Explainer

The United States has acknowledged deploying space weapons in orbit of the Earth.

US Air Force Secretary Troy Meink confirmed on Monday that the so-called “space control weapons” would be used to defend US forces on the planet, marking a significant new chapter in the militarisation of space – or at least the transparency of it.

The announcement, which Meink framed as a message to US rivals China and Russia, could turn Earth’s orbit into an increasingly contested military domain, experts warn. Warfare could include countries targeting each other’s satellites, which provide critical services such as GPS, communications and intelligence to military forces on the ground, as well as civilian infrastructure.

“Space Force doctrine describes ‘space control’ as having the outcome of space superiority, which they define as the ability to operate at the time and place of their choosing, while denying the same to an adversary,” Victoria Samson, chief director of Space Security and Stability for Secure World Foundation, a private non-profit focused on military space and security issues, told Al Jazeera.

So, what do we know about the US-deployed weapons in space? And do some countries already have them?

What do we know about these space weapons?

Not a lot. Air Force Secretary Meink said the US has stationed “weapons” in Earth’s orbit, but did not specify when they were placed there, how many there are, or what they are designed to do.

“Today, we continue to ensure we remain ready to meet the challenges of evolving threats wherever they exist,” Meink said at the Air, Space and Cyber Conference. “This is why the United States now has on-orbit space control weapons capable of defending the Joint Force against hostile adversary action.”

However, he did not give any details about what sort of weapons these may be, where they are positioned or what they are designed to do.

Samson said the keyword from Meink’s announcement is “weapons” in the context of “space control”. “Space control encapsulates the mission areas required to contest and control the space domain – employing kinetic and non-kinetic means to affect adversary capabilities,” Meink said, adding that “these capabilities can be employed for offensive and defensive purposes”.

“That’s the first time any official has acknowledged an actually designed weapon has been placed in space,” Samson told Al Jazeera. “It’s always been ‘systems with capabilities’ prior.”

Experts say these weapons are likely to be space-based communications jammers rather than kinetic ones that launch strikes. Kinetic weapons – for instance, a suicide satellite designed to ram into an adversary’s satellite – would likely cause fast-moving debris to be launched dangerously into space.

Bleddyn Bowen, an associate professor in astropolitics at Durham University in the United Kingdom, told the BBC’s Radio 4 Today programme: “We don’t know exactly what the mechanism of the weapon is. I would expect there to be some kind of electronic warfare or radio-jamming platform. This would be a non-destructive kind of anti-satellite weapon, and these variants already exist on Earth.

“Less likely would be a kinetic kill vehicle of some sort, so a vehicle that would release a projectile of some sort that would ram into a satellite and destroy it.”

What is the US Space Force?

The US Space Force is the newest branch of the US military, created in December 2019 under President Donald Trump’s first term, responsible for organising and conducting US military operations in and through space.

Unlike NASA, which focuses on civilian space exploration, Space Force is part of the US Air Force and comes under US Space Command, which is headquartered at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia.

Its responsibilities include operating and protecting military satellites, providing satellite communications and positioning services, monitoring objects and potential threats in space, and supporting US forces on Earth.

“China and Russia are developing new space systems to enhance military effectiveness and end any reliance on US space services,” the Space Force’s website says. “China and Russia are also testing and fielding sophisticated counterspace capabilities with the intent to disrupt and degrade US space-enabled capabilities.”

Aren’t there treaties limiting weapons deployments in space?

Yes, but they do not amount to a blanket ban on weapons in space.

The key agreement is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits countries from placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or stationing them in outer space. It also bans military bases and weapons testing on the moon and other celestial bodies.

However, the treaty does not expressly prohibit conventional weapons from being placed in Earth’s orbit. That means systems such as conventional anti-satellite weapons, electronic-warfare systems, or other counterspace capabilities are not automatically prohibited.

Such gaps leave room for interpretation and are at the heart of current international efforts to enhance military activities in space.

How have Russia and China reacted to the US announcement?

China’s Foreign Ministry opposed the move, warning against the “weaponisation of outer space, turning it into a battlefield, as well as an arms race there”.

“We urge the US side to stop expanding its military capabilities and preparing for war in outer space,” ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun told a news briefing.

Russia called for space to be kept “free of any weapons”.

“We are counting on broad international consolidation to continue working towards the complete demilitarisation of space,” said Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

Are Russia and China developing space weapons too?

Independent reports from research groups and think tanks note that both China and Russia are developing a broad range of counterspace capabilities designed to interfere with, disable, or potentially destroy satellites and other space systems.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, DC, identified both countries as possessing or developing kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace weapons.

A 2025 CSIS report notes that both Moscow and Beijing have direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, as well as capabilities involving jamming, spoofing, and cyber operations.

Samson of the Secure World Foundation (SWF) told Al Jazeera that her team has highlighted in their reports that “China and Russia have space-based jammers”. Therefore, she told Al Jazeera, “I always thought it would be strange that the US didn’t have them too.”

Bowen told the BBC: “In the last 10 years, Russia and China have been doing a lot more manoeuvres in space – rendezvous and proximity operations, as we call them – so, flying up really close to Western satellites, inspecting them, taking pictures. And on another occasion, the Chinese have demonstrated a ‘space tug’ capability. So, a vehicle that goes up to a satellite can grapple it and then move it into a different orbit.”

China has executed such a manoeuvre only with one of its own old satellites, which needed to be moved away from its location, he added.

What about other countries?

The emerging space-weapons race is not limited to the US, Russia and China: India has also demonstrated an ASAT capability and is developing technologies that could allow spacecraft to operate alongside other satellites.

France is also reported to be developing co-orbital capabilities, while the UK has conducted on-orbit cooperative operations with the US.

A 2026 report by SWF also notes how Iran, for instance, illustrates the less visible side of space warfare, relying increasingly on jamming and spoofing satellite-based services. Israel, meanwhile, has developed significant military space and electronic-warfare capabilities, although there is no public record of it conducting a debris-generating ASAT test.

Countries like North Korea and South Korea are also racing to develop more sophisticated space-based tech.

Is space the next frontier of war?

Samson told Al Jazeera that the US announcement of deploying weapons in Earth’s orbit is not essentially disruptive in the context of space technology. “What this does is normalise weaponising space,” she said.

“Space has always been a domain with the potential of being a flashpoint for conflict; this just turns up the heat there,” Samson added.

A US Space Force spokesperson told ABC News that the US “capabilities can be employed for offensive and defensive purposes at the direction of combatant commands”. The spokesperson noted that Washington “has warned about Russian and Chinese weapons testing and operationalisation since 2007”.

“Due to their actions, it is no longer a question that space is a warfighting domain,” the spokesperson said. “Open communication strengthens deterrence, prevents adversary miscalculation, and normalises space operations alongside the other services.”

Samson further noted that Meink’s statement “crosses a line”, and would “either encourage China and Russia to also declare weapons in space, or will make US allies and partners want to also place weapons in space”.

“Counterspace capabilities have been proliferating already – this speeds up that trend,” she said, adding that this “is incredibly destabilising and will work against US national security goals”.

“By opening the door to weaponising space, the US loses the most,” Samson noted. “Every person on this planet uses space-based data and services in some way. Any interference with access to or use of space will affect everyone, not just space powers.”

In a historic move last week, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to encourage the use of new world maps which more accurately depict continents with their true sizes.

The move followed months of lobbying by the African Union, which itself adopted a new map earlier in February. A total of 164 countries voted in favour while six abstained.

The United States was the only member to oppose it. US representative Yaryna Ferencevych said before the vote that the resolution was “the reason this institution is losing its credibility”.

“Instead of focusing on genuine problems … this body is debating map projects from the 16th century,” she said.

But since the resolution was approved, at least three other countries have voiced concerns about the changes: India, Ukraine and Japan.

None are explicitly opposed to adopting a new projection. However, they are raising concerns about how certain disputed territories should be depicted.

Here’s what we know:

Why is there a new world map?

The UN endorsed a resolution promoting the Equal Earth projection of the world map, rather than the Mercator projection, which is currently widely used.

The resolution does not ban Mercator or impose a particular replacement – it merely encourages nations to adopt the Equal Earth version, which was created by three researchers in 2018.

The Mercator projection, which was produced by Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator in 1569 when the West was busy “conquering” new territories, attempts to show a three-dimensional globe on a two-dimensional surface. That is why countries closer to the poles appear much larger than countries at the equator.

For decades, map experts have pointed out that Mercator’s projection disproportionately shrinks the true size of the African continent and that of other developing regions, while making Europe and the US seem much larger by comparison.

For example, Greenland is shown as roughly the same size as Africa, but, in reality, it could fit into the continent 14 times over. Europe, which is portrayed as bigger than South America, is actually half its size.

Advocates from African countries pointed out that the map is problematic because of the size issues. Importantly, they argued, it reinforces negative perceptions of Africa.

Several cartographers have attempted to develop equal area maps. However, African activists specifically pushed for the Equal Earth projection map, which significantly expands Africa and shrinks Europe and the US.

Experts say while maps are inherently inaccurate because of the constraints of depicting a spherical world on a flat plane, the Equal Earth projection is as close as it gets.

Why is Ukraine worried about the new map?

Ukraine was one of six countries which abstained from the vote at the UNGA, along with Estonia, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Lithuania, who voted in solidarity with Ukraine.

Kyiv has complained that the Equal Earth projection depicts the Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula in a distinctly lighter shade than mainland Ukraine.

Russia illegally occupied and annexed Crimea in February 2014, a move the UN has denounced.

Although the peninsula is also shaded differently from mainland Russia on the new map, its yellowish tint appears closer to the Russian shade than Ukraine’s.

“Ukraine does not in principle oppose the core issue addressed in this draft resolution,” Andrii Melnyk, the country’s permanent representative to the UN, said in an address to the assembly.

Melnyk said Kyiv had asked for corrections before the vote but had not received positive responses. The new map, he said, could be tantamount to opening a Pandora’s box, enabling the “abuse and distortion” of the world map.

“It would be a truly fatal mistake for all of us, and for this General Assembly, to seek to correct a historical injustice in the geographical depiction of countries and continents by simultaneously allowing a deeply troubling interpretation of the text of this draft resolution,” he added.

What is Japan demanding?

Meanwhile, on Thursday, Tokyo, which voted in favour of the new map, said it had also asked for corrections to the Equal Earth projection because the map uses the same colours and shades for Russian territory as it does for the disputed Kuril Islands.

Russia and Japan have long fought over control of the four islands, known in Russia as the Southern Kurils and in Japan as the Northern Territories. In 1945, during World War II, the Soviet Union invaded and annexed the islands as part of a pact with Western Allies that stipulated the Soviets would take the disputed territory. The islands’ Japanese inhabitants were removed.

Subsequently, Japan and the US have claimed that the islands were not part of the original pact. The islands, however, remain under Russian administration.

In August this year, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin paid his first-ever visit to the islands, drawing condemnation from Japan. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi called the visit “absolutely unacceptable”, saying it “offends the sentiments of the Japanese people”.

This week, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said the Japanese embassy in the US has asked Equal Earth’s creators to change the map.

“Displays that contradict the Japanese government’s position are seen [on the map],” Kihara said at a news conference. “We need to prevent incorrect perceptions regarding our country’s territories and geographical names from spreading.”

Why is India uneasy about the map?

India also voted in favour of the Equal Earth projection, but on Sunday, the Ministry of External Affairs published a caveat regarding depictions of the disputed border territory of Kashmir.

Following the Indian partition of 1947, both Pakistan and India lay claim to the former state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had been controlled by the British through indirect rule. The region has subsequently been a flashpoint for tensions between the two rivals and has led to several wars.

Parts of Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, while other parts are administered by India. China, which also disputes some Kashmir territory with India, administers its northeastern portion.

In his statement, spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal noted that the UN vote was in favour of encouraging the use of equal area projections and that it had not made the use of any one map mandatory.

“India’s sovereign territory, including the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, must be depicted in accordance with India’s official map,” he said. “Any inaccurate or misleading depiction is unacceptable.”

Yemen’s more than a decade-long civil war has flared up once again after the Houthi rebel group launched an offensive in several locations against Saudi Arabian-backed government forces. The conflict has already spilled over beyond the country’s borders with the Houthis launching an attack on southern Saudi Arabia, targeting oil facilities and wounding dozens of people this week.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a United Nations-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

So who is involved in this conflict? Here’s a look at the main actors:

The Houthis

The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), are an armed group controlling most parts of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, and some of the western and northern areas close to Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis emerged in the 1990s but rose to international prominence in 2014, when the group rebelled against Yemen’s government, forcing it to step down and causing a crippling humanitarian crisis.

The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The two warring sides have also repeatedly tried to hold peace talks.

Seen as part of a regional alliance known as the “axis of resistance” backed by Iran, the Shia Zaidi group nevertheless has its own base, its own interests – and its own ambitions.

The Houthis have demonstrated their missile and drone capabilities during the Yemen war in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, targeting oil installations and vital infrastructure. They have also proven resilient, defying more than 10 years of bombing by the Saudi-led coalition, as well as US and British strikes in recent years.

The group has gained international prominence for its attacks on Israel and shipping in the Red Sea since the start of Israel’s genocide in Gaza in October 2023.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh entered the Yemen war when it led a military coalition against the Houthis in March 2015, seeking to restore the government of then-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Back then, Saudi Arabia and Iran were at the peak of a regional competition, both deeply distrusting each other. An Iran-supported group expanding control at the kingdom’s southern border was unacceptable, hence the military action.

This was before a China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 marked the beginning of a more practical and less confrontational relationship.

Presidential Leadership Council

The PLC was established in 2022 when the former president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, formally transferred his powers to the new eight-member body.

It represents the internationally recognised government of Yemen, with a mandate to manage the country’s political, security and military affairs, and to steer negotiations towards a permanent ceasefire. It is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an adviser to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of the late president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Its membership is drawn from a mix of northern and southern politicians and military-linked leaders in a bid to unite major anti-Houthi forces under one roof.

The PLC is backed by Saudi Arabia and the alliance that Riyadh leads.

Islah party

The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, better known as Islah, is a Sunni Islamist movement with historic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a faction within the recognised PLC-led government but has long had an independent identity. Its major stronghold has long been Marib, the country’s sole gas-producing region with one of its largest oilfields.

National Resistance Forces

The National Resistance Forces is a government-aligned military faction led by Tareq Saleh, nephew of the late former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The force has maintained ties to Saudi Arabia and, like the Islah party, is part of the PLC. It aims for a unified Yemen, positioning itself as a counterweight to both the Houthis and southern secessionists.

The United Kingdom has announced a ban on the import of all goods produced in illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said in Parliament on Tuesday.

It comes in response to an intensifying wave of Israeli settler pogroms and settlement expansions in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The ban, set to come into effect within six to nine months, would target settlement exports such as dates, olive oil and agricultural products, with Miliband saying he did not believe “the British people want us supporting the occupation by accepting products from settlements in our shops”.

The International Court of Justice in July 2024 called Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory “unlawful”. Months later, the United Nations passed a resolution calling for an end to the Israeli occupation within a year.

Israel’s response was furious, as it announced four “counter-measures”, including banning 12 British MPs from entering Israel and closing the British consulate in Jerusalem.

After Miliband’s speech, 11 more countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, shared a joint statement supporting the so-called two-state solution and announcing their own intentions to impose restrictions on trade with illegal Israeli settlements.

Spain and Ireland had already announced their own national bans earlier this year, alongside the Netherlands and Belgium.

How much do these countries trade with Israel?

Aside from Canada and the UK, the rest of the countries considering or already banning settlement goods are European Union members.

The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, accounting for 31.7 percent of Israel’s total trade in goods in 2025 (43.3 billion euros, or $50.4bn), according to the European Commission. The EU supplied 33.1 percent of Israel’s imports (28 billion euros, or $32.6bn) and received 29.4 percent of Israel’s exports (15.3 billion euros or $17.8bn).

Israel is the EU’s 27th largest trade partner, with Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany being its biggest individual trade partners.

