energy security

Major central banks are confronting an increasingly difficult inflation landscape as multiple price pressures converge, raising questions over whether policymakers can continue treating inflation shocks as temporary.

The U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England all meet this week against a backdrop of elevated inflation driven by rising energy costs, geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, fiscal stimulus, labor market tightness and climate related risks.

While central banks have traditionally argued that isolated price shocks eventually fade without requiring aggressive monetary tightening, economists warn that today’s inflation environment is no longer defined by a single disruption but by several overlapping forces reinforcing one another.

Inflation remains well above target

The Federal Reserve’s preferred inflation measure, the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Price Index, is expected to remain significantly above the central bank’s 2 percent target.

Economists expect headline PCE inflation to stand at 3.7 percent and core inflation, which excludes food and energy, at 3.3 percent.

Inflation has remained above the Fed’s target for more than five consecutive years, complicating expectations that price growth will naturally return to normal levels.

Energy prices return as a major concern

Renewed military tensions in the Middle East have pushed crude oil prices sharply higher, adding fresh uncertainty to the global inflation outlook.

Brent crude briefly climbed above $100 per barrel before easing, while volatility in oil markets has increased as conflict around the Gulf and Red Sea threatens global energy supplies.

Higher crude prices have translated into rising fuel costs, with average U.S. gasoline prices now more than 30 percent above levels recorded a year earlier.

For central banks, energy inflation remains particularly difficult because monetary policy cannot directly resolve geopolitical conflicts or supply disruptions.

Food inflation adds further pressure

Food prices are emerging as another source of concern.

Annual U.S. food inflation already stands near 3 percent, while forecasts suggest stronger El Niño weather conditions could reduce agricultural production and lift global food prices over the coming months.

Some projections indicate food inflation could approach 5 percent next year, adding further upward pressure to overall consumer prices worldwide.

Unlike financial market volatility, rising food and fuel costs directly affect households and often shape public perceptions of inflation more than broader economic indicators.

Core inflation refuses to ease

Although policymakers often focus on core inflation because it removes volatile food and energy prices, underlying price pressures remain stubbornly elevated.

Persistent wage growth, continued strength in consumer spending and resilient labor markets have prevented meaningful progress toward the Fed’s inflation target.

Economists also warn that prolonged increases in food and energy prices eventually feed into broader consumer prices, making it increasingly difficult to separate temporary inflation from structural trends.

Tariffs and artificial intelligence create new price risks

Additional inflationary risks are emerging from trade policy and technological investment.

President Donald Trump’s renewed tariffs on imported goods could increase costs across multiple industries, while continued demand for artificial intelligence infrastructure has intensified shortages in advanced semiconductor markets.

Higher chip prices are expected to affect consumer electronics and industrial production, creating another potential source of inflation in manufactured goods.

Meanwhile, expansionary fiscal policies and strong financial conditions continue to support consumer demand, limiting the slowdown in prices that central banks have been seeking.

Strong labor markets complicate policy

Employment conditions remain exceptionally resilient across advanced economies.

In the United States, unemployment has remained near historically low levels, while wage growth above 3 percent continues to support household spending.

Although robust labor markets are generally viewed as positive for economic growth, they also contribute to persistent service sector inflation by increasing business labor costs.

This has made it harder for central banks to achieve price stability without risking slower economic growth.

Analysis: Inflation risks are becoming structural

The challenge facing central banks is no longer whether one inflation shock will fade but whether multiple overlapping shocks are creating a new inflation environment.

Energy markets remain vulnerable to geopolitical conflict. Climate related disruptions continue to threaten food production. Trade barriers are increasing production costs, while the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence is reshaping industrial demand and supply chains. At the same time, strong labor markets and expansionary fiscal policies continue to support consumer spending.

Individually, policymakers can argue that each of these factors is temporary or outside the influence of interest rates. Collectively, however, they reinforce one another and increase the likelihood that inflation remains above target for longer than anticipated.

For the Federal Reserve and other major central banks, the risk is no longer simply misjudging one temporary shock. The greater challenge is determining whether today’s inflation reflects a lasting structural shift in the global economy. If these pressures persist simultaneously, policymakers may be forced to maintain higher interest rates for longer, even at the cost of slower growth, making the path back to price stability significantly more difficult than markets currently expect.

With information from Reuters.

A well-known Russian city, Nizhny Novgorod, is incredibly famous for its place on the energy map as the location for the largest energy production and refinery for both local consumption and for exports to Europe. But the energy history has suddenly changed in early July 2026, primarily due to unexpected attacks by Ukrainian drones. The Ukrainian drone attacks, described in official reports, have left an indelible devastating mark on Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsitez (Norsi), considered the largest oil refinery of the Lukoil corporation in Kstovo (Nizhny Novgorod region), and had to suspend its routine refinery operations.

