escalation

It is increasingly difficult to regard what is happening in the West Bank as merely a series of measures that the Israeli government justifies on security grounds or as part of counterterrorism operations. Taken together, the cumulative pattern and expanding scope of these measures point to a broader political and territorial trajectory: one aimed at reshaping the West Bank, imposing new facts on the ground, entrenching Israeli control and advancing the de facto annexation of large parts of the territory while simultaneously subjecting Palestinians to mounting pressure that, directly or indirectly, pushes them from their land.

Israeli, journalistic and research reports have documented the intensification of this trajectory through settlement expansion, land confiscation, restrictions on Palestinian movement, control over water resources and grazing areas as well as military operations and repeated internal displacement in several parts of the West Bank.

Considered individually, each of these measures may appear to be a separate issue. Viewed together, however, they reveal a more consequential development: an effort to re-engineer the geography and demography of the West Bank in ways that undermine the prospect of establishing a contiguous and viable Palestinian state.

The question, therefore, is no longer simply what is happening in the West Bank.

The more urgent question is how can Jordan, the Palestinians, the Arab world and the international community prevent this trajectory from becoming a permanent reality.

Jordan Valley at the heart of the equation

The Jordan Valley assumes exceptional importance in this context, not only because of its geographical and security significance but also because of its agricultural and economic importance and its water resources for the Palestinian people.

Reports concerning the construction of a new Israeli barrier, referred to as the “Crimson Thread”, extending roughly 480km (300 miles) from the Golan Heights to the Red Sea, warrant serious Jordanian, Arab and international scrutiny, particularly if such a project is intended to isolate the Jordan Valley and place as much as 83 percent of its total area under Israeli control.

Such a development could in effect sever the West Bank from Jordan and deprive Palestinians of one of their most important agricultural and water resources.

Borders, walls, roads and settlements cease to be merely physical infrastructure when they are combined with control over land and water. They become instruments for reshaping political and demographic geography and weakening the ability of Palestinians to remain on their land.

This is precisely where the Palestinian issue intersects directly with Jordan’s national security.

Jordan faces a different phase

Jordan cannot treat developments in the West Bank as an exclusively Palestinian matter. At its core, this is an issue of Jordanian national security, regional stability and the future of the Palestinian cause.

Any fundamental change to the geographical or demographic reality of the West Bank will inevitably carry direct consequences for Jordan because of geography, history and proximity. And if the eventual outcome is forced displacement, then, as King Abdullah II has repeatedly made clear, such a scenario would amount to a declaration of war on Jordan.

The policy required of Jordan at this stage, therefore, must be proactive: one that anticipates possible scenarios and prepares for them politically, diplomatically, economically and in security terms.

First: Protect Jordanian national unity

Jordan’s first line of defence is its national unity.

At this stage, it is essential to strengthen the concepts of citizenship and the state, consolidate full equality among Jordanians, and reject any discourse or practice that creates divisions on the basis of origin, region or roots.

The Palestinian cause must remain a national, Arab and humanitarian cause. It must not be allowed to become a source of division within Jordanian society.

Responsibility falls on both the state and society to confront hate speech and incitement, apply the law equally and fairly, and protect the national fabric from attempts to exploit regional turmoil to sow division among Jordanians.

One of the gravest outcomes Jordan must prevent is the transfer of the conflict into its own domestic sphere. Relations among Jordanians of different origins, including those of Jordanian and Palestinian heritage, must never become a vulnerable fault line through which those seeking discord, whether from within the country or from abroad, can operate.

National unity, therefore, is not merely a social value. It is an integral component of Jordan’s national security architecture.

Second: Move from diplomacy of protest to diplomacy of pressure and proportionate action

Jordan has accumulated considerable international credibility and diplomatic capital. The present phase, however, requires Jordan to expand the tools at its disposal.

It is no longer sufficient simply to condemn settlement activity, reject annexation or warn against displacement. What is needed is an Arab, Islamic and international diplomatic front capable of translating political positions into practical measures.

In coordination with Palestine and Arab and Islamic states, Jordan should work to:

• Mobilise countries that reject annexation and settlement expansion.
• Support international legal action.
• Push for concrete measures and sanctions not only against settlements but also against state policies that enable and encourage them.
• Systematically document violations.
• Use Arab political and economic relations with influential states more strategically, expanding economic cooperation with countries that adopt firm positions against the Israeli occupation while recalibrating engagement with those that remain reluctant to take clear positions towards Israeli policies.
• Build an international coalition capable of preventing the imposition of irreversible facts by force.

A comparison with Russia’s war in Ukraine is instructive. When Russia occupied large areas of Ukrainian territory, sanctions were not confined to the territories under occupation; they were imposed on Russia itself. The question, therefore, is why a different standard should apply elsewhere.