According to a 2026 report by Global Echo Litigation Center, a Palestinian rights legal advocacy group, roughly 5,900 shipments from Israel were headed to Europe, with more than 17 percent containing products originating from settlements.

While no specific figures for settlement trade alone are known, it is understood to be a tiny fraction of total EU-Israel trade, meaning the ban’s impact is much more symbolic than economic.

The table below shows each country’s total trade with Israel for the European countries that have banned, or are introducing bans on, illegal Israeli settlement goods.

The top five European trading partners with Israel either enforcing or set to introduce settlement bans are Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK, France and Spain.

Ireland

Ireland-Israel bilateral trade totalled $5.36bn in 2025. Ireland is Israel’s second-largest export market for goods after the United States, driven largely by tech, particularly semiconductors and integrated circuits.

The Netherlands

Netherlands-Israel bilateral trade totalled roughly $4.8bn in 2025. The Netherlands is also Israel’s largest single foreign investor, accounting for roughly two-thirds of all EU investment in the country.

United Kingdom

According to UN Comtrade, UK-Israel bilateral trade totalled $3.73bn in 2025. An Al Jazeera investigation found at least 17 companies linked to illegal Israeli settlements hold more than 2.1 billion pounds ($2.85bn) in UK public-sector contracts.

France

France-Israel bilateral trade totalled $3.62bn in 2025. A large part of France’s trade with Israel constitutes export licences for surveillance and military technologies.

Spain

Spain-Israel bilateral trade totalled $2.79bn in 2025. In September that year, Spain banned the import of goods from illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, as well as the trade of arms.

What are Israeli settlements?

Israeli settlements are Jewish-only communities built illegally on Palestinian land.

Settlements are illegal under international law as they violate the Fourth Geneva Convention, which bans an occupying power from transferring its population to the area it occupies.

Illegal Israeli settlements continue to grow, decades after the 1993 Oslo Accords, which established limited Palestinian self-rule and were meant to lead to a permanent peace settlement.

At the time, about 270,000 settlers lived across the occupied territory. Today, that figure has more than doubled to between 600,000 and 750,000 people, about 10 percent of Israel’s Jewish population, living across some 250 illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The Eiffel Tower was temporarily closed on Monday after workers went on strike to protest the sidelining of female staff during a private visit by a Hindu religious group.

The tower, which has since reopened, shut after members of Bochasanwasi Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha (BAPS), a global socio‑spiritual Hindu denomination, visited the site. Female staff were reportedly asked to give way to male staff for the group’s tour, prompting protests from the workers’ union, outrage from French politicians and an apology from the Hindu group.

Here is more about BAPS and how the controversy unfolded.

What’s the controversy about?

The Eiffel Tower closed after staff walked out over the removal of women staff during a weekend visit by BAPS.

The Societe d’Exploitation de la Tour Eiffel, or SETE, which runs the Paris landmark, acknowledged that the group had requested the Saturday visit be organised in a way that limited “interactions with women”, and said “these conditions should not have been accepted”.

The BAPS monks, or sadhus, practise strict celibacy, which requires them to avoid physical contact with women and being alone in their company, and to minimise personal interaction or attention towards the opposite sex.

Wider community members of BAPS are not bound by these celibacy rules. According to news reports, the BAPS delegation visiting the Eiffel Tower comprised both monks and community members.

Eiffel Tower staff said in a statement that they condemned “professional instructions that led to female employees being sidelined, replaced and made invisible because of their sex” during the visit by the delegation.

“Some were asked to leave their posts and withdraw to other areas. In some posts they were replaced by men. And all female employees were instructed not to go through or cross certain areas while the delegation was present,” the staff union said, adding they were shocked to have been put in such a situation.

Paris Mayor Emmanuel Gregoire said an investigation would be launched “as soon as possible”. In a post on social media, he said he was aware of the employees’ anger and agreed their dissatisfaction was legitimate.

What is BAPS and how have they responded?

BAPS was founded in India in 1907 and began expanding internationally from the 1960s. It is a spiritual organisation which works on community building, constructing temples, helping with disaster relief and running medical camps, environmental drives and educational programmes.

It now also runs an extensive network of temples and cultural centres across the world, including more than 100 in the United States and more than 1,000 worldwide, including across Europe, Africa and Asia. BAPS also runs a temple in Paris.

On Tuesday, the BAPS Paris account posted a statement on X responding to the controversy.

“To our knowledge, at no time was access to the Eiffel Tower denied to anyone,” the account wrote, originally in French.

“Nevertheless, we wish to offer our sincere apologies to anyone who may have been hurt or inconvenienced by this situation,” it added.

How has the response in France been?

Leaders within France expressed outrage over reports of women being removed from the premises.

Aurore Berge, the minister delegate for gender equality and fight against discrimination in France, wrote in an X post on Monday: “In France, we do not ask women to step aside. No dogma, no religion is superior to the laws of the Republic.”

Yael Braun-Pivet, president of the National Assembly, wrote in a post on social media: “Welcoming others never means giving up our values. In France, women are fully present in public life. No one tells them to become invisible.”

Former French President Francois Hollande, now an MP, wrote on X on Tuesday: “We do not ask women to step aside to satisfy religious demands.”

He expressed support for the Eiffel Tower staff who walked out.

“Equality between women and men is a fundamental achievement of our Republic. It applies everywhere, to all women and all men, without exception,” Hollande wrote.

Parliamentarian and former PM Michel Barnier wrote on X: “It is therefore utterly unacceptable that an order aimed at making women disappear from this space could have been issued.”

Barnier added that “women are not hidden. They are not erased. They are respected, and their freedom is defended”, demanding an explanation from the SETE.

Jordan Bardella, the president of the far-right National Rally, wrote on X on Tuesday: “This degrading demand should never have been met. In a free country like France, gender equality is respected, and no religious reason can override women’s dignity.”

Prominent far-right MP and leader of the National Rally (RN), Marine Le Pen wrote in an X post: “In France, we will never accept that the presence of women be ‘limited.’”

Is BAPS linked to the Modi government?

BAPS is not officially part of a political party in India, and has long insisted that it is apolitical.

But researchers have long pointed to a close, cooperative relationship with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government.

In fact, the Eiffel Tower closure came just a day after Modi virtually inaugurated the BAPS temple in Paris.

Modi also attended the physical inauguration of the BAPS temple in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2024.

Has BAPS faced other controversies in the past?

BAPS has faced a series of high-profile controversies in the past.

During a landmark legal battle in 1966, BAPS leaders argued in court that their sect was not part of Hinduism but a distinct religion. They did so in an attempt to avoid the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act, which required Hindu temples to open their doors to Dalits, a historically marginalised caste group. The Indian Supreme Court rejected the appeal made by BAPS.

In 2013, two former BAPS monks filed a complaint accusing senior BAPS leaders of sexual assault dating back to the 1970s. BAPS leaders denied the allegations. The complaint did not result in any publicly reported criminal charges.

In 2021, a US federal class‑action lawsuit accused BAPS of exploiting low‑caste labourers from India to work on its temples. The case, brought on behalf of about 200 Indian workers, alleged they were lured from India, coerced into employment agreements, and forced to work more than 12 hours a day with only five days off a year at a temple in Robbinsville Township, New Jersey.

The suit says they were paid as little as $1.20 an hour, far below the US federal minimum wage of $7.25 and New Jersey’s $12 statewide minimum.

A US federal investigation into labour trafficking at the Robbinsville temple has since been closed without criminal charges, but the civil class‑action lawsuit brought by the workers continues.

One year ago, thousands of young people took to the streets in multiple Nepali cities to protest against corruption. Following the resulting curfews, arrests and the killing of protesters in a crackdown on the demonstrations, the Gen Z‑led movement forced the government from power, ushering in an interim administration and opening the way for new elections.

Now, as Nepal grapples with the aftermath of devastating floods along its border with Tibet, we examine what has changed over the past year – and whether the demands of the Gen Z protesters have been met.

What happened in Nepal last year?

On September 8, 2025, youth-led “Gen Z” protests began in Kathmandu and other cities of Nepal.

Demonstrators who took to the streets were protesting a series of corruption scandals in the country and were also angered by the rising trend of the children of Nepali government officials – dubbed “Nepo kids” – documenting their lavish lifestyles online.

The protests broke out just days after the country blocked 26 social media sites including Facebook, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok for not complying with government rules about “harmful” content. This ban was lifted when the protests began.

Some young demonstrators defied curfews imposed by the authorities after demonstrations began, leading to arrests and the police firing live rounds at protesters, killing about 76 people. Hundreds of protesters were injured and hundreds more arrested. Protesters also set fire to several government buildings, including parliament, and the army was deployed.

Then, on September 9, Prime Minister KP Oli, 74, resigned from his position. Within a week, Nepal’s former Chief Justice Sushila Karki had been appointed as the country’s new interim prime minister.

Ultimately, the protests culminated in the current government being formed in March this year when 35-year-old rapper-turned-politician Balendra Shah was sworn in as the country’s youngest-ever prime minister.

Shah leads the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), also known as the National Independent Party, a new anti‑establishment party which emerged after the youth-led protests and won more than two‑thirds of the 165 directly elected seats in parliament in March. Traditional parties such as the Nepali Congress and the CPN‑UML have a much smaller representation than ever before.

Although he was not a street organiser of the protests, Shah became one of the most prominent political figures, channelling Gen Z’s anger into his electoral campaign.

What were the key demands of the Gen Z protesters?

They included:

• An end to corruption: Protesters demanded greater transparency and accountability from political elites they view as corrupt, as well as an end to nepotism, whereby the children of those elites live in luxury while many young Nepalis struggle financially.
• Mass resignations and suspensions: Protesters called for the resignation of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and the mass resignation of parliamentarians. They also called for an immediate suspension of officials who issued the order to fire on protesters.
• Political overhaul: The protesters called for the dissolution of parliament, establishment of an interim government and holding new general elections.

Have these demands been met?

The demands have been met to some extent.

For instance, Oli resigned in the wake of the Gen Z‑led protests, and several senior members of his government also stepped down. Parliament was dissolved, an interim government was established, and new general elections were held in March this year.

“Despite the loss of life and property during the movement, the interim government successfully conducted peaceful elections, leading to the emergence of a new political force in government,” Yog Raj Lamichhane, an assistant professor at Nepal’s Pokhara University, told Al Jazeera.

“The result reflected public disenchantment with the old political establishment.”

In March this year, Nepal police arrested Oli and former Home Affairs Minister Ramesh Lekhak for their alleged involvement in the deadly crackdown on the protesters last year.

However, both men were released in April after a Supreme Court order asked the police not to indefinitely extend the detention. They remain under investigation in connection with last year’s deadly Gen Z protests, but have not been formally charged.

Furthermore, the issue of corruption among political elites has barely been addressed, observers say.

Dinesh Paudel, professor at the Appalachain State University in the US, told Al Jazeera: “The fundamental concerns and issues raised by the young protestor last year are still the same, and there are no governance style changes even after the new elected government, other than some populist rhetorics on small and cosmetic topics.”

Has the leadership change made any difference?

Some of the young leaders have entered parliament and government, while others remain in activist groups. The divisions between these two groups of people are becoming more apparent as they often clash over how much to compromise with the old political establishment.

Those who were elected to parliament in March mostly belong to the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), or National Independent Party.

“One of the most exciting and progressive parts is the emergence of youth in politics as most of the parliamentarians are young, educated and have much aspiration to change,” Bishnu Raj Upreti, a public policy analyst and research director at Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), told Al Jazeera.

“The leadership change appears to have brought some positive differences, particularly in the working style of the current prime minister,” Lamichhane said.

However, experts say the younger generation of MPs – those elected under the NIP/RSP banner as well as those in older parties – remains constrained by party hierarchies and Nepal’s entrenched political system.

“They are inexperienced and are still heavily controlled by party structures,” Upreti said. He added that wider generational distrust between young politicians and the older establishment also complicated reform efforts.

“Leadership change has started. It is good, but not enough.”

This has resulted in an apparent divide between those in government positions and those in activist groups.

In May this year, the new government invited Gen Z activists – mostly civil society leaders and youth activists – to give their input for constitutional amendments. However, 25 of the 29 invited boycotted the meeting, saying deeper systemic problems and earlier agreements with the previous administration were being ignored, according to Gen Z activist Aayush Basyal.

Basyal, who was present at the protests last year, said it was “really tricky” for young activists to adjust to working inside the system alongside the new Gen‑Z politicians now in office. “They are trying to cooperate with the authorities they previously challenged, while still pushing for the radical changes they demanded on the streets,” she explained.

“Now the Gen Z protesters of that time are divided into different factions, and some of the factions are vehemently opposing some work of government,” Upreti explained.

“So those who oppose the government are not in positive booking of the government,” Upreti added.

Where are the protesters now?

On Tuesday, families of protesters who were killed in last year’s crackdown organised a formal commemoration at what used to be Nepal’s parliament building.

After functioning as the parliament building for almost two decades, it shut down last year when Gen Z protesters trespassed and set fire to it.

Basyal said the authorities provided tight security amid rumours that some groups might try to incite violence, noting that Nepal’s “media economy” often amplifies sensational incidents even when only a few people are involved.

In the meantime, however, the divide within the Gen Z movement is becoming more stark, particularly what some see as a failure by the new leaders to advocate for protesters.

“The injured protesters have generally received medical treatment and certain monetary compensation,” Lamicchane said.

“However, the concept of compensation remains broader than financial support alone. In my view, the true compensation would be the fulfilment of the promises and objectives that inspired the Gen Z movement and the subsequent formation of a new government.”

Basyal said that while some of the people involved in the movement are now MPs or cabinet ministers, others, from poor, minority backgrounds, who lack money and influence, are still in jail and cannot speak up for themselves.

“There are people still in jail, officially more than 900 and unofficially, maybe like 1,600 plus, who are in jail for arson,” Basyal said.

He said it was troubling that these protesters remain in jail, suggesting this risks becoming “institutionalised” and raising questions over whether the government is effectively celebrating impunity.

Activists, he added, hope the new administration will treat these detainees better, but “that is yet to be seen.”

What still needs to change?

Analysts say structural changes are necessary.

“Although the government has promised reforms, particularly through changes in laws and policies, these commitments have not yet been substantially realised,” Lamichhane said.

Upreti noted that the new government has not begun any structural changes at all.

“Structural changes have to start with changing existing laws and bringing in new laws and policies,” he said.

“From what we’ve seen so far, the new leaders don’t appear to be prioritising that. Massive reform of the bureaucracy is a precondition to achieving the aims of the Gen Z movement, but the government has not yet done meaningful work in this line.”

He added that another important element is to develop better relations and deeper trust with Nepal’s two giant neighbours, India and China, since Nepal’s economic progress and geopolitical balance depend on them.

Experts also say Nepal’s highly centralised system of government is a major obstacle to deeper structural reform.

“Strong collaboration of the federal movement with provincial and local government is the necessary condition for advancing economic progress, but they ignore provincial and local government as they have no provincial and local government. It is not a good approach,” Upreti said.

“Structural changes are necessary and they come from internal power dynamics such as urban-rural divide, inherent conflict between educated elites and peasant farmers and economic and bureaucratically institutionalised corruption,” Patel said. “It is hard to imagine that there will be any structural changes, aiming to making people’s lives better, at this stage and under current circumstances.

“In short, Nepal has missed yet another opportunity from a popular uprising that would fundamentally address Nepali peoples desire for change.”

What’s next?

“This new government seems to be deeply under its own weight of expectation,” Basyal said.

He explained that historically in Nepal, there’s been an “expectation gap”: people expect a lot, governments deliver little, and that gap fuels frustration.

He said that this government has “not been transparent”.

“The prime minister, he doesn’t speak a lot in the parliament. And when he did address the parliament a few times, that was pretty chaotic, as well,” Basyal added.

“If this issue remains unaddressed, it may lead to a second wave of public disenchantment.”

Lamichhane said, however, it will take time to see if the government can address the challenges it faces.

“Let’s hope and wait for changes. Now, it’s not the appropriate time to criticise the government, as Nepal has faced an apocalypse in the form of a massive flood.”