Reuters reported this serious military-related incident on July 3, citing two sources in Russia’s oil industry. According to The Moscow Times, a reputable foreign media outlet, the drone attack damaged the plant’s main primary processing unit, AVT-6, which provided 53% of the Norsi refinery’s capacity. Another unit, AVT-5, which accounts for 25% of the plant’s capacity, was disabled by a drone on June 24. As of July 2, Norsi (Russia’s fourth largest oil refinery and the second largest gasoline producer) stopped selling wholesale quantities of gasoline and diesel fuel on the St. Petersburg Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange.

As The Moscow Times reports, Norsi, which has an annual capacity to process 15 million tons of oil and produce 5 million tons of gasoline, became the fifth Russian refinery to halt production since the beginning of June. Gazprom Neft’s Moscow refinery ceased refining on June 16, with repairs, according to Reuters sources, potentially lasting until 2027. Tatneft’s Taneco refinery in Nizhnekamsk has been idled since June 12; the Kuibyshev refinery, since June 10; and the Volgograd refinery, since June 1.

Moreover, the authorities of the aggressor country will likely be unable to increase the capacity of Russian oil refineries damaged by BP-LA strikes in the coming month, local Russian media Kommersant reported. According to its source, refining volumes in July will “at best” remain at June levels, and only if there are no further attacks at the refineries.

Ukrainian Defense Forces attacked the Kstovo oil refinery on May 18 and 20, 2026. As a result of the repeated attacks, the AVT-6 primary oil refining unit was damaged, after which the refinery suspended operations.

On July 2, Sergei Sternenko, advisor to Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, reported that drones had again attacked the Kstovsky refinery of Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez, and a major fire had broken out at the plant. Later that same day, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine confirmed that the strike on the Kstovsky Oil Refinery was carried out by the Defense Forces, as a result of which the AVT-6 primary oil refinery unit was damaged. Ukrainian officers noted that this oil refinery is one of the largest in Russia and has a design capacity of about 17 million tons of oil per year.

Reports also circulated this early July that Russia has turned to fuel imports from India after Ukrainian strikes disrupted its refineries, a rare reversal for one of the world’s biggest fuel exporters that could bring African oil giants into focus if Moscow widens its search for alternative suppliers. The reports further indicated Russia to likely seek imports from Belarus, with which it has a strategic partnership, and both formed the Russia-Belarus Union. Moscow and Minsk have been working together productively in all areas, coordinating their efforts in countering external threats and coordinating challenges through various institutions of the Russia-Belarus Union.

But for African oil producers, such as Algeria, Angola, Libya, Nigeria, and Egypt, Russia’s fuel crisis could open a new window for countries with active refineries, as global markets seek more secure supplies after US-Iran tensions and disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz reshaped fuel trade. That possibility has gained attention because Russia is now turning to foreign imports to ease domestic shortages.

Meanwhile, Russia has not traditionally depended on African crude oil, but its worsening fuel shortages could make Africa’s oil producers and refiners more strategically important as Moscow seeks supply through direct purchases or alternative refinery routes, while sanctions pressure complicates access to Venezuela and Iranian oil networks.

India is the fourth-largest oil refiner in the world. Indian Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Hardeep Singh Puri said at a press conference held on July 2 that India was ready to support Russia with oil and gas supply. “We could potentially supply fuel to Russia if needed,” the minister said, explaining it depends on how the situation develops. 

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak told TASS that Russia had sufficient fuel reserves to supply the domestic market, but the stir around the situation with gasoline had led to a demand increase of approximately 20-30%. However, he added, “the system’s logistics connections are currently being restructured to meet needs,” and this will take some time. He also stated that he could restrict exporting diesel to manufacturers “to further fill the domestic market.”

As Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated on June 30, if Russia can reach cost-effective deals to import fuel, that could help stabilize the market. However, Peskov added that the Kremlin will not disclose which countries it is in contact with regarding possible fuel imports.

In the meantime, Russia has taken a few steps to control the situation. The government has already reduced the mandatory sales of gasoline on the exchange trading from 15% to 10% of the volume. The Kremlin’s presidential decree has been signed, aimed at stabilizing the domestic petroleum product market. Interfax sources explained that the gasoline volumes freed up by the measure would be used to supply agricultural producers and socially significant consumers. While Russia makes no request for fuel from Kazakhstan, Orenburg processing plants are receiving 28% of usual gas from Kazakhstan. In addition, Bashkortostan’s oil refineries are boosting output, owing to unprecedented emergency demand of fuel, and this is stabilizing the situational challenge.

Ukrainian drones have attacked many cities, including Tver, Tula, Smolensk, Kaluga, Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Rostov, Krasnodar, and Moscow regions, as well as the republic of Crimea and the Sea of Azov and the Black Seas.

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz has restored the flow of oil and natural gas after more than 100 days of disruption, but the crisis has already left a lasting mark on global energy markets. The prolonged closure exposed the vulnerability of the world’s energy supply chain and has prompted governments to reconsider how they secure fuel supplies.

Analysts say the crisis mirrors the impact of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which transformed global energy policy by encouraging conservation, diversification, and strategic stockpiling. While today’s energy system proved more resilient, the Hormuz disruption may accelerate a broader shift away from fossil fuels.