The international community does not lack resolutions or statements. What it lacks is the conversion of political will into a tangible cost for those who violate international law.

Third: Establish an Arab and Islamic fund for Palestinian resilience

If the objective is to prevent displacement and enable Palestinians to remain on their land, financial support must become a sustained strategic policy rather than seasonal assistance tied to moments of crisis.

One option would be to establish an Arab, Islamic and international fund dedicated to strengthening Palestinian resilience with a mandate to finance specific projects in the West Bank and Gaza, including:

• Protecting land threatened with confiscation.
• Supporting farmers.
• Developing water resources and irrigation networks.
• Assisting affected families.
• Financing housing projects in vulnerable areas.
• Supporting education and health services.
• Assisting municipalities and local councils.
• Providing alternative sources of income to families who have lost employment as a result of Israeli measures.

Resilience is not merely a political slogan. It is a material reality.

Every Palestinian family who remains on its land, every farmer who continues to cultivate his fields and every village that retains access to its water resources represents part of the effort to prevent displacement.

Fourth: Treat the Jordan Valley as a Jordanian national security issue

Jordan should address developments in the Jordan Valley as a permanent strategic file.

A specialised Jordanian mechanism should be established to monitor:

• Settlement expansion.
• Land confiscation.
• The construction of roads, barriers and walls.
• Demographic changes.
• Control over water resources.
• Population movements and displacement.
• Any measures that could permanently alter the status quo.

These developments should be documented through maps, satellite imagery, statistics and official records so Jordan maintains a comprehensive dossier that can be used politically and legally before the international community.

Struggles over land are not determined by force alone. They are also shaped by documentation, maps, law and the ability to present an authoritative, evidence-based account of what is happening.

Fifth: Strengthen Jordan’s national defence architecture

Strengthening Jordan’s ability to protect its security, borders and national interests is not optional.

Jordan is a country with limited resources, but it possesses significant human and institutional expertise. It can further develop an advanced national defence, civil protection and crisis-management architecture.

This could include strengthening national service and training programmes, enhancing civil defence preparedness, protecting critical infrastructure, reinforcing cybersecurity and border security, and improving disaster and emergency management.

Jordan could also draw on the extensive experience of retired military personnel through structured national programmes under the supervision of appropriate state institutions, thereby strengthening the country’s overall defensive readiness.

The strength Jordan requires is the strength of deterrence, protection and preparedness, not an impulse towards an ill-considered confrontation.

Sixth: Prevent Jordan from becoming an “alternative homeland”

This issue must remain at the centre of Jordanian strategic calculations.

Any project that directly or indirectly leads to the depopulation of the West Bank or pushes large numbers of Palestinians towards Jordan is not merely a humanitarian question. It would carry profound political, security and demographic consequences for the kingdom.

Jordan’s position, therefore, must remain unequivocal: Resolving the Palestinian question cannot come at Jordan’s expense; displacement is not a political solution; and Jordan is not an alternative homeland for the Palestinian people.

At the same time, Jordan must preserve the humanitarian and legal dimensions of its response to any forced developments, so that opposition to displacement does not translate into further suffering for civilians.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Pakistani security forces report ongoing cross-border fire in latest escalation in fighting between the neighbours.

Pakistan has foiled an “attempted Afghan aggression” on the Pakistan-Afghan border.

Pakistani security sources said several Afghan members of the Taliban were killed in an intermittent exchange of fire in the Gulistan area of the border on Friday and that fighting was ongoing.

There has been no official confirmation from either country involved.

The Afghan government said on Thursday that it would deliver an “appropriate response” to Pakistani air attacks on 10 locations in Afghanistan earlier in the day.

The strikes were in response to a “deliberate and unlawful incursion into Pakistan by drones” on Wednesday, Pakistani Information Minister Attaullah Tarar said on Thursday.

Tarar said in a post on his X account that Pakistan’s aerial and drone attacks hit “terrorist hideouts and support infrastructure including drone launching and storage sites”.

He also posted a video said to show the military strikes on the Afghan sites.

Afghanistan’s government spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said the air strikes targeted Kandahar, Paktia and Khost provinces.

Taliban officials denied that their government launched drones against Pakistan on Wednesday.

The air raids on Thursday were carried out amid growing tensions between the former allies over attacks by armed groups in Pakistan, which triggered their worst fighting in years in February.

Islamabad accuses Kabul of harbouring fighters who stage cross-border attacks, but Afghanistan’s government denies harbouring anti-Pakistani armed groups and says the attacks are Pakistan’s internal problem.

The escalation threatens mediation efforts by China, Turkiye, Qatar and Saudi Arabia to broker a lasting peace between the two neighbours.