Meanwhile, flags in Nepal flew at half-mast on Monday as the country mourned the more-than-1,300 people who are known to have died in catastrophic floods which ravaged the border region with Tibet late last month. Thousands more people are still missing.

Basyal noted that Nepal’s current constitution was finalised and promulgated in September 2015, only after the devastating April and May earthquakes created urgent political pressure to end nearly a decade of deadlock.

“It feels like the nation comes together only during national disasters. So we’re really hopeful that this sense of unity that is right now will help.”

Yemen’s Houthi group has carried out attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, with Riyadh saying that dozens of people have been wounded, as fighting between the Iran-aligned group and pro-Saudi forces in Yemen sharply escalates.

The Houthis on Tuesday said they targeted Saudi energy sites belonging to oil giant Aramco in southern areas, with the group’s military spokesperson calling it “a broad operation”.

Saudi authorities confirmed attacks on several facilities and installations related to the energy sector in the south of the country, vowing a firm response. Riyadh also accused the Houthis of wounding at least 73 people in the attacks.

The conflict between the Yemeni armed group and Saudi Arabia is unfolding as the Houthis are currently fighting Yemen’s Riyadh-backed internationally recognised government, which announced that it was launching counteroffensives against Houthi-held positions across several provinces on Monday.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a UN-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

The escalation also comes as the strategic importance of Yemen’s Bab al-Mandeb Strait grows amid Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key passageway for global oil and gas supplies.

The Houthis have sought to advance towards the vital Red Sea shipping route, while government forces say their campaign ultimately aims to retake the Houthi-held capital, Sanaa.

So what do we know about the latest fighting, and what comes next?

How did the fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis unfold?

The Houthis on Monday said Saudi Arabia launched multiple attacks on Houthi-held areas.

The group said Saudi attacks using aircraft and cruise missiles struck al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces.

Moreover, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out an air strike on a prison in al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf, killing seven people and injuring seven others. Riyadh did not immediately comment on the attacks.

At the same time, the Houthis claimed to have shot down Saudi reconnaissance drones over al-Jawf and al-Bayda.

Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Major-General Turki al-Malki, the Saudi spokesman for the Riyadh-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis carried out attacks on the Saudi cities of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran, injuring at least 73 people, among them women and children.

According to a statement from Saudi Arabia’s Energy Ministry, the strikes also triggered fires at multiple oil installations and utility sites across the kingdom’s southern provinces.

Southern Saudi Arabia is home to key oil infrastructure, including the Jazan refinery, one of the kingdom’s largest, with the capacity to process 400,000 barrels of crude per day.

Shortly after, the Houthis announced that they had targeted Saudi energy infrastructure operated by oil giant Aramco in the south using drones and ballistic missiles.

The group’s military spokesman, Yahya Saree, said the attacks were retaliation for recent Saudi attacks on Houthi-controlled areas across Yemen.

Why is this escalation taking place now?

A key focus of the fighting is the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi shipping in July. The Houthis have also pushed towards government-held areas near al-Makha (Mocha) and territory bordering the Bab al-Mandeb Strait amid reinforcements and counteroffensives from government forces.

The strait’s strategic importance has increased dramatically because Iran’s restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz have forced Saudi Arabia to rely more heavily on its Red Sea export route. Between March and mid-July, Saudi seaborne crude exports through Bab al-Mandeb were eight times higher than during the same period in 2025.

In 2024, about 4.1 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the strait daily on average – about 5 percent of the global total.

Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the strait holds importance “when we look at the Houthis’ broader strategy”.

“The move towards the western coast is not only about gaining territory on the ground. It also has a maritime dimension,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The Houthis have already linked their military campaign to the Red Sea and the shipping routes around Bab al-Mandeb. So gaining more control over the … western coast could give them greater depth and allow them to sustain pressure on maritime traffic in the Red Sea. In that sense, the ground offensive and their maritime campaign are closely connected.”

The latest escalation also follows fighting that resumed in July after an Iranian aircraft attempted to land in Sanaa without Saudi authorisation, followed by strikes on Sanaa airport and Houthi retaliation.

What is happening between government forces and the Houthis?

On Sunday, Yemen’s internationally recognised government said its warplanes had struck Houthi positions in Hodeidah, Marib and al-Jawf, as fighting spread across several fronts.

On Monday, government-aligned forces stepped up their counteroffensive. They announced a ground push towards the al-Labanat mountains in al-Jawf, while also reporting rocket attacks on Yatma and “intensive battles” with Houthi fighters in the province. Government forces also claimed advances towards Dhi Na’im district in al-Bayda.

The Houthis said they had repelled the advance towards al-Labanat and inflicted casualties on government-aligned forces. Houthi official Mohammed al-Farah also claimed the group fired ballistic missiles at reinforcements in al-Jawf.

By late Monday, government-aligned forces reported carrying out further air attacks against Houthi positions west of Taiz.

Al Jazeera could not independently verify the battlefield claims by the Houthis or the Yemeni government.

Rashad al-Alimi, who heads Yemen’s Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, meanwhile said on Monday that government forces had made significant gains against the Houthis, pointing to advances in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Taiz and Hodeidah.

“Our armed forces will continue to carry out their constitutional duty until state institutions are restored and their authority extends over the entire territory of Yemen,” al-Alimi said in a statement.

Yemen’s deputy defence minister, Major-General Samir al-Sabri, said in comments aired on state television that the government had resolved to “retake Sanaa”.

Majid al-Nuzaili, a spokesperson for government-aligned forces, said the goal of the offensive was to “liberate Yemen from the grip” of the Houthis “and restore Sanaa as a capital for all Yemenis”.

What is the humanitarian situation on the ground?

The World Health Organization said on Monday that at least 728 people have been killed or wounded in Yemen since August 23, with the majority in Taiz and along the western coast.

It said an estimated 21,000 people, roughly 3,000 families, have been displaced from Taiz alone since Thursday.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said the casualty count is expected to rise.

“These casualties are said to be in the hundreds from both sides, especially as we have reports of air strikes being conducted in the governorate of al-Jawf,” he said.

The Crisis Group’s Nagi said the world was witnessing “significant deterioration in what is already a catastrophic situation”.

“We saw in the past few days a lot of displacement from areas where there has been fighting between the two sides, especially in Taiz,” he noted.

“Those are the direct impacts, but there are also indirect ones. The economic situation is likely to get worse, which will put even more pressure on the humanitarian situation. Ultimately, I think it will depend on how long this round of fighting lasts. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the humanitarian impact will be.”

What’s next?

Analyst Hisham al-Omeisy said the fighting in the war-torn country was no longer simply a domestic one.

“We are way beyond the concept [of it] being domestic. It all started with the Houthis pushing to control Bab al-Mandeb and the western coast, to control the chokehold on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, with the Iranians controlling the Strait of Hormuz,” al-Omeisy, a senior Yemen adviser at the European Institute of Peace, told Al Jazeera.

“This is definitely not domestic, especially when the Houthis have started attacking Saudi Arabia as well for the better part of the last month, and now escalating since today [Tuesday].”

Domestically, the Crisis Group’s Nagi said it was “unclear” what the outcome of this round of fighting will be, describing the situation on the ground as “very fluid”.

“But what we are seeing is that the government seems to be in a stronger position than at any time before, and it sees this round of fighting as an opportunity to consolidate its position and gain more territory from the Houthis,” he added, while warning that this did not mean the Houthis were weak.

“It’s true that the Houthis are fighting in Taiz, and they were the ones who launched the offensive against government forces there and made some gains. But on other fronts, in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and elsewhere, government forces have advanced and gained several key areas, while the Houthis have been on the defensive.”

On whether there will be a winner in this conflict, al-Omeisy said that in the long term, he expects a negotiated settlement.

“Look at the history of Yemen … we always inevitably reach some sort of a deal, so it’s not going to be a winner-takes-all,” he said.

“I don’t imagine there’s going to be a push to regain the capital [Sanaa], for instance. It’s going to be a bloodbath if they [government-aligned forces] do that.”

“There’s going to be a humbling of the Houthi forces. There’s going to be losses. But eventually, you will need a political deal,” al-Omeisy added.

According to Saudi political analyst Khaled Batarfi, the Houthi strikes will trigger a response but not a prolonged war.

“This is an escalation, of course,” Batarfi told Al Jazeera. In past attacks, Saudi Arabia tried “to not get engaged in a civil war, keep its distance and not to respond to attacks. But now this is too much [of an escalation],” he said.

“The coalition will have a say on that. This is a civil war inside Yemen, and it affects us as one of the parties. And so any response … in the same way [will be] an eye for an eye. But I don’t see a prolonged war – not with Iran and not with the Houthis.”

Tehran has threatened “serious consequences” for South Korea if it interferes in the US-Israel war on Iran.

The warning comes amid reports that Seoul is mulling contributing to the US naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz passage, which has hampered Iran’s oil exports.

In a statement posted on X on Monday, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Iran and South Korea had more than 64 years of diplomatic relations based on mutual respect and that Tehran values that friendship.

However, if South Korea joins the United States in its military actions against Iran at a time when the country is defending itself from what he called US aggression and “war crimes against women and children”, then there will be consequences, he warned.

Baghaei threatened that Iran would regard any military presence or participation in operations by another country in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz “would inevitably be regarded as direct support for the aggressor and would have serious consequences”.

“No sovereign and responsible country should succumb to US pressure and intimidation and become complicit in acts of aggression and horrific crimes against the great Iranian nation,” he added.

Seoul did not respond directly, but a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on Monday said it is communicating with the international community over the situation in the passageway.

Here’s what we know about how South Korea is getting roped in:

Why is South Korea involved?

Seoul, a close ally of Washington, has been under pressure from US President Donald Trump.

The issues began in mid-August, when Trump revealed in an interview, and later online, that he had spoken to South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and asked that Seoul give “a little hand” in the war on Iran.

According to media reports, the two leaders had spoken over the phone on May 17.

Seoul said, “No, thanks!”, according to Trump’s message on social media.

However, as South Korea now knows, saying no to Trump has repercussions.

On August 16, Trump announced that the US would significantly scale back joint military drills it holds annually with South Korea – the evening before they were scheduled to begin.

The Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercises are meant to sharpen Seoul’s readiness in case of a North Korean attack. They usually last for more than 11 days but were reduced to five.

In a post on his Truth Social site, Trump claimed the drills were “costly” and that they send a “hostile” signal to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with whom he is trying to build a relationship. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said in parliament there was no warning from the US.

Trump also questioned why South Korea would refuse his request when thousands of US soldiers are stationed on the Korean Peninsula.

The US also cancelled another military exercise scheduled for September, although South Korea’s military revealed it received a notification much earlier in June, with Washington citing constraints due to the war on Iran.

How has South Korea responded?

President Lee, a liberal who pushes for a dialled-down defence posture, has opted to negotiate. His office earlier released statements saying it hopes for “meaningful dialogue” with Trump.

South Korea’s Yonhap news agency reported on Monday that Washington has, however, “ratcheted up pressure” on Seoul.

On Friday, a South Korean presidential official told Yonhap that Seoul could consider a military contribution to international measures seeking to free up navigation in the passageway as long as it does not affect the country’s defence readiness.

South Korea is looking at various options, the official said, including possible cooperation with France, the United Kingdom and other allies on sending noncombat and search-and-rescue forces.

The South Korean military has also started reviewing assets and troops that could be deployed, including maritime patrol aircraft, explosive ordnance disposal teams and unmanned mine detection and clearing systems, he added.

Such a move would be unpopular. The opposition has spoken out against a possible deployment, as have some within Lee’s ruling Democratic Party. Many South Koreans have also protested against the US-Israel war on Iran.

What is the history of US-South Korea relations?

South Korea became one of the US’s closest allies after Washington backed Seoul against Pyongyang in the Korean War of 1950.

The US supported Seoul’s economic and military growth in the years after. Under a treaty, some 29,000 US soldiers have been stationed permanently on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the war. Seoul has also relied on US defence might to deter nuclear-armed North Korea.

In return, South Korea supported several US wars, including the Iraq War, and is designated an important non-NATO ally.

In 2025, however, Washington imposed a 25 percent tariff on the country, testing relations. Seoul opted to negotiate rather than retaliate, leading the US to lower tariffs to 15 percent.

Many South Koreans were also alarmed after hundreds of South Koreans were arrested in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids on a Hyundai plant in Georgia in September 2025.

Last October, Trump travelled to Seoul in a historic state visit, and earlier this year, President Lee visited the US. Lee is also trying to resume dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.

How is South Korea being affected by the US-Israel war on Iran?

South Korea is facing an economic crisis. The country relies on the Gulf supplies via the Strait of Hormuz for 60 to 70 percent of crude imports, meaning supply is being severely hit. The war has led to soaring inflation, causing the Korean won to fall to a 17-year low.

Seoul therefore has an interest in freeing up the strait. However, under Korean law, the government will require parliament’s approval before a military deployment, although some governing party members could oppose it.

For the first time since World War II, a far-right party is within reach of power at state level in Germany, after coming first in Saxony-Anhalt on Sunday.

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 44 percent of the vote, stopping short of an overall majority but making clear its wide political significance.

On election night, AfD’s leader in the state called on other political groups to cooperate. “As a democrat, I will reach out to all those who wish to work with us to bring about a fundamental political turnaround,” Ulrich Siegmund said.

Yet, forming a government will prove difficult. The AfD has been classified as “far-right extremist” by the domestic intelligence agency and other political groups remain wary of striking an alliance.

The AfD has dismissed accusations of extremism and mainstream parties have been unable to halt its surge in the polls over recent months. Latest polling indicates the party, which stands for strong restrictions on immigration, restoring ties with Russia, cutting support to Ukraine and quitting the euro, is Germany’s most popular at national level.

The Saxony-Anhalt election could be a harbinger of a historic return of the far-right in the 2029 national election, when forecasts say the AfD stands a realistic chance of finishing first.

What happened in Saxony-Anhalt?

Siegmund, the charismatic 35-year-old who attracted thousands to his campaign rallies, said AfD “made history”.

“The people have made it absolutely clear that they finally want political change and, above all, they have shown that they want it with ⁠us,” he told supporters.

The AfD achieved its best-ever election result in Saxony-Anhalt with 44 percent of the vote, leaving all other parties far behind. The incumbent centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU), led by Chancellor Friedrich Merz, scored less than half of that share with 17 percent.

The AfD is projected to gain 39 of the 83 seats in the state parliament in Magdeburg, leaving it three short of the 42 needed for an absolute majority.

That means the party must find allies, but all other mainstream parties refuse to work with the far-right, a strategy of non-cooperation known as the “firewall”. The AfD has so far never participated in a governing coalition in Germany’s 16 states nor in its federal government.

While he now appears willing to strike deals with other parties to come to power, previously Siegmund signalled unwillingness to find middle ground with other political groups. Leading up to the vote, he stated that he was only interested in governing alone to bring about fundamental political change in Germany.

How did AfD fare in recent elections?

The election takes the AfD one step closer to advancing its agenda, while also reflecting the growing unpopularity of Germany’s ruling coalition.

In Saxony-Anhalt, the party more than doubled its vote share — from 21 percent in the last election. By contrast, the CDU’s vote halved from 37 percent to 17 percent, its worst result ever in the east-central German state.

Federal elections last year similarly resulted in a landmark performance by the AfD, which emerged as the largest opposition faction in the Bundestag, the German federal parliament in Berlin. The party came second with 21 percent of the vote, securing its highest-ever showing.

In state elections in Baden-Wurttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate earlier this year too, the AfD more than doubled its seats — though it still finished third. In 2024, the AfD emerged victorious in the Thuringia state election and second in the Brandenburg state election — both were firsts for the party.

The AfD’s electoral gains in Saxony-Anhalt mirror growing dissatisfaction among voters — especially in the former East Germany — about the stagnant economy, high unemployment and domestic security, which the party largely pins on immigration.

What challenges lie ahead for AfD?