What Happened?

The Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies normally pass, remained effectively closed for more than three months during the US Israeli conflict with Iran.

Despite the disruption, global markets avoided a severe supply crisis through rapid rerouting of cargoes, the release of strategic reserves, reduced Chinese imports, and shifting demand patterns.

However, analysts say these emergency measures were only temporary. Energy inventories fell sharply during the crisis, and markets were approaching a critical point before shipping resumed.

Why the Crisis Matters

The Hormuz disruption demonstrated that even today’s highly interconnected global energy system remains vulnerable to geopolitical conflict.

Unlike previous crises, the world avoided a complete energy collapse because governments, traders, and shipping companies quickly adapted. Nevertheless, the episode exposed the limits of those emergency responses and reinforced concerns about overreliance on a single strategic chokepoint.

The crisis is expected to influence long term energy investment decisions far beyond the Middle East.

Lessons From the 1973 Oil Embargo

The 1973 Arab oil embargo fundamentally changed global energy policy after oil producing nations restricted exports to countries supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

The embargo caused oil prices to surge, triggering inflation and prompting governments to adopt fuel efficiency standards, develop domestic oil production, establish strategic petroleum reserves, and create the International Energy Agency.

Rather than ending fossil fuel use, the crisis encouraged countries to consume energy more efficiently while reducing dependence on imported oil.

A New Energy Strategy Emerges

The Hormuz crisis appears to be driving another major strategic shift, particularly across Asia.

Countries heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil and gas are increasingly prioritizing energy security over low fuel costs. Governments are expected to expand strategic petroleum reserves while accelerating investment in domestic renewable energy, nuclear power, and alternative fuel sources.

India, Pakistan, Japan, and South Korea are among the countries reviewing long term strategies aimed at reducing exposure to overseas energy disruptions.

Europe Continues Its Energy Transition

Europe entered the Hormuz crisis after already reshaping its energy system following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The loss of Russian energy supplies forced European countries to cut gas consumption, diversify imports, and rapidly expand renewable energy capacity.

The latest Middle East disruption is expected to reinforce that trend by encouraging further investment in clean energy and energy efficiency while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Investment Trends Support the Shift

Global investment patterns already suggest that energy markets are evolving.

According to the International Energy Agency, worldwide energy investment is projected to reach 3.4 trillion dollars this year, with much of the growth directed toward renewable energy, electricity infrastructure, battery storage, and grid resilience rather than new oil production.

Electric vehicle sales continue to rise rapidly across Europe, Latin America, and Asia Pacific, while Chinese solar panel exports have surged across Africa and Southeast Asia.

Governments are also increasing spending on energy efficiency, with around 20 countries introducing new conservation measures directly in response to the Hormuz crisis.

Why It Matters

The Hormuz crisis has reinforced that energy security is becoming just as important as energy affordability.

Rather than relying solely on global oil markets, governments are increasingly pursuing diversified energy systems that combine fossil fuels with renewables, nuclear power, strategic reserves, and domestic production.

This transition is expected to influence investment, industrial policy, and international trade for years to come.

Future Outlook

Oil and natural gas are expected to remain central to the global economy for decades, particularly in transportation, manufacturing, aviation, and power generation.

However, future growth in fossil fuel demand may become significantly slower as governments invest more heavily in renewable energy, electric vehicles, battery storage, and efficiency improvements.

The Hormuz crisis may ultimately be remembered not as the event that ended the oil era, but as the moment many countries accelerated preparations for a more diversified energy future.

Implications

The Hormuz crisis is likely to have consequences that extend far beyond the immediate recovery in oil and gas flows. Governments that experienced supply disruptions are expected to place greater emphasis on energy security, even if it comes at a higher economic cost. This could accelerate the expansion of strategic petroleum reserves, diversify import sources, and increase investment in domestic energy production, including renewables, nuclear power, and critical energy infrastructure.

For oil exporters in the Gulf, the crisis may strengthen the case for developing alternative export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz, reducing dependence on a single maritime chokepoint. Import dependent economies, particularly across Asia, are also likely to rethink long term procurement strategies by securing more flexible supply contracts and expanding storage capacity.

Financial markets are also expected to assign a higher geopolitical risk premium to energy prices. Even after shipping has resumed, investors may continue to price in the possibility of future disruptions, increasing volatility across oil, gas, shipping, and insurance markets. The crisis could also accelerate capital flows into technologies that reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels, including electric vehicles, battery storage, hydrogen, and energy efficiency.

Analysis

The Hormuz crisis may ultimately prove more significant for what it revealed than for the physical disruption it caused. Although global energy markets demonstrated remarkable resilience, that resilience depended on temporary measures such as drawing down inventories, rerouting cargoes, reducing consumption, and relying on spare production capacity. These mechanisms bought time rather than solving the underlying vulnerability of the global energy system.