Islamabad, Pakistan — More than 16 months after India and Pakistan fought a four-day air war, firing missiles and drones at each other, the South Asian neighbours came the closest since then to a military face-off — this time in the Arabian Sea.

Indian and Pakistani naval vessels collided on Tuesday, setting off tit-for-tat accusations. Pakistan’s government summoned India’s top diplomat in Islamabad on Wednesday, mirroring action New Delhi had taken hours earlier when it summoned Pakistan’s charge d’affaires and lodged a protest of its own over the incident.

The collision is the first direct military encounter between the nuclear-armed neighbours since their four-day conflict in May 2025, when Indian air strikes and Pakistani retaliation brought both countries closer to full-scale war than at any point in decades.

So far, details of what happened remain disputed. Neither government has released video, track data or an independent account – and each statement places the blame on the other’s vessel.

But analysts say it underscored the risks of unintended incidents in the seas that could potentially escalate into broader crises, when India and Pakistan have few military and diplomatic mechanisms left in place to defuse tensions.

Two accounts

According to Pakistan’s Foreign Office statement issued on Wednesday evening, the navy has been conducting its biennial SEASPARK-26 exercise inside its exclusive economic zone since September 1 .

A country’s EEZ extends 200 nautical miles (370km) from its coast. Its territorial waters are only 12 nautical miles (22km) from the coast, with the rest of the EEZ in international waters. While vessels from other countries can pass through a nation’s EEZ in international waters unencumbered, they cannot exploit the waters economically: that right belongs only to the country whose EEZ it is.

Pakistan said that an Indian vessel, identified as the guided-missile destroyer INS Kolkata, had “repeatedly” tried to enter the exercise area since September 7 .

On September 15 , it said, Kolkata made a “dangerous” change of course that brought it into contact with a Pakistani vessel identified in local media as PNS Hunain, an offshore patrol vessel.

“Pakistan strongly rejects this belligerent Indian action,” the Pakistani Foreign Office said, calling it a violation of a 1991 bilateral agreement requiring warships to stay at least three nautical miles (5.5km, 3.4 miles) apart in international waters.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs said the warship was on “routine surveillance” in international waters when a Pakistani vessel approached at high speed and manoeuvred unsafely.

Neither government has named the vessels in its own on-record statement, and India has not confirmed or denied the Kolkata identification.

The two navies last collided in June 2011, when Pakistani frigate PNS Babur brushed against Indian frigate INS Godavari in the Gulf of Aden, while escorting a merchant vessel freed from Somali pirates.

Each side blamed the other then too. That row faded within weeks.

The risks

Retired Vice Admiral Ahmad Saeed of the Pakistan Navy said the pattern — two ships pressing close without a clear intent to collide — was familiar from Cold War-era “bumping” incidents between Soviet and US ships in the Black Sea.

But he argued that India and Pakistan are worse placed to manage similar encounters.

“There’s no bilateral Incidents at Sea agreement, the kind the US and USSR signed in 1972, and no navy-to-navy hotline,” Saeed told Al Jazeera. “Article 10 sets a distance, but it gives no manoeuvring rules and no procedure for investigating an incident afterwards. That gap is exactly why each side can just accuse the other.”

Article 10 of the 1991 confidence-building agreement between the two nations requires warships to stay at least three nautical miles (5.6km, 3.5 miles) apart in international waters.

Saeed said the greater risk was what might follow the collision: sharper tactics such as fire-control radar lock-ons or helicopter overflights and eventually “a contact with actual casualties.”

Muhammad Shareh Qazi, a Lahore-based security and maritime analyst, however, pointed to the same 1991 agreement, which he said requires 30 days’ written notice before a military exercise, as well as international collision regulations that apply to both countries as signatories to the UN maritime convention.

“If this collision really had the potential to escalate militarily, you’d have noticed by now,” Qazi said. “There’s a tool for that, called chaff, fired just above the bow or stern purely to signal you could escalate if needed. Nothing like that happened here.”

Both navies also have their own internal accountability channels, he added, with a captain found to have acted without authorisation facing a court martial process separate from any diplomatic protest.

On fishermen routinely detained for straying across the Sir Creek boundary, which is not demarcated between India and Pakistan further south, Qazi said the link to incidents further out at sea was indirect but real.

“Clear demarcation could help close those ambiguities over time, by reducing the ambiguity around where and how these interactions are expected to occur,” he added.

Saeed was more cautious about how contained an incident like this would remain.

“This hasn’t stayed quiet. Both governments went public with protests within a day of each other,” he said, adding that what made the moment riskier than 2011 was that “both publics are primed after last year’s conflict, which was not the case in 2011.”