Since its formation in 2013, the AfD has been embroiled in various scandals and has faced major controversies, including alleged foreign espionage links, secret deportation plans and internal nepotism.

The party went from a fringe Eurosceptic group to the country’s most powerful opposition force in little more than a decade, becoming too extreme even for the European Parliament’s far-right Identity & Democracy group. It kicked the party out in May 2024 after lead AfD candidate Maximilian Krah stated that not everyone in the SS – Adolf Hitler’s infamous Nazi paramilitary organisation – was a criminal.

Krah has also been under investigation by German prosecutors for alleged illegal payments, bribery and money laundering linked to China and Russia. The German parliament last year decided to lift the far-right legislator’s immunity to help investigators.

AfD politicians have also come under fire for employing family members, including in Saxony-Anhalt, where several parliamentarians are reported to have employed relatives.

Bundestag President, Julia Klockner, banned seven AfD employees from entering the German parliament over security concerns, after they failed internal background reliability checks due to their ties to right-wing extremist networks and past criminal convictions.

Senior AfD figures also faced a backlash for attending a secretive meeting to discuss mass deportation plans for people with a migration background.

What are the AfD’s prospects for the national election in 2029?

Pollsters are unanimous in forecasting the AfD as the largest party in Germany in the next national election in 2029, with around 28 percent of the vote.

That would mark a major transformation in the German political landscape from 2025, when the CDU and its ally the Christian Social Union together won 28.5 percent of the vote.

Yet even that outcome would not necessarily give AfD the ability to govern. If other parties maintain a “firewall” policy, that could prevent the far-right party from forming a coalition government.

Still, the Saxony-Anhalt election has been received by some politicians as a call for change. “Politics begins with considering reality,” Cem Ozdemir, head of government in the southwestern state of Baden-Wurttemberg and a member of the Green Party, wrote on X.

“That means the AfD is the election winner in Saxony-Anhalt. And that must mean for all democratic forces that nothing can remain as it is, and we must fundamentally reconsider our politics and our political style.”

EXPLAINER

Pick which country is bigger, then watch it morph from Mercator to Equal Earth projection to see how close you were.

The map of Africa is much larger than most people think. However, most classroom maps and atlases still understate it – a distortion embedded in the Mercator projection that has shaped world maps for more than four centuries.

The distortion in question is not subtle. On a Mercator map, which was designed for European colonial exploration and maritime trade in the 16th century, Greenland appears roughly the size of Africa, which is actually about 14 times larger.

The exaggeration increases the farther you travel from the equator, so it falls almost entirely on one half of the world, inflating Europe, including Russia, and North America while shrinking Africa, Latin America and South Asia.

To address this, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted 164 to 1 on Friday to adopt a resolution promoting the Equal Earth projection, which shows continents in their true proportions, as an alternative to Mercator.

Led by Togo on behalf of the African Group and backed by the African Union, it encourages schools, institutions and tech companies to switch, correcting the shrinking of Africa and other equatorial regions. The African Group is the largest regional voting and dialogue bloc at the UN, consisting of 54 African Union member states.

Map quiz: Pick the bigger country

See it for yourself: pick which country is bigger, then watch it morph from Mercator to Equal Earth to see how close you were.

How did countries vote?

The United States was the only country to vote against the resolution calling the measure a “radical ideological project”. Serbia, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine abstained.

US representative Yaryna Ferencevych said before the vote that the resolution is “the reason this institution is losing its credibility”. “Instead of focusing on genuine problems … this body is debating map projects from the 16th century,” she said.

Friday’s resolution is nonbinding, intended only to encourage the world’s default maps to change. The UN said it does not ban Mercator or impose a replacement, but simply encourages wider use of the Equal Earth projection.

Togo’s Foreign Minister Robert Dussey told the UNGA that maps shape education, imagination and collective perception, and that the resolution affirms African reality.

The African Union adopted Equal Earth in March. Togo is planning a meeting in Lome early next year, with UNESCO, the African Union and technology companies including Google, to work out what implementation looks like in practice.

Why flat maps lie

Every flat map lies because the Earth is a sphere and no projection can flatten it without distorting something: shape, area, distance or direction.

Gerardus Mercator, a cartographer and geographer who published the world map in 1569, chose to preserve angles and straight bearings, a trade-off that made sense for 16th-century ships but has kept shaping perceptions of the world for nearly 500 years since. Equal Earth makes the opposite trade-off, preserving true area so continents can be compared honestly, at the cost of slightly bending their outlines.

Yemen’s internationally recognised government has launched a series of air attacks against Houthi positions in the country, marking a significant escalation in the conflict, with some of the country’s heaviest fighting since a fragile truce in 2022.

Government warplanes carried out at least 15 strikes on Friday against Houthi positions, gatherings and vehicles in the western provinces of Taiz and Hodeidah, according to the Yemeni military.

The air assault against Houthi positions provided support to government forces fighting a major Houthi offensive towards the Red Sea coast and the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

These are not the first air attacks by government aircraft since Yemen’s fragile truce began to unravel in July. On July 25, government aircraft struck Houthi missile and drone launch sites and weapons depots in Marib and al-Jawf, according to Yemeni military officials cited by the Reuters news agency.

And less than two weeks earlier, on July 13, Yemen’s internationally recognised government said its forces had struck the runway at the Houthi-held Sanaa International Airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing.

However, the latest attacks mark a significant step up in the government’s use of its own air power against the Houthis, after Saudi-led coalition aircraft provided much of the aerial firepower supporting anti-Houthi forces during the most intense years of Yemen’s war.

Friday’s air campaign comes as the Iran-backed Houthis, who have been vying for control of Yemen for years, attempt to advance through western Taiz and southern Hodeidah towards al-Makha (Mocha), and territory overlooking the critical Bab al-Mandeb Strait at the opening to the Red Sea.

Control of the area could strengthen the Houthis’ position along the Red Sea, where the group has previously attacked commercial and military vessels, while threatening a key government supply route.

The fighting unfolds against a backdrop of the wider regional conflict, with the Houthis recently declaring a Red Sea maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, while disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz during the US-Israel war with Iran has raised the strategic importance of alternative routes through the Red Sea. This means any expansion of Houthi influence around Bab al-Mandeb could have consequences for shipping far beyond Yemen.

Here’s what we know.

What has happened?

Fighting erupted on Thursday as Houthi forces launched a major offensive along front lines in western Taiz and southern Hodeidah, using ballistic missiles, drones and artillery as ground forces attempted to advance towards government-held territory along the Red Sea coast.

The fighting has centred on areas west of Taiz and around al-Makha, a government-held port near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

A Yemeni official in Aden told the AFP news agency that the Houthis were seeking to capture hills overlooking Bab al-Mandeb and al-Makha before pushing towards the coast.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said Houthi forces had made gains in western Taiz.

“According to military officials from the internationally recognised government, the Houthis have been able to take some of those territories,” Mawry said. “In western Taiz, they’ve managed to take over a strategic military base, which is settled on top of a strategic mountain and gives the Houthis an overview of the entire area.”

Mawry said there had been particularly heavy fighting around al-Barah and Maqbanah, where a main road is used to resupply government forces stationed in Taiz and al-Makha.

More than 120 fighters have been killed since the Houthi offensive began, according to an AFP tally, making the clashes among Yemen’s deadliest in years.

Several civilians were also reported killed and others injured after a ballistic missile hit a restaurant in the al-Makha area, according to government-run Saba TV.

On Saturday, at least four civilians were killed and nine others injured in a Houthi missile strike on a crowded road in southwestern Yemen, according to Saba news agency.

The attack by the Iran-backed group on Saturday targeted a gathering of civilians along the strategic Heijah al-Abd Road, south of Taiz city, Saba said, citing local and medical sources.

What is behind the latest tensions?

The Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in September 2014 and subsequently took control of much of northern and western Yemen, prompting a Saudi-led coalition of Arab countries to intervene in support of the internationally recognised government in March 2015.

A United Nations-brokered truce in April 2022 sharply reduced fighting. Although the agreement formally expired six months later, large-scale hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi-backed government forces remained relatively limited and Saudi Arabia pursued negotiations with the group.

No comprehensive peace agreement followed, however, leaving front lines largely frozen rather than ending the conflict.

That fragile status quo came under increasing pressure after the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28, but tensions escalated further in July with the government air force strike on the Houthi-held Sanaa International Airport, preventing an Iranian aircraft from landing.

What do we know about Yemen’s air force?

The modern Yemeni Air Force was created after North and South Yemen unified in 1990, bringing together two militaries equipped with both Soviet and Western aircraft.

Its fleet subsequently included MiG-21 and MiG-29 fighters, Su-22 fighter-bombers, US-made F-5 fighters and a range of helicopters and transport aircraft.

But Yemen’s armed forces fractured when the Houthis seized Sanaa and the political crisis descended into war in 2014 and 2015.

When Saudi Arabia intervened soon after, its coalition targeted airbases, air-defence systems and combat aircraft in a bid to prevent the Houthis from making use of Yemen’s air force.

That left the Saudi-led coalition – rather than the Yemeni government’s own depleted air force – providing much of the air power supporting government forces during the subsequent war.

Saudi-led coalition aircraft conducted tens of thousands of air raids between March 2015 and the 2022 truce, striking Houthi military positions and providing air support during major government ground offensives. The campaign also caused extensive civilian casualties and became one of the most controversial aspects of the war.

Between 2014 and 2022, Human Rights Watch documented dozens of apparently unlawful coalition air attacks on homes, markets, hospitals, schools, detention centres and other civilian sites.

In 2024, the US and the United Kingdom launched a new round of air attacks against Houthi positions in Yemen following strikes on Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea. Earlier this year, the US Pentagon disclosed that US military attacks against Yemen’s Houthis killed 153 civilians in 2025 and wounded another 243. The US had previously denied its attacks had caused civilian deaths.

The conflict in Yemen has caused a huge humanitarian crisis. In 2021, the UN estimated that 377,000 people had died in Yemen since 2014, with 60 percent the result of food shortages and lack of accessible health services.

Why is the Yemeni government using its own air power now?

Previously relying on Saudi-led coalition air force power, the government’s decision to deploy its own warplanes now comes as it tries to blunt a Houthi offensive that initially made gains across several fronts in western Taiz and threatened the main road linking Taiz with the Red Sea port of al-Makha.

Mohammed al-Basha, a Yemeni American analyst and former spokesperson for Yemen’s embassy in Washington, told Al Jazeera that the Houthis had achieved “some initial gains during a surprise, multi-axis offensive across western Taiz” this week, temporarily capturing positions and threatening areas overlooking the Taiz-al-Makha corridor.

But those advances did not produce the wider breakthrough the group appears to have sought, he said.

“The front did not collapse, the Taiz-al-Makha corridor was not severed, and attempts to expand the offensive towards other strategically important positions were stopped,” al-Basha added.

Government and allied forces recovered much of the territory lost during the first day of fighting, according to al-Basha, while Houthi advances on several other axes were contained or repelled.

The government has since sent reinforcements, and the use of aircraft gives those forces another means of attacking Houthi positions and concentrations as they try to retake high ground and prevent the group from cutting the Taiz-al-Makha road.

Why have the Houthis launched this offensive now – and what happens next?

Al-Basha said Jabal Numan, overlooking the Taiz-al-Makha road, is one of the most important remaining contested areas, while a Houthi attempt to capture Jabal Dhu Ba’s, north of Hays, was repelled by National Resistance forces.

Taking such high ground could allow the Houthis to observe and threaten government supply routes, while losing it could make further advances towards al-Makha substantially more difficult.

“The first day therefore ended with a mixed battlefield picture,” he said. “The Houthis gained ground through the initial surprise and speed of their multi-axis assault, but much of that ground was subsequently recovered.”

The arrival of new government-aligned forces, coupled with air support, could make it harder for the Houthis to repeat their initial breakthrough.

“The next phase is likely to be more difficult,” al-Basha said. “Both sides are reinforcing, several positions remain contested, and control of Jabal Numan remains a key immediate objective.

“The coming hours will likely centre on attempts by anti-Houthi forces to recover the mountain, consolidate their lines and prevent another Houthi push towards the Taiz-al-Macha corridor.”

As the United States and Iran exchanged attacks this week, one date was increasingly looming over the conflict.

The US midterm elections on November 3 could prove a pivotal moment in the war, as senior advisers to President Donald Trump seek to prevent the conflict from returning to all-out war before the polls when Republicans will be defending narrow majorities in both houses of Congress.

The push for restraint comes as Washington turns to economic pressure on Iran instead of military force. In August, the Trump administration announced its so-called “Economic D-Day”, imposing sanctions on 60 entities that it says facilitate oil revenues for trade with Iran and threatening other countries doing business with Tehran with secondary sanctions.

At the same time, the US naval blockade of Iranian ports in and around the Strait of Hormuz continues to exert pressure on Tehran’s oil exports.

Vice President JD Vance has meanwhile sought to downplay the war, which the US and Israel launched with attacks on Iran on February 28, as rising fuel prices and public opposition in the US threaten to become political liabilities for Republicans before the vote.

But there are clear limits to the restraint the Trump administration can show, with US forces continuing to strike Iran in recent days, and US leaders insist that further military action remains an option. Vance said this week that “everything that could happen is on the table,” including economic, military, diplomatic and covert pressure.

That leaves the coming two months as a particularly tricky period to navigate. Washington will want to avoid an all-out war while ratcheting up economic pressure, but Iran has its own calculations and could respond militarily anyway, potentially forcing the US into an escalation it would rather avoid before Americans go to the polls.

Here’s what we know.

Why do the midterms matter for Trump?

The midterms will determine whether the Republican Party can retain its narrow control of Congress. If the war escalates again before then, that could persuade more people to vote against the Trump administration.

Containing the fighting until November, therefore, may help prevent an already deeply unpopular war from dominating the political agenda.

A late-August Reuters/Ipsos poll suggested that just 31 percent of Americans support the war, compared with 63 percent who oppose it. Trump’s approval rating has also fallen since the outbreak of hostilities, from 40 percent to 33 percent, according to Reuters/Ipsos polling.

Observers say the Trump administration did not expect things to get to this point.

In early March, Trump insisted the war would last for “four or five weeks”. Instead, the conflict has dragged on, and unexpected consequences – including Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz causing energy prices to spike – have made it even more unpopular with US households.

US diesel prices hit a record high on Thursday, surpassing the previous peak recorded in 2022, as higher crude oil prices and refining bottlenecks drove up the cost of a fuel that underpins much of the US economy.

That is particularly damaging for a president who campaigned partly on a promise to dramatically reduce energy costs – as well as not to get involved in “unnecessary” wars.

The fallout from the war has not stopped at the petrol pump. Sustained increases in fuel and transport costs feed into the price of groceries, manufactured goods and other everyday purchases – potentially worsening inflation when Democrats are making the cost of living a defining issue for the midterm campaign.

A Politico poll conducted in August suggested that 61 percent of Americans believe the Iran war had made life more expensive for their families, four percentage points higher than a month earlier.

Can Trump keep the war contained until November?

There are signs that his administration is trying to do exactly that.

In recent weeks, Washington has intensified its campaign to economically isolate Iran, threatening severe sanctions against countries that continue trading with it while maintaining military pressure around the Strait of Hormuz.

With strikes on Iran earlier this week, Trump has also indicated he is willing to engage in sporadic attacks, while trying to keep the war from escalating back to all-out conflict.

Senior administration officials have simultaneously sought to play down the scale of the military confrontation. Asked at a White House briefing whether the Iran war would be resolved before the midterm elections, Vice President JD Vance said he “wouldn’t call it a war” and claimed there was “no active shooting right now”.

Asked when Iran would stop attacking commercial shipping, Vance said: “You would have to ask the Iranians.” He also said the conflict was having “less effect day by day” on global energy markets. The US claims it is escorting about 30 ships per night through the Strait of Hormuz – and officials claimed some 18 million barrels of oil were transported through on Tuesday this week. However, shipping data does not appear to fully support this claim.