Unlike the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which primarily forced consuming nations to improve efficiency while expanding fossil fuel production elsewhere, today’s crisis occurred at a time when commercially competitive alternatives to oil and gas already exist. Renewable energy, electric vehicles, battery storage, and advanced power grids have matured into viable strategic assets rather than purely environmental investments. As a result, governments are increasingly viewing clean energy not only as a climate policy but also as a national security priority.

Another important distinction is the shift in investment behavior. Historically, supply disruptions often encouraged greater investment in oil exploration and production. Following the Hormuz crisis, however, a growing share of capital is moving toward energy diversification instead of simply increasing fossil fuel output. This suggests policymakers increasingly see reducing oil dependence as a more sustainable way to improve resilience than expanding strategic reserves alone.

The crisis also exposed a structural imbalance in global energy markets. While production remains concentrated in politically sensitive regions, demand growth is increasingly centered in Asia, leaving major importers highly exposed to geopolitical instability. Countries such as India, Pakistan, Japan, and South Korea may therefore pursue parallel strategies of securing diversified hydrocarbon supplies while rapidly expanding domestic renewable generation, nuclear power, and energy storage.

Perhaps the most important takeaway is that energy security has overtaken cost as the dominant driver of policy decisions. For decades, governments largely optimized their energy systems for affordability and efficiency. The Hormuz disruption demonstrated that the cheapest energy source can quickly become the most expensive if geopolitical events interrupt supply. That realization is likely to reshape government policy, corporate investment, and global energy trade for years to come.

The crisis does not signal the immediate end of the oil era. Oil and natural gas will remain indispensable for transportation, petrochemicals, aviation, heavy industry, and electricity generation in many regions. However, it may represent an inflection point where the trajectory of fossil fuel demand begins to flatten as countries systematically reduce their strategic dependence on imported hydrocarbons. In that sense, the Hormuz crisis could be remembered less as an energy supply shock and more as the catalyst that accelerated the next phase of the global energy transition.

With information from Reuters.

The disruption caused by the Iran war and the temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz has prompted countries around the world to reconsider their energy security strategies. Governments that suffered economic damage from supply shortages and soaring prices are now looking to build larger strategic oil and gas reserves, potentially creating demand for hundreds of millions of additional barrels over the coming years.

Hormuz Crisis Exposed Energy Vulnerabilities

The near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted around one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies for more than three months, sending shockwaves through energy markets.

Brent crude prices surged to nearly $120 a barrel as import-dependent economies faced rising fuel costs, supply uncertainty and growing inflationary pressures.

Emergency Reserves Helped Stabilize Markets

One of the key factors preventing a deeper energy crisis was the release of strategic petroleum reserves.

All 32 members of the International Energy Agency agreed to a record release of 400 million barrels from emergency stockpiles, helping offset supply disruptions and ease pressure on global markets.

The coordinated action highlighted the importance of maintaining large emergency reserves during major geopolitical crises.

China’s Stockpile Strategy Pays Off

China emerged from the crisis in a stronger position than many other major importers due to its massive strategic petroleum reserve.

The country has spent years building what is believed to be the world’s largest emergency oil stockpile, estimated at more than one billion barrels.

During the conflict, China significantly reduced crude imports, allowing it to avoid buying large volumes of oil at elevated prices and limiting the economic impact of the disruption.

Import-Dependent Economies Face Greater Pressure

Countries with limited strategic reserves faced much greater challenges.

Several Asian economies relied on emergency measures such as:

• Fuel subsidies
• Consumption restrictions
• Reduced working hours
• Energy-saving programs

The experience exposed vulnerabilities among countries heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies without substantial emergency stockpiles.

India Eyes Larger Strategic Reserves

India is among the countries most likely to expand its emergency storage capacity.

As the world’s third-largest oil importer and one of the fastest-growing energy consumers, India currently holds reserves covering only a small fraction of its import needs.

Meeting International Energy Agency standards would require hundreds of millions of additional barrels of storage capacity.

Recent plans under consideration suggest New Delhi is moving toward expanding its strategic petroleum reserve network.

Pakistan Also Reviewing Energy Security

Pakistan, which relied heavily on Middle Eastern oil and LNG imports before the conflict, is also examining ways to increase domestic storage capacity.

The Hormuz disruption underscored the risks facing countries that lack sufficient reserves to absorb prolonged supply interruptions.

Australia Moves to Address Reserve Gap

Australia, long criticized for failing to meet International Energy Agency stockpile requirements, has announced plans to significantly increase fuel reserves.

The move reflects a broader recognition that energy security has become a national security issue amid growing geopolitical uncertainty.

Europe Considers Additional Gas Storage

Europe already maintains extensive gas storage infrastructure to manage winter demand.

However, the war has renewed concerns about dependence on imported LNG, particularly as the region increasingly relies on overseas suppliers.

Additional government-controlled gas storage facilities may become part of future energy security planning.

Gulf Producers Seek Overseas Storage

The lessons of the Hormuz disruption are also influencing major energy exporters.

National oil companies in the Gulf are exploring opportunities to expand storage capacity outside the region to maintain export flexibility during future crises.

Additional overseas storage could help producers continue serving customers even if regional shipping routes face disruptions.

