst into house music on this pulsating track about the release she feels in a nightclub. Over the beat, she utters: “The dance floor is not just a place, it’s a threshold. A ritualistic space where movement replaces language.”

Bring Your Love: The credibly cool lead single features Sabrina Carpenter, uniting two generations of pop stars who are resolute in their determination not to be swayed by naysayers. In the chorus they say: “Bring your love ’cause you cannot shake me. Bring your love ’cause you’ll never break me.”

Danceteria: “Everyone here is a work of art,” Madonna sings on this wonderfully poppy single, inspired by the New York nightclub she went to as a youngster.

Read My Lips: Spanish guitar and a guest appearance from Colombian singer Feid give this a different feel, though there’s a Latin trap beat to keep the party going. It’s clear Madge isn’t happy on it, though, singing: “You cut me with your lies, ’cause you hurt me with your kiss.”

Everything: It opens with strings reminiscent of her 1992 track Deeper And Deeper, but evolves to have regular house music breakdowns fit for a packed Ibiza dancefloor. And she’s worked up, spitting: “It’s not OK, I don’t f*** with it.”

Love Sensation: Pop makes a return on this heart-warming crowd-pleaser. “There’s nothing that we cannot do,” she repeats as the track builds to euphoric choruses. This is destined to be a future single.

Love Without Words: An ode to partying, starts with the sound of smoke being pumped on to a dance floor. “Call it trance, call it house, call it love without words,” she sings.

Bizarre: Madonna teamed up with super-producer Martin Garrix for this revenge track about her ex Sean Penn. The melody, complemented by strings and hints of EDM production, is enough to have people throwing their hands in the air.

School: “I can make moves on the dance floor, I can make love on a man’s floor,” she breathlessly coos on this track, on which her vocals are heavily distorted. It’s one of the weaker songs.

Fragile: There’s a major change of pace with break beats and strings, as she sweetly sings about her late brother Christopher. Her voice truly takes centre stage here.

My Sins Are My Savior: She is joined by Belgian rapper Stromae on this dark and moody track, which wouldn’t sound out of place on 1992’s Erotica album. Reflecting on the criticism in her career, she sings: “I was not lost, I was just broken. They tried to take me down, they tried to take my crown.”

Betrayal: She teams up with producer Mirwais, who she first worked with in 2000, on this 90s-inspired track, featuring brass and piano over bleak and mournful vocals.

The Test: Madonna has said Lourdes approached her about working together to heal their rift, and it certainly sounds cathartic. Her daughter’s voice here is far smoother, but they blend exquisitely.

L.E.S GIRL: It’s the end of the night, Madonna is on her way home and she’s reflecting on when she was a “Lower East Side girl, lost in a fragile world.” It’s a tear- jerker, and triumphant look back at how far she has come. The perfect ending.

Israeli journalist Gideon Levy says the US-Iran announcement represents a personal defeat for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his ambitions against Iran and Lebanon. His relationship with US President Donald Trump could also be at risk if Israel jeopardises the deal.

Californians couldn’t escape billionaire Tom Steyer’s political ads — during newscasts, sitcoms, or sporting events; on streaming services, YouTube, influencers’ social media feeds, or their mailboxes. Even the Puppy Bowl.

Yet despite spending a record-shattering $216 million of his wealth on his run for governor, the Democrat failed to win enough votes in last week’s primary to advance to the November general election to replace termed-out Gov. Gavin Newsom.

“Money isn’t everything, even though it obviously helps,” said Andrea Godfrey Flynn, a marketing professor at the University of San Diego. “It boosted Steyer way up. … But there are so many other factors at play that it may not have been enough.”

Steyer, a hedge fund co-founder turned environmental warrior, polled at 1% shortly before he entered the governor’s race in November, according to a survey by UC Berkeley’s Institute of Governmental Studies that was co-sponsored by the Los Angeles Times.

He climbed in subsequent polls, hitting 19% in the same poll shortly before the June 2 primary, putting Steyer in contention for winning one of the top two spots in the contest that would allow him to advance to the November election. But then he hit a ceiling, and on Tuesday, it became official that he failed to advance.

Steyer emailed supporters Tuesday expressing gratitude for their efforts backing his campaign, endorsements and votes.

“Together, we fought for a California that belongs to the people who keep it running every day, and we insisted that they do not have to settle for a system that protects corporate profits at the expense of working people,” he wrote. “I’m proud of how we never compromised our values or lowered our sights for what California can and should be.”

He pointed with pride at major corporations such as Chevron and Meta spending heavily to oppose his bid, and said their tens of millions of dollars spent attacking him shows the flaws in the electoral system. And he acknowledged that may be part of the reason some voters were skeptical of voting for a billionaire.

“I’m proud of the enemies we made,” Steyer said. “This campaign proved that business-as-usual depends on politics-as-usual, and there is no going back. We must continue to fight for a system where democracy serves Californians, not corporations — and where you do not have to be a billionaire to run on single-payer, or on breaking up monopolies, or on calling out a corrupt system when you see it. Because people are fed up with a system rigged to benefit billionaires and leave them behind.”

As of Tuesday evening, Steyer had received more than 1.9 million votes of the more than 9 million cast, lagging behind the two candidates who will appear on the November ballot: Republican Steve Hilton, a former Fox News commentator, and Democrat Xavier Becerra, a longtime elected official who most recently served in President Biden’s cabinet. Steyer was trailing Hilton, the second-place finisher, by just over 200,000 votes.