Trying to maintain a strategy of “no war, no peace” with sporadic attacks is high-risk, analysts have warned. Negar Mortazavi, senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based Center for International Policy, told Al Jazeera this week: “Tehran will not capitulate under [economic] pressure. Both sides may believe they can control the escalation, but every new exchange increases the risk of a wider regional conflict.”

One of the US attacks this week is also believed to have hit a civilian home where a wedding was taking place in Kuhestak, southern Iran, killing at least four people, including children, and wounding dozens.

Furthermore, The Washington Post reported on Sunday that senior Army, Navy and Air Force leaders have warned Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth in a written assessment that continuing the war at its current pace is unsustainable and risks undermining US military readiness in other parts of the world.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the US-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told Al Jazeera that this week’s attacks point to a US strategy that remains deeply unsettled.

“I think it’s quite likely that what we’re seeing right now is just complete military, strategic disarray on the American position in which the positions, the actions, the tactics, the strategies keep on getting changed,” Parsi said.

Washington had imposed sweeping economic sanctions on Iran in an apparent attempt to make further military intervention unnecessary, he noted. “Seven days later, the US is back into bombing Iran.”

The US appears to be “jumping from one position to the other”, he added.

What are Iran’s calculations?

While the most recent attacks between the US and Iran have been less intense than the heavy exchanges seen in the early weeks of the war and during the two flare-ups in July, the risk of escalation is high. And it may be in Iran’s interests for that to happen sooner rather than later.

Iran has excelled at the use of asymmetric warfare against an enemy with considerable military might – using cheap, mass-produced drones to exhaust US supplies of very expensive defensive systems, and launching attacks on US allies around the Gulf, sowing disharmony.

In particular, Tehran has demonstrated that it can severely disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, causing global economic consequences.

Continued Iranian attacks on US or regional military assets, shipping or energy infrastructure would place pressure on Washington to retaliate more strongly than via the few attacks it has carried out this week, creating the possibility of an escalatory cycle that could return the two countries to a much wider war regardless of the White House’s electoral calculations.

Furthermore, Washington’s economic strategy to isolate Tehran – an attempt to move away from open warfare – may in fact create a greater Iranian incentive to retaliate.

Parsi told Al Jazeera that Iranian officials appear to believe Trump ultimately intends to restart the war on a larger scale but is just waiting until after the midterms.

That creates a potentially dangerous calculation for Tehran, where it is better to escalate now – while Trump is at his most politically vulnerable. “The reaction of the Iranians to that might be to actually trigger the war themselves early right before the midterm elections in order to maximise the pain that will impose on the US president,” Parsi said.

What happens after November?

Reuters reported on Wednesday that senior White House officials are already considering whether to intensify military operations against Iran after the November 3 vote, although no decision has been made on returning to full-scale conflict, it reported.

A Republican victory in the midterms could give Trump greater political room for this option, particularly if the administration interprets the result as approval – or at least lack of enough disapproval – for the war despite the economic consequences for voters.

A Republican defeat presents a more complicated picture, however. On the one hand, losing one or both chambers of Congress will constrain the administration, as Congress controls government funding. Democratic control of the House or Senate would also give Trump’s opponents greater scope to hold hearings, investigate the US conduct of the war and challenge requests for additional military spending.

Conversely, with Trump no longer facing a congressional election, he may feel less pressure to contain the war, experts fear.

Parsi warned that an electoral defeat could therefore have the opposite effect to what Tehran might expect.

“I’m not so sure that it’s going to pay off necessarily for the Iranians because a Trump that is humiliated at the elections, who is faced with a Democratic [majority] House [of Representatives] and potentially a Democratic Senate, may also become a much more desperate and reckless president,” he said.

As many as 20 million children in 21 countries have experienced online sexual abuse or exploitation each year, according to new findings from the United Nations children’s agency, UNICEF.

More than one in five children aged 12 to 17 in countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe have been targeted on digital platforms, according to the UNICEF report released on Thursday.

Researchers surveyed 21,000 children aged 12 to 17 who used the internet across 21 countries between 2020 and 2021, and then again between 2024 and 2025. They also conducted in-depth interviews with 100 young people who have experienced childhood abuse.

Social media facilitated more than half of the abuse cases, according to UNICEF, which cautioned that figures could be inaccurate due to underreporting by children. Less than 1 per cent of all abusive incidents were reported to authorities, the researchers found.

Last week, US social media giant Meta agreed to a landmark $18bn settlement in a major US federal case accusing the company of endangering children. Meta has faced an avalanche of legal cases this year, most arguing that it has deliberately designed its platforms to be addictive and that they have harmed children. The company has now agreed to make major changes to the features of its social media platforms.

What are the key findings of the UNICEF report?

The report estimated that in the periods studied, more than 15 million children were exposed to unwanted sexual content, nine million were asked to engage in sexual conversations or share sexual images against their will, and four million children had sexual images of themselves shared without their consent.

UNICEF said the issue is compounded by the fact that children often don’t recognise abuse or know who to report it to, and fear repercussions if they do. Formal systems can feel distant, complex or intimidating, the report noted.

“The report reveals a painful reality. More than 20 million children across the countries studied were subjected to unwanted explicit sexual content or exploitation online, often in the digital spaces where they learn, play, and connect with friends,” said UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell. “These experiences cause profound emotional and mental distress. Many children suffer in silence, unsure where to turn for help. We cannot look away.”

Where was data collected?

Information for the report was based on nationally representative survey data collected between 2020 and 2025 from approximately 21,000 internet-using children from the following countries:

• Eastern and South Africa: Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Uganda 
• Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam
• Latin America and the Caribbean: Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Mexico 
• Eastern Europe: Armenia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia
• South Asia: Pakistan

Where are children being abused?

Abuse often begins in public spaces, such as in schools or local neighbourhoods, before moving to digital spaces which can further facilitate harm.

Social media and messaging platforms enable different stages of abuse, “including initial contact, relationship-building, sexual solicitation, image-sharing, coercion, blackmail and the continued circulation of sexual content”, the report said.

Sometimes abuse takes place solely online.

According to the report’s findings, more than 60 percent of cases occurred on social media platforms, with the majority on Facebook (50 percent), WhatsApp (29 percent), Instagram (24 percent), SnapChat (13 percent) and TikTok (12 percent).

Do children report abuse?

Most children do not seek help if they are being abused. Less than one percent of cases are reported to the police, a social worker or a helpline, while more than four in 10 cases not being disclosed to anyone at all.

“Children are not failing to report; they have correctly worked out that there is nowhere to report to,” Nighat Dad, executive director of the Pakistan-based Digital Rights Foundation, told Al Jazeera.

Dad, whose NGO works to provide safe online spaces in Pakistan, noted that incidents repeatedly occur online because of a “design problem – the message request, the move to a private chat, the reshare, the ability to return after being blocked”.

Many children minimise their experiences or do not recognise when they’ve been abused, she said.

Even when children do speak out, to a close friend, sibling, or parent, doing so may not necessarily stop the abuse or bring perpetrators to account.

UNICEF emphasised that its research interviews were the first time many of the children it interviewed had spoken to someone about the abuse they were subjected to.

Dad also cautioned that Pakistan, for example, is a “low-disclosure country” where notions of family “honour” and other cultural barriers prevent children from disclosing the harm they’ve experienced.

“A girl who speaks risks her phone, her schooling and sometimes her safety, and a boy is expected to cope in silence,” Dad said.

How does gender factor into online abuse?

Perpetrators often play on gender norms when exploiting children. Stigma and blame are used against girls to keep them silent, while boys are expected to cope alone, or threatened by perpetrators.

“Peer cultures and harmful norms around gender or masculinity can further normalise behaviours that cause significant harm, making abuse harder to recognise and address,” UNICEF noted.

What kind of impact does online sexual abuse have on children?

The repercussions are severe, UNICEF said: Children exposed to technology-facilitated sexual abuse and exploitation are four times more likely to have suicidal thoughts and to self-harm, along with higher levels of anxiety.

In Mexico or North Macedonia, for example, the risk of suicidal thoughts or behaviours was more than eight times higher among children who experienced abuse, while in Pakistan the risk of self-harm was more than seven times higher than average, the report found.

Abuse extends well beyond the digital sphere, seeping into children’s everyday lives, schooling and relationships.

What should be done about this?

UNICEF said the onus to protect children online must be placed on governments and technology companies, which must change how online spaces are designed and regulated.

It also highlighted that while children often take steps to protect each other, societies, schools and families must work to shift the burden of protection away from children.

Citing Meta’s recent settlement, Dad acknowledged that design changes, such as better age verification and parental controls, can and should happen.

“For years those of us working outside the US were told these defaults would break the product. Meta has now shown the product can change.”

A spokesperson for Meta told Al Jazeera, “This report is based on surveys from as far back as 2020, before we introduced the protections UNICEF recommends, like automatically defaulting teens into private accounts and preventing adults from messaging teens they’re not connected to.

“While the report doesn’t provide any specific evidence of abuse, we’ll continue to fight child exploitation aggressively across our apps and support law enforcement in prosecuting the criminals behind it.”

The spokesperson also pointed out that Meta-owned WhatsApp is a private messaging service rather than a social media platform. “We don’t have algorithms that make a piece of content more or less likely to be viewed, and you need someone’s phone number or exact username to connect with them for the first time.”

Snapchat and TikTok have not responded to requests for comment for Al Jazeera.

The United States and Iran continue to make competing claims about who has greater control of the critical Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf.

Washington claims the strait is open and that dozens of ships, carrying millions of barrels of oil, are passing through each day. US President Donald Trump claimed last month that the US was in “total control” of the waterway, through which one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas is shipped during peacetime, but which has been closed since the US-Israel war on Iran began six months ago.

Iran, however, says the strait remains under its control and is closed except to pre-approved vessels using its designated channels. It has warned that other ships attempting to transit risk being targeted.

So what is really going on in the strait – and what explains the divergent accounts?

What are the latest US claims about the Strait of Hormuz?

The US says shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has significantly increased in recent weeks.

Two US officials told CNN that 40 commercial ships carrying some 18 million barrels of oil passed through the strait under US military escort on Tuesday, in what would be a new wartime record.

Trump gave a similar figure on Monday, saying the US Navy was helping some 30 ships pass through Hormuz every night. He later said the waterway was “under USA control”.

In terms of oil, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that “at least 10 million barrels” were getting through the strait each day, with between 15 million and 17 million on Tuesday.

The assessment comes after US CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper claimed last week that the US military had cleared Hormuz’s transit lanes of sea mines.

Before the war began, an average of around 100 ships and 20 million barrels of oil are estimated to have passed through the waterway each day.

According to figures from PortWatch, this has fallen to an overall average of seven vessels since March.

What does Iran claim about the strait?

Iran has acknowledged that some vessels are getting through the strait, but insists it remains in control of the waterway.

Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on Tuesday said “the enemy managed to get some ships” through Hormuz, but stressed that Iranian forces remain “in complete control of the strait and will not allow it to be opened”.

Ghalibaf accused the US of giving ships “false guarantees” about their ability to cross a southern route in Hormuz, warning that ships that try to do so would be targeted.

The following day, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed two oil tankers had hit mines and were disabled while trying to cross an “illegal route” in the strait. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, claimed an Iranian attack hit a Saudi oil tanker, killing two Filipino sailors.

What does shipping data show?

The latest ship-tracking data paints a different picture than the US claims, with far fewer vessels recorded as transiting the strait.

According to marine analytics firm Kpler, just six vessels crossed the strait on Wednesday, 11 on Tuesday and five on Monday. It put the 10-day average at 13 vessels per day.

Other ship-trafficking services show a similar pattern. Maritime data firm Lloyd’s List Intelligence recorded an average of around 12 transits per day from August 26 to September 1, though the latest data may be incomplete “due to a lag in identifying dark transits”, said the firm’s maritime intelligence and research director, Bridget Diakun. This means that some ships are switching off their tracking beacons.

From August 17-23, Lloyd’s List Intelligence recorded “about 14 non-Iranian-linked ships each day”, Diakun told Al Jazeera.

All these figures are far lower than the US claim that 40 ships transited the strait on Tuesday.

The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC), which monitors threats to shipping in the region, said in a September 1 advisory that commercial traffic through Hormuz was “far below baseline”, despite a “modest uptick from recent lows”.

The advisory put the risk level for Hormuz at “severe”, citing a “continued risk of drifting or uncharted mines”, despite US claims to have cleared the strait of mines.

What explains the discrepancy?

Diakun told Al Jazeera that it is difficult to explain the gap between US-claimed transit figures and those recorded by ship trackers without insight into how the US tallies its own figures.

She said it’s possible the US includes smaller or non-cargo-carrying ships in its total, unlike Lloyd’s, which only counts “cargo-carrying vessels over 10,000 dwt [deadweight tonnage]”.

Eirik Hooper, a senior associate covering the ports and terminals sector for maritime research consultancy Drewry, also pointed to possible differences in how the US counts vessel transits.

“A US operational count plausibly includes everything that moved under or near naval protection: naval auxiliaries, offshore support and tugs, coastal and small craft [and] dhows,” said Hooper, noting that ship-tracking firm Kpler filters out such vessels “on size or cargo grounds”.

Hooper also said the US has access to “satellite, airborne and other sensor coverage plus its own convoy manifests”, which enables it to see vessels not immediately picked up by the normal automatic identification system (AIS) tracking system.

“By late August, the majority of Hormuz crossings were classified ‘dark’ or unknown by route, and AIS data counts often need to be revised to include vessels that switch off their transponders, with confirmed movements backdated,” said Hooper.

More generally, both the US and Iran have an incentive to play up their influence in the strait, the status of which has become a major sticking point in their six-month conflict.

Former US Ambassador Henry Ensher recently told Al Jazeera that he believes the latest cycle of US-Iran confrontation was likely triggered by CENTCOM’s claims to have de-mined that strait, and said “both sides would be well served to stop talking quite so much”.

Wheat prices have risen sharply amid disruptions to Black Sea exports as the Russia-Ukraine war continues and as changing weather patterns cause droughts that have sharply reduced production.

Over the past month, Russia and Ukraine have stepped up attacks on each other’s grain terminals on the Black Sea. With Russia the world’s largest wheat exporter, and Ukraine among the top 10 grain-producing countries, these attacks have taken their toll on global wheat and grain supply.

Chicago wheat futures, the global benchmark for the grain market, hit a three-year high on Friday, before nudging down 0.54 percent on Monday to $7.79 per bushel by 02:00 GMT. Authorities in Russia’s Rostov region called a state of emergency on Friday after announcing that port closures and navigation disruptions in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea basin have led to a pile-up of agricultural products at farms.

Meanwhile, the rising temperatures and lack of rain have threatened to cut this year’s wheat harvest in South Africa’s Swartland, which produces about 20 percent of the country’s wheat.

Here’s what we know:

What impact is the Russia-Ukraine war having on prices?

Over the past month, strikes on ports, vessels and grain facilities amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict have disrupted grain terminals and forced shippers to delay or cancel cargo loadings during the peak export season.

While Russian missile attacks have impacted Ukraine’s grain exports, Ukraine’s drone attacks in the Sea of Azov have also sharply curtailed Russian shipments of both grain and wheat. At the same time, attacks on Russia’s Novorossiysk and Taman ports have increased shipping costs out of its Black Sea ports.

According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Infrastructure, in July, Ukraine suffered 35 Russian attacks on vessels in port, 22 at sea and 67 on port facilities. By comparison, the total number of vessel strikes for the whole of 2025 was just 14.

On Friday, Kyiv’s agricultural minister said recent Russian air attacks have destroyed around 90 percent of retailers’ food logistics. With transport of wheat curtailed, prices have risen, raising fears of food insecurity around the world.

Joe Glauber, a research fellow emeritus in the director general’s office at the International Food Policy Research Institute, said that the issue, therefore, is less the amount of wheat being produced and more about the cost of getting it to buyers and consumers.

“There’s plenty of wheat in Russia and Ukraine, and ultimately that wheat will make it out on to the market. But right now it can’t, or it comes out with a very high cost, and so wheat prices have reflected that,” he told Al Jazeera.