Oil Market Impact

The expansion of strategic reserves worldwide could create substantial new demand for crude oil and refined products.

At the same time, emergency reserves that were depleted during the conflict will need to be replenished.

Together, reserve rebuilding and new storage programs could generate demand for roughly one billion barrels over the coming years, providing support for global oil prices even if overall supply growth remains strong.

What It Means for Global Energy Security

The Hormuz crisis has reinforced a lesson many governments learned during previous energy shocks: supply security can be just as important as supply availability.

Countries are increasingly viewing strategic reserves not as emergency assets to be used rarely, but as a core component of economic and national security planning. The crisis has also demonstrated how large stockpiles can provide governments with flexibility to reduce imports during periods of market stress and extreme prices.

Analysis

The most significant consequence of the Iran war may not be the temporary spike in oil prices but the long-term shift in how countries manage energy security. The conflict exposed a clear divide between nations with large strategic reserves and those forced to absorb the full impact of supply disruptions. China emerged as a model for energy resilience, while countries such as India and Pakistan were reminded of their vulnerability to geopolitical shocks.

If governments follow through on plans to expand storage capacity, the global oil market could gain a major new source of structural demand. Reserve construction and replenishment may help absorb future supply surpluses and provide a floor for prices, particularly during periods of weak economic growth.

At the same time, larger strategic stockpiles could make future oil shocks less severe. Countries with substantial reserves are better positioned to reduce imports during crises, dampening demand spikes and limiting extreme price volatility. In the longer term, the world could emerge from the Hormuz crisis with a more resilient energy system, but one in which strategic stockpiles play a much larger role in shaping oil demand, trade flows and government policy.

With information from Reuters.

Authors: Kung Chan and Yang Xite*

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent state visit to China, which was his first foreign trip of 2026, is a clear indication of the shifting dynamics of the bilateral relationship. Accompanied by an unprecedented delegation of 39 high-ranking officials, including five deputy prime ministers, eight ministers, the central bank governor, and energy executives, the scale resembled a partial cabinet relocation. This massive mobilization reflects Moscow’s urgency to secure an agreement on the Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline, a strategic super-project stalled in commercial negotiations since 2012. Planned to span over 2,600 kilometers with an annual capacity of 50 billion cubic meters, the pipeline would traverse Mongolia to link Russian fields with Chinese markets. For Russia, finalizing this energy artery is an economic imperative to replace the European market, where Western sanctions aim to eliminate Russian pipeline gas imports by the end of 2027.

Evaluating the geopolitics of this energy relationship requires analyzing five distinct strategic dimensions.

First, Beijing has strong incentives to resist quick concessions. The negotiation deadlock is largely on pricing. Russia reportedly seeks approximately US$ 265 per thousand cubic meters to cover the high extraction and infrastructure costs of its Yamal fields in Western Siberia, whereas China targets roughly US$ 120. Unlike Russia, China commands significant leverage, boasting robust domestic pipeline networks, stable Central Asian infrastructure, and diverse liquefied natural gas imports. Given Russia’s acute financial pressure and diminishing options due to sanctions after the war in Ukraine, Beijing has the luxury of strategic patience, allowing it to wait for terms that align with market principles rather than rushing a deal under political pressure.

Second, the pipeline is less about energy revenue for Moscow and more about maintaining global geopolitical relevance. In the current international order, Russia finds itself sidelined from primary great-power management. Consequently, Putin seeks to leverage the Ukraine conflict to engage Washington while simultaneously trying to bind Russia’s economic future to China, much like it previously did with Europe. This anxiety within the China-United States-Russia triangular relationship was highlighted by the timing of the visit, which occurred just days after the U.S. President Donald Trump departed Beijing. As the war enters its fifth year and energy weaponization loses its potency in the West, shifting exports eastward has transformed from a strategic choice into a necessity for regime survival. By proposing a 30-year, multibillion-dollar pipeline network, Moscow hopes to anchor itself to the world’s largest energy consumer, ensuring it remains an indispensable player rather than a marginalized resource base.

Third, the proposed pipeline route serves as a geopolitical lever within the post-Soviet space. Passing through Mongolia, the route allows Russia to entrench its influence over Ulaanbaatar, which has recently deepened its engagement with the United States and NATO, while monitoring China’s northern energy ingress. This alignment requires Beijing to pay substantial transit fees and leaves its energy security vulnerable to the political stability of a third country. For Moscow, the project simultaneously secures the Chinese market and reinforces its traditional sphere of influence across Central Asia and Mongolia, using infrastructure to manage the economic and diplomatic trajectories of neighboring states.

Fourth, the protracted timeline works in Beijing’s favor. The longer negotiations stall, the more China’s bargaining position strengthens against an increasingly isolated Russia. While Moscow faces a liquidity crisis within its National Wealth Fund and the fiscal drain of a prolonged war, China’s energy diversification has progressed rapidly. Construction on Line D of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline is advancing alongside commitments from Turkmenistan, while maritime LNG capacity expanded by over 10 million tons recently with imports from Qatar, Australia, and the United States. Furthermore, China’s domestic shale gas production and global leadership in renewable energy insulation provide a structural ceiling on long-term natural gas demand. Middle Eastern instability in the Strait of Hormuz elevates the short-term value of overland corridors, but it ultimately reinforces Beijing’s commitment to resilience rather than a singular dependence on Moscow.