Steyer immediately endorsed Becerra, whom he had relentlessly attacked in the closing weeks of the campaign as beholden to corporations with business in front of the governor.

California has a history of unsuccessful self-funders. Former Northwest Airlines co-chairman Al Checchi spent more than $40 million of his money on an unsuccessful gubernatorial primary campaign in 1998, which broke records at the time.

More than a decade later, former EBay chief Meg Whitman spent $144 million of her wealth on her bid to become California’s governor, setting a new national record for spending on a state election. She won the GOP nomination but lost in the general election.

This year’s gubernatorial contest is not the first time Steyer has spent an inordinate sum seeking office. In 2020, he spent $342 million on a brief, unsuccessful presidential campaign.

Sheri Sadler, a veteran Los Angeles-based Democratic media buyer, said Steyer’s 2026 gubernatorial deluge was notable.

“I literally saw his spots ad nauseam,” she said. “They left almost no stone unturned.”

Sadler worked for Steyer in the final weeks of his presidential bid and scheduled $50 million of billionaire Rick Caruso’s money on ads during his unsuccessful 2022 Los Angeles mayoral campaign.

She believes that Steyer hit a ceiling because voters who are bombarded by ads eventually feel that the candidate is trying to purchase their affection.

“It’s one thing to give me a message I can resonate with. If they’re just trying to buy my vote, that feels different to me,” she said, adding that Steyer’s wealth undermined his platform, which included support for raising taxes on billionaires. “That’s my gut. And I feel like that’s what happened to us on Caruso and possibly why he didn’t run” for governor this year.

Steyer, 68, made his fortune founding a hedge fund that included investments in fossil fuels, private prisons and other businesses that are controversial among Democrats. He told voters that he walked away from the firm 14 years ago, leaving an enormous amount of money on the table, because it did not align with his morals. Steyer adds that he and his wife have pledged to give away most of their wealth before they die.

And unlike many wealthy self-funders, Steyer did not leap into a campaign as a political neophyte who assumed their business skills would translate into being an effective elected official.

Steyer and his wife, Kat Taylor, are longtime donors to Democratic candidates, but for well over a decade, they have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on liberal causes such as fighting climate change, mobilizing young voters, urging the impeachment of President Trump, opposing an effort by oil companies to suspend California environmental standards, increasing the state cigarette tax and supporting last year’s redrawing of the state’s congressional districts to counter Trump.

Darry Sragow, a veteran Democratic strategist who advised Checchi, said that Steyer’s focus on such causes had the potential to be meaningful to voters who are often skeptical about the sincerity and motives of rich candidates.

“Tom Steyer has done a good job in that respect, because if you’re going to overcome that skepticism, it’s very helpful for the candidate to show that he or she has actually been involved in the world of public policy and politics for an extended period,” and Steyer has, Sragow said.

Assemblyman Isaac G. Bryan (D-Los Angeles), who endorsed Steyer, argued that he promoted proposals that were against his personal interests, such as the proposed billionaire’s tax that is expected to appear on the November ballot.

“Interestingly enough, Tom Steyer is also the only candidate who’s talked about campaign finance reform and wanting to get money out of politics, including his money, to return power to the people and have publicly financed elections,” Bryan said after a Steyer rally near downtown L.A. on May 31.

Former Orange County Rep. Katie Porter and state Supt. of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond also campaigned on limiting the influence of corporate PAC money in elections, or implementing publicly financed elections in California. Porter often criticized Steyer for running as a “change agent” while spending millions he earned from investments in oil and gas.

“You paid the lowest tax rate on this stage and yet you made the billions that you’re using to fund your campaign off fossil fuels,” she said to Steyer during an April 28 debate in Claremont.

Political experts argue that messages that seem contradictory to a candidate’s background, as well as drowning voters with incessant ads, can be jarring and off-putting to the electorate.

“It can be an overload to voters where they hit that tipping point where they’re no longer interested,” Flynn said.

Despite Steyer’s foundational argument that his wealth meant he was not beholden to anyone, she said voters may be unable to reconcile a billionaire’s ability to understand or empathize about an average Californian’s needs.

“The messaging still is a giant factor,” Flynn said. “I’m curious [about] how believable it came across to voters — can you trust a billionaire to really care about affordability, someone who made money working with business or in business not to care about special interests?”

While Steyer campaigned as a hard-left liberal, he failed to be the top pick for progressives. Steyer had the support of 35% of likely voters who identified as strongly liberal while Becerra was backed by 37%, according to Berkeley’s May poll.

After talking to college Democrats at UCLA on the eve of the primary, Steyer said regardless of what happens in the primary, he will remain politically involved, though he would not run for president in 2028.

“I’m going to keep working on these issues, because I’ve been working full-time on these issues for 14 years,” Steyer said. “There’s no question what I’m going to do. How I do it is a little bit up in the air.”

Times staff writer Dakota Smith contributed to this report.

Palestinian journalist and mother Aya Shamaa wrote about how an Israeli strike killed her children, newborn Ryan and seven-year-old Yaman. Like countless mothers in Gaza, she saw her children as gleams of hope amid a fragile ceasefire. Narrated by Al Jazeera’s Al Anoud Al Aqeedi.

US President Donald Trump has called Cuba ‘a failed nation’, as his administration expands its pressure campaign. Cuba has announced it’s getting rid of its fixed prices at the petrol pump as fuel shortages and power cuts worsen.