“There’s a lot of wheat in the world…it’s not a question of availability, it’s a question of affordability,” he added.

Egypt, the world’s largest wheat importer, usually spends around $3bn per year on importing wheat. In the first half of 2026, it sourced more than 82 percent of its stock from Russia and Ukraine.

In Asia, second-largest wheat importer Indonesia bought $361m of wheat from Ukraine and $102m from Russia between 2023 and 2024, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity. Indonesia usually sources between 15 percent and 20 percent of its wheat from the two countries.

An official at Indonesia’s Flour Millers’ Association told Reuters last week that current stocks can meet immediate food-grade wheat requirements. “But we don’t have abundant or excess supply. We have to look at other origins such as Bulgaria, Australia, Romania and Argentina for cargoes that do not get shipped from Russia and Ukraine,” the official said.

How does climate change fit into this?

Besides the war in Ukraine, droughts and drier weather patterns have taken a toll on wheat production and contributed to rising prices.

According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), as of July 1, the US, also one of the biggest wheat exporters, is forecast to yield “46.7 bushels per acre, down 0.1 bushels from last month and down 8.2 bushels from last year’s average yield of 54.9 bushels per acre”.

“If realised, the United States yield would be the lowest since 2015,” the USDA said.

In a report updated on August 14, the department wrote: “This year’s small crop is a product of long-term decline in US wheat acreage and widespread drought impacts on HRW [Hard Red Winter wheat] production in the Great Plains States. Total wheat supplies are forecast down 13 percent from the previous year, with larger beginning stocks dampening the effect of the smaller crop.”

For Canada, the world’s sixth-largest wheat producer, the USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service found that for the 2026-2027 production year, total production is forecast to be 34.6 million metric tons (MMT) – also 13 percent lower than the year before – due to reduced planted area and a return to lower-than-average yields.

Amid the heatwaves that have hit European countries over the past three months, wheat production in the bloc has also reduced. According to COCERAL, the European association of trade in cereals, oilseeds, rice, pulses, olive oil, oils and fats, animal feed and agrosupply, the excessive heat is expected to reduce grain crops in 2026 by around 9 million tonnes to 286 million tonnes.

In a report published in July, COCERAL said: “The weather has started to affect corn pollination in the southern half of France and in Hungary. More damage is expected from the forecast heat in other parts of the EU.”

The El Nino weather pattern is also expected to bring drier-than-usual conditions to the Southern Hemisphere this year, with South Africa and Australia expected to experience droughts as a result.

What can be done to mitigate all this?

While the Russia-Ukraine war continues, in July 2022, the year the war started, a Black Sea Grain Initiative was brokered to allow for the safe exports of grain, food and fertiliser from Ukrainian ports to stabilise and lower global food prices.

While that agreement held, more than 1,000 ships full of grain and other foodstuffs left Ukraine, according to the EU. However, Russia ended the agreement in July 2023.

The answer to the current crisis is far from easy, experts say.

Bringing prices down now would necessitate a major shift in war strategy by both Russia and Ukraine, while the impact of climate change could be mitigated by governments implementing policies including improving water management on farms through the use of reservoirs to support drought-affected crops and reduce the loss of production.

Moreover, Glauber explained, while alternative routes exist to ship out grain from Russia and Ukraine, they are costly, adding that a return to a possible Black Sea Grain Initiative “would help calm wheat markets a lot”.

One answer may be for other countries to step in.

According to Glauber, during the 2022 global grain price surge, other wheat producing countries such as India exported more to make up for shortages.

“India, for example, had record exports in 2022. It’s probably less likely this year, just because of El Nino and other other factors affecting them, but they could also provide more wheat. I think the world wheat market proved very resilient in 2022, and I expect we’ll see the same in in 2026,” he said.

EXPLAINER

With almost all votes counted, the ‘no’ side was ahead by 52.5 percent to 47.5 percent, the national broadcaster says.

Voters in Iceland have rejected a proposal to resume negotiations on joining the European Union, dealing a setback to the government’s push for closer ties with the 27-country bloc.

With almost all votes counted, the “no” side was ahead by 52.5 percent to 47.5 percent, according to national broadcaster RUV. Official results have not been announced yet.

The result is not a vote on EU membership itself, but on whether Iceland should reopen accession negotiations that were suspended more than a decade ago.

The government had argued that renewed talks could help Iceland confront growing economic and geopolitical pressures, including tensions over Arctic security.

Opponents of accession instead focused on protecting Iceland’s fishing waters and general sovereignty-related issues that would arise if the country became part of the bloc.

Here is what you need to know:

What was the vote about?

The referendum asked Icelanders a simple question: Should Iceland resume accession negotiations with the European Union?

It was not a vote on whether Iceland should actually join the EU. A “yes” result would have allowed the government to restart negotiations with Brussels. Any eventual agreement on membership would then have been put to voters in another referendum.

In 2009, Iceland applied to join the EU, following a financial crisis that severely affected its economy. Negotiations were suspended in 2013 after a eurosceptic government came to power.

Technically, the referendum result is nonbinding, but the coalition government headed by Social Democratic Prime Minister Kristrun Frostadottir has vowed to respect the result.

What was the result of the vote?

The “no” side won, according to RUV, with 52.5 percent against 47.5 percent for “yes”. Some votes from one constituency were still pending, but they were not expected to change the result.

The outcome represents a setback for Frostadottir’s government, which had presented the referendum as a “now or never” moment for the EU debate.

What’s the debate in Iceland on joining the EU?

The debate has largely centred on the economy, fishing rights and the cost of living.

The most important argument put forward by opponents against membership was the fate of the country’s fishing industry, a major part of Iceland’s economy.

Gudrun Hafsteinsdottir, the opposition leader who campaigned for the “no” vote, rejected claims that Brussels could solve Iceland’s economic problems.

“These are not problems that Brussels will solve for us. These are problems that Icelandic politicians must solve,” she said.

Supporters, however, argued EU membership could help address Iceland’s high inflation and interest rates. Iceland’s central bank rate is eight percent, compared with 2.25 percent at the European Central Bank.

Some also saw adopting the euro as a potential source of economic stability. Nevertheless, Iceland already has close economic links with the EU.

It belongs to the European Economic Area and the Schengen free-travel zone, giving it access to the EU’s single market without being a member.

What triggered the referendum?

The EU debate gained urgency because of a changing geopolitical environment surrounding Arctic countries. Iceland is a NATO member, but has no military of its own and depends heavily on its allies for defence.

However, the country’s left-leaning coalition government, elected in 2024, moved up the EU referendum it had planned for next year after US President Donald Trump mistakenly named the country four times while speaking about his policy towards Greenland.

The government argued that closer ties with Europe could provide Iceland with greater protection and strengthen its position amid growing tensions in the region.

Frostadottir said the campaign had raised discussion about Iceland’s place in the world and its broader geopolitical position.

“We’ve been waiting for this for years to be able to have a vote,” Frostadottir said, adding ⁠⁠that her government would continue its work regardless of the outcome.

What happens next?

It is unlikely that Iceland will resume EU accession negotiations during the current government’s term, which runs until 2028.

The government had already said it would respect a “no” vote. It is also expected to refer to parliament the question of whether Iceland should formally withdraw its EU membership application.

For now, Iceland will remain outside the EU while continuing its existing relationship with the bloc through the European Economic Area and Schengen.

Six months into the war on Iran, the largest US oil companies have posted their biggest profits since 2022, selling less oil at far higher prices. But the conflict is also putting their longstanding Gulf investments at risk, exposing the industry’s uneasy balance between wartime gains and mounting geopolitical vulnerability for investors worldwide.

Since the war began on February 28, Brent crude has risen about 22 percent, from $72 to $88 a barrel.

The Strait of Hormuz – through which one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas was shipped before the war – remains largely closed to commercial traffic, though Iran and Oman agreed last week on a temporary maritime route. Iran says the strait will not fully reopen until the United States fulfils its commitments under a lapsed interim peace deal, leaving longer-term security and management arrangements unresolved.

In the absence of a lasting resolution, the disruption is likely to continue supporting higher energy prices and creating windfalls for producers, despite placing energy companies’ regional assets and future projects at greater risk.

Rahul Choudhary, vice president of Upstream Research at Rystad Energy, an independent energy research company, said the conflict has already reduced the amount of oil and gas US energy firms are drawing from the Gulf region.

“Overall we expect US companies’ share of gas supplies [from the region] to fall by around 40 percent this year compared to last year [and] the share of oil supplies to drop by 30-35 percent,” he told Al Jazeera.

While higher commodity prices have helped offset the immediate financial impact, Choudhary said prolonged disruption is likely to delay major projects and weigh on the future growth plans of US oil and gas companies with a presence in the region.

Who has profited?

The surge in the oil price since early March, when Iran first closed the Strait of Hormuz, has delivered a windfall for oil companies, but gains have been tempered by challenges in the Gulf.

Chevron has limited exposure to Arab Gulf supply disruptions, with the region accounting for just 5 percent of its total global output. The group reported its highest quarterly profit in six years of $12bn in adjusted earnings on July 31.

ExxonMobil, by contrast, has been far more exposed to disruption in the Middle East, with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian attacks on US-linked infrastructure in the region affecting its operations in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which together account for 20 percent of its global equity upstream supply, according to Choudhary.

“We already saw in H1 [the first half of] 2026, the company’s upstream earnings dropped by around $1.3bn compared to H1 2025, due to lower upstream volumes from the Middle East. However, the shortfall was covered well by higher commodity prices,” Choudhary said.

The contrast highlights a broader divide between those US energy companies which have benefitted from tighter global supply – and the corresponding rise in the oil price – and those with assets, partnerships or operations in the Gulf at greater risk of disruption caused by recent attacks on energy facilities.

Where are US energy companies exposed in the Gulf?

The Gulf’s energy sector is dominated by state-owned giants such as Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and QatarEnergy.

Although these national oil and gas companies retain control over the region’s reserves and core infrastructure, US energy firms have carved out strategic positions across the region.

US companies generate revenue through stakes in production assets, joint ventures, production agreements, refining and petrochemical projects, as well as through long-term contracts to provide equipment, engineering and operational expertise.

ExxonMobil has some of the largest US commercial interests in the Gulf.

The company has been a major partner in Qatar’s LNG sector for decades, holding stakes in several QatarEnergy LNG joint ventures linked to the expansion of the North Field. The field is the Qatari section of the North Field-South Pars structure, the world’s largest natural gas field, which Qatar shares with Iran, where it is known as South Pars. ExxonMobil also holds an interest in the UAE’s Upper Zakum offshore oilfield alongside ADNOC.

Similarly, ConocoPhillips joined the North Field East (NFE) and North Field South (NFS) expansion projects with QatarEnergy in 2022 to increase export capacity at Ras Laffan.

The US group, Occidental Petroleum, has become one of the largest foreign producers in Oman, operating the Mukhaizna heavy oilfield, the country’s biggest producing oilfield. It also holds interests in UAE gas and pipeline projects.

Chevron maintains a smaller but strategically important Gulf footprint. Through Saudi Arabian Chevron, the company operates oil assets in the Saudi-Kuwait Partitioned Zone, including the Wafra field. In July, it said it was exploring potential routes to move Iraqi crude to Mediterranean export terminals, which could reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.

Where have attacks on energy facilities taken place?

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a US-registered independent conflict monitor, Iran and Iran-backed groups in the region have carried out at least 172 attacks on nonmilitary infrastructure across the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries since the US and Israel launched their war on February 28.

Energy infrastructure has been hit hardest, with oil and gas facilities, along with power plants and desalination plants, accounting for nearly half (48 percent) of all strikes on nonmilitary targets.

The UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain have suffered the highest number of successful strikes, with the majority aimed at oil and gas facilities.

Among the sites that have been struck are Kuwait’s Mina Abdullah and Mina al-Ahmadi refineries, the Bahrain Petroleum Company oil refinery, and ADNOC’s al-Ruwais Industrial City and the Habshan gas complex.

There have also been several strikes on Saudi Aramco facilities, most recently a drone strike on July 27 on the Abqaiq processing complex, one of the most critical nodes in Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure, processing more than seven million barrels of oil per day.

Nasser Khdour, Middle East assistant research manager at ACLED, said: “Oil and gas facilities, power plants and water desalination plants are likely to remain key targets for Iran because disruption to these sectors can increase economic pressure on Gulf states, while disruption to global energy supplies increases prices and pressure on the US during periods of escalation.”

In March, a drone attack close to the Saudi Aramco-ExxonMobil SAMREF refinery in Yanbu disrupted oil loading at the city’s Red Sea port. While the attack had only minimal operational impact, it highlighted the vulnerability of US-linked energy assets in the region.

Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, the world’s largest LNG export hub, which hosts major joint ventures between QatarEnergy, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, also came under repeated attack in March, at one point forcing the plant to halt production entirely. In June, an explosion as a result of a “technical malfunction” on Qatar’s Barzan gas project, where ExxonMobil holds a stake, killed at least 13 people.

“In terms of gas assets being impacted, major blows have been [dealt to] companies [that are] part of LNG projects in Qatar: ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips,” Choudhary said.

He added that ExxonMobil’s share of LNG supply from Qatar is expected to fall significantly this year to about four million tonnes compared with 13 million tonnes last year, while ConocoPhillips has also experienced reduced volumes to one million tonnes this year compared with 2.5 million tonnes last year.

The attacks on Qatar’s LNG infrastructure could have longer-term consequences. Damage to LNG trains at Ras Laffan could take years to repair, according to QatarEnergy, while delays to Qatar’s North Field expansion projects could push back planned supply growth.

“The attack on LNG trains 4 and 6 at Rasgas damaged roughly 13 million tonnes of capacity, which will take anywhere between three to five years to come back online with a total repair cost estimate of around $3bn,” said Choudhary.

He added that the second most impacted gas project has been the Shah gas project in the UAE, in which Occidental Petroleum has a 40-percent stake and where drone attacks in March caused a fire at the gas plant that halted operations.

The conflict has also affected ExxonMobil’s oil interests in the UAE, Choudhary said. Production from Upper Zakum, where ExxonMobil has a 28 percent stake, was reduced between March and May when export routes were disrupted, limiting the ability to move offshore crude.

Beyond the UAE, the most significant impact on US companies’ oilfield operations played out in Iraq. A drone attack hit the Sarsang oilfield in March, followed by an explosion at one of its storage facilities in April, together causing damage to the field.

Looking ahead, Choudhary said higher prices could support cash flows, but prolonged conflict risks could threaten future growth. ExxonMobil’s $10bn Upper Zakum and Qatar LNG expansions could face delays, while ConocoPhillips remains exposed through investments in higher-risk markets, including its planned 42-percent stake in BP’s Kirkuk operations in Iraq.

“For companies like Chevron and Occidental Petroleum, whose presence are in less volatile countries like Israel and Oman respectively, the impact of escalations will not be as severe, as we have not seen significant disruption in these countries,” said Choudhary.

US oilfield service companies in the Gulf

Oilfield service giants, including US firms SLB (formerly Schlumberger), Halliburton and Baker Hughes, provide drilling technologies, equipment and operational expertise across the Gulf, supporting Saudi Aramco, ADNOC and QatarEnergy.

For oilfield service companies, the outlook is mixed, according to Chinmayi Teggi, energy research analyst at Rystad Energy, a research group. While higher oil prices and energy security concerns could lift demand over time, near-term margins remain under pressure from higher logistical costs, supply-chain disruptions and delayed projects.

“For the Big Three (SLB, Baker Hughes and Halliburton), the conflict continues to weigh on regional revenues,” Teggi told Al Jazeera, adding that second-quarter Middle East revenues were down 8-10 percent compared with the previous year across the three companies, while higher oil prices meant revenues were higher in other geographies.

However, a recovery in suspended operations and production could help drive growth into 2027.

For US companies, therefore, the Gulf remains both an opportunity and a risk.

“The impact on US companies will depend on the extent of exposure and countries in which these companies are present,” Choudhary said.

Their investments have secured US access to some of the world’s most important oil and LNG projects, but the conflict has exposed the risk of operating in a region where energy infrastructure has become increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical conflict.