Fifth, China’s optimal energy architecture centers on the Southern Corridor, specifically what can be called the “Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan (TUT) Corridor” framework. This network offers a direct alternative that circumvents Russian territory, extending through Xinjiang and across the Caspian Sea toward Azerbaijan and Europe. Lines A, B, and C of the Central Asia-China pipeline are already operational, and the completion of Line D will raise total capacity to 65 billion cubic meters annually. This infrastructure is backed by deepening diplomatic ties. Beijing and Dushanbe codified their strategic partnership via a friendship treaty, and China’s trade volume with the five Central Asian republics surpassed US$ 100 billion, cementing its status as their primary trading partner. A fully integrated Central Asian energy network directly erodes Russia’s traditional influence in its southern flank, creating a new economic center of gravity.

Ultimately, while Putin’s high-profile delegation sought to secure a vital economic lifeline, the unresolved pipeline agreement exposes the cold calculation of national interests underlying the partnership. For Beijing, maintaining a deliberate pace maximizes its buyers’ advantage and allows alternative supply chains to mature. The true key to Eurasian energy security lies not in a single northern pipeline, but in a diversified, networked western corridor that mitigates risk and ensures supply chain autonomy, a structural reality that will shape the continent’s geopolitical architecture for decades.

*Yang Xite, a Research Fellow at ANBOUND.

Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said international partners are urging the country to increase oil exports as concerns grow over disruptions to energy supplies linked to tensions around the Strait of Hormuz.

According to Akkenzhenov, buyers are seeking the maximum possible increase in Kazakh oil shipments due to uncertainty surrounding one of the world’s most important energy transit routes. However, he noted that Kazakhstan faces infrastructure and production constraints that limit how quickly exports can be expanded.

To support higher output, Kazakhstan has postponed planned maintenance work at the Kashagan Oil Field until 2027. The country is also considering increasing crude shipments through the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan Pipeline, potentially raising volumes from 1.5 million tons to 2.2 million tons annually and beyond.

The development comes as global energy markets remain sensitive to geopolitical tensions involving Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, a key route for international oil and gas exports.

Why It Matters

Kazakhstan’s growing importance highlights how global energy markets are seeking alternative supply sources amid rising geopolitical risks in the Middle East.

Any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz could affect a significant share of global oil shipments, prompting importers to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on vulnerable routes. Kazakhstan, one of the world’s major oil producers, is increasingly viewed as a reliable alternative supplier.

The decision to delay maintenance at Kashagan signals that Kazakhstan is prioritizing production stability and export capacity at a time when energy security has become a major concern for consuming nations.

The move could also strengthen Kazakhstan’s strategic position in global energy markets, giving it greater influence as countries seek dependable suppliers outside conflict affected regions.

Key Stakeholders

• Kazakhstan – Seeking to expand exports while balancing OPEC+ commitments.
• Yerlan Akkenzhenov – Overseeing the country’s energy strategy.
• Kashagan Oil Field – One of the world’s largest oil fields and a key source of future production growth.
• OPEC+ members monitoring compliance with production agreements.
• Energy importing countries seeking alternative crude supplies.
• Oil traders and global energy markets responding to supply risks.
• Countries along the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan Pipeline route that facilitate exports to international markets.

Future Outlook

Kazakhstan is likely to face increasing pressure from international buyers if instability around the Strait of Hormuz persists. While production constraints may limit immediate gains, the postponement of Kashagan maintenance suggests authorities are positioning the country to maximize output over the coming years.

The expansion of exports through the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan pipeline could become increasingly important as energy consumers seek routes that bypass geopolitical hotspots. This would further enhance Kazakhstan’s role in global energy diversification efforts.

However, Kazakhstan must also balance market demand with its commitments under the OPEC+ framework. Any significant increase in production could attract scrutiny from fellow producers seeking to maintain supply discipline and price stability.

If Middle East tensions remain elevated, Kazakhstan is likely to emerge as one of the key beneficiaries of the global search for secure and reliable oil supplies.

With information from Reuters.

Oil shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz have quietly increased in recent weeks, but traders say the movement reflects a fragmented and opaque energy market rather than a full recovery in global supply flows.

More than four months into the ongoing conflict involving Iran, tanker traffic remains heavily disrupted, with shipping patterns increasingly shaped by risk, secrecy and shifting political arrangements.

Tanker Traffic Shows Limited but Rising Movement

Shipping data suggests that only a small number of tankers are currently crossing the Strait of Hormuz compared with pre conflict levels.

Monitoring firms including LSEG and Kpler estimate that an average of just a few vessels per day are now passing through the strait, far below normal volumes.