Similar close-quarters confrontations have become more frequent between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

In the most recent flare-up, on July 24 , Philippine officials said a Chinese vessel came within about seven metres (23 feet) of a Philippine fisheries boat near Scarborough Shoal, the Philippine-claimed reef that China has controlled since 2012, and that Chinese coast guard ships fired water cannon at Philippine vessels.

Whether this week’s collision follows that pattern or fades like the 2011 incident depends less on the ships than on what comes next diplomatically, Qazi said.

“If, in the next 24 to 48 hours, an official statement suggests there was a genuine cause to manufacture an incident for the purpose of escalation, then yes, there may be a real possibility of this happening again,” he added.

WASHINGTON — A bold military push by Iran and its proxies to create a choke hold on global oil supplies has once again caught the Trump administration off guard, threatening a market shock and a steep political backlash in the U.S. midterm elections.

A drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s most crucial pipeline, which siphons crude oil from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, has led to the line’s closure, potentially taking 4% of the world’s supply off the market.

And a lightning advance by Iran-backed Houthi rebels along Yemen’s Red Sea coast threatens commercial traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, second only to Hormuz in its importance to regional shipping.

The strikes put the Trump administration in a newly precarious position less than two months until the November midterms. President Trump’s military advisors have warned him that any retaliation could lead to a further depletion of critically low U.S. munition stockpiles, endanger American personnel in the field and risk escalation that could spiral out of Washington’s control.

A semi prepares for departure from a Pilot fuel station Monday in Buda, Texas.

(Brandon Bell / Getty Images)

On Tuesday, the global price of oil topped $107 a barrel — the first time in U.S. campaign history that an incumbent president has faced rising pump prices at this stage of an election.

The Iranian strikes come as Europe and the United States are facing increased energy needs entering the fall and winter months, and as Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure have surged, pushing diesel prices up to record highs.

Signs are emerging that the latest attacks could trigger an acute market panic, with Brent crude buyers paying a steep premium for early delivery — an indication that the industry fears an impending supply crisis.

“I fear there is a considerable risk of much higher gas and diesel prices in the weeks to come,” said Michael O’Hanlon, director of research of the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution.

“No one is quite sure how to predict the fuel markets,” he added, “but the military dynamics are seriously worrisome.”

Last week, Trump told reporters that the Iranian government is “desperate to try and affect the election” and could be trying to keep oil prices elevated to hurt Republican prospects.

“Right after the election, oil prices are going to be tumbling downward,” Trump said. “I think it’s going to take a little bit longer than the midterm.”

Traders work on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange on Monday morning.

(Michael M. Santiago / Getty Images)

Polls have found that likely voters are prioritizing the economy far beyond any other policy matter going into the fall election season, with a New York Times poll published Tuesday showing voters trusting Democrats to handle the economy more than Republicans.

“There’s no quick fix,” said Simon Henderson, the director of the Washington Institute’s Gulf and Energy Policy program. “The main question is whether it is a big shock to the oil market or just another more minor shock. The answer depends on whether the damage to the East-West pipeline cable is repaired quickly.”

Region on edge

The latest Iranian campaign threatens Saudi Arabia’s economic core, straining a long-standing alliance built on robust U.S. defense of Riyadh’s vital interests.

The attack on the East-West oil pipeline originated in Iraq, where Iran continues to operate proxy militias, according to government officials in Riyadh and Baghdad. Saudi Arabia agreed not to retaliate militarily against targets on Iraqi soil, temporarily staving off a regional conflagration.

While the Iraqi militia group denied involvement, it also praised the Houthi advance in Yemen and the militants’ “ongoing battlefield victories against Saudi forces.”

Israel has been providing Saudi Arabia with intelligence to help thwart further attacks, using American military intermediaries, according to Israeli media reports.

Active combat in the war between Iran and the United States eased after a ceasefire was brokered in June. While that truce collapsed in July, the two sides have opted for asymmetric tactics over the resumption of direct attacks, with the United States maintaining a full naval blockade of Iranian ports.

The Trump administration has since focused instead on targeting Iran’s economic partners with aggressive secondary sanctions, seeking to further pressure Tehran into a meaningful peace agreement. But negotiations have failed for months to get back off the ground.

When he first launched the war in February, Trump projected the mission would last roughly six weeks. He said the goal of the U.S. operation was to incapacitate Iran’s ballistic missile program, its navy and its nuclear program.

Trump was warned ahead of the war by his joint chiefs of staff that Iran could attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz in response. But he dismissed the threat, anticipating Tehran would quickly back down from a direct confrontation with the United States.

More than six months on, Iran’s ballistic missiles continue to pressure U.S. defense systems across the Middle East. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted and discussions on Iran’s future nuclear work have broken down. In private, Trump administration officials fear the war could drag through the remainder of the president’s term.