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly warned Iran against restricting access to the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the waterway must remain open to global commerce.

But for companies with billions of dollars invested across the Gulf, the challenge isn’t just about keeping shipments moving – it is ensuring the infrastructure remains secure, they say.

Meta has agreed to a landmark $18bn settlement in a major US federal case accusing it of endangering children, the terms of which will force the social media giant to introduce new safety features to platforms including Instagram and Facebook.

The social media giant has faced an avalanche of legal cases against it this year, mostly arguing that it deliberately designed its platforms to be addictive and that they have harmed children. It has already lost two of these and been forced to pay damages.

Under the agreement, child users under the age of 18 will see a slew of changes to their Facebook and Instagram accounts, ranging from night curfews to two-hour usage limits, which Meta must implement as part of the settlement reached on Wednesday with 48 US states.

The agreement could have a global ripple effect as several countries around the world are already taking regulatory action against Meta and other social media companies over their platforms.

So, what is in the settlement Meta has reached in the United States, and how will Instagram and Facebook change for users?

What was the lawsuit about?

Twenty-nine US states sued Meta, accusing it of designing its platforms in ways that “encourage addictive behaviour, fail to verify users’ ages, encourage adolescents to bypass parental controls, and inadequately safeguard against harmful content and/or intentionally amplify harmful and exploitative content”, according to filings at the Court of Appeal in California.

The first four of the states that originally filed their federal lawsuit against Meta in 2023 – California, Kentucky, Colorado and New Jersey – began their cases in a California federal trial last week.

The attorneys general bringing the case also asked the court to order that changes be made to Meta’s platforms to protect young social media users. In particular, they demanded that Meta introduce a process of parental verification for teenage users; change its “dopamine-manipulating” algorithms; remove image filters for users’ personal images; forbid the creation of multiple accounts; and end “disappearing” messages and posts.

The lawsuit also alleged Meta had violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act by collecting, ⁠retaining and using personal data from children under 13 without proper parental consent.

In February this year, Meta lost a multimillion-dollar case brought on similar grounds by a young woman referred to as KGM in Los Angeles, over platform features linked to addiction in younger users.

In March, a US jury ordered Meta to pay $375m for endangering children in a case brought by the state of New Mexico.

Last month, a judge in New Mexico also ordered Facebook and Instagram owner Meta to pay a further $567m in a second phase of the trial.

Meta denied wrongdoing but agreed to settle after evidence was heard that Meta knew its products harmed children’s mental health. The total payout – to be paid over 10 years – is a fraction of Meta’s 2025 revenue of $201bn.

The company, which was originally founded as Facebook in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg, agreed to make maximum payments totalling $16.7bn to 47 US states as well as Washington, DC; Puerto Rico; American Samoa; and the Northern Mariana Islands.

Among those, California could receive a $2.2bn payout, while New York could receive $1.1bn. Texas reached a separate settlement worth more than $1bn. Some states will deposit funds they receive in general accounts, while others will earmark portions to address children’s mental health services.

The settlement does not require Meta to discontinue personalised recommendations or targeted advertising.

It also does not address some content researchers found particularly problematic, including posts that made Instagram users uncomfortable with their body image.

“Ensuring teens have a safe and productive experience on our platforms is an absolute imperative for Meta,” Meta said in a blog post. “We want to get this right for parents and teens.”

What changes will be seen on Instagram and Facebook?

Under the agreement, children under 18 using Meta platforms will be restricted to two hours’ use per day, with a night curfew in place from midnight to 6am. Meta will limit “social comparison” features by hiding likes and reactions to children’s accounts, and will ban “cosmetic procedure filters” that alter the appearance of a user’s image, as a default setting. These settings will only be able to be overruled by parental consent.

The company also agreed to disable the majority of push notifications from the platforms during school hours – 8am to 3pm – for teenage users.

It will also facilitate much closer parental supervision of social media accounts by giving designated adults the ability to more extensively monitor and change settings on a social media account.

Parents and guardians will be able to receive information about time spent on platform apps, and usernames of social connections and accounts sending messages to children.

Supervising parents will also receive daily notifications from Meta any time the teen account messages an adult account for the first time, as well as a link to the adult’s account. Parental accounts will also be notified any time the teen account searches for keywords related to suicide, self-harm or eating disorders.

Meta also agreed to improve the technology used to check children’s ages, using its own as well as third-party tools, with regular outside audits on how well this monitoring is working. This measure is particularly notable because Australia banned under-16s from using social media platforms in December last year. However, the Australian internet watchdog, eSafety, found in August this year that more than eight in 10 young Australian teens and preteens continue to use them – largely because age-check procedures are ineffective.

So far, Meta has only agreed to pay 70 percent of the settlement, or roughly $12.7bn, over the next 10 years. It will only pay the remaining amount, about $5bn, if its rivals – including Snapchat, TikTok and Alphabet-owned YouTube – adopt similar measures and agree to pay the same. It also said it would reduce time restrictions to one hour per day if other platforms do the same.

These changes would be phased over time. Once the court approves the settlement, non-personalised feeds would be introduced within four months; broader compliance measures within six months; and major age-assurance requirements within one year.

While these changes will apply to users in the US, it is unclear if Meta plans to introduce them worldwide. However, Meta is already under rising regulatory pressure in European Union countries and those elsewhere to implement similar changes.

How much difference will these changes make?

Critics and child safety advocates have acknowledged that this settlement has forced landmark changes by Meta, the world’s biggest social media company, which owns Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger, each of which has more than two to three billion monthly active users.

However, critics say the central plank of Meta’s latest settlement deal is the move to restrict teens to two hours per day on platforms, rather than fundamentally changing their addictive algorithms.

Sacha Haworth, executive director of The Tech Oversight Project, which campaigns for youth safety online, said the deal is a “historic settlement that will have a lasting impact, but we cannot truly protect all children and teens until these protections are required on every platform and are permanent – that’s something only Congress can do”.

Ella Bradshaw, policy officer for child safety online at the NSPCC, a UK children’s charity, welcomed moves to rein in “addictive” design features like personalised algorithms and likes. “These are the things that we know keep children hooked and feeling out of control of their screen time, so action here is necessary and welcome. However, important gaps remain,” she told Al Jazeera.  

Bradshaw described the settlement as taking “piecemeal action” on tackling risky features and addictive design choices which drive harm of children.

“This means features like disappearing messages, infinite scroll, the ability to gift and livestreaming remain unaddressed. Similarly, little has been announced on how Meta’s AI chatbots will be made safer – better guardrails are needed, particularly when children raise safeguarding concerns.”

Bradshaw also called for stronger protections for younger children as well as protections that “don’t suddenly drop away the moment a teenager turns 18.”   

Furthermore, she said: “Not all children have families they can rely on to oversee their online worlds and help them to stay safe. We know that the issue of patchy online protections extends across the online world.

“This settlement must spur governments and regulators to go further faster; taking stronger action across the online ecosystem including private messaging, AI tools and online gaming. Without that wider shift, children will continue to face avoidable harm.”

What action are other countries taking against Meta?

While action against social media giants in the US is mostly taking the form of lawsuits, elsewhere it is regulators who are leading the charge.

In the European Union, regulators are pursuing several legal and regulatory cases against Meta, covering antitrust rules for artificial intelligence (AI) on WhatsApp, as well as child safety protections and addictive platform features under the Digital Services Act (DSA).

The EU specifically accused the group of designing Facebook and Instagram to be “addictive”, adding that Meta has failed to adequately assess the danger its products pose to users’ physical and mental health.

On Thursday, a European Commission spokesperson said it is waiting on Meta to present changes to limit the addictive designs of its social networks.

“We have been very clear … Meta knows what we are expecting from them. … the ball is in Meta’s court,” Thomas Regnier said. “Now it is for the company to offer these commitments in the European Union to protect our kids here, too.”

In June, the UK government also announced a sweeping ban on social media for those below 16 to come into force next year, following a global trend after Australia pioneered it. The UK is also considering overnight curfews and ways to prevent infinite scrolling for those under 18.

In Brazil, a prominent consumer rights organisation, the Collective Defence Institute, filed twin lawsuits for three billion reais ($525m) in damages against the Brazilian subsidiaries of Meta, TikTok and Kwai in October 2024.

Those lawsuits also accuse the groups of failing to implement safeguards against addiction and use by children and adolescents. Since March this year, platforms have been required to link the accounts of children below 16 to legal guardians under Brazil’s Digital Statute for Children and Adolescents.

South Korea’s media regulator also reacted on Thursday to Meta’s settlement, calling for better protections for young users to be ideally applied worldwide, rather than just in specific markets.

Football’s biggest club competition returns for the 2026-2027 season as the UEFA Champions League gets under way next month, with the draw for the main round taking place on Thursday.

Back-to-back champions Paris Saint-Germain are chasing a historic third consecutive title, while European giants Real Madrid, Barcelona, Manchester City, Liverpool and Bayern Munich will look to dethrone the two-time champions.

The league phase format, now in its third year, will begin in September and run until January. It will be followed by the knockout rounds, with the champions crowned in early June.

Here’s all you need to know about this year’s draw:

When and where is the Champions League draw?

The main round fixtures will be drawn on August 27 at 6pm (17:00 GMT) at the Grimaldi Forum in Monaco.

How does Champions League qualifying work?

Of the 36 competing teams, 29 qualified with their rankings in their respective national leagues. The remaining seven spots were up for grabs in a qualifying competition that began earlier this month and will conclude less than 24 hours before the draw.

Bodo/Glimt, LASK and Sabah became the latest teams to book their place in the elite competition, leaving eight teams to battle it out for the last four places on Wednesday.

Which teams have qualified for the Champions League?

• Arsenal
• Aston Villa
• Atletico Madrid
• Barcelona
• Bayern Munich
• Bodo/Glimt
• Borussia Dortmund
• Club Brugge
• Como
• Feyenoord
• Galatasaray
• Inter Milan
• LASK
• RB Leipzig
• Liverpool
• LOSC Lille
• Manchester City
• Manchester United
• Napoli
• Paris Saint-Germain
• PSV Eindhoven
• RC Lens
• Real Betis
• Real Madrid
• AS Roma
• FC Porto
• Sabah FK
• Shakhtar Donetsk
• Slavia Prague
• Sporting CP
• VfB Stuttgart
• Villarreal

What are the pots for this season?

Under the new format, each team will play fixtures against eight teams – two teams each from Pots 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Four of the eight matches will be at home, and the other four away.

Pot 1: PSG, Bayern Munich, Real Madrid, Liverpool, Inter Milan, Manchester City, Arsenal, Barcelona, Atletico Madrid

Pot 2: Aston Villa, Manchester United, Borussia Dortmund, Roma, Sporting, Porto Club, Brugge PSV, Eindhoven, Real Betis

Pot 3: Feyenoord, Lille, Napoli, RB Leipzig, Villarreal, Shakhtar Donetsk, Galatasaray, Bodo/Glimt, (winner of League Path)

Pot 4: Slavia Prague, VFB Stuttgart, LASK, Como, Lens, Sabah, (3 winners of Champions Path)

When are league phase and knockout matches?

The league phase matches are scheduled for:

Matchday 1: September 8-10

Matchday 2: October 13 and 14

Matchday 3: October 20 and 21

Matchday 4: November 3 and 4

Matchday 5: November 24 and 25

Matchday 6: December 8 and 9

Matchday 7: January 19 and 20

Matchday 8: January 27

The knockout phase matches are scheduled for:

Playoffs: February 16, 17 and 23, 24
Round of 16: March 9, 10 and 16, 17
Quarterfinals: April 6, 7 and 13, 14
Semifinals: April 27, 28 and May 4, 5
Final: June 5

When and where is the Champions League final?

The upcoming season’s final will be held at the Estadio Metropolitano, home of Spanish club Atletico Madrid.

How did PSG win last season’s Champions League?

The French side held their nerve in a cagey ⁠⁠final to retain the title by beating ⁠⁠Arsenal 4-3 on penalties as the nail-biting showdown ended 1-1 after extra time.

Arsenal defender Gabriel blasted his spot kick over Matvey Safonov’s crossbar at the Puskas Arena in Budapest, his miss confirming PSG as the first club to retain the trophy since Real Madrid completed their ⁠⁠three-year reign from 2016 to 2018.

Earlier in August, PSG won the UEFA Super Cup for a second straight year by beating Aston Villa 2-1, thanks to Desire Doue’s second-half goal in the annual curtain-raiser to the European football season.

Doue’s 61st-minute strike after running onto Ousmane Dembele’s pass was initially ruled out for offside, only for the goal to be awarded following a video review, with Matty Cash adjudged to have marginally played him onside.

India has taken a major step towards opening one of its most sensitive areas of defence production to private companies.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approved the transfer of technologies developed by the state-run Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for all conventional missile systems to Indian industry for domestic production, the country’s Ministry of Defence said on Tuesday.

The move marks a significant shift for the sector dominated by government-run firms and research laboratories. Private companies will be able to compete for the technology and production rights, subject to technical qualifications, certifications and other regulatory requirements, the ministry said.

The Narendra Modi-led government says the aim is to move missiles from development into mass production faster, increase domestic manufacturing and reduce India’s dependence on imports.

So, does India’s private defence industry have the capacity to manufacture sophisticated missile systems at the scale and reliability the military needs, is the country moving towards developing its own military-industrial complex, and are there security risks involved?

What did the government announce?

India’s Defence Ministry said Singh had approved the transfer of DRDO-developed technology for all conventional missile systems to Indian defence companies for production inside the country.

“The objective is to enhance domestic manufacturing capabilities, strengthen the defence industrial base, and create opportunities for the participation of Indian MSMEs (micro, small and medium-sized enterprises) and other technology partners in the supply chain,” the ministry said in a statement.

The measure would enable the “successful transition of missile system development to industrial production” and create opportunities for MSMEs and other technology partners, the ministry added.

“DRDO remains committed to working closely with Indian industry to facilitate the transfer and absorption of advanced defence technologies and to further strengthen the country’s indigenous defence capabilities.”

The announcement spans a wide range of missiles, said Aditya Ramanathan, a research fellow with the Bengaluru-based Takshashila Institution.

“It will include surface-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles, anti-radiation missiles, antitank systems, and so on. It will also include more heavy-duty hardware like land-attack cruise missiles,” he told Al Jazeera.

Why is India doing this?

India has traditionally relied heavily on state-owned defence companies to turn weapons developed by DRDO into large-scale production. Bharat Dynamics, one such state-owned company, has long held a monopoly in missile production.

Tuesday’s announcement is a “big change” because it ends that monopoly, said Ramanathan.

“Private companies have been making missile components for years, but what this decision does is allow them to move up the value chain and become prime integrators for these systems,” he said.

While India largely relies on domestically made missiles, it also imports missiles — especially from Russia and Israel, two key weapons suppliers to the country.

But under Modi, India has attempted to both encourage self-reliance in defence — a concept that the government calls Atmanirbhar Bharat or self-reliant India — and prod foreign defence majors to manufacture in India.

At a time when geopolitical allegiances are changing fast, and India faces uncertainties on both major borders — with rivals Pakistan and China — the country under Modi has more than doubled its defence budget, from $38bn in 2014 to $86bn in the current financial year.

The brief four-day conflict with nuclear-armed rival and neighbour Pakistan last year has injected fresh urgency into India’s defence preparedness plans. This year’s defence budget is 16 percent higher than the previous year’s.

Other geopolitical events have forced the government’s hand too, suggested Ramanathan.

“I don’t think this move would have happened as soon as it did if not for the experience of recent wars. Indian decision-makers have been looking at Ukraine, they’ve been looking at the US war with Iran, and of course they’ve been imbibing the lessons of operations from last year,” he said.

“One reason you’re going to need large stockpiles is that, as we’ve seen recently, you’re going to burn through your inventory pretty quickly. The other reason is that your adversary could also degrade your stockpiles using their own precision-strike systems.”

China, he said, was a major factor in India’s calculations.