Despite this, analysis of oil stored on tankers in the Gulf indicates that outflows have gradually increased, suggesting more crude is leaving the region than official shipping visibility shows.

Hidden Shipping Patterns and “Dark” Tankers

A growing share of tankers are reportedly turning off tracking systems during transit through the strait, a practice known as going dark.

This involves disabling Automatic Identification System signals, making it harder to track vessel movements in real time.

According to shipping analytics firms such as Vortexa, a large majority of outbound tankers recently used this method, reflecting rising caution among operators.

This has made it significantly harder for markets to accurately assess global supply flows and has increased uncertainty in oil pricing.

Oil Stored on Tankers Shows Gradual Decline

One key indicator of market movement is the volume of oil stored on ships inside the Gulf, often referred to as oil on water.

Estimates from Kpler suggest that volumes have fallen from a peak of around 184 million barrels in March to roughly 148 million barrels more recently.

This decline indicates that more oil is gradually leaving the region, even if it is not fully visible through standard tracking systems.

Analysts estimate that outflows have increased over recent weeks, suggesting a slow and uneven recovery in shipping activity.

Security Risks Continue to Disrupt Shipping

The ongoing conflict involving Iran has significantly disrupted maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important oil transit routes.

Limited access to the strait has forced producers to reduce output in some cases, while storage constraints have added pressure to supply chains across the Gulf.

Some shipping routes are reportedly being managed through informal arrangements or alternative corridors, while others rely on higher risk transit strategies to avoid detection or confrontation.

Recovery Remains Uncertain

Despite signs of increased movement, analysts warn that the situation is far from a return to normal.

A sustained recovery in oil flows would require consistent shipping access, stable security conditions and sufficient tanker availability to support exports.

Many shipowners remain reluctant to operate in the region due to elevated insurance costs and the risk of vessels being stranded or targeted.

Long Term Structural Change Possible

Industry observers warn that even if diplomatic progress leads to a formal reopening of the strait, the global oil market may not return to previous conditions.

There is growing discussion that Iran could attempt to impose tolls or control systems on shipping through the waterway, which would fundamentally alter global energy logistics.

Such a scenario could force Gulf producers to seek alternative export routes or invest in new infrastructure to reduce dependence on the strait.

Analysis: Market Stability Replaced by Managed Uncertainty

The situation in the Strait of Hormuz highlights a shift from predictable global energy flows to a more fragmented and opaque system.

While oil continues to move out of the Gulf, the lack of transparency in shipping routes is creating uncertainty for traders and pricing benchmarks.

The increased use of stealth navigation and alternative transit arrangements reflects a market adapting to geopolitical risk rather than resolving it.

As long as tensions persist, energy markets are likely to remain volatile, with supply visibility as important as supply itself in determining global prices.

Conclusion

Oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz are slowly increasing, but hidden tanker movements and ongoing conflict mean the global energy market remains deeply uncertain. Without stable political conditions and transparent shipping routes, a full recovery in oil flows is unlikely in the near term, keeping traders cautious and markets volatile.

With information from Reuters.

Global markets are navigating two powerful and competing forces: escalating geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and continued investor enthusiasm for artificial intelligence-related stocks. While concerns over renewed conflict between the United States and Iran have boosted oil prices and supported demand for safe-haven assets, the AI-driven technology rally has continued to push stock markets higher, particularly in Asia.

What Happened

Oil prices rose for a third consecutive session on Wednesday after fresh hostilities emerged in the Gulf region. Brent crude climbed 1% to $94.74 per barrel as hopes for a quick resolution to tensions between Washington and Tehran faded.

The U.S. military reported that Iranian missile attacks targeting Bahrain, Kuwait and other regional locations were either intercepted or failed. The developments came after negotiations aimed at ending the conflict between the United States and Iran stalled despite both sides announcing a tentative agreement last week.

Meanwhile, financial markets showed mixed reactions. U.S. stock futures were largely unchanged, while European futures edged lower. In Asia, however, technology shares continued their strong advance, helping stock indexes in Japan and Taiwan reach record highs.

Why Markets Are Reacting to Middle East Risks

Investors had previously expected the United States and Iran to formalize an agreement that would reduce regional tensions and ease concerns about energy supplies. The lack of progress in negotiations has instead revived fears of a prolonged conflict that could disrupt oil shipments from the Gulf, a critical region for global energy markets.

Higher oil prices typically reflect concerns about potential supply disruptions. The latest military developments prompted traders to unwind some of their earlier bets on a diplomatic breakthrough, contributing to the rise in crude prices.

Currency markets also reflected growing caution. The U.S. dollar strengthened against the Japanese yen, briefly touching the closely watched 160 level before retreating amid concerns that Japanese authorities could intervene to support their currency.

AI Stocks Continue to Defy Market Uncertainty

Despite geopolitical concerns, enthusiasm surrounding artificial intelligence remained a major driver of equity markets. Wall Street indexes posted modest gains on Tuesday, supported by technology shares.

Chipmaker Marvell Technology surged more than 32% after Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang described the company as a potential trillion-dollar business. Investor optimism surrounding AI also helped propel SoftBank Group above Toyota Motor Corporation as Japan’s most valuable listed company.

The AI boom has continued to attract investment even as broader markets grapple with geopolitical uncertainty and concerns about interest rates.

What Comes Next

Investors are now closely watching upcoming U.S. economic data, including services sector activity, private payroll figures and Friday’s employment report. Strong labor market data could reinforce expectations that the Federal Reserve will keep interest rates higher for longer or even consider further increases.

Bond markets remained relatively stable, while traders adjusted expectations from potential rate cuts earlier in the year to the possibility of additional rate hikes. Markets have also priced in the likelihood of monetary tightening in Europe and Japan.

At the same time, developments in the Middle East remain a key risk factor. Any further escalation between the United States and Iran could push oil prices higher and increase volatility across global financial markets, while continued strength in AI-related stocks may help support broader equity markets despite geopolitical headwinds.

With information from Reuters.

The Middle East has been a difficult region to deal with in oil markets. When it comes to energy geographies, the region has proven to be a disproportionately significant part of the world’s energy resources, with export facilities traversing a handful of maritime routes and political situations that have been tense, if not outright volatile, at times. The change in 2025 and into 2026 isn’t the nature of the forces but rather the confluence of overlapping pressures: ongoing sanctions enforcement, multiple theaters of conflict, OPEC+ tensions that are more public than ever in previous years, and disruptions to shipping in the Red Sea, which now seem to have become a semi-permanent part of the shipping route landscape.

There is no background information for commodity traders, market analysts, and energy investors. It’s a real-time, constantly evolving dynamic that can make all the difference in the day-to-day performance of prices, and it’s particularly important when prices are sliding around rapidly, and the stories behind them are changing just as fast.

The Behavior of Prices and the Risk of Middle East Supplies

Traders who follow crude oil price live data are the first ones to witness this. Real-time feeds are a reflection of more than just the fundamental supply-demand elements, but the market’s real-time assessment of the value of geopolitical risk and how much it “should” be worth at any given moment. A news event, which is a minor detail in a more stable environment, can cause future prices to move $5 or more in less than an hour. The consistent and tough question – and it is a tough one – is, which events actually have physical supply implications and which ones are sentiment-driven moves that die in a session or two?

The Strait of Hormuz

About 20-21 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products go through the Strait of Hormuz, which is about 20% of the world’s oil consumption. No readily available bypasses can be found that can absorb that flow at a similar cost. There are partial alternatives, including the IPSA pipeline and Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, but they would not even come close to filling the deficit should the Hormuz be closed en masse.

Source

It is a strait between Oman and Iran. Geography makes it so that any serious disruption in U.S.-Iran relations or of security conditions in the Gulf in general puts Hormuz back on the market’s agenda. Traders are all familiar with this: when there is a lot of Iranian tension, the futures positioning will always reflect the chokepoint risk, even if there is no incident per se.

Production Outages That Don’t Make the Front Page

Key Risk Factors Shaping Market Sentiment in 2026

Active Conflict Zones and Exposure to Infrastructure

The Persistent Iranian Supply Question

Infrastructure Concentration Risk

OPEC+ Internal Dynamics

Non-State Actor Activity and Shipping Friction

How the Market Prices Geopolitical Risk

Risk Premium in Practice

Geopolitical risk premiums in times of heightened Middle East tension have varied from around $4 to $10 per barrel, depending on the market participants’ views on the probability of actual physical supply disruptions in the case of Brent crude, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. That’s a fairly broad window for economic trading, and it has a tendency to close up very fast when the tension subsides and without a supply event, which is the more common scenario.

The geopolitical risk premium factors analysts may consider are:

• The nearness to active conflict, producing fields, or the working export terminals.
• Production capacity that would be available to make up for the loss of production elsewhere.
• The availability and magnitude of the IEA’s strategic stockpiles to be tapped.
• Current tanker market conditions and the viability of an alternative route.
• Diplomatic messages sent by governments in the area, including the United States and other great powers
• Past examples of similar events, which have had identifiable supply impacts.

It is not easy to give exact weights to these inputs. Part of the reason for the price action to seemingly be different with comparable geopolitical events can be due to different analysts forming different conclusions from the same events.

Historical Supply Disruptions and Price Responses

The 2025-2026 entry is a more diffuse form of market pressure than those acute events listed above. It is not one particular incident, but rather sanctions enforcement and Iranian volumes kept low and shipping activity in the Red Sea continuing to cause friction in the transport system, which has kept transport costs elevated. The World Economic Outlook from the IMF pointed out that this type of persistent supply constraint is likely to have a longer-lasting impact on medium-term price expectations than acute supply shocks, which markets have historically been able to absorb and turn around in relatively short periods of time. Thus, a slow-burning risk premium can be more ‘sticky’ than a dramatic risk premium.

Broader Market Implications

Strategic Reserve Releases (SRRs) as a Counterweight

Geopolitical Risk Analysis: What It Does and Doesn’t Accomplish

Conclusion

Disclaimer