“India believes that to deter China, which is its most capable adversary, it will need to demonstrate that it can both inflict and absorb really punishing attrition over weeks of gruelling warfare,” Ramanathan said.

To that end, India is also creating a tri-services conventional missile force. “To be a viable and effective force, it’s going to require serious magazine depth, and this cannot be achieved without the active involvement of the private sector,” he added.

What is India’s defence industry already manufacturing?

In June, India announced that it was preparing to spend more than $2bn on military drones from domestic manufacturers, reflecting the rapid expansion of the country’s private defence industry.

More than 600 companies were involved in India’s drone industry, including major groups such as Adani, Larsen & Toubro, and Tata Advanced Systems, as well as startups.

In July, India also approved the purchase of a range of military equipment for its defence forces worth $5.46bn, including missiles, electronic warfare systems and Kamikaze drones.

India is also pushing to rapidly modernise its navy with an eye on Beijing’s growing influence in key Indian Ocean shipping lanes. In December, New Delhi announced plans to procure at least 75 ships and submarines, with most expected to be constructed domestically.

At the same time, India is trying to diversify the foreign sources of its weapons. Over the past decade, New Delhi has worked to move away from its longstanding reliance on Russia for military hardware, expanding defence ties with countries such as the United States, France and — increasingly — Israel.

Does the private sector have the capacity to build missiles?

Private arms manufacturers in India have been increasing spending on bolstering military production in the past few years.

Major conglomerates have invested heavily in ammunition, drones, aerospace and military electronics. Of late, they have started to invest in facilities that aim to manufacture missiles.

Adani Defence & Aerospace, owned by business tycoon Gautam Adani, a close associate of Indian Prime Minister Modi, announced plans in 2024 to invest more than 30 billion rupees ($315m) in ammunition and missile manufacturing facilities in Uttar Pradesh.

The facilities would include capabilities for handling explosives used in missiles and precision munitions.

But commitments and intent don’t build missiles.

“Ultimately, I think the success or failure of this move will depend on how the Indian government places orders,” Ramanathan said. “Making missiles is an incredibly complex and costly affair, and companies are going to have to invest a lot in infrastructure, technology and people. These sorts of investments will only pay off if the government places large enough orders to justify them and also, hopefully, leave these companies with some profits that they can pour back into research and development.”

What missiles does India have?

India has a range of cruise and ballistic missiles, several of which are also capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

In May, on the anniversary of the 2025 war with Pakistan, India successfully test-fired the Agni-V, its most advanced nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach a distance of 5,500km (3,418 miles) — a range that covers all of China, the Middle East and even parts of Europe.

Its other ballistic missiles have ranges from as little as the Prithvi-1 (150km or 93 miles) to the Agni-IV (4,000km or 2,485 miles), again covering everything from border skirmishes with Pakistan to India’s extended neighbourhood.

It also has powerful cruise missiles, like the BrahMos, co-developed with Russia, which has a range of up to 500km (311 miles), and was used in last year’s war with Pakistan.

Is India also exporting missiles and other weapons?

India has dramatically ramped up its military exports in recent years, from just $72m in 2014-15 — when Modi came to power — to $4bn in 2025-2016.

Paras Defence, one of India’s fast-growing defence manufacturers, said this month it expects its exports to more than double in the 2026–27 financial year, up to $14m, driven partly by increased demand linked to conflicts in the Middle East.

Indian arms makers have also been involved in joint ventures with companies abroad. Adani Defence, in partnership with Elbit Systems – Israel’s largest weapons manufacturer – produces the large Hermes 900 armed drone systems.

A 2024 investigation by Al Jazeera exposed how India was exporting rocket parts and ammunition to Israel, even as the Modi government was publicly calling for diplomacy to end the war on Gaza.

In June 2026, Amnesty International said in a report that India’s weapons exports to Israel made it complicit in the genocide in Gaza.

But it isn’t just Israel that has sought and received weapons from Indian manufacturers. Nor is it just bullets and weapons parts that India is exporting today — complete missiles are in demand, too.

In 2022, the Philippines bought three batteries of the BrahMos missiles from India. Since then, Vietnam and Indonesia have signed deals with India for the purchase of these missiles. And India has submitted a proposal to the United Arab Emirates offering to supply the Gulf country these missiles, too.

Is the latest move a step towards building a military-industrial complex?

That appears to be the intention.

While Tuesday’s announcement marks the first time that India’s state-run research and manufacturing facilities will transfer missile technology to the private sector, the government earlier this year shortlisted private firms to manufacture the country’s next-generation fighter jets.

Tata Advanced Systems, a subsidiary of Tata Sons, and Bharat Forge are among companies to be shortlisted, and are emerging as major makers of artillery systems, ammunition and aerospace systems. India has its homegrown jets, but imports the most cutting-edge planes in its arsenal, including the Rafale fighters from France. The Indian Air Force also relies heavily on Soviet-era jets.

Still, while India “wants to build a wider defence industrial base”, said Ramanathan, “it is very far from developing the sort of military-industrial complex that [former US President Dwight] Eisenhower worried about. Power in India still resides overwhelmingly with the government.”

What about India’s military imports?

Despite the surge in domestic manufacturing and exports of specific weapons systems and parts, India on the whole remains a major military importer.

India was the world’s second-largest importer of weapons between 2021 and 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Russia was its biggest source, accounting for 40 percent of India’s imported weapons.

Are there risks in transferring sensitive technology to the private sector?

As the US and Israel bombed Iran in March this year, a group of Iranian hackers claimed it broke into the servers of major US defence manufacturer Lockheed Martin, stealing blueprints of components used in the F-35 fighter jets.

The alleged data breach exposed the risks of private companies — which often have lower security standards and oversight than top-secret government laboratories — holding sensitive information.

But Ramanathan pointed out that in India’s case, “the companies that are most likely to get the missile contracts are all old hands”.

“They’ve been involved in the defence sector in some capacity for decades, and they have experience in dealing with confidentiality and secrecy,” he said.

The Indian government, on its part, also “doesn’t want the technology or its missile secrets to go to its adversaries, and it also wants to abide by its commitments to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which gives India several advantages,” he said, referring to one of the world’s major export-control regimes.

“So India has good reasons, in its own self-interest, to ensure that missile technology doesn’t leak.”

Attacks on Palestinian communities by Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank, which are often supported by Israeli forces, have gathered pace over the past month since settlers from the Havat Gilad settlement attacked Palestinian homes on the eastern edge of Tal, southwest of Nablus.

On Sunday and Monday, the Israeli military raided multiple towns, villages and refugee camps across the occupied territory, and reports of arrests, home searches and settler attacks have continued to mount.

A 15-day siege on three families comprising 15 people, including two children, in the village of Qusra, which is ongoing, drew a rare public condemnation this month from the United States ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, a staunch supporter of Israel and its West Bank settlements.

Israel is also pushing ahead with plans for the so-called E1 settlement expansion close to Jerusalem, which human rights organisations warn would essentially sever the West Bank in two, further hampering the freedom of movement of Palestinians on either side of it and endangering the possibility of a Palestinian state.

The West Bank attacks increasingly fit the definition of a pogrom, experts said. United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories Francesca Albanese described these Israeli attacks against Palestinians as “pogroms against defenceless civilians”.

So why are experts calling settler attacks pogroms, and do they fit the formal definition of one?

What’s happening in the West Bank?

Settlers, frequently supported by the Israeli military, have been attacking Palestinian homes, businesses, and agricultural fields across the occupied West Bank. Such attacks have been commonplace for decades as settlements have expanded across the territory, but they gathered pace after October 7, 2023 when Israel launched it genocidal war on Gaza, and have become particularly violent and frequent over the past month.

Israeli settlements across the West Bank are illegal under international law.

According to the Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, however, Israeli settlers now number roughly 780,000 across the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, living among 192 settlements and 400 outposts, rising to 71 percent of Area C, which is under full Israeli civil and military control, and 91 percent of the Jordan Valley.

Settlers often set up outposts without formal approval around Palestinian villages from which they launch a campaign of harassment, including killing livestock, cutting supply lines and damaging property, in order to drive local residents out. Once they establish a more formal settlement, they often receive retrospective approval from the Israeli government for the settlement.

In some places more recently, illegal settlers have laid siege to individual family homes – such as in the Ras al-Ein area of Qusra – cutting off water and other supplies and damaging orchards or harming livestock.

This has set a new pattern: settlers establish a tent adjacent to individual homes; Palestinians’ homes are besieged, with essentials cut off; and Israeli soldiers arrive not to remove the settlers, but rather to remove the family – through arrest or ostensibly for their “protection”.

In Qusra, the three besieged families were forced together into one of the family houses. Meanwhile, Israeli forces have occupied one of the other homes for use as a military post and thrown furniture and belongings from its windows, according to the Palestinian news agency Wafa.

The UN humanitarian affairs office recorded more than 1,330 settler-related attacks on Palestinians in the occupied West Bank between January and late July this year, averaging six a day and marking the fastest pace since the agency began systematic tracking two decades ago.

Separately, a UN-appointed commission of inquiry has found that the Israeli authorities have repeatedly failed to prevent foreseeable settler attacks and, in some cases, have directly enabled them through army protection and the provision of weapons and funding.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has found that settler attacks, demolitions and evictions forcibly displaced more Palestinians in the first four months of this year than in the whole of 2025.

OCHA reported that 107 communities, comprising 5,900 Palestinians, had been completely or partially displaced as a result of settler violence since January 2023. It also found that the Israeli military have expelled another 32,000 Palestinians from their homes in the occupied West Bank since January 2025, essentially emptying the Jenin, Tulkarem and Nur Shams camps.

What is the definition of a pogrom?

Major US and UK dictionaries vary to some degree on the definition of a “pogrom”.

The British Collins Dictionary identifies a pogrom as “organised, official violence against a group of people for racial or religious reasons”, with a notable inclusion of official, or state-backed violence.

Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary calls it “the organised killing of large numbers of people, because of their race or religion”, without mention of state-sanctioned violence.

Merriam-Webster says it is “an organised massacre of helpless people” – “specifically: such as a massacre of Jews”.

Cambridge Dictionary says it is “an act of organised cruel behaviour or killing that is done to a large group of people because of their race or religion”.

The word is understood to have been introduced via Yiddish and was at first used to describe the wave of violent, organised mob attacks on Jewish communities in the Russian Empire following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881.

It is important to note that unlike legal terms including “crimes against humanity” or “genocide,” “pogrom” has no established legal definition under international law.

Can attacks in the West Bank be referred to as pogroms?

Besides Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories, who has described Israeli attacks against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank as “pogroms against defenceless civilians”, Israeli officials themselves have described such attacks as “pogroms”.

On February 26, 2023, hundreds of Israeli settlers attacked Huwara and surrounding Palestinian communities after two Israeli settlers were killed. A Palestinian was killed, hundreds were injured, and homes, businesses and cars were burned.

The Israeli military’s then-commander in the occupied West Bank, Yehuda Fuchs, called the settlers’ attack a “pogrom”, and it was also recorded as such by the US State Department.

Israeli-Palestinian human rights group B’Tselem has also previously described Israeli actions in the occupied West Bank as “pogroms”, especially after the February 2023 attacks. Later, it followed up with a report titled, “The pogroms are working – the transfer is already happening”, which argued that settler attacks were contributing to the displacement of Palestinian communities.

“Settler violence is not a new phenomenon. But over the past three years, it has become more violent, more systematic and, most importantly, part of a state mechanism intended to ethnically cleanse large parts of the West Bank,” said Yair Dvir, the spokesperson for B’Tselem.

“The government funds and arms the settlers, while the Israeli military stands by and, in many cases, actively participates in the attacks,” he told Al Jazeera. “So far, these militias have expelled 64 Palestinian communities and taken control of around one million dunams of land.”

Dvir also told Al Jazeera that the Israeli settlers are “now carrying out organised attacks on established Palestinian villages and towns in order to drive out their residents”.

“These are armed militias operating as an unofficial arm of the state, with a shared goal: to ethnically cleanse as much of the West Bank as possible,” he added.

The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, which is named after Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, who is credited with coining the term genocide after the Holocaust, referred to settler attacks on Al-Mughayyir, a Palestinian village in Ramallah, as “pogroms”, reporting that hundreds of armed settlers attacked residents and burned buildings and cars while soldiers stood by earlier this year. In 2025, the Israeli military uprooted thousands of Palestinian olive trees at Al-Mughayyir.

Raheel Dhattiwala, an Indian scholar who focuses on collective violence, told Al Jazeera: “West Bank attacks fit the characteristics of a pogrom – systematic targeting of one civilian group by another with state approval. A few senior Israeli army officers have called it ‘pogroms’ in the past too, for example after attacks in Huwara.

“One might want to debate the use of the term, ‘pogrom’, but it is accurate to call settler violence systematic attacks of occupiers, with government approval, on groups of occupied people.”

Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, (MBS), is on the second day of his two-day state visit to France, where he’s meeting President Emmanuel Macron.

In this explainer, we outline what they are expected to discuss and examine how their latest meetings build on an already evolving relationship.

What is on the agenda?

MBS’s visit to Paris began on Sunday evening alongside President Macron at the closing ceremony of the Esports World Cup. It was the first time the Esports tournament, which includes competitions ranging from video games to chess, had been held outside Saudi Arabia.

On Monday, Macron and Bin Salman are expected to sign several agreements on health, transport and energy.

French media reported that a deal to build a Dragon Ball-themed amusement park, backed by a Saudi investment fund and inspired by the iconic Japanese manga series, could be signed.

Valerie Pecresse, President of the Regional Council of Île-de-France in Greater Paris, told French broadcaster TF1 that the regional government had been working on the project for 18 months.

“There is a very important meeting at the Elysee today that may result in the signing of this agreement. We are waiting for the signature,” she said, describing the project as “on the scale of Disneyland”.

Bin Salman and Macron are also holding bilateral discussions on regional security and their economic ties.

That is expected to include discussions about energy routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz, such as new pipelines, capacity upgrades and alternative port networks.

France is a major buyer of Saudi oil and mineral products.

Since the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran on February 28, shipping has been severely disrupted in the Strait of Hormuz – the vital waterway on which oil exporters in the Gulf are heavily reliant and where 20 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas supplies are shipped from during peacetime. The disruption sent oil prices soaring.

Before the war, a barrel of Brent crude – the global benchmark – cost about $66. Over the course of the conflict, prices have climbed above $100 – hitting a high of $119 early on in the war.

On Monday, Brent was trading around $93 a barrel.

Bin Salman and Macron are also expected to discuss the war in Iran, the bloodshed in Palestine, as well as developments in Syria and Lebanon, where Israel occupies around one-fifth of its territory.

Other expected topics on Monday’s agenda include global events that Saudi Arabia is set to host in the coming years, including Expo 2030, focusing on sustainability and urban innovation, and the 2034 football World Cup.

How much trade does Saudi Arabia do with France?

The two countries have a fairly equal trading balance.

In 2024, France exported $4.5bn worth of goods to Saudi Arabia and imported $4.6bn worth, according to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), an online platform that compiles and visualises international trade statistics.

Refined petroleum accounted for 72 percent of Saudi Arabia’s exports to France in 2024. Besides refined petroleum, Saudi Arabia exported crude petroleum and other mineral products to France. It also exported small amounts of machinery, chemicals and cars.

France’s exports to Saudi Arabia in 2024 were more diverse, including airliners, helicopters, gas turbines, pharmaceutical products and perfume, among other products.

What have relations between Saudi Arabia and France been like?

Sunday’s visit marked the third time MBS has visited France after trips in 2022 and 2023.

In December 2024, Macron visited Riyadh, where the two countries founded the Saudi-French Strategic Partnership Council, which formalised and upgraded political and economic ties between Saudi Arabia and France.

The current visit is also MBS’s first international trip since the August 7 signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, known as the Mecca pact – the mutual defence agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan.

Signed by the prince, Turkiye’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, the agreement commits all three states to treat an armed attack on any one of them as an attack on all three.

Analysts say the pact shows that Saudi Arabia is taking steps to diversify its security partnerships beyond Washington.